Re-Distributional Effects of Austerity Measures
In: Financial and Monetary Policy Studies; The Euro and International Financial Stability, S. 187-192
422223 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Financial and Monetary Policy Studies; The Euro and International Financial Stability, S. 187-192
SSRN
In: Revue d'économie politique, Band 122, Heft 2, S. 233-256
ISSN: 2105-2883
Combats dynamiques et l'effet de découragement Après avoir considéré plusieurs types principaux des combats dynamiques (la course, le tir à la corde, les combats éliminatoires et les luttes répétées pour l'obtention de mandats), nous identifierons un schéma général: l'effet de découragement. Cet effet explique pourquoi la somme des efforts engagés dans la recherche de rente est souvent largement inférieure au montant du gain mis en jeu. Cela peut provoquer de violents conflits dans les premiers rounds, mais il peut aussi conduire à de longues périodes d'interaction pacifique.
In: Presidential studies quarterly, Band 42, Heft 4, S. 683-719
ISSN: 0360-4918
In: Reassembling Social Security, S. 293-332
In: Studies in second language learning and teaching: SSLLT, Band 1, Heft 2, S. 189
ISSN: 2084-1965
In: Social work research, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 3-7
ISSN: 1545-6838
In: American foreign policy interests, Band 33, Heft 6, S. 283-285
ISSN: 1533-2128
In: Hegemony and Sovereign Equality, S. 55-69
SSRN
Working paper
In: Financial Derivatives: Market & Application, New Delhi, ISBN 978-81-8387-482-3, 2011
SSRN
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 49, Heft 1, S. 101-119
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: Housing policy debate, Band 20, Heft 4, S. 687-706
ISSN: 2152-050X
There exists a large body of literature regarding the organization of the United States Congress and the importance of political parties in shaping legislative outcomes. Ideological scores developed in the last two decades have become increasingly popular in this debate. However I show here that the scores themselves are affected, and most likely biased, by the strength of the majority party. First, I show that the distribution of DW- NOMINATE scores for majority members is significantly different than for the minority party. In Chapter 2, I show that the probability DW-NOMINATE incorrectly predicts a majority party member's vote is significantly lower than for a minority party member's vote. I argue that this is because fewer bills dividing the majority party are likely to reach the floor than those dividing the minority party. Finally, in Chapter 3, I demonstrate one method of using DW-NOMINATE scores that accounts for the party strength bias of the scores. Using this method, I show that majority-party membership is more important for shaping legislative outcomes than is committee membership or ideological centrism
BASE
In: Marine corps gazette: the Marine Corps Association newsletter, Band 94, Heft 4, S. 48-50
ISSN: 0025-3170