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The most important legal instrument of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations __ the ASEAN Charter __ entered into force on December 15, 2008 and bestowed a legal personality for this regional organization. The ASEAN Charter has given root to a new ASEAN. In this original framework, the ASEAN meetings of 2009 and in particular the October 23-25, 2009, ASEAN Summit hosted in Thailand were conceived to herald a new phase in ASEAN's life. By their results, the 2009 ASEAN Summits will have a special place in the history of this regional institution because they managed to consider in a constructive way and to find workable solutions on how to give tangibility to three communities: "A Community of Action"; "A Community of Connectivity"; "A Community of Peoples". This article contains an analysis from a diplomatic perspective of the most significant documents adopted at the ASEAN Leaders' level. A fundamental question is: can ASEAN successfully cope with future predictable and unpredictable challenges (global or regional)? In this regard, is ASEAN able and equipped to take the lead in genuine institution building in the East Asia region? The general conclusion is that ASEAN can play a more important role in its area and at global level, only if its members cooperate more closely in all fields.

In the early 15th through 13th centuries BCE, the world of the Near East, from the Mediterranean to modern day Iran, was linked together in what historians today call the First International Age. Correspondence from that period found at El Amarna in Egypt and other sites in Mesopotamia and Anatolia details the diplomatic and economic exchanges between the "Great Powers" of the time (Babylon, Assyria, Mittani, Hatti, and Egypt), and contains letters from the Egyptian vassal kingdoms in the Levant, known as Canaan. The complex diplomatic interchanges and active economic trade during this period were possible because of the status of Canaan as a series of semi-autonomous vassal states under the Egyptian empire. Canaan acted as the economic center for the entire region, linking the goods and kingdoms of southwest Asia, Africa, and southeastern Europe into a single trading system. Though under the nominal control of Egypt, Canaan served as neutral territory for all the powers, enabling complex political and diplomatic interchange throughout the region. This paper explores the conditions within Canaan that allowed this system of exchange to flourish, and will show that a number of military, political, and cultural factors in Canaan, which were cultivated by the Egyptians, allowed the region to act as an international territory facilitating trade and political interaction between the Great Powers.

In den vergangenen Jahren hat ein Wettlauf um Einflusszonen in Südostasien eingesetzt, in den auch China und die USA involviert sind. Ausdruck dafür ist der von Obama verkündete "Pivot to Asia", die Hinwendung der USA nach Asien. (APuZ)

Hanois Streben nach Äquidistanz zu Moskau und Peking, Vietnams Abhängigkeit von sowjetischer Hilfe: eine Quelle von Spannungen. Hanois Bemühen um eine Eingrenzung des sowjetischen Einflusses in den indonesischen Staaten. Vietnamesisches Mißtrauen gegenüber dem sino-sowjetischen Annäherungsprozeß. Einstellung der ASEAN-Staaten der UdSSR gegenüber vor und nach 1978. Birmas Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion seit 1948. (DÜI-Sen)

Asia's regional architecture : a historical-institutional perspective -- Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the making of an alliance consensus -- Change and continuity : 1989-1997 -- Rising regionalism : 1997-2007 -- Complex patchwork : 2008-2016 -- Regional order and governance -- Conclusion : theory, policy, and the relevance of historical institutionalism and Asia

Recent studies of ASEAN have focused on why ASEAN community building has emphasised liberal norms such as human rights, democracy promotion and a commitment to wider participation while maintaining a set of sovereignty-preserving regional principles – the ASEAN Way norms – that have been more suited to securing illiberal agendas and the authoritarian practices of state elites. ASEAN's seeming progressive turn is argued to be instrumentally aimed at buttressing the legitimacy of the grouping as a credible regional institution in international society in which these norms are widely accepted though not uncontested. With recent developments suggesting further consolidation of, or a return to, authoritarian tendencies across the region, state-based modes of governance may become more limited in terms of what ASEAN member states are prepared to endorse. It is, therefore, time for scholars to expand analysis to explore how transnational issues and problems may be functionally governed outside of formal regional institutions involving non-state actors in key roles. While the turn to privately generated standards, rules and practices in global governance is well-recognised and researched, the disparate studies on private governance in South-East Asia are rarely cumulated into a more coherent research programme that addresses the effectiveness of private governance as well as its normative implications. These questions point to a promising agenda for research on regional and other transnational modes of governance in South-East Asia. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

Suh Jaemahn: An overview of Korean-Jordanian relations. - S. 23-34. Rew Joung Yole: Regional system and developing nations: the case of Korea. - S. 35-43. Braizat, Musa S.: Jordan's regional role: balancing change with stability. - S. 45-72. Park Byung-ho: The causes and effects of the rapid growth of Korean exports (1962-1977). - S. 75-88. Ahmad, Ahmad Qassem El-: Encouragement of investment laws in Jordan since 1955. - S. 89-110. Zu'bi, Bashir Al- ; Kasasbeh, Hamad: Jordan's economy: challenges and opportunities. - S. 113-138. Tealakh, Gali Oda: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Republic of Korea cooperation in Central Asia. Prospects and potentialities. - S. 139-160. Shim Ui-sup: New international economic cooperation strategies of Korea and Jordan for the Islamic frontier countries in Central Asia. - S. 161-173

Der Autor vermittelt einen kurzen Überblick über die Entwicklung der von der United National Party-Regierung Sri Lankas seit 1977 verfolgten Außen- und Außenwirtschaftspolitik, wobei Haltung und Aktivitäten Sri Lankas bzgl. Fragen der internationalen Beziehungen sowie die Regionalpolitik Sri Lankas behandelt werden. (BIOst-Klk)

A new dawn is emerging in the regional order of the Indo-Pacific, with Japan playing a central role in keeping the region focused on shared concerns. At the summit meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and President Biden in Washington DC this week, concerted efforts to demonstrate the depth and breadth of partnership between Japan and the United States was on full display that went well beyond pageantry. But amid concerted efforts to expand the networks of security partnerships across the region, prospects for enhancing the latticework of economic ties continue to lag behind. The good news is that trade relations are no longer the source of heightened tension as in the decades past. Instead, shared concerns about the China challenge have emerged as a driving force for greater strategic economic cooperation. Wariness of Chinese economic coercion and Beijing's abuse of advanced technologies have become the driving force for greater cooperation on technology development. The latest development in bilateral economic partnership also brings much-needed capital as well as political buy-in to ensure sustained commitment to industries that will be key for future growth as well as security. Certainly, the excitement over new investments between the United States and Japan to bolster advanced technology cooperation is palpable, as are the initiatives to build up the workforce in emerging industries. Microsoft's decision to invest $2.9 billion in Japanese AI and cloud infrastructure as well as workforce training is expected to jump-start Japanese spending in those critical sectors. Moreover, the announcement of new AI research partnerships between major US universities through funding from a consortium of Japanese companies, as well as NVIDIA, Amazon, Arm, and Microsoft, are expected to stimulate greater dynamism and innovation in Japanese universities in applied technologies. Yet, the divide between the flourishing of security partnerships to enhance the defense of the Indo-Pacific and efforts to bolster greater prosperity in the region continues to grow. The latest summit meeting has laid the foundation for the two countries to coordinate efforts to expand security networks across the region. Including Japan in the second pillar of AUKUS together with Australia and the UK to further joint defense capabilities adds to Tokyo's efforts to shift its military export policy in recent months. Moreover, the first trilateral summit between the United States, Japan, and the Philippines that immediately followed the Biden-Kishida meeting is enhancing coordinated defense posture in the South China Sea, which in turn will supplement US-Japan-ROK efforts against the North Korea threat. Efforts to enhance the latticework to deter China as well as North Korea and Russia are expected to deepen moving forward. When it comes to economic coordination, however, there is yet no clear shared vision of what success would mean, especially when it comes to enticing the Global South. Japan and the United States may not see eye to eye when it comes to dealing with China as an economic challenge, but they are aligned when it comes to promoting innovation, establishing rules of new technologies, and protecting the rules-based economic order. For South and Southeast Asia, however, there is no clear gain for closer US-Japan ties on developing advanced technologies, nor even from preventing Chinese acquisition of such developments. Rather, their focus remains to secure investments as well as opportunities to go up the value chain and to avert the middle income trap. The launch of the Luzon Economic Corridor to connect Subic Bay, Clark, Bantangas, and Manila as the first project under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment is promising for the Philippines, given its focus on developing transportation projects including civilian port upgrades and investing in semiconductor manufacturing capabilities in the country. Its success will be vital, especially given that over half of Southeast Asians surveyed by Singaporean think tank ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute would choose China over the United States should they need to pick a side. The China challenge has spurred greater cooperation between Japan and the United States in developing pioneering technologies. But fear of Beijing alone is not the motivating factor. Rather, joint investment in critical technologies and harnessing the power of the private sector in particular will be a driving force in shaping the economic relationship between Tokyo and Washington moving forward. Similarly, wariness of China alone will not be enough to entice countries across the Indo-Pacific to be an integral part of the latticework that is emerging to act as a deterrence against Chinese aggressions. Ensuring the success of the Luzon initiative and replicating its model through partnerships between governments as well as the private sector will be vital to ensure that there is lasting support for the free and open Indo-Pacific vision that is now firmly a force unifier between the United States and Japan. The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the US Government or the Wilson Center. Copyright 2024, Indo-Pacific Program. All rights reserved.

A new dawn is emerging in the regional order of the Indo-Pacific, with Japan playing a central role in keeping the region focused on shared concerns. At the summit meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and President Biden in Washington DC this week, concerted efforts to demonstrate the depth and breadth of partnership between Japan and the United States was on full display that went well beyond pageantry. But amid concerted efforts to expand the networks of security partnerships across the region, prospects for enhancing the latticework of economic ties continue to lag behind. The good news is that trade relations are no longer the source of heightened tension as in the decades past. Instead, shared concerns about the China challenge have emerged as a driving force for greater strategic economic cooperation. Wariness of Chinese economic coercion and Beijing's abuse of advanced technologies have become the driving force for greater cooperation on technology development. The latest development in bilateral economic partnership also brings much-needed capital as well as political buy-in to ensure sustained commitment to industries that will be key for future growth as well as security. Certainly, the excitement over new investments between the United States and Japan to bolster advanced technology cooperation is palpable, as are the initiatives to build up the workforce in emerging industries. Microsoft's decision to invest $2.9 billion in Japanese AI and cloud infrastructure as well as workforce training is expected to jump-start Japanese spending in those critical sectors. Moreover, the announcement of new AI research partnerships between major US universities through funding from a consortium of Japanese companies, as well as NVIDIA, Amazon, Arm, and Microsoft, are expected to stimulate greater dynamism and innovation in Japanese universities in applied technologies. Yet, the divide between the flourishing of security partnerships to enhance the defense of the Indo-Pacific and efforts to bolster greater prosperity in the region continues to grow. The latest summit meeting has laid the foundation for the two countries to coordinate efforts to expand security networks across the region. Including Japan in the second pillar of AUKUS together with Australia and the UK to further joint defense capabilities adds to Tokyo's efforts to shift its military export policy in recent months. Moreover, the first trilateral summit between the United States, Japan, and the Philippines that immediately followed the Biden-Kishida meeting is enhancing coordinated defense posture in the South China Sea, which in turn will supplement US-Japan-ROK efforts against the North Korea threat. Efforts to enhance the latticework to deter China as well as North Korea and Russia are expected to deepen moving forward. When it comes to economic coordination, however, there is yet no clear shared vision of what success would mean, especially when it comes to enticing the Global South. Japan and the United States may not see eye to eye when it comes to dealing with China as an economic challenge, but they are aligned when it comes to promoting innovation, establishing rules of new technologies, and protecting the rules-based economic order. For South and Southeast Asia, however, there is no clear gain for closer US-Japan ties on developing advanced technologies, nor even from preventing Chinese acquisition of such developments. Rather, their focus remains to secure investments as well as opportunities to go up the value chain and to avert the middle income trap. The launch of the Luzon Economic Corridor to connect Subic Bay, Clark, Bantangas, and Manila as the first project under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment is promising for the Philippines, given its focus on developing transportation projects including civilian port upgrades and investing in semiconductor manufacturing capabilities in the country. Its success will be vital, especially given that over half of Southeast Asians surveyed by Singaporean think tank ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute would choose China over the United States should they need to pick a side. The China challenge has spurred greater cooperation between Japan and the United States in developing pioneering technologies. But fear of Beijing alone is not the motivating factor. Rather, joint investment in critical technologies and harnessing the power of the private sector in particular will be a driving force in shaping the economic relationship between Tokyo and Washington moving forward. Similarly, wariness of China alone will not be enough to entice countries across the Indo-Pacific to be an integral part of the latticework that is emerging to act as a deterrence against Chinese aggressions. Ensuring the success of the Luzon initiative and replicating its model through partnerships between governments as well as the private sector will be vital to ensure that there is lasting support for the free and open Indo-Pacific vision that is now firmly a force unifier between the United States and Japan. The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the US Government or the Wilson Center. Copyright 2024, Indo-Pacific Program. All rights reserved.

During a recent visit to my hometown and Australia's capital, Canberra, I couldn't help but notice the cavalcade of motorcades, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) flags and excitement in the air, as the leaders of ASEAN descended on Australia to celebrate the 50th anniversary of ASEAN-Australia Dialogue.The Summit was remarkable in many ways. It represented the strong relationship between ASEAN countries and Australia and shared values. At their closest points, Australia and ASEAN are just 90 miles apart. They share rich government, cultural and economic linkages.The Leaders' Vision Statement underscored the shared commitment for a rules-based regional order in the Indo-Pacific, underpinned by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This was a not-so-subtle response to many ASEAN members concerns with China's aggression in the South China Sea. It demonstrates the impressive trade ties between ASEAN and Australia, empowered by the Australia-New Zealand-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA). Australia's two-way trade between Australia and ASEAN is larger in nominal terms than in its two-way trade with the United States. However, it also underscored a significant structural challenge in the economic relationship. Australian investment in ASEAN represents under 3% of total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in ASEAN. Canada, a similar sized economy but geographically far removed, has over double Australia's stock of FDI in ASEAN.Australia and ASEAN: A Partnership for the FutureThe Summit was an opportunity to take stock of the important and growing relationship between Australia and ASEAN and to set its course for the next 50 years. There were a series of tangible outcomes to address the structural barriers to the relationship and strengthen ties for years to come. Chief among them was the announcement of an AU$2b (US$1.32b) Southeast Asia Financing Facility to boost Australian investment in clean energy and infrastructure across ASEAN. There were also a series of defense, intelligence and regional governance announcements that will further enhance ASEAN-Australia's relationship and shape the Indo-Pacific's security and economic architecture.While it remains to be seen if Australia's investors, powered by the world's 5th largest pool of pension funds, will be incentivized enough to increase their investment footprint in the region, the Summit was remarkable not only for Australia and ASEAN but the evolution of America's greatest diplomatic strength, its alliances. The US' Hub and Spoke Alliance Model The US National Defense strategy calls the US network of alliances its "greatest global strategic advantage".In the Indo-Pacific, the US' alliance network developed as a 'hub and spoke' model whereby its security (and to a lesser extent, economic) relationships are underpinned by bilateral treaties connecting the spokes (treaty partners) to the hub (the United States). The US' six regional bi-lateral security alliances include Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand. The US also has regional Free Trade Agreements with Australia, Korea, Singapore, and a Trade Agreement with Japan. Conspicuously, the US does not participate in any Indo-Pacific multi-lateral security alliances (like it does with NATO in Europe) or multi-lateral free trade agreements (like it does with Mexico and Canada in North America), nor do its formal alliances include growing regional heavyweights such as India and Indonesia.The hub and spoke model developed following World War II, represents a time where the US was the uncontested regional economic and security hegemon. As the world economy has grown since the Second World War, so too have the economic and security capabilities of the countries of the Indo-Pacific, relative to the US. In an era of increased contestability and limited resources, there are increasing calls for the hub and spoke model to evolve to encourage greater multilateralism and for the hubs to increase ties with one and other. Indeed, the US' Indo-Pacific Strategy reinforces this sentiment, seeking to "modernized long-standing alliances and…[increase] collective capacity" to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific.A Welcome EvolutionAs Washington focuses inward during an election year, the Australia-ASEAN Summit is a welcome milestone of the positive evolution of the hub and spoke alliance model. The Summit strengthens ties between hub and spoke partner, Australia and the Indo-Pacific's most important multilateral organization, ASEAN. It's an example of increasing collective capability in ways that the US cannot do bi-laterally. The outcomes at the Summit will advance the US' work to create a free and open Indo-Pacific without committing additional scarce US resources to the cause. Australia can operate in ways the US is currently unable to, including through multi-lateral trade agreements such as the the Australia-New Zealand-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. This will help ensure US interests are advanced in the region even in fora which it does not participate.The Australia-ASEAN Summit is just one of many ways the US alliance system is evolving in the Indo-Pacific. In recent years, the Australia-Japan Security Agreement, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and The American–Japanese–Korean trilateral pact are reflective of the evolution of the hub and spoke model to bring in additional partners such as India and strengthen ties between spoke countries.As the US hurdles towards one of its most contested elections in living memory that may fundamentally change the way it engages with the world, the evolution of the hub and spoke alliance model is not only most welcome, but also much needed.

As we move further and further into the twentieth century, the Western 'global governance' norm of interventionism is being challenged by East Asian norm of non-interference and territorial integrity. The two sets of norms are historically and philosophically rooted and have influential backers. Intriguingly, while the two approaches appear irreconcilable, some countries have lent their support to both sets of norms. As East Asia emerges as a major force in global relations can a way be found for the two sets of contrasting norms to exist side-by-side, perhaps each governing particular regional relations, or is it even possible that a compromise set of 'global' norms might be developed? (Pac Rev/GIGA)