This paper argues that neoliberal globalization is presenting a challenge to welfare provisioning in the industrialized countries and to the prospects for equitable social development in developing and transition economies. This challenge flows partly from the unregulated nature of the emerging global economy and partly from intellectual currents dominant in the global discourse concerning social policy and social development. The paper contends that certain global conditions are undermining the prospects for the alternative: equitable public social provision in both developed and developing countries. These conditions include the World Bank's preference for a safety-net and privatizing strategy for welfare; the self-interest of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in providing basic education, health and livelihood services that might otherwise be provided by the state; and the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) push for an open global market in health services, education and social insurance. Yet these disturbing trends are taking place in parallel with an apparent shift in the politics of globalization from orthodox economic liberalism to global social concern. The paper begins by reviewing the challenges faced by countries seeking to secure the social welfare of citizens and residents in the context of globalization. In the North, globalization has set welfare states in competition with each other. Moreover, the different kinds of welfare state are differently challenged by globalization, and have responded differently. Anglo-Saxon countries, which have residualized and privatized welfare provision, are in tune with liberalizing globalization, but at the cost of equity. Workplace-based welfare systems of the former state socialist countries, and payroll tax-based 'Bismarkian' insurance systems common in many Western European countries, are proving vulnerable to global competitive pressures. The social democratic, citizenship-based welfare systems funded out of consumption and income taxes, found in the Nordic countries, have been surprisingly sustainable in the face of global competitive pressures due to political will to maintain them. In the South, globalization has generated indebtedness that has undermined the capacity of governments to secure education, health and social protection. It has threatened social and labour standards, segmented social policy within countries and created zones excluded from any of the benefits of globalization. Next the paper considers the current global social policy discourse within and between international organizations and aid agencies. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently shown signs of taking the social dimensions of globalization more seriously, by beginning to consider whether some degree of equity within countries is beneficial to economic growth. The World Bank has articulated more clearly its 'individual risk management approach' to social protection in the context of globalization. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has asserted that globalization may lead to the need for more, not less, social expenditure. While the International Labour Organization (ILO) has begun to show signs of making concessions to the Bank's views on privatizing some aspects of social security, it has also shown an interest in a new universalism emerging from bottom-up movements in several countries. The views of the WTO on the desirability of a global market in health and social service provision are assuming new prominence. International NGOs are now more clearly divided into those acting as substitutes for government, and those advocating greater government responsibility for welfare. Yet within this discordant global discourse can be discerned elements of a new politics of global social responsibility. Orthodox economic liberalism and inhumane structural adjustment appear to be giving way to concern in the World Bank and the IMF with the social consequences of globalization. International development assistance is increasingly focusing on social development. United Nations agencies are giving more attention to the negative social consequences of globalization. Among the shifts in policy thinking and concrete steps that are being taken, which could herald more socially responsible globalization, are moves to globalize social rights, indications that social policy issues are moving up the development agenda and steps to regulate the global economy. The paper looks at each of these in turn, and at the disagreements as to how to proceed with this new orientation. It examines the dangers of the North moralizing about global social rights without providing the resources to realize them in practice. It also discusses whether the initiative to establish a code of principles and best practice for social policy will enable these dangers to be overcome. The paper then questions whether the move to establish development targets, such as basic education for all by 2015, represents global social progress or the legitimation of residual social policy. The obstacles to progressive North-South social policy and social development dialogue are also examined. In terms of the moves to inject social concerns into the global economy, the paper reviews conflicts of interest surrounding the failed WTO conference in Seattle, the proliferation of codes of conduct for transnational corporations and the debate about raising global taxes to finance social programmes. The paper argues that despite the apparent shift from global neoliberalism to global social responsibility, four tendencies within the new global paradigm, if pursued, will undermine equitable social progress and development-at a time when the resources exist to fund such advances. These tendencies are: the World Bank's belief that governments should provide only minimal levels of social protection; the concern of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to focus funding on only basic education and healthcare; the self-interest of international NGOs in substituting for government provision of services; and the moves being made within the WTO to open the global market in private healthcare, education and social insurance. Within the context of minimal and basic-level-only state provision, the middle classes of developing and transition economies will be enticed to purchase private social security schemes, private secondary and tertiary education, and private hospital and medical care. The wider repercussions are predictable. We know that only services for the neediest will remain-and that services for the poor are poor services. We know that those developed countries without universal public health and education provision are not only more unequal than those that do, but also more unsafe and crime ridden. This is the prospect for all countries that buy into this new global social development paradigm. Some policy measures to counteract this trend and to re-establish the place of equity in the discourse and practice of global social policy and development are suggested in this paper, together with an assessment of global forces that might be sympathetic to them. It is concluded that a major problem is the fragmentation and functional separation of agencies (WTO, World Bank, IMF, ILO, WHO, UNDP, UNESCO, OECD, regional groupings), and conflict and competition within and between them for the right to determine the content and other aspects of global social policy. Whether the five-year review of the World Summit for Social Development (Geneva 2000) begins the process of establishing a responsible and accountable global system of governance in the social sphere will depend to a large extent on political support from the European Union. It will also hinge on progressive voices from the South speaking out for improvements in the structure of global governance-in the interests of the North and the South, and of equity within and between countries.
INTRODUCCION-OBJETIVOS: La presente tesis describe la problemática provocada por los delitos de peligro abstracto. La tensión permanente entre norma primaria y principios del Derecho penal clásico -reserva, culpabilidad, inocencia, lesividad u ofensividad y proporcionalidad-; generado, básicamente, por una "Sociedad de riesgo". El legislador se ha volcado hacia un Derecho penal de autor, dejando atrás un Derecho penal de acto. El Derecho penal se ha expandido, no actúa como última ratio, se convierte en una especie de conformación social o instrumento de cambio de la sociedad. Lo dicho lleva a una reconceptualización del bien jurídico protegido. Asimismo, se ha buscado desentrañar si esa conducta legisferante de mayor endurecimiento punitivo, tiene justificación empírica, en base a datos criminológicos. También se analiza, brevemente, advirtiendo posiciones dogmáticas y doctrinarias, las últimas reformas del CP y con más precisión los delitos contra la seguridad vial. Se analiza la política criminal actual que radica en un constante y permanente adelantamiento de la barrera punitiva -tolerancia cero- y, con ello, un enfrentamiento con ciudadanos "peligrosos". METODOLOGÍA: Estudio descriptivo de bibliografía jurídica, revistas especializadas y jurisprudencia. Análisis estadístico. Asistencia y participación en cursos de especialización en derecho penal. CONCLUSION: A) Desde una visión dogmática: argumentos negativos 1) tipificar conductas peligrosas o aquellas que traen consigo peligro de peligro –delito obstáculo-, vulneran principios clásicos (reserva, lesividad, inocencia, culpabilidad, proporcionalidad e intimidad); 2) preeminencia de prevención general; 3) Conversión en un Estado paternalista de permanente control; 4) adelantamiento de la barrera punitiva, bajo intereses electorales. Argumentos a favor: 1) los códigos penales, no pueden, ni deben ser estáticos; 2) Intensa búsqueda de avanzar y "crecer" con la sociedad y su constante evolución; 3) Reformulación del concepto de bien jurídico protegido para adecuarlo a un moderno Derecho penal; B) Desde una visión político criminal, 1) obrar legislativo teñido de desidia por falta de estudios criminológicos serios o, a espaldas de los existentes, con fuerte influencia de los medios de comunicación 2) Utilización de los delitos de peligro abstracto como "arma" predilecta para regular conductas sociales, 3) Cuestionamientos a las últimas reformas del Código penal, entre ellos, los delitos contra la seguridad vial; 4) Aplicación de un Derecho penal del enemigo "apartando" al sujeto peligroso del todo social, -aumento de reclusos condenados por delitos contra la seguridad vial-. 5) Erosión de la cultura garantista y de aquella orientada hacia la reinserción; 6) La delincuencia ya no es vista como la consecuencia, a nivel individual, de desajustes sociales; sino como expresión de la actividad de un sujeto delincuente, disfuncional al todo social; 7) Quebrantamiento del welfarismo penal, incursionando en políticas de "tolerancia cero"; 8) Utilización de expresiones como terrorismo urbano, provocando estigmatización en sujetos no "incluidos" al todo social, 9) Falta de elaboración de políticas integradoras –política criminal, criminología y derecho penal-; 10) Acreditación empírica, en delitos contra la seguridad vial, que aún con baja en los números de víctimas mortales, se optó por endurecer los tipos penales, con ello: aumento de reclusos, incremento de juicios rápidos y urgentes, mayor número de condenados a TBC; 11) En consecuencia, aquella, tensión entre reglas primarias y principios se decanta por la primera; 12) Se propone hablar de un Derecho penal de confianza excluyente; 13) Proyectar un Derecho penal intermedio entre lo nuclear y accesorio, entre Derecho Administrativo y Derecho penal, 14) Proponer un concepto personal de bien jurídico protegido y 15) La administrativización de delitos de peligro abstracto. INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVES: This tesis describes the problem area caused by crimes of abstract danger. The permanent tension between the primary rules and basic the principles of criminal law -reservation, culpability, inocence,harmnfulness and proportionality-: basicly generated by a "risk society".The legislator has turned his activity into an authoring criminal law, leaving away an acting criminal law. The criminal law has expanded, not only acting as a última ratio, but its becomes into a sort of social confrontation, or an instrument for socia change. That drives into a re-conceptualisation of the legal protected good. Furthermore, the unraveling of if there is a empirical justification on the basis of criminological data for endure the punishment for this legisferante conduct has been sought. The brief analysis, begining in a dogmatic position, of the last changes in the criminal law is also included, and more precisely the crimes against road safety. The analyse of the criminal policy, which lies in a constant and permanent hardening of the punitive barrier -Zero Tolerance- and a subsequent confrontation against "dangerous" citizens is also included. METHODOLOGY: Descriptive study of legal bibliography, specialized magazines and jurisprudence. Statitistical analysis. Attendance and participation in criminal law. CONCLUSION: A) Taking a Dogmatic approach: negative points 1) typify dangerous behaviour or that conducts thath may cause danger of a danger-obstacle crime- they violate the classic principles (reservation, harmfulity, inocence, culpability, proporcionality and intimacy); 2) General prevention preeminence; 3) Conversion into a paternalistic state of permanent control; 4) advance of the punitive barrier,due to electoral interest. Arguments for: 1) criminal laws can not and should not be static; 2)An intense research for advance and grow up with the society and its constant evolution; 3) the reformulation of the concept "legal good" in order to adequate it into a modern crime rigths; B) From a political criminal point of view, 1) An aphatic legislative process for a lack of serious criminological studies, or some against the existing ones, affected by the influence of the mass media. 2) The use of crimes of abstract danger as the predilect gun for the regulation of social behaviour, 3) Questioning of the last changes in the penal code, among them, the crimes against road safety; 4)Implementation of a criminal law turning away the dangerous subject from the society-increment of inmates condemned for road safety crimes-. 5) Sputtering of the guarantee-based culture and that oriented to the reintegration; 6)Crime is not seen as a consecuence ofsocial imbalances anymore, at the individual, but the expression of the activity of an individual criminal person,dysfunctional to all social; 7) Breakdown of penal welfarismo,raiding into "Zero tolerance" policies ; 8) The use of such expressions as "urban terrorisim" causing a stigma in those subjects that are not included in all social, 9) The lack in the elaboration of inclusion policies- criminal policies, criminology, and criminal law-;10) Empirical accreditation, in those crimes related to road safety crimes, that even with a low rate of casualties, a more stringent law were set, and as a consecuence, the number of inmates increase, and also in the expeditious trials, and more condemned in TBC; 11) As a consecuence, the tension between the primary rules and principles decides in the first; 12) A proposal of a penal law of a excluding trust has been set; 13) To project an intermediate penal law between the nuclear and the accesory, between administrative and penal law, 14) Propose a personal concept of a legally protected good, and 15) The administrativization of abstract danger crimes.
The scientific community has been debating climate change (CC) for over two decades. In the light of certain arguments put forward by the aforesaid community, the EU has recommended a set of innovative reforms to science teaching, such as incorporating environmental issues into the scientific curriculum, thereby helping to make schools a place of civic education. However, despite these European recommendations, relatively little emphasis is still given to climate change within science curricula. The main goal of the research project described in this thesis is to study if, how and why the scientific contents related to CC could be reconstructed so as to integrate the many dimensions involved in the issue. Specifically, the project set out to create and test innovative materials and activities for secondary school students, designed to foster: i) effective and meaningful understanding of the concepts involved in CC (disciplinary dimension); ii) a growing personal involvement in environmental issues supported also by the maturation of rational arguments for moving consciously through the political, economical, social and ethical dimensions (societal dimension); iii) epistemological reflections aimed at problematizing the traditional and outdated image of science which is still widespread among citizens (epistemological dimension). In the design and analysis of the materials, we start from the conjecture that behind many conceptual difficulties and psychological barriers lie particular epistemological obstacles related to a naïve and stereotypical view of science. In order to reach the main goal, the work has been organized according to four research questions (RQs): RQ_1: What operational criteria can be identified for reconstructing physics so as to integrate the many dimensions considered in the main goal? RQ_2: (a) Which models of greenhouse effect and GW are effective for implementing the criteria identified? (b) What experimental activities can be designed in order to promote an inquiry-based approach to the study of environmental issues, and to help students understand the models and their multi-dimensionality? RQ_3: How do secondary school students react to the proposed materials? Are the materials effective in achieving the main goal of the research? RQ_4: Which analytic methods can be used to investigate the multiple dimensions of a teaching/learning classroom experience? In Chapter 1, the analysis of a selection of research papers and international reports is presented. The selected papers and reports concern: the conceptual difficulties that students usually encounter in dealing with physics concepts related to CC; the sociological and behavioural reactions of citizens facing CC; the crucial points regarding the scientific debate on CC; the status of the research on modelling in science education. The match among the main results in so many different research fields led us to point out some design principles which guided the process of instructional design of a multidimensional proposal on climate change intended for upper secondary school students (grade 11th, 12th and 13th). The design principles, the teaching materials and the developed conceptual path are described in chapter 2. The multidimensional conceptual path was implemented in four different teaching experiences and many data were collected in order to keep tuned the many dimensions involved in the study. The contexts of implementation, the role of each one and the data sources properly designed are described in chapter 3. The materials and the data tools were initially validated in a pilot-study which aimed to test and revise both the teaching materials and the data sources (chapter 4). On the basis of the results of this pilot-study, the materials have been reviewed in order to emphasize the epistemological dimension. Specifically, the results led us to make the epistemological fil rouge on the models and modelling stronger and more evident; to revise (in form and content) the lesson on complexity; and to insert specific tools of investigations aimed at indepth investigation of the epistemological dimension. The data collection and data analysis focused initially on the single dimensions (conceptual, behavioural, epistemological) and later on the correlations among them. This strategy implied the development of new and original analytic tools able to bootstrap from the data results related to each dimension, but also analytic techniques that could render the results of each dimension comparable to each other (chapters 5-6-7). As a global result, the analyses highlighted a positive overall trend both on the three dimensions considered individually and with respect to the identification of positive influences and impacts among the different dimensions. Nevertheless, some critical elements emerged from the analyses. As far as the disciplinary dimension is concerned (chapter 5), the conceptual path revealed to be effective in providing a chance i) to resolve the problem of confusing climate change with different environmental phenomena, like the ozone layer depletion and general pollution, and ii) to relate the greenhouse effect to the properties of absorbance, reflectance and transmittance. The analysis, however, revealed the permanence in the students of conceptual difficulties which are well-documented in the research literature, such as i) the difficulty in managing the concept of emission and ii) the confusion between heat and radiation. These two problems are those in which there is the greatest discrepancy between common sense and scientific thinking and, as our other studies on thermodynamics show, they must be addressed indepth from the moment that the basic physics concepts of thermodynamics and electromagnetism are introduced. However, the type of analysis we were able to carry out did not allow us to thoroughly investigate the nature of these unresolved problems. As far as the societal dimension is concerned, the data analyses showed positive behavioural responses in all the teaching experiments. The analysis of the mutual interaction between knowledge and behavioural response (chapter 6) strengthens this result. Moreover, the evolution of a certain type of knowledge and, mainly, the introduction of the epistemological perspective of complexity appeared potentially able to provide students with the cultural tools necessary to rationally navigate through the jungle of ideological/media wars about environmental issues. The epistemological dimension constituted the particularly original feature of this research work (chapter 7). As we said above, this study originated from the conjecture that climate change represents not only a societal and disciplinary but also an epistemological challenge. Scientific debates imply sophisticated epistemological argumentations which refer, more or less implicitly, to a refined way of looking at modelling in climate science. In the light of the results of our analysis, we can assert that, under certain conditions, specific epistemological know-how can positively impact not only productive disciplinary engagement, but also a more personal and authentic involvement in climate change. The decision to keep together the societal and conceptual dimensions, thanks to the epistemological dimension, proved to be a successful choice. It offered the students the opportunity to understand the increasing importance of the role of models and modelling in coping with scientific issues that have direct impact on the social aspects of people's lives (e.g. climate change, earthquakes, nuclear physics, modern physics applied to medical studies). Besides the epistemological dimension, the other element of originality of the research work is the construction of new analytic methodologies constructed to exploit the data and correlations between the different dimensions. These new methods can make, in our opinion, a positive contribution to the current debate on methodology in science education research.
[SPA] La presente tesis doctoral tiene por objetivo identificar y caracterizar las Spin-off surgidas del quehacer académico e investigativo en las universidades públicas de Costa Rica. Así, se identifican y caracterizan las Spin-off académicas, se profundiza en los factores determinantes de su creación bajo la metodología de O`Shea, Chugh, y Allen (2008), se destaca el factor del emprendedor académico, al determinar sus características y motivaciones para emprender; se analiza la cultura intraemprendedora y su relación con la innovación y rendimiento en las Spin-off académicas y se profundiza en el estudio de las prácticas de éxito que promueven las Spin-off para competir en los mercados. La metodología utilizada implicó una amplia revisión bibliográfica con la cual se sustentaron las variables investigadas, para ello se construyó un cuestionario que se aplicó a los emprendedores académicos identificados. El proceso de selección de los emprendedores se realizó a través de entrevistas al personal de las Vicerrectorías de Investigación de cada universidad, entrevistas personales a ex–Rectores universitarios, y consultas formales a entes gubernamentales del ámbito de la Ciencia y la Tecnología de Costa Rica. En total se identificaron a 52 empresas y se logró entrevistar a 44 emprendedores que constituyeron Spin-off académicas. El análisis de los resultados se realizó de forma univariante y multivariante, a través de regresiones lineales. Las conclusiones obtenidas del estudio empírico realizado a profesores universitarios, que han trabajado o trabajan, en las universidades públicas de Costa Rica: Universidad de Costa Rica, Universidad Nacional e Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica, son relevantes y tienen importantes implicaciones para el desarrollo de las Spin-off. Entre los principales hallazgos tenemos que las spin-off académicas son un fenómeno creciente en las universidades costarricenses, son derivadas del quehacer académico-investigativo, existen spin-off híbridas y ortodoxas, han surgido sin apoyo universitario, ni planificación y son principalmente pequeñas y medianas empresas que han contribuido a la creación de nuevos puestos de trabajo. El principal determinante que ha impulsado la creación de las Spin-off académicas, es el emprendedor académico, quien por formación y vinculación con el sector productivo identificó una oportunidad de negocio y la puso en práctica. El determinante externo legal es el principal obstáculo, que inhibe la creación de empresas. Sin embargo, dentro de este factor determinante se cuenta con un ambiente empresarial propicio en Costa Rica, para promover la creación de Spin-off académicas. Aunque es necesario por parte de las universidades públicas promover un mayor acercamiento con el sector productivo, a fin de que esta invierta cada vez más en investigación. Por último, se encontró evidencia que las Spin-off académicas hacen uso de la cultura intraemprendedora y que esta tiene un impacto positivo sobre el rendimiento y la innovación. Finalmente, destacar que los principales factores de éxito competitivo de las Spin-off académicas son: la visión comercial, la actualización, la capacidad de los trabajadores y la buena coordinación entre las distintas áreas de la empresa, realización de acuerdos y alianzas estratégicas y las prácticas de recursos humanos. Con esta investigación, se busca explicar el comportamiento de las variables que promueven o frenan la creación de las Spin-off en el contexto de las universidades públicas de Costa Rica, para contar con información que apoye en la toma de decisiones que las desarrolle. ; [ENG] This doctoral thesis pretends to identify y characterize the spin-offs that come up from academic and research tasks in the public universities of Costa Rica. Moreover, by identifying and characterizing the academic spin-offs, this research plans to delve in the most important factors of their creation based in the methodology of O'shea, Chugh and Allen (2008). This method highlights the academic entrepreneur; by determine which are the characteristics and motivations to start a project. Also, it analyses the entrepreneurial culture and its relation with the innovation and performance of the academic spin-offs; hence, it deeply studies the practices that help to promote their success in a competitive market. The methodology used implies a wide bibliographic review in order to sustain the different variables of this research; in addition, a questionnaire was made and applied to a group of identified academic entrepreneurs. The selection process for the entrepreneurs was carried through some interviews to the personnel of the research vice-rectorates, interviews to former university rectors and some formal enquiries to governmental entities from the sector of science and technology of Costa Rica. In total, the academic spin-offs are constituted by 52 businesses and 44 entrepreneurs. The results were analyzed by means of univariate and multivariate methods, and through linear regressions. The conclusions obtained from the empiric study applied to university professors that currently work or had worked at the public universities of Costa Rica (i.e. University of Costa Rica, National University of Costa Rica and Costa Rica Institute of Technology) have proved to be relevant, and they reveal important implications to the development of the spin-offs. Among the most important findings, we found out that the academic spin-offs are a rising phenomenon in Costa Rican universities. They are a result of academic and research tasks. Moreover, there are hybrid and orthodox spin-offs (Nicolau and Birley, 2008) that have merge with neither university support (Pirnay, 2003), nor planning (Steffensen et al, 1999), and they are essentially small and medium businesses that have contributed to the creation of new jobs. The main factor that helps to create the academic spin-offs is the academic entrepreneur who, because of his formation and his link with the productive sector, has identified and carried out a business opportunity. On the other hand, the legal factor is the main obstacle since it inhibits the creation of businesses; however, inside this determinant factor, Costa Rica has a business environment that helps to promote the creation of academic spin-offs. Nonetheless, public universities need to promote a closer approach with the productive sector, in order to increase the investments on the research field. Lastly, some evidence has been found about the good impact that the intra-entrepreneurial culture has on the academic spin-offs since it benefits performance and innovation. Finally, the most important factors for the competitive success of the spin-offs are their commercial vision, their ability to remain updated, their workforce, and their accurate coordination among the different business departments, their ability to pact agreements and strategic alliances, and human resource practices. This research plans to explain the behavior of the different variables that either promote or halt the creation of the spin-offs in the context of the public universities of Costa Rica in order to gather some information that supports the decisions taking processes of their development. ; Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena ; Programa de doctorado en Administración y Dirección de Empresas
Article in U.S. News and World Report based on excerpts from Hays' book A Southern Moderate Speaks ; Inside Story of Little Rock . "I was tormented by the fact that my home city was drifting toward a crisis. A head-on clash between State and federal authority seemed imminent. Nothing was being done to avert it" of a disturbance at the school would not of itself provide any basis for action by federal authorities. He made a distinction between this case and the one in Clinton, Tenn., in which a federal-court order enjoining certain people from interfering with the plan being carried out there was violated and the judge called on the assistance of the Justice Department to make the order effective. It was in this context that a suit was filed in the Arkansas Chancery Court by the newly formed Mothers of Central High League to stop the implementation of the school-board plan. On Thursday, August 29, Governor Faubus appeared before Chancellor Murray O. Reed as a witness in support of the prayer for an injunction. He testified that "violence, bloodshed and riots" would result if the integration began as scheduled, and cited the increased sales of knives and revolvers to Negro and white students. While he failed to give any specific information, the chancery judge nonetheless granted the petition for an injunction. The school board immediately appealed to the federal district court for an order prohibiting the State court from interfering with the efforts of the board to go forward with the plan. Federal Judge Ronald N. Davies, who had been sent from North Dakota to Little Rock to deal with the backlog of cases which had accumulated since Judge [Thomas C] Trimble's retirement, heard the appeal on Friday, August 30, and issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the use of the chancery court's order. All obstacles were now thought cleared for the beginning of Little Rock's voluntary integration program on the day after Labor Day, September 2. Decision to Call State Troops Meanwhile, members of the school board heard that Governor Faubus was considering calling out the National Guard to defy the federal court's integration order. Winthrop Rockefeller, appointed by the Governor to head the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission and anxious to entice industry to the State, pleaded with Governor Faubus on Sunday not to take any action that would set back industrial progress for years. Governor Faubus indicated that he had not yet made up his mind but that he greatly feared violence. He apparently made his decision to call out the National Guard on Monday morning, and the proclamation was issued that afternoon. When Roy Harris heard this news that evening in Georgia, he later commented, "I sat there . . . just scratching my head and wondering if he called 'em out for us or agin' us." Governor Faubus was said to have complained to his friends that afternoon: "I can't win. . If there's trouble or violence out there tomorrow, the integration crowd will say I provoked it by bringing in troops. But if I don't call the Guard and some children are killed, the other side will say the blood is on my hands. I've got to act on the side of safety. When I testified in chancery court last week, I said there might be violence. Now, I'm convinced of it." Thus it was that National Guardsmen and State troopers turned back nine Negro students who tried to enter Central High School on September 4, after Judge Davies had directed the school board to disregard the troops and to permit Negroes to attend classes at a special hearing on September 3, the first day of school. Governor Faubus called out the Guard just a few days after the first session of the 85th Congress had ended, and I was still in Washington preparing to return home to spend the fall with my people. While there had been indications that the integration program approved by the courts would run into some difficulty, it did not seem likely that such drastic action would be taken to prevent violence. I arrived in Little Rock on Thursday, September 5, and made my first public comment that evening. Being relatively uninformed on details of the crisis, I had only this to say: "The whole situation is so new to me it's hard to say anything at all. I grant he, Faubus, has the duty to maintain law and order. The first thing we now must do is to try to re-establish a spirit of calmness so the orderly processes of law can prevail." That day the school board asked Judge Davies to suspend temporarily the plan for integrating. A hearing was set for Saturday morning. In the meantime, I began to think of ways I could be of assistance. On Friday, I received a call from Bob Estabrook of the Washington "Post" suggesting that I call former President Truman, who was known to be a friend of Governor Faubus, to ask him to appeal to the Governor to withdraw the troops. I was reluctant to make such a request to Mr. Truman and also was not sure of the timing, since the federal court would meet the next morning. Any suspension of the school-board plan would change the situation somewhat, and it seemed best for me to wait for further judicial action. A temporary postponement of integration by court order might be deemed a satisfactory solution to the Governor, who could then disband the National Guard and leave to the federal courts the final decision as to the date for peaceful integration to begin. With the city tense and expectant, the federal district court convened that Saturday. After a brief hearing, Judge Davies ruled that "this court is not persuaded that upon the tenuous showing made by the petitions this morning that it should suspend enforcement of the petitioners' plan of integration." The school board then announced that it considered its plan still in effect and that Central High School would "be open Monday for all students." That Sunday morning, I addressed the congregation of the Second Baptist Church, my home church; reporting to them on my work as head of the Southern Baptist Convention. Then I went back to the Sam Peck Hotel, where I spent the afternoon contemplating this grave challenge to the spiritual strength and social consciousness of Little Rock. I was tormented by the fact that my home city was drifting toward a crisis. A head-on clash between State and federal authority seemed imminent. The lawyers called it a constitutional crisis. Nothing was being done to avert it. What is a Congressman's responsibility in such a situation? If it were a flood or tornado, and federal emergency help were required, the Congressman would certainly act. Then should he not also act in a situation in which the misfortune centered around human relations rather than physical forces? Truman's Promise to Help I decided to act. I called President Truman, as I had been requested to do, and he assured me he would do all he could to help. Governor Faubus was interviewed that evening on a special television program by a panel of correspondents, and his moderate presentation of the need to preserve order, 120 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 23, 1959
In his 1961 classic The Labyrinth of solitude, Octavio Paz offered his much discussed metaphor of Mexican masks, referring to the gap in Mexican culture between formal expressions and actual intention or content. This gap between formal agreement and practical rejection is abundantly clear in the field of Human Rights. Mexico is a founding signatory of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and in contrast to its Northern neighbor an early adopter of almost any other additional treaty thereafter. Importantly, it also recognizing the corresponding institutions such as the Inter American Court of Human Rights. The mask fits tightly. Yet the Human Rights record in the past decades, both visible in formal investigations as in the everyday experience of its citizens, speaks of a different reality. Here we don't just refer to the disappearances, lack of security, etc., but also about the frequent violations of rights related to work and the provision of services like social insurance, education and healthcare. This in combination with the notorious impunity and failure of the legal system to effectively address such rampant violations, makes the smiling mask look all the more cynical.Alternatively, we could also accept the challenge that Human Rights pose, and try to match pretention with reality. Mexico does have a basic legal, educational, democratic, social, etc. infrastructure that, given reforms, can serve to build an institutional landscape that supports Human Rights. At the moment of writing, a new progressive government shows revamped interest in social and economic rights, alongside the more usual promises of more transparency, democracy and fighting corruption. If this can be achieved, and if it will be done so with respect for civil rights, it could mark a point of hope rather than a tradeoff.One precondition for any of this to happen, is an awareness of the human rights framework itself. Starting with one's own rights, but also those of others. Yet the violations of certain groups happen either far outside of our view (in forests or prison sells), or are not understood as Human Rights violations (such as obstacles to joining syndicates). By speaking to transnational migrants making the journey to the U.S. through Mexico from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador, my team learned a lot about hidden horrors. Murder and rape by criminal groups on trains, robbery and extortion at the hand of security forces in the forests, destitution from drought and disease the Northern deserts. All indicate a systematic failure of protecting, respecting and providing of rights like security, freedom of torture and health, amongst many others. Yet we only knew because of the survivors.The relative visibility and enforceability of the human rights of certain groups form the red thread that connects the first four articles in this special issue of Política, Globalidad y Ciudadanía, which is focused on Human Rights. Articles five, six and seven are part of the normal publication cycle of this journal, although it is difficult to truly stray far from topics that are relevant to human rights, as the entries on gender and policing demonstrate.As far as the first part on Human Rights is concerned, the goal is to draw attention to the systemic, continuous and often less visible human rights issues of Mexico. The aim is to do this in two ways:1. By presenting studies on systematic HR problems and the surrounding struggles, often involving marginalized groups.2. By reflecting on the recognition, visibility and handling of these human rights issues as human rights issues.Although to some extend present in all, the first will be mainly covered in the entries on disappearances (2) and foster children (4), while the second question surfaces more prominently in the this text (1) and the entry on the media representation of human rights (3) of this special issue.We will engage in this endeavor with an interdisciplinary approach and assemble. Various authors have identified the field of human rights as fertile grounds for interdisciplinary work (Freeman, 2002; De Feyter, 2008). A frequent starting point for the study of universal rights is the field of international law (and with that, international relations), yet the focus of this issue is national and thus not primarily concerned with the international aspect of HR. The analysis borrows much from a sociological approach, since the focus is often on "the societal processes and relations that shape and define how human rights are generated, defined and employed in specific social and political arenas" (Madsen, Verschraegen, 2013, p. 4). Besides law and sociology, our interdisciplinary assemble of authors employs perspectives from communication sciences and political science.In what follows, I will briefly walk the reader through the index of this issue of Política, Globalidad y Ciudadanía:In the first article, Tuur Ghys offers a general introduction to the topic and logic of human rights that will be useful in understanding the other entries in this journal. It also deepens the discussion of the central topic of unequal attention and why certain groups struggle to construct their grievances as Human Rights abuse. This article was written in English.In the second article, Darwin Franco Migues makes a deep reflection on the problem of disappearances in Mexico. Approaching the problem from a communication point of view, he explores how the disappeared are often stigmatized and forgotten, as well as the resistance of their families to try to re-frame these human rights abuses. The article was written in English.In the third article, Beatriz Elena Inzunza Acedo presents an empirical study on the knowledge and social imaginaries about human rights. This study, focused on Monterrey, presents data on what people know about HR, how they know it and what issues they imagine as human rights issues. This article was written in English.In the fourth article, Leticia Ivonne López Villarreal offers a case study of the interplay of public policies and private actors in organizing the protection human rights of foster care children in Nuevo León. It shows that a complex web of multi-level processes and actors is required to give voice to the rights of a particularly voiceless group. This article was written in Spanish. The fifth article deals with public policy in the field of sports. Francisco Javier Mendoza-Farias, Rocío Ivonne Quintal-López and Leticia Janet Paredes analyze the limited and slow process of implementing gender equality and sensitivity in CONADE between 2012 and 2018. This article was written in Spanish.In the sixth article, Lenin Ramírez Matus and Genaro Hernández Velazco make a case for improving police mediation in neighborhood conflicts. Reviewing literature, they conclude that local police need to further develop their role and responsibility in pacifying community relations. This article was written in Spanish.In the final, seventh entry, Said Dahdah Antar takes a more historical approach to the topics usually discussed within this journal. His article attempts to trace back the roots of rhetorical speech in political communication and citizen participation back to the ancient Greece and the Roman empire. This article was written in Spanish.As the editor of this issue, I would first of all like to thank the authors, especially the group that had the patience to stick with the human rights project until the end. Second, I want to thank any anonymous students and student assistants for their contribution, as they often form a hidden part of the academic production process. Lastly, in the name of the authors I want to thank all interview or survey respondents for their time and testimonies that gave empirical substance to our research. Enjoy the read. ; In his 1961 classic The Labyrinth of solitude, Octavio Paz offered his much discussed metaphor of Mexican masks, referring to the gap in Mexican culture between formal expressions and actual intention or content. This gap between formal agreement and practical rejection is abundantly clear in the field of Human Rights. Mexico is a founding signatory of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and in contrast to its Northern neighbor an early adopter of almost any other additional treaty thereafter. Importantly, it also recognizing the corresponding institutions such as the Inter American Court of Human Rights. The mask fits tightly. Yet the Human Rights record in the past decades, both visible in formal investigations as in the everyday experience of its citizens, speaks of a different reality. Here we don't just refer to the disappearances, lack of security, etc., but also about the frequent violations of rights related to work and the provision of services like social insurance, education and healthcare. This in combination with the notorious impunity and failure of the legal system to effectively address such rampant violations, makes the smiling mask look all the more cynical.Alternatively, we could also accept the challenge that Human Rights pose, and try to match pretention with reality. Mexico does have a basic legal, educational, democratic, social, etc. infrastructure that, given reforms, can serve to build an institutional landscape that supports Human Rights. At the moment of writing, a new progressive government shows revamped interest in social and economic rights, alongside the more usual promises of more transparency, democracy and fighting corruption. If this can be achieved, and if it will be done so with respect for civil rights, it could mark a point of hope rather than a tradeoff.One precondition for any of this to happen, is an awareness of the human rights framework itself. Starting with one's own rights, but also those of others. Yet the violations of certain groups happen either far outside of our view (in forests or prison sells), or are not understood as Human Rights violations (such as obstacles to joining syndicates). By speaking to transnational migrants making the journey to the U.S. through Mexico from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador, my team learned a lot about hidden horrors. Murder and rape by criminal groups on trains, robbery and extortion at the hand of security forces in the forests, destitution from drought and disease the Northern deserts. All indicate a systematic failure of protecting, respecting and providing of rights like security, freedom of torture and health, amongst many others. Yet we only knew because of the survivors.The relative visibility and enforceability of the human rights of certain groups form the red thread that connects the first four articles in this special issue of Política, Globalidad y Ciudadanía, which is focused on Human Rights. Articles five, six and seven are part of the normal publication cycle of this journal, although it is difficult to truly stray far from topics that are relevant to human rights, as the entries on gender and policing demonstrate.As far as the first part on Human Rights is concerned, the goal is to draw attention to the systemic, continuous and often less visible human rights issues of Mexico. The aim is to do this in two ways:1. By presenting studies on systematic HR problems and the surrounding struggles, often involving marginalized groups.2. By reflecting on the recognition, visibility and handling of these human rights issues as human rights issues.Although to some extend present in all, the first will be mainly covered in the entries on disappearances (2) and foster children (4), while the second question surfaces more prominently in the this text (1) and the entry on the media representation of human rights (3) of this special issue.We will engage in this endeavor with an interdisciplinary approach and assemble. Various authors have identified the field of human rights as fertile grounds for interdisciplinary work (Freeman, 2002; De Feyter, 2008). A frequent starting point for the study of universal rights is the field of international law (and with that, international relations), yet the focus of this issue is national and thus not primarily concerned with the international aspect of HR. The analysis borrows much from a sociological approach, since the focus is often on "the societal processes and relations that shape and define how human rights are generated, defined and employed in specific social and political arenas" (Madsen, Verschraegen, 2013, p. 4). Besides law and sociology, our interdisciplinary assemble of authors employs perspectives from communication sciences and political science.In what follows, I will briefly walk the reader through the index of this issue of Política, Globalidad y Ciudadanía:In the first article, Tuur Ghys offers a general introduction to the topic and logic of human rights that will be useful in understanding the other entries in this journal. It also deepens the discussion of the central topic of unequal attention and why certain groups struggle to construct their grievances as Human Rights abuse. This article was written in English.In the second article, Darwin Franco Migues makes a deep reflection on the problem of disappearances in Mexico. Approaching the problem from a communication point of view, he explores how the disappeared are often stigmatized and forgotten, as well as the resistance of their families to try to re-frame these human rights abuses. The article was written in English.In the third article, Beatriz Elena Inzunza Acedo presents an empirical study on the knowledge and social imaginaries about human rights. This study, focused on Monterrey, presents data on what people know about HR, how they know it and what issues they imagine as human rights issues. This article was written in English.In the fourth article, Leticia Ivonne López Villarreal offers a case study of the interplay of public policies and private actors in organizing the protection human rights of foster care children in Nuevo León. It shows that a complex web of multi-level processes and actors is required to give voice to the rights of a particularly voiceless group. This article was written in Spanish. The fifth article deals with public policy in the field of sports. Francisco Javier Mendoza-Farias, Rocío Ivonne Quintal-López and Leticia Janet Paredes analyze the limited and slow process of implementing gender equality and sensitivity in CONADE between 2012 and 2018. This article was written in Spanish.In the sixth article, Lenin Ramírez Matus and Genaro Hernández Velazco make a case for improving police mediation in neighborhood conflicts. Reviewing literature, they conclude that local police need to further develop their role and responsibility in pacifying community relations. This article was written in Spanish.In the final, seventh entry, Said Dahdah Antar takes a more historical approach to the topics usually discussed within this journal. His article attempts to trace back the roots of rhetorical speech in political communication and citizen participation back to the ancient Greece and the Roman empire. This article was written in Spanish.As the editor of this issue, I would first of all like to thank the authors, especially the group that had the patience to stick with the human rights project until the end. Second, I want to thank any anonymous students and student assistants for their contribution, as they often form a hidden part of the academic production process. Lastly, in the name of the authors I want to thank all interview or survey respondents for their time and testimonies that gave empirical substance to our research. Enjoy the read.
Inhaltsangabe: Introduction: The master thesis 'Worldwide Development of Nuclear Energy and the Strategic Deployment of German Consultancies on the Arabian Peninsula' is chiefly targeted at German consultancy companies so that they can assess their status of strategic deployment and prioritize their activities to enter a new business sector in a foreign market. This publication could also be of relevance for policy makers, investors, suppliers as well as nuclear energy and governmental agencies to identify their need for external advisers to safely operate a nuclear power program; provides a guideline for how to enter a new market. Hence this thesis should be considered as an aid to identify hurdles and obstacles that have to be foreseen and so overcome. Potential business fields are also noted as well as important factors that have to be considered to minimize the chance of failure in the new market. Nevertheless, this huge market with its continuously changing constraints and conditions could throw up a lot more obstacles than could be covered in this thesis. Also the internal organizations of individual companies may differ from the one described in the thesis. The objective of this master thesis is thus to set out a set of guidelines for possible approaches. The first two chapters present an overview of the current geographical, political, cultural and economic conditions to familiarize the reader with the background information and constraints needed for the subsequent chapters. The third chapter deals more specifically with the energy market on the Arabian Peninsula, particular in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This chapter provides information on types of energy, pending developments, country-specific organizations and institutions, as well as means of financing such huge projects. The fourth chapter is devoted exclusively to nuclear energy, starting with the current status and the motivation of the two countries to launch such a development. This is followed by a description of the legal requirements and other commitments as decreed by the countries' governments. These specific legal conditions do not just apply within the countries concerned, but companies which do business there are likewise obliged to follow these regulations. Challenges for countries are opportunities for consultants, and identification of these represents is the core content of this chapter. The content of the fifth chapter is the preparatory measures that are essential prior to entering a foreign market. A company's vision and mission as well as various analyses are needed to provide a sound basis for taking a decision to proceed. In this context, SWOT analysis is noted as well as an evaluation of M.E. Porter's 'Five Forces' to describe the market and internal organizations. After the preparatory measures, the implementation phase follows. This and its various stages are described in Chapter 6. It is inevitable that, to ensure success, many measures will have to implemented and subsequently adjusted. This starts with deployment and steering of business units and proceeds to overcoming difficulties with external parties. Recruitment on a permanent basis of employees is also a prerequisite for sustained business success, together with a staff feedback, incentive and salary system. Chapter 7 sets out methods for evaluating previous years' activities in the new business. The first couple of years after 'start-up' are over and the situation in which the company is now has to be assessed. It is frequently necessary to undertake organizational upgrades, that could amount to a complete reorganization of the business, aided by change management provisions. The final Chapter 8 summarizes the key information and content, and sets forth the need and reasons for strategic deployment. Changes in the market means that companies will have to re-adjust for economic survival. Because the nuclear program of the United Arab Emirates is more advanced than that of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and information is less available in the latter country, the main focus of this thesis is on the UAE. Nevertheless, the KSA is an emerging nuclear market with great ambitious for a nuclear program and so is worthy of mention when discussing constraints and conditions that these countries have in common. Other countries that are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) do share an interest in nuclear energy but are not yet at the same stage of development as the UAE and KSA. These serve from time to time to support arguments and figures. A sufficient and reliable energy supply is essential for continuous economic development, contributing also to poverty reduction and health care improvement. If these developments are restricted or lacking, often the result is social conflict that could even lead to civil strife. Examples are rural arid areas in the world where there is no access to potable water. A minor local conflict affects the economic development and population of specific countries and often results in regional instability and interventions from outside. The global energy imbalance has been steadily growing over the past couple of decades. Roughly 1.6 billion people live without electricity, and almost 2.4 billion people rely on traditional biomass to cook their daily meals . Modern fuels are not available or are restricted to the upper social strata. There is an almost equal share of the world's population with no access to potable water, so in the struggle for survival the consequences will be social unrest and riots. In some poor countries of the world, the per capita electricity consumption is as low as 50 kWh per annum, compared to developed countries with 8,600 kWh. Worldwide, the provision of energy is dominated by three major challenges. 1. Energy consumption has tripled in the past half century. If this continues, humankind will consume more energy in the 21st century than in the entire past history. This represents an increase of 53% in global energy consumption by 2030. 2. The main energy resources are now scarce, so to ensure economic development, countries will compete with each other to acquire their own supplies. Each country seeks to protect its existing sources and open up new ones. This will not result in a fair distribution of resources, as poor countries are not able to compete with their developed neighbors and lose out, as has often happened in history. 3. To an increasing extent attention is focusing on environmental impacts. Because of the greenhouse effect, carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels bring about a rise in global temperatures. The consequences are long-lasting drought, sea level rise, submerging coastal regions and more destructive storms. For these reasons, many governments are reviewing their present energy mixes and are considering alternatives to avert the consequences of energy scarcity, including the renewal of interest in nuclear energy that has been noted in recent decades. Adoption or resumption of nuclear energy is at least one solution for some countries faced with a threat to the security of their energy supplies. Among others, one benefit of nuclear energy is zero emissions of greenhouse gases during their operating phase and the ability of huge plants to provide electricity reliably and on a large scale. Much engineering effort has been devoted to significantly improving nuclear plant safety in recent decades. Furthermore, although they are finite, there are ample reserves of uranium and, unlike petrochemicals, they are not put to any other use apart from as an energy source. Prospecting is under way for new deposits, as currently in Yemen. The cost of electricity generated by nuclear power is now competitive, but a major concern that has still to be resolved is final storage of down burned nuclear fuel rods. An overview of the economics is provided by a cost comparison of the various electricity generation technologies, as shown in Figure 1-1 below. This survey is ongoing in a couple of countries to seek a basis for taking decisions on their energy strategies. The quoted figures are ballpark estimates, with actual values depending very much on local conditions and the current market situation, but they do serve to provide a rough comparison. The outcome of these calculations is that electricity generation from nuclear fuel is, at 91.0 US Dollar/MWh, much more competitive than firing crude oil at 133.4 US Dollar/MWh. However, a major consideration is the distinction that has to be made between supplying base and peak/cycling load. To meet the demand for base-load electricity, large-scale power plants, like nuclear and those fired with coal and crude oil are more favorable. These need an extended start-up period – ranging from a couple of hours to two or three days – before they can feed power into the grid. Smaller scale plant, like diesel-fired simple-cycle gas turbines and solar power plants are able to rapidly ramp their power output up and down to cover daily consumption peaks. For this reason, nuclear power plants almost exclusively operate continuously at or near peak output to supply base load, together with natural gas-fired combined cycle gas turbine plants and coal-fired power plants. Diesel-fired gas turbines and solar power plants find application for peak and cycling duty. The key factors are listed in the following table, with firstly the operating parameters, which are attributes specific to the various power plant technologies that are taken as basic assumptions for the further calculations. The second sub-heading is key financial constraints, which fix the technology that is more economical. These comprise the capital cost for construction and development as well as long-term costs that are highly cyclical and cannot be so readily predicted as the other costs. The third main distinction is the direct electricity generation costs. These are running costs incurred only during power plant operation and are directly related to the rated power output in MWe. This calculation serves as well to identify companies and utility suppliers for nuclear power generation as well as to broaden the mix of energy supply technologies and reduce dependency on specific primary resources.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: List of Figures4 List of Abbreviations6 1.Introduction and Objective8 1.1Objective of this Master Thesis8 1.2Introduction9 2.Geographical, Political, Cultural and Economic Conditions13 2.1Geography and Culture13 2.2Economy and Politics14 2.3Political and Social Stability in the UAE18 2.4Relations between the UAE and Germany18 2.5Relationship between the KSA and Germany19 3.Energy Sectors of the Leading Countries on the Arabian Peninsula20 3.1Electricity Generation and Consumption in KSA and UAE20 3.2Water Production and Consumption in the KSA and UAE24 3.3Renewable Energy in the UAE and KSA25 3.4Pending Developments25 3.5Country-specific Organizations and Authorities26 3.6Financing of Power Projects in Arabian Countries27 3.7Summary of Chapter 327 4.Nuclear Energy on the Arabian Peninsula28 4.1Status in the UAE and KSA28 4.2Reasons for Launching a Nuclear Program29 4.3Obligations to Launch a Nuclear Program30 4.4Commitments of the UAE31 4.5Challenges and Potentials of the Nuclear Path33 4.6Global Outlook35 5.Preparations for Market Penetration37 5.1Vision and Mission38 5.2Market Analysis39 5.3Strategic SWOT Analysis41 5.3.1Strengths41 5.3.2Weaknesses45 5.3.3Opportunities46 5.3.4Threats47 5.4Five Elements of Realization Strategy49 5.4.1Arenas (market conditions and valuable segments)49 5.4.2Staging and pacing53 5.4.3Differentiators55 5.4.4Vehicles (course of action)55 5.4.5Economic logic58 5.4.6Summary and checklist of foundation59 6.Execution of the Initial Phase60 6.1Centralization versus Decentralization of Business Units60 6.2Acquisition of New Permanent Employees61 6.2.1Recruitment strategy for employees without experience61 6.2.2Recruitment strategy for experienced employees62 6.2.3Selection of potential candidates63 6.2.4Recruitment process63 6.3Internal Deployment and Organization66 6.3.1Feedback systems66 6.3.2Development of competencies66 6.3.3Incentives and salary systems68 6.3.4Difficulties with external parties69 7.Assessment of Business after 'Start-up Phase'70 7.1Reassessment of Recent Years70 7.2Organizational Improvement Measures72 7.3Change Management and the Reorganization of Business and Markets73 7.3.1Strengthen the position in the existing market74 7.3.2Entering new global markets75 8.Summary76 List of Literature78Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 3.3, Renewable Energy in the UAE and KSA: Utility companies in the GCC states are under enormous pressure due to the global scarcity of fossil fuels, which are running out much faster than expected, consequently they are boosting also renewable energies. Governmental agencies have been instructed to review energy consumption in the Middle East and are seeking alternatives to meet the rising demand, which is also in line with the global environmental movement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The long shoreline and high insolation throughout the year are optimal for generating wind, water and photovoltaic power. The following illustrate the efforts made by government agencies for the upcoming year: Abu Dhabi's Masdar City is spending US Dollar 2 billion on promoting solar technology. Saudi Arabia is looking to position itself as a centre for solar energy research and so become a net exporter of energy sourced from renewables. Abu Dhabi is to build the world's largest hydrogen power plant at a cost of US Dollar 15 billion. 'Glance over the borders": Jordan is assessing plans for constructing a wind farm while Qatar is considering solar power. 3.4, Pending Developments: Regarding upcoming developments, the two countries, UAE and KSA, have to be considered separately due to the primary resources that are available. Crude oil and natural gas reserves in Saudi Arabia will last decades more than the resources in the UAE. A further reason is that the quality and composition of the mineral resources are much less favorable in the KSA than in the UAE. This means that their firing for power generation is, for economic reasons, the only reasonable option for their exploitation. In the UAE the situation is different, as there the mineral resources are of much higher quality and are too valuable to fire in power plants. The price obtainable on the world petrochemicals market is much higher than the benefit derived from electricity generation. The UAE therefore has a greater incentive to diversify its power generation and to invest in technologies other than fossil fuels much earlier. Based on the financial and economic crisis, the 'Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie' expects a smoother growth of GDP in 2008 and 2009. This means that ongoing projects with a total CAPEX of US Dollar 378 billion will be postponed or abandoned. Despite these figures, the UAE will remain the most important project market for German companies in the Arabian region. Over the near term, between 2009 and 2011, the UAE expects investments of about US Dollar 540 billion. Showing high potential for investments of about US Dollar 24 billion is expansion of water production and power plant capacities. To participate in this development, frequent consultations and top-level meetings are held to strengthen the relationship between German industry and local agencies like DEWA (Dubai Electrical and Water Authority) and ADWEA (Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority). These authorities organize and guide all water and electricity projects, starting with planning and tendering through to commissioning. Over the past four years, energy consumption in the Emirate of Dubai has increased by around 10,000 GWh. As a consequence, the projection for 2010 is for a new electricity generation capacity of 9 GWe provided by power plants. Likewise electricity transmission has potential for growth. DEWA intends to award contracts annually for more than 6,000 km of HVDC (high voltage direct current) transmission lines. DEWA has an estimated annual budget of US Dollar 2 billion.
The citizens' relationship toward the European integration process and the European Union is a dynamic category, varying from country to country and from time to time. The changes in attitudes are affected by occurrences at the EU level, as well as processes taking place in each individual country. However, in spite of the differences and changes, there are tendencies of a more permanent character, which explain the relationship of citizens toward the processes and institutions of the united Europe. Therefore the data collected on the sample of youth and adults in Croatia at the beginning of 2004 give an insight, not only into the attitudes of that moment, which are more or less susceptible to changes, but into trends that enable us to gain scientific insights about the subject of our research. In this analysis the relationship of the participants towards European integration and the EU was investigated through numerous indicators, with emphasis on the perception of the consequences of Croatia's accession to the European Union. However, other aspects of the relationship toward Europe and the EU, which represent a wider context for the understanding of the perception of consequences of entering Europe, were also investigated. The results obtained demonstrate that most young and adult participants in Croatia actually had a neutral perception of the EU – even though there are more of those with a positive than a negative image – and it is logical to assume that this neutrality might be relatively easily changed under the influence of different factors. Nine out of ten participants even supported Croatia's integration into the European Union at the beginning of 2004. Among them, most were Euro-skeptics, that is, those who believe that too much is expected from accession. At the same time, the Euro-enthusiasts (expecting comprehensive benefits from accession) and Euro-realists (believing that integration is inevitable for the survival of small countries) were considerably less numerous. The domination of Euro-skeptics again warns of the instability of the relationship towards the EU, which can be influenced by different events both in the EU and in Croatia. However, in spite of the expressed skepticism, two thirds of participants expected that Croatia will be an equal member of the Union by 2010 at the latest. The experiences of other transitional countries also demonstrated that there are numerous obstacles on the road to a united Europe. Our participants ascribed these obstacles equally to Croatia and the EU, however, the number of young participants emphasizing the EU's responsibility increased from 1999 to 2004, while the number of those stressing Croatia's responsibility decreased. Also, to determine the relationship towards European integration and Croatia's accession to the Union, the findings about the expected positive and negative consequences, once Croatia is integrated into the EU, are most important. Again, both the young and the adults expect more advantages than undesirable consequences. However, there was a mild decrease in the expectance of positive, and an increase in the expectance of negative consequences in the five year period between the two pieces of research. In spite of all these tendencies, the expectations of youth are more positive than those of the adults. The greatest positive expectations were registered on an individual and socio-cultural level, while socio-economic enthusiasm waned. Indeed, it is because of the socio-economic unpreparedness of Croatia for joining a developed European environment, that most negative consequences are expected. An insight into the perception of the social and political consequences of Croatia' s integration into the European Union was gained with the aid of a number of indicators. Thus, research into the expected development of the EU in the coming ten years demonstrated that only the opportunity for easier travel, work, study and life in Europe is something most participants expect, where this opinion is accepted by two out of three young participants. However, they are quite afraid of the costs of integration for Croatia and the worsening of the farmers' position. The adult participants expect more social problems than the young, including a higher level of unemployment. The negative consequences for their own countries are also less perceived by the young in Croatia than was the case with their counterparts in the Union. Related to the fears from the building of a united Europe and European Union, we determined that the young in Croatia are most afraid of the abolition of the Croatian currency and an increase in crime, and least afraid of the potential loss of social privileges. The adult participants, on the other hand, are consistent in demonstrating a higher level of fear in all the examined elements. The fears of the participants from the enlarged EU are somewhat different – the greatest fear is that of employment transferring to other countries, as well as an increase in crime and the drug trade, difficulties for farmers and the price their country will have to pay due to the construction of the EU. Both the young and the adult participants in Croatia are less worried about losing their national identity, language and social privileges than the Europeans. One of the most important components of the construction of Europe and the EU is the enlargement process, although the current crisis that the European integration process is going through, may result in an intermission in its tempo and scope. All our participants emphasize the multifaceted benefits from EU enlargement, followed by the positive influence of that enlargement on Croatia, while the efforts the Croatian authorities are putting into joining the Union were evaluated quite poorly. The adults accept all these attitudes more than the young, as well as valuing Croatia qualities more. Almost two thirds of the participants from the EU candidate countries, on the other hand, gave high marks in 2002 to all the potentially positive consequences of EU enlargement, but one quarter also demonstrated a fear of the possible increase in unemployment in their countries. The potential accession of Croatia to the European Union will also signify a change in the way decisions are made, in the sense that some will be made at the national level, and some along with the EU. Our participants have in this regard turned out to be very prepared for integration, for most of them believe that four fifths of all the observed areas should be the subject of joint decision-making by Croatia and the EU. The only areas in which, according to the opinion of the young participants, Croatia should decide autonomously, are the acceptance of refugees, the judiciary, culture, agriculture and fisheries and the police. The European share a different opinion on this issue, and believe two thirds of the stated areas should be decided upon by their country along with the EU, while it should be autonomous in the fields of preventing juvenile crime, urban violence, then education, basic rules regarding the media, health and social care, as well as unemployment. The perception of the potential winners and losers of Croatia's membership in the EU is especially indicative. Different social groups were, based on the perception of the young participants, structured into the potential losers from integration (e.g. farmers, retired persons, manual workers, the unemployed), potential winners of integration (such as the inhabitants of the capital and some regions, youth and all Croatian citizens), and sure winners of integration, who are also best prepared for Croatia's accession to the EU (experts, those who speak foreign languages, the political elite, managers and large companies). Indeed, it was demonstrated that the young believe the greatest winners from EU integration are those that are today in a relatively better position in Croatian terms, and those whose existing position is not invidious and who most need a better future, were seen as potentially the weakest winners. It is encouraging that the young put themselves in the group of potential winners, meaning they believe that the existing capabilities and potentials of their generation only need optimal circumstances to be fully expressed. Since people that speak foreign languages are perceived as certain winners of joining the Union, we have particularly examined this aspect of readiness for accession. The data about the knowledge of foreign languages is less than thrilling, especially compared to the knowledge of foreign languages of the young in the EU. The first position, of course, belongs to the English language. However, unlike the European results, where the knowledge of French is next in line, in Croatia the second most common foreign language is German. The young speak both these languages more than the adult participants, while they are in a worse position regarding other foreign languages researched (Italian, French, and Russian). In this research, we also determined that approximately three quarters of our participants are proud of the fact that they are Croatian citizens, while somewhat more than half of the young and slightly fewer adults are proud to be European. The young are those with a slightly more critical attitude towards their national identity and are especially avid in the positive validation of their Europeism. However, the most interesting finding is that all the Croatian participants feel less national pride than the population of the European Union, while it is understandable that the EU participants emphasize their pride in being European more often. The answers of the participants regarding the content of the " citizen of the European Union" indicate that neither the young nor the adults have a coherent conception of citizenship in the EU. Still, the right to work, live and study in any EU member country is the key element of understanding this citizenship, with the young in Croatia, as well as youth in the Union itself. Also, both the young and the adult participants in Croatia chose as the least important the general active suffrage, regardless of elections being held for the European Parliament, the national or the local representative bodies. Only one out of four participants from Croatia believes they will have some personal benefits from Croatia's membership in the EU, while almost half of the young and a third of the adult participants have no defined opinion on this issue. This feeling is clearly very much linked to the issue of the personal meaning the European Union has for the participants, where neither the young nor the adults have a homogenous perception. Only one answer occurs in the majority of cases – the EU is a way of creating a better future for the young, while little support was given to the claim that the EU signifies a " European Government" , superior to the national states who are the Union's members. Unlike the youth in Croatia, those from the Union countries mostly emphasize the freedom of movement, while in time the concept of the " European Government" grew more pronounced in their attitudes. Like the Croatian youth, the young in the EU have an equal fear of Euro-bureaucracy, the loss of cultural diversity and the Utopianism of the European idea. Intrigued by the often publicly expressed concern about the emigration of young, especially highly educated people, to other country, we deemed it necessary to explore the readiness of our participants to spend a certain period of time or their whole life abroad. According to our data, two fifths of young people would like to spend a long period of time (working and studying) abroad, while a quarter of Croatian youth would leave forever. The desire of youth to gain certain knowledge, material wealth and experience in other countries is not in question, especially if it is taken into consideration that the young are also the most mobile and flexible segment of society. However, the information that a quarter of youth wishes to abandon this country forever (while not all of them will do so), is worrisome, seen from the point of view of human capital, which is extremely important for the survival and optimal development of a small country such as Croatia. Also, it is important to mention that the percentage of youth that would go abroad forever, with or without an adequate opportunity, increased over the five year period, which is an indicator of the unfavorable trends in the social development of Croatia. The adult participants, on the other hand, demonstrate a more conservative attitude toward the possible emigration of their children to one of the Union countries, but are still prepared to accept their studying and training in the EU, and only 14% of them would like their children to reside permanently or during their working life in one of the European Union member countries. The analysis of the differentiation of youth regarding European integration and the EU indicated the limited influence of the social attributes used. In other words, the young are relatively homogenous in their perception of a unified Europe as well as expectations from Croatia's accession to the European Union. However, there are certain differences, and they are mostly caused by party identification, socio-professional status, regional status and religiousness. The conclusion is that the most influence is exerted on the attitudes toward the European integration process by ideological-political orientations and existing social status as well as the specifics of the wider environment. It was, hence, shown that the supporters of the left of center parties, the pupils and students, the inhabitants of more developed regions and the non-religious participants are more inclined to the EU and the integration process, and emphasize the positive consequences and potential gains from Croatia's accession to the Union more than they express their fears from the negative consequences. This also applies, although to a lesser degree, to young men, the academically educated youth, with an urban background and/or domicile, while the age related differences within the young population are inconsistent. Therefore, we can say in short that the higher social competence of youth is reflected in the formation of a stable and consistent pro-European orientation. Since this group still consists of a minority of youth, it is obvious that a great effort on the part of the advocates of integration is necessary, especially the political protagonists, to attract the majority of youth that are vacillating and, thus, susceptible to influences often opposite in nature. Finally, two most important tendencies may be stressed, which are the result of the research data about the relationship of youth towards the European integration process. The first indicates that the young generation in Croatia is recognized – both by themselves and by the adults – as one of the potentially greatest winners of the European integration process and, in that context, of Croatia's accession to the European Union. The second trend demonstrates that the young, in relation to the adults, consistently demonstrate a more definite pro-European orientation. Both these tendencies suggest that the potentials of youth are a resource to be taken into serious consideration on Croatia's path to the EU, and then in its adequate development in the new circumstances that will arise. Hence, along with all the other damage, which would occur by stopping the EU enlargement process, one of the undesirable consequences would also be the weakening of the motivation and Euro-optimism of youth in Croatia. This would, therefore, additionally aggravate the negative consequences, because they might be used as one of the more important motors for the development of this country, which does not seem to be going in the right direction, in more favorable circumstances – which the assured accession of Croatia to the EU would contribute to.
The empirical literature on institutions and development has been challenged on grounds of reverse causality, measurement error in institutional indicators, and heterogeneity. This paper uses firm-level data across countries to confront these challenges. Instead of analyzing ultimate outcomes, such as income levels where institutional quality is likely endogenous, the focus is on firm-level external finance. Moreover, institutions are "unbundled" to explore how various types of institutions affect external finance differently. The paper documents that micro firms have significantly less access to external finance than small and medium firms. General financial development and contracting institutions that facilitate transactions between private parties exert little effect, on average, on firms' access to external finance. In contrast, property rights institutions that constrain political and economic elites exhibit stronger positive association with access to external finance. The analysis finds evidence of attenuation bias associated with error in measuring institutions. For leveling the playing field between elite and non-elite firms (as proxied by firm size) in their access to external finance, property rights institutions also figure more prominently—with an important exception for the information environment, a component of contracting institutions. The results indicate that a specific channel through which development is affected more by property rights institutions rather than contracting institutions is external financing for firms.
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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky chided NATO states this week for their unwillingness to directly join the fight against Russia."What's the issue with involving NATO countries in the war? There is no such issue," Zelensky told the New York Times in a fiery interview. Western planes could simply "shoot down what's in the sky over Ukraine" without leaving NATO territory, he argued, thus mitigating escalation risks.Zelensky added that he would welcome any plans to send NATO soldiers to support Ukraine's war effort on the ground. The Ukrainian leader also asked Western states to allow Ukraine to use their weapons to target military sites within Russian territory.Zelensky's increasingly desperate pleas come at a difficult time for Ukraine. It has now been over a year and a half since Kyiv made any substantial gains on the battlefield. As political scientist Graham Allison recently pointed out, Russia took more territory in the past two months than Ukraine liberated in its entire 2023 counteroffensive.Ukraine has attempted to regain an advantage through a campaign of attacks on Russian infrastructure, including fuel depots and power plants. The tactical shift is in part a response to Moscow's long-standing campaign of strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, which forced Kyiv to impose rolling blackouts this week for the first time since Russia's 2022 invasion.In this moment of crisis, the U.S. has chosen a Goldilocks approach. American officials have long opposed Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory, in part due to fears of escalation and in part due to the potential impact on global oil prices. But Secretary of State Antony Blinken appeared to soften that stance in comments last week."We have not encouraged or enabled strikes outside of Ukraine, but ultimately Ukraine needs to make decisions for itself on how it conducts this war," Blinken said. "We will continue to back Ukraine with the equipment it needs to win."From Ukraine's perspective, such comments are far too ambiguous. But American actions have been somewhat more direct. Just a few weeks ago, Washington revealed that it had secretly given long-range missiles to Kyiv that are capable of striking deep within Russian territory.The U.S. has been firmer in its opposition to sending troops to Ukraine or directly helping to shoot down Russian missiles. While some NATO states have warmed to the idea of deploying soldiers to the country, Gen. C.Q. Brown, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Monday that "right now, there are no plans to bring U.S. trainers into Ukraine.""Once this conflict is over and we're in a better place, then I would suspect we would be able to bring trainers back in," Brown said.As Zelensky plays down fears of nuclear escalation, the Kremlin is taking a different tack. Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered drills this week in which his troops practiced using tactical nukes. While these battlefield weapons are smaller than strategic warheads, certain variants can pack a bigger punch than the bombs that flattened Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.Russia said the drills, which took place near the border with Ukraine, were a response to "provocative statements and threats of certain Western officials regarding the Russian Federation."The escalatory move highlights a diplomatic tension that the Biden administration has yet to address. While Ukraine and the U.S. have a strong shared interest in making Russia pay for its invasion, Washington's superseding goal is to prevent nuclear escalation by avoiding a direct conflict with Moscow. Ukraine, for its part, has every reason to drag the U.S. into a war that Kyiv views as existential.European states are stuck in the squishy middle. Europe has stronger incentives to back Ukraine to the hilt, hence why countries like France and Britain have floated plans for more direct involvement in the war. But any sudden move would naturally implicate their most powerful ally, the United States, which has strongly discouraged any efforts to drag NATO into the conflict.The West has largely papered over these divisions by insisting that it will continue to back Ukraine "as long as it takes." But, as Kyiv's battlefield position worsens, that approach could have an expiration date.In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— Ukraine could enter formal talks to join the European Union by the end of June, according to Politico. The main obstacle to this step is Hungary, which has long been skeptical of bringing Ukraine into the bloc, in part due to controversies surrounding Hungarian minorities in the country. But, with Budapest taking over the rotating presidency of the European Council in July, some diplomats speculate that Hungarian officials would rather get the issue out of the way as soon as possible, especially given that there will be plenty of future opportunities to derail Kyiv's accession in the coming years.Ukraine's larger and longer-term impediment will be bringing its political system in line with the standards for EU membership, which will require efforts to root out corruption and strengthen democratic systems in the country.— Last Friday, the EU moved to ban four Russian media outlets that the bloc described as "essential and instrumental in bringing forward and supporting Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine," according to Reuters. The decision to block the Russian-language outlets followed a previous move to ban Russia Today and Sputnik, both of which have broadcasts in English. The Kremlin pledged to "respond with lightning speed and extremely painfully for the Westerners" without revealing exactly what that means.— In this week's edition of "who's mad at France," American and European officials fumed over French President Emmanuel Macron's decision to invite a Russian representative to D-Day commemorations next month, according to Politico. "Perhaps this will remind the Russians that they actually fought real Nazis once, not imaginary ones in Ukraine," an anonymous U.S. official told Politico. The event will provide a rare scene: Biden, Macron, and even Zelensky will stand side-by-side with a Russian official for one of the first times since Russia's 2022 invasion.— In part deux of "who's mad at France," Zelensky chided Macron for suggesting a worldwide truce during the Paris Olympics this summer, according to Agence France Presse. "Let's be honest... Emmanuel, I don't believe it," the Ukrainian leader said. "We are against any truce that plays into the hands of the enemy." Chinese leader Xi Jinping threw his support behind the idea, but Putin has yet to say if he would endorse a truce.— Ukraine is now offering parole to prisoners who sign up to fight Russia, with the exception of those convicted for particularly serious offenses, according to Reuters. Ukrainian officials say the decision could allow as many as 20,000 prisoners to join the war effort, providing a much-needed boost in manpower as the war drags on. Russia has faced harsh international criticism for its own policy of granting clemency to inmates who join the war on Moscow's side, a policy that has given the Kremlin more than 50,000 extra soldiers.U.S. State Department news:In a Monday press conference, State Department spokesperson denied that the U.S. is using a double standard for International Criminal Court cases against Russian and Israeli officials. "There is a fundamental difference here and it's that Israel said they were going to cooperate with the investigation. Russia did not," Miller said. "Israel said they were going to cooperate with the investigation, talk to them about the charges that they were preparing to bring. And the ICC short-circuited that cooperation by bringing these charges."
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If there is a "Chekhov's gun" in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, it consists of circa $300 billion worth of central bank assets sitting in the coffers of the U.S. and (more so) its close allies. Frozen at the outset of Moscow's invasion, the money represents both the object of the strongest sanctions taken so far against a state outside of a UN-authorized regime, and, at the same time, the possible target for even more dramatic further escalatory measures.The question at the moment is whether G7 states will make the crucial transition from "freezing" to "seizing" – i.e., liquidate the funds and then reallocate them to assist Ukraine. The issue has gathered urgency amidst flagging support in the U.S. and in Europe for continuing to expend funds on shoring up Ukraine's struggling defenses.At home in the U.S., the bipartisan REPO Act endorsed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would empower the President to "confiscate ... Russian sovereign assets'' and to then deposit them into a "Ukraine Support Fund" that would aid in reconstruction, recovery, and the "welfare of the Ukrainian people." Those goals, if vague, are hardly objectionable. But using seized sovereign assets to promote them is, as a matter of law, untested and problematic. As a matter of economic statecraft, meanwhile, it is still more inadvisable, for several reasons. These include the significant risk of alienating allies, further discrediting U.S. "dollar power", boosting China's prestige and its own "yuanization" aims, and endangering U.S. assets abroad.Piercing the Veil of SovereigntyThe legal objections are quite simple to summarize. The norm of sovereign immunity is one of the most well-established customs in international law. In the eyes of many experts, it is precisely the firmness of this bedrock principle that has allowed exceptions, such as litigation for commercial disputes involving states, to become reliable.The rule is reflected in the law of countries around the world, including in the U.S.'s own Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. China, notably, has only as of this year finally implemented legislation for immunity that clearly separates commerce from matters of state, putting foreign businesses and investors on equal footing as litigants — which should be seen as a victory for U.S. interests in its market.Despite immunity's inarguable applicability to central banks, advocates of asset seizure have pointed to the custom of "countermeasures'' to justify their project. These are illegal acts taken by states injured by a previous wrong of another state, and intended only to induce the latter to cease its misbehavior. Usually, only a directly injured party (here, Ukraine) can take such actions, but emerging arguments for "collective countermeasures"would extend the field of retaliators for some core wrongs to include any state in the global community.Experts critical of asset seizure have pointed out, however, that doctrinal support is lacking. As Vanderbilt Law School's Ingrid (Wuerth) Brunk rightly summarizes: "There is little or no state practice on countermeasures for reparations ... There is little practice of third-party countermeasures, little or no practice of countermeasures used to deny immunity, and no practice that provides clear support for denying central bank immunity as a countermeasure."Meanwhile, given that most of the funds currently lie in special accounts at the financial services company Euroclear, any repercussions would also be primarily borne not by Washington, but rather by its European allies. That fact has prompted considerable opposition to the initiative among European policymakers, despite their willingness to join earlier rounds of sanctions. After all, Europe's leaders are, in effect, being deputized to carry out a policy of financial warfare whose costs they will have to bear right along with that policy's targets.First of all, the precedent of a geopolitically-motivated confiscation could threaten the euro's hard-won status as the world's second reserve currency. The euro's attractiveness has been based on numerous ingredients, obviously including Europe's economic productivity, stability, and growth potential; however, its apparent security for asset-holders as compared with the more thoroughly weaponized U.S. financial system is also a key factor. And then there is, of course, European states' relatively far greater vulnerability than Washington in the case of any escalations of the broader NATO-Russia conflict.It is understandable why the EU has so far balked on agreement to a plan of outright confiscation of Russian funds. It has, instead, begun to implement a much more moderate approach of reallocating to Kyiv the sizable interest payments being generated by the frozen assets. However, the G7 is still due to discuss the proposal for seizure at its next meeting. The Biden administration, along with Canada and Japan, remain strong backers of this idea.A Financial Coalition of the Willing?Debates are intensifying. For example, when Swiss lawmakers discussed reparations involvement this month, the motions were adopted in the Senate by 21 votes to 19, with three abstentions. Some senators worried about "weakening" international law protections, which "exist to protect small states." Those misgivings are still more widely shared beyond Europe, of course, as large swathes of the Global South know precisely how vulnerable they can already be to Western sanctions. A dubious new practice of asset confiscation would make U.S. dollar power, already a subject of widespread discontent, even more unpalatable.If the G7 financial offensive provokes as much backlash as it seems poised to, could China stand to benefit? Certainly, Beijing is likely to reap diplomatic dividends from perceptions that Western financial warfare has become too extreme. Xi Jinping's Party center has emphasized portraying China as a law-abiding global power, especially by embracing UN institutions (where it, of course, exerts great influence at little cost). The contrast with a G7 maneuvering around the UN at every turn makes a potent impression in the Global South.A separate question is whether China's vision of a "de-dollarized" world could receive a boost from Western confiscation efforts. Certainly, Beijing has long sought to increase the yuan's share of global foreign currency reserves and cross-border usage, and has made some recent progress. The RMB would indeed become more attractive as dollar and euro accounts began to look ever more vulnerable to seizure.But it has a long way to go. Currently, the yuan is only the fifth global reserve currency, still narrowly trailing the yen and the pound. It is also limited by domestic economic issues and, especially China's strict capital controls and heavily managed exchange rates. As a recent article produced for a PRC Ministry of Education research project phrased it, given all of the current obstacles to international use of the RMB, even for Russia itself, "de-dollarization cannot be a complete renminbization."Still, intensified weaponization of Western currencies could indeed boost China's yuan efforts, and, more significantly, provide a major stimulus to plans for a BRICS basket reserve currency. The move would simultaneously improve Beijing's reputation as an apparently more responsible actor with respect to foreign assets, while also perversely incentivizing it to further experiment with its own nascent unilateral sanctions regime.A managed process of de-dollarization with cross-bloc participation could be a good thing, but a chaotic transition triggered by Western hubris, provoking similar ventures by great power rivals, would not be. Like the "coalition of the willing" that supported the illegal Iraq War in 2003, arguably helping to normalize behaviors like those of Russia today, the coalition now aligning for ever-escalating financial warfare may ultimately weaken international law protections for everyone, not only their intended targets. It is time to put a freeze on the transition to seizure.
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Haiti's deepening crisis — armed groups launching an assault on the government, and the de facto prime minister on indefinite layover in the San Juan, Puerto Rico airport — is a predictable consequence of 14 years of U.S. support for undemocratic regimes connected to Haiti's PHTK party as it has dismantled Haiti's democracy. Haiti has a chance at reversing this descent and returning to a more stable, democratic path, but only if the Biden administration will let it.Prime Minister Ariel Henry was stranded in San Juan Tuesday on his way back from Kenya, where he had signed an agreement for Kenyan police to come bolster his repressive, corrupt and unpopular regime. The armed groups, including many that had collaborated with Henry's regime, took advantage of his absence to attack government infrastructure, and free 5,000 prisoners, many of them members of armed groups. Henry had planned to fly to the neighboring Dominican Republic and take a helicopter ride back to Haiti's National Palace under the cover of darkness. But Dominican authorities refused entry to the prime minister's chartered plane, which re-routed to San Juan.Prime Minister Henry has not yet resigned, and the State Department denied reports that it demanded his resignation. But Henry has clearly lost the support of the United States, which for two years had allowed him to resist Haitians demands for fair elections. Absent Washington's support, Henry has little chance of regaining power. This dire situation is not only predictable, it was predicted. Haitian-American officials, Haitian civil society, members of the U.S. Congress, and other experts had been warning for years that the U.S. propping up Henry would lead to increasing tragedy for Haitians. The United States, which installed Henry in power in the first place, ignored these pleas and stood resolutely by its friend. With U.S. support, Henry's unconstitutional term as prime minister exceeded any other prime minister's term under Haiti's 1987 Constitution. Levels of gang violence, kidnapping, hunger, and misery also reached unprecedented levels.The United States is still insisting on getting Kenyan troops to Haiti. The State Department has persistently — if so far unsuccessfully — tried to deploy non-American boots onto Haitian ground since Henry requested them in October 2022. The mission's deployment initially stalled because it was widely rejected as a bad idea that will primarily serve to prop up the repressive regime that generated the crisis. Haitian civil society repeatedly insisted that the first step towards security must be a transitional government with the legitimacy to organize elections and determine how the international community can best help Haiti.Concerns that the intervention would serve only to reinforce an unpopular regime led the countries that the Biden administration first tapped to lead the mission, including Canada, Haiti's Caribbean neighbors, and Brazil, to pass. The U.N. itself concluded that the mission would require too much "robust use of force" to be appropriate for a peacekeeping mission. So, the Security Council took the unusual step of authorizing the mission, but on the condition that it not actually be a U.N. mission that the organization would have to take responsibility for. The Biden administration, likely concerned about election-year cell phone videos of troops shooting indiscriminately in crowded neighborhoods — as the last foreign intervention did — declined to send U.S. troops for the mission (but is considering deploying a small Marine contingent to Haiti in early March).Last August Kenya — which did not even have diplomatic relations with Haiti but did need the hundreds of millions of dollars that the United States offered — agreed to lead the mission. The exploratory delegation Kenya sent to evaluate conditions in Haiti quickly realized how deadly the planned mission would be for Haitians and Kenyans alike, and proposed to limit its scope to protecting public infrastructure.The United States was not open to renegotiating the deal, and Kenya withdrew its proposed limits. But Kenya's High Court temporarily blocked the deployment as unconstitutional. Ariel Henry's visit to Kenya was for the signature of an accord that Kenya's President William Ruto hoped would overcome the court's objections. Kenyan lawyers insist that the agreement itself is illegal, and are continuing their challenge. In the meantime, Kenyan officers who had volunteered for the mission are changing their minds. Another obstacle appeared on March 7, when the White House conceded that the mission cannot be deployed without congressional approval of funding.The State Department's insistence that the Kenyan deployment must nevertheless happen raises fears that the United States will also continue its policy of installing and propping up undemocratic regimes in Haiti. Finance Minister Patrick Boisvert, who Henry tapped as interim prime minister when he left for Kenya, increased concerns of authoritarian governance on March 6 when he declared a three-day curfew and state of emergency throughout the Port-au-Prince region in an edict that did not even mention the legal basis for his authority. The next day Boisvert raised more fears by extending the emergency measures for a month and adding in a ban on all protests.The State Department's rescinding its support for Henry might have been promising had the gangs not already made his ouster inevitable. State's claim that it now supports "an empowered and inclusive governance structure" that will "pave the way for free and fair elections" might have been promising if it had not added the condition that the new government must "move with urgency to help the country prepare for a multinational security support mission."A legitimate, broadly supported, sovereign transitional Haitian government might request foreign police assistance. But a government allowed to form only if it accepts a U.S.-imposed occupation force originally designed to prop up a hated, repressive government is not sovereign. It may not be legitimate or broadly-supported either.The United States tasked CARICOM, the federation of Haiti's Caribbean neighbors, to forge a civil society consensus. CARICOM has enjoyed credibility in Haiti in the past, but over the past few months it has faced criticism for trying to strong-arm civil society into an agreement that maintained Henry's power. Not surprisingly, CARICOM-led talks on March 6 and 7 failed.When allowed, Haitians have a history of coming together to make their way out of a crisis. Haiti became a country in 1804 by defeating Napoleon, with almost no outside help. In 1986, when the U.S. finally withdrew its support from Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, Haitians eventually wrested power from the military and held fair elections. In 2006, they voted their way out of the crisis created by the U.S. kidnapping of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide two years before. In August 2021, shortly after the killing of Haiti's last president, Jovenel Moïse, a broad-based group presented the Montana Accord that would have created a transitional government leading to elections in two years. The U.S. vetoed the accord, citing, among other reasons, that the two-year time frame was too long. That was 30 months ago, and there are no elections in sight.No amount of submission to U.S. demands by Prime Minister Henry and his predecessors can justify the absolute horror that our support has allowed them to inflict on the Haitian people. It is time for the United States to let Haitians come together and make their way out of the current crisis. Civil society sees an opportunity for democracy in the crisis, and people all over Haiti have been meeting, discussing and negotiating to develop platforms for a broad-based, legitimate transitional government that can hold fair elections. It is expected that soon — maybe within weeks — one of these platforms will rise to the top, and civil society will coalesce around it. The United States needs to let that process happen without interference or conditions.
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The Biden administration is wrestling for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — or so it claims. President Joe Biden has insisted that the war in Gaza must end with a pathway to Palestinian independence, a proposal Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has loudly rejected. Arab governments have tried to sweeten the deal, by offering to normalize relations with Israel in exchange for "irreversible" steps towards a Palestinian state.There's one irreversible step Biden could take with or without a deal: granting the Palestinian Authority diplomatic recognition. Experts say that the U.S. president has the power to recognize the State of Palestine, with immediate legal effects, and would most likely be able to push the United Nations to recognize Palestine as well. The president would not need permission from Congress or Israel, despite the fact that Israeli troops remain in control of most Palestinian territory."Even if the exact borders haven't been defined, Israel was recognized as a state without defined borders, so it's not an insurmountable obstacle," said Khaled Elgindy, former adviser to Palestinian negotiators and current head of the Program on Palestine and Israeli-Palestinian Affairs at the Middle East Institute in Washington.Biden is unlikely to make such a drastic move. His administration has opposed steps as basic as a ceasefire in Gaza, while running past Congress to flood Israel with generous military assistance, including ammunition refills and targeting support. Although Biden administration officials have portrayed themselves as helpless bystanders to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, trying their best to create the conditions for a solution, experts and former officials say that the administration has a variety of tools it has so far chosen not to use — both diplomatic recognition and other moves short of it."On the ground in Palestine," recognition of a Palestinian state "would not change too much," argued human rights lawyer Zaha Hassan, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "It would likely change how third states deal with the issues following on the U.S. lead, however."U.S. State Department official Josh Paul had resigned from his post last October over concerns that the "expanded and expedited provision of lethal arms to Israel...would only lead to more and deeper suffering for both the Israeli and the Palestinian people." In an essay published by the Los Angeles Times last month, Paul called on the Biden administration to recognize Palestine and endorse Palestinian statehood at the UN Security Council as the "first step" to a new peace process.The United States previously blocked the Palestinian Authority's bid for full UN membership in 2014. (It currently has a non-voting, observer seat.) Paul told Responsible Statecraft that no permanent member of the Security Council "would veto a U.S.-supported candidacy for Palestine."Everything from water rights to the use of radio waves and airspace over Israel and Palestine "would become negotiations between two equal parties rather than concessions from the occupier to the occupied," Paul said. "For many of these there are international arbitration fora that exist that would suddenly apply."Making Palestine a full member of the United Nations would render Israel "a state engaged in aggression against another member state" under the UN Charter, said Hassan, the lawyer. That could have immediate effects under American law. The Arms Export Control Act, which regulates American weapons sales and military aid, requires foreign buyers to use American-made weapons for "legitimate self-defense" in line with the UN Charter.After the Israeli air force bombed an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, the Reagan administration temporarily suspended fighter jet shipments to Israel on the grounds that Israel had exceeded the limits of self-defense. If Palestine were recognized as a separate country from Israel, similar calculations may come into play.However, it "really depends on the parameters of that recognition decision and what Israeli action we're talking about," said former State Department lawyer Brian Finucane, now a Crisis Group adviser. The United States could interpret Palestine's borders and Israel's right to self-defense in a way that continues to allow for broad Israeli military action.Another immediate impact of recognition would be allowing Palestine to open an embassy in America. Previously, Palestinian diplomats were based in the Palestine Liberation Organization offices in Washington, which the Trump administration shut down in 2018. If Palestine were a state, it could open an embassy protected by international law."However, Palestine might not want to do that unless the president also stops treating the PLO/PA officials as terrorists," said Hassan. The administration could waive immigration restrictions on Palestinian officials, but those officials may still be on the hook for civil lawsuits over violence against Israelis, due to the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act, passed by Congress in 2018.On top of the terrorism sanctions, any future U.S. administration could de-recognize the Palestinian government, warned Finucane, so "you need some kind of political consensus supporting" Palestinian independence to make it last. From the 1990s onwards, U.S. policy has been to support a Palestinian state as the end result of negotiations, not beforehand."It would almost certainly create a crisis in the bilateral relationship with Israel, which is the fundamental reason why it wouldn't happen," said Elgindy, the former adviser.However, Elgindy insisted that there are measures short of recognition that the Biden administration could take. Biden has so far imposed visa bans on Israeli settler vigilantes who commit violence against Palestinian civilians. He could push more serious economic sanctions against the settlements. Elgindy pointed out that several American charities funnel money to the settlements, and Biden could easily revoke their tax-exempt status. Several New York state legislators are pushing for that measure.Biden has also declined to reverse some of the Trump administration's moves entrenching Israeli legal control over the Palestinian territories. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had issued a memo declaring that Israeli settlements are not "per se inconsistent with international law," and ordered U.S. customs authorities to label settlement products "made in Israel." Biden's State Department has not reversed either decision.U.S. military aid to Israel is often cited by critics as another point of leverage that the United States refuses to use. Congress currently budgets around $3 billion a year in aid to Israel and is considering $14.5 billion in additional aid this year. There are signs Biden would have a willing partner in Congress if he decided to restrict that aid. Almost every single Democrat in the Senate has signed on to an amendment that would add endorsement of a two-state solution to the military aid package."Step One is the realization that there isn't a military solution to this, and that only addressing the political dimension is going to resolve that. Right now, they're doing both. They're saying there is a military solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, but we also want to have a diplomatic solution. You can't really do both. It doesn't make any sense," Elgindy said. "Maybe they think that they mean it, but in reality, they are creating the conditions that make a diplomatic settlement almost impossible."Faced with the tradeoff between military and diplomatic measures, Biden is committed to continuing the Israeli war."You cannot say there's no Palestinian state at all in the future. And that's going to be the hard part," Biden said at a December campaign event. "But in the meantime, we're not going to do a damn thing other than protect Israel in the process. Not a single thing."
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The Israeli incursion into Gaza has begun though we do not know yet how full or advanced it will become. But it is reminding us already that war, especially urban combat, is indeed hell.So what will this ground invasion actually look like on a tactical level? Gaza proper is roughly 25 miles long and on average 5.5 miles wide. This is a tiny amount of space in which to conduct a large-scale military operation. Most modern artillery can almost shoot the length of Gaza. Most modern anti-tank missiles can shoot half its width. Israeli F-16s can fly the length of the strip in under three minutes and will find it necessary to be in a constant turn to maintain position over Gaza City. To make the range issue worse is the urban nature of the battlefield. While it might only be around five miles wide, it's highly unlikely that you have line of sight that far due to man-made obstacles — better known as buildings. What this means is no one has superior range. If you can see it, it's in range. If it's in range, so are you.The majority of this space in fact is covered in buildings — shops, offices, schools, hospitals, and residences. Each one provides cover and concealment for fighters. The structures also create natural channels funneling attacking forces into pre-designated fire zones for ambushes or over top of improvised explosive devices. Israeli armor can't conduct maneuver warfare on this battlefield. Armor will be sitting ducks without infantry support. Infantry are vulnerable to everything. The Israelis will take losses, and already have, according to the New York Times on Wednesday. Urban areas pose difficult tactical problems. Fortified urban areas are worse. Over the past decade Hamas has developed a labyrinth of tunnels that are fortified and connected literally across the entirety of the strip, and especially heavy in Gaza City. They use these underground structures for command and control, movement, logistics, shelter, and as a way to "out flank" and ambush an enemy. Fortified urban areas with significant population density pose the biggest challenges. The majority of combat will take place in Gaza city proper which has a greater population density than New York, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia or San Francisco. There are over two million people living in an area roughly twice the size of Washington D.C. This means civilians, or non-combatants, are everywhere. Even if half the population has moved south it will still cause the Israelis immense targeting problems. In addition, the densely populated area compounds the Israeli problem of target identification. Hamas intentionally blends in with the civilian population. The bottom line for the battlefield is that it helps Hamas and hinders the Israelis. In urban warfare, the defender, in this case Hamas, has the advantage. An advantage that can be mitigated if the attacker has overwhelming firepower, and the will to use it. How Hamas will fightHamas will use the urban terrain to cause excessive Israeli casualties while forcing them to injure civilians to limit those casualties. They will make every block a fortress and every street corner an ambush site. By using the "subterranean flank" they will pop out of tunnels and hiding places in buildings to shoot at Israeli vehicles with missiles, launch grenades, or even throw Molotov cocktails.While they may not be using Javelin anti-tank weapons (although the threat of Hamas having those weapons shouldn't be dismissed, given what may have been captured or "lost" in Ukraine), their weapons will be more than sufficient to at least disable a tank and cause casualties. The short ranges decrease Israeli reaction time and increase lethality. Hamas fighters are commingled with the civilian population most likely both intentionally and unintentionally, and will take full advantage of that. They know the world watches what the Israelis do and are counting on pressure to make them stop. Again, they see this war as existential, so they will use any and all means to win. How the Israelis will fightFirst, Israelis must find the Hamas fighters, then engage them in their fortified positions.They must do this without taking unreasonable casualties, all the while trying not to kill civilians. To find Hamas fighters the Israelis will use a variety of sources. They will have already scanned the electromagnetic spectrum for everything from cell phones, computers, to radios looking for an electronic signature to identify a potential target. They will pour over social media for anything identifiable.They will use drones, manned aircraft, and human reconnaissance teams to confirm and verify what they think they know. They will do all this and more to listen, collect, and build a targeting picture of command centers, logistics sites, artillery positions, and order of battle — who is who, who has what, and where it is. This process is called intelligence preparation of the battlefield. This is what the Israelis have been doing — in truth some of their targets were most likely derived long before Hamas attacked just as most certainly Hamas had/has a robust target list of Israeli targets — since the start of hostilities. The ground incursion of course changes this process. With Israeli tanks and infantry "closing" with the enemy, finding and subsequently engaging Hamas fighters will most likely devolve into merely returning fire — often with zero time to figure out how to limit civilian casualties. It's one thing to take a breath and disengage in sparse open terrain, it's another thing to figure out who is shooting at you.Once located, the Israelis have a host of options to engage the Hamas fighters. But it's not a simple task of deciding what weapon is best to use. They have to measure what they do by three metrics: 1) does it achieve the desired effect on the enemy? 2) Can they accomplish the task without losing too many Israeli soldiers? 3) Can they limit civilian casualties, which in excess can be a war loser for Israel? If civilian casualties weren't a concern, the Israelis would use their massive firepower to destroy any and all Hamas targets or potential targets. They have the potential to literally level Gaza City using 2,000-pound satellite guided bombs with delayed fuses to smash the known tunnel complexes or at least seal them for eternity. This would meet the goal of destroying Hamas and limiting Israeli losses. But in reality this approach would cause unacceptable civilian casualties. The inverse would be to advance for a close quarter battle that seeks a more "surgical" path. In a close quarter battle, you do nothing to mitigate the defender's advantage in urban warfare and you take losses — lots and lots of losses. Storming a building can be like storming a trench. We have seen what that is like in Ukraine. So how will the Israelis fight? Their best option for destroying Hamas (which is the first priority), managing their own losses (second priority), and limiting civilian casualties (last priority), will be to strike hard when they have known, verified targets, advance to make contact with the enemy, then choose the weapon to engage. Moving slowly, deliberately, a block at a time.This is why the prime minister said it would be a long war. This grinds Hamas down through attrition and loss of supply. The longer it takes, the more food, water, and fuel Hamas uses with no hope of real re-supply. The Israelis proclaim this war is existential. They will keep that consideration as they manage the tension of their losses and civilian casualties. Some suggest this will look like the battle for Fallujah between U.S. forces and Iraqi insurgents. Perhaps. But I suggest it will be more like Stalingrad or Berlin. Like in those battles, both sides see the war as existential and will conduct themselves accordingly. One thing is for certain, for the populations on both sides, this war is truly hell.