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"The right of peoples to self-determination seems well-settled and covered extensively in the scholarly record. Yet old Trotsky's question - of whom is this right and to what? - haunts the self-determination literature. Somehow almost every work on it begins with an expression of puzzlement. This right turns out to be elusive, underdefined in its scope and content, paradoxical in almost every aspect. This book mobilises all powers of critical legal theory and modern philosophy to take the bull by its horns. Instead of ironing out the paradoxes, it aims to finally give them a proper explanation based on the concept of exception"--

In patent law, "unenforceability" can have immense consequences. At least five equitable doctrines make up the defense of "unenforceability" as it was codified into the Patent Act in 1952: laches; estoppel; unclean hands; patent misuse; and according to some, inequitable conduct. Yet in the seventy years since incorporation of equitable defenses into the patent statute, the Supreme Court has not clarified their reach. Indeed, twice in the last four years, the Supreme Court avoided giving complete guidance on the crucial questions of whether, and when, such equitable defenses are available to bar damages in cases brought at law. Several interpretive methods have been proposed for determining the reach of generally worded statutes like the Patent Act. Under a dynamic statutory interpretation, courts would be permitted to develop such statutes in accordance with what the law ought to be. Under a traditional faithful agent approach, in contrast, courts would try to determine the scope as set forth by the legislature, piecing together context and history to frame limited words. The scope of equitable defenses in patent law is an ideal proving ground between these methods, having both historical background for use in traditional approaches and high-stakes social questions that factor into a dynamic approach—what conduct do we allow patentees to engage in before we cut off remedies for infringement on innovations that support our health and modern lifestyle? Setting the stage of the statutory interpretive battle, this Article examines the historical and statutory bases of equitable limits on patent law, with a particular focus on the substantive equitable defenses of unclean hands and patent misuse. It contrasts the history of equitable defenses such as estoppel, which crossed fully into courts of law well before the merger of law and equity and the Patent Act, with equitable defenses such as laches, unclean hands, and misuse. This Article walks through these defenses' pre-codification roots and potential statutory interpretations and presents normative and constitutional considerations under the competing interpretive approaches. It also presents a surprising approach to inequitable conduct, arguing that it is not an equitable defense and should no longer result in infectious invalidity. This Article is the first to provide a comprehensive framework for the analysis of equitable defenses in patent law.

Abstract
The current article focuses on Events in the Middle East in relation to non-state actors and the right of self-defense. As study-case is adopted for Yemen, where the Houthis, as the de facto authority—and, according to their own standpoint as the de jure authority too—of the state, or at least large parts of it, declare that they exercise a right to self-defense against the Saudi-led intervention.
The theme is examined in the context of protracted conflicts, which from non-international become internationalized armed conflicts, in states of fragmented authority and sovereignty. The argument is that while non-state actors (NSAs) do not autonomously possess a right of their own to self-defense, in cases involving states of fragmented authority and sovereignty they may exercise this right, on behalf of the state which is suffering the attack for as long as the government is not in a position to fulfill its responsibility regarding the defense of the state.
The article does not advocate a contra legem interpretation of Article 51, expanding its application to non-state actors. It argues in favor of the substitution of the entity that is entitled to implement Article 51, when the government of a state is absent or incapable of carrying out its duties. It is in this sense that non-state actors are linked to the right of self-defense.

A well-known part of Hobbes's political theory is his discussion of the inalienability of the right of self-defense. In this article, I present and defend a reinterpretation of Hobbes's account of self-defense. I begin by showing the weaknesses of the standard interpretation of this account: It rests on an implausible thesis about the evil of death; it renders Hobbes's applications of the right of self-defense inexplicable; and it conflicts with Hobbes's claim that there are cases in which the right of self-defense can be given up. I argue that we should understand Hobbes's claim to be that the right of self-defense is inalienable only in the social contract, and I offer a new interpretation of how his argument on this point might go.