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This article examines the implications of international intervention against piracy off the coast of Somalia backed by several Security Council resolutions since 2008. Based on a seminal academic debate generically known as naval peacekeeping, the article argues that the intervention against Somali piracy is the empirical realization of an autonomous concept of peacekeeping at sea, disconnected from the concepts usually applied to the land-based UN peace operations framework. Adapted from the source document.

"UN peacekeepers today do far more than patrol a ceasefire line. In most cases, there is no frontline, no truce, numerous parties and among them some armed groups seeking to undermine a settlement. In short, the UN is attempting to conduct peacekeeping in places where there is no peace to keep. Unfortunately the UN has failed to adequately develop the instruments to identify armed groups, and then deal with the challenge they pose. This book is a policy guide for UN missions. It analyses the nature of non-permissive UN mission environments and argues that the UN should think afresh about its approach to missions in these settings. By embracing and developing three concepts -- robust peacekeeping, political processes, and the protection of civilians -- the UN can arrive at a stabilisation doctrine."--back cover

Examines the origin and evolution of UN peacekeeping operations; argues for need to establish common standards and operating procedures for UN peacekeeping forces, and for their expansion to peace enforcement and coercive humanitarianism. Case studies include the 1956 UN Emergency Force in Egypt, UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia), UNOSOM I and II (Somalia), UNAVEM3 (Angola), and UNUMOZ (Mozambique).

The International Responsibility of International Organisations addresses the joint responsibility of organisations for violations of international law committed during the deployment of peacekeeping operations. More specifically, it inquires if and under which circumstances - in terms of the notion of control - international organisations can be jointly responsible. The author analyses the practice of international organisations (the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States) on an inter-institutional level, as well as in the field in the form of five case studies. The likelihood and distribution of responsibility between international organisations engaged in peacekeeping operations is affected by the different layers of applicable primary norms (Security Council mandates, internal law of the organisations, international humanitarian and human rights law). Although external pressure may contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of holding international organisations jointly responsible, any substantial measures and mechanisms can only be implemented with the participation of states and international organisations

THE BUILDING AND MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG AND EFFECTIVE UN FORMS A KEY OBJECTIVE OF IRISH FOREIGN POLICY WITHIN WHICH PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS HAVE COME TO PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE. IRELAND IS A MIDDLE POWER CONTRIBUTOR TO PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES AND ITS CONTRIBUTION HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL. IN 1993, IRELAND AGREED TO CONTRIBUTE TROOPS TO UNOSOM II WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN POLICY. THIS MARKED A NATURAL PROGRESSION IN IRISH POLICY.

FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE OAU CREATED AN INTER-AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE CHARGE WITH MAINTAINING ORDER. AFTRE MONTHS OF WRANGLING WHILE THE IAF TRIED TO DEFINE ITS MAN MANDATE, THE OAU HAS PRESENTED A PEACE PLAN DESIGNED TO LEAD TO ELECTIONS AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCE. THE INITIAL REJECTION OF THAT PLAN BY THE CHAD GOVERNMENT WAS A SETBACK FOR AFRICAN STATES HOPING THE PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVED WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERVENTION.

AbstractThis paper presents a theoretical model of conflict between two players, with intervention by a peacekeeping force. Peacekeepers are treated as a military contingent, capable of taking sides, acting as a third (independent) side in the war or remaining inactive, depending on circumstances. This departs from previous models, in which peacekeeping was no more than a parameter affecting players' fighting costs. The main result is an optimal deployment strategy by peacekeepers, detailing the nature and level of intervention required under different circumstances; this strategy results in the lowest possible level of warfare between the two antagonists. The credible threat of force (rather than mere intervention) is the strategy's key component.

Uses the gradual withdrawal by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) of its consent to the operation conducted by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), July 1992-Apr. 1993, as an example of negative results of attempts to force a host-country's compliance.

United Nations peacekeeping has proven remarkably effective at reducing the death and destruction of civil wars. But how peacekeepers achieve their ends remains under-explored. This book presents a typological theory of how peacekeepers exercise power. If power is the ability of A to get B to behave differently, peacekeepers convince the peacekept to stop fighting in three basic ways: they persuade verbally, induce financially, and coerce through deterrence, surveillance and arrest. Based on more than two decades of study, interviews with peacekeepers, unpublished records on Namibia, and ethnographic observation of peacekeepers in Lebanon, DR Congo, and the Central African Republic, this book explains how peacekeepers achieve their goals, and differentiates peacekeeping from its less effective cousin, counterinsurgency. It recommends a new international division of labor, whereby actual military forces hone their effective use of compulsion, while UN peacekeepers build on their strengths of persuasion, inducement, and coercion short of offensive force.