Suchergebnisse

Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; Relacje między Francją a Wielką Brytanią kształtuje odwieczna rywalizacja regionalna i aspiracje maksymalizacji wpływów międzynarodowych, ale także bliskość i powiązania gospodarczo-polityczne związane z tymi aspiracjami. Podstawą współpracy francusko-brytyjskiej jest podobna percepcja w kwestiach strategicznych. Oba państwa podobnie rozumieją wyzwania polityczne, gospodarcze, kulturalne i są ważnymi partnerami "skazanymi" na kooperację militarną. Brexit wywołał polityczny wstrząs wśród europejskich liderów, inicjując pragmatyczną refleksję nad przyszłością UE. W Paryżu decyzję o Brexicie określono jako z jednej strony bolesną (straty gospodarcze), z drugiej jako szansę na przekształcenie UE zgodnie z francuską wizją integracji (koniec brytyjskiego weta wobec przyspieszania integracji). Niewątpliwie Brexit wzmocni w UE oś Paryż–Berlin i przyspieszy ściślejszą współpracę gospodarczą i militarną. W praktyce jednak wyjście Wielkiej Brytanii z UE osłabi realny wymiar WPBiO i może stać się źródłem długoterminowego zróżnicowania "projektu europejskiego" w oparciu o różne prędkości integracji. ; Relations between France and Great Britain are formed by the eternal regional rivalry and aspirations to maximize international influence, but also the proximity and political – economic ties linked with those aspirations. The basis of Franco-British cooperation is similar perception of strategic issues. Both countries have the same understanding of the political, economic, cultural challenges and are important partners "doomed" on military cooperation. Brexit caused political shock among European leaders, initiating pragmatic reflection on the future of the EU . In Paris, the decision about Brexit was defined as painful the one hand (due to economic losses) and as an opportunity to transform the EU in line with the French vision of integration on the other (due to the end of the British veto towards acceleration of integration). Brexit undoubtedly will strengthen in the EU the Paris-Berlin axis will and accelerate closer economic and military cooperation. In practice, however, the output of Great Britain from the EU will weaken the real dimension of the CSDP and can become a source of long-term differentiation of the "European project" based on different speeds of integration.

Within theframework of the European Security Strategy, approved by the European Council in December 2003, it is assumed that European forces would contribute to global security and would engage in tasks that are different from classic war fighting or traditional peacekeeping. These operations can be described as law enforcement or human security operations even though they are more robust than policing and may involve the use of military force. Prerequisities for these operations include: the primacy of human rights; legality; appropriate military response; clear political authority; civil, police and military coordination; and adequate intelligence and information. The coordination of these elements will require a change in military culture and in civil-military relations as well as considerable political will. (Survival / SWP)

AbstractThe European Union has developed into a multilevel electoral system in which elections take place at regional, national and European tiers of governance. Election scholars have taken up an interest in European and regional elections and the dominant approach to study these elections is the second‐order election model. This model has generated important insights but it also faces limitations. A multilevel party system perspective exposes several vertical and horizontal interactions between electoral arenas. An empirical analysis on second‐order effects in European elections held in 217 regions and 11 countries reveals that regional authority, regional identity and electoral timing of regional vis‐à‐vis European elections significantly alters the extent and way in which national politics flows into the European electoral arena. These results provide strong evidence that regionalization has significantly transformed European elections but this impact only comes to the fore once one adopts a multilevel party system perspective.

This paper argues that the main determinant of differences in tax revenue collection across countries are differences in political regimes and institutions. The evidence based on the 8 members States of West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) over the period 90-2017, clearly supports that tax collection leads to better economic institutions and more democratic political system. Thus, handle the problem of tax collection will entail a reform of these institutions and a democratization of the political regimes. Institutions, political regimes, and democracy significantly increase tax collection while autocracy reduces it. The findings turn out to be robust accounting for the potential endogeneity of various institutions and aid intensity through 2SLS estimates.

This paper argues that the main determinant of differences in tax revenue collection across countries are differences in political regimes and institutions. The evidence based on the 8 members States of West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) over the period 90-2017, clearly supports that tax collection leads to better economic institutions and more democratic political system. Thus, handle the problem of tax collection will entail a reform of these institutions and a democratization of the political regimes. Institutions, political regimes, and democracy significantly increase tax collection while autocracy reduces it. The findings turn out to be robust accounting for the potential endogeneity of various institutions and aid intensity through 2SLS estimates.

This paper argues that the main determinant of differences in tax revenue collection across countries are differences in political regimes and institutions. The evidence based on the 8 members States of West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) over the period 90-2017, clearly supports that tax collection leads to better economic institutions and more democratic political system. Thus, handle the problem of tax collection will entail a reform of these institutions and a democratization of the political regimes. Institutions, political regimes, and democracy significantly increase tax collection while autocracy reduces it. The findings turn out to be robust accounting for the potential endogeneity of various institutions and aid intensity through 2SLS estimates.

Examining the effects that political, legal, and regulatory institutions have on economic development, this book provides new contributions on the political economy of the European constitution. It covers many issues including social protection, fiscal reform and regional policies that are on the table of European policy makers.