Bombs without boots: the limits of airpower
It sounds simple: use airpower to intervene militarily in conflicts, thus minimizing the deaths of soldiers and civilians while achieving both tactical and strategic objectives. In reality, airpower alone sometimes does win battles, but the costs can be high and the long-term consequences may fall short of what decision-makers had in mind. In Bombs without Boots, long-time U.S. intelligence analyst Anthony Schinella assesses the military operations and postconflict outcomes in five post-Cold War cases in which the United States and/or its allies used airpower to "solve" military problems: Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Lebanon in 2006, and Libya in 2011. In each of these cases, airpower helped achieve the immediate objective, but the long-term outcomes often diverged significantly from the original intent of policymakers. Schinella concludes that the combination of airpower and local ground forces can sometimes be effective, but decision-makers should carefully consider the adversary, the proxy being supported, and the potential postconflict commitments before sending planes, drones, or missiles aloft.
