Suchergebnisse

Interview with Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush on nuclear disarmament in North Korea, the new Iraqi Constitution, the growing authoritarian stance of the Russian government, preemptive strategy, and Pakistan's efforts to combat Islamic subversion. Summaries in English and Spanish p. 487 and 501.

The FTAA is not just a trade agreement but, rather, a framework for a new regional architecture combining free markets with democratic politics intended to heighten the level of security within the region. The prime consideration for Canada with respect to this new regional architecture is the creation of an orderly community in terms of both economics & politics. The purpose of the FTAA for Canada, it is argued, is to help construct a community of the Americas, what Prime Minister Jean Chretien has referred to as "una gran familia.". 5 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

This dissertation reexamines the negotiation process mediated by the U.S. that occurred between parties representing Angola, Cuba, Namibia, and South Africa during the 1980's. It presents the U.S. policy of constructive engagement ('81- '89) as a contributing factor in the mitigation of regional conflicts in Southern Africa. It reexamines whether the guiding principles of the mediation strategy effectively led to the Cuban withdrawal from Angola and the independence of Namibia. In addition, it looks at how constructive engagement created a regional climate for peace through the mitigation of these interconnected conflicts which significantly contributed to South Africa's transition away from apartheid. The central question of the dissertation is, did constructive engagement foster a regional climate for peace in Southern Africa, defined by the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, the independence of Namibia, and a path towards South African democratization? There are three sub questions: (I) what were constructive engagements techniques and guiding principles? (II) why did the Reagan administration pursue the strategy; and (III) was constructive engagement a successful international conflict mediation strategy? To answer these questions, this dissertation will employ relevant literature to produce general principles of constructive engagement. It will use William Zartman and Saadi Touval's classifications of third-party mediators in international conflict in addition to Vincente Tome's staged model of the negotiation process. In this respect, this dissertation is an interpretative case study. This dissertation argues that constructive engagement is an effective conflict mediation strategy that made a significant impact on the propensity for peace in Southern Africa on several fronts. It aims is to reconsider the overwhelmingly negative opinion of U.S. intervention in Southern Africa throughout international relations discourse. It produces a piece of literature that explores the positive impact of the mediation strategy of constructive engagement as a driver for Southern African regional peace and subsequently a contributing factor in the end of apartheid.

It is widely accepted that a state cannot treat a struggle with an organized non-state actor as an armed conflict until the violence crosses a minimum threshold of intensity. For instance, during the recent standoff at the Oregon wildlife refuge, the U.S. government could have lawfully used force pursuant to its domestic law enforcement and human rights obligations, but President Obama could not have ordered a drone strike on the protesters. The reason for this uncontroversial rule is simple—not every riot or civil disturbance should be treated like a war. But what if President Obama had invited Canada to bomb the protestors—once the United States consented, would all bets be off? Can an intervening state use force that would be illegal for the host state to use itself? The silence on this issue is dangerous, in no small part because these once-rare conflicts are now commonplace. States are increasingly using force against organized non-state actors outside of the states' own territories—usually, though not always, with the consent of the host state. What constrains the scope of the host state's consent? And can the intervening state always presume that consent is valid? This Article argues that a host state's authority to consent is limited and that intervening states cannot treat consent as a blank check. Accordingly, even in consent-based interventions, the logic and foundational norms of the international legal order require both consent-giving and consent-receiving states to independently evaluate what legal regime governs—this will often turn on whether the intensity threshold has been met. If a non-international armed conflict exists, the actions of the intervening state are governed by international humanitarian law; if not, its actions are governed instead by its own and the host state's human rights obligations.

Anhand von zwei historischen Beispielen werden private Direktinvestitionen in ihrer regionalen Verteilung und in ihrer Rentabilität verglichen. Investitionen britischer Kapitalisten werden im ausgehenden 19., Anfang des 20. Jhs. (Imperialismus) analysiert; multinationale amerikanische Unternehmen mit Investitionen nach dem 2. WK. Beide Länder spielten politisch, wirtschaftlich und militärisch im jeweils untersuchten Zeitraum eine dominante Rolle im internationalen System. Dabei zeigt sich, daß Investitionen in der Peripherie von Kapitalisten eher gemieden wurden, d.h. daß das Risiko in unterentwickelten Ländern nicht durch die Profite kompensiert werden konnte. (SWP-Tth)