Suchergebnisse

The models of Irish local politics that dominate the literature offer inadequate explanations of the elected politiciad officer relationship. This article analyses the behaviour of the most senior local officer (the county or city manager) vis‐à‐vis elected representatives by first reviewing the relevant parts of four current models and then offering an alternative explanation by way of a fifth 'divergent interest' model. This final model is in part an amalgam of the other four though it also aims to disaggregate the notion of policy as it is currently used. In particular, it seeks to compromise between the neglect of substantive policy concerns inherent in the brokerage explanation and the epiphenomena1 model's ambivalence on the initiatives available to the manager. A feature of this model is that both managers and councillors have policy and administrative interests but in largely non‐competitive areas. The divergence of interests between official and politician arises from differing perspectives established by both consideration of time‐scale and socialization. The stability of their relationship is reinforced by the temporal fragmentation of the formal policy making process, and b the non‐competing resources over which the manager and his councillors seek command: It is hoped that the divergent interests model offered here will be a useful tool in understanding the relationship between Irish politicians and bureaucrats at the local government level.

The manner in which central and local governments engage has taken on extra salience in recent years as governments seek to address wicked issues and begin to appreciate the role of place as a key contributor of economic growth. Different approaches exist, ranging from formal and constitutional to informal and political, but none represents a magic bullet with outcomes always subject to local circumstances. In this context the example of New Zealand highlights a particular challenge; how to maintain effective of inter-governmental relationships in the absence of either constitutional recognition of local government or a formal agreement between the two sectors.

Issued November 1981. ; Chiefly tables. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Intro -- Preface and Acknowledgements -- Praise for Asymmetric Federalism in India -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- A Revised Template of Federation -- Federalism, Society and Ethnic Homeland -- Theory and Concepts -- Methodology -- Chapterisation -- Notes -- References -- 2 Concept of Asymmetric Federalism and the Politics of Recognition -- Introduction -- Theoretical Framework of Asymmetric Federalism -- Exclusion/Inclusion in Federalism -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- 3 Founding Moment (1946-56) -- Introduction -- Princely States: Asymmetric Integration -- SRC's Asymmetric Approach to State-Making -- CA and the Making of Asymmetric Provisions for Tribal Self-governance -- The 6th Schedule: Asymmetry Within Asymmetry -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- 4 Federal Asymmetry in India and Various Forms -- Introduction -- State Level Asymmetry -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- 5 Politics of Fiscal Asymmetry in India -- Introduction -- Democracy and Federal Asymmetry -- General Category and Special Cater States for Fiscal Distribution -- Finance Commission and Fiscal Asymmetry: Varying Needs of Diversity -- Notes -- References -- 6 Ethnic Cleavages and Federal Asymmetry -- Introduction -- Demographics: Ethnicity and Diversity -- Limits to Territorial Solution: Demands for More (Survey Data) -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- 7 The Making and Unmaking of the Special Category States in India -- Introduction -- SCS: Development and Governance -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- 8 Asymmetry Within Asymmetry in India -- Introduction -- 5th Schedule (Under Art 244(1)) -- 6th Schedule -- Ethnic Cleavages and Tribal Autonomous Districts: How Far to Go -- Conclusion -- References -- 9 The Working of Sub-State Federal Asymmerty in Tripura -- Introduction -- A Brief History -- Formation of the ADC.

Abstract Nigeria struggles to establish and sustain cooperative, interdependent state-local intergovernmental relations (IGR) by providing for the powers and rights of local governments in the federal constitution. Despite the provisions, the practice of state-local IGR has remained inclusive, hierarchical, dependent and competitive. This paper investigates the extent to which constitutional provisions determine state-local relations as against the macrostructure of intergovernmental relations between the federal government and states. The authors argue that it is difficult to expect a cooperative, interdependent, state-local IGR through constitutional provisions of the powers and rights of local governments, if the federal-state relations, which should be the determining framework of IGR is inclusive, hierarchical and dependent. The paper suggests that the lower forms of IGR in a federation (e.g. the state-local IGR), largely depend on the super-structure, which is that between the federal government and the lower tiers. The implication is that the level of autonomy enjoyed by local governments largely depends on the level of autonomy the states themselves enjoy.

The purpose of this book is to study comparative administrative law in the main EU states and the United States of America and Canada and then to provide proposals for the modernization of Romanian public administration in order to increase administrative convergence and to better meet the needs of citizens. In this book, the author aims to realize a dynamic approach by looking at the contemporary challenges and perspectives of the future of the contemporary administrations and on the other hand the modifications to be made at the level of the Romanian administrative law to increase the degree