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Does the United States have the right to defend itself by striking first, or must it wait until an attack is in progress? Is the Bush Doctrine of aggressive preventive action a justified and legal recourse against threats posed by terrorists and rogue states? Tackling one of the most controversial policy issues of the post-September 11 world, Michael Doyle argues that neither the Bush Doctrine nor customary international law is capable of adequately responding to the pressing security threats of our times. In Striking First, Doyle shows how the Bush Doctrine has consistently disregarded a vital distinction in international law between acts of preemption in the face of imminent threats and those of prevention in the face of the growing offensive capability of an enemy. Taking a close look at the Iraq war, the 1998 attack against al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, among other conflicts, he contends that international law must rely more completely on United Nations Charter procedures and develop clearer standards for dealing with lethal but not immediate threats. After explaining how the UN can again play an important role in enforcing international law and strengthening international guidelines for responding to threats, he describes the rare circumstances when unilateral action is indeed necessary. Based on the 2006 Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, Striking First includes responses by distinguished political theorists Richard Tuck and Jeffrey McMahan and international law scholar Harold Koh, yielding a lively debate that will redefine how – and for what reasons – tomorrow's wars are fought. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1245/thumbnail.jpg

This article addresses the effect of political instability and domestic conflict on the probability of militarized interstate disputes. Existing research on the subject has produced inconsistent findings. I hypothesize that the effect of political instability on international disputes is conditional on states' involvement in civil conflict. More specifically, I argue that while political instability provides leaders with the willingness to use force, civil war creates the necessary opportunities for initiating conflict abroad. A directed-dyad analysis of international rivals for the 1816–2000 time period shows that instability coupled with civil war increases the probability of militarized interstate dispute initiation among rival states. Results are consistent for alternative indicators of political instability and civil war.

Efforts to resolve interstate disputes are often characterized by repeated engagement and evolving strategies. What explains a state's decision to continue conflict resolution efforts but escalate their management strategy? Drawing from foreign policy literature, I argue that third parties escalate policies in response to past failures, shifting conflict dynamics and their relationship with the disputants. Analysis of management efforts from 1946 to 2001 reveals that the changing nature of the conflict, policy failures and relationships between the third party and disputants are integral to understanding the management decision process, but the effects of these factors depend on the management history. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd.]

Negotiation & conflict resolution theories do little to shed light on the role of understanding in resolving violent political conflicts. A useful complement is Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics. The question addressed in the essay is this: How is a shared understanding reached in a negotiation process aimed at resolving conflicting issues? In Gadamer's view, understanding is important, because conflict resolution engages the parties to a conflict in a dialogue of interpreting meaning & values. Any mediators involved will also take part in the interpretation of meaning: theirs is a job of a translator; that is, they will interpret & transfer meaning between the language games the parties in conflict play. The Gadamerian model is, however, limited because it does not tackle the issue of asymmetry & power in international conflict resolution. Despite its limitations, the theoretical model can be translated into practical policy implications, which suggest that an outside party cannot force the parties into a dialogue. Attempts at conflict settlement that rely on force are unlikely to be successful. 27 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2005.]