Suchergebnisse

Eje 1 / Eixo 1; PROCESOS PARTICIPATIVOS PARA LA PRODUCCIÓN SOCIAL DEL HÁBITAT: Experiencias de las Cooperativas de Viviendas / Marcelo Salgado; CONTRIBUIÇÕES DA ARQUITETURA E DO URBANISMO PARA A AÇÃO COMUNITÁRIA E A CIDADANIA: Urgências sociais e emergência sanitária no Jardim Colombo, São Paulo / Maria Amélia Devitte Ferreira D´Azevedo Leite Ester Carro de Oliveira Bashalidis; ERIC KING: TRAZOS DE UNA CONVERGENCIA ENTRE EL ARTE, LA ARQUITECTURA Y LA ENSEÑANZA / Romina Alday; O URBANISMO DAS TRÊS ECOLOGIAS: Utopismo dialético e desenvolvimentos geográficos desiguais / Edison França da Silva Filho Denise Falcão Pessoa; OLHARES PROTAGONISTAS / Constança Maria Lima de Almeida Lucas Leonardo Francisco Mareco Ribeiro; APORTES HACIA EL HÁBITAT DIGNO EN UN SECTOR VILLA 15 CIUDAD OCULTA. Experiencia participativa del equipo académico con vecinos y ong`s en un pasillo s/n con múltiples vulneraciones / Ricardo de Sárraga; A VOZ DO GRAFITE EM UMA SOCIEDADE SILENCIADA: Crime ou Arte? / Breno Lucas Teodósio de Araújo Bruno Dias Ribeiro Giovanna Silveira Cavalcante José Wellington do Nascimento Araújo Marianne Delgado Morimitsu; OS ESTRANHOS: NARRATIVA E MEMÓRIA DA CIDADE / Antonio Busnardo Filho Helena Napoleon Degreas Antonio Soukef Júnior; PERCEPÇÃO DO PEDESTRE EM ROTAS CAMINHÁVEIS COMO REFE-RENCIAL DE IDENTIDADE DO ESPAÇO URBANO DO TATUAPÉ / Sílvia Pereira de Sousa Mendes Vitale Denilsa Aparecida Marques Edvania Delmiro Viana Gabriel Rodrigues dos Santos Milena Rodrigues de Almeida; LA PROBLEMATIZACIÓN Y POLITIZACIÓN DE LA DE VIDA COTIDIANA: Un Camino de Integralidad de los Debates en Materia de Hábitat, Vivienda y ciudad / Eugenia Jaime Gabriela Torrents; COMPARAÇÃO ENTRE AS DIRETRIZES DO PLANO DIRETOR E AS OBRAS REALIZADAS NO MUNICÍPIO DE CÁCERES, MATO GROSSO, Apresentadas no Portal da Transparência entre os Anos de 2016 a 2020 / Willian Jonas Mininel Antonio Busnardo Filho; VIDA URBANA EM TEMPOS DE COVID: A Relação Entre Espaço e Indivíduo / Marcela Correa Eduardo Munhoz de Lima Castro; DENSIDADE URBANA E QUALIDADE DE VIDA: Estudo Estatístico sobre o Índice Númbeo / Alda Paulina dos Santos Lauro Luiz Francisco Filho; GRUPO MIGUILIM: Narração Oral de Literatura e Cidadania / Maria Elisa Pereira de Almeida; CONSIDERAÇÕES SOBRE O PROBLEMA DA POPULAÇÃO EM SITUAÇÃO DE RUA NO BRASIL / Giuliana Lima Oliveira Vera Santana Luz; PROCESSO E PROJETO PARTICIPATIVO PARA O HABITAR DAS MULHERES PODEROSAS /Sofia de Freitas Portugal Liza Maria Souza de Andrade; RESTAURO E REABILITAÇÃO DA GRÁFICA PEPE EM CUIABÁ/MT – uma proposta de Centro de Referência para a Comunidade Lgbt / Daniel Silva Campos Antônio Soukef Jr; A DESIGUALDADE URBANA VISTA PELA TAXA DE LETALIDADE DA COVID-19 NOS BAIRROS DO MUNICÍPIO DO RIO DE JANEIRO / Joana Spadaccini Grangeiro Cláudio Rezende Ribeiro; METODOLOGIAS PARTICIPATIVAS: O Caso Exemplar da "ilha" da Bela Vista/ Porto (2013-2017) / Fernando Matos Rodrigues Manuel Carlos Silva António Cerejeira Fontes André Cerejeira Fontes; CASA ORLANDO: Uma Integração de Patrimônio com a Sustentabilidade / Daniel Silva Campos Victória Ferreira Galvão; PROJETOS CULTURAIS DO PERÍODO VARGAS PARA A AMÉRICA LATINA / Margarida Nepomuceno; INTERVENÇÃO DE PATRIMÔNIO HISTÓRIO: Proposta de reabilitação da casa Orlando em Cuiabá, Mato Grosso / Amanda Botelho Daniel Silva Campos Emily Maira Juliana Bankow Livia Costa; A EXPERIÊNCIA DO COLETIVO CHÁCARA DAS JABOTICABEIRAS Para Preservar a História, a Paisagem, os Valores Sociais e Ambientais de uma Parcela do Território da Vila Mariana em São Paulo / Maria Albertina Jorge Carvalho; VISÕES DE UM BAIRRO PLANEJADO: Estudo do bairro do Marco em Belém/Pará/Brasil / Adriano Lima de Menezes Stélio Saldanha Santa Rosa; Eje 2 / Eixo 2; UNIVERSIDAD, POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS EDUCATIVAS Y EL DERECHO A LA EDUCACIÓN DE LOS JÓVENES: Aportes para (re)pensar estas interacciones / Alejandra Castro Silvia Oliva Andrea Martino Luisina Zanuttini Federico de la Fuente Analía Van Cauteren Belén Franco Florencia Serra Sofía Álvarez; O DIREITO À CIDADE E AS PRÁTICAS DE ENSINO NA FAU MACKENZIE SÃO PAULO – BRASIL / Débora Sanches Viviane Manzione Rubio Volia Regina Kato Angélica Tanus Benatti Alvim; A 100 AÑOS DE REPENSAR LA PRÁCTICA SOCIAL DEL DISEÑO: Talleres Artísticos y Técnicos Superiores (VKHUTEMAS-VKHUTEIN) (1920) / Celso Valdez Vargas Selene Laguna Galindo Genaro Hernández Camacho David Castillo Núñez; ESTRATÉGIAS PARTICIPATIVAS DE OCUPAÇÃO DO ESPAÇO URBANO / Michaela Iwanow Débora Sanches; LA INVESTIGACIÓN: Un Vínculo entre la Docencia y la Extensión / Luz Alejandra Moreno Valeria Mabel Márquez Lourdes Castellanos Hilda Mariela Kanan; O CURSO DE ARQUITETURA E URBANISMO DA UNILA E A INTEGRAÇÃO SOLIDÁRIA DE NUESTRA AMÉRICA / Andréia Moassab; LA TEORÍA Y LA PRAXIS Hermenéutica y Heurística como Vehículos entre los Campos Metodológicos y Epistemológicos de la disciplina Arquitectura / Sergio D. Huaier; O EXERCÍCIO DE PENSAR O LUGAR DO PROJETO EM DIÁLOGO, CONFLITO E PROPOSIÇÃO / Antonio Aparecido Fabiano Junior Lizete Maria Rubano; PENSAR-NOS DESDE EL HACER Reflexiones desde una propuesta académica que nace de la extensión / Equipo docente Taller de Diseño de Cooperativo; UM OLHAR SOBRE O PAPEL DA EXTENSÃO: Universidade e Movimentos Sociais na Luta pelo Direito à Cidade / Danielle de Melo Rocha Fabiano Rocha Diniz; CELEBRAR EL PASADO PARA CONSTRUIR EL FUTURO: A 49 años de Arquitectura-Autogobierno / María de Lourdes García Paola Flores; MARABÁ: UM LABORATÓRIO URBANÍSTICO / Camila Azevedo José Lima; LA INICIACIÓN CIENTÍFICA COMO CAMINO PARA LA INCURSIÓN EN EL CONOCIMIENTO CIENTÍFICO Y TECNOLÓGICO / Miriam Chugar; RELAÇÕES DE PODER NOS AMBIENTES DE APRENDIZADO: Contrapontos Entre o Virtual e o Presencial / Lucimeire Pessoa Helena Ayoub Silva; DINÁMICAS Y SOPORTES PARA EL PROCESO DE DISEÑO PARTICIPATIVO y MULTIESCALAR Experiencias del TLPS en el B° 23 de Diciembre, Cuartel V, Moreno; Herramientas y Procedimientos: Métodos de Nuestras Prácticas / Mariana Guido Fabián Leguizamon Andrea Cabrera Gabriela Bandieri; A TRAJETÓRIA RECENTE DOS CURSOS DE ARQUITETURA E URBANISMO NO BRASIL: Privatização da educação, reconversão docente e desvalorização da força de trabalho / Maria Ribeiro Calil Cláudio Rezende Ribeiro; PROCESOS EDUCATIVOS Y PRÁCTICAS DE ENSEÑANZA - Aprendizaje para acompañar desde saberes disciplinares: Procesos Participativos, Interdisciplinarios, Progresivos e Intersectoriales en la Producción Social del Hábitat / Beatriz Pedro; PROJETO PARTICIPATIVO NOVA KANTUTA: Aliança entre Extensão Universitária e População Local para Requalificação da Praça Kantuta / Ana Carolina de Paula Bezerra Ana Carolina G. Liess Katarina Andreosi A. B. Arantes Taymara Ingrid Leonardi Alexander Soyei Yamaguti; PARANAPIACABA: OLHARES DE UMA EXPERIÊNCIA ETNOGRÁFICA / Elaine M. Albuquerque Enrico Spaggiari Mariana Hangai Rodrigo V. Chiquetto Yuri Bassichetto Tambucci; DE LA NECESIDAD A LA ORGANIZACIÓN. Procesos colectivos de elaboración y apropiación de herramientas y metodologías participativas / Camila Alvarez Gabriela Bandieri Noelia Bronstein Gabriela Cuesta Lorena Fernandez Beatriz Pedro Andrea Sucari; ARQUITETURA DA CIDADE E SUSTENTABILIDADE: Perspectivas curriculares da formação de arquitetos e urbanistas em Campos dos Goytacazes/RJ / Raiza de Oliveira Machado Cássia Maria de Assis Rangel Melo Sergio Rafael Cortes de Oliveira; ARQUITECTURA Y URBANISMO Y SU ENSEÑANZA, DEBATE Y PARTICIPACIÓN Argentina, México y Brasil: de los años 1970 a la Actualidad / Beatriz Pedro Maria de Lourdes Garcia Vázquez Nora Lanfri Sylvia Adriana Dobry; EXTENSÃO UNIVERSITÁRIA: O HABITAR COMO DIREITO HUMANO. O caso do Mercado de Flores da Vila Alpina e da Praça Alcides Franco de Lima. São Paulo. Brasil / Luís Felipe Xavier; O DISCURSO ENTRE A DIDÁTICA E O ENSINO NO CURSO DE ARQUITETURA E URBANISMO: A Experiência dos Movimentos Disciplinares Tradicionais e Não Convencionais na Introdução e Formação Acadêmica dos Estudantes nas Universidades Privadas / Ricardo Mingareli Del Valle Marcelo Hamilton Sbarra; RED UNIVERSITARIA LATINOAMERICANA DE CATEDRAS DE VIVIENDA. 27 años de articulación en red de experiencias formativas en la actuación profesional en la producción y la gestión social del hábitat / Beatriz Pedro; INTERDISCIPLINARIDADE E FORMAÇÃO PEDAGÓGICA: Literatura e Ciências Humanas / Eulina Pacheco Lutfi Nidia Nacib Pontuschka, in memoria; ABRIL PRA COR: Pensar com as Cores no Ensino de Arquitetura e Design / Karine Queiroz; UNA EXPERIENCIA DE CURRICULARIZACIÓN DE LA EXTENSIÓN. Para la Formación Universitaria en Tiempos de Pandemia / Silvana Lorena Lagoria María Pilar Martínez Nora Lanfri; Eje 3 / Eixo 3; DEBATES TEMPRANOS DEL MOVIMIENTO ESTUDIANTIL DE ARQUITECTURA y su Circulación por Latinoamérica - 1956 a 1964 / Maria Eugenia Durante; ARQUITETURA FAZ MAL À SAÚDE: Como o curso de arquitetura e urbanismo pode ser prejudicial à saúde mental de seus estudantes / Laura Esther Mágero Dourado Liza Maria Souza de Andrade Vânia Raquel Teles Loureiro Ana Luiza Aureliano Silva; ESCRITÓRIO MODELO DE ARQUITETURA E URBANISMO – Na Construção de Espaços Educacionais Participativos / Guilherme Fernandes de Morais Mariah Vitória Silva Pereira Mariana Evelyn de Souza Inada Vanessa Acquaviva Carrano; OS PROGRAMAS DE ASSISTÊNCIA ESTUDANTIL E A EQUIDADE DE ENSINO Na Faculdade de Arquitetura e Urbanismo da Universidade de Brasilia / Suenne Gomes Cardoso Thaylla Santos Damasceno Liza Maria Souza de Andrade Ana Luiza Aureliano Silva; PORTAL CELESTE: Mulher, Movimento de Moradia e o Espaço Público / Aline Araújo dos S. de Lima Victória Fernandes Vicente Débora Sanches; TERRITÓRIO, AMBIENTE E IDENTIDADE: A importância de Fundamentos de América Latina na formação discente no CAU UNILA / Andreia Moassab Ana Silvia Fonseca; ALGUNOS DOCUMENTOS HISTÓRICOS Y ANTECEDENTES / ALGUNS DOCUMENTOS HISTÓRICOS E ANTECEDENTES; Puesta en marcha del Taller Total; Documento de cierre del Taller Total; MESA REDONDA: a 30 años de la creación del Taller Total; Presentación del Profesor Titular arquitecto Juan José BARI; Cartas al rector en 2013; De Arquimedes A. FEDERICO; De Sylvia A. DOBRY. ; El libro se ordena en tres ejes que discurren sobre los temas centrales del Taller Total, tan vigentes cuando se gestaron y tan necesarios en nuestro tiempo actual: hábitat, participación y construcción de ciudadanía; la formación del profesional y su compromiso con los problemas de la región, el rol del estudiante en su formación profesional y ciudadana. Cabe preguntarnos ¿Cuáles son los valores que hacen del Taller Total una experiencia transitada que se revisa a sí misma, se retroalimenta y se proyecta hacia el futuro? ¿Cuántas otras experiencias pedagógicas, actividades de extensión universitaria, de ésta y otras facultades de arquitectura se ven reflejadas en estos valores? La construcción pedagógica del trabajo del Taller Total, la relación fortalecida docentes- alumnos, la enseñanza interdisciplinar, el compromiso social con los temas de época, son valores que trascienden y se proyectan hasta nuestros días. La cantidad de artículos y autores de las más de cincuenta ponencias que se presentan en esta compilación, recrean estos valores en distintos ámbitos académicos y experiencias con la sociedad. Durante el ciclo académico 2020/2021, la mayor parte de las universidades del mundo, por la situación de pandemia, debieron migrar a formato virtual. Nuestra Facultad se adaptó transformando los espacios de taller presenciales en aulas virtuales. Así como el Taller Total fue un momento de fuerte reflexión y una oportunidad de transformación de los procesos pedagógicos y vínculos universidad sociedad, así también este nuevo escenario nos plantea un fuerte desafío: trabajar sobre las oportunidades que nos dará en el futuro una enseñanza mixturada — presencial y virtual— que fortalezca la relación con el medio social, profesional y productivo. Transitemos la esperanza…Que podemos ser mejores de lo que somos como sociedad y que para serlo es necesario apoyarnos en la comunidad, la creación colectiva, el conocimiento y la ciencia. La universidad es la institución que mejor reúne esos valores. ; Fil: Lanfri, Nora Zoila. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Arquitectura, Urbanismo y Diseño; Argentina. ; Fil: Dobry, Sylvia Adriana. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Arquitectura, Urbanismo y Diseño; Argentina. ; Fil: Martínez, Mónica Susana. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Arquitectura, Urbanismo y Diseño; Argentina. ; Fil: Salgado, Marcelo. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Arquitectura, Urbanismo y Diseño; Argentina.

Background: In 2013, an estimated 2.8 million newborns died and 2.7 million were stillborn. A much greater number suffer from long term impairment associated with preterm birth, intrauterine growth restriction, congenital anomalies, and perinatal or infectious causes. With the approaching deadline for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2015, there was a need to set the new research priorities on newborns and stillbirth with a focus not only on survival but also on health, growth and development. We therefore carried out a systematic exercise to set newborn health research priorities for 2013–2025. Methods: We used adapted Child Health and Nutrition Research Initiative (CHNRI) methods for this prioritization exercise. We identified and approached the 200 most productive researchers and 400 program experts, and 132 of them submitted research questions online. These were collated into a set of 205 research questions, sent for scoring to the 600 identified experts, and were assessed and scored by 91 experts. Results: Nine out of top ten identified priorities were in the domain of research on improving delivery of known interventions, with simplified neonatal resuscitation program and clinical algorithms and improved skills of community health workers leading the list. The top 10 priorities in the domain of development were led by ideas on improved Kangaroo Mother Care at community level, how to improve the accuracy of diagnosis by community health workers, and perinatal audits. The 10 leading priorities for discovery research focused on stable surfactant with novel modes of administration for preterm babies, ability to diagnose fetal distress and novel tocolytic agents to delay or stop preterm labour. Conclusion: These findings will assist both donors and researchers in supporting and conducting research to close the knowledge gaps for reducing neonatal mortality, morbidity and long term impairment. WHO, SNL and other partners will work to generate interest among key national stakeholders, governments, NGOs, and research institutes in these priorities, while encouraging research funders to support them. We will track research funding, relevant requests for proposals and trial registers to monitor if the priorities identified by this exercise are being addressed ; publishedVersion

BackgroundIn 2013, an estimated 2.8 million newborns died and 2.7 million were stillborn. A much greater number suffer from long term impairment associated with preterm birth, intrauterine growth restriction, congenital anomalies, and perinatal or infectious causes. With the approaching deadline for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2015, there was a need to set the new research priorities on newborns and stillbirth with a focus not only on survival but also on health, growth and development. We therefore carried out a systematic exercise to set newborn health research priorities for 2013-2025.MethodsWe used adapted Child Health and Nutrition Research Initiative (CHNRI) methods for this prioritization exercise. We identified and approached the 200 most productive researchers and 400 program experts, and 132 of them submitted research questions online. These were collated into a set of 205 research questions, sent for scoring to the 600 identified experts, and were assessed and scored by 91 experts.ResultsNine out of top ten identified priorities were in the domain of research on improving delivery of known interventions, with simplified neonatal resuscitation program and clinical algorithms and improved skills of community health workers leading the list. The top 10 priorities in the domain of development were led by ideas on improved Kangaroo Mother Care at community level, how to improve the accuracy of diagnosis by community health workers, and perinatal audits. The 10 leading priorities for discovery research focused on stable surfactant with novel modes of administration for preterm babies, ability to diagnose fetal distress and novel tocolytic agents to delay or stop preterm labour.ConclusionThese findings will assist both donors and researchers in supporting and conducting research to close the knowledge gaps for reducing neonatal mortality, morbidity and long term impairment. WHO, SNL and other partners will work to generate interest among key national stakeholders, governments, NGOs, and research institutes in these priorities, while encouraging research funders to support them. We will track research funding, relevant requests for proposals and trial registers to monitor if the priorities identified by this exercise are being addressed.

In 2013, an estimated 2.8 million newborns died and 2.7 million were stillborn. A much greater number suffer from long term impairment associated with preterm birth, intrauterine growth restriction, congenital anomalies, and perinatal or infectious causes. With the approaching deadline for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2015, there was a need to set the new research priorities on newborns and stillbirth with a focus not only on survival but also on health, growth and development. We therefore carried out a systematic exercise to set newborn health research priorities for 2013-2025. We used adapted Child Health and Nutrition Research Initiative (CHNRI) methods for this prioritization exercise. We identified and approached the 200 most productive researchers and 400 program experts, and 132 of them submitted research questions online. These were collated into a set of 205 research questions, sent for scoring to the 600 identified experts, and were assessed and scored by 91 experts. Nine out of top ten identified priorities were in the domain of research on improving delivery of known interventions, with simplified neonatal resuscitation program and clinical algorithms and improved skills of community health workers leading the list. The top 10 priorities in the domain of development were led by ideas on improved Kangaroo Mother Care at community level, how to improve the accuracy of diagnosis by community health workers, and perinatal audits. The 10 leading priorities for discovery research focused on stable surfactant with novel modes of administration for preterm babies, ability to diagnose fetal distress and novel tocolytic agents to delay or stop preterm labour. These findings will assist both donors and researchers in supporting and conducting research to close the knowledge gaps for reducing neonatal mortality, morbidity and long term impairment. WHO, SNL and other partners will work to generate interest among key national stakeholders, governments, NGOs, and research institutes in these priorities, while encouraging research funders to support them. We will track research funding, relevant requests for proposals and trial registers to monitor if the priorities identified by this exercise are being addressed.

We present the temperature and polarization angular power spectra of the CMB measured by the Atacama Cosmology Telescope (ACT) from 5400 deg(2) of the 2013-2016 survey, which covers >15000 deg(2) at 98 and 150 GHz. For this analysis we adopt a blinding strategy to help avoid confirmation bias and, related to this, show numerous checks for systematic error done before unblinding. Using the likelihood for the cosmological analysis we constrain secondary sources of anisotropy and foreground emission, and derive a "CMB-only" spectrum that extends to l = 4000. At large angular scales, foreground emission at 150 GHz is similar to 1% of TT and EE within our selected regions and consistent with that found by Planck. Using the same likelihood, we obtain the cosmological parameters for Lambda CDM for the ACT data alone with a prior on the optical depth of tau = 0.065 +/- 0.015. Lambda CDM is a good fit. The best-fit model has a reduced chi(2) of 1.07 (PTE = 0.07) with H-0 = 67.9 +/- 1.5 km/s/Mpc. We show that the lensing BB signal is consistent with Lambda CDM and limit the celestial EB polarization angle to psi(P) = 0.07 degrees +/- 0.09 degrees. We directly cross correlate ACT with Planck and observe generally good agreement but with some discrepancies in TE. All data on which this analysis is based will be publicly released. ; National Science Foundation (NSF) AST0408698 AST-0965625 AST-1440226 PHY0355328 PHY-0855887 PHY-1214379 Princeton University University of Pennsylvania Canada Foundation for Innovation CFI under the Compute Canada Government of Ontario Ontario Research Fund \ Research Excellence University of Toronto Simons Foundation National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) NNX13AE56G NNX14AB58G National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST) - USA Cornell Presidential Postdoctoral Fellowship Comision Nacional de Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnologica (CONICYT) BASAL CATA AFB-170002 National Science Foundation (NSF) AST-1814971 AST1454881 AST-1513618 AST-1907657 AST-1910021 National Research Foundation - South Africa STFC Ernest Rutherford Fellowship ST/M004856/2 STFC Consolidated Grant ST/S00033X/1 Horizon 2020 ERC Starting Grant 849169 Dicke Fellowship Mishrahi and Wilkinson funds CIfAR's Gravity & the Extreme Universe Program CGIAR Dunlap Institute

Funding Information: This work was conducted in part using the resources of the Advanced Computing Center for Research and Education at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN. KS, BL, CH were supported by the National Institutes of Health under award numbers R01EB017230, and T32EB001628, and in part by ViSE/VICTR VR3029 and the National Center for Research Resources, Grant UL1 RR024975-01. This work was also possible thanks to the support of the Institutional Research Chair in NeuroInformatics of Université de Sherbrooke, NSERC and Compute Canada (MD, FR). MP received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 754462. The Wisconsin group acknowledges the support from a core grant to the Waisman Center from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (IDDRC U54 HD090256). NSF OAC-1916518, NSF IIS-1912270, NSF IIS-1636893, NSF BCS-1734853, NIH NIBIB 1R01EB029272-01, and a Microsoft Faculty Fellowship to F.P. LF acknowledges the support of the Cluster of Excellence Matters of Activity. Image Space Material funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany´s Excellence Strategy – EXC 2025. SW is supported by a Medical Research Council PhD Studentship UK [MR/N013913/1]. The Nottingham group's processing was performed using the University of Nottingham's Augusta HPC service and the Precision Imaging Beacon Cluster. JPA, MA and SMS acknowledges the support of FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia within CINTESIS, R&D Unit (reference UID/IC/4255/2013). MM was funded by the Wellcome Trust through a Sir Henry Wellcome Postdoctoral Fellowship [213722/Z/18/Z]. EJC-R is supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF, Ambizione grant PZ00P2 185814/1). CMWT is supported by a Sir Henry Wellcome Fellowship (215944/Z/19/Z) and a Veni grant from the Dutch Research Council (NWO) (17331). FC acknowledges the support of the National Health and Medical Research Council ofAustralia (APP1091593 and APP1117724) and the Australian Research Council (DP170101815). NSF OAC-1916518, NSF IIS-1912270, NSF IIS-1636893, NSF BCS-1734853, Microsoft Faculty Fellowship to F.P. D.B. was partially supported by NIH NIMH T32-MH103213 to William Hetrick (Indiana University). CL is partly supported by NIH grants P41 EB027061 and P30 NS076408 "Institutional Center Cores for Advanced Neuroimaging. JYMY received positional funding from the Royal Children's Hospital Foundation (RCH 1000). JYMY, JC, and CEK acknowledge the support of the Royal Children's Hospital Foundation, Murdoch Children's Research Institute, The University of Melbourne Department of Paediatrics, and the Victorian Government's Operational Infrastructure Support Program. C-HY is grateful to the Ministry of Science and Technology of Taiwan (MOST 109-2222-E-182-001-MY3) for the support. LC acknowledges support from CONACYT and UNAM. ARM acknowledges support from CONACYT. LJO, YR, and FZ were supported by NIH P41EB015902 and R01MH119222. AJG was supported by P41EB015898. NM was supported by R01MH119222, K24MH116366, and R01MH111917. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement No. 785907 & 945539 (HBP SGA2 & SGA3), and from the ANR IFOPASUBA- 19-CE45-0022-01. PG, CR, NL and AV were partially supported by ANID-Basal FB0008 and ANID-FONDECYT 1190701 grants. We would like to acknowledge John C Gore, Hiromasa Takemura, Anastasia Yendiki, and Riccardo Galbusera for their helplful suggestions regarding the analysis, figures, and discussions. Funding Information: This work was conducted in part using the resources of the Advanced Computing Center for Research and Education at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN. KS, BL, CH were supported by the National Institutes of Health under award numbers R01EB017230, and T32EB001628, and in part by ViSE/VICTR VR3029 and the National Center for Research Resources, Grant UL1 RR024975-01. This work was also possible thanks to the support of the Institutional Research Chair in NeuroInformatics of Universit? de Sherbrooke, NSERC and Compute Canada (MD, FR). MP received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sk?odowska-Curie grant agreement No 754462. The Wisconsin group acknowledges the support from a core grant to the Waisman Center from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (IDDRC U54 HD090256). NSF OAC-1916518, NSF IIS-1912270, NSF IIS-1636893, NSF BCS-1734853, NIH NIBIB 1R01EB029272-01, and a Microsoft Faculty Fellowship to F.P. LF acknowledges the support of the Cluster of Excellence Matters of Activity. Image Space Material funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany?s Excellence Strategy ? EXC 2025. SW is supported by a Medical Research Council PhD Studentship UK [MR/N013913/1]. The Nottingham group's processing was performed using the University of Nottingham's Augusta HPC service and the Precision Imaging Beacon Cluster. JPA, MA and SMS acknowledges the support of FCT - Funda??o para a Ci?ncia e a Tecnologia within CINTESIS, R&D Unit (reference UID/IC/4255/2013). MM was funded by the Wellcome Trust through a Sir Henry Wellcome Postdoctoral Fellowship [213722/Z/18/Z]. EJC-R is supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF, Ambizione grant PZ00P2 185814/1). CMWT is supported by a Sir Henry Wellcome Fellowship (215944/Z/19/Z) and a Veni grant from the Dutch Research Council (NWO) (17331). FC acknowledges the support of the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia (APP1091593 and APP1117724) and the Australian Research Council (DP170101815). NSF OAC-1916518, NSF IIS-1912270, NSF IIS-1636893, NSF BCS-1734853, Microsoft Faculty Fellowship to F.P. D.B. was partially supported by NIH NIMH T32-MH103213 to William Hetrick (Indiana University). CL is partly supported by NIH grants P41 EB027061 and P30 NS076408 ?Institutional Center Cores for Advanced Neuroimaging. JYMY received positional funding from the Royal Children's Hospital Foundation (RCH 1000). JYMY, JC, and CEK acknowledge the support of the Royal Children's Hospital Foundation, Murdoch Children's Research Institute, The University of Melbourne Department of Paediatrics, and the Victorian Government's Operational Infrastructure Support Program. C-HY is grateful to the Ministry of Science and Technology of Taiwan (MOST 109-2222-E-182-001-MY3) for the support. LC acknowledges support from CONACYT and UNAM. ARM acknowledges support from CONACYT. LJO, YR, and FZ were supported by NIH P41EB015902 and R01MH119222. AJG was supported by P41EB015898. NM was supported by R01MH119222, K24MH116366, and R01MH111917. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement No. 785907 & 945539 (HBP SGA2 & SGA3), and from the ANR IFOPASUBA- 19-CE45-0022-01. PG, CR, NL and AV were partially supported by ANID-Basal FB0008 and ANID-FONDECYT 1190701 grants. We would like to acknowledge John C Gore, Hiromasa Takemura, Anastasia Yendiki, and Riccardo Galbusera for their helplful suggestions regarding the analysis, figures, and discussions. Publisher Copyright: © 2021 ; White matter bundle segmentation using diffusion MRI fiber tractography has become the method of choice to identify white matter fiber pathways in vivo in human brains. However, like other analyses of complex data, there is considerable variability in segmentation protocols and techniques. This can result in different reconstructions of the same intended white matter pathways, which directly affects tractography results, quantification, and interpretation. In this study, we aim to evaluate and quantify the variability that arises from different protocols for bundle segmentation. Through an open call to users of fiber tractography, including anatomists, clinicians, and algorithm developers, 42 independent teams were given processed sets of human whole-brain streamlines and asked to segment 14 white matter fascicles on six subjects. In total, we received 57 different bundle segmentation protocols, which enabled detailed volume-based and streamline-based analyses of agreement and disagreement among protocols foreach fiber pathway. Results show that even when given the exact same sets of underlying streamlines, the variability across protocols for bundle segmentation is greater than all other sources of variability in the virtual dissection process, including variability within protocols and variability across subjects. In order to foster the use of tractography bundle dissection in routine clinical settings, and as a fundamental analytical tool, future endeavors must aim to resolve and reduce this heterogeneity. Although external validation is needed to verify the anatomical accuracy of bundle dissections, reducing heterogeneity is a step towards reproducible research and may be achieved through the use of standard nomenclature and definitions of white matter bundles and well-chosen constraints and decisions in the dissection process. ; Peer reviewed

In the present essay, I will examine the traces of coexistence between the Muslim and Christian world in architecture and literature, using the examples of the mezquita, or 'mosque', and the most important novel of Spain, Don Quixote of la Mancha (1605;1615) by Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra. This study incorporates an interdisciplinary approach that utilizes historical, literary, and architectural methods to explain the dual function of the margin— its architectural function in the Mosque and its narrative function as used in specific chapters from Cervantes's novel. Furthermore, I will show how the architectural margin of the wall of the mosque was familiar to Cervantes's readers who lived in Spain and this familiarity allows Cervantes to exploit the metaphorical meaning of the literary margin as architectural margin. A metaphor establishes an equivalency between a pair of images; the best-known example of which belongs to Ezra Pound, the founding leader of Imagism (1912-1923). This is a school of poetry that endorsed clarity of expression and simplicity through the use of precise visual imagery. The best known metaphor is Pound's own, in which faces are compared with petals in the poem, "In a Station of the Metro": The apparition of these faces in the crowd: Petals on a wet, black bough. Through his architectural and literary metaphor, Cervantes covertly expresses his personal beliefs about multiculturalism that could not be directly expressed for fear of censorship by the Inquisition. ; Winner of the 2020 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the Senior Arts/Humanities category. ; In the Margins of Literary and Architectural Discourse: A Comparison of Arabic Commentary in Cervantes's Don Quixote and Moorish Architectural Inscription Pablo Picasso: Don Quixote, August 10, 1955. Internet: Public Domain Alexandra Parent SP 415: Seminar on Don Quixote Professor Stallings-Ward 28 February 2020 1 Introduction The history of the Iberian Peninsula is a rich one, filled with influences from the entire European and Asian continents over time. When we think about Spain, there is one defining factor that distinguishes her from the rest of Europe: the presence of racial, ethnic and religious influence from Africa, and, resulting therefrom, a unique moment in world history: the confluence of three major world religions in one geographical place. Christianity, Judaism, and Islam once flourished side by side in mutual tolerance and economic interdependence in the Andalusian region of southern Spain, known as 'Al-Andalus,' in the High Middle Ages. Tolerance of others who are different, as Maria Rosa Menocal points out, is the underpinning of this unique historical coincidence and the essential component for the development of science, philosophy, medicine, urbanization, and hence trade and commercial prosperity.1 The Jews and Christians of Muslim Andalusia flourished economically and culturally under the Umayyad, whose dynasty (661-750) was transplanted from Damascus to Cordoba by Abd al-Rahman (756- 1031) after a civil war between two rival Caliphates. These three religions borrowed language and architecture from one another leaving traces of their coexistence, not surprisingly, within the architecture and literature of Spain. In the present essay, I will examine the traces of coexistence between the Muslim and Christian world in architecture and literature, using the examples of the mezquita, or 'mosque', and the most important novel of Spain, Don Quixote of la Mancha (1605;1615) by Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra. This study incorporates an interdisciplinary approach that utilizes historical, literary, and architectural methods to explain the dual function of the margin— its architectural function in the Mosque and its narrative function as used in specific chapters from Cervantes's 1 Menocal, The Ornament of the World. 2 novel. Furthermore, I will show how the architectural margin of the wall of the mosque was familiar to Cervantes's readers who lived in Spain and this familiarity allows Cervantes to exploit the metaphorical meaning of the literary margin as architectural margin. A metaphor establishes an equivalency between a pair of images; the best-known example of which belongs to Ezra Pound, the founding leader of Imagism (1912-1923). This is a school of poetry that endorsed clarity of expression and simplicity through the use of precise visual imagery. The best- known metaphor is Pound's own, in which faces are compared with petals in the poem, "In a Station of the Metro": The apparition of these faces in the crowd: Petals on a wet, black bough.2 Through his architectural and literary metaphor, Cervantes covertly expresses his personal beliefs about multiculturalism that could not be directly expressed for fear of censorship by the Inquisition. My essay is divided in three sections. In the first section, I will present a historical overview of Muslim presence in the Iberian Peninsula. In the second section, I present a survey of Muslim Architecture in Andalusia based on the results of a photographic study of architecture I did while visiting Spain during study abroad. I survey the presence of Muslim architecture found throughout Andalusia, placing particular emphasis on the function of the margin in the design of the walls of the mosque reserved for the calligraphy that features citations of scripture from the Holy Koran. The margin, although small in size compared to the rest of the entire structure of the mosque, is as I will show, actually the most important part of the mosque. In the third section of my essay, I analyze the literary margin treated in the episode of the lost manuscript in Volume I: Chapters Eight and Nine of Cervantes's Don Quixote. I will look at 2 Judith Stallings-Ward, Gerardo Diego´s Creation Myth of Music: Fábula de Equis y Zeda. London: Routledge, 2020, 175. 3 the coexistence of the Christian and Arab writers in Cervantes's Don Quixote. The collaboration between Cervantes and Cide Hamete Benengeli allows Cervantes to establish a metaphor between the architectural margin of the mosque and the literary margin of the manuscript as the place for covertly expressing his esteem for multiculturalism and his condemnation of the expulsion of the Moors by national decree; a ploy he uses to escape censorship by the Inquisition. The play with spatial perspective (margin vs center) and the severance of the manuscript (with the lost section recovered in the market of Toledo) establishes the architectural and narrative metaphor that recalls the physical and cultural coexistence between Muslims and Christians valued by Cervantes. In addition, I examine how Cervantes extends this metaphor to also evoke the rupture of that coexistence through expulsion of the Moors, which Cervantes believed broke the backbone of the country. Part I: Historical Overview of Muslim Presence in the Iberian Peninsula The invasion of the Iberian Peninsula began with one young man named Abd Al- Rahman, the son of the Arab family ruling Damascus in the east—the Umayyads. However, during a civil war, his family was massacred, and his escape left him the sole survivor. He fled through North Africa into Cordoba where he began to establish himself as the Caliph, or ruler.3 After the Visigoth monarchy fell, Muslim control dominated the Iberian Peninsula. From 711 through 1492, Islamic society had a long and profound presence on shaping Spanish culture until the Christian kings unified the country. By 716, almost all of Iberia, with the exception of the far northwest and mountainous regions, was under Muslim control and the province was name 'Al- Andalus'. By naming the country in this manner, it directly opposes the 'Hispania' title that the 3 BBC Worldwide Learning, The Moorish South: Art in Muslim and Christian Spain from 711-1492. 4 Romans gave the peninsula, foreshadowing the enmity between the religions of Islam and Christianity.4 Abd Al-Rahman sought to recreate his cultural roots here in Iberia. The peninsula was dominated by the Umayyad dynasty, who had no affiliation to the eastern Muslim dynasties at the time, and were met with little to no resistance from the small groups of Christians still living in the peninsula. As demonstrated in Figure 1, the conquering forces came through Northern Africa and thus were also comprised of Berber forces from that region. By 741, there were approximately 12,000 Berber forces, 18,000 Arabs, and 7,000 Syrians entering through the Southern tip of the peninsula. This totaled anywhere from 4,000,000 to 8,000,000 living in the Iberian Peninsula at the time.5 6 Islam and Christianity under Islamic Rule By the mid eighth century, the population of Iberia had grown exponentially and became more diverse both racially and religiously. Although Muslim forces had conquered what remained of the Visigoth territories and established themselves as the dominant, ruling power, a 4 O'Callaghan, A History of Medieval Spain, 91. 5 Phillips and Phillips, A Concise History of Spain. 6 Alchetron.com. "Umayyad Conquest of Hispania - Alchetron, the Free Social Encyclopedia," August 18, 2017. https://alchetron.com/Umayyad-conquest-of-Hispania. Figure 1: Depiction of the route of Abd-Al Rahman and the subsequent conquests of the Muslim Empire. From Internet: public domain.6 5 majority of the population living in Iberia was still Christian. This undoubtedly posed issues for the Moorish rulers who practiced Islam. As a result, conversion became a necessity for Christians. It is important to distinguish between the upper and lower class when discussing the notion of conversion. Many Visigoth royalty, nobles, and influential families saw it in their best interest to convert and to do what they could to join the new rulers in an effort to pursue political advantages.7 Yet, the majority of Iberia was home to lower class Hispano-Roman Christians who converted out of survival. Despite this, many of the people in this situation retained their Christian faith while adopting Muslim customs like learning Arabic so as to appease the rulers. The name given to these people are mozárabes, or 'Mozarabs', meaning 'Muslim-like'.8 A Christian writer noted the following about Christians living under Islamic rule in 854: Our Christian young men, with their elegant airs and fluent speech, are showy in their dress and carriage, and are famed for the learning of the gentiles; intoxicated with Arab eloquence they greedily handle, eagerly devour, and zealously discuss the books of the Chaldeans (i.e. Muhammadans), and make them known by praising them with every flourish of rhetoric, knowing nothing of the beauty of the Church's literature, and looking down with contempt on the streams of the Church that flow forth from Paradise ; alas ! The Christians are so ignorant of their own law, the Latins pay so little attention to their own language, that in the whole Christian flock there is hardly one man in a thousand who can write a letter to inquire after a friend's health intelligibly, while you may find a countless rabble of kinds of them who can learnedly roll out the grandiloquent periods of the Chaldean tongue. They can even make poems, every line ending with the same letter, which displays high flights of beauty and more skill in handling metre than the gentiles themselves possess.9 It is evident from this passage that the Christians admired the Arabs for the type of civilization they created. The Mozarabs recognized that the Arabs had something to offer them in terms of literature, character, and even language. This demonstrates that on some level, there was an 7 Phillips and Phillips, A Concise History of Spain. 8 Phillips and Phillips. 9 Alvar, Indiculus luminosus; quoted from Arnold, The Preaching of Islam; A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith, 137-138. 6 acceptance of Muslim culture and practices which set the foundation for the incorporation of Islamic architectural styles and writing styles to be continued after the Christians' reconquering of Iberia. Christian Kingdoms and "La Reconquista" When the Muslim forces conquered Iberia, they were not able to infiltrate the regions in the north. These regions were not seen as an apparent threat because they were isolated, poor, and not heavily populated, so the Moors did not make a vigilant effort to convert or control these Christians.10 However, the Christian states organized themselves into kingdoms and solidified their control in northern Spain by the mid-twelfth century before moving into Southern Spain during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The progression of the Christian kingdoms' conquests can be seen in Figure 2. 11 At the height of the reconquest, there were seven individual Christian kingdoms within the peninsula: Asturias, Galicia, Aragon, Navarre, Leon, Castile, and Valencia. Each of these kingdoms had their own struggles trying to gain territory, power, and recognition. The Kingdom 10 Phillips and Phillips, A Concise History of Spain, 55. 11 "Reconquista+General.Jpg (1600×914)." Accessed February 19, 2020. http://4.bp.blogspot.com/- ofiGywz891k/TzynBPnsc7I/AAAAAAAAAok/ECNzH3rSp3E/s1600/Reconquista+General.jpg. Figure 2: Timeline of the Christian King's Reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula. Internet: public domain.11 7 of Navarre was largely under the control of the French to the north and did not have much to do with the conquering of other Spanish Christian kingdoms, let alone taking a stance on combating the Arab south. However, not only were the Christian kings working to overthrow the Islamic caliphate and reconquer Iberia from the Muslims, they were all vying for control amongst themselves. In the tenth century, Alfonso III expanded into the regions of Galicia and Leon slowly gaining more territory and strengthening his Christian kingdom to combat the Moors. The kingdoms of Castile and Leon unified in 1085 and then under the kingship of Alfonso VI, they conquered Toledo.12 Toledo is situated where the Moorish Al-Andalus and the Christian kingdoms of Castile and Leon border each other, so the conquering of Toledo was a push in the right direction for the Christian kings' ultimate goal of expelling the Moors from Spain. In the northeast, Alfonso I of Aragon began consolidating his power and conquered Zaragoza by 1134, and joined with Barcelona in 1137 to form the Kingdom of Aragon. By this point, the Muslim empire was facing many issues in trying to run their territories and were slowly losing their sphere of power in the south. King Fernando III of Castile was able to penetrate Al-Andalus and conquer the Andalusian cities of Cordoba and Seville in the mid-thirteenth century. So, when the two kingdoms of Aragon and Castile prevailed over their Christian counterparts, they were left with only the Emirate of Granada as their last steppingstone to banish Muslim rule from the peninsula. King Fernando II of Aragon and Queen Isabella of Castile married in 1469 and this consolidated the royal authority of Spain.13 In January of 1492, the city of Granada fell to the Spanish forces and this ended the 780 years of Muslim control in the Iberian Peninsula. This was the final act of La Reconquista and the beginning of the age of Los Reyes Católicos or 'The Catholic Kings.' King Ferdinand and Queen 12 Phillips and Phillips, 306. 13 Phillips and Phillips, 116. 8 Isabela ruled into the first few years of the sixteenth century, which is marked as the beginning of the Spanish Inquisition—a judicial institution that was used to combat heresy in Spain. Islam and Christianity under Christian Rule Islam first began to submit to Christian rule during the period when the Christian kingdoms were all building up their states and conquering each other in the eleventh century. When Toledo was captured in 1085, allowing the Muslims to stay was crucial to the economic stability and the intellectual advancement of Christian society.14 With the expulsion of the Moors came the expulsion of their religion and began the institution of Christianity, more specifically Catholicism. The immediate issue that the church saw after the reconquest of Spanish cities was the need to introduce their ecclesiastical structure, so they began to assign bishops to these major cities in addition to creating two new ecclesiastical provinces.15 This rapid organization and dispersion of the Catholic religion in previously Islamic territories was not good news for those Muslims still living in Spain after the reconquest. The Christians could not simply expel the Muslims because in some places they made up the majority of the population and were an integral part of the economy for the country.16 Muslims who continued to live under Christian ruler adopted the name mudéjares or 'mudejars' in English. This name is derived from the Arabic word mudajan meaning 'permitted to remain' with a colloquial implication of 'tamed or domesticated.'17 Ironically, the same way the minorities were treated under Islamic rule, to include Christians, was now how the Muslims were treated under Christian rule. The Mudejars would practice their religion, law, and customs in addition to being permitted to continue their 14 Watt, A History of Islamic Spain, 150. 15 O'Callaghan, A History of Medieval Spain, 488. 16 Watt, A History of Islamic Spain, 151. 17 Watt, 151. 9 craft so long as they paid a tax. It was not uncommon for these minority groups to distinguish themselves by dressing differently and even inhabiting different quarters of town. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a period known as the Mudejar age, it is evident that there is a culture common to both Christians and Muslims, and that coexistence, to the point of assimilation, was possible. However, it is important to note that the Christians, being the dominant power, were selective in what they chose to assimilate. The most evident piece demonstrating assimilation is the artistic productions, both architecturally and literarily. It was obvious that incorporating the Muslims into society was necessary and beneficial, but towards the end of the fifteenth century, economic disparages were becoming obvious and the Mudejars were the wealthier of the two groups. This jealousy and animosity led to a growing prejudice of Mudejars and once Ferdinand and Isabella unified the peninsula, they turned this prejudice into policy. The previous flirtation of religious tolerance was coming to an end, but due to the policy written for the surrender of Granada, many people of Islamic faith were briefly safe in 1492, so these religiously intolerant policies attacked other groups, namely the Jewish factions of the country. This period of brutal intolerance is known as the Inquisition, and it drastically influenced Spanish society for the years to follow, to include Miguel de Cervantes's Don Quixote of La Mancha. Part II: Survey of Muslim Architecture in Andalusia Moorish architecture is something that when one sees it, they know it. It is a mixture of oriental and occidental to create a recognizable and unique form of architecture. There are certain staple architectural features that help make this style so well-known and are also the features that other cultures adopt simply because of their beauty. Some of these features include 10 stone parapets with Islamic crenellations, horseshoe windows and doors, towers sometimes evoking a minaret, domes, arches, slender pillars, and many of these features were typically constructed with alternating colors of yellow and red brick and stone.18 The following figures demonstrate these architectural features. 18 Kalmar, "Moorish Style: Orientalism, the Jews, and Synagogue Architecture," 73. Figure 4 (above): The series of arches and horshoe shaped doors. Taken by Alexandra Parent in the Royal Alcazar in Seville, Spain. January 31, 2018. Figure 5 (below): The classic Islamic crennelations and attention to detail that characterizes all of Islamic architecture. This is also exemplatory of the domes that were utilized in Moorish architecture. Taken by Alexandra Parent at the Royal Alcazar in Seville, Spain. January 31, 2018. Figure 3: The slender pillars and open courtyards. Taken by Alexandra Parent at the Alhambra in Granada, Spain. February 23, 2018. Figure 6: The Torre del Oro or Tower of Gold located in Seville, Spain. Exemplifies the use of towers and minarets in Islamic architecture. Taken by Alexandra Parent in Seville, Spain. April 12, 2018. 11 19 These features are apparent throughout all the everyday buildings within the cities of Al- Andalus, but they also came together to make great, exceptional buildings. One in particular is the Great Mosque in Cordoba. This was built when the religion of Islam was only a century old, so it is renowned as one of the first mosques ever built. This mosque is truly grandeur in architectural style in addition to sheer size. In Islamic faith, it is forbidden to depict Allah, or any religious figure, so the traditional methods of using a painting to inspire religious awe was not possible, thus allowing for architecture to take its place. As seen in Figure 7, the rows of archways are seemingly never ending and absolutely uniform. 20 The architectural margin of the mosque (Fig 8 and Fig 10.D), which Cervantes metaphorizes with the annotation of Dulcinea written on the margin in Don Quixote, refers to the most important part of the mosque: the inscriptions. In the Islamic religion, as aforementioned, worshipping any idols or to depict Allah, Muhammad, or any other important religious figures 20 "The Mosque-Cathedral of Cordoba (Spain)." Accessed February 19, 2020. https://www.turismodecordoba.org/the-mosque-cathedral-of-cordoba-spain. Figure 7: The Great Mosque located in Cordoba, Spain. Known for the uniformity and neverending archways and pillars. From Internet: public domain.20 12 through paintings are prohibited. So, the role of the inscriptions becomes the most important and revered part of the mosque much like the depiction of Jesus on the cross is worshipped by Christians. This is because the inscriptions are the holy words of the Koran. The phrase most 21commonly inscribed in these architectural margins are 'only Allah is victorious.' The metaphor Cervantes makes between the architectural and literary margin is developed to a second degree with the handwriting in the margin of the manuscript being Arabic calligraphy. This can be compared to the inscriptions in the architectural margin of the mosques, which are also written in Arabic calligraphy. This type of writing is very distinct from Western modes of writing because the purpose of Arabic calligraphy is "no como un medio utilitario de 21 Fernando Aznar, La Alhambra y el Generalife de Granada. Monumentos, 12. Figure 10: Architecture of the Mosque21 (from left to right and top to bottom): A) ataurique B) interlacing decoration C) calligraphy in the margin of the wall with scripture "Only Allah is Victorious". Also shown in Fig 11. D) horseshoe arc E) muqarnas F) half horseshoe arcs G) arc with muqarnas H) column with crowned capital Figure 8 (above): The horsehoe shaped windows and use of alternating colors and very detailed crennelations. The Arabic calligraphy can be seen above the windows. Taken by Alexandra Parent at the Alhambra in Granada, Spain. February 23, 2018. Figure 9 (above): Fig 8 on a closer scale to better see the calligraphy 13 comunicación entre los hombres sino como un medio sagrado de comunicación entre Dios y los hombres," meaning, it is not like a utilitarian means of communication between humans, but rather a sacred means of communication between God and men.22 This type of calligraphy that Arabs place in the margins of their mosques obviously have religious value and is called caligrafía cúfica or 'Kufic calligraphy' as is shown in Figure 11. 23 The text written in Arabic calligraphy in the margin of the wall of the mosque is epigrafía. It is present in all mosques and throughout the royal palace known as La Alhambra in Granada. As Fernando Aznar explains, "El texto tiene gran importancia en la decoración. Frases que ensalzan a Alá, o que hace referencia a las bellezas del lugar donde se encuentra, ditando a veces a los constructores de cada zona, se reparten por todos los muros de la residencia real."24This quote says that text has great importance in the decoration of the buildings, and that the phrases that praise Allah, or that refers to the beauties of the place where Allah is located, are all throughout the royal palace. It amplifies the important role that language has in religious symbols. 22 "La Caligrafía Árabe." 23 "Arabic Inscription." Alamy. Accessed February 24, 2020. https://www.alamy.com/stock-photo-arabic-inscription- carved-in-a-palace-wall-of-the-alhambra-in-granada-17181753.html. 24 Fernando Aznar, La Alhambra y el Generalife de Granada. Monumentos, 12. Figure 11: An example of Kufic calligraphy. The style of the Arabic writing in this image is classically used in Islamic mosques to state the word of Allah from the Holy Koran. This is the architectural margin. From Internet: public domain.23 14 Moorish Architectural Influence Under Christian Rule As the Christians slowly began organizing themselves into kingdoms and conquering Moorish cities in Al-Andalus, two incredibly different cultures met each other. As previously stated, an assimilation of sorts was taking place by the Christians who were adopting Islamic practices and other elements of their culture. Architecture was one of these elements that Christian rulers not only preserved, but in some cases built from bottom up utilizing these inherently Moorish styles. Using the example of the Mosque of Cordoba, it is important to note that in the middle of this Islamic prayer hall, there is something unknown to Islam; a Catholic Cathedral (Fig. 12, 13, and 14). This addition was made in the sixteenth century after the Moors were abolished from Iberia. The rulers who erected this cathedral demolished the central columns in order to make room for the Christian edifices, however, Charles V recognized the gravity of this action and how it drastically changed the ambiance and historical significance of this architectural feat. This cultural vandalism by the Christians is symbolic of the enforcement and imposition of their religion onto a different group of people. This theme is also apparent in the literary works of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to include Don Quixote of La Mancha by Miguel de Cervantes. Figure 12: Located in the middle of the Great Mosque of Cordoba. Christian, gothic architecture meeting with Islamic architectural styles. Taken by Alexandra Parent. January 31, 2018. 15 An example of Mudejar work is the Cathedral of Seville, built after the demolition of a mosque, in order to increase the power of the Christian rulers. The architectural style of the building is very European and gothic with high vaulted ceilings and stained glass.25 As a statement piece for Christianity in former Islamic Spain, it is not expected for one to find traces of Moorish architectural influence, but there is. The Cathedral was built by Christian architects, so there was no lack of qualified Christian craftsmen, however there are qualities inherently Moorish that make its way into this grand architectural achievement. As depicted in Figure 15, the high altar in the Cathedral is adorned in so much detail that it mimics the Moorish tendency to not leave any blank space. The incessant ornamental decoration style that was a part of Islamic Spain bled into and permeated traditional Christian and European styles of architecture making its way into the very soul of Christian craftsmanship. Although the Christian Spanish rulers 25 BBC Worldwide Learning, The Moorish South: Art in Muslim and Christian Spain from 711-1492. Figure 13 (right): Christian altar located in the middle of the Great Mosque of Cordoba in Spain. Taken by Alexandra Parent. January 31, 2018. Figure 14 (left): Example of Christianity inserting itself into Muslim architecture. Taken by Alexandra Parent. January 31, 2018. 16 erected this cathedral as a statement to assert their religious dominance, the Moorish aesthetic had already made its way into the minds of the architects of that era. In addition to this, the minaret attached to the Cathedral of Seville, La Giralda (Figure 16), is evidence of this as well. The construction of this minaret concluded in 1568 and is the twin tower to the city of Marrakech. Having begun construction in 1184, La Giralda is host to the visible mixing of Moorish and Christian culture. Through the stonework, inscriptions, and different styles used, La Giralda is evidence of this assimilation of cultural and architectural practices. 26 Perhaps the most notable architectural feat in regard to Moorish influence on Christianity is seen in the Real Alcázar, or Royal Alcazar. At first glance, it is a very distinct Moorish-looking building in terms of architecture; it contains the classic Moorish archways, courtyards, crenellations and pillars (Fig 17 and 18), so it would be reasonable to conclude that it was 26 "Cathedral of Seville. Aerial View." Accessed February 24, 2020. https://seebybike.com/blog/must-see-cathedral-and- alcazar-of-seville/cathedral-of-seville-aerial-view/. Figure 15 (right): The altar located inside the Cathedral of Seville. Known for it's incredulous detail and extravagant style that is suspected to be a result of lingering Moorish influences. Taken by Alexandra Parent. January 31, 2018. Figure 16 (left): An aerial view of the Cathedral of Seville. It includes many influences of Morrish architecture to include the large tower known as La Giralda, the minarets all over the building, and the many domes that make up the cathedral. From Internet: public domain.26 17 constructed under Islamic rule. However, Christian king Peter of Castile, also known as Peter the Cruel, commissioned the Alcazar as his royal palace in the fourteenth century. He made the Alcazar identical to the architectural stylings of the Spanish Middle Ages. So, the question arises as to why a Christian ruler would deliberately choose Islamic decoration? The answer is that it comes down to power. By appropriating the Islamic art and traditional expressions, the Christian ruler projects a sort of authority over the minority subjects.27 The Moorish expressions of wealth and power are understood differently than traditional Europeans, so by creating something that the Muslim population would recognize as powerful, Peter the Cruel wielded a sort of power over the Mudejars. 27 Fernández, "Second Flowering: Art of the Mudejars." Figure 17 (left): The courtyard of the Royal Alcazar. Despite being built by a Christian king, it has many, if not completely full of, influences from Islamic architecture. Note, the pillars, the archways, the courtyard, the crennelations. Taken by Alexandra Parent. January 31, 2018. Figure 18 (right): The Royal Alcazar in Seville, Spain. This wall has both Christian and Islamic influences. Note the differences between the lower floor and the second floor of the archways. The bottom is much more functional and plainer, like traditional Christian architecture whereas the top portions are much more detailed and colorful such as depicted by Islamic architecture. Taken by Alexandra Parent. January 31, 2018. 18 Part III: The Literary Margin Treated in the Episode of the Lost Manuscript in Volume I: Chapters Eight and Nine of Cervantes's Don Quixote When reading Don Quixote, the reader is frequently taken off the main narrative path involving the adventures of the main characters, the knight and his squire Sancho Panza, and led down secondary narratives involving encounters with characters who interrupt the main narration with tales of their own stories of love, captivity, and triumph. The complexity of the narrative shows the novel to be an amalgam of many different short novels, much like the way of the river Amazon, which is fed by many smaller rivers, at the heart of which is Cervantes's parody of books of chivalry. Nevertheless, the one unchanging constant is the way the novel opens a window onto the life and times of the man who wrote it. Cervantes's novel reflects his lived experience rooted in multicultural society whose heterogeneity was the source of Spain's economic and agricultural well-being. Cervantes saw the well-being of his country destroyed by the Hapsburg dynasty's religious intolerance and persecution of minorities who did not convert from their Jewish or Muslim faith. Cervantes himself was of Jewish ancestry. His father was a surgeon, a vocation known to be practiced by Jews. Cryptic references to his Jewish ancestry appear in the portada, or cover page of this novel. For example, the phrase from the book of Job—after darkness light is hoped for—and references to their inability to worship on the Sabbath appear in the first chapter of the novel; a day when the Jewish population must be in duelos and quebrantos, or 'pain and suffering'. While a student, Cervantes was arrested and ordered to have his right hand cut off for allegedly shooting a man who had insulted his sisters. Cervantes escaped punishment by fleeing to Italy from where he joined the Holy League (an alliance among the Vatican, France, and Spain) in the Battle of Lepanto, a major battle against the Turks in the waters of the 19 Mediterranean, during which Cervantes lost the use of his left hand. After his distinguished military service in this major victory against the Turks, Cervantes was taken captive and held prisoner for five years in Algeria. His profound understanding of the Islamic world of the Maghreb, as the northern region of Africa is known, is reflected throughout Don Quixote. Upon return to Spain, he obtained work as a tax collector tasked with gathering funds throughout Andalusia for the construction of the Spanish Armada. His detailed knowledge of the geography and customs of Southern Spain is reflected throughout the novel as well. Cervantes's experiences from his military expedition against the Turks, his years in captivity in northern Africa, his travels through Andalusia, and his Jewish ancestry can be added as another factor that forged the broad multicultural perspectivism formed in his novel. As a student, Cervantes was taught by Lope de Hoyos, a known follower of the Dutch humanist philosopher Erasmus of Rotterdam. Erasmus criticized the empty ritual of the Catholic Church as well as its intolerance for Christians, especially followers of Martin Luther, who sought an unmediated religious relationship with God; one that did not require mediation by a Catholic priest. The teachings of Erasmus, an intellect who denounced the hypocrisy of the Catholic Church and its persecution of minorities and different versions of Christianity, are embraced by Cervantes and find expression in a covert manner in Don Quixote (II: 22-23).28 The episode of the lost manuscript (Volume I:8-9) reflects the perspective of multiculturalism and diversity Cervantes gained from the life experiences outlined above. Chapter eight is first and foremost about Don Quixotes's iconic battle with the windmills, the most well-known episode of the novel. Don Quixote's illusion leads him to believe that the windmills were originally giants that have been transformed into windmills by his enemy, the 28 Judith Stallings-Ward, "Tiny (Erasmian) Dagger or Large Poniard? Metonymy vs. Metaphor in the Cave of Montesinos Episode in Don Quixote." 20 wizard Freston, to cheat Don Quixote from a victory in battle against them. The deception of the knight conveys Cervantes's use of humorous parody to denounce the books of chivalry whose fantasy version of reality has brainwashed Don Quixote. A subsequent adventure in this chapter reveals Don Quixote has another lapse of reason. He believes that a Basque woman travelling to Seville, preceded by two Benedictine friars who are not in her party, and surrounded by her own men on horseback, is a princess being kidnapped. Upon observing once again his master's mind in the grip of delusion, Don Quixote's squire Sancho Panza replies, "This will be worse than the windmills."29 This foreshadows the battle that Don Quixote will ultimately have with the Basque. At the end of Chapter eight, we are left with both men having their swords unsheathed and raised at each other, but then the narration of the story abruptly stops. The narrator, a literary form of Cervantes inserted into the story by the real historical Cervantes, begins to speak directly to the reader as if in an informal conversation with them to convey that the end of the scene and the rest of the history are missing.30 This narrative style continues into Part II, chapter nine when the narrator begins a search for the missing manuscript. In this chapter we are brought to Toledo and the narrator brings the reader through the Alcaná market. The narrator Cervantes tells the story of his journey to find the manuscript in the market and how he comes across a young boy trying to sell him some notebooks, old torn papers, and other small commodities. Cervantes is inclined to pick up a certain book that the boy has and realizes the script on the front is in Arabic. Since he could not read Arabic, he finds a Morisco aljamiado, so called for their ability to speak both Arabic and Spanish, who can help translate the manuscript. It was not difficult to find this person and soon Cervantes flipped to the middle of the book and asked the Morisco to translate. Cervantes points out the availability of translators of 29 Cervantes, Don Quixote, 62. 30 Cervantes, 65. 21 all classic languages in the market, thus underscoring the advantage of multicultural spaces such as the markets of Spain. As the translator--the Morisco aljamiado--began to read the page, he laughed at something written in the margin: it stated, "'This Dulcinea of Toboso, referred to so often in this history, they say had the best hand for salting pork of any woman in La Mancha.'"31 The narrator immediately knew that this was the missing manuscript he was looking for, so he had the Morisco read even more. It is then that the reader learns the novel was originally written in Arabic by the Arab historian Cide Hamete Benengeli. Narrator Cervantes commissions the Morisco to translate the entire novel, paying him in "two arrobas of raisins, and two fanegas of wheat," so that the story of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza can be continued.32 This process of translation of the original manuscript from Arabic to Spanish is now the source of the narrator Cervantes's history of Don Quixote, and it is a collaboration between the literary Christian "Cervantes" and the original Arabic author Cide Hamete Benengeli, delivered through the translator. The reader is now being told the story through someone else's eyes and mind. The novel descends into a rabbit hole of authorship in which, ironically, the new lens is a Morisco translator. This metaphor demonstrates that true Spanish history is written as a compilation between Christianity and Islam, not one or the other, thus demonstrating historical Cervantes's disdain and disapproval of the expulsion of the Moors. Rather, Cervantes displays the importance and necessity of diversity and multiculturalism. The true author, historical Cervantes, also establishes a metaphor between the literary margin, in which the literary Cervantes discovered the novel was indeed Don Quixote, and the architectural margins of the mosque. Cervantes does this in a very clever and implicit manner, 31 Cervantes, 67. 32 Cervantes, 68. 22 otherwise he would be severely censored. Through this implied metaphor of architectural and literary margins, Cervantes is able to write a novel that has commentary to covertly express his condemnation of the Moors and announce his glorification of multiculturalism. The focus of attention placed on the margin of the manuscript wherein Arabic commentary is written calls to mind the architectural margin of the mezquita, or 'mosque', in which the Arabic calligraphy is written. The comparison between the textual margin of Cervantes's manuscript and architectural margin of the walls of the mosque would be easy for the readers of Cervantes's day to recognize given the prevalence of Muslim architecture throughout Spain, as my survey in the first part of this essay shows. Furthermore, the handwriting in Arabic by the Arab historian easily calls to mind the calligraphy used for citations from the Koran. The Arabic commentary—associated with the authoritative word of the Koran placed in the margin of the walls of the mosque—second guesses the religious purity of Dulcinea, the object of courtly worship by the Christian knight. When the translator points out the Arab historian's commentary in the margin of the manuscript, that 'the Lady Dulcinea has the best hand at salting pork,' he taints her purity by placing her in contact with a food source that is considered polluted for Muslims. The comment casts Dulcinea in tainted light. The Arab historian's questioning of religious purity occurs in tandem with the questioning of the authority or authorship of the history of Don Quixote. The literary Cervantes is a Christian writer, but he is not the true author of the original manuscript; the Arab historian Cide Hamete claims true authorship; and Dulcinea is not the pillar of religious purity she is perceived to be. The play with the double meaning of the margin (textual vs architectural) occurs with the play of spatial perspective between margin vs center. The reader sees through Cervantes's use of the metaphor as a multicultural perspective that questions the absolute status of Christian 23 authority and Christian purity. The play with meaning and perspective in Cervantes's treatment of the margin in chapters eight and nine may be taken to one final and third level of development. The margin, shown to be central in connection with the ruptured or severed manuscript, is a covert expression for Cervantes's esteem for the contributions to Spanish society by the Muslim population of his country and his condemnation for their expulsion by governmental degree from Spain. In the eyes of Cervantes, this broke of the backbone of Spain's culture and economy since the Arab population made up an incredibly large portion of the Iberian Peninsula. Cervantes accomplishes this by, not only changing chapters, but beginning a whole new section of the novel. Part I concludes with chapter eight and the pending battle between Don Quixote and the Basque, then Part II begins with the narrator Cervantes informing the reader of his journey to find the rest of the novel. Being wary of the censorship that plagued others during the Inquisition, Cervantes chose this metaphorical approach to convey his true sentiments about the situation of Spain at this moment in history. This rupture in Don Quixote's history is reflective of the moment in Spain's history where law has been decreed to banish something so inherent to the nation itself: the Moorish people. By placing these episodes side by side, Cervantes invites the reader to compare the delusion of the Hapsburg imperial vision and its expulsion of the Moors with the episode of the windmills. The blindness of Spain's government seems even more laughable than Don Quixote's own misguided attack on the windmills. Cervantes's play with the margin allows him to express his views on multiculturalism in an indirect manner that allowed him to escape censorship by the Inquisition. The Inquisition was not savvy enough to realize that this profound division between Part I and II is symbolic of the division of tolerant Spain into an intolerant Spain. After Cervantes 24 died, the Inquisition did censor and expurgate a passage that was considered too directly stated. In chapter thirteen, Don Quixote is once again declaring his servitude and attesting to the beauty of his beloved Dulcinea of Toboso. In his description to Vivaldo, he uses a Petrarchan metaphor, a very classical and renaissance style of poetry, to describe Dulcinea. Don Quixote states (Volume I:13): "Her tresses are gold, her forehead Elysian fields, her eyebrows the arches of heaven, her eyes suns, her cheeks roses, her lips coral, her teeth pearls, her necklace alabaster, her bosom marble, her hands ivory, her skin white as snow, and the parts that modesty hides from human eyes are such, or so I believed and understand, that the most discerning consideration can only praise them but not compare them."33 While eloquently put, Cervantes is nonetheless making references to the private areas of Dulcinea's body and thus was censored by the Catholic Church in 1624 after his death; they dared not censor him before since his novel made him so beloved by the people. Cervantes was too clever to have to follow the rules. His questioning of authority was apparent from the very opening words of the novel when he writes, "[s]omewhere in La Mancha, in a place whose name I do not care to remember…"34 Cervantes conveys how exact places and names are all arbitrary and are not relevant to the novel. This echoes Cervantes own questioning of authority and Spain's religious Inquisition going on that persecuted the Moors and other minorities alike. 33 Cervantes, Don Quixote, 91. 34 Cervantes, 19. 25 Conclusion The religious tolerance and interdependence between minorities of Al-Andalus, which are reflected through the architecture of Andalusia and also underscored in Cervantes's Don Quixote through the metaphorical treatment of the literary margin in the episode of the lost manuscript, seems evermore elusive today. In light of the divisiveness and racism rampant in our society that mars efforts toward multiculturalism and diversity, such as those undertaken at universities like Norwich, tolerance seems like the impossible dream that is the object of the quest of the chivalrous knight Don Quixote. 26 Bibliography Arnold, Thomas Walker. The Preaching of Islam; A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith. New York: C. Scribner's sons, 1913. http://archive.org/details/preachingofisla00arno. Aznar, Fernando. La Alhambra y el Generalife de Granada. Monumentos Declared of World Interest by Unescco. Mariarsa:1985. BBC Worldwide Learning. The Moorish South: Art in Muslim and Christian Spain from 711- 1492. Documentary Film. The Art of Spain: From the Moors to Modernism, 2009. https://fod.infobase.com/p_ViewVideo.aspx?xtid=39408. Cervantes, Miguel. Don Quixote. Translated by Edith Grossman. 5 edition. New York: Harper Collins, 2003. Fernández, Luis. La Historia de España en 100 preguntas. Madrid, Spain: Ediciones Nowtilus, 2019. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/norwich/reader.action?docID=5703133&ppg=1. Fernández, María Luisa. "Second Flowering: Art of the Mudejars." Saudi Aramco World, The Legacy of Al-Andalus, 44, no. 1 (February 1993): 36–41. Harsolia, Khadija Mohiuddin. "Captivity, Confinement and Resistance in Mudejar and Morisco Literature." University of California, Riverside, 2016. WorldCat.org. https://search.proquest.com/docview/1849025713?accountid=14521. Kalmar, Ivan Davidson. "Moorish Style: Orientalism, the Jews, and Synagogue Architecture." Jewish Social Studies 7, no. 3 (2001): 68–100. "La Caligrafía Árabe." Accessed February 21, 2020. http://www.arabespanol.org/cultura/caligrafia.htm. Maíz Chacón, Jorge. Breve historia de los reinos ibéricos. 1a. edición. Quintaesencia ; 6. Barcelona: Ariel, 2013. http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1313/2013369841- b.html. Menocal, Maria Rosa. The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain. Reprint edition. Boston: Back Bay Books, 2003. O'Callaghan, Joseph. A History of Medieval Spain. 1st ed. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1975. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/norwich/detail.action?docID=3138541. 27 Phillips, William D., and Carla Rahn Phillips. A Concise History of Spain. Cambridge Concise Histories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. https://library.norwich.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true &db=e000xna&AN=490553&scope=site. Raquejo, Tonia. "The 'Arab Cathedrals': Moorish Architecture as Seen by British Travellers." The Burlington Magazine 128, no. 1001 (1986): 555–63. Sheren, Ila Nicole. "Transcultured Architecture: Mudéjar's Epic Journey Reinterpreted." Contemporaneity: Historical Presence in Visual Culture 1 (June 1, 2011): 137–51. https://doi.org/10.5195/contemp.2011.5. Stallings-Ward, Judith. "Tiny (Erasmian) Dagger or Large Poniard? Metonymy vs. Metaphor in the Cave of Montesinos Episode in Don Quixote." Comparative Literature Studies. 43.4 (2006) special issue: Don Quixote and 400 Years of World Literature. 441-65. Stallings-Ward, Judith. Gerardo Diego´s Creation Myth of Music: Fábula de Equis y Zeda. London: Routledge, 2020. Urquízar-Herrera, Antonio. Admiration and Awe: Morisco Buildings and Identity Negotiations in Early Modern Spanish Historiography. 1 online resource (289 pages) vols. Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2017. http://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=4850548. Watt, W. Montgomery. A History of Islamic Spain. Islamic Surveys; 4. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1977.

Ego te provoco: algunas consideraciones preliminares.El continuo despliegue de potencias extra-regionales por el hemisferio ha adquirido nuevas connotaciones estos dos últimos años. En ambientes políticos, y comunidades epistémicas, han surgido visiones contrapuestas a la hora de evaluar estos despliegues. Por un lado, están quienes ven esta problemática de forma relativamente benigna y en lo medular acorde a las tendencias globalizantes que estarían abarcando todo el planeta sin excepciones de país, cultura, economía o sociedad. Por otro, están quienes matizan las intensidades y diferencian entre los objetivos buscados por una u otra potencia extra-regional. China, India, Rusia e Irán, los actores extra-regionales más activos, tendrían motivaciones distintas; y la receptividad también sería diferenciada. Sin embargo, en los nichos e intersticios por donde circula la influencia extra-regional queda al descubierto una característica común cual es la ausencia relativa del otrora omnipresente comportamiento de Estados Unidos.En este contexto, plagado de factores multidireccionales, es la penetración iraní la que suscita mayor atención. También es sobre la que hay menor información en fuentes públicas. Ello no ha sido óbice, sin embargo, para que, desde 2005 en adelante, ésta penetración sea no sólo ostensible sino creciente. En visibilidad y en complejidad.En efecto, Irán se está desplegando por América Latina a través de una hábil combinación de elementos propios de soft y del hard power. Emplea también una gama de otros elementos intermedios. Los énfasis de unos, o de otros, está relacionados no sólo con el diseño conceptual y praxis desplegada por Teherán, sino también con la receptividad que ha tenido en cada país de la región. De esta forma, se han generado tendencias que hacen de la relación de Irán con los países latinoamericanos un tema esencial de la agenda de seguridad hemisférica.Siguiendo a dos de los más prolíficos autores en esta materia, Román Ortiz y Ely Karmon, y teniendo en consideración el carácter complejo del diseño conceptual y la praxis de la penetración iraní, se sostiene la hipótesis general de que la principal motivación de los iraníes es la obtención de influencia en el "patio trasero de EEUU".Aunque el despliegue iraní se observa en la mayoría de los países del hemisferio, cinco sudamericanos son los que concentran mayor actividad (en orden alfabético): Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Ecuador y Venezuela. Con cada uno, se registra una relación multifacética y no desprovista de elementos sui generis, que poco o nada tienen que ver con los cánones tradicionales de las relaciones bilaterales. En consecuencia, identificar y problematizar estos elementos coadyuva en la muy intrincada tarea de desentrañar las razones por las que, por primera vez en su historia milenaria, los persas se muestran interesados en esta zona del mundo.Para alcanzar un foothold en América del Sur, el régimen iraní se procura diversos tipos de elementos categorizables en a) aquellos de poder suave (diplomacia pura y formal, lazos culturales inocuos, como el hermanamiento de ciudades, convenios universitarios y otros), b) elementos intermedios (apoyo material y espiritual a comunidades shií en la región, a mezquitas y centros religiosos) y c) elementos definitivamente duros (acuerdos militares o industriales vinculados a asuntos de seguridad y defensa o comerciales con dicha finalidad, o bien actividades encubiertas con grupos terroristas afines como Hizbollah). Denominador común de todos estos elementos es su ubicación en el contexto de una estrategia a prioridefinida.La vastedad de los elementos señalados, así como el fortísimo sigilo con que son ejecutados, ha llevado a que analistas y académicos privilegien dos posturas para entender su impacto; ambas benignas. En efecto, la mayoría las ve como algo irrelevante, por momentos incluso con cierta indiferencia, casi como un sub-producto de las excentricidades del régimen de los ayatollahs, mientras que en otros momentos, buscan asociarla a cierta inevitabilidad de los cambios en el escenario mundial y a la pérdida relativa de la influencia estadounidense en América del Sur. Sin embargo, ambas relativizan las verdaderas consecuencias y no dan cuenta de su naturaleza. Naturaleza y consecuencia van de la mano. La primera se entiende por su rasgo fundamental, cual es que toda la estrategia iraní está en manos del Pasdaran. Por cierto que ello no implica necesariamente que todas las consecuencias sean previsibles o inmediatas. Pero al ser el Pasdaran el principal instrumento de la penetración, no se puede sino asociar la penetración a los objetivos e imperativos estratégicos de Teherán, vale decir con los planes nucleares, con la competencia estratégica con EEUU, con la construcción de bases capaces de propinar golpes de represalia en el corazón mismo de Norteamérica y, last but no least, con el papel global asignado a la religión. En otras palabras, con la capacidad de disuasión iraní. Por lo mismo no es casualidad que los planes de desarrollo nuclear y misilístico estén bajo tuición del Pasdaran. Tampoco es casualidad que el despliegue esté tan estrechamente vinculado a su estrategia de promoción del fundamentalismo islámico y a la pretensión de aislar a Israel (1). Vista en el contexto de los imperativos estratégicos de Irán, la generación de complicidades con gobiernos afines es fundamental.En esta materia, el despliegue iraní en la región registra novedades generales y específicas a lo largo del bienio 2010-2011.Hannibal ante portas: Irán se despliega en América del SurCuasi de forma paralela a la gira del Presidente Barack Obama por Brasil, Chile y El Salvador en marzo de 2011, el Viceministro de Relaciones Exteriores iraní, Behrouz Kamalvandi realizó un periplo por Quito, Bogotá y La Paz. Pocas semanas más tarde, al iniciar junio de 2011, el influyente y controversial Ministro de Defensa iraní, Ahmed Vahidi, llegó a Caracas para desplazarse luego a La Paz. Asimismo, a fines de 2010, el régimen de Ahmedinejad destinó US$ 4.500 millones para esta nueva etapa de su despliegue en América del Sur (2).Esta verdadera proliferación de recursos económicos, políticos abiertos y encubiertos, así como diplomáticos indica que los énfasis de estos dos últimos años se han comenzado a vincular crecientemente con el poder duro. De acuerdo a las previsiones de Elías Eliaschev, durante 2011 se completará la designación de 150 cargos para el staff que se dedica a América Latina en general, y de esa masa de US$ 4.500 millones, ya se han empezado a ejecutar US$ 87 millones (una transferencia supervisada por el propio comandante general de las brigadas Quds, Qassem Soleimani), de los cuales, a su vez, siete milllones han ido directo a Hizbollah(3).Parece razonable entonces asumir la hipótesis de que el poder duro ha adquirido centralidad. Sin embargo, los ritmos e impulsos que vaya observando el despliegue iraní dependerá finalmente de los nioveles de receptividad de cada país sudamericano(4). Esta responde a necesidades y motivaciones específicas. De ahí que el despliegue deba tener también una atención relativa en aquellos elementos de poder blando y toda la gama intermedia. Los sucesos acaecidos en torno a la visita de Ahmed Vahidi a Bolivia, examinados infra, así como el objetivo de alcanzar pronto US$ 20 mil millones en inversiones diversas de Irán en la región, confirman esta necesidad que tendrá Irán de ir acomodando su estrategia a las citadas sensibilidades de cada país sudamericano.En cuanto a los elementos de poder suave, el más importante verificador de tendencia del despliegue está dado por el incremento de embajadas iraníes en la región. Teherán tenía hasta el 2007 (5) sólo cinco embajadas en América Latina; de ellas únicamente tres en América del Sur. Hacia el 2011, el número de legaciones con embajador residente ha crecido ostensiblemente. Once suman hasta mediados de 2011 las embajadas iraníes en América Latina. Un dato anexo es que salvo Guyana y Surinam, la diplomacia iraní mantiene legaciones en todos los países de la región, y la única donde no hay embajador residente es aquella en Paraguay. Sin embargo, las visitas a Asunción del embajador concurrente -desde Montevideo- tienen la inusual frecuencia de una por mes; sin contar las constantes visitas de personeros de gobierno a Asunción (6). Finalmente, dentro del ámbito de poder suave, destaca también el apoyo manifiesto expresado por los embajadores de los países integrantes del ALBA en Teherán el 16 de julio de 2010, reiterando el "derecho soberano de Irán para generar energía atómica y utilizarla para fines pacíficos". Declaración vista con satisfacción en Teherán ya que permite visualizar algunos signos homogéneos en la receptividad regional. Debe tenerse en consideración que en los asuntos concernientes al vínculo con Irán, son los países sudamericanos del ALBA (Venezuela y Bolivia) los que llevan la iniciativa (7).En definitiva, se trata de un bienio lleno de connotaciones de alto significado, de una tendencia in crescendo, que, sin embargo, podría terminar abruptamente si la enfermedad del Presidente venezolano eclipsa su protagonismo.a) Relatio in terrorem: ArgentinaLas relaciones argentino-iraníes, a lo largo de estos dos últimos años, siguieron muy fuertemente marcadas por las reverberaciones de los brutales atentados a la embajada israelí y contra la AMIA en 1992 y 1994, respectivamente (8).Antecedentes con poderosa significación fueron descritos y fundamentados por Pepe Eliaschev en el diario Perfil (26.3. 2011). El primero apunta a la propuesta de la Casa Rosada para negociar un acuerdo secreto entre los dos gobiernos para dejar de lado el proceso judicial que lleva a cabo el juez Alberto Nisman contra exdiplomáticos y altos funcionarios iraníes a cambio de un compromiso por mayor intercambio comercial (9). La revelación de este antecedente tuvo como resultado que la visita del canciller Hector Timmerman a Israel, anunciada para fines de marzo, estuvo a punto de ser cancelada debido al profundo malestar causado en el gobierno iraní. Declaraciones posteriores de la cancillería argentina, negando la propuesta, mitigaron el estado de crispación bilateral, y el canciller finalmente se desplazó a Jerusalén.Un segundo antecedente de alta significación, y que causó gran molestia en el juez Nisman, es la revelación de tareas de reclutamiento y recolección de fondos en Brasil por parte de Hizbollah, Hamas y Al Qaeda en la zona de la Triple Frontera, en las que el iraní Moshe Rabbani, sindicado como autor intelectual del ataque a la AMIA, es fundamental. Rabbani ha visitado ocasionalmente Brasil utilizando pasaporte falso (10). Para ahondar aún más la controversia, Rabbani participó en abril de 2011 en un programa de radio junto al activista kirchnerista Luis D´Elía negando la versión de sus viajes a Brasil. Anexo a esta problemática, durante el bienio continuó también la controversia en torno a las actividades de la embajada de Irán en Buenos Aires. El juez Rafael Rafecas, por ejemplo, denunció que desde esa legación se financia a muchas agrupaciones anti-judías y que el nexo es el activista pro-gubernativo Luis D´Elía (11).El intento de revertir el estado de deterioro generalizado que existe en las relaciones bilaterales, y que Eliaschev adjudica a la influencia del canciller Timmerman, ocurrió meses después de que la Presidenta Cristina Fernandez, hablando ante la Asamblea General de la ONU en septiembre de 2010, propusiera una solución a la Lockerbie, que comprendiera un proceso judicial a los iraníes acusados por el caso de la AMIA en un tercer país, por mutuo acuerdo entre Irán y Argentina (12). No queda muy claro la finalidad de la propuesta, ya que, como era dable esperar, provocó una agria carta respuesta de Irán dirigida al Presidente de la Asamblea General(13).Finalmente cabe consignar que en el plano comercial, a inicios de abril de 2011, se anunció que Teherán empezará a incrementar sus compras de soya. La iniciativa surgió no sólo por el interés de Irán sino por la baja de las exportaciones argentinas de este producto a la India para las que era necesario encontrar otro poder comprador (14).En suma, el bienio 2010-2011 ha servido para constatar que el vínculo iraní-argentino sigue alterado en sus cimientos (15). La intensidad de las reverberaciones que continúan emanando de los atentados a la embajada israelí y a la AMIA ponen necesariamente un signo de interrogación a la evolución ulterior que tenga este problema, cuya solución definitiva no se divisa. En tal sentido, el principal elemento a monitorear es la presunta oferta emanada de Teherán a mediados de julio orientada a re-tomar el diálogo.b) Dulce periculum: las tentaciones bolivianas El bienio 2010-2011 fue especialmente fructífero para la relación entre estos dos países. Mirado desde el punto de vista de la estrategia iraní, los antecedentes del período consolidaron a Bolivia, en términos cualitativos, como el segundo eslabón más importante en la región. Mirado desde la perspectiva boliviana, asistencia iraní en diversos ámbitos superó los US$ 1200 millones lo que convirtió a Irán en el segundo donante del país, superando a la Unión Europea (16).En el plano diplomático adquirieron relevancia varios hechos como la inauguración de la embajada iraní en La Paz, en septiembre de 2010, el viaje del Presidente Morales a Teherán un mes más tarde (17), y los desplazamientos realizados por varios altos personeros del gobierno iraní por territorio boliviano durante el primer semestre de 2011. Desde el punto de vista comunicacional, lo más destacado del viaje de Morales a Teherán y Tabriz, fue el anuncio de que Irán asistiría a Bolivia en la construcción de una planta de energía nuclear. Dado que el asunto carece de toda viabilidad debido al precario nivel de masa crítica existente en Bolivia respecto a esta materia, el anuncio adquiere singularidad. Desde ahora en adelante habrá movimientos, algunos visibles, otros menos, de especialistas y personeros vinculados a elementos de poder duro iraní. En este marco, fuertes sospechas tiene la aprobación de un proyecto de ley por el Congreso boliviano en junio de 2011, destinado a facilitar el turismo entre los dos países, ya que, pese a no existir cifras oficiales sobre el tema, todas las estimaciones apuntan a un flujo prácticamente inexistente.Otros dos elementos de poder duro son tanto la declaración conjunta emitida tras el viaje de Morales, en el sentido de que ambos países señalan a EEUU como enemigo común, como también el anuncio de crear un banco binacional que permitirá gestionar futuros proyectos. Esto último, ya se había visualizado un mes antes del viaje de Morales, cuando el ministro de Industrias y Minas de Irán, Ali Akhbar Mehravian asistió a la presentación de cartas credenciales del embajador Alireza Ghozeilee en La Paz, asunto que además, coincidió con la apertura física de la legación persa. La cartera del ministro constituyó una señal indicativa del énfasis que Irán está dando a este vínculo. Consecuentemente, durante la visita de Mahrebi, ambos países suscribieron acuerdos en materias de gas, petróleo y petroquímica. Además, Mahrebi inauguró las dependencias de la Iranian Oil en Santa Cruz y ofreció una nueva línea de crédito por US$ 254 millones que permitirá expandir los proyectos existentes y examinar nuevos proyectos en torno a la extracción del litio.Posteriormente, en marzo de 2011, la visita del Vicecanciller Behrouz Kamalvandi hizo anuncios que reforzaron el carácter estratégico que está asumiendo Bolivia en el despliegue iraní en la región. Kamalvandi anunció tanto la creación de un Centro Geocientífico, que se dedicará a estudiar datos geológicos de Bolivia, como de una red de transmisión y de antenas que permita crear un canal nacional de televisión. El objetivo central del Centro Geocientífico es localizar yacimientos de uranio. Hasta ahora, los estudios sobre localización y caraterísticas de depósitos uraníferos bolivianos son confusos, debido a su obsolescencia y poca acuciosidad. Uranio existiría en la Cordillera de Los Frailes, en Cotaje (Potosí) y en Mamonó, el este del país cerca d ela frontera con Brasil, en el Parque Noel Kempff Mercado y bajo el Bosque Seco Chiquitano (ambos forman el ecosistema El Pantanal). Tras la visita de Mehravian, la ministra boliviana de Planificación, Viviana Caro manifestó, "hay intenciones de realizar trabajos, pero lo que se necesita es una carta geológica actualizada en la que colaborará Irán" (18). Jorisch sostiene que el litio podría ser utilizado como un acelerador alternativo en el enriquecimiento de uranio. Durante su visita, Kamalvandi firmó acuerdos justamente para explotar litio (algo acordado inicialmente durante la visita de Ghozeilee)(19). Además, comprometió una línea de crédito adicional a la de US$ 270 millones ya existente para construir represas. Se trata de una línea crediticia abierta que se materializará apenas lo disponga el gobierno de Morales.Una significancia mayor tiene la llegada a Bolivia, en junio de 2011, del ministro de Defensa iraní, Ahmed Vahidi (20), quien visitó La Paz y Santa Cruz. Declaraciones de Vahidi ofreciendo todo tipo de ayuda militar que Bolivia demande y la invitación a la inauguración de la Escuela Militar del ALBA, ratifican la hipótesis sustentada acerca de la especificidad estratégica que tiene el despliegue iraní en Bolivia. Como trascendió por la prensa, Vahidi debió interrumpir su estadía en Bolivia, cuando fue detectado por el servicio de inteligencia argentino (SI) mientras se efectuaba una ceremonia en el Colegio Militar de Aviación (COLMILAV) en la que se entregaban licencias de pilotos a cadetes de Bolivia, Venezuela y Panamá. Ello motivó la rápida queja del gobierno de Cristina Fernández, quien advirtió al Presidente Morales sobre el retiro de la invitación que se le había cursado para que visitara Buenos Aires la semana siguiente (21). Bolivia presentó sus excusas al gobierno argentino, y ni Morales ni su ministra de Defensa, Cecilia Chacón se refirieron públicamente al incidente. Vahidi, sin comentarlo directamente, valoró positivamente su paso por Bolivia y reiteró que "la cooperación total con los países latinoamericanos goza de prioridad para Irán"(22).El carácter estratégico de Bolivia en el despliegue iraní en la región, había quedado esbozado en octubre de 2010, cuando el ministro de Economía y Finanzas de Bolivia, Luis Arce informó de un acuerdo entre los dos países para la compra de equipos militares iraníes, el mantenimiento de las aeronaves de la Fuerza Aérea Boliviana (FAB), así como un acuerdo para entrenamiento militar. Ese anuncio ministerial ocurrió dos semanas después que Morales llegara procedente de Teherán (23).En síntesis, la relación bilateral ha entrado en una etapa cualitativamente distinta estos dos últimos años, marcada por claras intenciones de fortalecer un compromiso que adquiere visos de estratégico. El interés manifestado por ambos en esta línea indica que se debería generar mayores niveles de asociatividad bilateral en el futuro cercano. En todo caso, si Bolivia no cautela los aspectos políticos formales de este acercamiento, se producirán inevitablemente fricciones inesperadas con terceros, tal cual de desprendió de la tensión argentino-iraní en relación a Vahidi. La experiencia de este hombre clave del Pasdaran en Bolivia es una señal que los próximos pasos del acercamiento bilateral se caractericen por la opacidad y el sigilo.c) De omnibus dubitandum, las aprehensiones del neo-lulismobrasileño Las relaciones bilaterales durante el bienio, sometidas a las reverberaciones del viaje del Presidente Ahmedinejad a Brasil, ocurrido en las postrimerías del 2009, siguen mostrando señales ambivalentes. Sin embargo, la fuerza ex intra de algunas de éstas indican que, paulatinamente, se ha ido instalando la idea de poner las relaciones bilaterales bajo premisas nuevas. Son señales que, decodificadas, ofrecen matices diferenciadores respecto a los años de lulismo puro.En efecto, a lo largo de casi todo el 2010 se observó una atención brasileña muy deferente hacia problemática iraní, ejemplificada en la crítica que hizo el canciller Celso Amorim en marzo de ese año a la imposición de sanciones contra el régimen de Teherán. El pragmatismo del lulismo puro cobró expresividad en el acuerdo Brasil-Turquía (marzo 2010), que provocó desconcierto en varios países centrales, malestar en Washington y preocupación en Israel (24). Ese acuerdo, percibido positivamente por Ahmedinejad, se suscribió en el marco de la cumbre de los G-15 realizada en Teherán.Otra señal proveniente del pragmatismo lulista había ocurrido poco antes, en abril de 2010, cuando Petrobras anunció que mantendría sus oficinas en Teherán y todas sus inversiones en el Mar Caspio, pese al clima internacional desfavorable. Prosiguió al mes siguiente, cuando de forma demostrativa, Lula realizó una visita oficial a Teherán, que culminó en el controversial acuerdo con Turquía. Continuó en junio de 2010, cuando, en votación dividida, el Consejo de Seguridad aprobó sanciones (Resolución 2040) con los votos en contra de Brasil y Turquía (ambos miembros no permanentes del órgano en ese momento).En esta postura pragmática subyacía una visión muy clara. Lula veía los asuntos internacionales con un prisma que favorecía la mantención del diálogo con todo tipo de regímenes y de rechazo a la imposición de sanciones. Para Lula, el efecto de las sanciones terminaban recayendo en los más pobres. Lula, además, insistía en el necesario respeto a la cultura, costumbres y leyes de todos los países, alegando que de lo contrario se alimentaba las tendencias al caos en el sistema internacional.Sin embargo, la asunción de Dilma Roussef comenzó a ofrecer matices respecto allulismo puro, denominación que parte del supuesto que con Dilma el lulismo sigue representando el prisma central de la política exterior brasileña.Sin embargo, los nuevos matices, advertibles en las primeras decisiones de Dilma en torno a la problemática iraní, sugieren que subyacen ideas nuevas. Aunque es prematuro visualizar la intensidad que estas ideas nuevas, se pueden conjeturar énfasis de tipo cuasi doctrinario, por ejemplo en materia de derechos humanos, vistos tanto genéricamente como en lo relativo al de las mujeres. Tal inclinación salpicará directamente la relación con Irán.Dos novedades interesantes sobre esto son las siguientes. Dilma, por ejemplo, fue mucho más dura que su antececesor en cuanto a criticar la lapidación de Sakineh Ashtiani, por presunta complicidad en asesinato de su esposo. Indicó que era "inaceptable y medieval". Apenas ocurrido el hecho, y en su calidad de candidata presidencial, Dilma, solicitó al entonces Presidente Lula, que diera indicaciones a su embajador en Teherán, Antonio Luis Salgado para reunirse con autoridades de la cancillería persa e informarles que Brasil estaba en condiciones de garantizar asilo a Ashtiani.Luego, ya en funciones, invitó a la abogada disidente Shirin Ebadi, Premio Nobel de la Paz 2003, asunto que irritó a la cancillería iraní. Luego, el ministerio de Cultura brasileño formuló críticas a la censura de las obras del escritor Paulo Coelho en Irán.Probablemente el dato más significativo ocurrió en 2011, cuando, por primera vez en 10 años, Brasil (junto a Panamá y Colombia y contra Cuba y Ecuador) votaron a favor de una moción en la Comisión de Derechos Humanos para monitorear la situación de éstos en Irán. Baste recordar que el año previo -2010, es decir bajo ellulismo puro- Brasil se abstuvo (25).Aunque el re-enfoque brasileño implicará que Brasil ya no tendrá un papel tan relevante en el establecimiento del foothold iraní en la región, el régimen de Ahmedinejad ha reaccionado con cautela ante las nuevas señales provenientes de Brasilia. No ha hecho ver sus molestias y pareciera optar por darle preeminencia a los espacios e intersticios que se muestren disponibles. En esa línea, anunció que establecerá un centro comercial durante el segundo semestre 2011 para facilitar negocios entre los dos países (26). El régimen iraní es consciente que el deterioro de la relación bilateral perjudicará más a Irán que a Brasil. Además, también hay señales de continuidad.Vital en este aspecto es la mantención del negocio de la triangulación de alimentos, carnes y azúcar que realizan empresas brasileñas instaladas en Dubai y Emiratos Arabes Unidos.Huelga subrayar que este recalibramiento seguirá siendo monitoreado por Washington y las potencias centrales. A lo largo del bienio ha habido varios motivos de preocupación que podrían repetirse. Por ejemplo, según revelaciones de Wikileaks, a fines de 2010, se produjo una situación que generó preocupación en EEUU y en Alemania, ya que la empresa Machine Sazi Tabriz (MST) habría estado adquiriendo material de uso dual a la brasileña Mello SA Maquinas e Equipamentos. Siemens habría detenido a última hora importantes envíos a Mello SA que iban a ser entregados a MST (27).En definitiva se puede establecer que la relación brasileño-iraní pasa por momentos de ciertas re-definiciones producto de los cambios políticos internos en Brasilia. Dado que la cautela dominará la apreciación de ambos, es probable que la agenda bilateral no oscile entre elementos de poder duro ni blando, sino descanse en aquellos intermedios, donde las cuestiones estrictamente comerciales vayan adquiriendo centralidad. (1) Los dos principales instrumentos globales de la línea estratégica anti-israelí son ese híbrido llamado Hizbollah y el Pasdaran; ambos con capacidades para operar en cualquier parte del globo. Los mortíferos ataques en Buenos contra la embajada de Israel en Buenos Aires en 1992 y contra la AMIA en 1994, ejecutados conjuntamente, son los mejores ejemplos de dicha capacidad. Karmon sostiene que la amenaza terrorista es el principal desafío a la seguridad internacional y que después de la guerra fría no se podría hablar de un conflicto armado donde no se haga uso del instrumento terrorista. En tal sentido –añade- la gran amenaza actual proviene de lo que denomina la "coalición iraní", compuesta por Irán y su proxy organization, Hizbollah, creado por el Pasdaran, por Siria, por Hamas.(2) La cifra aparece en varias de las referencias utilizadas en este texto. Según Eliaschev, las prioridades de esta nueva fase del despliegue iraní son: la Triple Frontera (Brasil, Paraguay, Argentina), Venezuela y Panamá. (3) Ver: "Venezuela e Irán".(4) Otros elementos de poder duro son el esfuerzo por instalar en la región bancos iraníes o bien formar instituciones bancarias asociadas así como la cooperación para la prospección y explotación de recursos energéticos específicos (uranio, litio, petróleo y gas).(5) Fecha referencial clave. El despliegue iraní adquirió contornos más precisos y sistémicos con la Conferencia Internacional sobre América Latina, denominada "Desarrollo en América Latina: su papel y su estatus en el futuro sistema internacional" (febrero, 2007) y en la que participaron invitados de Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Cuba, Brasil, Uruguay y Ecuador aparte de latinoamericanistas de Italia, Rusia, y China". Fue un seminario auspiciado por el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores iraní y sirvió para dar luces acerca del diseño conceptual y modelos de praxis para materializar la iniciativa. Procuró insertar conceptualmente el despliegue en las corrientes revolucionarias de la época, buscando asociar las figuras de los comandantes Chamran y Guevara como simbólicas del encuentro revolucionario entre Irán y América Latina. El gobierno iraní invitó a exponer al seminario a dos hijos de Guevara. Pocos meses más tarde, en Teherán e Isfahan, también con auspicio de organismos de gobierno, se efectuó el Primer Congreso Internacional de Literatura Latinoamericana. Ver Witker, op cit. pp. 171-172.(6) La relación de Irán con Paraguay se inicia bajo mandato del Presidente Lugo el 15 de agosto de 2008. Un trascendido relevante en las relaciones de Irán con esta zona del mundo es la presunta petición formulada a inicios de abril de 2011 por Ahmedinejad al Presidente paraguayo, Fernando Lugo en orden a garantizar asilo para Muammar Gaddafi.(7) Ver "Apoyo del ALBA a Irán" en el sitio http://www.noticiasdeiran.com (accesado el 01.06.2011).(8) La trayectoria y los eventos dramáticos ocurridos en la capital argentina apuntan a un diseño conceptual y praxis específicas del interés de Irán en Argentina, pues no se divisan motivos demográficos o migratorios, ni económicos, ni gran colaboración militar, aunque sí hay versiones, no confirmadas, de interés en la industria nuclear argentina a comienzos de los 90. Sí tiene fuerza explicativa la numerosa población judía en Argentina. Al asumir a los aproximadamente 250 mil judíos argentinos como blanco de su despliegue global, se advierten elementos coherentes con el esquema antijudío que marca la diplomacia iraní desde fines de los 80.(9) El acuerdo habría nacido tras una oferta hecha por Timmerman mientras efectuaba una visita a Aleppo, Siria entre el 23 y 24 de enero de 2011. Los mediadores iban a ser el Presidente sirio Bashar al Assad y su canciller Walid al Mohalem. El texto de Eliaschev asegura que en septiembre de 2010 y febrero de 2011 se produjeron tratativas directas, aunque discretas, entre Argentina e Irán a nivel de "funcionarios poco conocido".(10) Pagina 12 y Perfil (7 de abril). El juez Nisman identificó una casa de seguridad de Rabbani y otros 20 terroristas en Sergipe N° 67 en la ciudad Foz de Iguacú.(11) Rafecas instruye casos contra algunos grupos terroristas como Quebracho. Esas afirmaciones las hizo en una reunión realizada en la Sociedad Hebraica del Pilar, Buenos Aires el 30 de marzo de 2011.(12) Hay versiones que indican que esta fórmula habría sido propuesta en 2003 y que no se habría encontrado ningún país dispuesto a servir como tal.(13) "Respuesta de Irán a Argentina en Naciones Unidas" en http://www.noticiasdeiran.com (accesado 14.6.2011).(14) El intercambio comercial entre Irán y Argentina llegaba en 2011 a US$ 1.200 millones anualmente.(15) Inicialmente, las investigaciones tropezaron con las enormes dudas acerca de qué pudo haber motivado esta expansión terrorista hacia América del Sur. También se hicieron públicas varias hipótesis argentino-céntricas de un presunto descontento del mundo musulmán por la participación de Buenos Aires en la primera guerra desatada por Estados Unidos contra Irak, aunque Irán era muy hostil al Irak de Saddam Hussein 1980-1988. Ese resentimiento musulmán se habría visto alimentado también por otros motivos. Los daños causados a Irak, financista de Egipto, y potencial beneficiario del proyecto misilístico Cóndor (desarrollado por Argentina y Egipto), abandonado por Menem por imposición de Estados Unidos. Luego estaría la decepción de Trípoli tras haber invertido fondos en la campaña electoral de Menem. Otro elemento de resentimiento musulmán con Argentina sería la distancia que tomó Buenos Aires respecto del Movimiento de No Alineados en 1991 y su acercamiento a Estados Unidos. Por último, la desilusión experimentada por Damasco ante los diversos viajes de Menem a Medio Oriente en los que no visitó Siria (el país de sus ancestros), a la vez que se convertía en el primer Presidente argentino en viajar a Israel. Todas hipótesis excesivamente argentino-céntricas y carentes de efectivo poder explicativo.(16) Irán ha financiado una fábrica de textiles, una de cemento, un hospital en El Alto, una procesadora de lácteos y ha iniciado estudios para una ensambladora de tractores. La suma es un conjunto de créditos que forman parte del llamado Plan de Cooperación Industrial válido por cinco años firmado en 2007 durante la visita de Ahmedinejad a La Paz. Notoriedad tiene un reportaje de la BBC (27.11.2009) alerta sobre la posible obligatoriedad que existiría en el centro hospitalario construido en El Alto para que las mujeres porten velo.(17) La visita de Morales incluyó un desplazamiento a la ciudad de Tabriz donde visitó una fábrica de tractores. Irán tiene la oferta de instalar una ensambladora similar a la levantada en Venezuela.(18) Ver: "Uranio y agua para Irán" en http://www.noalamina.org (accesado 10.6.2011).(19) Sobre este punto, las negociaciones se habían iniciado en octubre de 2010 durante la segunda visita de Morales a Teherán. Bolivia tiene un depósitos estimados de 100 millones de toneladas métricas (TM) de litio, lo que correspondería al 70% de las reservas mundiales.(20) Excomandante general de la Fuerza Quds del Pasdaran. Existe orden de captura internacional por su participación en el atentado contra la AMIA en Buenos Aires en 1994. Por años nexo entre Teherán y Hizbollah. Su cargo actual implica una tuición directa en el programa de desarrollo nuclear de Irán. La orden de captura de Interpol se extiende a Moshen Rabbani (ex agregado de prensa en la embajada iraní en Buenos Aires), Ali Akhbar Velayati (excanciller), Alí Fallahijan (exministro de Informaciones), Alí Rafsanjani (expresidente), Moshen Rezai (exasesor presidencial), Hadi Soleimanpour (exvicecanciller).(21) Gran parte de la prensa mundial consignó esta nota ese día. El canciller David Choquehuanca endosó responsabilidades a funcionarios medios del Ministerio de Defensa. Otro antecedente que apoya la sospecha de una circunstancia embarazosa es que Vahidi se encontraba alojado en el mismo hotel (Casa Blanca), que el Presidente Morales. Ver La Tercera, Santiago de Chile 6.6. 2011.(22) La Prensa (Bolivia) 03.06.2011.(23) El anunció precisó que podrían adquirirse FAJR-3, S-68 e IRAN-140 así como helicópteros. Ver Los Tiempos, Cochabamba 1.11.2010.(24) El acuerdo consistía en que Irán se comprometía a enviar 1200 kilos de uranio enriquecido al 3,5% hacia Turquía y recibiría el producto enriquecido al 20% para usos médicos, en un proceso supervisado por EEUU, Francia y Rusia más el Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica.(25) Aprobada por 22 votos a favor , 7 en contra y 14 abstenciones.(26) Aunque la relación entre ambos países también se remonta a comienzos del siglo 20 sólo a partir de los 90 comenzó a registrar cierto volumen al intercambiar alimentos. Sin embargo, a partir de 2003, Petrobras obtuvo una primera licencia de exploración de petróleo en el Mar Caspio con lo que la relación bilateral aumentó fuertemente. En 2004, Petrobras obtuvo una segunda licencia y en 2007 una tercera. El 2009, asociada con Repsol, obtuvo derechos de explotación del bloque Tosan, también en el Caspio.(27) State 123431 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL:12/12/2034 *El autor es politólogo y periodista de la Universidad de Chile,PhD en Comunicaciones por la Universidad Carlos IV de Praga, República Checa y egresado del Centro Hemisférico de Estudios de la Defensa, National Defense University (CHDS-NDU). Ha sido jefe de la Mención en Relaciones Internacionales del Doctorado en Estudios Americanos de la Universidad de Santiago y jefe de Cátedra de Estudios Internacionales de la Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos (ANEPE) de Chile. En la actualidad es profesor de la ANEPE y la Universidad Alberto Hurtado de Santiago de Chile,profesor visitante del Colegio Interamericano de Defensa, Washington DC. Ha publicado varios artículos sobre terrorismo y seguridad internacional en revistas académicas, destacando "Los guiños de Mefisto. Relaciones Irán-América Latina, los casos de Chile y Argentina", "El síndrome de Herostratos o la conversión de terroristas en íconos". "Momentos palmerstonianos: retórica integracionista y conductas divisivas a la luz de la cumbre energética de 2007".

Editorial Aniversario y balance Por una renovación de la agenda historiográfica de las izquierdas Colectivo Editor Se han cumplido veinte años ya de aquel viernes 3 de abril de 1998 en que el CeDInCI abriera por primera vez sus puertas en el barrio porteño de Almagro. Poco antes de la universalización del correo electrónico, y a través del antiguo sistema de invitación por tarjeta de cartón, del rumor boca a boca y el llamado telefónico, más de doscientos asistentes desbordaron la vieja casa de la calle Sarmiento cuando todavía olía a pintura fresca. Más de la mitad de los concurrentes debió esperar en la calle a que salieran los primeros para poder ingresar. ¿Qué fue lo que convocó en aquellos años de reflujo de las izquierdas y de apogeo del menemismo a las más diversas figuras de la cultura argentina, desde David Viñas a Juan José Sebreli, desde Emilio J. Corbière a Mary Feijóo, desde José Sazbón a Abel Alexis Lattendorf? Sin lugar a dudas, la expectativa de que, finalmente, un centro de documentación concebido a la manera de las modernas instituciones europeas pudiera recoger en un espacio único y plural el patrimonio documental de los movimientos sociales y las izquierdas que hasta entonces se dispersaba, y a menudo se perdía. Sin embargo, esa fundación no vino, como suele decirse, a "llenar un vacío". Fue necesario librar a lo largo de los años una verdadera batalla cultural para introducir en la agenda pública y en la agenda social el concepto de patrimonio documental. Para entonces, cuando el primero de estos términos era apenas un sinónimo de patrimonio arquitectónico, el legado documental era una noción carente de sentido. En lo que a la cultura de izquierdas respecta, los fondos personales de militantes, dirigentes, sindicalistas, escritores y editores, o los acervos de pequeñas organizaciones políticas y sociales se volatilizaban; y con ellos, la posibilidad de escribir la historia de las izquierdas, de los movimientos sociales, de las clases subalternas. La fundación del CeDInCI conjuró para siempre aquel desdén, aquel olvido. Desde ese abril de 1998 su acervo creció exponencialmente. Veinte años después, se contabilizan con nombre y apellido casi dos mil donantes. A pesar de su fragilidad institucional —apenas una asociación civil sin fines de lucro, gestionado por un equipo de una decena de profesionales—, el CeDInCI apareció a lo largo de estos años como un espacio que ofrece a los donantes garantías de transparencia, estabilidad y pluralidad. La modernización que propuso el CeDInCI en el terreno bibliotecológico, hemerográfico y archivístico vino estrechamente ligada a una propuesta de renovación historiográfica. Poner a disposición de los investigadores un acervo documental cuantioso, rico y diverso era condición necesaria pero no suficiente para una actualización de los estudios sobre las izquierdas. Recordemos brevemente aquel contexto. Para fines del siglo XX el estudio de las izquierdas estaba fuera de la agenda historiográfica. La historia obrera, una de las ramas que se había desprendido de la historia social a mediados del siglo XX, había quedado reducida a un rol residual, apenas cultivada por un porfiado puñado de historiadores, entre los que sobresalía la figura tutelar de Alberto Pla, fallecido en 2008. El cierre del CICSO (un centro de investigación fundado en 1966 que había producido una obra colectiva de referencia a comienzos de la década de 1970),[1] la dispersión de sus investigadores más reconocidos y la donación de su archivo a una institución tan poco previsible como la SADE (Sociedad Argentina de Escritores) constituían un síntoma elocuente de aquel fin de ciclo. Algunos de los historiadores obreros más jóvenes apelaban por entonces a la renovación que había conocido la historiografía inglesa desde la década de 1960, pero a menudo sus referencias a las obras de un E. P. Thompson fueron, antes que un índice de lecturas fructíferas o una puesta en acto de sus aportes teórico-conceptuales, verdaderos modelos de citas de autoridad.[2] Mientras estos historiadores obreros resistían desde un paradigma historiográfico francamente conservador (una teoría de la clases sociales y de su conciencia de corte leninista, una reificación del conflicto social y una metodología positivista de recolección "objetiva" de "datos"), la historiografía conocía una renovación vertiginosa a escala global, que socavaba incluso muchos de sus supuestos epistemológicos. Desde el impacto del "giro lingüístico" hasta al correspondiente al "giro material" (por no hablar del más reciente "giro reflexivo"), tanto la microhistoria, la historia de las mujeres, la historia de lo cotidiano, la historia de la sexualidad, la historia social de la cultura como la nueva historia política conmovían los cimientos de la profesión, despertaban la vocación de los nuevos historiadores y reorientaban incluso los intereses muchos investigadores formados. De modo que para fines de la década de 1990 la mayor parte de los miembros del PEHESA,[3] un centro fundado en 1977 a comienzos de la última dictadura militar y que había venido a modernizar los estudios de historia social, habían abandonado la historia obrera stricto sensu. Si bien durante algunos años prosiguieron los trabajos de Silvia Badoza sobre la Sociedad Tipográfica Bonaerense, los de Mirta Lobato sobre las obreras de los frigoríficos de Berisso, los de Juan Suriano sobre el anarquismo argentino o los de Ricardo Falcón sobre la formación de la clase obrera en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX, buena parte de los investigadores fueron atraídos enseguida por otras demandas historiográficas. Suriano fue desplazando sus intereses desde el movimiento obrero anarquista hacia la cultura libertaria.[4] Leandro Gutiérrez —el principal inspirador de la historia y la cultura obrera, y su último cultor a tiempo completo, fallecido en 1992—, había iniciado junto a Luis Alberto Romero un desplazamiento de su objeto hacia los que entonces se designaban como "sectores populares".[5] Significativamente, la obra que reunía gran parte de los trabajos maduros de historia social y obrera de esa generación —nos referimos a Jeremy Adelman (ed.), Essays in Argentine Labour History 1870-1930— no encontró un editor en la Argentina.[6] Si la historia de la clase obrera se veía progresivamente desplazada de la renovada agenda historiográfica de fin de siglo, la historia de las corrientes de izquierda que no se encuadraba en lo que entonces llamábamos "historias oficiales", seguía siendo cultivada casi exclusivamente por el periodismo de investigación. La popularidad que gozaron en los años '80 y '90 las contribuciones sobre anarquismo, socialismo, comunismo y nueva izquierda de figuras como Osvaldo Bayer, Emilio J. Corbière, Isidoro Gilbert y María Seoane contrastaban con la reticencia de la historiografía académica frente a estos objetos. Sólo unas pocas obras clave nacidas entre esas dos décadas vinieron a dar una nota discordante en ese clima académico: nos referimos a Una modernidad periférica: Buenos Aires 1920 y 1930 (1988) de Beatriz Sarlo, Nuestros años sesentas. La formación de la nueva izquierda intelectual en la Argentina (1956-1966) (1991) de Oscar Terán, e Intelectuales y poder en Argentina en la década del sesenta (1991) de Silvia Sigal. Aunque respondían más a ejercicios de balance histórico por parte de intelectuales formados en las décadas pasadas que a la agenda académica de esos años, estas obras iban a abrir una brecha en la renovación historiográfica nacida con el nuevo siglo. Fue en ese contexto de innovación al mismo tiempo que de profesionalización de la historiografía argentina, que el CeDInCI postulaba en torno a 1998, además de la necesidad de un acervo documental, una agenda historiográfica para el estudio de las izquierdas y de las clases subalternas. Por supuesto, ya la propia organización de un centro que reuniera en forma integral y al mismo tiempo diferenciada áreas de biblioteca, hemeroteca y archivo, hablaba de una renovación respecto de las antiguas bibliotecas donde estas áreas solían estar confundidas. La hemeroteca adquiría en este proyecto un lugar central, poniendo a disposición de los investigadores un universo revisteril mucho más denso, diverso y proteico que el de las pocas revistas canónicas que había consagrado la historia literaria en el siglo XX. El archivo, centrado en los fondos de militantes, escritores y editores, venía a ofrecer un corpus hasta entonces apenas transitado por la historiografía. La novedad no estaba tanto en la diversidad de los soportes ofrecidos, como en el orden con que fueron organizados y presentados. La organización y la catalogación misma de los libros, los folletos, los afiches, los periódicos, las revistas, las cartas privadas, fueron concebidas desde un inicio para propiciar una historia renovada y multidimensional de las izquierdas. Borges decía que el orden de una biblioteca era un modo silencioso de ejercer la crítica. Para nosotros, el catálogo excedía su dimensión técnica, el orden de las piezas respondía a una perspectiva de la historia, el tesauro a un universo conceptual, la descripción se comprometía con la investigación. También el propio nombre de la institución, con su referencia expresa no a "la izquierda" lisa y llana, sino a una "cultura de izquierdas", sugería además de la pluralidad todo un abanico de dimensiones materiales, simbólicas e imaginarias de social y de lo político que connotaba el término cultura, excediendo con creces la clásica historia institucional centrada en pasar revista de los congresos, analizar la corrección de los discursos de los dirigentes y en contabilizar la cantidad de obreros que el partido controlaba entre los marítimos o los ferroviarios. El lanzamiento del CeDInCI fue acompañado de una serie de libros y de artículos de carácter programático elaborados por algunos de sus fundadores que en poco tiempo era asumida y enriquecida por una nueva camada de historiadores.[7] A contrapelo de un clima historiográfico en el que Marx y el marxismo eran sacrificados en el altar del "fin de las ideologías", esos textos, al mismo tiempo que celebraban la profunda renovación historiográfica en curso, se esforzaban en mostrar el estímulo intelectual y el provecho historiográfico que ofrecían ciertas figuras y conceptos forjados por el marxismo crítico de un Gramsci o un Benjamin, así como por historiadores marxistas extraacadémicos olvidados como Issac Deutscher, Arthur Rosenberg o Fernando Claudín. Pugnaban, asimismo, por mostrar los signos de renovación de la historia social británica a los que la academia argentina comenzaba a darle la espalda —desde los estudios clásicos de Eric Hobsbawm, E.P. Thompson y Raymond Williams hasta los de Raphael Samuel, Perry Anderson y Gareth Stedman Jones—, la innovación historiográfica que había representado en las décadas de 1970 y 1980 la obra de figuras como Robert Paris, Georges Haupt y Franco Andreucci para la historia del marxismo y las internacionales obreras, así como los aportes contemporáneos de la sociología de la cultura (Pierre Bourdieu y su escuela) y la sociología de los intelectuales revolucionarios (Michael Löwy). La nueva historia de las izquierdas y de las clases subalternas incluía y al mismo tiempo excedía la historia partidaria, la historia obrera o la historia del mundo del trabajo. Proponía, por ejemplo, otras claves para repensar la dimensión institucional (desde el socioanálisis de René Lourau y Georges Lapassade hasta la teoría foucaultiana de los micropoderes, pasando por la dimensión imaginaria teorizada por Cornelius Castoriadis),[8] incorporaba la perspectiva de género y el concepto de vida cotidiana para repensar las subjetividades militantes, dialogaba con los aportes conceptuales y metodológicos de la sociología cultural, de la historia intelectual y la historia del libro y la edición para reconsiderar dimensiones claves de la cultura de izquierdas, hasta entonces apenas exploradas en nuestro país por unos pocos estudios pioneros, como los de Dora Barrancos. El CeDInCI promovió un diálogo productivo de la historia de las izquierdas con la nueva historia intelectual, menos atento a ciertas prescripciones de la Escuela de Cambridge de Skinner y Pocock —sobre todo las que parecen "querer apresar las ideas de una época en sus marcos lingüísticos"[9] — que a las vertientes que ponen en el centro los soportes materiales de los procesos históricos de la cultura, aquellos que se resisten a ser simplemente reducidos a texto. Comprometida en un proyecto de historización radical de las ideas, Políticas de la Memoria promovió estudios y debates sobre la problemática de la recepción y la circulación internacional de ideas y saberes, poniendo sobre todo de relieve los problemas de "traductibilidad", los "desvíos" y "malentendidos" propios de las "ideas fuera de lugar". Dentro de la renovación que conoce la historia de los intelectuales, nuestra revista atendió antes que nada a la dimensión relacional de la historia social de la cultura, prestando especial atención a las redes intelectuales, las redes editoriales y las redes revisteriles. Siguiendo estas líneas, fue plataforma de difusión de diversos referentes de esa renovación historiográfica como Enzo Traverso, Bruno Groppo, Perry Anderson, Christophe Prochasson, Daniel James, Judith Revel, Roberto Schwarz, Ricardo Melgar, Claudio Batalha, Ricardo Piglia, Giselle Sapiro, Jean-Yves Mollier, Vivek Chibber, Philippe Artières y Dominique Kalifa, entre muchos otros. Una política de edición que anticipó y complementó una revista hermana del CeDInCI como El Rodaballo, menos acotada al campo historiográfico y más abierta a los debates intelectuales, que dio a conocer entre 1994 y 2006 textos inéditos en español de Toni Negri, Michael Hardt, Perry Anderson, Robin Blackburn, Michael Löwy, Boris Kagarlitsky, Nancy Fraser, Judith Butler, André Gorz, John Holloway, Frédrik Jameson, Robert Castel, Daniel Bensaïd, Richard Greeman, Terry Eagleton, Etienne Balibar, Régis Debray y René Lourau, entre muchos otros. Con el apoyo de estas renovadas lecturas, Políticas de la Memoria garantizaba la puesta en circulación de un amplio espectro de problemas referidos al mundo de la cultura de izquierdas en Argentina, Latinoamérica y Europa; participando, de este modo, de diferentes y entrecruzadas agendas historiográficas, debates político-académicos y temas de marcada recurrencia entre historiadores y cientistas sociales. A partir de la publicación de artículos, dossiers e intervenciones se abordaron cuestiones como la recepción argentina de Marx y la configuración de una cultura marxista en nuestro país, la formación y las derivas del socialismo argentino, las vicisitudes del anarquismo en América Latina, la historia intelectual del comunismo latinoamericano, el sindicalismo y sus diversas corrientes ideológicas, el antiimperialismo en los albores del siglo XX, el indigenismo y los latinoamericanismos, los intelectuales y su relación con la política revolucionaria, los avatares del trotskismo en la Argentina, del peronismo de izquierda, de las "nuevas izquierdas" y de los grupos armados a nivel continental. Asimismo, Políticas de la Memoria dio lugar a debates recientes sobre la historia europea contemporánea (guerras mundiales, revolución rusa, totalitarismos, guerra fría), ofreciendo estudios referidos al desarrollo de los partidos socialistas y comunistas a nivel mundial y a la historia de las Internacionales Obreras. La historia del marxismo europeo y latinoamericano ocupó en sus páginas un lugar sostenido, lejos tanto del desdén de la historia académica como de los abordajes trillados de los órganos semipartidarios. La serie sobre las sucesivas "crisis del marxismo", aún en curso de publicación, ofreció textos hasta entonces inéditos en español de Masaryk, Sorel, Croce, Gentile y Mondolfo, así como los sustantivos estudios introductorios de Daniel Sazbón, Miguel Candioti y Horacio Tarcus. Finalmente, debemos destacar al anuario como uno de los pioneros en la difusión de estudios y debates sobre los movimientos feministas y sobre la cuestión sexo-genérica en la cultura de izquierdas. En la construcción sostenida de esta singular agenda de temas y de problemas, no fue menor la exhumación de documentos inéditos (piénsese en la correspondencia cruzada entre Ingenieros, Darío y Lugones, en las cartas de Simón Radowitzky a Salvadora Medina Onrubia, en la correspondencia de Mario R. Santucho con Carlos Astrada, en la de José Aricó con Héctor P. Agosti, o en las Actas del Comité Obrero de 1890) así como la incorporación de trabajos que reconstruyen la trayectoria biográfica, política e intelectual de figuras clave en la historia de las izquierdas, como Germán Avé-Lallemant, Virginia Bolten o Ernesto Laclau. Por su parte, la publicación de reseñas críticas, fichas de libros y de revistas que ofrece cada año Políticas de la Memoria —secciones que fueron engrosándose hasta formar parte constitutiva del anuario—, constituyen un insumo fundamental de actualización bibliográfica para cualquier interesado en el mundo de las izquierdas. Pero el aporte de Políticas de la Memoria a los estudios sobre la cultura de izquierdas no es simplemente temático. Su contribución tampoco se resume en la incorporación y en la difusión de autores y de obras de reconocimiento internacional. El anuario interviene en el debate de ideas y se interesa por diferentes perspectivas historiográficas: a su modo, ha formado parte del cultivado campo de la historia intelectual argentina y latinoamericana, ha mostrado un interés sostenido pero también crítico por los modos en que a menudo se cultiva la historia reciente, dando lugar a debates sobre la relación entre historia y memoria, y señalando las potencialidades y los límites de la historia oral. Políticas de la Memoria ha sido pionera en difundir nuevas corrientes de investigación dedicadas a la historia del libro y la edición, a las políticas de archivo y a la relación entre historia cultural y nueva historia política. El mero enunciado de los ejes temáticos con que fueron convocadas las sucesivas Jornadas de Historia de las Izquierdas del CeDInCI a lo largo de los últimos 20 años ofrece un índice ilustrativo de su programa historiográfico, tal y como se fue desplegando a lo largo del tiempo: "Exilios políticos latinoamericanos y argentinos" (2005); "Prensa política, revistas culturales y emprendimientos editoriales de las izquierdas latinoamericanas" (2007); "¿Las 'ideas fuera de lugar'? El problema de la recepción y la circulación de ideas en América Latina" (2009); "José Ingenieros y sus mundos" (2011); "La correspondencia en la historia política e intelectual latinoamericana" (2013); "Marxismos latinoamericanos. Tradiciones, debates y nuevas perspectivas desde la Historia cultural e intelectual" (2015); "100 años de Octubre de 1917: Peripecias latinoamericanas de un acontecimiento global" (2017). El estudio de Juan Maiguashca incluido recientemente en Marxist historiographies. A global perspective tomaba justamente a las Jornadas del CeDInCI como un índice de la renovación historiográfica latinoamericana de izquierdas posterior a los años de la "crisis del marxismo".[10] El historiador ecuatoriano, actualmente profesor de la Universidad de York, Canadá, ofrecía un cotejo entre los que identificaba como los dos polos paradigmáticos de la renovación del marxismo historiográfico de inicios de siglo: la revista mexicana Contrahistorias. La otra mirada de Clío, que fundó en 2003 Carlos Antonio Aguirre Rojas, y las jornadas bianuales del CeDInCI. Maiguashca reconocía como notas distintivas del caso argentino la creciente voluntad de exceder los límites de la historia nacional para abrazar un horizonte latinoamericano; la consolidación de un espacio de diálogo que vino a reemplazar "las actitudes solipsistas de antaño"; el rigor en el tratamiento y el citado de las fuentes; la apertura hacia los diversos marxismos y más allá de los marxismos; y la ampliación del universo de la cultura de izquierdas hacia problemáticas antes negadas o desconocidas como el feminismo, los movimientos sociales o la memoria histórica. "La preocupación obsesiva con las clases se ha ido y los participantes están comenzando a explorar con una mente abierta las importaciones analíticas de otras variables: etnia, género, territorio, entre otros".[11] Además de sus jornadas bianuales, el CeDInCI organizó o promovió la coorganización de encuentros académicos sobre campos de estudio más amplios, como los Coloquios Argentinos de estudios sobre el libro y la edición (2012, 2016 y 2018), los Encuentros de Investigadore/as del Anarquismo (2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 y 2015), el Primer Congreso de Investigadorxs sobre Anarquismo (2016), o las Jornadas de Archivo (2015 y 2017) así como el Encuentro nacional de Teoría Crítica José Sazbón (Rosario, 2010), las Jornadas Internacionales José María Aricó (Córdoba, 2011) y las Jornadas A 100 años de la Reforma Universitaria. Historia, Política, Cultura (Rosario, 2018). Además, en los últimos años, se han creado en el marco del CeDInCI dos nuevos espacios específicos que han mancomunado archivo e investigación. Primero, el Programa de Investigación del Anarquismo que animó, junto a otros colegas, un proceso de intercambio que culminó con la organización del Congreso de 2016 cuya continuidad, en un Segundo Congreso Internacional de Investigadorxs del Anarquismo, se celebrará en Montevideo en 2019. A su vez, en el año 2017 se creó el Programa de memorias políticas feministas y sexogenéricas que, con una notable Colectiva asesora, lleva adelante un intenso trabajo de recuperación, preservación y disposición a la consulta pública de un invaluable material que se encontraba en riesgo de pérdida, disperso o inaccesible. Finalmente, el CeDInCI fue parte activa de las sucesivas Jornadas de Trabajo sobre Historia Reciente, librando batallas, desde sus primeras manifestaciones en el año 2003 y hasta el presente, a favor de esa historia crítica que se resiste a ser avasallada por la memoria; el CeDInCI protagonizó asimismo las primeras manifestaciones pluralistas de los Congresos de Historia Intelectual Latinoamericana (CHIAL) realizados en Medellín (2012) y Buenos Aires (2014), tomando luego prudente distancia de un espacio que fue adquiriendo en México (2016) y más gravemente en Santiago de Chile (2018) contornos elitistas y conservadores. * * * A lo largo de estos 20 años, la producción historiográfica sobre las izquierdas conoció una expansión inédita, no sólo en nuestro país sino en toda América Latina. En los textos programáticos de la década de 1990 que anunciaban el nacimiento del CeDInCI, la bibliografía argentina sobre las izquierdas apenas superaba una carilla. Hoy contamos con una masa de estudios sobre el anarquismo, el socialismo, el reformismo universitario, el comunismo, el antifascismo, el trotskismo, el peronismo revolucionario y las diversas expresiones de la nueva izquierda que se ha tornado prácticamente inabarcable. El espectro tradicional de las izquierdas se fue complejizando con la indagación focalizada en ciertos cruces, préstamos e hibridaciones poco antes impensados, como los "anarcobolcheviques" o los "comunistas liberales". A su vez, estas corrientes son atravesadas diagonalmente por estudios innovadores sobre los intelectuales revolucionarios, las políticas editoriales, la prensa y las revistas, el papel de las juventudes, el rol de las mujeres militantes, las micropolíticas, las prácticas sexuales y las biopolíticas de las organizaciones de izquierda. El CeDInCI acompañó y contribuyó a modelar este vasto proceso de producción con su acervo siempre enriquecido, con sus jornadas y sus seminarios de posgrado, con su revista Políticas de la Memoria, con sus ediciones de fuentes y sus diccionarios biográficos. Basta repasar los centenares de agradecimientos que muchos investigadores estampan en las primeras páginas de sus tesis o de sus libros para reconocer al menos el umbral más básico de esta deuda. Además, las obras que fueron elaborando los propios hacedores del CeDInCI se han ido instalando como referencias en el campo de estudios sobre las izquierdas en Argentina y América Latina. Ahora bien, el CeDInCI ha sido apenas un propiciador de este campo. El notable dinamismo desplegado en la Argentina de los últimos veinte años ha respondido a demandas múltiples y diversas. Una de las mayores fue la que podríamos llamar la "demanda de verdad" respecto de la militancia revolucionaria de los años '60 y '70 así como de las condiciones de su represión y su derrota. Poco antes, la "demanda de justicia" propia del movimiento de derechos humanos tendía a poner a los sujetos de la política en el lugar de víctimas de la represión. En un segundo momento, el periodismo de investigación y la historiografía académica después, vinieron a reponer a esos sujetos en su condición de militantes. El auge de estudios sobre la militancia de las dos décadas de gran movilización social y radicalidad política (1955-1976) tuvo un efecto dinamizador sobre otras experiencias y otras figuras militantes de pasados algo más remotos. Esta demanda social de "verdad" fue inicialmente satisfecha por un periodismo de investigación abiertamente tensado por sus posicionamientos políticos, desde las contribuciones de Isidoro Gilbert y María Seoane hasta las de Ceferino Reato y Tata Yofre. En el campo específicamente historiográfico, algunas de las primeras respuestas surgieron de una cierta perspectiva académico-militante, de espíritu defensivo y reivindicativo, cuyo afán por exhumar documentos o recabar testimonios que probaran las correctas posiciones de las izquierdas en el pasado, o bien su profunda implantación social e incluso la aprobación social de sus acciones militares, los empujaba de modo concomitante a invisibilizar sus límites, a desproblematizar sus dilemas y a sublimar sus fracasos. En buena parte de esta literatura, la perspectiva historiográfica quedaba, así, capturada por el sistema de creencias de los propios actores que estudiaba. Estas formas de teleología obrera y de sobrepolitización de la historia apenas si se vieron neutralizadas por las exigencias de profesionalización propias de fines del siglo XX. Ciertamente, el ciclo de estudios sobre las izquierdas coincidió con un profundo proceso de profesionalización de las ciencias sociales y las humanidades que tuvo lugar a lo largo de estos veinte años: esto es, la significativa ampliación de cupos de ingreso a carrera de investigador de CONICET; la gran expansión de becas de especialización e investigación en universidades y diversas entidades científicas y académicas; y la proliferación de espacios de formación, producción y circulación de saberes disciplinares. Este proceso significó, sin duda, una necesaria y justa democratización del universo académico, fundamentalmente en lo relativo al establecimiento de condiciones materiales para la producción intelectual. Sin embargo, la normativización y objetivación —la más de las veces cuantitativa— de los criterios de acreditación, evaluación y legitimación del quehacer intelectual implicaron en contrapartida una penalización a la historiografía más elaborada, crítica y original. La producción en serie de papers y artículos en los que prima la descripción —a veces minuciosa o erudita, otras no tanto— por sobre la interrogación y la construcción de objetos-problema; las escrituras que en su afán de productividad han abandonado todo debate, toda pretensión teórica o cuanto menos reflexiva, es la que predomina hoy en nuestros campos disciplinares. La cuestión excede con creces, por supuesto, a la historiografía de izquierdas, pero es ésta la que nos interesa aquí. Este sistema cuantitativo de evaluación y legitimación ha sido incluso perfectamente funcional para el crecimiento de esas versiones de la historia obrera tradicional o de la historia partidaria, permitiéndoles acomodarse perfectamente a unas reglas que exigen alta productividad antes que problematización de los objetos y avances reales en la construcción social del conocimiento histórico. El balance de conjunto de la producción de estos últimos veinte años sobre las izquierdas aún está por hacerse. Aquí sólo quisimos avanzar en algunos señalamientos que hacen al específico posicionamiento del CeDInCI, entre los riesgos de partidización de la historia reciente, por un lado, y ciertas derivas elitistas y despolitizadoras de la nueva historia intelectual, por otro. Nos propusimos incitar a un debate colectivo que sirva como balance de lo producido y como actualización de una agenda historiográfica para el estudio de las izquierdas, que tal como había sido formulada veinte años atrás, ya ha quedado en cierto modo realizada, y por lo tanto anticuada. El aniversario, además de la congratulación, puede ser una excelente oportunidad para barajar y dar de nuevo, para debatir colectivamente cuál es hoy el mapa de la historiografía de izquierdas; cuáles sus dispositivos teórico-metodológicos y sus redes conceptuales más destacadas; cuáles sus imbricaciones y apuestas político-intelectuales; cuáles son sus tensiones; qué tradiciones político-ideológicas se perpetúan en las escrituras actuales; cuáles han sido desechadas, cuáles olvidadas, cuáles actualizadas; cuáles son sus puentes, cuáles sus distancias con el espacio más general de la memoria. Incluso cabe preguntarse: ¿Puede hablarse de un campo de estudio de las izquierdas?, o incluso: ¿qué sería hoy una historiografía de izquierdas? Para ello, invitamos a colegas y amigos a participar de las próximas Xas Jornadas de Historia de las Izquierdas Dos décadas de historia de las izquierdas latinoamericanas. Aniversario y balance, los días 20, 21 y 22 de noviembre de 2019. Beba Balvé, Miguel Murmis, Juan Carlos Marín, Lidia Aufgang, Tomás J. Bar y Roberto Jacoby, Lucha de calles, lucha de clases. Elementos para su análisis (Córdoba, 1961-1969), Buenos Aires, La Rosa Blindada, 1973. ↑ Tan sólo a modo de ejemplo: en sentido opuesto a la expresa declaración de su autor, el enfoque de Oposición obrera a la dictadura (Buenos Aires, Contrapunto, 1988) de Pablo Pozzi era escasamente thompsoniano. Lejos de tomar la dimensión de la experiencia como constitutiva de la clase obrera, no hacía más que evaluar las prácticas de resistencia obrera construidas empíricamente con el rasero de una conciencia de clase previamente establecida (en un sentido, justamente, pre-thompsoniano). ↑ Programa de Estudios de Historia Económica y Social Americana. ↑ Juan Suriano, Trabajadores, anarquismo y Estado represor : De la Ley de Residencia a la Ley de Defensa Social (1902-1910), Buenos Aires, CEAL, 1988; y Anarquistas. Cultura y política libertaria en Buenos Aires. 1890-1910, Buenos Aires, Manantial, 2001. ↑ Leandro Gutiérrez, Luis Alberto Romero, "Los sectores populares y el movimiento obrero: un balance historiográfico", en Sectores populares. Cultura y política, Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 1995. ↑ Jeremy Adelman (ed.), Essays in Argentine Labour History 1870-1930, Londres, Macmillan Press, 1992, incluyó estudios de Juan Suriano, Hilda Sábato, Silvia Badoza, Mirta Lobato, Ofelia Pianetto, Ruth Thompson, Colin M. Lewis, Eduardo A. Zimmermann, Leandro H. Gutiérrez, Luis Alberto Romero y el propio Jeremy Adelman. ↑ Horacio Tarcus, El marxismo olvidado en la Argentina: Silvio Frondizi y Milcíades Peña, Buenos Aires, El Cielo por Asalto, 1996; Horacio Tarcus, Mariátegui en la Argentina, o las políticas culturales de Samuel Glusberg, Buenos Aires, El Cielo por Asalto, 2001; H. Tarcus, J. Cernadas y R. Pittaluga, "Para una historia de la izquierda en la Argentina. Reflexiones preliminares", en El Rodaballo nº 6/7, Buenos Aires, otoño/invierno 1997, pp. 28-38; Íbid., "La historiografía sobre el Partido Comunista de la Argentina: un estado de la cuestión", en El Rodaballo. Revista de política y cultura nº 8, Buenos Aires, otoño/invierno 1998, pp. 31-40. ↑ Horacio Tarcus, "La secta política. Ensayo acerca de la pervivencia de lo sagrado en la modernidad", en El Rodaballo. Revista de política y cultura, nº 9, Buenos Aires, verano 1998/99, pp. 13-33. ↑ Enzo Traverso, La historia como campo de batalla, Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2012, pp. 22; véase una crítica semejante en el estudio de Michael Heinrich que ofrecemos en este mismo número. ↑ Q. Edward Wang and Georg G. Iggers (eds.), Marxist historiographies. A global perspective, New York, Routledge, 2016. El estudio de Juan Maiguashca apareció inicialmente como "Latin American Marxist History: Rise, fall and resurrection", en Storia della Storiografia nº 62, Pisa, 2012, pp. 105-120. Hay una versión española de Isabel Mena: "Historia marxista latinoamericana: nacimiento, caída y resurrección", en Procesos. Revista ecuatoriana de historia nº 62, Quito, segundo semestre 2013, disponible en: http://revistaprocesos.ec/ojs/index.php/ojs/article/view/6/24 ↑ Juan Maiguashca , "Historia marxista latinoamericana: nacimiento, caída y resurrección", op. cit., p. 106. ↑

© 2021 The Authors. ; The third edition of Flow Cytometry Guidelines provides the key aspects to consider when performing flow cytometry experiments and includes comprehensive sections describing phenotypes and functional assays of all major human and murine immune cell subsets. Notably, the Guidelines contain helpful tables highlighting phenotypes and key differences between human and murine cells. Another useful feature of this edition is the flow cytometry analysis of clinical samples with examples of flow cytometry applications in the context of autoimmune diseases, cancers as well as acute and chronic infectious diseases. Furthermore, there are sections detailing tips, tricks and pitfalls to avoid. All sections are written and peer-reviewed by leading flow cytometry experts and immunologists, making this edition an essential and state-of-the-art handbook for basic and clinical researchers. ; Hyun-Dong Chang is supported by the Dr. Rolf M. Schwiete Foundation. Susanne Melzer and Attila Tarnok thank De Novo Software for providing FCS Express. Enrico Lugli is supported by a grant from the Associazione Italiana per la Ricerca sul Cancro (AIRC IG20676). Gabriele De Simone and Giovanni Galletti were supported by Fellowships from the Fondazione Italiana per la Ricerca sul Cancro-Associazione Italiana per la Ricerca sul Cancro (FIRC-AIRC). Jun Dong is supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschft (DFG, German Research Foundation) Projektnummer 389687267 and Chinesisch-Deutsches Zentrum für Wissenschaftsförderung [Sino-German Center for Research Promotion (SGC)] grant C-0072. Nicola Gagliani, Samuel Huber and Franziska Muscate are supported by DFG fundings: SFB841,GA 2441/3-1, HU 1714/10-1. The tetramer APC-conjugated H-2K (d) HIV-1 gag197-205 AMQMLKETI used in TDS assay for mouse blood T cells was obtained through the NIH Tetramer Facility. Larissa Nogueira Almeida was supported by DFG research grant MA 2273/14-1. Supported by the following grants: AIRC 5X1000 2018 id. 21147 (Lorenzo Moretta); AIRC IG 2017 id. 19920 (Lorenzo Moretta); RC-2020 OPBG (Lorenzo Moretta); AIRC and European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 800924 (Linda Quatrini). Dirk Baumjohann was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Emmy Noether Programme BA 5132/1-2 (252623821) and Germany's Excellence Strategy EXC2151 (390873048).

European Research Council and EU, Grant/Award Number: AdG‐250189, PoC‐727440 and ERC‐SyG‐2013‐610028; Natural Environmental Research Council, Grant/Award Number: NE/L002531/1; National Science Foundation, Grant/Award Number: DEB‐1237733, DEB‐1456729, 9714103, 0632263, 0856516, 1432277, DEB‐9705814, BSR‐8811902, DEB 9411973, DEB 0080538, DEB 0218039, DEB 0620910, DEB 0963447, DEB‐1546686, DEB‐129764, OCE 95‐21184, OCE‐ 0099226, OCE 03‐52343, OCE‐0623874, OCE‐1031061, OCE‐1336206 and DEB‐1354563; National Science Foundation (LTER) , Grant/Award Number: DEB‐1235828, DEB‐1440297, DBI‐0620409, DEB‐9910514, DEB‐1237517, OCE‐0417412, OCE‐1026851, OCE‐1236905, OCE‐1637396, DEB 1440409, DEB‐0832652, DEB‐0936498, DEB‐0620652, DEB‐1234162 and DEB‐0823293; Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia, Grant/Award Number: POPH/FSE SFRH/BD/90469/2012, SFRH/BD/84030/2012, PTDC/BIA‐BIC/111184/2009; SFRH/BD/80488/2011 and PD/BD/52597/2014; Ciência sem Fronteiras/CAPES, Grant/Award Number: 1091/13‐1; Instituto Milenio de Oceanografía, Grant/Award Number: IC120019; ARC Centre of Excellence, Grant/Award Number: CE0561432; NSERC Canada; CONICYT/FONDECYT, Grant/Award Number: 1160026, ICM PO5‐002, CONICYT/FONDECYT, 11110351, 1151094, 1070808 and 1130511; RSF, Grant/Award Number: 14‐50‐00029; Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, Grant/Award Number: GBMF4563; Catalan Government; Marie Curie Individual Fellowship, Grant/Award Number: QLK5‐CT2002‐51518 and MERG‐CT‐2004‐022065; CNPq, Grant/Award Number: 306170/2015‐9, 475434/2010‐2, 403809/2012‐6 and 561897/2010; FAPESP (São Paulo Research Foundation), Grant/Award Number: 2015/10714‐6, 2015/06743‐0, 2008/10049‐9, 2013/50714‐0 and 1999/09635‐0 e 2013/50718‐5; EU CLIMOOR, Grant/Award Number: ENV4‐CT97‐0694; VULCAN, Grant/Award Number: EVK2‐CT‐2000‐00094; Spanish, Grant/Award Number: REN2000‐0278/CCI, REN2001‐003/GLO and CGL2016‐79835‐P; Catalan, Grant/Award Number: AGAUR SGR‐2014‐453 and SGR‐2017‐1005; DFG, Grant/Award Number: 120/10‐2; Polar Continental Shelf Program; CENPES – PETROBRAS; FAPERJ, Grant/Award Number: E‐26/110.114/2013; German Academic Exchange Service; sDiv; iDiv; New Zealand Department of Conservation; Wellcome Trust, Grant/Award Number: 105621/Z/14/Z; Smithsonian Atherton Seidell Fund; Botanic Gardens and Parks Authority; Research Council of Norway; Conselleria de Innovació, Hisenda i Economia; Yukon Government Herschel Island‐Qikiqtaruk Territorial Park; UK Natural Environment Research Council ShrubTundra Grant, Grant/Award Number: NE/M016323/1; IPY; Memorial University; ArcticNet. DOI:10.13039/50110000027. Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research in the Tropics NWO, grant W84‐194. Ciências sem Fronteiras and Coordenação de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES, Brazil), Grant/Award Number: 1091/13‐1. National Science foundation (LTER), Award Number: OCE‐9982105, OCE‐0620276, OCE‐1232779. FCT ‐ SFRH / BPD / 82259 / 2011. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service/State Wildlife federal grant number T‐15. Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies (CE140100020). Australian Research Council Future Fellowship FT110100609. M.B., A.J., K.P., J.S. received financial support from internal funds of University of Lódź. NSF DEB 1353139. Catalan Government fellowships (DURSI): 1998FI‐00596, 2001BEAI200208, MECD Post‐doctoral fellowship EX2002‐0022. National Science Foundation Award OPP‐1440435. FONDECYT 1141037 and FONDAP 15150003 (IDEAL). CNPq Grant 306595‐2014‐1 ; Peer reviewed ; Publisher PDF

Skowron, Jan/0000-0002-2335-1730; Sokolovsky, Kirill/0000-0001-5991-6863; Jovanovic, Miljana D/0000-0003-4298-3247; Harrison, Diana/0000-0001-8687-6588; Esenoglu, Hasan/0000-0003-3531-7510; Bonanos, Alceste Z/0000-0003-2851-1905; Liakos, Alexios/0000-0002-0490-1469; Reig, Pablo/0000-0002-6446-3050; D'Ago, Giuseppe/0000-0001-9697-7331; Martinez, Josep Manel Carrasco/0000-0002-3029-5853; Burgaz, Umut/0000-0003-0126-3999; Wyrzykowski, Lukasz/0000-0002-9658-6151; Lu, Jessica/0000-0001-9611-0009; Jensen, Eric/0000-0002-4625-7333; Chruslinska, Martyna/0000-0002-8901-6994; Mozdzierski, Dawid/0000-0002-3861-9031; Ranc, Clement/0000-0003-2388-4534; G. C., Anupama/0000-0003-3533-7183; Strobl, Jan/0000-0002-4147-2878; Russell, David/0000-0002-3500-631X; Pawlak, Michal/0000-0002-5632-9433; BAKIS, VOLKAN/0000-0002-3125-9010; Seabroke, George/0000-0003-4072-9536; Sitek, Monika/0000-0002-1568-4551; Kilic, Yucel/0000-0001-8641-0796; Netzel, Henryka/0000-0001-5608-0028; Nesci, Roberto/0000-0002-6645-6372; Iwanek, Patryk/0000-0002-6212-7221; Leto, Giuseppe/0000-0002-0040-5011; Awiphan, Supachai/0000-0003-3251-3583; Norton, Andrew/0000-0001-7619-8269; Kolb, Ulrich/0000-0001-8670-8365; Altavilla, Giuseppe/0000-0002-9934-1352; Itoh, Ryosuke/0000-0002-1183-8955; Gromadzki, Mariusz/0000-0002-1650-1518; Szegedi, Helene/0000-0002-9904-3582; Baker, Steven/0000-0002-6436-1257; Zielinski, Pawel/0000-0001-6434-9429; Kurowski, Sebastian/0000-0002-1557-0343 ; WOS:000508411900001 ; Gaia16aye was a binary microlensing event discovered in the direction towards the northern Galactic disc and was one of the first microlensing events detected and alerted to by the Gaia space mission. Its light curve exhibited five distinct brightening episodes, reaching up to I = 12 mag, and it was covered in great detail with almost 25 000 data points gathered by a network of telescopes. We present the photometric and spectroscopic follow-up covering 500 days of the event evolution. We employed a full Keplerian binary orbit microlensing model combined with the motion of Earth and Gaia around the Sun to reproduce the complex light curve. The photometric data allowed us to solve the microlensing event entirely and to derive the complete and unique set of orbital parameters of the binary lensing system. We also report on the detection of the first-ever microlensing space-parallax between the Earth and Gaia located at L2. The properties of the binary system were derived from microlensing parameters, and we found that the system is composed of two main-sequence stars with masses 0.57 +/- 0.05 M-circle dot and 0.36 +/- 0.03 M-circle dot at 780 pc, with an orbital period of 2.88 years and an eccentricity of 0.30. We also predict the astrometric microlensing signal for this binary lens as it will be seen by Gaia as well as the radial velocity curve for the binary system. Events such as Gaia16aye indicate the potential for the microlensing method of probing the mass function of dark objects, including black holes, in directions other than that of the Galactic bulge. This case also emphasises the importance of long-term time-domain coordinated observations that can be made with a network of heterogeneous telescopes. ; Polish National Sci-ence Centre (NCN): HARMONIA NCN grant [2015/18/M/ST9/00544]; Polish National Sci-ence Centre (NCN): OPUS NCN grant [2015/17/B/ST9/03167]; Polish National Sci-ence Centre (NCN): DAINA NCN grant [2017/27/L/ST9/03221]; European CommissionEuropean CommissionEuropean Commission Joint Research Centre [312430, 730890]; Polish Ministry of Higher EducationMinistry of Science and Higher Education, Poland [3040/7.PR/2014/2, DIR/WK/2018/12]; MAESTRO NCN grant [2014/14/A/ST9/00121]; DDT programmes [SW2016b12, A34DDT3]; UK Science and Technology Facilities CouncilUK Research & Innovation (UKRI)Science & Technology Facilities Council (STFC); Foundation for Polish Science (Program START); National Science Center, PolandNational Science Centre, Poland [ETIUDA 2018/28/T/ST9/00096]; Slovenian Research AgencySlovenian Research Agency - Slovenia [P1-0031, J1-8136]; COST Action GWverseEuropean Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST) [CA16104]; National Research Foundation of KoreaNational Research Foundation of Korea [2017R1A4A1015178]; STFCUK Research & Innovation (UKRI)Science & Technology Facilities Council (STFC); European Space Agency under the NELIOTA program [4000112943]; GROWTH project - National Science Foundation [1545949]; MINECO (Spanish Ministry of Economy) [ESP2016-80079-C2-1-R, ESP2014-55996-C2-1-R, RTI2018-095076B-C21]; ICCUB (Unidad de Excelencia a Maria de Maeztu) [MDM-2014-0369]; Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (ASI)Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (ASI) [ASI I/058/10/0, ASI 2014-025-R.1.2015]; Royal Society Research GrantRoyal Society of London [RG170230]; Ministry of Science and Technology (Taiwan)Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan [104-2112-M-008-012MY3, 104-2923-M-008-004-MY5]; European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013)/ERC Grant [320964]; Gordon and Betty Moore FoundationGordon and Betty Moore Foundation [GBMF5490]; NSFNational Science Foundation (NSF) [AST-1515927, AST-0908816, AST-1412587]; Mt. Cuba Astronomical Foundation; Center for Cosmology and AstroParticle Physics at the Ohio State UniversityOhio State University; Chinese Academy of Sciences South America Center for Astronomy (CAS-SACA); Villum Foundation; MINECO under the Ramon y Cajal programme [RYC-2016-20254]; MINECO [AYA2017-86274-P]; AGAUR grantAgencia de Gestio D'Ajuts Universitaris de Recerca Agaur (AGAUR) [SGR-661/2017]; Science and Technology Facilities CouncilUK Research & Innovation (UKRI)Science & Technology Facilities Council (STFC) [ST/P000541/1]; STFC consolidated grant [ST/M001296/1]; Research Council of LithuaniaResearch Council of Lithuania (LMTLT) [S-LL-19-2]; TUB.ITAKTurkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Arastirma Kurumu (TUBITAK); IKI; KFU; AST; National Science Fund (Bulgaria)National Science Fund of Bulgaria [DN 18/13-12.12.2017]; Institute of Astronomy via research project "Study of ICRF radio-sources and fast variable astronomical objects"; NAO Rozhen, BAS, via research project "Study of ICRF radio-sources and fast variable astronomical objects"; Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia [176011, 176004, 176021]; DFGGerman Research Foundation (DFG)European Commission [SPP 1992, WA 1074/11-1]; NCN [2016/21/B/ST9/01126]; MINECO Ramon y Cajal programme [AYA2017-86274-P, RYJ-2016-20254]; Robert Martin Ayers Sciences Fund; National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationNational Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) [NNX08AR22G]; National Science FoundationNational Science Foundation (NSF) [AST-1238877]; W. M. Keck FoundationW.M. Keck Foundation; ICCUB (Unidad de Excelencia 'Maria de Maeztu') [MDM-2014-0369]; [3.6714.2017/8.9] ; This work relies on the results from the European Space Agency (ESA) space mission Gaia. Gaia data are being processed by the Gaia Data Processing and Analysis Consortium (DPAC). Funding for the DPAC is provided by national institutions, in particular the institutions participating in the Gaia Multi-Lateral Agreement (MLA). The Gaia mission website is https://www.cosmos.esa.int/gaia.In particular we acknowledge Gaia Photomet-ric Science Alerts Team, website http://gsaweb.ast.cam.ac.uk/alerts.We thank the members of the OGLE team for discussions and support. We also would like to thank the Polish Children Fund (KFnRD) for support of an internship of their pupils in Ostrowik Observatory of the Warsaw Univ-ersity, during which some of the data were collected, in particular we thank: Robert Nowicki, Michal Por.ebski and Karol Niczyj. The work presented here has been supported by the following grants from the Polish National Sci-ence Centre (NCN): HARMONIA NCN grant 2015/18/M/ST9/00544, OPUS NCN grant 2015/17/B/ST9/03167, DAINA NCN grant 2017/27/L/ST9/03221, as well as European Commission's FP7 and H2020 OPTICON grants (312430 and 730890), Polish Ministry of Higher Education support for OPTICON FP7, 3040/7.PR/2014/2, MNiSW grant DIR/WK/2018/12. PMr and JS acknowledge support from MAESTRO NCN grant 2014/14/A/ST9/00121 to Andrzej Udal-ski. We would like to thank the following members of the AAVSO for their amazing work with collecting vast amounts of data: Teofilo Arranz, James Boardman, Stephen Brincat, Geoff Chaplin, Emery Erdelyi, Rafael Farfan, William Goff, Franklin Guenther, Kevin Hills, Jens Jacobsen, Raymond Kneip, David Lane, Fernando Limon Martinez, Gianpiero Locatelli, Andrea Mantero, Attila Madai, Peter Meadows, Otmar Nickel, Arto Oksanen, Luis Perez, Roger Pieri, Ulisse Quadri, Diego Rodriguez Perez, Frank Schorr, George Sjoberg, Andras Timar, Ray Tomlin, Tonny Vanmunster, Klaus Wenzel, Thomas Wikander. We also thank the amateur observers from around the world, in particular, Pietro Capuozzo, Leone Trascianelli, Igor Zharkov from Ardingly College and Angelo Tomassini, Karl-Ludwig Bath. We also thank Roger Pickard from the British Astronomical Association and Matthias Penselin from the German Haus der Astronomie association for their contributions. KS thanks Dr. Dmitry Chulkov and Dr. Panagiotis Gavras for the interesting discussion of stellar multiplicity. We acknowledge support of DDT programmes SW2016b12 (WHT) and A34DDT3 (TNG). The INT, TNG and WHT are operated on the island of La Palma by the Isaac Newton Group of Telescopes in the Spanish Observatorio del Roque de los Muchachos of the Instituto de Astrofisica de Canarias. The Liverpool Telescope is operated on the island of La Palma by Liverpool John Moores University in the Spanish Observatorio del Roque de los Muchachos of the Instituto de Astrofisica de Canarias with financial support from the UK Science and Technology Facilities Council. SJF would like to thank the UCL students who assisted with the collection and checking of UCLO data for the observing campaign: Martina Aghopian, Ashleigh Arendt, Artem Barinov, Luke Barrett, Jasper Berry-Gair, Arjun Bhogal, Charles Bowesman, William Boyd, Andrei Cuceu, Michael Davies, Max Freedman, Gabriel Fu, Abirami Govindaraju, Iandeep Hothi, Clara Matthews Torres, Darius Modirrousta-Galian, Petru Neague, George Pattinson, Xiaoxi Song, and Brian Yu. P.Mr. acknowledges support from the Foundation for Polish Science (Program START) and the National Science Center, Poland (grant ETIUDA 2018/28/T/ST9/00096).; r r AC, AG and NI acknowledge the financial support from the Slovenian Research Agency (research core funding No. P1-0031 and project grant No. J1-8136)and networking support by the COST Action GWverse CA16104. Skinakas Observatory is a collaborative project of the University of Crete and the Foundation for Research and Technology-Hellas. Work by C.H. was supported by the grant (2017R1A4A1015178) of National Research Foundation of Korea. KW acknowledges funding from STFC, and thanks the University of Lei-cester for the investment in instrumentation. We gratefully acknowledge financial support by the European Space Agency under the NELIOTA program, contract No. 4000112943. This work has made use of data obtained with the Kryoneri Prime Focus Instrument, developed by the European Space Agency NELIOTA project on the 1.2 m Kryoneri telescope, which is operated by IAASARS, National Observatory of Athens, Greece. The Aristarchos tele-scope is operated on Helmos Observatory by the IAASARS of the National Observatory of Athens. This work was supported by the GROWTH project funded by the National Science Foundation under Grant No 1545949. This work was supported by the MINECO (Spanish Ministry of Economy) through grant ESP2016-80079-C2-1-R (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and ESP2014-55996-C2-1-R (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and MDM-2014-0369 of ICCUB (Unidad de Excelencia a Maria de Maeztu). This work was supported by the MINECO (Spanish Ministry of Economy) through grant ESP2016-80079-C2-1-R and RTI2018-095076B-C21 (MINECO/FEDER, UE), and MDM-2014-0369 of ICCUB (Unidad de Excelencia 'Maria de Maeztu'). The Joan Oro Telescope (TJO) of the Montsec Astronomical Observatory (OAdM) is owned by the Catalan Government and is operated by the Institute for Space Studies of Catalonia (IEEC). Support to this study has been provided by Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (ASI) through grants ASI I/058/10/0 and ASI 2014-025-R.1.2015. KW thanks Dipali Thanki and Ray McErlean for their technical support of the scientific programme of the University of Leicester observatory. This work was supported by Royal Society Research Grant RG170230. CCN thanks the funding from Ministry of Science and Technology (Taiwan) under the contracts 104-2112-M-008-012MY3 and 104-2923-M-008-004-MY5. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013)/ERC Grant Agreement n. 320964 (WDTracer). We thank the Las Cumbres Observatory and its sta ff for its continuing support of the project. ASAS-SN is supported by the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation through grant GBMF5490 to the Ohio State University and NSF grant AST-1515927. Development of ASAS-SN has been supported by NSF grant AST-0908816, the Mt. Cuba Astronomical Foundation, the Center for Cosmology and AstroParticle Physics at the Ohio State University, the Chinese Academy of Sciences South America Center for Astronomy (CAS-SACA), the Villum Foundation, and George Skestos. ARM acknowledges support from the MINECO under the Ramon y Cajal programme (RYC-2016-20254) and the AYA2017-86274-P grant, and the AGAUR grant SGR-661/2017. We acknowledge support from the Science and Technology Facilities Council (TB and RWW; ST/P000541/1). K.Horne acknowledges support from STFC consolidated grant ST/M001296/1. This work was partly supported by the Research Council of Lithuania, grant No. S-LL-19-2 Authors thank to TUB.ITAK, IKI, KFU, and AST for partial supports in using RTT150 (Russian-Turkish 1.5-m telescope in Antalya).; r r This work was partially funded by the subsidy 3.6714.2017/8.9 allocated to Kazan Federal University for the state assignment in the sphere of scientific activities. This research was partially supported by contract DN 18/13-12.12.2017 with the National Science Fund (Bulgaria). Work by YS was supported by an appointment to the NASA Postdoctoral Program at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, administered by Uni-versities Space Research Associ-ation through a contract with NASA. GD gratefully acknowledges the obser-ving grant support from the Institute of Astronomy and NAO Rozhen, BAS, via bilateral joint research project "Study of ICRF radio-sources and fast variable astronomical objects" (PI:G.Damljanovic). This work is a part of the Projects no. 176011 "Dynamics and kinematics of celestial bodies and systems", no. 176004 "Stellar physics" and no. 176021 "Visible and invisible matter in nearby galaxies: theory and observations" supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia. YT acknowledges the support of DFG priority program SPP 1992 "Exploring the diversity of Extrasolar Planets" (WA 1074/11-1). This work of PMi, DM and ZK was supported by the NCN grant no. 2016/21/B/ST9/01126. ARM acknowledges support from the MINECO Ramon y Cajal programme RYJ-2016-20254 and grant AYA2017-86274-P and from the AGAUR grant SGR-661/2017. The work by C. R. was supported by an appointment to the NASA Postdoctoral Program at the Goddard Space Flight Center, administered by USRA through a contract with NASA. The Faulkes Telescope Project is an education partner of Las Cumbres Observatory (LCO). The Faulkes Telescopes are maintained and operated by LCO. This research was made possible through the use of the AAVSO Photomet-ric All-Sky Survey (APASS), funded by the Robert Martin Ayers Sciences Fund and NSF AST-1412587. The Pan-STARRS1 Surveys (PS1) and the PS1 public science archive have been made possible through contributions by the Institute for Astronomy, the University of Hawaii, the Pan-STARRS Project O ffice, the Max-Planck Society and its participating institutes, the Max Planck Institute for Astronomy, Heidelberg and the Max Planck Institute for Extraterrestrial Physics, Garching, The Johns Hopkins University, Durham University, the University of Edinburgh, the Queen's University Belfast, the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, the Las Cumbres Observatory Global Telescope Network Incor-porated, the National Central University of Taiwan, the Space Telescope Sci-ence Institute, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under Grant No. NNX08AR22G issued through the Planetary Science Division of the NASA Science Mission Directorate, the National Science Foundation Grant No. AST-1238877, the University of Maryland, Eotvos Lorand University (ELTE), the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. Some of the data presented herein were obtained at the W. M. Keck Observatory, which is operated as a scientific partnership among the California Ins-titute of Technology, the University of California and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The Observatory was made possible by the generous financial support of the W. M. Keck Foundation.

We conducted preregistered replications of 28 classic and contemporary published findings, with protocols that were peer reviewed in advance, to examine variation in effect magnitudes across samples and settings. Each protocol was administered to approximately half of 125 samples that comprised 15,305 participants from 36 countries and territories. Using the conventional criterion of statistical significance (p < .05), we found that 15 (54%) of the replications provided evidence of a statistically significant effect in the same direction as the original finding. With a strict significance criterion (p < .0001), 14 (50%) of the replications still provided such evidence, a reflection of the extremely high-powered design. Seven (25%) of the replications yielded effect sizes larger than the original ones, and 21 (75%) yielded effect sizes smaller than the original ones. The median comparable Cohen's ds were 0.60 for the original findings and 0.15 for the replications. The effect sizes were small (< 0.20) in 16 of the replications (57%), and 9 effects (32%) were in the direction opposite the direction of the original effect. Across settings, the Q statistic indicated significant heterogeneity in 11 (39%) of the replication effects, and most of those were among the findings with the largest overall effect sizes; only 1 effect that was near zero in the aggregate showed significant heterogeneity according to this measure. Only 1 effect had a tau value greater than .20, an indication of moderate heterogeneity. Eight others had tau values near or slightly above .10, an indication of slight heterogeneity. Moderation tests indicated that very little heterogeneity was attributable to the order in which the tasks were performed or whether the tasks were administered in lab versus online. Exploratory comparisons revealed little heterogeneity between Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) cultures and less WEIRD cultures (i.e., cultures with relatively high and low WEIRDness scores, respectively). Cumulatively, variability in the observed effect sizes was attributable more to the effect being studied than to the sample or setting in which it was studied.

This paper aims to examine how effective Cuba's national security services were in working with drug traffickers to obtain their national goals, how exactly the Cuban government was involved and when these drug operations began, as well as the level of culpability on the part of the Castro brothers and legal veracity of the drug trials. Given the extreme lack of academic study into Cuban intelligence and their potential involvement in the drug trade, this research (utilizing interviews with persons who have direct involvement and insight, analyzing declassified files and memorandums) is highly instrumental in determining how effective Cuba has been in making effective foreign policy in addition to offering insights into how Cuba's military and intelligence agencies have performed covert action operations. ; Winner of the 2021 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Graduate category. ; CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY "Trafficking for a Cause": Cuban Drug Trafficking Operations as a Foreign Policy Alan Chase Cunningham Norwich University Advisor: Gamze Menali 01 June 2021 CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham ABSTRACT A capable intelligence service and military force is immensely integral to the national security policy of any nation, regardless of their political ideology or international activity. Cuba's national security apparatuses have proven themselves time and again to be exceptional at accomplishing the Republic's foreign policy goals. From the nation's early beginnings, in the 1960s and 70s, elements of the Cuban government were involved in the drug trade, either on an official or unofficial basis, utilizing drug trafficking as a form of aiding likeminded non-state actors, acquiring small arms and other weaponry, gaining U.S. currency, and making war against the United States. In the 1980s, following increased international outcry, multiple members of Cuba's military and intelligence forces were arrested, tried, and either executed or sentenced to prison for their roles in the drug trade. Many international observers, alongside defectors from Cuba's military and intelligence services and foreign governments, claimed that these trials were for show designed to protect the Castros. This paper aims to examine how effective Cuba's national security services were in working with drug traffickers to obtain their national goals, how exactly the Cuban government was involved and when these drug operations began, as well as the level of culpability on the part of the Castro brothers and legal veracity of the drug trials. Given the extreme lack of academic study into Cuban intelligence and their potential involvement in the drug trade, this research (utilizing interviews with persons who have direct involvement and insight, analyzing declassified files and memorandums) is highly instrumental in determining how effective Cuba has been in making effective foreign policy in addition to offering insights into how Cuba's military and intelligence agencies have performed covert action operations. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would first like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Gamze Menali, at Norwich University. She provided exceptional advice and support that was highly integral to the completion of this thesis and my degree. Her comments were always well-received and significantly bolstered my paper's overall effect and allowed my research to take on a professional quality. A better advisor could not have been provided nor found. I additionally must thank those persons who sacrificed their time and allowed themselves to be interviewed for my final project. Bobby Chacon of the FBI, Fulton Armstrong of the Intelligence Community, Harry Sommers of the DEA, Mike Powers of the DEA, Pierre Charette of the DEA, Richard Gregorie of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, Mike Waniewski of the DEA, Harry Fullett of the DEA, and Seth Taylor of the U.S. Customs Service. This work is intended to honor them and their years of service and dedication to the U.S. government. I would also like to thank two professors whom were of immense importance in my academic career; Professor Jonathan Brown and Assistant Professor Joshua Frens-String of the University of Texas. Both sparked my interest in Latin American affairs and guided me on how to conduct historical research. They were inspirations and role models for me as a historian. Finally, I would like to offer special thanks to both my mother and father who supported me in more ways than one through my entire educational career. My family, importantly Kaytlynn Lopez, were a source for comfort, relaxation, and support throughout this endeavor. I could not have done this without any of them. I hope this work looks well upon all of those who helped and inspired me and allows a new generation of researchers and scholars to better understand this period in Cuban history. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham Table of Contents Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….01 A Basic History of Cuba's Military and Intelligence Services……………………………….03 Early Beginnings: Cuba and Drugs in the 1960s…………………………………………….07 A Change in Policy: Cuba and Drugs in the 1970s………………………………………….16 The Cocaine Boom: Cuba and Drugs in 1980s……………………………………………….21 The Question of Culpability on the Part of the Castros…………………………………….52 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………61 CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham1 Introduction Cuba's intelligence and military services are among the best in the world. They have been described in laudatory terms by intelligence professionals, national security theorists, and academics alike. Brian Latell, a former National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Latin America and career Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst, agrees and recounts how veteran counterintelligence officers from all areas of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) would, "stand in awe of how Cuba, a small island nation, could have built up such exceptional clandestine capabilities and run so many successful operations against American targets".1 The CIA's former Chief of Counterintelligence, James M. Olson, agrees, writing, "no foreign intelligence service rankled me more than [Cuba's]…It was ruthless, it was devious, and worst of all, it was very, very good".2 Analysts from the research and analysis think tank CNA agree with Latell, writing, "[Cuba's] intelligence services are widely regarded as among the best in the world – a significant accomplishment given the country's meager financial and technological resources".3 The longtime lead historian of Cuban affairs, Jorge I. Dominguez, wrote in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, "Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)…have been among the world's most successful military".4 Longtime attorney and the Chief of Narcotics for the U.S. 1 Brian Latell, Castro's Secrets: The CIA and Cuba's Intelligence Machine (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 01, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/733231302. 2 James M. Olson, To Catch A Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2019), p. 31, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/1055568332. 3 Sean Durns, "Castro's dead, but his spies live on," The Hill, Capitol Hill Publishing, published 05 December 2016, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/308811-castros-dead-but-his-spies-live-on. 4 Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Military and Politics," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, published 29 May 2020, https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1810. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham2 Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (USAO-SDFL) during the early 1980s, Richard Gregorie, has said that Cuba's intelligence services "is better than the CIA in Miami".5 It is apparent that, across multiple fields and specialties, Cuba is a well-regarded foreign power with a highly effective intelligence apparatus and robust military force. Not only that, but Cuba has been able to maintain effective relationships with like-minded state and non-state actors. Throughout the Cold War, Cuba maintained effective relationships with Latin American states by encouraging leftist revolutions amongst foreign populaces and aligning with foreign political parties6, becoming a benefactor to various regimes, political parties, and revolutionary groups in places like Venezuela, Angola, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. These relationships were maintained in a variety of ways from the providing of covert financial and military aid to the physical commitment of Cuban troops to ground warfare. It is well documented that, one of these relationships included the providing of security to drug traffickers and the usage of Cuba as a weigh station for drug traffickers. Through this almost three decade long covert operation, Cuba was heavily entrenched in building up beneficial relationships with non-state actors like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and legitimate nation states like Manuel Noriega's Panama, finding a steady source of income, and being able to make war against their age old adversary, the United States of America. By efficiently coordinating these operations and working to traffic illicit substances abroad, Cuba was able to improve their standing in Latin America and assist in the making of revolution abroad, essentially using the trafficking of drugs and other narcotics as a form of positive foreign policy. 5 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. 6 "Castro and the Cold War," American Experience, Public Broadcasting Service, published 2005, republished November 2015, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/comandante-cold-war/. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham3 Despite the fact that this incident offers a great deal of information as to how Cuba has conducted themselves in a foreign policy sense and has made war against the United States, it has been only minimally studied. In researching this area, one can find only a few academic papers and books written from the late 1990s which covers this issue in depth, with other books on Cuban history or drug trafficking in Latin America failing to cover this area or devoting only a paragraph or two to the entire ordeal. By examining this issue in depth, one can be able to determine just how intricate and involved Cuba's foreign policy endeavors were in addition to better understanding Cuba and the Castro's commitment to the exportation of revolution. This research chronologically catalogs how Cuba engaged in the drug trade, where they expanded and how they altered plans to most effectively suit their own needs. This research also intends to determine the level of knowledge Fidel and Raul Castro, Cuba's most well-known and high ranking officials, had of the operation and show how Cuba's drug trafficking efforts either succeeded or failed in bringing about the results desired by the island nation. A Basic History of Cuba's Military and Intelligence Services To fully and best understand Cuba's involvement in the drug trade, one must first come to understand the nation's intelligence and military infrastructure. The history of the FAR began when Fidel Castro and the military arm of his 26th of July Movement (M26) returned to the nation in December of 1956.7 Though soundly crushed by Fulgencio Batista's forces, Castro's rebellion was able to persevere by launching successful guerilla raids upon important military targets and acquiring a devoted following of students and lower to middle-class Cuban citizens, eventually becoming militarily superior to Batista's forces and claiming the country in January of 1959.8 The rebel army, under the command of Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, 7 Marc Becker, Twentieth-Century Latin American Revolutions (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), p. 111. 8 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham4 purged the military corps of Batista's regime, executing, exiling, or simply discharging various officers before officially creating the FAR in October of 1959.9 The FAR was initially under the control of the Ministry of Defense, yet this was renamed to the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) and was headed by Raul Castro, Fidel's brother and later Vice President.10 Between 1959 and 1961, Castro populated the FAR with officers and enlisted personnel who would remain loyal to the new government, implemented educational programs which served to expose the military to Communist and Marxist teachings, and established militias which bridged the gap between Cuba's military and societal structures.11 Cuba's intelligence service, the Dirección General de Inteligencia (until 1989, the service went by the acronym DGI, before being changed to DI; the acronym DGI will be used when referring to this service), was created sometime in 1961, the actual date being unclear, as placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (MININT).12 What is clear with the DGI, however, is their connections to the Soviet Union and the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezposnosti (KGB). Immediately following the Bay of Pigs crisis, the KGB assisted Cuba in infiltrating Cuban exile groups in Florida and New York to determine if the Kennedy administration would try and oust Castro from power again.13 In March of 1962, the KGB set up an "operations base in Havana to export revolution across Latin America,"14 while later beginning an information 9 Damián J. Fernández, "Historical Background: Achievements, Failures, and Prospects," in The Cuban Military Under Castro, ed. Jaime Suchlicki (Miami, FL: University of Miami Graduate School of International Studies, 1989), p. 05. 10 Ibid. 11 Fernández, "Historical Background: Achievements, Failures, and Prospects," in The Cuban Military Under Castro ed. Jaime Suchlicki, p. 07-08. 12 "Cuba, Intelligence and Security," in Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security, ed. K. Lee Lerner & Brenda Wilmoth Lerner (Farmington Hills, MI: The Gale Group, 2004), p. 292, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/55960387. 13 Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West (United States of America: Basic Books, 2009), p. 51-53. 14 Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (United States of America: Basic Books, 2001), p. 184, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/727648881. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham5 sharing operation with the Cubans and even putting in place a KGB liaison officer within the DGI.15 Since the beginning of Cuba's foray into the world of counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection, the KGB has been heavily invested and taken a special interest in Cuban intelligence operations. Early Beginnings: Cuba and Drugs in the 1960s Stratfor, a private geopolitical intelligence firm based in Austin, Texas, wrote in 2008 that, "While seeking refuge from Batista forces in the hills outside Havana, the future dictator was sheltered by marijuana farmers. Castro promised the growers protection for their hospitality".16 While trying to corroborate this claim about Castro's promise is difficult, it is well-documented that the Sierra Maestra mountain range, where Castro and his 26th of July Movement carried out guerilla attacks against the Batista regime, "had been traditional outlaw country long before Castro – rife with smuggling, marijuana growing…".17 Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade seemingly sometime shortly after the DGI was founded in 1961. A declassified Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD – the precursor to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)) document details how, in 1961, a meeting was held between Che Guevara (then the President of Cuba's National Bank and head of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA)18), Ramiro Valdes (Che's deputy during the revolution and now head of the "[state's] security and intelligence apparatus"19), a Captain from Valdes' outfit, and Salvador Allende, then a Senator from Chile.20 The meeting first revolved 15 Ronald Young, "Cuba," in Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 186, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/436850527. 16 "Organized Crime in Cuba," Stratfor, Rane Corporation, published 16 May 2008, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/organized-crime-cuba. 17 Gil Carl Alroy, "The Peasantry in the Cuban Revolution," The Review of Politics Vol. 29, No. 01 (1967), p. 97, https://www-jstor-org.library.norwich.edu/stable/1405815?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents. 18 Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York, NY: Grove Press, 2010), p. 424. 19 Anderson, Che Guevara, p. 368. 20 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1990), p. 24. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham6 around Chilean politics, "but soon Comandante Valdes turned the talk to setting up a cocaine-trafficking network in order to raise money to help finance Allende…Valdes…suggested that Roberto Alvarez, chief of Cuban espionage, head the new organization".21 While attempts were made to gain access to this document via a FOIA request to the DEA, the DEA was unable to provide the document by the time of publication. This is not the only document which alleges Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade during the early 1960s. Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN - the precursor to the BNDD and therefore the DEA) Henry Giordano specified in multiple letters and internal memoranda that the FBN and BNDD had located, "a "pattern of Cuban nationals," who were "suspected Castro sympathizers . . . dominating the traffic" and "operating in Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile to distribute large quantities of cocaine throughout the United States",".22 This mirrors what Giordano's predecessor, Harry J. Anslinger, seemed to believe in early 1961, that "the island nation [was] trying to subvert the United States with drugs".23 The BNDD too apparently, "investigated a purported Cuban government operation to sponsor marijuana and heroin crops in Cuba's Oriente province, using a secret department within the country's National Institute of Agrarian Reform".24 While both these incidences mention drug trafficking/production on the part of INRA and within Chile, seemingly backing up what the defector alleged to the BNDD, Giordano and Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury David Acheson both changed their opinions in the mid-1960s. The two officials believed that while individual Cubans were involved in the drug trade, this was not government 21 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 24-25. 22 William L. Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine: How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America (Chicago, IL: Chicago Review Press, 2010), p. 92, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/592756109. 23 William O. Walker III, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: An Odyssey of Cultures in Conflict (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1996), 171, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/33132446. 24 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 91. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham7 sanctioned and was of such a tiny scale that it would be "too small to have much of an effect on the supply of dollars to that country".25 Naturally, for a government official to change their personal opinion (especially those with the highest access to sensitive documents), they must have been exposed to some form of information which detailed to them that their previously held notion of Cuban involvement was faulty. This being said, evidence collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), individual FBN agents, and allegations by Soviet defectors, seem to corroborate the investigations by federal agencies, pointing to drug trafficking endeavors sanctioned by the Cuban government. According to a letter penned by J. Edgar Hoover, the longtime director of the FBI, "several Colombian airplanes taken to Cuba in 1967 were hijacked on behalf of the Cuban government for the purpose of obtaining the cargo—smuggled heroin".26 The Federal Bureau of Narcotics also agreed with the FBI's assessment and even estimated the total worth of the heroin was in the twenty million dollar range.27 Also in 1967, "a Cuban trained Venezuelan intelligence officer established…Cuban link of drugs for guerrilla weapons in the hemisphere," detailing this information before the Organization of American States (OAS), "providing a major connection between Havana, the guerilla movements, and narcotics".28 Acting Federal Narcotics Commissioner and long-time FBN agent Charles Siragusa also claimed in March of 1962 that six Cuban drug traffickers arrested in Miami and New York were transporting cocaine from Cuba to the U.S. for the purposes of "raising money [and] 25 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 92. 26 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 93. 27 Ibid. 28 Ralph E. Fernandez, "Historical Assessment of Terrorist Activity and Narcotic Trafficking by the Republic of Cuba," The Law Offices of Ralph E. Fernandez and Associates, P.A., Ralph E. Fernandez, P.A., published 22 January 2003, p. 02. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham8 demoralizing Americans and discrediting Cuban exiles in Miami".29 An FBN agent involved in the investigation and raid also confirmed this.30 A 2003 historical assessment focusing on the Cuban government's involvement in the drug trade and terrorism published by the law offices of Ralph E. Fernandez in Tampa, Florida indicated that Juvenito Pablo Guerra, the Miami group's ringleader, was an intelligence officer.31 Among the evidence that this cell was linked to the Cuban government and that Guerra was an intelligence officer includes "a supply of Communist literature and pictures of Cuban premier Fidel Castro in Guerra's apartment".32 While this piece of information is highly circumstantial in trying to link Castro to the drug ring, it does indicate that this cell was most likely not a grouping of exiled Cubans, ones who fled following Castro's claiming power in 1959, but rather were supporters of the Castro regime. Upon being sentenced in June of 1962 to "fifteen years in prison [for] narcotics conspiracy and assault with intent to kill a Federal officer…an undercover narcotics agent testified that Guerra was closely associated with Premier Castro and has been a member of a ring that had smuggled cocaine into this country from Cuba to obtain arms for Dr. Castro during the revolution".33 Also in the early 1960's, a FBN agent named Salvatore Vizzini was involved in the arrest of, "two Cuban agents…in Miami with large amounts of cocaine in their possession".34 29 "Cuba Plot Is Cited in Narcotics Raids," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 31 March 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/03/31/archives/cuba-plot-is-cited-in-narcotics-raids.html?searchResultPosition=78. 30 "Big Cocaine Seizure Held Cuban in Origin," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 30 March 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/03/30/archives/big-cocaine-seizure-held-cuban-in-origin.html?searchResultPosition=106. 31 Fernandez, "Historical Assessment of Terrorist Activity and Narcotic Trafficking by the Republic of Cuba," The Law Offices of Ralph E. Fernandez and Associates, P.A, p. 02. 32 "Big Cocaine Seizure Held Cuban in Origin," The New York Times. 33 "U.S. Jails 2 in Narcotics Case; One Reported Close to Castro," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 02 June 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/06/02/archives/us-jails-2-in-narcotics-case-one-reported-close-to-castro.html?searchResultPosition=12. 34 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 25. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham9 Recounting the arrest in a 1978 letter to Morley Safer of CBS' 60 Minutes, Vizzini detailed that the subsequent investigation proved conclusively that the arrestees (Ramon Diaz and Jose Barrel) were both working for the Cuban government and were either selling the cocaine for profit or were involved in trading the coke for weapons.35 Throughout Vizzini's law enforcement career, this would not be the only time he would encounter evidence of Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade. Writing in his 1972 memoirs, Vizzini recounted one undercover operation in which he was sent to San Juan, Puerto Rico and received a teletype by HQ. The teletype contained "a lot of unconfirmed rumor" which included headquarters' suspicion, "that Castro and his boys were secretly involved in the smuggling [of narcotics]," while also including the names of two Cuban expats, Luis Valdez and Caesar Vega.36 Eventually being able to infiltrate the Puerto Rican underworld and meet with Valdez and Vega, Vizzini bought $750.00 USD for an ounce of cocaine. While the eventual arrests of those involved failed to capture both Valdez and Vega, the San Juan Police Department's Narcotics Squad seemed to believe the two had already fled back to Cuba.37 While the FBN seemingly was never able to confirm their suspicions about Valdez and Vega's relationships to the Castro government, it is worth pointing out that, in early Summer 1959, a Cuban Major similarly named Cesar Vega was in charge of a Castro sanctioned operation to overthrow the Panamanian government.38 Vizzini it seems held that, "there was reason to believe the operation was being carried on with the knowledge of Fidel Castro, that his supporters were running it, and that the profits were getting back to shore up the dictator's shaky 35 Sal Vizzini, letter to Morley Safer, 27 February 1978. 36 Sal Vizzini, Vizzini: The Secret Lives of America's Most Successful Undercover Agent (New York, NY: Pinnacle Books, 1972), p. 284. 37 Vizzini, Vizzini, p. 309. 38 Robert L. Scheina, Latin America's Wars: The Age of the Professional Soldier Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2003), p. 56. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m0 government".39 In an extension of remarks placed in the Congressional Record in May of 1965, the CIA's view of these allegations and claims comes through. DeWitt S. Copp, a CIA analyst, detailed additional evidence concerning Castro and the Cuban government's culpability in the drug trade in a paper titled, "Castro's Subversion in the United States". Copp writes, "In December 1964, three Castro agents were arrested at Miami Airport – one of them a Cuban, Marlo Carabeo Nerey…On January 15, 1965, Oscar H. Reguera and Elidoro Martinéz were taken into custody in a New York motel with $3 million worth of cocaine in their luggage. Martinéz is believed to be a Cuban agent," while also making the claim that Cuba was engaging in narcotics trafficking in order "to finance an insurrection in Puerto Rico".40 The CIA, while any comment on the arrests of Juvenito Guerra's cell or the other arrests listed was unable to be found, certainly seemed to investigating that Cuba was, on some level, involved in the trafficking of narcotics to better support their own desires and machinations. This would also not be the last time that a group of drug traffickers would be alleged to be aligned with Cuba in the 1960s as well. In September of 1967, it was reported that, following an investigation conducted by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and Queens District Attorney's Office, six persons were arrested for their involvement in a drug ring which brought in, "$2.88 million [of cocaine]…from Cuba to Montego Bay, Jamaica and then to New Orleans for the flight to New York".41 According to law enforcement officers, Cuban governmental officials knew about this drug trafficking ring yet, "did not interfere in the 39 Vizzini, Vizzini, p. 282. 40 Representative Craig Hosmer, Extension of Remarks, on 25 May 1965, "Castro's Subversion in the United States – Part I," 89th Cong., Congressional Record, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00149R000400100003-7.pdf. 41 "6 Are Seized Here With Cocaine Worth Nearly $3-Million," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 10 September 1967, https://www.nytimes.com/1967/09/10/archives/6-are-seized-here-with-cocaine-worth-nearly-3million-cuban-did-not.html?searchResultPosition=156. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m1 narcotics ring's activities and, in return, ring members supplied the Cuban government with information about anti-Castro elements in the United States," with members posing, "as fundraisers for anti-Castro elements," and then transmitting the contributor's information back to Cuba.42 Attempts to access the NYPD's files or interview detectives with relevant knowledge of the case were unsuccessful. In the late 1960s as well, it appears that some measure of involvement by the Cuban military in the drug trade was occurring within South Florida. Around 1969, two agents from the FBN/BNDD's Miami Field Office (FO) went undercover as local drug dealers to meet with a Cuban contact at a dock behind the Playboy Club in Miami at 7701 Biscayne Boulevard. According to former DEA Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (ASAC) Pierre Charette, "the two agents did meet with a Cuban general and had discussed using Cuba as an entry point [for drugs]".43 Charette, who was not himself involved in the meeting but was close with one of the agents who was present, also confirmed that the Cuban general was an "active-duty [officer] with Castro's forces" and that the conversation was audio recorded by one of the agents.44 What one can see here is Cuba utilizing drug trafficking, not as a way of gaining an upper hand against the United States or to gain a better financial standing, but rather as a form of information gathering and intelligence collection on potential political and national security threats. By aligning themselves with a non-state actor able to work abroad in foreign land without arising suspicion from counterintelligence organizations, the Cuban government was able to better defend from foreign threats by Batista supporters and anti-Castro groups. In the form of gaining the upper hand on adversaries and gathering intelligence, this is an ingenious 42 Ibid. 43 Pierre "Pete" Charette (retired Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 16 March 2021. 44 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m2 tactic. In the late-1960s, a defector alleged that "Raúl Castro and/or his associates within the Cuban Defense Ministry actively discussed the issue of drug trafficking as an ideological weapon to be used against the United States [and that] Czech intelligence operatives trained Cuban agents to produce and distribute drugs and narcotics into the United States".45 This claim was made by Major General Jan Sejna, a military officer in the Czechoslovak People's Army and, "chief of the political wing of the Czech Defense Ministry and…member of the Communist Party's General Staff and the National Assembly, the country's legislative body".46 Sejna defected in 1968 following the "Prague Spring" under allegations of embezzlement by reformist Communists led by Alexander Dubček, a political opponent of Sejna's "patron, Antonin Novotny".47 Following Sejna's defection, both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) kept Sejna on their payroll as a counterintelligence analyst and consultant.48 Throughout the 1960s, it is apparent that Cuba was, at the least, a way station for drug traffickers to resupply before heading on into the United States (as the island nation had served since the mid-1500s)49 or, at the most, was officially sanctioning the trafficking of narcotics into the U.S. for profit. Given the fact that Cuba was a newly created country and was in dire need of economic stability, it makes sense that Castro's regime would engage in some form of drug 45 Emilio T. González, "The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking and the Castro Regime," CSA Occasional Paper Series Vol. 02. No. 06 (1997), p. 01-02, https://scholarship.miami.edu/discovery/delivery?vid=01UOML_INST:ResearchRepository&repId=12355424610002976#13355471490002976. 46 Louie Estrada, "Gen. Jan Sejna, Czech Defector, Dies," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 27 August 1997, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1997/08/27/gen-jan-sejna-czech-defector-dies/0aa7916b-1005-4595-9a2e-5dc51012dbf5/. 47 David Stout, "Jan Sejna, 70, Ex-Czech General and Defector," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 30 August 1997, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/30/world/jan-sejna-70-ex-czech-general-and-defector.html. 48 "Gen. Jan Sejna, Czech defector, dead at 70," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 26 August 1997, https://apnews.com/article/395f04eda00526846fb4d3cfff44f726. 49 T.J. English, The Corporation: An Epic Story of the Cuban American Underworld (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2018), p. 04, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/990850150. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m3 production and trafficking to provide a certain level of income. Additionally, it also would allow the new nation to craft strong foreign ties to non-state actors and individual governmental officials abroad who could prove valuable in other, more legitimate matters. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April of 1961, in which the United States and the Cuban governments became more antagonistic towards one another, one can see (based upon U.S. documents and defector testimony) that Cuba began taking further actions of trafficking narcotics into the U.S. as a method of covert action, "those activities carried out by national governments or other organizations…to secretly influence and manipulate events abroad".50 Sejna's allegations, if true, corroborate a great deal of what the FBN/BNDD and FBI found during the course of their criminal investigations, that the Cuban government was involved in the creating of narcotics and the trafficking of drugs throughout the Latin America region. Given the abundance of evidence surrounding Cuba and the drug trade in the 1960s, it would be logical to believe that some elements of the Cuban government (either individual ministers, agency heads, etc.) or Fidel and Raul Castro themselves, were involved in the trafficking or shipping of narcotics to the United States from Cuba. While the amount of evidence conclusively linking the Castros to the drug trade in the 1960s is minimal (with perhaps the most concrete evidence being the undercover agent's testimony during the Guerra trial), given the fact that Castro exerted a tight grasp upon the daily functions of the government and was heavily involved in minute details of military operations, foreign policy endeavors, and domestic matters, it is hard to envision that Castro was not aware of these operations or was completely oblivious to them. These operations to traffic drugs, throughout the 1960s, do not appear to be a large scale 50 Loch K. Johnson & James J. Wirtz, "Part IV: Covert Action," in Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies: An Anthology, ed. Loch K. Johnson & James J. Wirtz (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 237. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m4 policy stance. It did not appear to be organized nor a prominent feature of the Cuban government's foreign policy or income. The usage of drug trafficking by governmental entities and the allowing of drug traffickers to ply their trade within the island nation indicates this was done in an effort to garner additional currency, gather intelligence on threatening groups, or temporarily assist foreign allies. These operations do not seem to be large scale or integral to the overall conduct of the Cuban government, but are instead minor and almost done in a tentative way, perhaps out of fear of reprisal from the U.S. or the Soviet Union had their activities been uncovered. A Change in Policy: Cuba and Drugs in the 1970s Throughout the 1970s, the solidifying of the relationship between the Cuban state and non-state actors became more apparent. It was at this time that the Cuban government began making more long-lasting and profitable strides into the global drug trade while also greatly increasing their alignment with non-state actors and strengthening their foreign policy goals. At this time in Cuban history, Cuba was involved in a variety of foreign policy endeavors and military conflicts. Having failed in the 1960s to become self-sufficient economically, the island, "turned to the Soviet Union for support…[increasing] its subsidies for the Cuban economy through running trade deficits with the island and paying above-market prices for its sugar", further cementing the Soviets' presence in the nation-state.51 Given the fact that Cuba was in need of hard currency and did not desire to be too reliant upon the Soviets, Cuba can be seen as somewhat increasing their drug trafficking and security operations significantly in the mid to late-1970s. Evidence of Cuban involvement in the 1970's drug trade came through in the early-mid 51 Becker, Twentieth-Century Latin American Revolutions, p. 127. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m5 1980s and onward, with multiple defectors and arrested drug traffickers from Cuban military/intelligence organizations and Latin American cartels respectively offering this information to the U.S. government. Cuban defectors and drug cartel associates arrested in the 1980s indicated "in late 1975, some of Colombia's best-known and biggest cocaine kingpins met secretly in Bogotá…with the Cuban ambassador Fernando Ravelo-Renendo…Havana not only was prepared to ignore drug-laden mother ships operating in its waters but also to provide fueling and repair services to its ports…Havana also offered to escort the narcotics boats upon leaving Cuban ports, as well as provide Cuban flags to disguise their origin all the way to feeder vessels stationed off the Florida Keys," in return for roughly "$800,000 per vessel".52 In her book Narco-Terrorism, Rachel Ehrenfeld, then a research scholar at New York University School of Law, claims that Ravelo-Renendo was a Cuban intelligence operative from the Departamento América53, a "parallel intelligence apparatus"54 headed by Manuel Piñeiro Losada. It does seem that Ravelo-Renendo was a Cuban intelligence operative of sorts as, upon his death in July of 2017, a former Cuban Army officer wrote a detailed obituary documenting Ravelo-Renendo's services to Cuba, mentioning his entry into Cuba's intelligence service and his tenure during the 1970s as Cuba's Ambassador to Colombia.55 According to Dirk Krujit, professor emeritus of development studies at Utrecht University, the Departamento América was a unit which, "conducted Cuba's secret foreign 52 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 29-30. 53 Ibid. 54 Nora Gámez Torres, "He now hunts Cuban human-rights abusers in the U.S. Was he one himself?" Miami Herald, The McClatchy Company, published and updated 12 July 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article214754450.html. 55 Alfredo García, "Cuban internationalist veteran Fernando Ravelo dies," Colarebo, Colarebo, published 04 July 2017, https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=https://colarebo.wordpress.com/2017/07/04/fallece-veterano-internacionalista-cubano-fernando-ravelo/&prev=search&pto=aue. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m6 relations under the direct supervision of, and access to, Fidel Castro"56 with these secret foreign relations techniques coming in the form of "[supplying] arms, money, intelligence, guidance, and a rear base to a variety of leftist guerilla movements in Latin America that wanted to duplicate the Cuban model".57 Manuel Piñeiro Losada too was a close friend of both Fidel and Raul Castro, having solidified his position as a loyal intelligence officer during the revolution.58 An interview with retired Resident Agent-in-Charge (RAC) of the DEA's Tampa office, Mike Powers, also was able to shed some light on how important Cuba was in the Colombian drug trade. He relayed an incident detailed to him by a smuggler arrested sometime in the 1980s who later became an informant. According to the smuggler, in the early 1970s, "he was flying a load of marijuana from Colombia to Florida…As he was almost across [Cuban airspace], a Cuban MiG came up, flew next to him and signaled to follow him and land. At that point, he [the smuggler] held up a bale of marijuana and the pilot laughed and signaled [him to] go ahead [through Cuban airspace]".59 While this incident does not indicate official government sanctioning of the drug trade nor some larger effort by the Cuban government to enter into the drug trade, this piece of information is indicative of how important Cuban airspace was in the drug trade and also how individual Cuban military officers or officials may have begun engaging in the drug trade to attain either larger foreign policy goals or as an extra source of income. This information is all quite interesting as this is the first time there is some form of evidence, albeit tangentially, in which Cuban officials and members of drug cartels met to 56 Dirk Krujit, Cuba and Revolutionary Latin America: An Oral History (London, UK: Zed Books, 2017), p. 05, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/964892858. 57 Larry Rohter, "Manuel Pineiro, Spymaster For Cuba, Is Dead at 63," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 13 March 1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/13/world/manuel-pineiro-spymaster-for-castro-is-dead-at-63.html. 58 Dirk Krujit, "Cuba and the Latin American Left: 1959-Present," Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina Vol. 28, No. 02 (2017), p. 32, http://eial.tau.ac.il/index.php/eial/article/view/1519/1623. 59 Mike Powers (retired Resident Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 20 December 2020. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m7 discuss a potential relationship revolving around the drug trade. However, this information must be treated with care in that these come from the mouths of defectors who must be listened to warily and have their claims treated with suspicion given the facts they, on occasion, will say anything in order to be given a lesser sentence or protection. Attempts to try and access CIA or other IC members' files were largely unsuccessful. However, declassified files were able to shed some light on the area. According to a declassified November 1983 document from the CIA, the Agency documented a series of claims revolving around Cuba and the drug trade, including one which mentioned how "Cuban officials, including Fidel Castro, has considered a scheme in 1979 to deal with narcotics smugglers in order to obtain hard currency for Cuba and contribute to the deterioration of US society".60 The CIA did mention as well that "not all of [these reports] have been corroborated", though were comfortable enough with the totality of the reports that they did endorse the belief that Cuba was involved, in some measure, with drug traffickers.61 The American non-profit, Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba (FHRC), produced a historical work in 2019 documenting Cuba's involvement in Venezuela, including a section on Cuba's alleged involvement in the international drug trade. They allege that Cuba's official entry into the narcotics trade began in 1978, "with the creation of a department for [MININT] operations inside the Cuban corporation CIMEX [Corporación de Industrias Mixtas de Exportación], for money laundering and marijuana trafficking".62 The FHRC cites Norberto 60 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Drug Trafficking: The Role of Insurgents, Terrorists, and Sovereign States (Langley, November 1983), p. 05-06, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00283R000300010008-6.pdf. 61 Ibid. 62 Juan Antonio Blanco, Rolando Cartaya, Luis Domínguez, & Casto Ocando, "Cubazuela: Chronicle of a Cuban Intervention," Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, published April 2019, p. 87, https://www.fhrcuba.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/CUBAZUELA-CUBAN-INTERVENTION-English.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m8 Fuentes, an original member of the Cuban Revolution and Castro historian, as the source for the claims. While Fuentes' exact statements were unable to be accessed, it is known that a defector from Cuba's Ministry of the Interior, Major Jose Rodriguez Antonio Menier, too claimed that CIMEX was "linked to the drug trade" while even going a step further and stating that Castro had knowledge of general drug trafficking and CIMEX operations, using the profits to "support and opulent lifestyle [and fund] off-budget projects".63 Maria C. Werlau, an independent scholar and Cuban human rights activist, speaking to other anonymous defectors from the DGI, confirmed that CIMEX had a department entirely under the control of MININT in addition to making the allegation that, "100% of their revenue went into Fidel Castro's accounts".64 In testimony before Congressional subcommittees during the late-1980s, two convicted drug traffickers provided similar statements on Cuban involvement in the drug trade. One of them, Luis Garcia, testified that, in either "late-1979 or early-1980, Cuban officials offered him use of airstrips for refueling drug flights" and though he did not accept, "he was aware of other smugglers who did".65 Another trafficker named George Morales claimed that during a 1979 meeting in Cuba, he was sold planes which were seized by the Cuban government (presumably, Morales either stripped these planes for parts or would use them in his own drug trafficking endeavors) before eventually getting the Cubans to agree "to allow his pilots overflight rights through Cuban airspace".66 Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 63 Don Podesta, "Ex-Cuban Officer Says Castro Profited from Drug Trafficking," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 26 August 1989, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/26/ex-cuban-officer-says-castro-profited-from-drug-trafficking/5f7a23ba-b4ad-4bc6-b8ec-fbea4470bac5/. 64 Maria C. Werlau, "Fidel Castro, Inc. A Global Conglomerate," Cuba in Transition Vol. 15 (2005), p. 379, https://ascecuba.org//c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v15-werlau.pdf. 65 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., December 1988, p. 64. 66 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m9 Narcotics, and International Operations, did however call Morales' statements "obviously incomplete", indicating that Morales' assertions required additional substantiation either through federal investigations, informants, or defectors.67 Attempts to find further evidence of Cuban involvement in the Western Hemispheric drug trade during the 1970s was minimal. It does appear that a top-secret, interagency, criminal investigation, initially codenamed "Operation Delta", was being conducted by the FBI, DEA, NYPD, and Chicago Police Department with the stated goal of "[digging] into the burgeoning Cuba-to-Florida narcotics trade and the distribution of drugs out of Miami".68 The details of this operation, however, are incredibly marginal, with attempts to access the records of this operation failing, despite multiple FOIA requests to the relevant agencies. It is possible that Cuba was not as active in the drug trade during this time due to the other foreign policy endeavors the nation-state was undertaking at that time (extensive military operations in Angola, South Africa, and Ethiopia). Due to the immense pressures going on with the nation, it is highly possible and logical even that Cuba toned down any drug trafficking activities that may have been going on. However, with the Soviet Union's death becoming more imminent and Cuba's foreign policy becoming more Latin American focused in the 1980s, Cuba seems to have significantly increased their ability at trafficking and providing security for drugs shipments as the crack epidemic swept into the U.S. during that time. The Cocaine Boom: Cuban and Drugs in the 1980s The 1980s saw a boom of drug trafficking and use throughout the Western Hemisphere. During the late 1970s, cocaine "[surged] in popularity…[being] associated with celebrities, high 67 Joan Mower, "Witness Claims Contra Drug Smuggling, Payoffs To Cuban, Bahamian Officials With," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 15 July 1987, https://apnews.com/article/5f5dd485a6d6825e88496281a2b1711c. 68 "Drugs gangs here, terrorist linked," Chicago Sun-Times, Sun-Times Media Group, published 16 April 1979, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/faln-drugs.htm. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m0 rollers and glamorous parties" with this continuing into the 1980s before peaking in 1985 and being declared a nationwide epidemic.69 Throughout this time period, cocaine (and the even more popular derivative crack cocaine) was trafficked into the United States predominantly by organized criminal elements utilizing "a distribution system that imported cocaine from South America into the U.S. market using sea and air routes via the Caribbean and the South Florida coast" in addition to trafficking drugs through Mexico.70 While these trafficking routes are now largely managed and controlled by Mexican cartels like the Gulf Cartel or the Los Zetas, in the 1980s, the Colombians were the largest drug traffickers in the Western Hemisphere. The Medellín and Cali Cartels were the two largest players in the drug trade, with the Medellín Cartel being the dominant organized criminal element until 1993 with the death of Pablo Escobar.71 While both the Medellín and Cali Cartels are now extinct, they were incredibly powerful at the time, with the Medellín Cartel raking "up to $60 million daily in drug profits"72 and the Cali Cartel, by 1992, being "responsible for seventy percent of the cocaine sold in the United States, as well as for the extraordinary growth of the cocaine market in Europe".73 Because of the massive influence these organizations had and their wide area of operations throughout Central and North America, these cartels, mainly the Medellín, also joined forces with legitimate state enterprises such as Manuel Noriega's Panama to drastically increase their 69 Jason Ferris, Barbara Wood, & Stephanie Cook, "Weekly Dose: cocaine, the glamour drug of '70s, is making a comeback," The Conversation, The Conversation, published 08 March 2018, updated 12 March 2018, https://theconversation.com/weekly-dose-cocaine-the-glamour-drug-of-the-70s-is-making-a-comeback-88639. 70 Deonna S. Turner, "Crack epidemic," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 08 July 2016, updated 04 September 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/crack-epidemic. 71 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Strategic Intelligence Section, The Cocaine Threat to the United States (Springfield, VA, 19 July 1995), p. 04, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/154678NCJRS.pdf. 72 Sara Miller Llana, "Medellín, once epicenter of Colombia's drug war, fights to keep peace," The Christian Science Monitor, Christian Science Publishing Society, published 25 October 2010, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2010/1025/Medellin-once-epicenter-of-Colombia-s-drug-war-fights-to-keep-the-peace. 73 Juan E. Méndez, Political Murder and Reform in Colombia: The Violence Continues (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, April 1992), p. 82. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m1 drug trafficking abilities.74 During the 1980s, many organized elements utilized the Caribbean to traffic narcotics either into Europe or into North America. It is without question that Cuba was one of these locations in which both air and sea craft landed to refuel and resupply before continuing on their way with payloads of narcotics.75 The first instance of Cuban involvement in the drug trade came in 1982 and 1983, with the apprehension and subsequent investigation of three persons with firsthand knowledge of these operations. These persons were Mario Estebes Gonzalez, an associate of Cuban intelligence, Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian weapons and drug smuggler, and Johnny Crump, a Colombian lawyer and drug smuggler. Mario Estebes' story was first reported on in the New York Times in April of 1983. According to Selwyn Raab, Estebes "was arrested by the Coast Guard on Nov. 29, 1981, while he was transporting 2,500 pounds of marijuana in a speedboat off the Florida coast. He was indicted on a charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and faced a maximum prison term of 15 years".76 Facing many years in prison, Estebes decided to turn state's evidence and inform, in returning for immunity from some criminal charges, delivering rather explosive testimony. Estebes' testified that his mission priorities included, "disrupting Cuban exile groups and performing economic espionage, but that his principal mission was the distribution of cocaine, marijuana, and methaqualone[sic] tablets in New York, northern New Jersey, and 74 Mimi Yagoub, "How Panama's Criminal Landscape Has Changed Since the Days of Narco-Dictator Noriega," InSight Crime, InSight Crime, published 30 May 2017, https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/how-panama-criminal-landscape-changed-since-narco-dictator-noriega/#. 75 Robert Filippone, "The Medellin Cartel: Why We Can't Win the Drug War," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 17, Iss. 04 (1994), p. 332, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576109408435960. 76 Selwyn Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 04 April 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/04/04/nyregion/a-defector-tells-of-drug-dealing-by-cuba-agents.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m2 Florida" and returned multiple millions of dollars back to Cuba.77 He also testified that "heroin and other narcotics were shipped to the New York area inside vans with concealed compartments to hide the drugs" in addition to claiming "he saw Vice Admiral [Aldo] Santmaria give orders permitting the unloading of narcotics at Paredon Grande [a small island off the Northern Coast of Cuba] brought in by a reputed international narcotics trafficker, Jaime Guillot Lara".78 In May of that same year, Estebes spoke before the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control in a joint hearing, testifying that the Cuban government, "used the 1980 Mariel boatlift to send as many as 7,000 spies to the United States, some of whom were ordered to help drug smugglers ''flood'' this country with illegal narcotics [and that] some agents were in this country for propaganda purposes and others were to create ''chaos'' in the event of war".79 Estebes expanded upon his earlier allegations and stated, "one scheme [involved] 23,000 pounds of marijuana and 10 million methaqualone tablets [being] shipped from Cuba to Florida," the profits of which were to be split between Cuban officials and the smugglers themselves.80 Jaime Guillot Lara is perhaps the most important of the three. Guillot Lara was a well-known drug/arms smuggler in Colombia who also happened to be "a close personal friend of the leader of the M-19 guerilla group, Jaime Bateman".81 As far as his smuggling habits, Guillot Lara, according to the DEA who had been keeping tabs on him as far back at 1975, "he was delivering over 400,000 pounds of marijuana, more than 20 million illicit methaqualone pills and 77 Alex Larzelere, Castro's Ploy-America's Dilemma: The 1980 Cuban Boatlift (Fort. Lesley J. McNair: National Defense University, 1988), p. 229-230, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/23/2002287258/-1/-1/0/LARZELERE_MARIEL_BOATLIFT.PDF. 78 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. 79 "Cuban Ties Boatlift To Drug Trade," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 01 May 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/01/us/cuban-ties-boatlift-to-drug-trade.html. 80 Ibid. 81 LT. Timothy J. Doorey, "The Cuban Interventionary Forces: The Growing Strategic and Regional Threat to the United States and NATO" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1986), p. 115, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a180123.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m3 thousands of pounds of cocaine to U.S. markets each year" while also acquiring an impressive fleet of ships for trafficking purposes.82 Guillot Lara first became introduced to the Cuban ambassador to Colombia, Ravelo-Renendo, through their mutual friend, Johnny Crump, during a meeting (conducted at Gonzalo Bassols' apartment, the number two at the Cuban Embassy in Colombia) which resulted in a profitable relationship between Guillot Lara and the Cubans. While Crump would also corroborate this meeting between the following members, Guillot Lara's girlfriend, who was there when the meetings took place, corroborated many aspects, while also testifying that Bassols "told Mr. Guillot-Lara that the drug scheme had been cleared by a high Cuban official" which Bassols then identified was Fidel Castro.83 Either during or immediately after this introduction, according to Congressional testimony from Francis M. Mullen, Jr., the Administrator of the DEA in the early 1980s, Guillot Lara "began to receive official Cuban protection for the movement of his drug-ladened[sic] vessels to the United States…[in addition to transporting and delivering] arms which were ultimately destined for the Colombian terrorist group, M-19" on Cuban behalf.84 Not only did Guillot Lara traffic weapons to Cuban aligned rebels and allow the Cubans in on his drug trafficking endeavors, it appears he "also transferred funds to the guerillas through an employee of a Panamanian bank" acting as something of a go-between.85 From 1980 to 1981, Guillot Lara 82 Nathan M. Adams, "Havana's Drug-Smuggling Connection, Reader's Digest, Reader's Digest Association, Inc., published July 1982, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/drugs.htm. 83 Extensions of Remarks, Cuba's Active Role in Drug Trafficking to the United States, 98th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 130, pt. 24B: 10400, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1984-pt8/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1984-pt8-2-3.pdf. 84 Leslie Maitland Werner, "U.S. Officials Link Castro and Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 10 November 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/10/us/us-officials-link-castro-and-drugs.html. 85 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication. Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere, edited by Colleen Sussman, (Washington, D.C., 12 March 1982), p. 02, https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QafYFT9344IVwbKAk5KG_OJydGlr3Q7oZPpK8WHGSx3JeWsUS431ZZwaW55TaMUk3UvHW4jiCHRb9Utgv1_TsoAFZD6FOi8njL3jjxp8gSVFo2zCTKSLLP0KOTaXLPl9ZdycsUgqn7e8ud91hnk09ZPGbYZ0QYrbwbNypMoakmWoqtvZNPGG0e9cQ33AwwDL7jITmBXQF CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m4 and the Cubans entered into a cozy relationship, though one that quickly became fraught with complications. In March of 1981, Colombian authorities found a "cache of M-19 weapons" and, with captured M-19 fighters implicating Cuban involvement, the Colombian government "[broke] off diplomatic relations with Havana and [expelled Ambassador Ravelo] and his staff".86 From midsummer to November of 1981, two Guillot Lara operated boats and one aircraft (the aircraft and one of the boats carried weapons for M-19) were apprehended by both the Colombian Coast Guard and United States Coast Guard; the capture of three M-19 rebels by the Colombian military also resulted in smuggling operations being significantly damaged.87 Guillot Lara fled Colombia, facing criminal charges, before being arrested by Mexican authorities.88 Awaiting extradition by the Mexicans to either the United States or Colombia, Guillot Lara revealed to both Mexican and U.S. investigators that he had "been involved in trafficking operations to Colombia for the M-19 on behalf of the government of Cuba. The latter provided the funds for the purchase of the arms".89 Following his revelations, however, Guillot Lara was released from Mexican custody and disappeared; according to the Colombian daily newspaper El Tiempo, Guillot Lara died in early April 1991 in Cuba of a myocardial infarction having "been detained on the island for twelve years".90 xujwOix6ni7j0-eT0RVti430wKPH9bicd8LdzulTZPXR8JDPGMTsyF2guKz20_HFjQkKlW8r6xpBfdR4TEC5SqWHYuetwHCl4rS7YWkCl0. 86 Adams, "Havana's Drug-Smuggling Connection, Reader's Digest. 87 John Dorschner & Jim McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine, The Miami Herald, KnightRidder, published 20 November 1983, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/crump.htm. 88 Edna Buchanan, "Miami drug smuggler ran drugs for Castro to guerillas, agents say," Miami Herald, Knight Ridder, published 24 January 1982, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00552R000303490005-9.pdf. 89 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 90 "Guillot Died of a Infarction," El Tiempo, Casa Editorial El Tiempo S.A., published 13 April 1991, https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-61284. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m5 Johnny Crump is where the public first became aware of a Cuban connection to the drug trade, though the last defector to be arrested by U.S. authorities. Crump, according to investigative reporter Ernest Volkman, was a Colombian lawyer of American descent who "went into the narcotics racket, running a large-scale cocaine and marijuana-smuggling operation" following the failing of his family's ranch in the late-1970s.91 Being politically well-connected, he was asked to serve as a guide for the newly appointed Cuban Ambassador to Colombia, the aforementioned Fernando Ravelo-Renendo, in 1975, the two quickly becoming friends.92 The two became so close that Crump even asked Ravelo to be his newborn daughter's godfather.93 At one point in 1979, in both federal testimony and statements made to Miami Herald journalists John Dorschner & Jim McGee, Crump detailed a meeting he had between Ravelo in which the ambassador detailed, "was dealing with some Chileans who needed help…seeking American weapons, not traceable back to Cuba, to use in the fight to overthrow Augusto Pinochet," to which Crump agreed and offered assistance.94 Following this, Crump tried to arrange a deal in which a plane would transport marijuana into the country, however, few pilots were willing to enter Cuba's Camaguey airport where Ravelo had arranged for refueling.95 In a previously mentioned meeting between Ravelo, Crump, 91 Ernest Volkman, "The Odd Couple: Castro and Vesco: The Cocaine Alliance," The Gadsden Times, Edward Marsh, published 29 April 1984, https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1891&dat=19840428&id=jKkfAAAAIBAJ&sjid=etYEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5242,6122535. 92 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 93 NBC Nightly News, "The Cuban Connection," featuring Roger Mudd, Brian Moss, Johnny Crump, and George H.W. Bush, aired 29 September 1982, transcript, NBC Network, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01070R000100380010-3.pdf. 94 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 95 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991, transcript, Public Broadcasting System, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/archive/cubaandcocaine.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m6 and Guillot Lara, the four agreed to transport the drugs via boat to Cuba with protection from Cuban Navy and Coast Guard forces.96 In a 1991 interview with PBS Frontline, Crump detailed the finalization of the first watercraft drug shipment to Cuba, discussing how he disembarked from "the plane to a Cuban government car that was waiting for us in the airport. I mean, there's no way that you can go to any country with no passport, with nothing like that, landing from another country in an international airport and have a car waiting for you right there in the field. It has to be with the OK of that government, that country… Everything was paid by the Cuban government. The hotel, you had to sign, like, you are a guest from the Cuban government because they don't let me pay for the hotel"; while Crump left the country before he personally could see any drugs entering the country, he was reassured by Ravelo that the drugs indeed touched down on Cuban soil.97 From that point onward, Crump became very involved in trafficking narcotics and arms with the Cubans, doing so via air and seacraft and aiding the Cubans larger foreign policy goals in aiding left-wing insurgent groups through Central and South America. In January of 1982, however, Crump was arrested in a joint Customs-DEA operation "at the Omni Hotel in Miami…on drug trafficking charges".98 At the time, Crump was acquiring arms and other weaponry "to be sent to an unspecified group in Bolivia" via his friend Jaime Guillot Lara.99 Much like Estebes, Crump was facing heavy prison time and began cooperating with federal 96 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 97 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991, accessed through vault, Public Broadcasting System, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/cuba-and-cocaine/. 98 Buchanan, "Miami drug smuggler ran drugs for Castro to guerillas, agents say," Miami Herald. 99 U.S. Department of State. Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere, edited by Colleen Sussman, p. 02. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m7 authorities, providing them "with details of his meetings and alleged drug dealings with Cuban government officials in Bogota and Havana".100 Much of Estebes, Guillot Lara, and Crump's claims are astounding, however, it must be kept in mind that these persons are convicted drug traffickers and defectors from Colombian drug cartels or are in some way associated with Cuba's military respectively. Despite this, many prosecutors and U.S. government agencies found some, if not a sizeable portion of their claims, credible. In Estebes' case, Richard Gregorie commented at the time on Estebes' validity as a witness describing how his comments were "very credible" and had been "independently corroborated".101 In an interview with Gregorie, the former attorney stressed he "found him credible because of that [outside and additional] corroboration".102 The Senate Chair of one committee also stated that Estebes' credibility was "checked out…with the Justice Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration".103 As far as Guillot Lara's credibility goes, the CIA's opinion of him seems to be rather high. According to a CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate from 1983, "[t]he Guillot Lara case…is proof that Cuba has used Colombian drug smuggling networks move arms to Colombian insurgents. In this case, Cuban officials and Colombian drug traffickers were clearly associated in facilitating narcotics shipments to the United States. Guillot paid the Cubans in hard currency and used his vessels and smuggling networks to move arms to Colombia for the insurgents. On the other hand, Cuba rather routinely searches some drug-smuggling ships found 100 NBC Nightly News, "The Cuban Connection," featuring Roger Mudd, Brian Moss, Johnny Crump, and George H.W. Bush, aired 29 September 1982, transcript. 101 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. 102 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. 103 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m8 in Cuban waters, confiscates drugs found and often imprisons the crew".104 Through this excerpt, the CIA seems to endorse the view that the overall claims about drug traffickers smuggling weaponry and drugs in collusion with Cuban figures and through Cuban waters is true and based in fact. While the CIA did seem to treat the accounts and his entire involvement with legitimacy, the agency was careful to note they were unsure of "the extent to which Cuba has continued to facilitate drug trafficking, either for money or arms".105 While the following document is not exactly an intelligence estimate or official analysis, an August 1982 conference report conducted by the CIA and the National Intelligence Council (NIC) stated, "Given the involvement of senior Cuban officials and at least two Cuban embassies, we believe this activity was approved at the highest levels of the Cuban Government. It almost certainly was not a case of corruption by mid- or low-level Cuban officials…Given the level of Guillot's Cuban contacts and the political implications of the arrangements, the operation was almost certainly approved at the highest levels of the Havana government" though the document was clear in stating that the U.S. government was uncertain as to who was behind the operation.106 These three witnesses were able to corroborate a great deal of information that the U.S. federal government, mainly the DEA and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), had been investigating since the late 1970s. With this testimony from defectors and arrested drug traffickers who were seemingly vetted and verified, the U.S. government finally was able to bring forth official charges against certain members of the Cuban government and military. 104 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Implications for the United States of the Colombian Drug Trade Vol. II (Langley, 28 June 1983), p. 02, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00302R000600990002-9.pdf. 105 Ibid. 106 U.S. Intelligence Community, National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Cuban Involvement in Narcotics and Terrorism (Langley, August 1982), p. iii, 3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B00851R000100160008-1.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m9 On 05 November, 1982, an indictment brought by the USAO-SDFL in Miami, Florida charged that certain drug traffickers and members of the Cuban government did "knowingly, willfully and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree, together with each other, and with diverse other persons who are both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to commit certain offenses against the United States" in the importation and possession of methaqualone tablets and marijuana and "used and caused to be used facilities in interstate and foreign commerce, including the telephone, and traveled and caused others to travel in interstate and foreign commerce between the Southern District of Florida, Colombia, Cuba and elsewhere, with the intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on and facilitate the promotion, management, establishment and carrying on of an unlawful activity, said unlawful activity being a business enterprise involving controlled substances".107 The persons charged in this indictment brought forth by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida included Jaime Guillot Lara, Fernando Ravelo-Renendo, Gonzalo Bassols-Suarez, Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado, Rene Rodriguez-Cruz, and David Lorenzo Perez, Jr. alongside multiple other, predominantly, Miami-based drug traffickers.108 Neither Crump or Estebes were charged as both had testified for the prosecution and received either partial or full immunity in addition to new identities and federal protection. The Cuban Interests Section in Washington, Cuba's foreign policy arm operating as an independent section of the Czechoslovakian Embassy, commented that the charges against Ravelo, Bassols, Santamaria, and Rodriguez-Cruz were "all lies"109; a January 1982 letter from 107 United States v. Jaime Guillot Lara et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE (S.D. Fla., 05 November 1982), http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/indictment-82.htm. 108 Ibid. 109 George Volsky, "U.S. Drug Charges Cite 4 Cuban Aides," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 06 November 1982, https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/06/us/us-drug-charges-cite-4-cuban-aides.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m0 Cuba's Ministry of Foreign Relations (MINREX) denied Cuba ever utilized drug traffickers to transport arms to rebels in Latin America, never gave arms to guerillas in Colombia, and denied that Guillot Lara had ever set foot in Cuba or received any monies from the Republic of Cuba.110 The denial by Cuba of having never gave arms to Colombian guerillas was roundly criticized, most notably in a 1990 interview with former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Thomas Boyatt.111 Among those charged were high level Cuban officials, some of whom have already been discussed including the Cuban Ambassador to Colombia Ravelo-Renendo and his "minister-counsel" at the Cuban Embassy in Colombia Bassols-Suarez.112 In addition to these figures, the indictment also charged Vice Admiral (VADM) of the Cuban Navy Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado and Rene Rodriguez-Cruz a "member of the Cuban Community Party Central Committee and president of the Cuban Institute of Friendship With The Peoples [ICAP]" with the same charges.113 It is worth noting that the ICAP was described by the CIA in a 1984 brief as being an organization which, in addition to bringing in foreign youths interested in Communism, Socialism, or Cuba also "provided Cuban intelligence services with a registry of aliens who might prove useful for intelligence collection efforts and operations in their homelands".114 110 "Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Drugs," Minister of Foreign Affairs Isidoro Malmierca Peoli (28 January 1982), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America Report, Cuba, JPRS L/10334, 18 February 1982, p. 03-04, heading: Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Drugs, Republic of Cuba, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Latin America Report, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030043-6.pdf. 111 Ambassador Thomas D. Boyatt (Ret.), interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 08 March 1990, p. 48, https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Boyatt,%20Thomas%20D.toc.pdf?_ga=2.264396167.981542772.1592939617-1066174783.1588020094&_gac=1.137161348.1589401103.EAIaIQobChMIgqnAwtSx6QIVSx-tBh2tGgsJEAAYASAAEgKALvD_BwE. 112 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba (Langley, October 1979), p. 224, https://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/AA/00/07/66/14/00003/AA00076614_00003.pdf. 113 Mary Thornton, "Four Cuban Officials Indicted in Drug Smuggling," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 06 November 1982, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/11/06/four-cuban-officials-indicted-in-drug-smuggling/d70ed042-0adc-42d2-971b-23475f7adc83/. 114 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba: Castro's Propaganda Apparatus and Foreign Policy (Langley, November 1984), p. 13, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000972183.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m1 David Lorenzo Perez, Jr. is an interesting figure within this legal case as he, in December of 1982, pled guilty to the first count of the criminal indictment.115 In his plea, Lorenzo Perez indicated culpability on Guillot Lara's part to "purchase, receive, store, and possess with intent to distribute approximately eight and one-half million methaqualone tablets" while indicating "that Jaime Guillot-Lara would provide ships to transport methaqualone tablets from Columbia[sic] with the knowledge of the Cuban governmental officials".116 Lorenzo Perez admitted he assisted Guillot Lara in all of these actions while also admitting he "traveled by private vessel from the Southern District of Florida to Paredon Grande, Cuba [and] met with Cuban government officials" including Santamaria and Rodriguez-Cruz.117 In Congressional testimony, Lorenzo Perez also testified that that "Cuban government was also to receive one-third of the profit of the marihuana[sic] sale" yet this did not go through as it appears Guillot Lara kept the profits [just under half a million USD] to himself.118 This case was the most significant development in the long standing allegations against Cuba on the area of narcotics trafficking. However, it is incredibly important to note that there was no evidence linking the Castros to the drug trade. The lead attorney who personally handled the case for the DOJ, Richard Gregorie, stated "Was Fidel Castro involved? At this point, no…[I] can't honestly say I saw that open Cuban involvement [and] did not come up with anyone who spoke directly to Fidel in those early cases".119 115 United States v. David Lorenzo Perez, Jr., et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE (S.D. Fla., 09 December 1982), p. 01, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/perez-jr.htm. 116 United States v. David Lorenzo Perez, Jr., et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE, p. 02, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/perez-jr-1.htm. 117 Ibid. 118 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 30 April 1983, p. 33. 119 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m2 Also around this time, many officials from the DOJ and U.S. Department of State (DOS) changed their previously emphasized opinions on the extent of Cuban involvement in the drug trade. In an October 1983 hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, DEA Administrator Mullen stated, "I moved very cautiously at first wanting to have evidence before publicly stating I was convinced that the Cuban Government was involved in drug trafficking. I am now convinced, as I have stated in prior sessions, that there is Cuban Government involvement in drug trafficking", bringing forth the above indictments and other "[classified and confidential] information" to support his reasoning.120 The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, James H. Michel, stated before Congress also in May of 1983 "the evidence clearly indicates more than a case of corruption by local or mid-level security officials in Cuba…Narcotics trafficking has apparently been sanctioned by Cuba as a means to finance subversion in Latin America".121 These comments were found by the Washington Post to, "fit in with a Reagan administration campaign to rally public and congressional support for its Central American policies, including more aid for El Salvador's army".122 Michel was not the only State Department official to make this claim either. The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger stated in May of 1983 that he "would find it very difficult to believe that the Cuban Government itself is not 120 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Impact of the South Florida Task Force on Drug Interdiction In The Gulf Coast Area, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 October 1983, p. 16, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/97516NCJRS.pdf. 121 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Cuban Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking, edited by Colleen Sussman, (Washington, D.C., 30 April 1983), p. 02, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Cuban_Involvement_in_Narcotics_Trafficki/NItKAQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0. 122 Edward Cody, "Castro Ties To Drugs Suggested," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 01 May 1983, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/05/01/castro-ties-to-drugs-suggested/242170fe-a930-4bc4-b30c-18016f794497/. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m3 involved… [The evidence is] really quite clear that there is major Cuban involvement in the drug traffic in this country", while also accusing the Castro government of playing a role in this.123 However, this appears to be more Eagleburger's own personal opinion as a more senior State Department official stated later that no agency had been able to prove "personal involvement by Fidel Castro".124 A spokesman for the Cuban Interests Section responded to the comments by Mullen and Michel by stating, "[This is] propaganda against the Cubans…We [the Cuban government] are refusing this accusation. We have consistent fighting against drug traffic. There are many American people who are put in Cuban jails for drug trafficking".125 At this stage, in relation to the Guillot Lara/Crump case, these definitive comments that Castro or the Cuban government officially was involved seemed to an extreme jump and other officials protested against this characterization. Stanley Marcus, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida and the attorney whose office brought forth the indictments against the four Cuban officials, stated before Congress "I think it is a fair and accurate statement to say some of the major organs and institutions of the Cuban state and some high-ranking officials of those organs and institutions of the state are involved in drug-running to the United States".126 William H. Webster, then Director of the FBI, also spoke about this in a television interview, stating the majority of the evidence currently being used by some officials to make judgements "[came] from one set of 123 Kenneth B. Noble, "Official Ties Cuba to U.S. Drug Traffic," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 02 May 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/02/world/official-ties-cuba-to-us-drug-traffic.html. 124 Ibid. 125 Werner, "U.S. Officials Link Castro and Drugs," The New York Times. 126 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Security, The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 30 April 1983, p. 15. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m4 sources and should be viewed with care".127 At this juncture, there was a great deal of conflicting views upon the established evidence, some most likely based upon political and individual biases based upon preconceived notions on both the nature of Communism and Latin America in general. While the evidence linking Castro or the Cuban government as a whole is very minimal (mostly relegated to evidence that would be considered hearsay in a U.S. court of law), it is undeniable that sections of the Cuban government, including areas of Cuba's diplomatic and intelligence services, were utilizing drug traffickers to achieve larger foreign policy goals within the Latin American region. As the 1980s progressed, additional evidence of Cuban involvement in the drug trade became even more apparent with defectors from Noriega's Panama, Cuba's DGI, and the arrests of multiple drug traffickers all speaking to U.S. officials. During this time as well, many criminal investigators of the U.S. federal government found or came across evidence of drug trafficking on Cuba's part along with the U.S. IC coming to a more solid conclusion on the matter. Prior to these November 1982 indictments, an FBI investigation into Cuban involvement in the drug trade was underway. In October of 1982, a U.S. Customs plane near Corpus Christi, Texas intercepted a Cessna aircraft that was having a mechanical malfunction and tracked it to Cleburne, Texas. The pilot, an American, "was arrested with 877 pounds of marijuana onboard" with "Chemical analysis [showing the marijuana] almost certainly was grown in Cuba".128 Following the pilot's conviction in April of 1983, federal investigators detailed "the ring operated for two years in violation of government embargoes on trade with Cuba by shipping computers and other equipment. Some of the return flights carried high-grade Cuban 127 Ibid. 128 "Did Cuba get computers in return for marijuana?" The Miami Herald, KnightRidder, published 02 April 1983, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/computers.htm. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m5 marijuana".129 The evidence necessary to make the claim that this ring was operating with the explicit approval of Cuban government officials or the Castros themselves is very lacking, however, what this does indicate is that there were individual smugglers beyond large metropolitan centers who were found to have ties to Cuba and that Cuba seemingly was involved in producing drugs in some quantity. In December of 1984, the CIA released an interagency intelligence memorandum stating outright, "Cuba is currently supporting drug trafficking…We judge that Fidel Castro is fully cognizant of and condones the drug-related activity that is taking place with the support of Cuban officials…The key Cuban participants are officers of the Interior Ministry or America Department of the Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee…Their participation strongly indicates a sanctioned government policy, rather than an arrangement for personal gain".130 While a good portion of this document is redacted, this is the first time in which an intelligence agency, or the CIA at least, has openly accused the upper echelon of the Cuban government and Castro himself of playing some role or in some way supporting the activities occurring. During this period, many criminal investigations uncovered more information on Cuban involvement in the drug trade, with additional evidence of Castro involvement becoming more apparent. In addition to this, many Congressional hearings and panels were convened with the goal of exploring the Latin American drug trade, during which many witnesses were called. Among these witnesses was Diego Viafara Salinas, an M-19 physician who infiltrated an armed civilian group with ties to members of the Medellín Cartel.131 Salinas held the belief he would be 129 Ibid. 130 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuban Government Involvement in Drug Trafficking (Langley, December 1984), p. 03, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87T00217R000700140002-5.pdf. 131 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 12-13 September 1989, p. 70, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/146771NCJRS.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m6 killed due to his past association with M19 and began providing evidence to the Colombian government, which eventually resulted in the deaths of many prominent Medellín Cartel leaders.132 In testimony before the U.S. Congress, Salinas recalled that, "[on November 22, 1988] two pilots flying a Commander 1000 aircraft were planning to stop and refuel in Cuba. They were leaving from an estate [in the Department of Cordoba] …When the seats of the plane were removed to load the cocaine, I saw the navigation charts, which indicated they were flying over the southern coast of Cuba. These pilots commented that they had to be sure to carry some amount of U.S. dollars with them to leave in Cuba as prearranged payment for the stopover".133 While the pilots Salinas spoke with never identified who gave them clearance to fly over Cuba with drugs, Salinas did testify "that it [the drug trafficking operation] was all the way up to Fidel Castro" with this information apparently coming from Fidel's spokesman.134 It is worth noting that this piece of testimony would effectively qualify as hearsay in a U.S. court of law. Many informants also came forward with information that would prove to be incriminatory to many persons with ties to the drug trade, including certain high-ranking Cuban leaders. On such source, a confidential informant for the DEA, who, after being arrested in 1985 on conspiracy charges, provided information on much of the Medellín's drug trafficking activities to the U.S. government.135 In a request for payment from the DEA's Asuncion Country Office, the agency noted the source's decades of service to the United States, describing him as having led "successful 132 U.S. Congress, Senate, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, p. 73. 133 U.S. Congress, Senate, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, p. 71-72. 134 Ibid. 135 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Asuncion Country Office, REQUEST for PAYMENT under 28 U.S.C. 524 (C)(1)(B) for CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE (CS #####) (Asuncion, post-2009), p. 01. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m7 negotiations for landing rights and refueling operations in [among other countries] Cuba…[the source] purchased a birthday surprise (an airplane bought in the U.S.) for Fidel CASTRO's[sic] birthday, which he personally handed over to Castro's brother Raúl (then Cuba's Minister of Defense) during lunch".136 This information is quite damning to the Castro regime and, if true, would prove that, at the least, Raúl Castro did have knowledge of Cuban involvement in the drug trade and condoned those operations. While it cannot be emphasized enough that this confidential source pled "nolo contendere to the conspiracy charges in 1986", it does speak volumes that the DEA found him an essential and trustworthy source to continue using well into the 21st century.137 At this same time, another development implicated an American fugitive with close ties to the Castro regime in the drug trade. In April of 1985, appearing "before the Senate subcommittee on children, family, and drugs" (which was investigating Nicaraguan governmental involvement in the drug trade) were two convicted smugglers who provided further information on Cuban involvement in the drug trade.138 One of them was smuggler James A. Herring, Jr. who, while insisting he never transported drugs for the Cubans or Nicaraguans, detailed his smuggling activities with the Cubans in an interview with PBS Frontline, saying, "When I would go into Varadero with boatloads of equipment, we would be received by marked vessels that the Cuban navy, so to speak, utilized, their military gunboats. They would escort us into the gunboat dockage there at Varadero. From there they would offload. We would stay as long as we felt necessary to refuel us, wined and dined us. And when we were ready to return to 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 "Witnesses Testify on Vesco Link to Drug trafficking in Nicaragua, Cuba," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 19 April 1985, https://apnews.com/article/09e42836a8f58d76da155fa155da7847. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m8 the Keys, they would take and escort us out".139 In addition to this, Herring also claimed that the DGI, "would even offer drugs in lieu of the cash. [They] had the availability of enormous amounts of drugs that they had warehoused through seizures that they had made in their country on drug operations that weren't paying protection for their air space or their waterways. So they had a readily available amount of drugs in the form of cocaine, Qualudes[sic] and marijuana".140 Herring also testified that "he worked with Cuban Government officials and [Robert Vesco] to help the Nicaraguan government build a cocaine-processing laboratory near Managua".141 Vesco had been a successful businessman in the United States, creating a hundred-million-dollar manufacturing empire by 1970 before being twice indicted on federal charges for "defrauding thousands of investors [of $224 million USD]" and "for making illegal contributions totaling $250,000" to Richard Nixon's re-election campaign in 1972 and 1976 respectively.142 Following this, Vesco fled to numerous Latin American countries (including Nicaragua) before settling in Cuba around 1984.143 In a March 1996 profile for Vanity Fair, Vesco's immediate family indicates a friendly relationship to Fidel and Raul Castro in addition to a partnership to traffic narcotics with Col. Antonio De La Guardia, a high-ranking figure in the DGI and an important part of Cuba's overall foray into the drug trade.144 Eventually, however, Vesco attracted the eye of U.S. federal law enforcement for his 139 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 140 Ibid. 141 Joel Brinkley, "Panel Hears Details Linking Managua and Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 20 April 1985, https://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/20/world/panel- hears-details-linking-managua-and-drugs.html. 142 Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, "Robert L. Vesco," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 20 July 1998, updated 30 November 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Robert-L-Vesco. 143 Ibid. 144 Ann Louise Bardach, "Vesco's Last Gamble," Vanity Fair, Condé Nast, published March 1996, https://archive.vanityfair.com/article/1996/3/vescos-last-gamble. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m9 alleged participation in drug trafficking and, though some convicted drug traffickers and Cuban intelligence defectors implicated him in criminal acts, the "FBI and [DEA] denied he had any role" in certain elements of the drug trade, disproving these traffickers and defectors' claims.145 Ultimately, Vesco was arrested and sentenced to prison in Cuba in 1996 "for economic crimes against the government of Fidel Castro".146 Since at least April of 1987, the DEA's Miami Office was actively pursuing an investigation against Cuban government and military officials. Harry Sommers, a newly minted DEA agent to the Miami FO and later Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) of the Atlanta FO, was the lead investigator on the case and detailed his investigation in an April 1990 academic work for Florida International University. According to Sommers, in April of 1987, "two pilots [an American and Cuban national] flew approximately 480 pounds of cocaine from Colombia to [Varadero Military Base, Cuba]…where the cocaine was transferred to Cuban military officers".147 According to Sommers, the pilots were both questioned by U.S. officials and, in this interview, both pilots claimed they had stopped in Cuba to make "emergency repairs" and "presented documentation from the Cuban government confirming their story".148 The drugs were then placed upon a boat named the "Flerida" and, while attempting to enter Florida waters that April, was intercepted by the DEA. In the ensuing interviews with the boat's operators (all Cubans who were "residing in 145 Jim McGee, Pierre Thomas, Guy Gugliotta, & Jerry Knight "Vesco Held In Cuba," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 09 June 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/06/09/vesco-held-in-cuba/874c16d3-81a5-4700-84ce- 6a4e8300fdab/. 146 Douglas Farah, "Vesco Gets 13-Year Sentence in Cuba," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 27 August 1996, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/08/27/vesco-gets-13-year-sentence-in-cuba/77271414- 9219-4efe-b68c-5d30b0f9b11b/. 147 Harry Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," (graduate paper, Florida International University, 23 April 1990), p. 07. 148 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 08. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m0 Miami"), the DEA found the boat was "[initially] met at sea by a Cuban Coast Guard vessel and escorted to the military base in Varadero [where the] crew members were housed and fed until the cocaine was loaded onto the vessel" upon which the boat was escorted out of Cuban waters by a Coast Guard ship.149 Additional evidence showing U.S.-based drug traffickers of Cuban descent docking and landing at Varadero and interacting heavily with Cuban military officers was uncovered through further investigations in May and November of 1987.150 This investigation led to the federal indictments of various figures in late 1988, including Reinaldo and Rueben Ruiz, a Cuban father and son drug trafficking team operating out of the South Florida.151 Reinaldo Ruiz, facing a sentence of life imprisonment, agreed to make a deal with the government in return for a lighter sentence.152 In a television interview with PBS Frontline before his death, Ruiz detailed his involvement in the drug trade and his associations with the Cuban government. According to Ruiz, he would transport a boat from Florida to Varadero where "everything had been arranged in advance [by Colonel Pardo, Chief of Command of Naval Operations in Varadero]" while his son, Rueben, would fly the cocaine from Colombia to Varadero which, upon landing, would be transferred to Ruiz's boat by members of the Cuban military and MININT.153 In this interview, Ruiz also stated "Every time that I went over there, I was completely sure that I was a 100 percent backing[sic], all the way to the top, otherwise I never, ever touch a thing out there". 154 149 Ibid. 150 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 08-10. 151 Buddy Nivens, "Jury Links Cuba To Drug Smuggling," South Florida Sun Sentinel, Tribune Publishing, published 27 February 1988, https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1988-02-27-8801120759-story.html. 152 Richard Cole, "Prosecutors: Trafficker Implicated More Top Cuban Officials," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 21 August 1989, https://apnews.com/article/348da22ca41fd9a7e77c7ab9226c504e. 153 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 154 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m1 Despite Ruiz's comment, he never once indicated to federal investigators he met Fidel or Raul Castro; the closest Ruiz got to implicating either senior leader was a secret recording made by a DEA informant in which Ruiz claimed "The [payoff] money went in Fidel's drawer".155 Again, Ruiz never identified this person as being Fidel Castro and, if he did, the information would have come from someone who had heard this information from someone else, effectively being inadmissible evidence. What is quite serious about Ruiz's allegations and testimony however are his connections to Cuban intelligence. According to Harry Sommers and confirmed by other federal investigations, Ruiz was a "cousin of Miguel Ruiz-Poo…a Cuban captain in the Ministry of the Interior" who was working in Panama when he met Reinaldo Ruiz.156 While they initially began transporting U.S. goods and products to circumvent the embargo, Reinaldo Ruiz eventually floated the idea of trafficking cocaine through Cuba which resulted in Ruiz-Poo informing his superior Major Amado Padrón Trujillo and Colonel Antonio "Tony" de la Guardia, both members of the Moneda Convertible (MC) Department, a division meant to "circumvent the United States embargo and earn Cuba hard currency".157 This is where Ruiz's involvement in shipping boats and aircraft filled with cocaine and other narcotics to Cuba and then on to Florida began. According to esteemed journalist Andres Oppenheimer, shortly after de la Guardia and Ruiz initially met, Ruiz asked de la Guardia if Fidel Castro was aware of their arrangement to traffic narcotics to which de la Guardia replied in the affirmative. Oppenheimer writes however 155 "Secret Drug Case Tape Talks of 'Fidel' Payoffs" Associated Press, Associated Press, published 09 March 1988, https://apnews.com/article/0800e600293914df73901e1fe452316b. 156 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 11. 157 González, "The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking and the Castro Regime," CSA Occasional Paper Series Vol. 02. No. 06 (1997), p. 10. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m2 "It is unclear whether Tony de la Guardia had personally discussed his cocaine-trafficking plans with Castro. The Commandante, with his instinctive revulsion for money matters, seldom got involved in dirty business deals. That was Interior Minister Abrantes's job…De La Guardia's statement to Reinaldo Ruiz may have reflected the colonel's assumption that Abrantes never would have okayed something as hot as a drug operation without Fidel's blessing".158 Also around this time was the federal indictment against Manuel Noriega, the dictator of Panama who had become an increasing annoyance to the U.S. government. Despite having initially been friendly to the U.S., providing information to the CIA and DEA159, his involvement in substantial drug trafficking and racketeering efforts (in addition to the significant corruption and general abuses of his regime) had made him a liability.160 Among the witnesses who provided information against Noriega was Jose Blandón Castillo, a former key member of Noriega's intelligence service and a "consul general in New York".161 Blandón provided first-hand knowledge of incidences, confirming some of what was already suspected by American officials and investigators on Noriega's activities, but also claimed Fidel Castro mediated a dispute between Noriega and the Medellín Cartel in the Darién Province of Panama. According to Blandón, he "met with Castro in Havana on June 21 or 22, 1984 [and] Castro recommended that Noriega return the $5 million in protection money and return the plant, personnel, and equipment to the Cartel" and on either June 27th or 28th, "Noriega and Castro met 158 Andres Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour: The Secret Story Behind the Coming Downfall of Communist Cuba (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 29. 159 Robert L. Jackson, "Noriega Gave DEA Limited Aid for 5 Years, Officials Say," Los Angeles Times, Times Mirror Company, published 16 December 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-12-16-mn-517-story.html. 160 Philip Shenon, "Noriega Indicted by U.S. For Links to Illegal Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 06 February 1988, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/06/world/noriega-indicted-by-us-for-links-to-illegal-drugs.html. 161 Stephen Engelberg with Elaine Sciolino, "A U.S. Frame-Up of Nicaragua Charged," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 04 February 1988, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90M00005R001100160023-3.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m3 directly" and Noriega agreed to go forward with Castro's suggestions, resulting in the release of numerous prisoners.162 While this information was used in indictments against senior Cuban officials and Manuel Noriega, some have found reason to doubt Blandón's claims. John Dinges, a noted investigative journalist and current Professor Emeritus of International Journalism at Columbia University, documented Blandón's claims in his 1991 book Our Man in Panama, stating, "There was no independent corroboration for the story…No other witnesses, including [Floyd Carlton Caceres, Noriega's personal pilot], had any knowledge of the Cuban meeting. If investigators had checked flight records and even press clips in Panama, they might have discovered that Blandón had gotten some basic facts of the Darién incident wrong: the dates for the trip to Cuba were wrong, and the prisoners supposedly released at Castro's urging had been freed more than one month before Blandón and Noriega went to Cuba".163 Richard Gregorie, who met with Blandón, disagrees with Dinges' assertions, saying, "Blandón provided the US government with valid evidence that was corroborated, but Blandón volunteered his cooperation and no one knew his true motivation. He was caught, prior to trial, recording his interviews by agents… The photos and information he provided were valid, but whether this was a lure by some foreign intelligence service or an attempt to sell his story for personal gain made him untrustworthy as a witness".164 Castro was interviewed around this time by Maria Shriver of NBC News and wholeheartedly rejected "José Blandón's charge" while also "[inviting] the Congressional committee [which heard Blandón's claims] to visit Cuba to receive evidence that Blandón was 162 U.S. Congress, Senate, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, p. 66. 163 John Dinges, Our Man in Panama: The Shrewd Rise and Brutal Fall of Manuel Noriega (New York, NY: Random House, 1991), p. 292, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/232993288. 164 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m4 lying to Congress".165 In this interview, he also "[denied] that the Medellín drug cartel has ever trafficked drugs through Cuba to the United States".166 Despite Castro's invitation to the committee, subcommittee chairman Senator John Kerry approached the Cuban Interests Section in D.C. and requested to visit Cuba on the conditions that "staff [be] permitted to advance the trip and…the Cubans agreed to discuss the drug trafficking problem in general" along with being able to meet Robert Vesco; the trip never materialized as "The Cubans never replied to any of these requests and never made any further arrangements for the visit".167 The concentrated U.S. criminal investigations, Congressional hearings, and federal indictments, the intense media speculation and reporting, along with seeming pressure from the Soviet Union168 forced the Cuban government's hand. On 12 June, 1989, multiple high-ranking members of Cuba's military and intelligence services were arrested. These members included General Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sanchez,169 Brigadier General Patricio de la Guardia, Colonel Antonio "Tony" de la Guardia (twin brother to Patricio), Colonel Antonio Rodriguez Estupinan, Captain Jorge Martinez Valdes, Lieutenant Colonel Alexis Lago Archoa, and Major Amado Padrón Trujillo.170 Also charged were Captain Leonel Estevez-Soto, Captain Antonio Sanchez-Lima, First Lieutenant Jose Luis Pineda-Bermudez, Captain Miguel Ruiz-Poo, Captain Rosa Maria Abierno-Gobin, and Captain Eduardo Diaz-Izquierdo.171 165 Jane Franklin, Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History (New York, NY: Ocean Press, 1992), p. 239, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/944186211. 166 Ibid. 167 U.S. Congress, Senate, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, p. 66-67. 168 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, International Narcotics Situation Report (Langley, VA: May 1989), p. 13, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91M01043R002200150004-9.pdf. 169 Robert Pear, "Cuba Arrests Top General on Corruption Charges," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 16 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/16/world/cuba-arrests-top-general-on-corruption-charges.html?searchResultPosition=8. 170 Robert Pear, "Cuba Seizes 6 More Officers Amid Signs of Big Shakeup," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 17 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/17/world/cuba-seizes-6-more-officers-amid-signs-of-big-shakeup.html. 171 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 14. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m5 The majority of these persons were members of Cuba's Ministry of the Interior and intelligence services, though Estupinan and Martinez were both former aides-de-camp to General Ochoa.172 Save for Archoa and Trujillo, who were not charged with any crime, the other persons were charged with a variety of public corruption crimes, including money laundering, drug trafficking, and treason. As well, though all were arrested rather simultaneously, there were two separate cases going on which involved the drug trade in Cuba. The first involved, "[Antonio "Tony"] de la Guardia, Major Padrón, and six other officers who worked at [the MC Department] … The Cuban government charged that de la Guardia's group arranged for six tons of cocaine to be sent from Colombia through Cuba to the United States in the two years after April 1987, and that they were paid $3.4 million for doing so".173 The second case involved primary Ochoa and his aide-de-camp Martinez (in addition to "several others") in which the Cuban government charged that "[Ochoa] enriched himself in black-market trading, using army resources, when he was stationed in Angola in 1988, and to have neglected his military duties…[stole] $161,000 from Nicaragua's Sandinista army through a failed weapons deal…[and] was said to have conceived of a scheme to send major cocaine shipments to the United States, and for that purpose to have sent Martínez secretly to Medellín, Colombia, in 1988 to meet with Pablo Escobar Gaviria, a magnate of the drug cartel".174 The charges against Ochoa did not allege he was involved in de la Guardia's operations nor ever took part in a drug deal, alleging only he engaged in treason and efforts to gain private funds for either independent military operations or for personal use. 172 Ibid. 173 Julia Preston, "The Trial that Shook Cuba," The New York Review of Books, NYREV, Inc., published 07 December 1989, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1989/12/07/the-trial-that-shook-cuba/. 174 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m6 The trial (which aired on public television throughout Cuba) began on 25 June, 1989, thirteen days after Ochoa had initially been arrested, with the first hearing beginning on the 26th of June.175 Throughout the course of the trial, numerous witnesses were called who testified in regards to the charges, in some cases admitting culpability and accepting responsibility for individual actions which were illegal while also implicating others such as Ochoa and the de la Guardia brothers in the illegal activities they had been charged with. Both Patricio and Tony de la Guardia and Arnaldo Ochoa admitted their involvements in drug trafficking and treasonous activities, respectively, before the trial had commenced.176 At the trial's conclusion, the prosecutor for the government recommended to the Honor Tribunal, a board of 47 high-ranking Cuban military officers (one of whom was Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado, who had been charged with drug trafficking by the U.S. in 1982)177, that "Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, Antonio de la Guardia Font, Jorge Martinez Valdez, Amado Bruno Padron Trujillo, Antonio Sanchez Lima, Alexis Lago Arocha, and Eduardo Diaz Izquierdo [receive] the death penalty…[for] the most serious crimes in this indictment, which are drug trafficking and treason against the fatherland".178 The prosecutor also recommended "30 years imprisonment for defendants Patricio de la Guardia Font and Rosa Maria Abierno Gobin, 25 years imprisonment for defendants Gabriel Prendes Gomez, Leonel Estevez Soto, Miguel Ruiz 175 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 03, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a347578.pdf. 176 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 07, 154, 164. 177 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 44. 178 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 187. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m7 Poo, and Luis M. Pineda Bermudez, and 15 years imprisonment for defendant Antonio Rodriguez Estupinan".179 The Honor Tribunal agreed unanimously on 11 July 1989, with the stripping of ranks coming later on 12 July 1989.180 On 13 July 1989, Ochoa, Tony de la Guardia, Valdez, and Trujillo were all executed by way of firing squad.181 During and following the trial, Cuba's Ministry of the Interior and the Cuban government as a whole was revamped; Diocles Torralba Gonzalez, Cuba's Minister of Transportation "was dismissed [on 14 June 1989] for "improper conduct" – suggesting he may have been engaged in corruption"182 while Cuba's Minister of the Interior, Brigadier General Jose Abrantes Fernandez, "was dismissed [on] June 26" and then arrested on 31 July 1989 alongside "Brig. Gen. Roberto Gonzalez Caso, a former head of immigration; Oscar Carreno Gomez, former customs chief; Lt. Col. Rolando Castaneda Izquiero, and Hector Carbonell Mendez, director of a state-owned company that dealt in foreign currency".183 Five more Brigadier Generals of the Cuban military, presumably aligned with the Ministry of the Interior, were also "demoted to colonel and retired".184 Both Abrantes and Torralba would later receive twenty year prison sentences, with Abrantes dying in 1991 of a heart attack.185 Replacing Abrantes in the MININT was "trusted four-star general Abelardo Colomé Ibarra" who quickly revamped much of MININT's capabilities.186 179 Ibid. 180 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 208-209. 181 Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour, p. 01-03. 182 Jim Anderson, "U.S.: High-level shakeup may be under way in Cuba," United Press International, United Press International, published 14 June 1989, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/06/14/US-High-level-shakeup-may-be-under-way-in-Cuba/4954613800000/. 183 Isaac A. Levi, "Five Senior Cuban Officers Arrested in Drug Scandal," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 31 July 1989, https://apnews.com/article/0782d185225919535cf3aa518ed550a9. 184 Ibid. 185 Richard Gott, Cuba: A New History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 285. 186 Krujit, Cuba and Revolutionary Latin America, p. 183. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m8 During and after the trial, the charges and convictions were heavily criticized. Some cast doubt on the trial's veracity in regards to having a military officer who had allegations of drug trafficking leveled against him187, while others (Cuban human rights activities, American journalists, and international human rights advocacy and monitoring groups) took offense to the lack of questions asked by the defendants' military appointed prosecutors (in addition to the rather loaded way in which some questions were asked).188 Jaqueline Tillman, a member of the National Security Council, was quoted as saying, "The evidence of Cuban involvement in narcotics trafficking was becoming so abundant that the regime moved to protect Fidel Castro by dissociating him from those activities" while Frank Calzon, a member of the human rights group Freedom House stated that either of the Castros, either Fidel or Raul, "had to approve of this activity, or at least [look] the other way".189 Even civilians of the island nation, according to former diplomat Wayne Smith, were "questioning the official explanation and arguing that there has to be a lot more to this than what is contained in the official announcement".190 Following the trials and into the 1990s, however, Cuba seemingly became more committed to halting drug traffic in Cuba. Fulton Armstrong, a former NIO for Latin America and two-time Director for Inter-American Affairs for the NSC, has stated that "Since Ochoa, collaboration has been good" mentioning that, since 1997, a formal relationship between the United States and Cuba exists, with both the U.S. and Cuba "[identifying] this as a matter of 187 Richard Cole, "Admiral's Role Calls Cuba Drug Crackdown Into Question," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 29 June 1989, https://apnews.com/article/9ef279d0c5de07e958d53e9c1a7bea5b. 188 Preston, "The Trial that Shook Cuba," The New York Review of Books. 189 Robert Pear, "Cuba Discloses A Drug Network Of Top Officials," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 24 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/24/world/cuba-discloses-a-drug-network-of-top-officials.html. 190 Larry Rohter, "Castro Is Anxious About His Military," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 25 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/25/weekinreview/the-world-castro-is-anxious-about-his-military.html?searchResultPosition=10. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m9 national interest".191 Pierre Charette, the ASAC for the DEA's Caribbean division during the late-1980s, identified that into the early-1990s, cooperation with the Cuban government has been "fantastic [with] drug trafficking through go-fast boats dropping significantly" and that this productive relationship remains in place today.192 In 1991, the U.S. Customs Service detailed to Frontline that "[drug, arms, and other illicit] trafficking had declined since the trial, but…not stopped".193 The DEA's Administrator194 and Chief of International Operations195, in 1996 and 1999 respectively, both testified before Congress that, despite large profile cases in the media, the Cuban government itself nor senior officials were not involved in drug trafficking. Also in 1996, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs "recognized cuban[sic] counter-drugs efforts, stating that the cuban[sic] government was giving anti-narcotics policies higher public profile in the face of growing narcotics transshipments and consumption".196 General Barry McCaffrey, who served as Commander of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and was President Clinton's Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ODNCP) from 1994 to 2001, recalled in 2015 "Cuba's a police state, and I don't believe the Cuban government wants to be a hub for drug smugglers. They saw it as a 191 Fulton Armstrong (retired National Intelligence Officer for Latin America with NSC) in discussion with the author, 13 January 2021. 192 Pierre "Pete" Charette (retired Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 16 March 2021. 193 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 194 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Statement by: Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, 104th Cong., 06 June 1996, https://fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/h960606c.htm. 195 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Statement by: William E. Ledwith, Chief of International Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration, 106th Cong., 17 November 1999, https://fas.org/irp/congress/1999_hr/ct111799.htm. 196 Isabella Bellezza-Smull, "Will Cuba Update its Drug Policy for the Twenty First Century?," Igarapé Institute, Igarapé Institute, published 29 December 2017, https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/08-11-2017-NE-29-Cuba-Drog-Policy.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m0 threat to their children, the workforce, their economy, their government" while noting that though cooperation was imperfect, there was constant communication with the Cubans throughout his time in terms of combating drug trafficking.197 The Question of Culpability on the Part of the Castros The involvement on the part of Fidel and Raul Castro in the drug trade is something that has long been debated and speculated. Since the 1960s, individual criminal investigations, U.S. federal government memorandums, Cuban intelligence defectors, convicted criminals, and congressional hearings have included testimony that has tried to implicate Fidel, Raul, or both Castros in the drug trade. With the 1989 trials, these speculations have increased and, in some cases, due to the handling of the trials, been given more credence. At least two U.S. Congressional hearings have been conducted since 1989, both of which focused on continuing drug traffic in Cuba.198 199 Into the 1990s, more evidence of possible involvement by the Castro regime was revealed. First were the allegations of Carlos Ledher, an experienced drug trafficker and pilot and co-founder of the Medellín Cartel.200 Ledher, upon his arrest and extradition in 1987, was "convicted…on charges of conspiracy and running a criminal enterprise as well as other charges related to the importation and sale of cocaine" in May of 1988.201 Due to this, Ledher began 197 Joshua Partlow & Nick Miroff, "In fight against drugs, Cuba and U.S. on same team," The Washington Post, Nash Holdings, LLC., published 05 January 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-fight-against-drugs-cuba-and-us-on-same-team/2015/01/05/6416305a-90fc-11e4-a66f-0ca5037a597d_story.html. 198 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Cuba's Link to Drug Trafficking, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 November 1999, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=2027. 199 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Drug Trafficking in the Caribbean: Do Traffickers Use Cuba and Puerto Rico As Major Transit Locations For State-Bound Narcotics?, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess., 3-4 January 2000, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg69521/pdf/CHRG-106hhrg69521.pdf. 200 Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 45, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/45086854. 201 Patricia Bauer, "Carlos Ledher," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 18 June 2018, updated 03 September 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Carlos-Lehder. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m1 cooperating with the U.S. government for a lesser sentence. In federal testimony during the Noriega trial, Ledher claimed "that Castro mediated a bitter 1984 dispute between Noriega and Colombia's Medellin cartel that saved Panama's strongman from probable assassination…and bribed Cuban government officials to ship tons of cocaine into the United States".202 Lieutenant Colonel Luis del Cid, a close aide to Manuel Noriega, alleged during Noriega's trial that he "accompanied Noriega on a flight to Cuba and met Castro following the raid [in which Panamanian troops raided a cocaine lab in Darién province Colombia]" though specified he did not attend the meeting in question.203 While both Ledher and del Cid's testimonies seem to corroborate what Blandón had previously testified in regards to Castro's connections to Noriega and the Medellín Cartel, it must be noted that both del Cid and Ledher testified in exchange for reductions in their sentences (which numbered into the hundreds of years for each of them) and also could easily have become aware of Blandón's testimony in any of the three years prior to their providing evidence to the U.S. government. Two former officials who defected from Cuba two years before the trials, Oscar Valdes from the Ministry of Trade and Manuel de Beunza from the Ministry of the Interior, offered their insights on the trial, claiming the trials were for "show" and were more politically motivated as Castro desired to remove opponents whom he saw as a threat to his power.204 This allegation that the drug trials were a show trial meant to snub out political opponents of Castro's hold on Cuba has become a very prominent. 202 Robert L. Jackson, "Cartel Leader Reveals Secrets of Drug World," The Los Angeles Times, Time Mirror Company, published 21 November 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-11-21-mn-404-story.html. 203 Richard Cole, "Former Aide Tells of Drug Cash, Castro, and Prostitutes," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 24 September 1991, https://apnews.com/article/0b7fcac1c0842630af2d1cc758ab1acd. 204 Jim Anderson, "Defectors: Cuba trials about politics, not drugs," United Press International, United Press International, published 27 July 1989, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/07/27/Defectors-Cuba-trial-about-politics-not-drugs/2648617515200/?spt=su. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m2 Other defectors, including those from the DGI who defected, also voiced their views on the trial. Jorge Masetti, a DGI officer and Tony de la Guardia's son-in-law who defected from Cuba in 1990, claimed in an interview, "If this operation really existed, it could only have existed if Fidel and Raúl Castro knew about it. They made these accusations, which were supposed to make the case against Ochoa. Arnaldo Ochoa was never proven to have smuggled drugs. The direct evidence does not exist, but they accused Ochoa, and why? Because Fidel wanted to send a message to all the officials with high authority".205 Juan Reinaldo Sánchez, a seemingly credible defector206 from Cuba's MININT who was the personal bodyguard to Castro for seventeen years, wrote in his book The Double Life of Fidel Castro that Castro had knowledge of subordinates' involvement in the drug trade and sanctioned it. Sánchez recalls overhearing a conversation in 1988 between Minister of the Interior Jose Abrantes and Castro in "centered on a Cuban [drug trafficker] living in the United States" who wanted to travel to Cuba to visit his parents; Castro approved the trip along with allowing the trafficker to, as a cover, say he was a Cuban intelligence operative while also requesting that Tony de la Guardia handle "the logistics of the trip".207 This conversation, while innocuous, seems to indicate that Castro did maintain a friendly relationship with some drug traffickers, yet reveals no legitimate information of Castro's involvement in the drug trade. Into the 1990s, working off the indictments against the Ruiz Family in 1988 and the 1992 Noriega trial, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida began investigating senior level members of the Cuban government. In 1993, the USAO-SDFL "drafted a [proposed 205 The Cuba Libre Story, season 1, episode 7, "Secrets and Sacrifices," directed by Emmanuel Amara, Kai Christiansen, & Florian Dedio, aired 11 December 2015, https://www.netflix.com/title/80109535. 206 Edward A. Lynch, "All Socialists Are Equal, but Some Are More Equal Than Others," Military Review (November-December 2019), p. 124, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/ND-19/ND-19-Book-B.pdf. 207 Juan Reinaldo Sánchez with Axel Gyldén, The Double Life of Fidel Castro: My 17 Years as Personal Bodyguard to El Líder Máximo (New York, NY: St. Martin's Griffin, 2015), p. 230. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m3 indictment that] would have charged Raul Castro and 14 other top Cuban officials [including Manuel Piñeiro, head of the Departamento América] with conspiracy and racketeering for allegedly providing safe passage for Medellin cartel cocaine loads, including permission to fly over Cuba and use its waters".208 Among others allegedly involved in this large enterprise was Abelardo Colomé Ibarra, the Minister of the Interior who replaced Jose

Invariablemente, y aunque no haya sido su propósito, en muchas ocasiones, en distintos estudios que hay sobre narrativa criminal, policíaca, el espionaje y el thriller se observa un hecho innegable: una confusión teórica sobre lo que son estas cuatro literaturas. Esto ha derivado en una prolongada discusión que no ha ayudado a disipar dicha confusión, sino todo lo contrario, la ha acentuado. Como bien apunta Rodríguez Joulia Saint Cyr (1970: 9) gran parte de los críticos y teóricos reúnen bajo la denominación de una serie de géneros y subgéneros que no corresponden a él. De ahí que dentro de la literatura hispanoamericana se considere novelas policíaca a Ensayo de un crimen (1943-1944) de Rodolfo Usigli, El túnel (1948) de Ernesto Sábato, Yo maté a Kennedy (1972) de Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, La cabeza de la hidra (1978) de Carlos Fuentes o Linda 67: historia de un crimen (1995) de Fernando del Paso, cuando ninguna de ellas lo es. Pero ¿por qué se da esta situación de confusión? Este conjunto de textos, junto a otros más, poseen un gran intercambio de tipologías discursivo-textuales criminales, policíacas, de espionaje y del thriller traspasando las fronteras de estas cuatro literaturas y provocando la ruptura del límite entre lo criminal, policíaco, espionaje y thriller, lo que, finalmente, lleva a toda una serie de confusiones y dudas: si un texto tiene como investigador a un criminal ¿es policíaco? Es indudable que la confusión entre estas cuatro narrativas tiene causas que van más allá de una lectura inadecuada por parte de los lectores: el problema se encuentra a un nivel profundo, en la enorme dificultad por delimitar las fronteras genéricas de ellos y de analizar debidamente las fluctuaciones de los elementos genéricos de cada una. Por tanto, se abre la posibilidad de estudiar el problema del límite entre lo criminal, lo policíaco, el espionaje y el thriller. Sin embargo, ¿es necesario un estudio de este problema? El problema de la ruptura de las fronteras de las literaturas criminal, policíaca, de espionaje y thriller ha sido estudiado de manera secundaria y casi desapercibida, ya que el denominado «género policíaco» ha «monopolizado» buena parte de los estudios como podemos ver a continuación "The Art of the Detective Story" (1924) de Austin Freeman, Le detectitte novel, et l'influence de la pensée sciéntifique (1929) de Regis Messac, Le roman policier (1941) Roger Caillois, The Art of the Mystery Story (1946) de Howard Haycraft, Petite histoire du roman policier (1956) de Fereydoun Hoveyda, Breve storia del romanzo poliziesco (1962) de Alberto del Monte, Le roman policier (1964) de Thomas Narcejac y Pierre Boileau, "Typology du roman policier" (1966) de Tzvetan Todorov, The Pursuit of Crime (1981) de Dennis Porter o Histoire du roman policier (1996) de Jean Bourdier, entre muchos otros. Mientras tanto, en lengua española se observan trabajos como "Leyes de la narración policial" (1933) y "Los laberintos policiales y Chesterton" (1935) de Jorge Luis Borges, Ensayo sobre la novela policial (1947), el prólogo a Los mejores cuentos policiales mexicanos (1955) y "Qué es lo policíaco en la narrativa" (1987) de María Elvira Bermúdez, Biografía de la novela policíaca (1956) de Juan José Mira, La novela policíaca: síntesis a través de sus autores, sus personajes y sus obras (1973) de César E. Díaz, De la novela policíaca a la novela negra (1986) y La novela policíaca en España (1993) de Salvador Vázquez de Parga, La novela policíaca actual (1990) de Carmen García Pardo, La novela criminal española (1991) de José Valles Calatrava, así como su prólogo "La novela criminal" que realizó Sánchez Trigueros, La novela policíaca española. Teoría e historia crítica (1994) de José T. Colmeiro, El cadáver en la cocina: la novela criminal en la cultura del desencanto (1997) de Joan Ramón Resina, Los héroes de la novela policíaca (2006) de Sergi Echaburu Soler o Poética del relato policíaco: de Edgar Allan Poe a Raymond Chandler (2006) de Iván Martín Cerezo, entre otros. Sin embargo, es posible apreciar investigaciones sobre lo criminal, el espionaje y el thriller: La novela de intriga (1970) de Carlos Rodríguez Joulia St.- Cyr, Bloody Murder. From the Detective Story to the Crimen Novel (1972) de Julian Symons, Thrillers, la novela de misterio (1978) de Jerry Palmer, Le Roman d'espionnage (1983) de Gabriel Veraldi, Panorama du roman d'espionnage contemporain (1986) de Jean-Paul Schweighaeuser, Diccionario de la novela negra norteamericana (1986) y La novela negra (1986) de Javier Coma, The literature of crime and detection: an illustrated history from antiquity to the present (1988) de Waltraud Woeller y Bruce Cassiday o La novela de espías y los espías de novela (1991) de Juan Antonio de Blas. Ahora bien, ya sea en lo criminal, policíaco, espionaje o thriller una gran parte de estas investigaciones se orientan a revisiones historiográficas –sobre todo de lo policíaco– e intentos por definir estas literaturas. Si bien, es cierto que en algunos de ellas existen análisis socio-críticos, semánticos y pragmáticos, sin olvidar algunos hermenéuticos, intertextuales o paratextuales. Realmente son pocos los estudios, y algunos muy desconocidos, respecto a las continuas fluctuaciones de elementos entre lo criminal, lo policíaco, el espionaje y el thriller. Su evolución ha propiciado que los límites establecidos en ellos se hayan ido desdibujando, en gran medida por el «realismo noir norteamericano», el polar y «neopolar francés» y por disrupciones entre las cuatro narrativas que ha llevado a la aparición de vertientes como la literatura policíaca metafísica, la narrativa psicológica crimino-policíaca, el nuevo realismo socio-crítico criminal o policíaco, el thriller político o la nueva narrativa de espionaje, pero también por narrativas nacionales como la alemana, la escandinava, la italiana, la española, la japonesa, la mexicana, la argentina, entre muchas otras, las cuales han aportado o variado los elementos de lo criminal, lo policíaco, el espionaje y el thriller a tal punto que difícilmente se percibe una marca divisoria clara y precisa entre ellos cuatro. El hecho concreto es que con estas nuevas vertientes en lo criminal, lo policíaco, el espionaje y el thriller, los distintos elementos discursivo-textuales que los componen van a transitar libremente entre uno y otro género, violando continuamente la «frontera genérica» entre ellos. El enigma ya no se referirá exclusivamente a quién era el asesino o si el espía/agente secreto podría trastocar los planes del enemigo. Las motivaciones psicológicas, la crítica social, lo fantástico o la metafísica influirán notablemente en ellos. Ahora bien, el propósito de esta investigación se centra en varios objetivos. Primero, un estudio que incluya lo criminal, policíaco, espionaje y thriller dentro de un concepto que hemos denominado «narrativa sensacional de suspense», aunque este esfuerzo no es el primero que se realiza. Ya en el 1970, Carlos Rodríguez Joulia St.- Cyr lo había intentado con La novela de intriga, un estudio de lo policíaco, lo criminal, el espionaje y el misterio, en el cual el propio investigador deja ver un hecho indiscutible: la confusión en torno a qué es lo criminal, lo policíaco, el espionaje y el misterio, y la cercanía que hay entre estas cuatro narrativas. Sin embargo, Rodríguez Joulia St.- Cyr se concentra de manera exclusiva en buscar los orígenes literarios, así como su desarrollo a nivel histórico. Dos años más tarde, el británico Julian Symons en Bloody Murder realiza interesantes apuntes y acotaciones en torno a lo que llama «sensational literature» y que engloba a textos con "violent ends in a sensational way" Symons (1992: 4) y en el que encontramos textos criminales, policíacos, de espionaje y thrillers, así como nuevos híbridos literarios. Desgraciadamente, Symons no lo estudió con mayor detalle. Hay que precisar que son los estudios de este investigador y autor británico los que sirven como punto de arranque de este estudio. El diseño y empleo de un término como «narrativa sensacional de suspense» no es al azar, responde a una necesidad que aparece debido a una serie de confusiones que se dan alrededor de las definiciones que hay en torno a lo criminal, lo policíaco, el espionaje y el thriller. En más de una ocasión se hace mención al denominado «género negro» sin especificar debidamente qué es o confundiéndolo: ¿Se trata de la literatura sensacional norteamericana de la primera mitad del siglo XX que incluye la obra de autores como Dashiell Hammett, Raymond Chandler, James M. Cain o Mickey Spillane? ¿O, tal vez, es un híbrido literario, producto de las fluctuaciones y combinaciones tipológicas criminales, policíacas, del espionaje y del thriller? El hecho es que ese clima de confusión ha llegado a tal punto que, incluso, se ha llegado a considerar la obra de autores clásicos, como Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, como olvidando el verdadero significado que Todorov (1966) acuña y que se relaciona directamente con la literatura norteamericana sensacional de la primera mitad del siglo XX. Es decir, se cae en un grave error al denominar la obra de Poe, Gaboriau, Christie o Wallace como novela negra, ya que no poseen ninguna característica de esta. A esta confusión se le suma el desconcierto que plantea la narrativa de espionaje y el thriller: ¿dónde incluirlos, en lo policíaco o en la llamada «novela negra» como varios estudios hacen, o es posible plantear que se trata de narrativas con características históricas, semánticas, pragmáticas y genéricas propias? El segundo objetivo es dejar de lado las confusiones en torno al empleo del término «novela negra» al cual sustituiremos por «realismo noir norteamericano». El primero hace referencia a esa literatura norteamericana sensacional que comienza a gestarse a principios de los veinte, y se ajusta al concepto de «realismo» que Raymond Chandler señala en su artículo The Simple Art of Murder (1950) y hace referencia directa a la denominación noir acuñado en la Série Noire, dirigida por Duhamel, a finales de la década de los cuarenta del siglo pasado. El tercer objetivo se centra en una serie de necesidades de la teoría literaria que solo en ocasiones, y de manera secundaria y casi desapercibida, han sido analizadas: la distinción conceptual entre lo criminal, lo policíaco, el espionaje y el thriller que lleva, inexorablemente a otro objetivo: al problema del límite y las fluctuaciones fronterizas en la «narrativa sensacional de suspense», es decir entre lo criminal, lo policíaco, el espionaje y el thriller, sin olvidar los nuevos híbridos literarios tales como el thriller de espionaje o policíaco o la narrativa psicológica crimino-policíaca. A través de un grupo de obras estudiadas observaremos cómo lo que denominamos «límites fronterizos genéricos» son traspasados en dichos textos por las continuas fluctuaciones comunicacionales de los elementos genéricos canónicos que componen lo criminal, policíaco, espionaje y al thriller. No obstante, es necesario establecer ciertos límites al conjunto de textos por analizar, ya que de lo contrario se correría el riesgo de exceder la propia investigación. Son siete las novelas elegidas: El complot mongol (1969) de Rafael Bernal, Noviembre sin violetas (1995) de Lorenzo Silva, Plenilunio (1997) de Antonio Muñoz Molina, Deudas pendientes (2005) de Antonio Jiménez Barca, Ojos de agua (2007) de Domingo Villar, El baile ha terminado (2009) de Julián Ibáñez y La soledad de Patricia (2010) de Carles Quílez, las cuales comparten un elemento temático en común: la investigación. La obra del mexicano Rafael Bernal se extiende a lo largo de más de veintiocho años de trabajo y en él queda constancia de sus grandes inquietudes: el mar, al cual plasma en el libro de relatos Gente de mar (1950) y en El gran océano –inédito hasta 1992–; la selva, la cual cobra vida en el libro de relatos Trópico (1946), en las novelas Su nombre era muerte (1947), Caribal, el infierno verde (1955) y en Tierra de gracia (1963); y lo policíaco, aunque, paradójicamente, este fuera una simple distracción para este autor, ya que solo le dedicaba ciertos momentos para descansar de proyectos más serios, desde su punto de vista. No obstante, Bernal puede ser considerado, con toda justicia, como una de las piedras fundamentales en la aparición y desarrollo de la narrativa policíaca mexicana, sin olvidar el crimen, el thriller y el espionaje, comenzando su periplo en la revista mexicana Selecciones Policías y de Misterio, fundada en 1946 por Antonio Helú, donde se publicarían relatos suyos como La muerte poética o La muerte madrugadora, sin olvidar otros cuentos como Un muerto en la tumba (1946) y La media hora de Sebastián Constantino (1946). Asimismo, Bernal nos presenta a uno de los primeros personajes investigadores amateurs mexicanos: Teódulo Batanes. En Un muerto en la tumba (1946) se descubre en la zona arqueológica Montealban el cadáver de un senador con un puñal de pedernal clavado en el pecho. Uno de los antropólogos, Batanes, es el encargado de resolver el misterio. Resulta curioso observar a este detective miope, desgarbado y que tiene el vicio de usar sinónimos de cuanta cosa dice. Un personaje basado, indudablemente, en la figura del padre Brown de G.K. Chesterton y que aparecería, nuevamente, en la novela corta De muerte natural (1948), en donde Batanes esclarece el homicidio, en un hospital, de una adinerada viuda. Otros textos policíacos de Bernal son El extraño caso de Aloysius Hand y El heroico Serafín, ambas incluidas, junto a De muerte natural, en el libro Tres novelas policíacas, las cuales observan ese estilo clásico de la «novela enigma». Es en 1969 cuando Bernal cambia radicalmente su estilo, alejándose de los esquemas clásicos gracias a la influencia del «realismo noir norteamericano», ofreciendo la obra maestra del thriller de espionaje mexicano: El complot mongol. Respecto a Lorenzo Silva su nombre es ya reconocido dentro de la literatura policíaca gracias a la pareja de guardias civiles conformada por el brigada Rubén «Vila» Bevilacqua, y la sargento Virginia Chamorro, una singular pareja de frustrados: el primero, un psicólogo que jamás logró ejercer como tal; la segunda, hija de un militar, que no logró acceder a ninguna de las academias de los ejércitos –tierra, mar y aire– y que encontró en la Guardia Civil el único resquicio para salvar la tradición militar familiar. El lejano país de los estanques (1998) es el nacimiento de la sociedad conformada por el entonces sargento «Vila» y la novata guardia Chamorro que deberán esclarecer el asesinato de una adinerada joven austriaca en los ambientes nocturnos de un pequeño centro turístico de Mallorca. La pareja aparece de nuevo en El alquimista impaciente (2000) en donde exploran el tema de la corrupción urbanística. En La niebla y la doncella (2002) Vila y Chamorro parten hacia la isla canaria de La Gomera para resolver el asesinato de un joven y que destapará un escándalo para la Guardia Civil. En la antología de cuentos Nadie vale más que otro (2004) Vila y Chamorro se enfrentan a cuatro distintos asesinatos que lo único que les demuestra es que el crimen se da por las situaciones más simple y absurdas. En La reina sin espejo (2005) la pareja de guardias civiles se enfrentan a un caso multipublicitado: el asesinato de una célebre periodista de Barcelona casada con un consagrado escritor catalán. Un caso que abandona los terrenos del crimen pasional y que lleva a Vila y Chamorro por los entresijos de la pornografía, la prostitución y la trata de blancas en Barcelona. La estrategia del agua (2010) nos enseña a un Rubén Bevilacqua ya ascendido a brigada, pero también profundamente decepcionado del sistema judicial español, que tiene que investigar, junto a la también ascendida sargento Virgina Chamorro, el asesinato de un criminal de poca monta y que entraña profundos lados oscuros que deberán averiguar los dos guardias civiles, acompañados de un nuevo compañero: el guardia Arnau. Sin embargo, el contacto de Lorenzo Silva con lo policíaco, y en general con la , no se da exclusivamente con la serie protagonizada por Vila y Chamorro. En La sustancia interior (1996) observamos un thriller histórico, mientras que en Muerte en el "reality show" (2007) dos nuevos investigadores aparecen: la juez Tortosa y el comisario Fonseca, los cuales deberán esclarecer un asesinato cometido «en directo». Asimismo otro texto del escritor madrileño sobresale enormemente: su primera novela Noviembre sin violetas (1995) la cual mantiene un pulso intertextual con La llave de cristal (1931) de Dashiell Hammett. Beatus Ille (1986), la primera novela de Muñoz Molina, recorre ampliamente los terrenos policíacos gracias a su discurso de investigación. No obstante, el texto no pertenece al género policíaco. La interdiscursividad que se presenta en este caso, por sí sola, no es elemento de peso para considerar Beatus Ille una novela policíaca. Hacen falta personajes, temática, ambientación, atmósfera y otros elementos para considerar el texto dentro de lo policíaco. Todo lo contrario sucede en El invierno en Lisboa (1987). Esta novela presenta características mucho más cercanas a lo criminal y a lo policíaco: hechos, acciones, personajes y temática, entre otros elementos, van construyendo una historia que, sin embargo, presenta serias dificultades: ¿es criminal o policíaca? Indudablemente la novela recuerda mucho los antiguos textos del «realismo noir norteamericano», como Cosecha roja o El halcón maltés de Dashiell Hammett, que, en muchas ocasiones, son tan difíciles de definir y clasificar. Una situación que se repetirá en Beltenebros (1989) solo que con mayores dificultades: el texto discurrirá entre lo policíaco, lo criminal, el thriller político y la narrativa de espionaje. En el caso de Los misterios de Madrid (1992) Muñoz Molina ofrecerá una parodia de lo policíaco a partir de un investigador –Lorencito Quesada– que poco o nada tiene que ver con los legendarios private eyes del «realismo noir» o del polar francés. El dueño del secreto(1994) regresa a la problemática presentada en El invierno en Lisboa y Beltenebros: ¿es un texto criminal o policíaco? Cualquier afirmación tajante puede estar errada, ya que, aunque posee algunos elementos propios de ambos géneros, como el discurso, la ambientación y la atmósfera, la novela está en estrecho contacto con la narrativa de espionaje y el thriller político, haciendo muy difícil una clasificación. Dentro de la obra de Muñoz Molina relacionada con lo criminal y lo policíaco, así como con otros géneros afines, encontramos los cuentos Te golpeare sin cólera (1983), El hombre sombra (1983), La colina de los sacrificios (1993), La poseída (1993), Borrador de una historia (1993), La gentileza de los desconocidos (1993) y la novela corta Nada del otro mundo (1993). Pues bien, con Plenilunio (1997) el escritor giennense explora el relato criminal y policíaco de un modo complejo: se adentra en el conflicto psicológico del investigador y del criminal, como lo lleva a cabo el norteamericano Thomas Harris en El dragón rojo (1980-1981) y El silencio de los corderos (1988), pero enlazando también elementos del thriller, el espionaje y el terrorismo. Por lo que se refiere al periodista Antonio Jiménez Barca su obra literaria se traduce en una sola novela: Deudas pendientes (2006), un texto que encierra ciertas complejidades propias del thriller y de lo policíaco. Domingo Villar es un autor gallego que saltó a la palestra en el año 2006 con la publicación de Ojos de agua, protagonizada por el inspector de policía Leo Caldas. Un texto que, como la siguiente aventura de Caldas, La playa de los ahogados (2009), mantiene un esquema clásico: un crimen se ha cometido y es necesario investigarlo y solucionarlo. No es de llamar la atención que este esquema siga siendo popular en la narrativa policíaca en general, ya que dicho esquema es actualizado por los escritores y adaptado a las necesidades de cada texto. Finalmente, la narrativa policíaca en este siglo XXI sigue manteniendo la máxima clásica de . Así pues, tanto en el caso del asesinato del músico Luís Reigosa como el del marinero Justo Costelo, el inspector Caldas continúa con los esquemas clásicos, pero lo interesante es que Domingo Villar le ofrece al lector una visión del complejo entramado psicológico gallego. Es interesante señalar dentro de la obra de Villar el cuento Las hojas secas, incluido en la antología de cuentos La lista negra (2009), compilada por Àlex Martín Escribà y Javier Sánchez Zapatero. En pocas ocasiones se tiene la oportunidad de escribir sobre el personaje-arquetipo del testigo. Pues bien, Domingo Villar es de los pocos que logra hacerlo a través de un ex-presidiario, testigo involuntario de un crimen que lo acosará hasta el día de su muerte. El santanderino Julián Ibáñez comienza en 1980 su andadura por el «sensacional de suspense» con la novela La triple dama, protagonizada por Ramón Ferreol, una antigua estrella de fútbol, un texto que se mueve entre el thriller y lo policíaco. Al año siguiente Ibáñez entregaría La recompensa polaca, pero es en 1983, con No des la espalda a la paloma, cuando Ramón Ferreol vuelve a aparecer en medio del suicidio de un agente de aduanas. En 1986, con Tirar al vuelo, Ibáñez sorprende con un investigador que se aleja totalmente de las convenciones policíacas respecto al personaje del investigador, ya que Novoa no se acerca en lo mínimo a ello. Él es un simple ciudadano común y corriente, un contable, que ve cómo el peligro se aproxima y tiene que tomar cartas en el asunto. Un personaje que protagonizaría Llámala Siboney (1988), Mi nombre es Novoa (1994) y ¿Y a ti, dónde te entierro, hermano? En la década de los noventa, Julián Ibáñez abordaría el espionaje gracias a Bar Babilonia (1991) y continuaría con otras dos novelas policíacas: Doña Lola (1991) y No hay semáforos para los pumas (1995). Ya en el año 2001, Ibáñez ofrece dos nuevos textos. En Manuela Scarface el escritor santanderino aborda la temática criminal de los asaltos bancarios a través de Paco Peña, un joven que trabaja en una sucursal de la Caixa, que una mañana de finales de agosto se ve sorprendido, junto al resto de empleados y clientes, por unos atracadores, por una banda de asaltantes. Pero la verdadera sorpresa de Paco será la de reconocer, a pesar de los disfraces de los delincuentes, a su novia Manuela. Una situación que puede hundirlo, ya que la policía y sus compañeros lo considerarían un cómplice. Mientras tanto, en Entre trago y trago observamos el bajo mundo del crimen, con sus ambientes turbios y corruptos, a través de Maza, un delincuente de poca monta que regenta El Oasis, un club de mala muerte perdido en una carretera de la Mancha. Un texto que nos recuerda los ambientes sórdidos del «realismo noir norteamericano» y el polar francés de los cincuenta. Resulta interesante ver esos ambientes deprimentes en la siguiente novela de Ibáñez: La miel y el cuchillo (2003), de la mano de otro delincuente menor, Florín, un cuarentón con humor crudo perteneciente a ese Madrid tenebroso, por el que este personaje deambulará golpeando y robando. En Los gorilas no bromean con la corbata (2006) observamos a Viriato Ansorena Ruiz, un chico común y corriente que por las noches se transforma en un fotoperiodista de sucesos que busca la noticia que lo encumbre a él y a su padre, sin pensar siquiera que ese descubrimiento puede costarle la vida. Por su parte, Que siga el baile (2006) es un regreso a esa temática policíaca híbrida, en la que el policía Barquín, testigo directo del extraño robo al bar Boom Boom, se verá implicado en una peligrosa investigación, en la búsqueda de las dos extrañas atracadoras. Con Crimen supertranquilo (2007), Ibáñez parece adoptar las convenciones del best-seller: quinientos años después de la expulsión de los judíos de Sefarad –la España hebrea– Rebeca viaja con su padre a Toledo en busca de la casa de sus antepasados. Pero, sorpresivamente, el hombre muere en el Servicio de Urgencias del Hospital. La historia se complica ya que existe la posibilidad de que el padre de Rebeca haya sido asesinado por causa de una antigua llave de oro que se encontraba entre sus pertenencias, robadas, supuestamente, por Pedro, el celador del hospital donde murió el viejo judío. El baile ha terminado (2009) muestra a Ruano Peredo, un policía del Grupo de Localización de Fugitivos, con sede en Gijón, que se verá envuelto en una compleja trama de espionaje en el que estarán involucradas la Guardia Civil, la Ertzaintza y ETA. En El beso del samurái (2009) la temática policíaca continúa dentro de la obra de Ibáñez. Pedro, el ayudante del detective de un hotel, se hace amigo de Helga, una joven alemana. Una amistad que le llevará a involucrarse en una misteriosa trama criminal. La búsqueda de Julián Ibáñez por romper los esquema y paradigmas policíacos la encontramos en Perro vagabundo busca a quién morder (2009) un extraño relato policíaco que, aparentemente, no encierra ningún crimen dentro de la forzada investigación que realiza el misterioso . En 2010, Ibáñez entrega tres nuevos textos en donde la investigación y el crimen se entrelazan de la mano de policías corruptos y delincuentes pragmáticos: Giley, un relato que explota al personaje del sospechoso, encarnado en el policía Cobos; Calle intranquilidad, un viaje hacia ese Bilbao testigo del tráfico de inmigrantes y el negocio de la prostitución y El invierno oscuro, la visión de un joven inmerso en el peligroso mundo de la kale borroka etarra. Por lo que respecta al barcelonés Carles Quílez, su acercamiento a lo «sensacional de suspense» comienza con Atracadores (2002) una antología en la que se observan once distintos cuentos basados, en clave periodística, en los crímenes de las principales bandas de atracadores de Barcelona en los últimos veinticinco años. Una interesante antología que nos enseña una ciudad oculta y sombría, que nada tiene que ver con el destino turístico que de ella se presenta. En Asalto a la virreina (2004), Quílez saca a relucir su identidad periodística al reconstruir un evento criminal sucedido en Barcelona en 1991: el intento de robo de la colección de monedas del Gabinet Numismàtic de Catalunya, instalado en el palacio de la Virreina. Ese rasgo del escritor barcelonés por reconstruir historias a partir de una visión periodística se repite en dos de sus siguientes novelas: Psicópata: un relato basado en personajes y situaciones (2005), en donde un periodista recibe el encargo de componer la historia de un psicópata encarcelado, un trabajo que se transforma en un sombrío reto que nos acerca a la problemática psiquiátrica de los asesinos seriales y su complejo mundo interno y La soledad de Patricia (2010), un texto que se mueve entre el espionaje y el thriller. Piel de policía (2006) se ajusta más a lo policíaco. Lacruz, ex policía que regenta un bar de mala muerte en Barcelona, ve cómo su vida cambia radicalmente a partir del asesinato de Castán, su ex compañero en la policía. Así pues, la elección de El complot mongol (1969), de Rafael Bernal, Noviembre sin violetas (1995), de Lorenzo Silva, Plenilunio (1997), de Antonio Muñoz Molina, Deudas pendientes (2005), de Antonio Jiménez Barca, Ojos de agua (2007), de Domingo Villar, El baile ha terminado (2009), de Julián Ibáñez y La soledad de Patricia (2010), de Carlos Quílez, no es al azar, sino meditada. En estas novelas se puede observar el traspaso de las diferentes fronteras que «separan» lo criminal, lo policíaco, el thriller y el espionaje, es decir la «narrativa sensacional de suspense», lo cual plantea la posibilidad de que no exista alguna frontera. Y, aunque en Ojos de agua se aprecia el esquema policíaco clásico, esto se debe a una razón: es necesario un texto policíaco para que pueda compararse este con uno criminal, un thriller o uno de espionaje y se ponga en evidencia las diferencias entras estas narrativas. Ahora bien, ante la situación de traspaso de fronteras genéricas por parte del grupo de novelas seleccionadas, surge una duda en especial ¿cómo llevar a cabo esta investigación? Una gran cantidad de hipótesis aparecen de inmediato, pero lo cierto es que lo más importante es poseer un método. Generalmente, muchos estudios de lo criminal y lo policíaco, sin olvidar los del espionaje y el thriller, son históricos, compendios a través de los cuales observamos la historia literaria de ambos géneros, así como su desarrollo y evolución. Investigaciones interesantes y valiosas, dado que rastrean obras y autores que habían sido olvidados o estaban ocultos bajo algún seudónimo. Sin embargo, una visión histórica no es suficiente para abordar un problema como el del límite entre lo criminal, lo policíaco, el espionaje y el thriller que se plantea a partir de El complot mongol, Noviembre sin violetas, Plenilunio, Deudas pendientes, Ojos de agua, El baile ha terminado y La soledad de Patricia. Para ello son necesarias más herramientas de investigación y por eso emplearemos directrices y pautas de análisis histórico, pragmático-hermenéutico, discursivo-textual, semántico y de la teoría del género. En el primer capítulo reflexionaremos sobre los aspectos históricos y para eso se llevará a cabo una revisión histórica literaria de lo criminal, lo policíaco, el espionaje y el thriller, solo que de una manera algo distinta: separando estas cuatro narrativas Como ya hemos señalado, existe una confusión entre ellas que puede llevar a pensar, como de hecho ocurre, que criminal es sinónimo de policíaco o viceversa, o que el espionaje está supeditado a lo policíaco, todo esto falso. A partir de esta visión histórica apreciaremos cómo se gesta cada narrativa de manera independiente haciendo ver que se trata de manifestaciones literarias distintas. Esto nos permitirá, por un lado, ver dónde se sitúan las novelas estudiadas, es decir, de dónde vienen, cuáles han sido los antecedentes históricos, sus antepasados literarios. Por otro lado, vamos a observar cómo una idea que venimos gestando desde hace varios años ve la luz. La inmensa mayoría de los críticos e investigadores consideran a Edgar Allan Poe como el padre de la novela policíaca, pero se olvidan o no le dan la importancia a un nombre clave sin el que el género, muy probablemente, no habría comenzado a popularizarse y establecerse: Charles Dickens. La labor de Dickens es enorme y, aunque desgraciadamente no podemos analizar su obra criminal y policíaca, es un objetivo claro revalidar su enorme labor haciendo mención de su trabajo. En el segundo capítulo emplearemos la pragmática-hermenéutica como uno de los pilares de análisis del problema del límite de la «narrativa sensacional de suspense» y la fluctuación tipológica en las novelas estudiadas, lo cual hará ver cuáles de estos textos se acercan más a formas híbridas. De igual modo, la pragmática-hermenéutica nos ayudará en otros dos objetivos: analizar las relaciones intratextuales de las novelas de Rafael Bernal, Lorenzo Silva, Antonio Muñoz Molina, Antonio Jiménez Barca, Domingo Villar, Julián Ibáñez y Carles Quílez, pero también las extratextuales, aquellas en las cuales se puede generar la confusión, en las relaciones que mantendrá el texto no solo con el lector, sino con mediadores que pueden resultar nocivos en el proceso comunicacional al generar dicha confusión. Asimismo, y aunque no realizaremos un profundo análisis comparativo, estableceremos relaciones comparativas entre los siete textos elegidos con el fin de evidenciar las diferencias entre lo criminal, lo policíaco, el espionaje y el thriller. Por lo que se refiere al capítulo dedicado al discurso y al texto es necesario aclarar que se transita por terrenos en los que no hay acuerdos respecto a la definición de ambos conceptos. No es nuestro propósito buscar una definición de ellos, sino reflexionar sobre ambos en base a las definiciones de un grupo de especialistas, y de este modo abordar el problema del límite en base a una confusión ya algo antigua: ¿existe un discurso policíaco, uno criminal o uno de espionaje? ¿Si es así ¿por qué un texto con un discurso policíaco como El maestro de San Petersburgo (1994) de Coetzee, no puede ser catalogado como policíaco? Nuestro interés se centrará en analizar el discurso criminal, policíaco, de espionaje y del thriller y ponerlo en referencia a El complot mongol, Noviembre sin violetas, Plenilunio, Deudas pendientes, Ojos de agua, El baile ha terminado y La soledad de Patricia junto a otros textos para observar cómo aparece el problema del límite, de la mano de una serie de elementos textuales que se mueven de una narrativa –lo policíaco– a otra –el thriller–. Otro pilar fundamental para esta investigación es la semántica. Empleando la semántica de «mundos posibles» y dos teorías de ella, la de Tomás Albaladejo y Lubomír Doležel, se observará cómo se va construyendo un texto ficcional, en este caso las novelas estudiadas, a partir de parámetros comunicacionales. Gracias a este análisis se confirmarán las impresiones pragmáticas: las novelas de Bernal, Silva, Muñoz Molina, Jiménez Barca, Villar, Ibáñez y Quílez se construyen a partir de eventos diametralmente opuestos: el crimen e investigación, terrorismo y espionaje contraterrorista, amenaza y seguridad, pero no bajo regímenes estrictos, sino como un texto en el que dos submundos, de acuerdo a la terminología de Albaladejo, el de los protagonistas y antagonistas de las obras estudiadas se enfrentan. Es imposible cerrar esta investigación sin tocar un tema espinoso en el que no hay grandes acuerdos: el del género. En el último capítulo tenemos el propósito de señalar los elementos genéricos de lo criminal, lo policíaco, el espionaje y el thriller y ver cómo se combinan, ofreciendo las señales del desplazamiento de la frontera entre estas narrativas y el problema de la confusión. También, y gracias a dos modelos genérico-comunicacionales, el de Kurt Spang y el de Jean Marie Schaeffer, tendremos la ocasión de vislumbrar cómo, de manera genérica, tratamos de ubicar las obras estudiadas y de confirmar su carácter híbrido. No obstante, es inevitable que en este capítulo hagamos mención al problema de la definición del género. Es claro que no se pretende dar una respuesta a dicho problema, ya que esto es imposible, pero lo que sí se llevará a cabo será, gracias a las propuestas de Spang, Schaeffer, García Berrio y Huerta Calvo, construir una definición que sea práctica para esta investigación. Igual de importante será observar en este último capítulo un concepto diseñado para esta investigación: el «sensacional de suspense». En ningún momento buscaremos defenestrar a la «novela negra», pero sí analizaremos el problema que aparece al utilizar dicho término, y las bondades que hay en torno al concepto «sensacional de suspense». Hay que aclarar que este estudio no está divido en dos secciones, una de metodología y otra de aplicación. Por el contrario, lo llevaremos a cabo in sito, es decir realizando la metodología y la aplicación conjuntamente. El motivo de esta elección es de carácter práctico, pues en anteriores trabajos de investigación nos ha funcionado correctamente.