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Argues that steps taken by the People's Republic of China to enforce controls on the export of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will have little effect because China's proliferation activities are part of the broader policy of using "strategic proxies" to hinder US engagement in Asia, especially the Taiwan Strait. China is unlikely to restrain arms control violations as long as it believes a US that is vulnerable to a WMD attack is not as apt to exercise military strength overseas. A look at the failure of such nonproliferation strategies as economic sanction threats, incentives, formal treaties, & bilateral agreements notes how China's approach to nonproliferation differs from that of the US. Other issues discussed include China's focus on returning Taiwan to the mainland; Chinese opposition to US interventionism in the Middle East & elsewhere; the cost-effectiveness of strategic proxies as a way to discourage American interventionism; & the need for the US & its allies to develop a more creative approach that isn't tailored to an earlier geopolitical environment. 1 Table. J. Lindroth

1: The Nuclear Weapon States 1. - 2: Seeking to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation: Baruch Plan, Atoms for Peace, IAEA 23. - 3: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origins and Evolution 45. - 4: Nuclear Test Bans to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 69. - 5: Seeking Control of Nuclear Weapons Materials 95. - 6: Geographical Denuclearization: Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones 113. - 7: "Proliferation in Reverse": Cooperative/Restraining Measures 133. - 8: Foregoing Nuclear Weapons: Then and Now 161. - 9: Assessing the Nonproliferation Regime 191

Drawn from presentations made at the Hoover Institution's October 2007 conference, this collection of essays examines the practical steps necessary to address the current security challenges of nuclear weapons and to move toward the Reykjavik goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons. The distinguished group of contributors includes former officials of the past six administrations—Republican and Democratic—along with senior scholar and scientific experts on nuclear issues

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In 2012, a 20-year moratorium on state employment of chemical weapons use was broken. Since then, there have been more than 200 uses, against civilians, military targets, and political enemies. These attacks have broken norms against the use of weapons of mass destruction and create a gap in the nonproliferation fabric that must be restored.

Nuclear Notes is a publication of the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) featuring innovative thinking by rising experts in the nuclear field. Its goal is to advance the public debate about nuclear weapons strategy, arms control, nonproliferation, disarmament, and other nuclear issues by providing a forum for sharing new analysis and insight.

"The mortal danger of nuclear weapons in unique in its terrifying potential for devastation on an unprecedented and unimaginable scale. In this book, Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby - each with more than forty years' experience in national security issues both in public and private capacities - review the main policy issues surrounding nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. They address the specific actions that the community of nations - with American leadership - should take to confront and turn back the nuclear danger that imperils humanity."

Examines issues confronting the 2005 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. The NPT's inability to become fully universal is seen as a major failing. This need for universality is linked to the need to retain states-parties as treaty members; the issue of withdrawal is considered in terms of Article X, and steps that can be taken to prevent it are offered. The NPT's lack of an automatic enforcement mechanism is then addressed, suggesting that rather than altering enforcement mechanisms, the conference would be better off working on when such enforcement is needed. Problems with Article VI are next considered with respect to the disarmament of nuclear weapon states. It is suggested that nuclear weapon states will likely focus on Article IV, which provides for an "inalienable right" to nuclear energy; suggestions for addressing weaknesses to the article are offered. Related to this are weaknesses in the outdated safeguards requirement Article III, while an emerging weakness is that the treaty was designed to deal with states only. Remaining unresolved from the outset is that the treaty did not provide legally binding negative security assurances; some options for acquiring such legally binding assurances are looked at. The 2005 NPT Conference should focus on the achievable; maintain the balance between core NPT bargains; and not look to reinterpret, negate, or withdraw from existing obligations.