Suchergebnisse

Mergersm the publishing industry have been criticised as concentrating power in the hands of a few largefirms Peter Curwen, of Sheffield Polytechnic, finds recent take‐overs to be a response to increased competition as the publishing industry wakes up to economic reality Mark Rogers condemns the Net Book Agreement of major UK publishers as a cartelistic device which restricts competition and choice

The article describes the culture of competition, primarily one of its most important aspect – antitrust legislation. The formation of this legislation is different in particular countries. It can be initiated "from the bottom" (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, etc.) and "from above" (Russia). In these circumstances the main task of the governmental bodies is to find an equilibrium ("golden mean") between antitrust and pro-competition activities.

This paper shows how competition among governments for mobile firms can bring about excessive differentiation in levels of taxation and public good provision. Hotelling's Principle of Minimum Differentiation is applied in the context of tax competition and shown to be invalid. Instead, when an equilibrium exists, differentiation of public good provision is maximized. Non-existence of equilibrium, which is possible, is a metaphor for intense tax competition. The paper also shows that, to some extent, perfect tax discrimination presents a solution to the existence problem created by Hotelling tax competition, but that the efficiency problem of Hotelling tax competition is exacerbated.

This paper provides a comprehensive discussion of the deterrence properties of a competition policy regime. On the basis of the economic theory of law enforcement we identify several factors that are likely to affect its degree of deterrence: 1) sanctions and damages; 2) financial and human resources; 3) powers during the investigation; 4) quality of the law; 5) independence; and 6) separation of power. We then discuss how to measure deterrence. We review the literature that use surveys to solicit direct information on changes in the behavior of firms due to the threats posed by the enforcement of antitrust rules, and the literature based on the analysis of hard data. We finally argue that the most challenging task, both theoretically and empirically, is how to distinguish between 'good' deterrence and 'bad' deterrence.

"This book explores how the concept of "competition", which is usually associated with market economies, operated under state socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where the socialist system, based on command economic planning and state-centred control over society, was supposed to emphasise "co-operation", rather than competitive mechanisms. The book considers competition in a wider range of industries and social fields across the Soviet bloc, and shows how the gradual adoption and adaptation of Western practices led to the emergence of more open competitiveness in socialist society. The book includes discussion of the state's view of competition, and focuses especially on how competition operated at the grassroots level. It covers politico-economic reforms and their impact, both overall and at the enterprise level; competition in the cultural sphere; and the huge effect of increasing competition on socialist ways of thinking"--