What Tolstoy says about families also applies to banks: sound banks are all alike, but every failing bank fails in its own way. This is the reason why broad discretion is needed to manage banking crises. This paper studies the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive to assess whether it grants the competent authorities enough discretionary powers to deal with banking crises in the most efficient way. The new EU legal framework for banking resolution is marked by a very complex system of rules, with numerous constraints on the discretionary choices of the competent authorities, which could make it difficult to reach the goals underlying the BRRD, i. e., ensuring long term financial and economic stability and reducing the public cost of banking crises.
This article seeks to undertake a critical assessment of the changing position of public science in the entrepreneurial ecosystem of the countries on the periphery of Euro- pean research. These countries are driven by new innovation paradigm based on entrepreneurship, which are implemented within the European Smart specialization strategy (S3). This article argues that S3 is widely implemented in the cohesion coun- tries and, while it provides substantial resources for science, technology, and innova- tion, it fails to provide sustainability in the public research sector. This has direct implications for policies concerning innovation and entrepreneurial ecosystems. In order to prove the thesis, the article provides theoretical argumentation for emer- gence of a new innovation paradigm, driven by the rise of the entrepreneurial ecosys- tem, its incorporation into S3, and a consequent retreat of science policy in favor of entrepreneurial policy. The empirical analysis is focused on the funding trends seen in the business and public research sectors over the last decade (2008–2017), which have clearly shown that S3 has not contributed, despite expectations, to an increase in public expenditure for science. This signifies S3's neglect of public research within entrepreneurial ecosystems and challenges the ability of S3 to reduce wide dispar- ities in research and innovation performance across the European Union. This ulti- mately endangers the innovation potential of the entrepreneurial ecosystem itself.
[Abstract editor: European Union law has developed a concept of Union citizenship based on a right of exit from one's country and a consequential right of entry in another Member State of the Union. 'Empowering' European citizens and enabling them to integrate into other Member States' territories is its main purpose. If we seek to analyse further the concept of Union citizenship, it is almost inevitable that we inquire into the social background of this construction, the individual skills and resources it entails, the state structures and collective goods it affects. This is the puzzle with which the most acute commentators engage. Looked at this way, Union citizenship is about integration of Union citizens into national communities, financial solidarity with other Member States' nationals and recognition of their personal identities. Ultimately it is about transnational integration and new forms of social justice within the Member States. There is, however, another way to engage with the concept. The focus on social integration is replaced by a somewhat more ambitious project: to empower the Union citizens to connect with Europe as a whole. This approach assumes that a proper regime of Union citizenship constitutes not only a right to free movement but a right to enjoy a common way of living. It would allow Union citizens to live, at least partially, in social and moral conditions which denote a far-reaching European society. If we take this project seriously, the problem, then, is as follows: how are we going to shape this project within a conceptual framework based on transnational integration? What does it mean practically to create ties between individuals who have been allowed to disaffiliate from their country of origin? To which 'whole' shall we refer that is not a structured state and yet does not boil down to a mere sphere of individual interests and particular social interactions? The essays presented here suggest two ways to approach this problem. The first explores the concept of 'the territory of ...
This book provides an overview of the effects of home ownership, a housing sector that has grown rapidly in recent years in many countries, not least because this is normally encouraged by governments. The first part of the subtitle, 'Getting in', refers to processes in the development of the homeownership stock including problems of access, which in turn implies issues of affordability, the viability of financial institutions and subsidies. 'Getting from' indicates that this form of housing tenure may provide households with advantages such as wealth accumulation and independence that may not.
Lusíada. Política internacional e segurança. - ISSN 1647-1342. - S. 1, n. 11 (2014). - p. 29-49 ; While observing the rising of the Pacific as the new geo-strategic epicenter of international politics, the concept of 'Soft Power' gained more attention from Japanese, Chinese, and Korean foreign policy experts and decision makers. When considering the Japanese case study, its domestic, foreign, defense and security policies may all encompass a soft power dimension given Japan's unique political values, foreign policy legitimacy and culture. Similarly, the European Union is often pointed as a civilian power with valuable soft power assets, a global actor which uses its prestige and reputation in the international community as a fundamental foreign policy tool. Simultaneously, both the EU and Japan are facing considerable political, economic and security challenges in the 21st century, which require increased cooperation through traditional and innovative diplomatic tools. Soft power resources can be shared and used in a cooperative fashion by both political actors. The EU, with its successful history of integration from the Treaties of Rome to the Treaty of Lisbon – an event that gave rise to the 'post-modern World' - is facing its biggest challenges so far, e.g. with the euro crisis. Similarly, Japan's position in the world today is the result of challenging external and domestic conditions: an aging population, a debt-to-GDP ratio over 200% and the rise of China. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to assess and analyze how important are shared political values for both Japan and the European Union's foreign policy strategies and bilateral relations, taking into account the ongoing changing distribution of power not only in East Asia but also at a global level. The focus of this paper will underline the similarity between EU's and Japan's political values, and how their combined soft power resources may contribute to a more peaceful and democratic global order and counter-balance recent authoritarian trends.
AbstractThe barriers to concerted political action on climate change mitigation are steep, especially in multilevel systems where power is diffused and authority contested. This article seeks to explain how mobilization—galvanizing resources and people to participate actively—occurs in complex multilevel systems. It compares two different polities—the United States and the European Union—to tease out the key features of multilevel systems and how they affect climate activism and mobilization. To capture this dynamic, it proposes a three‐staged model of mobilization: awareness building, alliance building, and network creation. The latter stage features "mobilization networks"—stakeholder networks able to transcend levels and institutional inertia and steer polities toward particular climate goals. The article demonstrates how each stage of mobilization is highly contingent on stakeholders' ability to exploit—or at least navigate—multilevel institutional barriers.
Bu çalışmada kaçak göçmenlerin Türkiye üzerinden Avrupa Birliği (AB) üyesi ülkelere transit geçmesinden doğan sorunlar incelenmiştir. Bu amaçla göç konusunun güvenlik sorunu hâline gelmesi, Avrupa Birliği'nde ortak bir göç politikasının oluşması ve göçmenlerin entegrasyonu süreçleri incelenmiştir. Düzenli Raporların ve Türkiye'nin hazırladığı Müktesebatın Üstlenilmesi için Ulusal Programın paralel olarak okunması sonucunda taraflar arasındaki anlaşmazlığın temelinde üç konunun bulunduğu tespit edilmiştir. Öncelikle, Birliğin Türkiye'den ülkesinden geçen her transit göçmeni geri kabul etmesi talebi ve Türkiye'nin AB ile bir geri kabul anlaşması imzalamaya yanaşmamasının ardında yatan sebepler üstünde durulmuştur. İkinci olarak, Türkiye'nin 1951 tarihli Mültecilerin Korunmasına İlişkin BM Sözleşmesi'ne koyduğu coğrafi sınırlama incelenmiştir. Üçüncü olarak, Türkiye'nin AB'den göçmenlerin işlemlerinin getirdiği masrafların paylaşılması yolunda yaptığı talep üzerinde durulmuştur. Türkiye'nin transit ülke olarak üstlendiği rolün, daha fazla sorumluluk alması için Avrupa Birliği'ne yaptığı talebin ve bu talebin Avrupa Birliği'nin dış sınırların korunmasını ülkelerin uhdesine bırakan yaklaşımıyla hangi bakımlardan çatıştığının altı çizilmiştir. Son olarak taraflar arasında halihazırda mevcut olan durum incelenmiştir. Bu bağlamda Türkiye'nin yaptığı çalışmaların sonuçları vurgulanmıştır. Ayrıca Birliğin transit kaçak göçle mücadelede Türkiye'ye nasıl destek olabileceği ve Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'nin göç politikalarının uygulanması için uygun bir zemini nasıl sağlayacağı konusunda bazı öneriler ileri sürülmüştür.This study addresses issues between the European Union (EU) and Turkey regarding transit illegal migration through Turkey to the European Union member states. While doing this, it explores three processes namely, securitization of migration, communautarisation of migration policies in European Union and integration of immigrants. As a result of a parallel reading of the Regular Reports and Turkish National Program on the Adoption of the Acquis, three issues are evaluated to constitute the main line of contention between parties. First of all, demand by the Union from Turkey to readmit any migrant who had transited from Turkey and the reasons why Turkey has been unwilling to sign a readmission agreement with the EU are examined. Secondly, Turkey's geographical limitation to 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees is investigated. Thirdly, Turkey's demand from the EU to share the burden of processing migrants is examined. Emphasis is made on Turkey's role as a transit country, her demand from the EU to assume more responsibility and how does this demand conflicts with the EU's attitude that favors placing individual countries sole responsibility of protection of their external borders. Finally, the current state of affairs between the parties is discussed. In this context, attention is drawn to the fruits of efforts Turkey has made. Also, some suggestions are made as to how the Union can support Turkey's fight against transit illegal migration and how Turkey can be an ideal ground for application of the EU migration policies.
We identified a notable lack of academic literature on the issue of third-country auditors and the main contribution of our article is to address this gap. This research builds on adjacent audit oversight and capital markets literature and we extend this literature by providing evidence on third-country auditors. Specifically, we test the relationship between market capitalization and number of foreign IPOs of listed companies in representative EU countries (on one hand) and the existence of third-country auditors in those respective countries (on the other hand). Our research was performed in the second half of 2018 and is based on the latest data available. We have found that there are about 200 third-country auditors present in the public registers of audit oversight bodies in 11 EU countries. According to our network analysis, only European countries with a developed capital market have attracted third-country auditors. Most of the relationships of these developed EU capital markets are nurtured with non-EU capital markets that are at the same level of development (e.g. USA, Switzerland, Canada, Israel, and Australia). Our research hypotheses were validated: (1) the higher the market capitalization of a EU country, the higher the likelihood for the registration of third-country auditors; (2) the higher the number of foreign IPOs relative to the total IPOs on the stock exchange market, the higher the likelihood for the registration of third-country auditors.
