Suchergebnisse

The military operations of 1974 in Cyprus led to the formation of two autonomous areas houding Turkish Cypriots in the north and the Greek Cypriots in the south. The island is divided by the "Green Line", patrolled by U.N. peace keeping forces.Movement is blocked and communication severed. There are multiple and conflicting Cypriot identities and feelings of nationalism ranging from pride in being Cypriots, to feelings of connection to Hellenic heritage, and cultural along with political and economic ties to Greece. A Turkish Cypriot identity linked to a distinct religious and linguistic background co-exists with Turkish settlers living in the independent north yet tied to Turkey. This article examines the division from a communication perspective taking into account language, religion, the visual landscape and the media landscape on each side ofthe "Green Line" along with interlocking media landscapes with Greece or Turkey in order to explore influences shaping collective identity and nationalism.

Meeting in Lisbon from February 20 to 25, 1952, and with Greece and Turkey participating as full members, the ninth session of the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization took decisions on five major items: 1) the forces to be made available to the military command during 1952; 2) the bases and facilities to be built and made available for the forces; 3) the establishment of a European Defense Community comprising six countries, including western Germany; 4) the report by the occupying powers on the proposed contractual arrangements with the German Federal Republic; 5) the reorganization and strengthening of NATO itself. In addition, the Council took note of the report by the Atlantic Community Committee on economic cooperation, agreed on the amount of the German financial contribution to defense for 1952–1953 and assigned the ground and air forces of Greece and Turkey to the over-all command of SHAPE.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is the top destination for Russian food exports, grains in particular. Focusing on Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, this chapter shows that Russia's food trade with MENA countries is strongly affected by bilateral political relations. Russia banned most food imports from Turkey over a political conflict in 2016. In the same year, improved intergovernmental cooperation with Saudi Arabia resulted in a diversification of Russia's food exports to the Gulf country, and in 2019, Iran's accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) led to increasing food trade with Russia. Food imports in MENA countries are usually managed by powerful state trading enterprises (STEs), which recurrently disapprove food products originating from Russia based on non-adherence to food quality standards. Our analysis shows that Russia is successfully working to open additional destination markets, while simultaneously impeding imports of food products that it aims to produce domestically.

This study analyzes why and for which countries the Turkish Foreign Ministry uses the word kardeş (brother) in its discourse, particularly during the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) era. The study reveals that if a country is Muslim or ethnically Turkic, it is called a brother country. Besides states, Muslim or Turkic minorities in other countries are included in the brotherhood category. On the other hand, non-Turkic and non-Muslim countries are described as a friend, an ally, or strategic partners. However, being a brother does not mean that Turkey has the best relations with a country. On the contrary, Turkey has better relations with non-brother countries as well. Yet, being a brother state means probable privileged status in relations. Besides elucidating the discourse in Turkish foreign policy, this study also tries to counter realist ideas that friendship is not possible in the world order, which is supposed to be anarchical. Besides literature review, interviews were made to write the article. ; Bu çalışma, özellikle AK Parti hükümetleri döneminde Türk Dışişleri Bakanlığının söyleminde geçen 'kardeş ülke' terimini neden ve hangi ülkeler için kullandığını analiz etmektedir. Çalışma, bir ülkenin Müslüman veya etnik olarak Türk olması durumunda, kardeş ülke olarak adlandırıldığını ortaya koyuyor. Türk Dışişleri, devletlerin yanı sıra diğer ülkelerdeki Müslüman ve/veya Türk azınlıkları da kardeşlik kategorisine sokmaktadır. Öte yandan, Türk ve/veya Müslüman olmayan ülkeler bir dost, müttefik veya stratejik ortak olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Ancak kardeş ülke olarak anılmak Türkiye'nin bir ülke ile en iyi ilişkilere sahip olduğu anlamına gelmemektedir. Aksine, Türkiye'nin kardeş olmayan ülkelerle de çok iyi ilişkileri bulunmaktadır. Ancak yine de kardeş devlet olmak ilişkilerde ayrıcalıklı olmaktır denilebilir. Bu çalışma, Türk dış politikasındaki söylemi aydınlatmanın yanı sıra, realistlerin anarşik farz ettiği dünya düzeninde dostluğun da mümkün olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Makalenin yazımı için literatür taramasının yanı sıra röportajlar da yapılmıştır.

In February 1959, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey conducted negotiations over the independence of Cyprus. Great Britain, as the colonial power, demanded to keep 3% of the Cypriot territory in order to establish Sovereign Base Areas (SBA). Greece and Turkey, in their capacity as "homelands", negotiated without any Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots being represented. Following these interest-based negotiations, Cyprus was given a political system that was both rigid and unsuited to local realities and Constitutional treaties were signed that impeded Enosis (union between Cyprus and Greece) and Taksim (partition on a linguistic and religious basis). These two insular extranationalisms were in fact the result of a concomitant interaction between the British colonial policy and the aggressive expression of Greek and Turkish nationalisms outside the national borders of Greece and Turkey, and have been made possible by the very position of the political Cypriot leaderships. Obtained from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 as a place d'armes in order to defend British interests, Cyprus underwent a deep social transformation under the British rule. Great Britain's ambiguous and opportunistic policies played on local dynamics to serve British strategic objectives. The aim of this research is to show how the British colonial heritage contributed to the ongoing conflict between the two main Cypriot communities. ; En février 1959, la Grande-Bretagne, la Grèce et la Turquie négocient l'indépendance de Chypre. La première, en tant que puissance coloniale, exige en retour la cession de 3% du territoire insulaire pour établir des bases militaires souveraines ; les deux secondes, reconnues en tant que " mères-patries ", négocient en l'absence des Chypriotes grecs et des Chypriotes turcs. Chypre sera, à la suite de ces négociations d'intérêts, dotée d'un système de gouvernance rigide et inadéquat par rapport à la réalité locale, ainsi que de traités à force constitutionnelle interdisant la réalisation de l'Enosis (union de Chypre avec ...

In February 1959, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey conducted negotiations over the independence of Cyprus. Great Britain, as the colonial power, demanded to keep 3% of the Cypriot territory in order to establish Sovereign Base Areas (SBA). Greece and Turkey, in their capacity as "homelands", negotiated without any Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots being represented. Following these interest-based negotiations, Cyprus was given a political system that was both rigid and unsuited to local realities and Constitutional treaties were signed that impeded Enosis (union between Cyprus and Greece) and Taksim (partition on a linguistic and religious basis). These two insular extranationalisms were in fact the result of a concomitant interaction between the British colonial policy and the aggressive expression of Greek and Turkish nationalisms outside the national borders of Greece and Turkey, and have been made possible by the very position of the political Cypriot leaderships. Obtained from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 as a place d'armes in order to defend British interests, Cyprus underwent a deep social transformation under the British rule. Great Britain's ambiguous and opportunistic policies played on local dynamics to serve British strategic objectives. The aim of this research is to show how the British colonial heritage contributed to the ongoing conflict between the two main Cypriot communities. ; En février 1959, la Grande-Bretagne, la Grèce et la Turquie négocient l'indépendance de Chypre. La première, en tant que puissance coloniale, exige en retour la cession de 3% du territoire insulaire pour établir des bases militaires souveraines ; les deux secondes, reconnues en tant que " mères-patries ", négocient en l'absence des Chypriotes grecs et des Chypriotes turcs. Chypre sera, à la suite de ces négociations d'intérêts, dotée d'un système de gouvernance rigide et inadéquat par rapport à la réalité locale, ainsi que de traités à force constitutionnelle interdisant la réalisation de l'Enosis (union de Chypre avec ...

In February 1959, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey conducted negotiations over the independence of Cyprus. Great Britain, as the colonial power, demanded to keep 3% of the Cypriot territory in order to establish Sovereign Base Areas (SBA). Greece and Turkey, in their capacity as "homelands", negotiated without any Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots being represented. Following these interest-based negotiations, Cyprus was given a political system that was both rigid and unsuited to local realities and Constitutional treaties were signed that impeded Enosis (union between Cyprus and Greece) and Taksim (partition on a linguistic and religious basis). These two insular extranationalisms were in fact the result of a concomitant interaction between the British colonial policy and the aggressive expression of Greek and Turkish nationalisms outside the national borders of Greece and Turkey, and have been made possible by the very position of the political Cypriot leaderships. Obtained from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 as a place d'armes in order to defend British interests, Cyprus underwent a deep social transformation under the British rule. Great Britain's ambiguous and opportunistic policies played on local dynamics to serve British strategic objectives. The aim of this research is to show how the British colonial heritage contributed to the ongoing conflict between the two main Cypriot communities. ; En février 1959, la Grande-Bretagne, la Grèce et la Turquie négocient l'indépendance de Chypre. La première, en tant que puissance coloniale, exige en retour la cession de 3% du territoire insulaire pour établir des bases militaires souveraines ; les deux secondes, reconnues en tant que " mères-patries ", négocient en l'absence des Chypriotes grecs et des Chypriotes turcs. Chypre sera, à la suite de ces négociations d'intérêts, dotée d'un système de gouvernance rigide et inadéquat par rapport à la réalité locale, ainsi que de traités à force constitutionnelle interdisant la réalisation de l'Enosis (union de Chypre avec ...

In February 1959, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey conducted negotiations over the independence of Cyprus. Great Britain, as the colonial power, demanded to keep 3% of the Cypriot territory in order to establish Sovereign Base Areas (SBA). Greece and Turkey, in their capacity as "homelands", negotiated without any Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots being represented. Following these interest-based negotiations, Cyprus was given a political system that was both rigid and unsuited to local realities and Constitutional treaties were signed that impeded Enosis (union between Cyprus and Greece) and Taksim (partition on a linguistic and religious basis). These two insular extranationalisms were in fact the result of a concomitant interaction between the British colonial policy and the aggressive expression of Greek and Turkish nationalisms outside the national borders of Greece and Turkey, and have been made possible by the very position of the political Cypriot leaderships. Obtained from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 as a place d'armes in order to defend British interests, Cyprus underwent a deep social transformation under the British rule. Great Britain's ambiguous and opportunistic policies played on local dynamics to serve British strategic objectives. The aim of this research is to show how the British colonial heritage contributed to the ongoing conflict between the two main Cypriot communities. ; En février 1959, la Grande-Bretagne, la Grèce et la Turquie négocient l'indépendance de Chypre. La première, en tant que puissance coloniale, exige en retour la cession de 3% du territoire insulaire pour établir des bases militaires souveraines ; les deux secondes, reconnues en tant que " mères-patries ", négocient en l'absence des Chypriotes grecs et des Chypriotes turcs. Chypre sera, à la suite de ces négociations d'intérêts, dotée d'un système de gouvernance rigide et inadéquat par rapport à la réalité locale, ainsi que de traités à force constitutionnelle interdisant la réalisation de l'Enosis (union de Chypre avec ...

During today's crisis in Turkey, victimhood authorises oppression, oppressors see themselves as victims and the oppressed are not only the poor, but educated middle classes. Citizen and state are imbricated in the same political and discursive fields where people mobilise against one another, some moving up and others down, creating unexpected landscapes of victimisation and oppression that do not fit comfortably in literature that analyses 'politics from below'. How do we conceptualise this in a way that respects people's understanding of their coordinates in a complex landscape of power? This article interrogates some basic assumptions of this literature, including the impact of the observer's position and the oppression/resistance framework, replacing it with a model of politics as a shared horizontal topography of action across a terrain of values.

This article maintains that the Kurdish identity is determinant in almost all areas of Turkey's foreign policy. It discusses this significance by using in general the instruments of constructivism and in particular the instruments of rule-oriented constructivism of Nicholas Onuf. In this context, it puts forward three claims. First, Kurdish identity leads to the construction of a collective identity which determines Turkey's relations with its neighbours and near environment. Second, as the subject of a human rights question it causes a negative identification regarding Turkey and thus affects its relations with western states and institutions. And finally, involving the construction process of the Turkish national identity, it excites Turkish nationalism and hence inserts the foreign policy decisions and behaviours in a nationalist framework. Adapted from the source document.

The end of the Cold War has changed the general conditions of the Turkish foreign policy. While Turkey had some difficulties in the post Cold War period parallel to its lower importance in European security context to legitimate its European course with the final destination of the full membership in the EU, there were new chances in Caucasus and Central Asia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This article intends to locate the Turkish foreign policy under these new conditions of the international relations. It tries to answer the question whether it concerns by the new foreign policy concept a potential as alternative to dominating orientation with the destination of EU membership, or whether this orientation could be categorized differently as well. Adapted from the source document.

An overview of recent events in the ongoing conflict between the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) & the Turkish government is offered, highlighting opportunities & difficulties for a peaceful political solution. While the military conflict between the PKK & the army can be ended in a reasonable amount of time, the underlying tensions between the Ankara government & Turkey's sizable Kurdish minority remain. It is suggested that Ankara adopt a more conciliatory tone & develop a peace policy toward Kurdish separatists; conflict resolution may be required, & in fact the intercession of third parties is necessary. A political solution to the Kurdish problem is mandatory if Turkey is to be accepted into the European Union. Discussed in closing is the role of the US (Turkey's leading military sponsor) in bringing the conflict to a close. A. Cohen-Siegel

The present paper analyses the securitisation of time by national sovereignties and the challenges posed to this nationalised time by ethnic minorities in two countries, i.e. Romania and
Turkey. The argument builds on an understanding of sovereignty as inseparable from the modern subjectivity discoursing it and the spatial and temporal coordinates of this subjectivity. It employs the Heideggerian theorisation of the modern sovereign subjectivity to explain, with an appeal to Derrida, how this subjectivity produces its private temporality in terms of its own presentpresence. In the same, Heideggerian tradition of thought, the paper then theorises national sovereignty as an onomastic exercise placing the private temporality of the sovereign subjectivity, its conception of past and future, under the name of the nation. The author elaborates on Giorgio Agamben's view of sovereignty as state of exception and Hans-Georg Gadamer's theory of naming in order to explicate how the national, sovereign subjectivity authors in this way its own realm, its own normality and the exceptions from that normality. This amounts to the production of the consensus of national sovereignty expressed in the policies of the modern state. The result, in the account by Jacques Rancière and Erin Manning, excludes politics contesting the sovereign consensus, which in an onomastically nationalised political life excludes, in fact, the non-national inside, i.e. the ethnic minorities and their alternative predication of political life. The author illustrates how the production of the nationalised temporality has emerged in Romania and Turkey and also how the most numerous minorities there, Hungarian and Kurdish respectively, have started
challenging the consensus of national sovereignty. Since Romania has already become EU Member State and Turkey is currently a candidate to EU membership, the research also sheds a new light on the possibility of post-national politics in Europe under the aegis of the Union.

Table of Contents : Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- Chapter 1: The European paradigm -- 1.1. The European Union: an evolutionary process -- 1.2. The European Union: A post-modern Institution -- 1.3. Polycentric governance: Synthesis of individuation and integration -- Chapter 2: Review of Greek Foreign Policy -- 2.1. The theoretical background -- 2.2. The logic of Helsinki and "citizen diplomacy" -- 2.3. The Venizelos-Ataturk Pact -- 2.4. Cyprus: A cause of protracted crisis between Greece and Turkey -- 2.5. Andreas Papandreou: From "no dialogue" to Davos -- 2.6. Pangalos-Kranidiotis: The linkage policy -- Chapter 3: Review of US foreign policy -- 3.1. Turkey: A pivotal state for the US -- 3.2. Johnson's letter: The syndrome -- 3.3. US opposition to Cyprus' accession to the EU -- 3.4. The EU's negative stance on Cyprus' accession -- 3.5. Holbrooke's strategy -- 3.6. The Imia crisis and the S-300 missiles -- 3.7. Mediation by Holbrooke -- 3.8. US behind the new mobility -- 3.9. Assessment of US foreign policy -- Chapter 4: Changes in Turkey -- 4.1. The static conception of Turkey and the NO vote to the Referendum -- 4.2. From the Ottoman Empire to the Kemalist state: Nationalism, Pan-Turkism, Expansionism. -- 4.3. Islam: In search of identity -- 4.4. Turgut Ozal: Liberalization of the economy, Turkish-Islamic synthesis -- 4.5. Political Islam: The Islamic Party -- 4.6. The politics of fear and the revolution of the AKP -- 4.7. The Cyprus question: How it has affected Turkish foreign policy and internal affairs -- 4.8. Turkish revisionism in Turkish-Greek relations -- 4.9. Turkey's European orientation and the demand for democratization -- 4.10. Turkey's European bid and the Cyprus problem -- 4.11. The European Union and Turkey -- Chapter 5: The perception of the solution by the Greek Cypriot Community -- 5.1. The Enosis movement and Greek Cypriot nationalism -- 5.2. Makarios and the enosis movement -- 5.3. Makarios and the 1960 Constitution -- 5.4. Between the devil and the deep blue sea -- 5.5. An "interlude of joy" -- 5.6. Towards the abyss -- 5.7. The perception of federation by Makarios -- 5.8. The two "precepts" of Makarios -- 5.9. The perception of the solution and electoral calculations -- 5.10. Return to the logic of "absolute solution" -- 5.11. Helsinki and the reunification perspective. -- Chapter 6: The perception of the solution by the Turkish Cypriot community -- 6.1. The inception of Turkish Cypriot nationalism -- 6.2. From Young-Turk to Kemalist nationalism. -- 6.3. The political organization of separation. -- 6.4. The leading role of Rauf Denktas -- 6.5. The perception of the solution by the Turkish community after the invasion -- 6.6. The Turkish Cypriot uprising -- Chapter 7: From Waldheim's "evaluation" to the Annan Plan -- 7.1. The UN peace mission in Cyprus -- 7.2. The Cuellar initiatives -- 7.3. Boutros Ghali's "Set of Ideas" -- 7.4. The Annan Plan: On the tracks of the Set of Ideas -- 7.4.1. The "new state of affairs" -- 7.4.2. Bicommunality - Bizonality -- 7.4.3. Political equality -- 7.4.4. The unity of the country. -- 7.4.5. The "single list" in the election of the Presidential Council -- 7.4.6. The Presidential Council: Transition to the post-leader era. -- 7.4.7. Territory, Displaced, Properties -- 7.4.8. Historical and cultural heritage -- 7.4.9. Individual rights -- 7.4.10. Security: Withdrawal of troops, Guarantees -- 7.4.11. Settlers -- 7.4.12. Transitional arrangements -- Chapter 8: Towards the Referendum -- 8.1. Submission of the UN Plan and initial reactions -- 8.2. "Coercion" a feature of the timing -- 8.3. The "faultless" stand: From Copenhagen to The Hague -- 8.4. Turkey-Turkish Cypriots: In search of an outlet -- 8.5. Tassos Papadopoulos: Reneging on the Hague commitment -- 8.6. Piecing together a strategy of rejection -- 8.7. New York's "cold shower" and the decision to reject -- Chapter 9: The NO vote of 24 April 2004 -- 9.1. The convergence of events and the possibility of political symbiosis -- 9.2. Papadopoulos' refusal to negotiate at Bürgenstock -- 9.3. The Annan Plan and t.