Search results

Some basic models in science are not grounded in what we know but in careful specifying of the limits of our ignorance. Boundary conditions on the conceptually possible range determine whether a distribution is likely to be closer to normal or lognormal and whether arithmetic or geometric means should be used. If finite and non-zero boundary values can be defined, then most actual cases tend to be around the center of the possible range. This approach makes it possible to estimate the number of parties in a national assembly within a factor of two, using only assembly size and electoral district magnitude. Deviations from ignorance-based base line are a signal to look for specifically political causes. This approach may be of use in many aspects of political science.

Some basic models in science are not grounded in what we know but in careful specifying of the limits of our ignorance. Boundary conditions on the conceptually possible range determine whether a distribution is likely to be closer to normal or lognormal and whether arithmetic or geometric means should be used. If finite and non-zero boundary values can be defined, then most actual cases tend to be around the center of the possible range. This approach makes it possible to estimate the number of parties in a national assembly within a factor of two, using only assembly size and electoral district magnitude. Deviations from ignorance-based base line are a signal to look for specifically political causes. This approach may be of use in many aspects of political science.

Counting the number of `real' candidates in elections is complicated by the frequent presence of individuals who win a small percentage of the vote and have no realistic chance of winning the election. Increasingly, researchers have solved this problem by using the Laakso—Taagepera `effective N', originally devised to count numbers of political parties (usually in the overall electorate). We argue that when counting candidates in individual districts, the focus should be on viability and that the effective N is therefore inappropriate. We discuss the concept and measurement of candidate viability and propose two alternative measures. We illustrate the use of these counting rules by re-analyzing and updating Reed's (1990) analysis of the number of candidates in Japanese elections under the Single Non-Transferable Vote. In contrast to Reed, we find lower numbers of candidates, more rapid learning of strategic behavior, and closer adherence to the theoretical upper limit of one more candidate than the district magnitude ( M + 1).

This theory specifies the party sizes expected on the basis of constraints imposed by simple electoral rules. Duverger's law and hypothesis states that under the single-member plurality rule third parties tend to be eliminated, while proportional representation in multi-seat districts enables more than two parties to thrive. Expanding on Duverger' statements, the seat and vote shares of parties at all size ranks are calculated here, using nothing but two institutional inputs (district magnitude and assembly size) plus the number of voters. These are the baseline values expected if (and only if) institutional constraints were the only factor, with other factors balancing themselves out. The theory is complete in the sense of leading to complete party size structure. Among the relatively simple electoral systems the institutional baselines do reflect the long-term averages in New Zealand, while the residuals indicate the imbalance of inputs by other factors in the case of The Netherlands and Finland, and especially in the case of the UK.

Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? A number of studies have tried to uncover economic and social determinants of corruption but, as far as we know, nobody has yet empirically investigated how electoral systems influence corruption. We try to address this lacuna in the literature, by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample from the late nineties encompassing more than 80 (developed and developing) democracies. Our empirical results are based on traditional regression methods, as well as non-parametric estimators. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical models reviewed in the paper. Holding constant a variety of economic and social variables, we find that larger voting districts - and thus lower barriers to entry - are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists - and thus less individual accountability - are associated with more corruption. Altogether, proportional elections are associated with more corruption, since voting over party lists is the dominant effect, while the district magnitude effect is less robust.

This theory specifies the party sizes expected on the basis of constraints imposed by simple electoral rules. Duverger's law and hypothesis states that under the single-member plurality rule third parties tend to be eliminated, while proportional representation in multi-seat districts enables more than two parties to thrive. Expanding on Duverger' statements, the seat and vote shares of parties at all size ranks are calculated here, using nothing but two institutional inputs (district magnitude and assembly size) plus the number of voters. These are the baseline values expected if (and only if) institutional constraints were the only factor, with other factors balancing themselves out. The theory is complete in the sense of leading to complete party size structure. Among the relatively simple electoral systems the institutional baselines do reflect the long-term averages in New Zealand, while the residuals indicate the imbalance of inputs by other factors in the case of The Netherlands and Finland, and especially in the case of the UK.

This theory specifies the party sizes expected on the basis of constraints imposed by simple electoral rules. Duverger's law and hypothesis states that under the single-member plurality rule third parties tend to be eliminated, while proportional representation in multi-seat districts enables more than two parties to thrive. Expanding on Duverger' statements, the seat and vote shares of parties at all size ranks are calculated here, using nothing but two institutional inputs (district magnitude and assembly size) plus the number of voters. These are the baseline values expected if (and only if) institutional constraints were the only factor, with other factors balancing themselves out. The theory is complete in the sense of leading to complete party size structure. Among the relatively simple electoral systems the institutional baselines do reflect the long-term averages in New Zealand, while the residuals indicate the imbalance of inputs by other factors in the case of The Netherlands and Finland, and especially in the case of the UK.

Background:Rabies is a deadly Zoonotic disease most often transmitted to humans through animal bite. Since there is no community-based data to get the actual magnitude of Rabies infection and lack of awareness with misconceptions of patients in Datia region this study was planned.Objectives: To estimate the extent of problem & the epidemiological characteristics of animal bite cases.Methodology: It was Community Based Cross-sectional analytical study conducted at field practice area (UHTC) under Community Medicine Department of Government Medical College, Datia. The study was conducted for period 1 year. Interview schedule was used, and data was thoroughly cleaned and analysed using Epi info.Results: Total 420 cases of animal bites were studied in the present study. Most common biting animal was dog as 97.33% cases gave history of dog bite. Right lower limb was the most common (55%) biting sit. The local applications at the site of bite were tobacco snuff, red chillimiscellaneous which were practiced by 69% of cases. Conclusion: There is need for creating awareness in public and medical community about proper wound management and judicious use of anti-rabies vaccine.

<p>This research was initiated by the rise of the business licensing service quality issues on the Government of Karimun Regency of Riau Islands province that has not been effective. The problem is detected, allegedly associated with the ineffectiveness of the leadership role, motivation, coordination and organizational commitment in the Government of Karimun Regency of Riau Islands province. The design of this study was conducted using a quantitative approach through explanatory survey method. Data analysis technique used is multiple linear regression. The study found that the role of leadership, motivation, coordination and organizational commitment either partially or simultaneously have a significant influence on the quality of the business licensing services to the Government of Karimun Regency of Riau Islands province. The results also reveal that motivation is the most dominant variable in affecting the quality of service business permit, then followed by a variable leadership role. This implies that the improvement of the quality of service the business licensing is determined by the implementing agency work motivation factor and the magnitude of the leadership role in supporting the success of the process of business licensing services.</p>

This article examines the extent to which legislators use legislative debates to engage in localism activities to cater to the interests of their selectorate in nonpreferential electoral systems. We define localism activities as the delivery of tangible and intangible benefits to a geographically confined constituency that is instrumental to legislators' re-selection. Our primary argument is that legislators whose selectorate operates at the local level make more speeches with parochial references. Results show strong support for this assertion. Furthermore, we find that high district magnitude leads to higher levels of localism. We use a mixed-methods research design, combining an original data set of 60,000 debates in Portugal with qualitative evidence from elite interviews. We make a methodological innovation in the field of representation and legislative studies by using a Named Entity Recognition tool to analyze the debates.

Female gender and low income are two markers for groups that have been historically disadvantaged within most societies. The study explores two research questions related to their political representation: (1) 'Are parties biased towards the ideological preferences of male and rich citizens?'; and (2) 'Does the proportionality of the electoral system moderate the degree of under-representation of women and poor citizens in the party system?' A multilevel analysis of survey data from 24 parliamentary democracies indicates that there is some bias against those with low income and, at a much smaller rate, women. This has systemic consequences for the quality of representation, as the preferences of the complementary groups differ. The proportionality of the electoral system influences the degree of under-representation: specifically, larger district magnitudes help in closing the considerable gap between rich and poor.

This paper discusses the electoral rules used in Chile since 1833, highlighting how difficult it was to change them after first adopted. It is then analyzed the current system, emphasizing its strengths & weaknesses. It is argued that the current system can be best understood as an insurance against an electoral defeat since it imposes high thresholds on a party that seeks to transform its electoral majority into a commanding majority of seats in the legislature. It is shown that the Concertacion has found it difficult to transform its electoral majority into a majority control of the legislature. Using electoral simulations, it is shown that the conservative coalition (given its share of votes) gets a larger share of seats with the current system than with any other alternative district magnitude. Tables, Graphs, References. Adapted from the source document.