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Why do democratising nations make the constitutional choices they do? Conceiving democratic transition as a critical juncture, we propose a theory of constitutional choice. We place the degree of uncertainty at the centre of our theorising efforts to explain the relationship between constitutional bargains among competing political groups and the type of executive-legislative relations adopted during democratisation. We posit that parliamentarism is more likely to be adopted under high-uncertainty conditions, while presidentialism is more likely under low-uncertainty conditions. Identifying four factors that affect the level of uncertainty in the transition process, we examine how the choices of executive-legislative relations are made under strong influences of historical and geographic factors. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright, the International Political Science Association.]

INSTITUTIONAL ENTROPY IS A PROCESS WHICH AN INSTITUTION MAY UNDERGO AS IT GROWS OLDER, CAUSING IT TO FUNCTION AT A LOWER LEVEL AND LESS EFFECTIVELY. THE DATA SUPPLIED BY 300 LARGE CREDIT UNIONS GAVE NO INDICATION THAT OLDER OR NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS WERE LESS EFFICIENT THAN SIMILAR YOUNGER INSTITUTIONS.

Few studies have focussed on the impact made by individual institutions on the attainment of prospective university applicants and their subsequent destinations within higher education. In this paper we deploy the concept of institutional habitus in order to explore such influences. In spite of an inevitable degree of overlap and blurring of boundaries between peer group, family and institution we argue that there are specific effects from attending a particular educational institution. And these become most evident when examining the choices of similar kinds of students across the private-state divide. We conclude by arguing that, despite the gaps and rough edges in the seams of the concept of institutional habitus, these do not vitiate its value but, rather, suggest the need for further work. This paper then is the beginning of our efforts to try and develop institutional habitus at both the conceptual and empirical levels as a method for understanding the ways in which educational institutions make a difference in higher education choices.

European Union (EU) Horizon 2020 program, action ERC-2014-STG, Project HUCO, grant numer 636746

In many organizations, members need to be assigned to certain positions, whether these are legislators to committees, executives to roles, or workers to teams. I show that these assignment problems lead to novel questions about institutional stability. Will the set of agents being assigned prefer or vote in favor of some alternative allocation over their current allocation thereby lobbying to reform the institution? I explore questions of institutional stability where the choice of the institution (i.e., the matching mechanism) is chosen and agreed upon by the very people who are assigned by the assignment procedure. I endogenize an institution's choice of assignment procedures by analyzing an important sub-case of social choice that I call a social allocation choice problem. I discuss a variety of voting rules (plurality, majority, and unanimity) and their institutional stability counterparts in matching theory (popular matching, majority stability, and pareto efficiency). The novel property of majority stability is introduced and its existence and robustness to correlated preferences and interdependent preferences are analyzed. Chains of envy are necessary to overcome the packing problem that arises in reallocating a majority to a new set of assignments under an alternative allocation. This makes majority stability, in sharp contrast to plurality rule, strikingly robust to correlated preferences.

International audience ; Political strategies are a crucial matter for MNEs in the context of globalization. We argue that MNEs' influence on political decision-making depends on their insertion into policy networks, which define the institutional framework and the interaction patterns of business/government relations in different issue-areas. Then, we propose a stylized taxonomy regarding the differentiation of MNEs' political leverage in various domains, at a home country level. Finally, we explore the influence of political power at home on MNEs' strategic approaches to the host countries, taking into account the bargaining power of local actors in the concerned issue-areas.

International audience ; Political strategies are a crucial matter for MNEs in the context of globalization. We argue that MNEs' influence on political decision-making depends on their insertion into policy networks, which define the institutional framework and the interaction patterns of business/government relations in different issue-areas. Then, we propose a stylized taxonomy regarding the differentiation of MNEs' political leverage in various domains, at a home country level. Finally, we explore the influence of political power at home on MNEs' strategic approaches to the host countries, taking into account the bargaining power of local actors in the concerned issue-areas.