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In this article, we propose a new approach to an old question: How does development affect religion-state relations? We argue that because development increases states' ability to effectively formulate and implement policy, it will be associated with greater state regulation of religion. This stands in contrast to predominant theories that examine development's negative impact on individual religiosity while largely overlooking the impact that development may have on state institutions. We test our theory using data drawn from over 160 countries, and demonstrate that the effect of economic development on state regulation of religion is consistently positive, substantively significant, and robust to alternative measurements and the inclusion of a broad range of controls. Statistical analysis also demonstrates that the correlation between development and state regulation of religion is primarily a result of economic development's impact on state capacity, rather than social dislocation or improved coordination by religious communities. Incorporating state capacity recasts the study of religious regulation—and suggests that economic growth is unlikely to take religion off the political agenda.

AbstractOne approach within theIslamic camp treatsIslam, which emphasizes overarching notions such as the 'Islamic brotherhood' and 'ummah', as incompatible with ethno‐nationalist ideas and movements. It is, however, striking that in the last decades, severalIslamic and conservative groups inTurkey have paid increasing attention to theKurdish issue, supporting their ethnic demands and sentiments. Even more striking, the leftist, secularKurdish ethno‐nationalists have adopted a more welcoming attitude towardIslam. How can we explain such intriguing developments and shifts? Using original data derived from several elite interviews and a public opinion survey, this study shows that the struggle forKurdish popular support and legitimacy has encouraged political elites from both camps to enrich their ideological toolbox by borrowing ideas and discourses from each other. Further,Turkish andKurdish nationalists alike utilizeIslamic discourses and ideas to legitimize their competing nationalist claims. Exploring such issues, the study also provides theoretical and policy implications.

Indonesia provides a fruitful case study of differences between radicalization processes in liberal and authoritarian regimes. Political Science hereby tends to emphasize regime type as the determinant of Islamist political strategy (radical, militant or moderate) and therefore as the main explanatory factor for radicalization processes. Although this is true of the role of Islamists in various Middle Eastern countries, where electoral participation has moderated political programs and strategies, it is of little relevance to Indonesia. The democratic opening in 1998 provided Islamists with new opportunities to participate in electoral politics, and even become co-opted by formally "secular" forces, but at the same time opened up spaces for militant, radical Islamist groups. Whereas radical Islam faced severe state repression under Suharto's New Order, we now find a highly ambiguous relationship between the state and radical Islamists, expressed in operational terms as a parallelism of repression and cooptation. This article tries to make sense of the relationship between the post-authoritarian state and radical Islam in Indonesia by transcending the institution-centered understanding of the role of Islam through an examination of the configurations of social forces that have determined the shape, scope, and practices of radical Islam within Indonesia's new experiment with democracy. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis article claims that the revolutions in the Arab world foster insight into more than the spread of liberalism. Fukuyama's end of history has not just reached the Muslim world faster than expected. These revolutions show that strong religion and liberal democracy are compatible: they are postsecular revolutions. As already the revolutions of 1989 proved in some respect, in contrast to the secular ideals of the French Revolution, revolution and religion can go hand in hand in a postsecular way. Praying and making revolution does not need to end in a religious autocracy as 1979 in Iran. Religious citizens stood up praying for democracy and the rule of law against secular regimes which legitimised themselves as a bulwark against sinister forces of religion. Analysing the revolutions of 1989, Jürgen Habermas speaks of 'catching-up revolutions' which brought nothing new to the course of history. Yet after 9/11 he started to develop his idea of a postsecular society in which secular and religious citizens are equally entitled to make their arguments in a public sphere. Criticising the early Habermas with the later, the article argues that the postsecular revolutions of 1989 and 2011 are preparing the ground for a postsecular democracy.

This article brings the thought of Giuseppe Mazzini back into the field of nationalism studies, from which it has been largely missing for a half century. It suggests the following: that Mazzini is much more modern and secular than he is usually portrayed; and that his commitment to liberal policies while rejecting liberal principles suggests that the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism has been misconceived. Nationalism, to Mazzini, was not an end in itself but a means to an end -- government of, by and for the people. The demand for such a government was manifested in three popular demands in nineteenth-century Europe: in the West as democracy, in the East as national sovereignty (the precondition for democracy) and in both East and West as social democracy. Thus nationalism may be instrumental rather than an end in itself, and it may be attributable not to ethnic groups' natural striving for autonomy but to the pursuit of democracy. Adapted from the source document.

Since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, the Israeli authorities have been ruminating over Israel's place in the shifting political sands of the Middle East. Their worries are further fuelled by the need to address some serious domestic issues hanging over the country's future. The biggest problem is the persistent poverty that affects some 20% of the population, especially ultra-orthodox Jews and Israeli Arabs. A rash of sharp price rises and the rollback of the welfare state brought hundreds of thousands into the streets in the summer of 2011, but the protest movement gained no political traction. Prime Minister Netanyahu still has a firm grip on the rudder, but it may take more than that to allay the country's escalating social tensions, especially between ultra-orthodox and secular citizens, for any length of time. Adapted from the source document.

The increased visibility of assertive forms of atheism has provoked much public debate. This article argues that new atheism primarily seeks to contest what it considers to be the unjustifiably powerful role of religion through a multifaceted challenge to religious beliefs, practices and institutions. Influential theories of power are drawn upon to unpack the character of new atheist positions. It is proposed that new atheism seeks to challenge four perceived 'dimensions' of religious power, in particular (i) religion's role in public decision-making; (ii) the ability of religious groups to shape policy agendas; (iii) the power of religion to create preferences that run counter to an individual's true interests and, (iv) the role of religion in constituting forms of subjectivity more generally. Focussing particularly on the role of atheism in the UK, the paper also considers the implications such thinking has had on atheist practice and activism. The paper also considers how defenders of religion have reacted to the challenges posed by new atheism. It is argued that religious groups and authors have largely focussed on defending the role of religious faith and the significance of God in people's lives, rather than explicitly defending what new atheists consider to be the unfair institutional privilege accorded to some religious organisations.

Popular tensions in the Middle East have erupted into the streets in an unprecedented wave of protests this year. Old regimes have toppled, with others set to follow in their wake. But what type of government will replace them? Few imagine that these former dictatorships will transition rapidly into Western-style secular democracies. At the same time, the people seem little inclined to hand power back to religious parties, as they did in Iran. In this respect, Turkey stands as a compelling compromise. Power in Ankara is exercised by the AK Party, which describes itself as "moderate Islamist", with liberal economic policies and a determination to reduce the influence of the country's once all-powerful army. The Turkish model is not without its drawbacks, however. The AK Party has shown itself to be increasingly authoritarian and ever more determined to impose strict religious standards in public life. While countries emerging from decades of dictatorship could learn much from the Turkish model, it is far from a 'cure-all' remedy. Adapted from the source document.