Contemporary Ukrainian state and society pass through complicated and contradictory period of transformation of socio-economic, political, spiritual and moral relations. The youth, as subject and object of policy, social and cultural relations, mirrors the features of Ukrainian political system's evolution and cultural evolution in its vital activity. The youth is an important part of Ukrainian society, the medium of its intellectual potential, a main factor of socio-economic progress. Process of state building largely depends on capability of youth to be an active creative power.Nevertheless, it should be noted, that significant part of youth has no reliable political and socio-cultural reference points, civic consciousness isn't formed, spiritual and moral ideals are lost, increasingly the youth regards with negative to socially useful activities and becomes most separated from society and state than previous generations.Meantime effective socialization of youth is a necessary condition for a constant development of Ukrainian political system, largely depictures the future of the country. Perspective of society's further development primarily depend on the features of formation of the political culture of youth, its political values, socio-political orientation, political choice, attitude to power.In this regard, necessity of studying processes, what spread across youth subculture, political analysis of youth subcultural differentiation, production technologies and mechanisms for prevention deviant behaviour and crises among young people, appears.The socio-economic and spiritual development of Ukraine is impossible without concentration on resolving the problems of the youth as future of our country, a guarantor of social and economic progress, because an immutable truth is that further development mostly depend on providing young generations with decent conditions for life. In despite of declared realization of this truth, a majority of countries in the world starts new millennium with a significant burden of unsolved problems of youth, most of them, for a example, imparity of youth, unemployment, marginalization of young people, propagation of illegal social practices and asocial manifestations among young people, youth health problems and some marital and family problems etc., now shows tendency to intensification.Under conditions of deep economic and demographic crisis, crisis of culture and ideology, of post-Soviet countries, including Ukraine, youth problems in different areas of life become more specific, they entail hard and prolonged consequences, therefore, they need be analyzed deeply and regulated, realistic and balanced youth policy must be developed.The term "youth" is treated diversely in many branches of science - philosophy, sociology, political science, pedagogy, psychology etc. Its generalized version is suggested in encyclopedias and determines the youth as a separate socio-demographic group that differs in a complex of age characteristics, features of social status, that are determined by social system, culture, regularity of socialization, education in terms of a particular society.The youth, within the meaning of current age ranges of youth in Ukraine (according to national legislation an age range of youth is 15 - 34 years), makes up the significant part of the population of Ukraine. Now the youth contingent in Ukraine is demographically heterogeneous, because the youth unites in itself groups of rather a broad age range – from teenagers (15-17 years), post teenagers (18-19 years old) to much more experienced in age and socially persons and adults, that are over 30 years old (30-34 years).It should be considered that the youth is socially heterogeneous. Yong workers, villagers, students, political leaders, representatives of the business community, migrants, young specialists, marginal people with different degree of success adapt to market economy, frequently orient themselves on contradictory political and spiritual values.The position of youth political culture, as well as society generally, is largely fragmented. The separate groups of the youth differ from each other in the interest to policy, level of inclusion in the political life, orientations on different ideological and political currents of modern Ukraine. All this differences haven't characterized as acute antagonism and haven't led to excessive politicization yet.The young people significantly differ from older generations, because they almost got rid of illusions that somebody can solve their own problems. They are individualistic and pragmatic, relate to the modern authority rather neutrally and don't connect any positive changes with it.The young generation perceives the policy and the authority as entity that cause neither admiration, nor especially acute negative emotions. First of all, it proves in removal of a large number of the youth from political life. In some measure apathy of youth, first of all, appears because the reforms that take place in Ukraine impact on the youth most painfully, and because of absence of understanding policy towards youth as an independent socio-demographic group, also because the youth, on the one hand, doesn't see necessity to change something cardinally in environment, but, on the other hand, doesn't consider political activity as something important, it finds most perspective methods and forms of self-fulfillment. As a result – total alienation of the youth from the authority, that can be transformed into active rejection at any time.Today state only declares principles of political culture of participation and public culture. During period of formation of the youth generation it is necessary to examine the situation, to explore the depth and sharpness of social problems, to establish monitoring of youth life.Modern problems such as crisis of relationship of generations, impairment of vital parameters, formation of specific youth subculture and counterculture etc., demonstrate that all structures of socialization together – family, environment and even education, become not enough to solve the problems of society when new generations come on and it is not enough to solve the problems of youth, that takes on its historical subjectivity.Liberal views of youth are often formed under the influence of education, cultural environment, family socialization, but are not the result of a «rational» choice. State youth policy, as an innovative Institute, has it own particularities and the main one of them is that it is specialized and was built on innovative forms of activity. These forms are associated with deep process of knowledge and management. They need political will and great resources to be realized. The payment for that are guaranteed results of activity, without what society can't exist and develop no longer.As a result of new situation, what appeared because political activity in labor and educational groups had been prohibited, the policy moved on from industrial and academic areas to the sphere of free time of youth and led new youth organizations on the competition with traditional structures of free time. The youth structures could gain neither recognition, nor authority on broad stratums of the rising generation.The perspective of further development of society connects, first of all, with features of the formation of political culture of youth, its political values, a socio-political orientation, political choice and attitude towards the authority.The formation of consciousness of the category of population is strategically important for the state, because working politically active forces will be replaced exactly by today's youth. Now it is hard to manipulate the young people, they are very sensitive and note everything that takes place in society. May be, some part of them go to policy in order to make money, but for the most of them is important to realize their own opinions.The current political situation in Ukraine makes the youth think about a lot of questions: how can I, young man, decide something and affect the situation in the country (the region); how much does my vote weigh in elections etc. One of the most important factors that can push these people into active public deeds is confidence of an opportunity that something can be changed by their choice and decision.The modern politicians come to understanding that the slogans are ineffective and the youth can't be conquered with appeals on TV. The new generation is more independent than previous one and, the most important of this, that it has a choice. The votes of youth will not be cast without any reason – someone must work with it. The experience of last decades proves that only when countries pay much attention on work with youth they will success in policy and economy. A sustainable progress is demonstrated by societies that have looked over the system of traditional opinions about new generation and it importance for political and socio-economical development (for example, Germany, Sweden).In Ukraine a program of state and public actions in this sphere and mechanisms of solving these problems is determined by modern national policy. The especial attention should be paid to solving problems of youth self-realization and formation of young citizens.There is 367 003 persons (30,67 percent of all population of the region) of young people from 14 to 35 years old in Mykolaiv, including citizens - 251 712 persons and villagers - 115 291 persons. The youth needs permanent protection and help of state. However to give support to the youth doesn't mean to solve all its problems. First of all, it means to give the youth an opportunity to solve problems by itself.The Regional Program "The Youth of Mykolaiv Region" on 2011-2015 years becomes a strategic document. The conception determines directions of relationship's development between the state and the youth at the regional level. The most optimal way and method of solution are:to develop the scientifically argumentative strategy of implementation of public policy towards the youth of region;to popularize efficiency, availability and creation of extensive network of youth social infrastructure, a directing on activity that will satisfy needs and create the necessary conditions for effective socialization of young people;to promote youth occupation by introduction the system of career-guidance, creation the conditions for secondary employment, provision with fist job, stimulation to make business, outspread of youth information field concerning existing professions and demand for them; to promote youth employment and youth entrepreneurship by expansion of employment, professional training of youth, giving an opportunity to realize youth projects;to involve the youth in realization of social programs and projects of state youth policy that are directed on solving problems according to Program;to create a complex system of social protection for representatives in special categories of youth community, to render social assistance and support for the youth that is in crisis;to create conditions for providing social assistance and modeling healthy lifestyle among all groups of youth in Mykolaiv;to encourage the creative self-realization and total evolution of youth, to support the youth initiatives and activities at different spheres of life, to implement incentives in order to improve the cultural level of youth;to implement the mechanism how to inform youth community by mass media and Internet-resource;to implement measures to create conditions for youth loans;to promote the youth integration towards world and European community, the exchange of experience and joint activities of the youth at the regional and the national levels;to promote spiritual and physical development of young people in Mykolaiv region, a high patriotic consciousness, a national pride, a formation and development of motivation that is directed to preparation for doing public and constitutional duty in order to protect the national interests of Ukraine.Now it is possible to use young people in realization of youth police by enlisting them in youth and children public organizations. These organizations are one of the most important social institutes that promote a formation of civil society. The public organizations have exclusive opportunities for political socialization of youth, because they are not only a key-note subject of youth policy that affects its formation and realization, but also are good staff reserve for the public authorities and local government. The social movement is the force that can't be ignored and should not be ignored.So, it is important to create legal and other conditions for cooperation of the authority, youth public organizations and active representatives of this part of population. The principal revolution in youth attitude to policy will take place only when it feels itself a real member of process of transformation and development in Ukrainian society. ; Статья посвящена исследованию особенностей формирования политической куль-туры молодежи, ее политических ценностей, социально-политических ориентиров в период трансформации украинского общества, анализируется роль государства в формировании и реализации современной молодежной политики. ; Статтю присвячено дослідженню особливостей формування політичної культури молоді, її політичних цінностей, соціально-політичних орієнтирів у період трансформації українського суспільства, проаналізовано роль держави у формуванні та реалізації сучасної молодіжної політики.
Security Council 8221st Meeting ; 5/21/2018 Questions Remain over Syria's Chemical Weapons Programme, Security Council Hears, as Speakers Call for Agreement on Suitable Ac… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13276.doc.htm 1/5 MEETINGS COVERAGE Questions Remain over Syria's Chemical Weapons Programme, Security Council Hears, as Speakers Call for Agreement on Suitable Accountability Mechanism After more than four years of work, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was still unable to verify that Syria's initial declaration on its chemical weapons programme was accurate, delegates told the Security Council today, underlining that questions remained about the use of such weapons in that country. Discussions between the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the Syrian Government were continuing, although they had not led to the resolution of any of the remaining issues regarding the completeness and accuracy of Syria's initial declaration, said Thomas Markram, Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Aairs. Stressing that resolving those outstanding issues would allow for shared condence in Syria's declaration across the international community, he emphasized: "The persistent allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria underscore the need to identify solutions and reach agreement on an appropriate accountability mechanism." The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission was continuing its work and was currently in Damascus looking into allegations of the use of chemical weapons that were brought to the attention of the OPCW Director-General by the Government, said Mr. Markram. The next report of the Fact-Finding Mission would be submitted when it considered that it had sucient information and was in a position to draw a conclusion. In the meantime, the Syrian Government had continued eorts to destroy the two remaining chemical weapons production facilities in the country, he said, adding that destruction of those facilities was expected to be complete within two to three months from the start date and would be veried by OPCW. Expressing concern that OPCW was still unable to verify Syria's initial declaration on its chemical weapons programme, the representative of Sweden noted there were still a number of serious outstanding issues that had yet to be resolved. Specically, the Director-General last month reported that the initial 5 outstanding questions had grown to 22, including the case of the Syrian Scientic Studies and Research Centre. Emphasizing that sarin and chlorine stocks did indeed exist in Syria, France's representative said that the country had either deceived the Council or pursued a clandestine chemical weapons programme. Given those two options, France called on Syria to respond to all unanswered questions, "and there are many of them". The Damascus-based regime's responsibility for the use of chemical weapons had been publicly and unambiguously established by the Joint Investigative Mechanism and any attempt to discredit its clear conclusion could not change that reality, he said, stressing that impunity for those who used chemical weapons was not an option. The speaker for the United States said a few years ago, a single chemical weapons attack would have united the Council in shock and anger, but now there was a regime that used them "practically every other week". Letting one regime o the hook emboldened others, she said, adding that the world was rapidly sliding back to a time when people lived in fear of colourless, shapeless gas leaving them gasping for air. Her country refused to believe that the Council could not come together once again on chemical weapons, despite dierences between its members. Echoing those concerns, the United Kingdom's representative noted that, in the absence of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, there was no proper channel to ensure accountability. Substantive gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies in Syria's declaration remained and the seriousness of the situation had increased over time. Turning to the recent poisoning in the town of Salisbury in her country, she said no explanation had been provided as to how a military-grade nerve agent had come to be used to sicken two people. There should be no more victims of chemical weapons attacks, whether they took place in the war zones of Syria or in an English town, she stressed. The representative of the Russian Federation said that the conclusions of the Joint Investigative Mechanism were nothing more than a pre-ordained, pre‑programmed result aimed at accusing the Syrian authorities. The Russian Federation was unable to support extension of the Mechanism's mandate in an unchanged form, he said, highlighting that his delegation had proposed a specic alternative and circulated a draft resolution which was currently "in blue". Syria's representative said that his Government had fullled its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention and Council resolution 2118 (2013). It had eliminated its chemical weapons programme in record time, which was a rst in the history of OPCW, he stressed, and the Joint Investigative Mechanism had conrmed that fact in its June 2014 report. The 5/21/2018 Questions Remain over Syria's Chemical Weapons Programme, Security Council Hears, as Speakers Call for Agreement on Suitable Ac… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13276.doc.htm 2/5 Syrian Army did not use chemical weapons nor did it possess them, rather they had been used against civilians by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh), Nusrah Front and other associated entities. Also speaking today were the representatives of the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Ethiopia, China, Bolivia, Côte d'Ivoire, Poland, Equatorial Guinea and Peru. The meeting began at 10:03 a.m. and ended at 11:47 a.m. Brieng THOMAS MARKRAM, Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Aairs, said that the Syrian Government had continued eorts to destroy the two remaining chemical weapons production facilities in the country. Destruction of those facilities was expected to be complete within two to three months from the start date and would be veried by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), he said, stressing that the long-awaited and veried destruction of the two facilities was an essential step towards the full implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). Discussions between the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the Syrian Government were continuing, although they had not led to the resolution of any of the remaining issues. "The OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to be unable to conrm the completeness and accuracy of Syria's declaration," he said, underscoring that resolving those outstanding issues would permit shared condence in Syria's declaration within the international community. The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission was continuing its work and was currently in Damascus looking into allegations of the use of chemical weapons that were brought to the attention of the OPCW Director-General by the Government, he said. The next report of the Fact-Finding Mission would be submitted when it considered that it had sucient information and was in a position to draw a conclusion, although those conclusions would not entail attribution of responsibility in those cases where the use of chemical weapons was determined. "The persistent allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria underscore the need to identify solutions and reach agreement on an appropriate accountability mechanism," he emphasized, adding that the Secretary-General and the High Representative for Disarmament Aairs had repeatedly underlined the need to avoid impunity and ensure that those responsible for the use of chemical weapons were identied and held responsible. Statements NIKKI R. HALEY (United States) said the Council often talked about chemical weapons, but she worried that sometimes it lost sight of the human side of chemical weapons attacks. A century had lapsed between the rst use of chemical weapons in the First World War and the chemical weapons attack in Khan Shaykun one year ago today, and in that time, several international instruments sought to prohibit such weapons. The international community dared to believe that once day chemical weapons would be relegated to the history books. Then came Syria, where shared disgust led the Council to adopt resolution 2118 (2013) requiring the scheduled destruction of Syria's chemical weapons, followed in 2015 by the creation of the Joint Investigative Mechanism on Chemical Weapons Use in Syria. The United Nations found that the Assad regime, as well as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh), had been responsible for the use of chemical weapons, and the Council dared to believe that consensus over the use of such weapons would hold. "But, we know what happened next," she said. The Assad regime continued to use chemical weapons, with one Council member shielding that regime from the consequences. The world today was a more dangerous place, with the Assad regime dropping chlorine bombs on men, women and children, she said. A few years ago, a single chemical weapons attack would have united the Council in shock and anger, but now there was a regime that used them "practically every other week". Letting one regime o the hook emboldened others, she said, adding that the world was rapidly sliding back to a time when people lived in fear of colourless, shapeless gas leaving them gasping for air. Even as the Council remained deadlocked, some had stood up to demand accountability, with the General Assembly approving an impartial mechanism to investigate serious crimes in Syria and France establishing a partnership against impunity for the use of chemical weapons. At the same time, people in Syria were facing the terrifying reality of such heinous weapons. She invited Marmoun Morad, a Syrian physician who treated victims of the Khan Shaykun attack, present in the Council chamber this morning, to stand up, and saluted him for his courage and determination. He was present today to be an inspiration for all Council members, she said, adding that, if Mr. Morad was not going to stop treating victims of chemical weapons attacks, then the Council must not stop working to eliminate such weapons and to hold to account anyone, anywhere who used them. Concluding, she said her country refused to believe that the Council could not come together once again on chemical weapons, despite any dierences between its members. KAREL JAN GUSTAAF VAN OOSTEROM (Netherlands) recalled that Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention almost ve years ago, having promised to destroy and abandon its chemical weapons programme; yet month after month there was news that the Syrian regime's declaration could not be considered complete or accurate. One year ago, the Assad regime carried out the heinous 4 April 2017 chemical attack against Khan Shaykhun that resulted in the deaths of about 100 innocent Syrian civilians, including many children. The use of chemical weapons should never go unpunished, he stressed. The Council must act upon the conclusions of the Joint Investigative Mechanism and the outcomes of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission. Further, the Council must intensify its eorts to achieve a mechanism that could continue the meticulous work of the Joint Investigative Mechanism. 5/21/2018 Questions Remain over Syria's Chemical Weapons Programme, Security Council Hears, as Speakers Call for Agreement on Suitable Ac… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13276.doc.htm 3/5 KAREN PIERCE (United Kingdom) recalled that the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission had concluded that sarin had been used at Khan Shaykhun and the Joint Investigative Mechanism had concluded that the Syrian regime was responsible for that attack. After more than four years of work, OPCW had yet to verify that Syria's declaration was accurate. Gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies remained which were not trivial points of minor detail — they were substantive and the seriousness of the situation had increased over time. There could be no impunity, she said, pointing out that, in the absence of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, there was no proper mechanism to ensure accountability. There was still no explanation provided as to how a military-grade nerve agent had come to be used in the poisoning in Salisbury. There should be no more victims of chemical weapons attacks; whether they took place in the war zones of Syria or in an English town. KAIRAT UMAROV (Kazakhstan) said that the use of chemical weapons was absolutely unacceptable under any circumstances. His delegation was pleased that during the reporting period there had been some progress towards the destruction of the remaining two chemical weapons production facilities in Syria, although, at the same time, he expressed concern about the lack of progress in clarifying all outstanding issues regarding the Government's initial declaration. The Council had not yet restored its investigative potential, he noted, stressing the need for every eort to be made to nd common ground on the issue. It was extremely important and necessary to overcome all dierences among Council members that prevented the complete elimination of the threat of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. FRANÇOIS DELATTRE (France) said the responsibility of the Damascus-based regime for the use of chemical weapons had been publicly and unambiguously established by the Joint Investigative Mechanism. Any attempt to discredit and to cast into oblivion the clear conclusion of the Joint Investigative Mechanism could not change that reality. Emphasizing that sarin and chlorine stocks did, indeed, exist in Syria, he said that country had either deceived the Council or pursued a clandestine chemical weapons programme. Given those two options, France called on Syria to respond to all unanswered questions, "and there are many of them". Reiterating his country's full support for OPCW, he said the use of chemical weapons was a moral oense that undermined the fundamental standards of international law, as well as the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. A taboo had been broken in Syria, as in Salisbury and elsewhere. He went on to emphasize that impunity for those who used chemical weapons was not an option. Their use against civilians was a war crime and a crime against humanity, and perpetrators must be held to account. If there was an area in which the Council's credibility was at stake, it was chemical weapons, he said, delivering an urgent appeal for Council members to overcome their political dierences and put an end to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. That much was owed to civilians, who were the main victims of such weapons, and to the international non-proliferation regime. MANSOUR AYYAD SH. A. ALOTAIBI (Kuwait) said that, due to divisions within the Council, the justice he had hoped for in the Khan Shaykun incident had "vanished into thin air". The continued use of chemical weapons in Syria four years after the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013) was unacceptable. His delegation backed any mechanism that could achieve consensus in the Council and hold those responsible for committing such crimes to account, according to the principles outlined in resolution 2118 (2013). Indeed, the draft resolution tabled by the United States contained such elements. As such, he called on Member States to use that draft as the basis for future negotiations on any such mechanism. Stressing the importance of bringing perpetrators of chemical crimes to justice, he expressed support for the work of Joint Investigative Mechanism in assisting in the investigation and prosecution of such crimes in Syria and looked forward to hearing the results of its rst report, which would be discussed on 17 April in the General Assembly. TEKEDA ALEMU (Ethiopia) expressed concern for the "barbaric" chemical attack in Khan Shaykun one year ago and called for those responsible to be held accountable. Without a unied response from the Council, damage to the chemical weapons disarmament and non-proliferation regime could not be repaired. He expressed hope that the Syrian Government — with the support of OPCW — would eliminate its two remaining stationary above-ground facilities. In that connection, he reiterated the importance of continued communication between OPCW and the Syrian Government with the ultimate objective of addressing remaining gaps and inconsistencies. Meanwhile, it was imperative that the investigative work of the OPCW's Fact-Finding Mission continued on all allegations of chemical weapons use. Nevertheless, the Council had to address the current institutional gap by creating an independent, impartial and professional investigative mechanism that could identify all State and non-State actors responsible for such crimes. WU HAITAO (China) said that his delegation was greatly concerned by the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria and rmly opposed the use of such weapons under any circumstances. Recent incidents of suspected use of toxic chemicals were deeply concerning, and in that regard, establishing a new investigative mechanism to nd out the truth and prevent the recurrent use of such weapons was of vital importance. All parties should continue to insist that the Security Council and OPCW should be the main channels for addressing the use of chemical weapons. He hoped that the Syrian Government would continue to cooperate with OPCW on the resolution of the initial declaration and properly resolve the outstanding issues. Political settlement was the only way to resolve the Syria issue, and in that context, the international community should support the next round of Geneva talks. JUAN MARCELO ZAMBRANA TORRELIO (Bolivia) expressed concern about the latest reports of alleged uses of chemical weapons in Syria and believed that there could be no justication for the use of such weapons, irrespective of the circumstances. His delegation strongly supported the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission and called on all parties to ensure an investigation could be carried out in a transparent and eective manner. However, there was still the need for a mechanism 5/21/2018 Questions Remain over Syria's Chemical Weapons Programme, Security Council Hears, as Speakers Call for Agreement on Suitable Ac… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13276.doc.htm 4/5 to identify the perpetrators so they could stand trial before the competent bodies. The Security Council must not be politicized or exploited on that issue, he said, calling on the parties to seek greater dialogue to create an investigative mechanism. The only way to resolve the conict was through a political process led by the Syrian people. CARL SKAU (Sweden) said the failure to agree on a new, independent and impartial attributive mechanism for chemical weapons use in Syria cast a particularly dark shadow on the Council. He condemned the continued and repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria, which constituted a serious violation of international law and a threat to international peace and security. Regarding the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), he expressed concern that OPCW was still unable to conrm whether Syria's initial declaration on its chemical weapons programme was accurate and complete. Indeed, there were still a number of serious outstanding issues. More specically, the Director-General last month reported that the initial 5 outstanding questions had grown to 22, including the case of the Syrian Scientic Studies and Research Centre. He went on to express deep regret that the Council had failed to agree on an extension of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, which was essential to protect the international disarmament and non‑proliferation regime and ensure accountability. BERNARD TANOH-BOUTCHOUE (Côte d'Ivoire) said cooperation among the Syrian Government, OPCW and the United Nations Oce for Project Services (UNOPS) aimed at the destruction of remaining chemical weapons production units was encouraging. He also thanked those States which had contributed to the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons. However, major challenges persisted, he said, urging Syria to continue its cooperation with OPCW to address outstanding issues, including the destruction of remaining chemical weapons facilities. Any use of chemical weapons was a breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention and a violation of hard-won international standards banning such weapons. He encouraged OPCW, the Fact-Finding Mission and the Syrian Government to continue their cooperation, and called for a political settlement to the Syrian conict. PAWEL RADOMSKI (Poland) said his delegation had taken note with utmost concern that the OPCW Technical Secretariat had been unable to conrm whether declarations submitted by Syria were accurate and complete. Once again, Poland joined the Secretary-General in calling on Syria to extend its fullest cooperation with the declaration assessment team. A clear message must be sent that the use of chemical weapons by anyone would not be tolerated, and the international community must be empowered to address each and every chemical weapons attack and to hold perpetrators accountable. Poland believed that the United States draft resolution was a good basis for further discussion on investigating the use of chemical weapons. He emphasized that the credibility of the non-proliferation regime, as well as collective security were at stake. Poland also hoped that those responsible for the reckless act in Salisbury would soon be held accountable. ANATOLIO NDONG MBA (Equatorial Guinea) said the use of chemical weapons posed a clear threat to international peace and security. The divergent positions of Council members had demonstrated that the end to the use of chemical weapons in Syria hinged on an inclusive political agreement. His delegation armed the urgent need for an investigative mechanism, calling it a collective responsibility and moral obligation to the victims of the conict. He called for Council members to recall their important role in the promotion of international peace and security. VASSILY A. NEBENZIA (Russian Federation) said it would be constructive to conduct a thorough analysis of the Khan Shaykhun incident and the consequences of that event in the context of global and regional security. The circumstances around that incident remained obscure. The so-called work done by the Joint Investigative Mechanism could not be taken seriously by professionals. The conclusions of that Mechanism were nothing more than a pre-ordained, pre‑programmed result aimed at accusing the Syrian authorities. They ran counter to the laws of physics, chemistry, aviation, ballistics and explosive matters. Experts did not travel to the location where the incident occurred and they had built their guesses on information received from armed groups and dubious structures that supported terrorist groups, including the white helmets. The Russian Federation was unable to support the extension of the Joint Investigative Mechanism mandate in an unchanged form, he said. Armed groups had amassed considerable capacity in chemical warfare. His delegation had proposed a specic alternative to the former Joint Investigative Mechanism and circulated a draft resolution which was currently "in blue". The urgent need was to conduct an analysis of the production of chemical weapons by non-State actors, as well as their eective use of those toxic substances. Nevertheless, Western colleagues were insisting on the recreation of a mechanism that was convenient for them and that would rubber stamp their own conclusions. International law fell to pieces when suspicions became the queen of evidence. Countries continued to condently announce that chemical weapons were being used by Damascus, despite the absence of evidence and the clear political and military objectives behind such allegations. Lastly, he called for a Council meeting on Thursday regarding the incident in Salisbury. GUSTAVO MEZA-CUADRA (Peru), Council President for April, speaking in his national capacity, said chemical weapons attacks were atrocities committed in open deance of the non-proliferation regime, as well as a threat to international peace and security which the Council could not allow. He expressed Peru's concern about the accuracy of the Syrian Government's declarations, adding that the Syrian authorities must be encouraged to provide all information without delay. Paying tribute to the Fact-Finding Mission, he said its work must be complemented by an independent mechanism that would make it possible to assign responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in line with international law. 5/21/2018 Questions Remain over Syria's Chemical Weapons Programme, Security Council Hears, as Speakers Call for Agreement on Suitable Ac… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13276.doc.htm 5/5 MOUNZER MOUNZER (Syria) said Syria had fullled its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention and Council resolution 2118 (2013). It had also always fully cooperated — in a positive, transparent and exible manner — despite great challenges and a complicated and dicult security situation. The Syrian Government had been able to eliminate its chemical weapons programme in record time, which was a rst in the history of OPCW. The Joint Investigative Mechanism conrmed that in its June 2014 report. But, rather than commending the Government for its eorts, some Council members — including the United States, which had not destroyed its chemical arsenal, United Kingdom and France — had mastered the art of deception and misinformation to dominate the world and take it back to the era of colonialism and trusteeship. They were investing in new Council meeting formats with one clear goal: to obstruct the Syrian army's progress against armed terrorist groups which they supported. He referred to theatrics staged by "white helmets" whose claims about the use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta coincided with its liberation from armed terrorist groups. Recalling the incident in Khan Shaykhun, he said the Joint Investigative Mechanism had refused to visit that location, relying instead on false witness statements and so-called open sources whose work was unfounded and lacking in credibility. His Government had insisted before the Council and the OPCW Executive Council that it condemned the use of chemical weapons and any other weapon of mass destruction for any reason in any place. The Syrian Army did not use chemical weapons nor did it possess them, he said. Rather, they had been used against civilians by ISIL, Nusrah Front and other associated entities. He said his Government had sent the Council and specialized agencies 130 letters on the possession, production and use of chemical weapons by armed terrorist groups, but, unfortunately, it never got an answer regarding measures that the Council might take against those States which facilitated terrorist access to such weapons. He went on to ask how the United States, United Kingdom and France could claim to be committee to justice while having carried out "blood-curdling attacks" in several countries in the Middle East, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean over many years. The partnership against impunity established by France represented an attempt to set up a politicized parallel mechanism that would serve the interests of States opposed to the Syrian Government, he said. His Government was committed to implementing its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and it would continue its war against terrorists regardless of political blackmail and cheap attempts to exploit the suering of the Syrian people. Concluding, he asked the representative of the Netherlands why no information had been provided about chemical agents aboard an aircraft that fell on Amsterdam in 1992, creating an orange-coloured explosion. For information media. Not an ocial record.
Eine nachhaltige Entwicklung bedeutet eine dauerhaft mögliche Entwicklung innerhalb des ökologischen Erdsystems. Durch das weltweite Bevölkerungswachstum, den ansteigenden Wohlstand und nicht-nachhaltige Lebensweisen drohen die ökologischen Belastungsgrenzen unsere Erde jedoch überschritten zu werden bzw. wurden teilweise bereits überschritten. Dies hat zur Folge, dass nachfolgende wie auch parallel existierende Generationen nicht die gleichen Möglichkeiten zur Erfüllung ihrer Bedürfnisse haben, wie die heute in den Industriestaaten lebenden. Die landwirtschaftliche Erzeugung trägt dabei einen bedeutenden Teil zu dieser Bedrohung und Überschreitung der planetaren Grenzen bei, denn insbesondere der hohe und weiter ansteigende Konsum von tierischen Produkten weltweit hat zahlreiche ökologisch, jedoch auch sozial und gesundheitlich nachteilige Folgen. Einer der grundlegenden problematischen Aspekte tierischer Produkte ist der hohe Energieverlust im Laufe des Veredlungsprozesses von pflanzlichen Futtermitteln zu Fleisch- und Milchprodukten. Die Folge sind große intensiv genutzte Landwirtschaftsflächen, die notwendig sind, um jene Futtermittel zu produzieren. Dies führt zu Biodiversitätsverlusten, Treibhausgasemissionen, Landraub und gesundheitlichen Problemen aufgrund des Pestizidgebrauchs. Weitere Konsequenzen eines hohen Konsums tierischer Produkte umfassen einen hohen Wasserbedarf, Flächenkonkurrenzen zwischen dem direkten Lebensmittel- und dem Futtermittelanbau, aber auch den ethisch bedenklichen Umgang mit Tieren sowie Gefahren für die menschliche Gesundheit, z. B. koronare Herzerkrankungen und Antibiotikaresistenzen. Begründet liegt dieser hohe und weiter wachsende Konsum tierischer Produkte in persönlichen, sozialen, ökonomischen und politischen sowie strukturellen Faktoren, wobei in vorliegender Arbeit auf den durch die westeuropäische Kultur geprägten Menschen fokussiert wird. Persönliche und soziale Hindernisse für einen reduzierten Konsum tierischer Lebensmittel liegen insbesondere in einem fehlenden Wissen, dem psychologischen Phänomen der kognitiven Dissonanz, mangelnder Achtsamkeit sowie dem Druck sozialer Normen. Wirtschaftspolitische und strukturelle Hindernisse umfassen eine wachstumsorientierte Ökonomie, fehlende Preisanreize für einen nachhaltigen Konsum sowie eine Infrastruktur, die den Konsum tierischer Produkte begünstigt. Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NRO) als Teil des sog. Dritten Sektors, neben der Wirtschaft und der Politik, und als Vertreterinnen der Gesellschaft sind essentielle Akteurinnen in nationalen und internationalen Gestaltungsprozessen. Sie werden zumeist von der Gesellschaft oder zumindest Teilen der Gesellschaft unterstützt und können durch Öffentlichkeitsarbeit und andere Maßnahmen auf politische und ökonomische Protagonisten Druck ausüben. Somit sind NRO als potentielle Schnittstelle zwischen Gesellschaft, Politik und Wirtschaft vielversprechende Einrichtungen um den Konsum tierischer Produkte zu senken. Aufgrund der o. g. multidimensionalen Auswirkungen des hohen Konsums tierischer Produkte, haben insbesondere NRO, die die Ziele Umweltschutz, Ernährungssicherung, Tierschutz und Gesundheitsförderung verfolgen, potentiell Interesse an einer Reduktion des Fleisch-, Milch- und Eikonsums. Studien über NRO in Schweden, Kanada und den USA weisen jedoch darauf hin, dass Umweltorganisationen sich in ihrer Arbeit für eine Begrenzung des Klimawandels nur in begrenztem Umfang für eine pflanzenbetonte Ernährungsweise einsetzen. Aufgrund der o. g. mehrdimensionalen Folgen eines hohen Konsums tierischer Lebensmittel weitet vorliegende Arbeit den Erhebungsumfang aus und umfasst die Untersuchung von deutschen Umwelt-, Welternährungs-, Gesundheits- und Tierschutzorganisationen in Hinblick auf deren Einsatz für eine Reduktion des Fleisch-, Milch- und Eikonsums. Die Erhebung umfasst die Untersuchung von 34 der wichtigsten deutschen NRO mittels Material- und Internetseitenanalyse, vertiefende leitfadengestützte Expert*inneninterviews mit 24 NRO sowie eine Fokusgruppendiskussion zur Ergebniskontrolle, wobei das zentrale Element dabei die Expert*inneninterviews darstellen. Insgesamt entspricht der Forschungsprozess der Grounded Theory Methodologie (GTM), einem ergebnisoffenen, induktiven Vorgehen. Die Forschungsfragen umfassen neben der Analyse des aktuellen Umfangs des Einsatzes für eine pflanzenbetonte Ernährungsweise insbesondere die Einflussfaktoren auf diesen Umfang sowie die umgesetzten Handlungsstrategien für eine Reduktion des Konsums tierischer Lebensmittel. Entsprechend der GTM steht am Ende des Forschungsprozesses vorliegender Arbeit ein Modell, das die Erkenntnisse in einer verdichteten Kernkategorie zusammenfasst. Als zentrales Ergebnis der Erhebung kann das 'Modell der abwägenden Bestandssicherung' gesehen werden. Es weist, in Übereinstimmung mit der Literatur, darauf hin, dass NRO als Teil der Gesellschaft von der Außenwelt abhängig sind, d. h. von ihren Mitgliedern und staatlichen wie privaten Geldgeber*innen, aber auch von parallel agierenden NRO, Medien und gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungen. Dies kann unter der Überschrift der 'Einstellung relevanter Interessensgruppen' zur Thematik der tierischen Lebensmittel gefasst werden. Auf der anderen Seite steht die 'Einstellung der Mitarbeitenden' einer NRO, da die Themenaufnahme der Problematik eines hohen Fleisch-, Milch- und Eikonsums auch davon abhängt, welche Bedeutung die Mitarbeitenden dieser Thematik zusprechen und inwiefern sie bereit sind sie in das Maßnahmenportfolio aufzunehmen. Wenn sowohl die Interessensgruppen als auch die Mitarbeitenden einer NRO der Themenaufnahme befürwortend gegenüber gestellt sind, so ist ein umfassender Einsatz für eine Reduktion des Konsums tierischer Lebensmittel von dieser NRO zu erwarten. Dies trifft in vorliegender Erhebung vorwiegend auf Tierschutzorganisationen und einige Umweltorganisationen zu. Der gegenteilige Fall einer fehlenden Thematisierung tierischer Produkte tritt ein, wenn weder relevante Interessensgruppen, noch die Mitarbeitenden einer NRO die Themenaufnahme befürworten oder als dringlich erachten. Dies kann insbesondere bei Welternährungs- und Gesundheitsorganisationen beobachtet werden. Wenn die Mitarbeitenden einer NRO die Thematisierung der Problematik tierischer Lebensmittel befürworten, die relevanten Interessensgruppen jedoch ablehnend gegenüber derartigen Maßnahmen stehen, ist eine zurückhaltende Thematisierung zu erwarten, die sich auf Informationstexte bspw. auf den Internetseitenauftritten der NRO beschränkt. Dies ist v. a. bei Umwelt- und Welternährungsorganisationen erkennbar. Der vierte Fall, dass die Interessensgruppen einer NRO für eine Reduktion des Konsums tierischer Produkte eintreten würden, nicht jedoch die Mitarbeitenden der NRO, konnte in vorliegender Erhebung nur in Ansätzen bei Umweltorganisationen beobachtet werden. Der Hauptgrund, warum NRO, insbesondere Welternährungs- und Gesundheitsorganisationen, die Problematik des hohen Konsums tierischer Produkte nicht oder nur in geringem Umfang aufnehmen, liegt in der o. g. Abhängigkeit der NRO von öffentlichen Geldgeber*innen, wie auch von privaten Spender*innen und Mitgliedern ('Einstellung relevanter Interessensgruppen'). Weitere Faktoren umfassen bspw. die Arbeitsteilung wie auch den Wettbewerb zwischen NRO, insofern dass auf andere NRO verwiesen wird und Nischen für eigene Themen gesucht werden. Neben den Gründen für den Umfang der Thematisierung des hohen Konsums tierischer Lebensmittel wurden auch Strategien erfragt, die die NRO anwenden um denselben zu senken. Hierbei wurde insbesondere die Öffentlichkeitsarbeit in verschiedenen Ausrichtungen genannt und als sehr wirksam eingeschätzt. Vor allem emotional ausgerichtete, positiv formulierte, zielgruppenspezifische und anschaulich dargestellte Kampagnen können als effektiv eingeschätzt werden. Auch politische oder juristische Maßnahmen, wie Lobbyismus oder Verbandsklagen werden von den NRO durchgeführt, wobei die befragten NRO auf der bundespolitischen Ebene derzeit kaum Potential sehen Änderungen herbeizuführen; auf Regionen- oder Länderebene jedoch realistischere Einflussmöglichkeiten sehen. Als nächste Schritte für NRO im Sinne einer (verstärkten) Thematisierung der Problematik tierischer Lebensmittel können folgende Maßnahmen geraten werden: • Eine Erhebung der Meinung von Mitgliedern und Spender*innen zu der o. g. Themenaufnahme in das Maßnahmenportfolio der jeweiligen NRO. Dies ist insbesondere bei NRO sinnvoll, die unsicher über die Reaktion ihrer Mitglieder und Spender*innen auf einen Einsatz für eine Reduktion des Konsums tierischer Produkte sind. • Eine Prüfung von alternativen Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten, die eine Abhängigkeit von staatlichen Geldern verringern. Hierdurch würde der Bedeutung von NRO als Teil des Dritten Sektors neben Politik und Wirtschaft gerecht und die Einflussmöglichkeiten auf dieselben erhöht. • Eine vermehrte Kooperation zwischen NRO innerhalb einer Disziplin und zwischen Disziplinen, sodass bspw. im Rahmen eines Netzwerkes aufeinander verwiesen werden kann. Dies ermöglicht die Einhaltung der jeweiligen Organisationsphilosophien und Kernkompetenzen trotz Zusammenarbeit mit NRO, die andere Herangehensweisen an die Förderung einer pflanzenbetonten Ernährungsweise verfolgen. Zudem ermöglicht diese Netzwerkbildung eine erhöhte Wettbewerbsfähigkeit mit dem ökonomischen und politischen Sektor. • Die Anerkennung der Handlungsfähigkeit von NRO als Pionierinnen des Wandels. Als Dritter Sektor neben der Politik und Wirtschaft kommt NRO eine große Bedeutung in der Beeinflussung gesellschaftlicher Prozesse, insbesondere auf zwischenstaatlicher Ebene zu. Auch komplexe Themen und, angesichts der Überschreitung der planetaren Grenzen, dringliche weltumfassende Themen können von kleinen, regionalen NRO aufgegriffen werden. • Die Fortführung von bewährten Maßnahmen zur Reduktion des Konsums tierischer Produkte, wie verschiedene Formen der Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, kann als sinnvoll erachtet werden. Hinzu können neue Inhalte genommen werden, wie bspw. die Förderung eines achtsamen Konsumstils durch naturnahe Lernorte. Für eine Umsetzung wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse zu Verhaltensänderungen hinsichtlich nachhaltiger Konsumstile ist eine verstärkte Zusammenarbeit mit Forschungseinrichtungen sinnvoll. Diese Erkenntnisse hinsichtlich der Gründe für eine Thematisierung der Problematik tierischer Produkte durch NRO lassen sich evtl. auch auf andere Themen übertragen, die von NRO aufgegriffen werden können, wie bspw. die Kritik an Flugreisen. Zudem ist es denkbar, dass die auf Deutschland beschränkte Analyse auch auf weitere, insbesondere westlich geprägte Länder übertragen werden kann. ; Sustainable development facilitates a permanently pursuable development which is within the ecological earth system. Through the worldwide population growth, the increasing wealth and unsustainable lifestyles the ecological limits are about to be or are already exceeded, so that future generations as well as parallel living generations haven't got the same possibilities to meet their needs as those living in current developed nations. Agricultural production contributes a high share to this threat to and exceedance of planetary boundaries, as in particular the high and further increasing consumption of animal source products has numerous ecological but also social and health consequences. One of the basic problematic aspects of animal source products is the high energy loss during the processing from plant animal feed to meat and dairy products. As a result large intensively used agricultural areas are necessary to feed animals leading to biodiversity loss, greenhouse gas emissions, land grabbing and health problems due to pesticide usage. Furthermore, high water usage, competition between food and fodder, as well as inhumane treatment of animals, and threats to human health by e.g. coronary heart diseases and antibiotic resistance are consequences of a meat-rich diet. Reasons for this high and increasing animal product consumption include personal, social, economic and political as well as structural factors, whereby in the thesis at hand the focus lies on people which are shaped by a Western European culture. Personal and social barriers to a reduced consumption of animal source food mainly include a lack of knowledge, the psychological phenomenon of cognitive dissonance, a lack of consciousness as well as the pressure of social norms. Political and economic barriers comprise the growth-oriented economy, a lack of price incentives for a sustainable consumption as well as an infrastructure which facilitates the consumption of animal source products. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as part of the so called Third Sector, besides politics and economy, and representatives of the society are a vital player in national and international governance. They are mostly supported by the society or at least by parts of it and can put pressure on political and economical protagonists through public relations activities and other means. Thus, NGOs as potential interface between society, politics and economy are one promising player for reducing animal product consumption. Due to the above named multidimensional consequences of a high consumption of animal source products especially NGOs targeting to protect the environment, improve the world nutrition situation, care for animal ethics and enhance the health status are potentially interested to reduce the consumption of meat, dairy and eggs. However, according to previous studies in Sweden, Canada and the U.S., there is a limited degree of engagement in encouraging reduced meat consumption of environmental NGOs in light of climate change. Due to the multidimensional consequences of animal source products in the thesis at hand the coverage of analysis is extended and includes the investigation of German environmental, food security, health and animal welfare organizations regarding their commitment to a reduced consumption of animal products. Research consists of a material analysis of 34 NGOs, 24 expert interviews with NGO staff and a focus group discussion testing the preliminary results of the interviews, whereby the central element is the expert interviews. Overall the research process complies with the Grounded Theory Methodology (GTM), which is an inductive procedure without fixed expectations regarding the results. In particular, the research questions include, besides the analysis of the current scope of the commitment to a plant-based nutrition, the influencing factors on this scope as well as the kind of strategies of action for a reduced consumption of animal source products. In accordance to the GTM a new model has been developed as final result of the research process which summarizes the findings in a compact core category. As central result of the research the 'model of the weighing of existence-securing' can be presented. In compliance with previous literature it indicates that NGOs as part of the society are dependent on their environment, i. e. on their members as well as public and private funders, but also on parallel existing NGOs, the media and societal developments. This can be summarized under the headline 'attitude of relevant stakeholders' to the theme of animal source products. On the other side, the 'attitude of the staff' of a NGO can be named as influencing factor, as the thematisation of the problematic of the high animal product consumption is also dependent on the importance which is awarded to this topic by the staff members and in how far they are ready to include the topic in their portfolio of action. In case of the support of the topic by both the stakeholders and the staff members of a NGO, a comprehensive thematisation of the problematic of animal source products can be expected from the respective NGO. In the investigation at hand, this is mainly true for animal welfare and environmental organisations. The contradictory case of no thematisation occurs if neither relevant stakeholders nor the staff members of a NGO support the urgency and thematisation of the reduced animal product consumption. This case can be observed mainly for food security and health organisations. If staff members of a NGO are in favour of the thematisation of the problematic of animal source products, but the stakeholders reject such measures, a restrained thematisation can be expected, which is limited to information texts e. g. on the website of the respective NGO. This is mainly for some environmental and food security organization observable. The fourth case, in which stakeholders are in favour of the thematisation, but staff members aren't, is merely true for some environmental organisation in the analysis at hand. The main reason for a restrained plaid for a reduced consumption of animal source products, mainly by food security and environmental organisations, can be detected in the dependence on financial means from the government, donors and members ('attitude of relevant stakeholders'). But there are also factors like the division of responsibility and the competition between NGOs which impede an engagement in reducing animal product consumption, as NGOs refer to other NGOs or are search for own thematic niches. Besides the reasons for the scope of animal product thematisation by NGOs, strategies of the NGOs advocating a reduced animal product consumption has been analysed. These strategies include mainly public relations work in different variants, which is estimated by the NGOs to be highly effective. In particular emotionally created, positively formulated, target group specific and vividly presented campaigns can be rated as effective. In addition political and legal measures like lobbying or representative actions are named by the interviewed NGOs, whereby they don't see any potential for change on the federal level but on regional or provincial level. As next steps for NGOs according to the reduction of the consumption of animal source products, the following measures can be advised: • A survey about the opinions of the members and donators about the inclusion of the above named topic into to portfolio of measures. Particularly this is relevant for NGOs which are not sure about the reaction of their members and donators to their commitment to a reduced consumption of animal product consumption. An analysis of alternative possibilities of the origin of financial means, which minimize the dependence on public funds. Through this change of the origin of financial means NGOs would satisfy their meaning as part of the Third Sector besides politics and the economy and would increase their possibilities of influencing them. • An increased cooperation between NGOs of the same discipline as well as between different disciplines, so that they can e.g. refer to each other within a network. This enables NGOs to follow their respective organisational philosophy and core competences while at the same time allows cooperating with NGOs following a different approach to foster a plant-based way of nutrition. In addition, this creation of networks facilitates an increased competitiveness with the economic and political sector. • The acknowledgement of NGOs possibilities for action as agents of change. As part of the Third Sector besides politics and the economy, NGOs have a high importance in the influencing of social developments, especially on the interstate level. Complex topics as well as – due to the exceedance of planetary boundaries – urgent global topics can be thematised both by small, regional and large, international NGOs. • The continuation of proven measures aiming to reduce the consumption of animal source products, like different kinds of public relations work, is reasonable. In addition, new contents can be included, like e. g. the fostering of a conscious style of consumption through learning facilities close to nature. For an implementation of scientific findings about behaviour change regarding sustainable styles of consumption an improved cooperation of NGOs and research institutions is recommendable. These findings regarding the reasons for the thematisation of the problematic of animal source products through NGOs might be able to be transferred to other topics, which are thematised by NGOs, like e. g. the criticism on air travels. Furthermore, it is conceivable to transfer the findings about German NGOs to other countries, especially Western characterised countries.
Under a Creative Commons license.-- Review.-- et al. ; Targeted therapies and the consequent adoption of >personalized> oncology have achieved notablesuccesses in some cancers; however, significant problems remain with this approach. Many targetedtherapies are highly toxic, costs are extremely high, and most patients experience relapse after a fewdisease-free months. Relapses arise from genetic heterogeneity in tumors, which harbor therapy-resistantimmortalized cells that have adopted alternate and compensatory pathways (i.e., pathways that are notreliant upon the same mechanisms as those which have been targeted). To address these limitations, aninternational task force of 180 scientists was assembled to explore the concept of a low-toxicity >broad-spectrum> therapeutic approach that could simultaneously target many key pathways and mechanisms. Using cancer hallmark phenotypes and the tumor microenvironment to account for the various aspectsof relevant cancer biology, interdisciplinary teams reviewed each hallmark area and nominated a widerange of high-priority targets (74 in total) that could be modified to improve patient outcomes. For thesetargets, corresponding low-toxicity therapeutic approaches were then suggested, many of which werephytochemicals. Proposed actions on each target and all of the approaches were further reviewed forknown effects on other hallmark areas and the tumor microenvironment. Potential contrary or procar-cinogenic effects were found for 3.9% of the relationships between targets and hallmarks, and mixedevidence of complementary and contrary relationships was found for 7.1%. Approximately 67% of therelationships revealed potentially complementary effects, and the remainder had no known relationship. Among the approaches, 1.1% had contrary, 2.8% had mixed and 62.1% had complementary relationships. These results suggest that a broad-spectrum approach should be feasible from a safety standpoint. Thisnovel approach has potential to be relatively inexpensive, it should help us address stages and types ofcancer that lack conventional treatment, and it may reduce relapse risks. A proposed agenda for futureresearch is offered. ; Amr Amin was funded by Terry Fox Foundation Grant # TF-13-20 and UAEU Program for Advanced Research (UPAR) #31S118; Jack Arbiser was funded by NIHAR47901; Alexandra Arreola was funded by NIH NRSA Grant F31CA154080; Alla Arzumanyan was funded by NIH (NIAID) R01: Combination therapies for chronic HBV, liver disease, and cancer (AI076535); Work in the lab of Asfar S. Azmi is supported by NIH R21CA188818 as well as from Sky Foundation Inc. Michigan; Fabian Benencia was supported by NIH Grant R15 CA137499-01; Alan Bilsland was supported by the University of Glasgow, Beatson Oncology Centre Fund, CRUK (www.cancerresearchuk.org) Grant C301/A14762; Amancio Carnero was supported by grants from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitivity, ISCIII (Fis: PI12/00137, RTICC: RD12/0036/0028) co-funded by FEDER from Regional Development European Funds (European Union), Consejeria de Ciencia e Innovacion (CTS-6844 and CTS-1848) and Consejeria de Salud of the Junta de Andalucia (PI-0135-2010 and PI-0306-2012). His work on this project has also been made possible thanks to the Grant PIE13/0004 co-funded by the ISCIII and FEDER funds; Stephanie C. Casey was supported by NIH Grant F32CA177139; Mrinmay Chakrabarti was supported by the United Soybean Board; Rupesh Chaturvedi was supported by an NIH NCCAM Grant (K01AT007324); Georgia Zhuo Chen was supported by an NIH NCI Grant (R33 CA161873-02); Helen Chen acknowledges financial support from the Michael Cuccione Childhood Cancer Foundation Graduate Studentship; Sophie Chen acknowledges financial support from the Ovarian and Prostate Cancer Research Trust, UK; Yi Charlie Chen acknowledges financial support from the West Virginia Higher Education Policy Commission/Division of Science Research, his research was also supported by NIH grants (P20RR016477 and P20GM103434) from the National Institutes of Health awarded to the West Virginia IDeA Network of Biomedical Research Excellence; Maria Rosa Ciriolo was partially supported by the Italian Association for Cancer Research (AIRC) Grants #IG10636 and #15403; Helen M. Coley acknowledges financial support from the GRACE Charity, UK and the Breast Cancer Campaign, UK; Marisa Connell was supported by a Michael Cuccione Childhood Cancer Foundation Postdoctoral Fellowship; Sarah Crawford was supported by a research grant from Connecticut State University; Charlotta Dabrosin acknowledges financial support from the Swedish Research Council and the Swedish Research Society; Giovanna Damia gratefully acknowledges the generous contributions of The Italian Association for Cancer Research (IG14536 to G.D.); ; Santanu Dasgupta gratefully acknowledges the support of the University of Texas Health Science Centre at Tyler, Elsa U. Pardee Foundation; William K. Decker was supported in part by CPRIT, the Cancer Prevention and Research Institute of Texas; Anna Mae E. Diehl was supported by NIH National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK), the NIH National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA), Gilead and Shire Pharmaceuticals; Q. Ping Dou was partially supported by NIH/NCI (1R01CA20009, 5R01CA127258-05 and R21CA184788), and NIH P30 CA22453 (to Karmanos Cancer Institute); Janice E. Drew was supported by the Scottish Government's Rural and Environment Science and Analytical Services Division; Eyad Elkord thanks the National Research Foundation, United Arab Emirates University and the Terry Fox Foundation for supporting research projects in his lab; Bassel El-Rayes was supported by Novartis Pharmaceutical, Aveo Pharmaceutical, Roche, Bristol Myers Squibb, Bayer Pharmaceutical, Pfizer, and Kyowa Kirin; Mark A. Feitelson was supported by NIH/NIAID Grant AI076535; ; Dean W. Felsher was supported by NIH grants (R01CA170378, U54CA149145, and U54CA143907); Lynnette R Ferguson was financially supported by the Auckland Cancer Society and the Cancer Society of New Zealand; Gary L. Firestone was supported by NIH Public Service Grant CA164095 awarded from the National Cancer Institute; Christian Frezza "would like to acknowledge funding from a Medical Research Council CCU-Program Grant on cancer metabolism, and a unique applicant AICR project grant"; Mark M. Fuster was supported by NIH Grant R01-HL107652; Alexandros G. Georgakilas was supported by an EU Marie Curie Reintegration Grant MC-CIG-303514, Greek National funds through the Operational Program 'Educational and Lifelong Learning of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF)-Research Funding Program THALES (Grant number MIS 379346) and COST Action CM1201 'Biomimetic Radical Chemistry'; Michelle F. Green was supported by a Duke University Molecular Cancer Biology T32 Training Grant; Brendan Grue was supported by a National Sciences Engineering and Research Council Undergraduate Student Research Award in Canada; Dorota Halicka was supported by by NIH NCI grant NCI RO1 28704; Petr Heneberg was supported by the Charles University in Prague projects UNCE 204015 and PRVOUK P31/2012, by the Czech Science Foundation projects 15-03834Y and P301/12/1686, by the Czech Health Research Council AZV project 15-32432A, and by the Internal Grant Agency of the Ministry of Health of the Czech Republic project NT13663-3/2012; Matthew D. Hirschey wishes to acknowledge Duke University Institutional Support, the Duke Pepper Older Americans Independence Center (OAIC) Program in Aging Research supported by the National Institute of Aging (P30AG028716-01) and NIH/NCI training grants to Duke University (T32-CA059365-19 and 5T32-CA059365); ; Lorne J. Hofseth was supported by NIH grants (1R01CA151304, 1R03CA1711326, and 1P01AT003961); Kanya Honoki was supported in part by the grant from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan (No. 24590493); Hsue-Yin Hsu was supported in part by grants from the Ministry of Health and Welfare (CCMP101-RD-031 and CCMP102-RD-112) and Tzu-Chi University (61040055-10) of Taiwan; Lasse D. Jensen was supported by Svenska Sallskapet for Medicinsk Forskning, Gosta Fraenkels Stiftelse, Ak.e Wibergs Stiftelse, Ollie och Elof Ericssons Stiftelse, Linkopings Universitet and the Karolinska Institute, Sweden; Wen G. Jiang wishes to acknowledge the support by Cancer Research Wales, the Albert Hung Foundation, the Fong Family Foundation, and Welsh Government A4B scheme; Lee W. Jones was supported in part by grants from the NIH NCI; W Nicol Keith was supported by the University of Glasgow, Beatson Oncology Centre Fund, CRUK (www.cancerresearchuk.org) Grant C301/A14762; Sid P. Kerkar was supported by the NIH Intramural Research Program; Rob J. Kulathinal was supported by the National Science Foundation, and the American Cancer Society; Byoung S. Kwon was supported in part by National Cancer Center (NCC-1310430-2) and National Research Foundation (NRF-2005-0093837); Anne Le was supported by Sol Goldman Pancreatic Cancer Research Fund Grant 80028595, a Lustgarten Fund Grant 90049125 and Grant NIHR21CA169757 (to Anne Le); Michael A. Lea was funded by the The Alma Toorock Memorial for Cancer Research; Ho-Young Lee. ; This work was supported by grants from the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF), the Ministry of Science, ICT & Future Planning (MSIP), Republic of Korea (Nos. 2011-0017639 and 2011-0030001) and by a NIH Grant R01 CA100816; Liang-Tzung Lin was supported in part by a grant from the Ministry of Education of Taiwan (TMUTOP103005-4); Jason W. Locasale acknowledges support from NIH awards (CA168997 and AI110613) and the International Life Sciences Institute; Bal L. Lokeshwar was supported in part by United States' Public Health Services Grants: NIH R01CA156776 and VA-BLR&D Merit Review Grant No. 5I01-BX001517-02; Valter D. Longo acknowledges support from NIH awards (P01AG034906 and R01AG020642) and from the V Foundation; Costas A. Lyssiotis was funded in part by the Pancreatic Cancer Action Network as a Pathway to Leadership Fellow and through a Dale F. Frey Breakthrough award from the Damon Runyon Cancer Research Foundation; Karen L. MacKenzie wishes to acknowledge the support from the Children's Cancer Institute Australia (affiliated with the University of New South Wales, Australia and the Sydney Children's Hospital Network); Maria Marino was supported by grant from University Roma Tre to M.M. (CLA 2013) and by the Italian Association for Cancer Research (AIRC-Grant #IG15221); ; Ander Matheu is funded by Carlos III Health Institute (AM: CP10/00539), Basque Foundation for Science (IKERBASQUE) and Marie Curie CIG Grant (AM: 2012/712404); Christopher Maxwell was supported by funding from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, in partnership with the Avon Foundation for Women (OBC-134038) and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research New Investigator Salary Award (MSH-136647); Eoin McDonnell received Duke University Institutional Support; Kapil Mehta was supported by Bayer Healthcare System G4T (Grants4Targets); Gregory A. Michelotti received support from NIH NIDDK, NIH NIAAA, and Shire Pharmaceuticals; Vinayak Muralidhar was supported by the Harvard-MIT Health Sciences and Technology Research Assistantship Award; Elena Niccolai was supported by the Italian Ministry of University and the University of Italy; Virginia R. Parslow gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Auckland Cancer Society Research Centre (ACSRC); Graham Pawelec was supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, BMBF) Grant number 16SV5536K, and by the European Commission (FP7 259679 "IDEAL"); Peter L. Pedersen was supported by NIH Grant CA-10951; Brad Poore was supported by Sol Goldman Pancreatic Cancer Research Fund Grant 80028595, the Lustgarten Fund Grant 90049125, and Grant NIHR21CA169757 (to Anne Le); Satya Prakash was supported by a Canadian Institutes of Health Research Grant (MOP 64308); Lizzia Raffaghello was supported by an NIH Grant (P01AG034906-01A1) and Cinque per Mille dell'IRPEF–Finanziamento della Ricerca Sanitaria; Jeffrey C. Rathmell was supported by an NIH Grant (R01HL108006); Swapan K. Ray was supported by the United Soybean Board; Domenico Ribatti received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under Grant agreement n°278570; Luigi Ricciardiello was supported by the AIRC Investigator Grants 10216 and 13837, and the European Community's Seventh Framework Program FP7/2007–2013 under Grant agreement 311876; Francis Rodier acknowledges the support of the Canadian Institute for Health Research (FR: MOP114962, MOP125857), Fonds de Recherche Québec Santé (FR: 22624), and the Terry Fox Research Institute (FR: 1030); ; Gian Luigi Russo contributed to this effort while participating in the Fulbright Research Scholar Program 2013–14; Isidro Sanchez-Garcia is partially supported by FEDER and by MICINN (SAF2012-32810), by NIH Grant (R01 CA109335-04A1), by Junta de Castilla y León (BIO/SA06/13) and by the ARIMMORA project (FP7-ENV-2011, European Union Seventh Framework Program). Isidro Sanchez-Garcia's lab is also a member of the EuroSyStem and the DECIDE Network funded by the European Union under the FP7 program; Andrew J. Sanders wishes to acknowledge the support by Cancer Research Wales, the Albert Hung Foundation, the Fong Family Foundation, and Welsh Government A4B scheme; Neeraj K. Saxena was supported by grant funding from NIH NIDDK (K01DK077137, R03DK089130); Dipali Sharma was partially funded by NIH NCI grants (R01CA131294, R21 CA155686), the Avon Foundation and a Breast Cancer Research Foundation Grant (90047965); Markus David Siegelin received funding from National Institute of Health, NINDS Grant K08NS083732, and the 2013 AACR-National Brain Tumor Society Career Development Award for Translational Brain Tumor Research, Grant Number 13-20-23-SIEG; Neetu Singh was supported by funds from the Department of Science and Technology (SR/FT/LS-063/2008), New Delhi, India; Carl Smythe was supported by Yorkshire Cancer Research and The Wellcome Trust, UK; Carmela Spagnuolo was supported by funding from Project C.I.S.I.A., act n. 191/2009 from the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance Project CAMPUS-QUARC, within program FESR Campania Region 2007/2013, objectives 2.1, 2.2; Diana M. Stafforini was supported by grants from the National Cancer Institute (5P01CA073992), IDEA Award W81XWH-12-1-0515 from the Department of Defense, and by the Huntsman Cancer Foundation; John Stagg was supported by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research; Pochi R. Subbarayan was supported by the University of Miami Clinical and Translational Science Institute (CTSI) Pilot Research Grant (CTSI-2013-P03) and SEEDS You Choose Awards; Phuoc T. Tran was funded by the DoD (W81XWH-11-1-0272 and W81XWH-13-1-0182), a Kimmel Translational Science Award (SKF-13-021), an ACS Scholar award (122688-RSG-12-196-01-TBG) and the NIH (R01CA166348); Kathryn E. Wellen receives funding from the National Cancer Institute, Pancreatic Cancer Action Network, Pew Charitable Trusts, American Diabetes Association, and Elsa U. Pardee Foundation; Huanjie Yang was partially supported by the Scientific Research Foundation for the Returned Oversea Scholars, State Education Ministry and Scientific and Technological Innovation Project, Harbin (2012RFLXS011); ; Paul Yaswen was supported by funding from the United States National Institutes of Health (ES019458) and the California Breast Cancer Research Program (17UB-8708); Clement Yedjou was supported by a grant from the National Institutes of Health (Grant # G1200MD007581), through the RCMI-Center for Environmental Health; Xin Yin was supported by NIH/National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute Training Grant T32HL098062.; Jiyue Zhu was supported by NIH Grant R01GM071725; Massimo Zollo was supported by the European FP7-TuMIC HEALTH-F2-2008-201662, the Italian Association for Cancer research (AIRC) Grant IG # 11963 and the Regione Campania L.R:N.5, the European National Funds PON01-02388/1 2007-2013. ; Peer Reviewed
Between 2001 and 2004, the OECD, the European Training Foundation, CEDEFOP and the World Bank carried out extensive reviews of career guidance, looking broadly at related policy and practice in both the labourmarket and the education sectors. In 2002, the European PES Network's Expert Group carried out a study on personalised services with a special focus on guidance and counselling, documenting examples of interesting practice in six Public Employment Services (PES). The present study, commissioned by DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities in October 2004 in collaboration with the Heads of PES Network, sets out to build on the accumulated knowledge of the previous reviews by drawing on the responses of 28 countries—the EU25 plus three EEA countries (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland)—to a questionnaire survey that was specifically developed to facilitate the identification and examination of the place of career guidance in the Public Employment Services across Europe. The survey data was complemented by country visits to Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden, in order to provide a qualitative dimension to the study, and to enable a deeper examination of the issues that were foregrounded in the survey. The key purpose behind the study was to gauge the manner in which—and the extent to which—personalised employment and career guidance services in the European PES have responded to the widely-adopted goal of implementing a personal service approach, identifying the difficulties they have encountered and the innovative responses they have generated. The study is guided by a concern with the practical, i.e. it sets out to describe the day-to-day realities of work in the PES with a view to identifying some of the more promising and successful practices, and to make proposals for improvement. The report provides details of the various models of career guidance in use, the processes that are being implemented across the range of EU and EEA countries, the outcomes of PES interventions, the tools and instruments used to attain such outcomes, the level of staff preparation for delivering career guidance services, and the strategies that are in place in order to ensure quality provision. An understanding of the context in which the PES across Europe provide career guidance services is crucial. The study is therefore careful to locate the survey within the context of the European Employment Strategy (EES), and particularly the European Employment Guideline on prevention and activation. It also draws a link between the latter and the effort to modernise the PES across Europe through the widespread adoption of a personal service model, which gives pride of place to the client, and which strives to guarantee citizens' rights for quality, proximity, personalisation and individualisation of public services. The report further examines the potential of career guidance in contributing to the attainment of the Lisbon targets, particularly in relation to the priorities established by the EES to increase in the adaptability of workers, to attract more people to the labour market, and to increase quality investment in human capital. It is argued that career guidance and personalised employment services have the potential for making such a contribution by advancing lifelong learning goals, by helping to address a whole range of labour market issues, and by supporting efforts to attain social equity and social inclusion goals. While career guidance services are offered in a range of settings, and there is an overlap in the way that these services are understood in such settings, specific attention needs to be given to the way career guidance is defined within the overall mission of the PES. Here we can distinguish three main categories of activities: - The first are those activities that fall within the area of 'personalised employment services', and that have elements of career guidance embedded in them. Employment advisers register and interview clients, and in the process of doing so utilise several guidance-related skills, particularly where efforts are being made to personalise services through client segmentation. While the employment adviser's work at this level—in relation to the initial interview, personal action planning, and assistance in the job-search process through job-broking and other means—cover processes and tasks that are largely administrative, they can also have strong guidance elements embedded in them. The report acknowledges the tensions that arise in the mix and balance between administrative and guidance roles, stressing that both elements are critical in the consolidation of career guidance elements within services that have, as their primary objective, the placing of people in employment. - The second category of activities are specialised career guidance services. These are distinguished from the first category by their more intensive and more focused engagement with the client, on the basis of a deeper knowledge base and extended competence. It is noted that the two categories are increasingly becoming blurred, and that this carries with it both opportunities and challenges for career guidance in a PES context. - A third category of activities considers other career guidance provision that the PES may be involved in, including the production and/or dissemination of labour market information, as well as occupational information, and the provision of career guidance services to students. These three categories of activities need to be considered within the changes in the overall organisational context of the public employment services. One of the key trends that have an impact on the way personalised employment and career guidance services are delivered is responsibility-sharing. The study considers three key aspects in relation to this organisational trend. The first is the sharing of responsibility with regional and local employment offices through decentralisation. The second is the sharing of responsibility with partners through joint service delivery, or through outsourcing and contracting-out. In both cases, the different modalities by means of which the process can be organised are discussed in some detail, particularly with a view to identifying how they can improve—or jeopardise— quality career guidance provision. Indeed, a key challenge that the PES has to confront is to find the right balance between, on the one hand, encouraging innovative, flexible and context-sensitive responses in its decentralised mediation between clients and local labour markets, and on the other, maintaining standards across the whole range of providers, thus ensuring that citizens, irrespective of their geographical or social location, have guaranteed access to the same quality of service that they are equally entitled to. The issue of quality standards in the attempt to manage the decentralisation process is therefore pivotal, and constitutes the third aspect considered. The study highlights different approaches to quality assurance across the 28 European countries, pointing to some of the formative experiences in the use of both quantitative and qualitative strategies in this respect. The change in the organisational context, as well as the paradigmatic shift towards a 'personal service model', has given rise to a number of trends in the delivery of career guidance and career-guidance-related services within Europe's PES. One of the more important is the increase in the range and depth of services that contain career guidance elements. This increase in both supply and demand for services can lead to tensions resulting from the attempt to develop personalised approaches while at the same time catering for increasingly large numbers of unemployed in a differentiated manner. Such tensions are particularly accentuated in those contexts where human and material resources have either remained stable or even been decreased. Europe's PES have developed three key ways to manage these tensions. These include: a resort to partnership and to outsourcing; a shift to self-service modes of delivery; and the introduction of tiering, to provide career guidance in self-access modes and in groups to the majority of clients, reserving to the rest more intensive individual career guidance interviews if and when needed. Employment advisers and career guidance staff are at the crucible of most of the transformations taking place in the PES, and their training, competence levels and motivation have a great bearing on the quality and nature of services provided. The study considers PES staff involved in delivery of personalised employment and career guidance services from a variety of angles. First, attention is given to aspects of their profile, including age, gender and conditions of work. The focus then turns to the distribution of career guidance roles among PES staff, with distinctions being drawn between those systems that have specialised tiers of staff, and those that require their staff to be multi-functional. The implications that such role distributions have for the provision of specialised services on the one hand, and holistic services on the other, are also examined. A third major consideration in regard to staff is the profile required of career guidance and career-guidance-related personnel at the point of recruitment, as well as the opportunities that such staff have for pre-service, induction and continued training. While many systems do not provide initial training, and recruitment is often effected on the basis of proxy qualifications, there is a trend for improved induction and in-service professional development opportunities—linked, for example, to the range of tools and instruments that career-guidance-related staff use in delivering services. Details of the modalities for the provision of training are presented, as are examples of commendable practice from a variety of countries. Training gaps are also identified, many of which were signalled by respondents to the survey who felt that expanded roles required the targeting of specific competence development. In their attempt to modernise their delivery systems, Europe's PES have striven to reach out to a range of clients, giving special attention to those categories that have particularly acute needs for individualised and tailor-made support on the road to employment: these include the long-term unemployed, women returnees, persons with disability, the unqualified and low-skilled, company-closure clients, and customers with a variety of social problems and/or tenuous links to citizenship rights. The study provides details of the different career guidance models and strategies used to deliver services to such clients. It also considers the results of client-satisfaction surveys, which are being used by PES in several countries as an indicator of effectiveness. Despite major improvements in catering for differentiated needs, it is also clear that there are other categories of customers that the PES are finding more challenging to reach. In particular, rising unemployment levels in a tight resource environment are often leading PES to focus narrowly on the unemployed, despite the fact that lifelong career guidance perspectives are adhered to in principle. Swift placement in employment remains a pivotal challenge for the PES, even as they strive to balance this with other career guidance-related goals such as client clarification of occupational strengths and interests, as well as career management and development in a lifelong perspective. In their attempt to maintain the dynamics of transformation into effective and client-oriented organisations, Europe's PES face a number of important challenges. Four are particularly relevant to personalised employment and career guidance services: - The first challenge concerns the need for PES career guidance and careerguidance- related services to be more systematic in the evaluation of their effectiveness. While there is a strong tradition of critical assessment of PES functions overall, the targeted evaluation of career guidance within PES settings needs further attention, even if there are a number of examples of good practice in several countries that could serve to provide models for emulation. A stronger evidence base on the match between career guidance services and policy objectives buttresses claims for improved resourcing. On the other hand, a lack of systematic evidence leads to a situation where the major shifts in the modalities of service delivery—particularly in relation to responsibility-sharing with partners and outsourced agencies—remain unexamined in terms both of efficiency in resource use, and of impact on quality of service. - A second challenge is to get the right balance between integrating career guidance elements in the services and activities provided by the PES, while at the same time maintaining specialist services for deeper engagement with clients when this is required. In many ways this implies the foregrounding of the identity of career guidance within PES settings. In addition, the attempt to deepen career guidance and career-guidance-related services towards a larger range of clients signals the need for more intensive preparation of staff, and for a more careful consideration of the ways in which the administrative and the career guidance roles of providers can be kept in appropriate balance. - A third challenge arises from the necessity to open up guidance services within the PES to embrace a more long-term, life-long perspective: one that is more in tune with the needs of citizens in the emergent knowledge economy. This vision presents enormous resource and training challenges for the PES, but it is likely to be one that it will need to rise to as citizens increasingly move through occupational and training pathways in more complex, non-linear ways. A lifelong perspective on career guidance would entail the PES in stronger collaboration with education institutions and with companies, so that service delivery is experienced by the client in a seamless, holistic way, with community resources being mobilised in support of goals that have, as an outcome, both the private good and the public good. - Finally, the PES has to rise to the challenge of addressing key gaps in service delivery, and to focus on those areas that require further attention and investment in order to facilitate the provision of quality services for all. The way forward lies in addressing these challenges. ; peer-reviewed
The Situation In The Middle East This Record Contains The Text Of Speeches Delivered In English And Of The Translation Of Speeches Delivered In Other Languages. ; United Nations S/PV.8195 Security Council Seventy-third year 8195th meeting Wednesday, 28 February 2018, 10.35 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Alotaibi. . (Kuwait) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Ms. Guadey France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Tumysh Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Orrenius Skau United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Ms. Eckels-Currie Agenda The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/138) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-05507 (E) *1805507* S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 2/22 18-05507 The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/138) The President (spoke in Arabic): In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/2018/138, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017). I now give the floor to Mr. Lowcock. Mr. Lowcock: We have received a lot of questions about resolution 2401 (2018), which the Security Council adopted on Saturday, 22 February, and its demand for a cessation of hostilities without delay for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria. I want to start today by answering the questions we have received. Is the United Nation ready to deliver to people who need humanitarian assistance? Yes. We have convoys ready to go to 10 besieged and hard-to-reach locations, including a 45-truck convoy with aid for 90,000 people to Douma and eastern Ghouta. Are you ready to support medical evacuations from eastern Ghouta? Yes, we are working very closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and other health partners on that. Has resolution 2401 (2018) been implemented? Is there a ceasefire in Syria? No, and no. Have you got any inter-agency cross-line convoys through to hard-to-reach or besieged areas? No. Have you been given permission to access any of those locations? No. Have you received the necessary facilitation letters for convoys? No. Have there been any medical evacuations? No. Have any civilians left eastern Ghouta? No. Is there any actual improvement in the humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta since the adoption of the resolution demanding, as it did, unimpeded access? No. Can you deliver assistance in eastern Ghouta during a humanitarian pause between 9 a.m. and 2 p.m. local time? To quote the ICRC Middle East Director, who spoke about that yesterday: "It is impossible to bring a humanitarian convoy in five hours." Agencies now have years of experience in that area, and it can take a day simply to pass checkpoints, even when the parties have agreed. The goods then have to be offloaded. If there has been no humanitarian access since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) on Saturday, what has happened in the past few days? More bombing, fighting, death, destruction, maiming of women and children, hunger and misery — in other words, more of the same. On 26 February, two days ago, airstrikes, barrel bombs and artillery shelling were reported across eastern Ghouta, including in Harasta, Shafuniyeh, Otaya, Hosh Eldawahreh, Al-Ashari, Jobar, Beit Sawa, Hazerma, Hannnura, Nashabiyeh, Sagba and Douma. Reports indicate that at least 30 civilians, including women and children, were killed. In Shafuniyeh, 14 people, including three women and four children, were reportedly killed and many others injured by airstrikes. Eighteen civilians, including drivers of ambulances, women and children, were reportedly received at health facilities in Shafuniyeh with difficulties breathing, consistent with the use of chlorine. One child reportedly died as a result. On the same day, two workers from local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were reportedly killed as a result of shelling on the besieged enclave. It was also reported that two health-care facilities in Saqba were taken out of service by airstrikes. In the past few days, shells have also reportedly continued to fall on Damascus city from eastern Ghouta. Since 18 February, more than 580 people are now reported to have been killed due to air and ground strikes in eastern Ghouta, with many more than 1,000 people injured. At the same time, hundreds of rockets fired from eastern Ghouta into Damascus have reportedly killed 15 people and injured more than 200. I now want to update the Security Council on the situation in other parts of the country. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 3/22 In Idlib, fighting continues to kill and injure civilians, destroy civilian infrastructure and result in large population movements. Since December, an estimated 385,000 people have been displaced, with many civilians moving north. Half of Idlib's population was already displaced. People are being forced to move yet again, with each disruption increasing their vulnerability. Civilians are concentrated in an ever-smaller area. Many are forced to live in makeshift camps or in the open air. Formal camps are overwhelmed, operating at up to 400 per cent of their capacity. The response is being stretched to its limits. We are receiving reports of civilian deaths and injuries and of restriction on the movement of many civilians as a result of military operations in Afrin. Those who risk moving continue to be stopped at exit points by the local authorities in Afrin, preventing them from accessing safer areas. We believe that, so far, approximately 5,000 people have reached the surrounding villages and Aleppo city. Tens of thousands are believed to be displaced within Afrin. The Turkish authorities have emphasized to us their willingness to facilitate humanitarian access. We would like to see aid convoys operated from Damascus. However, to date that has not been agreed by the Syrian side. In Raqqa city, conditions remain unsafe for the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Among those trying to return home, 637 people have been injured and more than 125 killed by unexploded ordinance since last October. Medical and other essential services are absent and access for humanitarian workers to the city remains precariously limited because the conditions are so dangerous. As I have said before, demining activities need to be accelerated as a matter of urgency. Humanitarian access for the United Nations and its implementing partners in Hasakah was limited for much of January due to the increased restrictions placed by the local authorities. United Nations convoys were blocked from travelling to the northeast from elsewhere within the country. The delivery of aid already in local warehouses was also blocked. While an agreement to resume humanitarian deliveries was reached on 30 January, that agreement will end in March. NGO partners continue to deliver goods and services across the north-east. However, sustainable access for the United Nations is critical. Any protracted interruption of humanitarian assistance and services in the IDP sites may drive the displaced people back to areas where they are not safe. Earlier this month, the United Nations received clearance for the first assessment visit to Deir ez-Zor after it had been under the control of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) for three and a half years. More than 100,000 people live in the town despite that fact that it is estimated to be 80 per cent destroyed. The infrastructure is almost completely destroyed, particularly in the central and the eastern areas, where ISIL was in control. In coordination with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, the United Nations has dispatched 78 trucks carrying food, health, nutrition, protection, shelter, education, water and sanitation items since last September, when ISIL was driven out. Finally, we remain concerned about the tens of thousands of people stranded in Rukban, in south-eastern Syria. We continue to seek the necessary agreements for convoys of life-saving assistance to them. As I said last week (see S/PV. 8186), there was a severe reduction, of nearly 40 per cent, in cross-line access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas in 2017 as compared to 2016. On average in 2017, over the entire 12-month period, we reached 165,000 people a month with cross-line convoys. That was completely inadequate. So far this year, we have reached a total of only 7,200 people through a single small convoy earlier this month. In other words, we were reaching more than 50 times as many people in besieged and hard-to-reach areas last year as to date this year. The main reason for the reduction in the number of convoys has been the consistent refusal by the Government of Syria to provide the necessary approvals and facilitation letters to support delivery. As the Secretary-General's report (S/2018/138) details, while we continue to reach millions of people in urgent need in areas controlled by the Government of Syria and through the cross-border programmes mandated in resolution 2393 (2017), assistance across conflict lines to millions of people in hard-to-reach and besieged areas has completely collapsed in recent months. Unless that changes, we will soon see even more people dying from starvation and disease than from the bombing and shelling. The United Nations remains focused on reaching those most in need throughout the country, including the 5.6 million people considered to be in acute need. The needs-based approach means that the United Nations will continue to seek to deliver aid and to S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 4/22 18-05507 provide services to millions of people in a principled manner regardless of where they are located. More than half of those in need are in Government-controlled areas. However, millions more people are not. What the Syrian people need has been made abundantly clear — protection, access to basic goods and services, an end to sieges and respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The Security Council has unanimously supported all such needs in adopting resolution 2401 (2018). I started today by answering questions that we have received regarding resolution 2401 (2018). I would like to end with a question for the Security Council. When will the resolution be implemented? The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Mr. Lowcock for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Feltman. Mr. Feltman: I am grateful for this opportunity to brief the Security Council following the comprehensive briefing by Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock. In two weeks, we will mark the beginning of the eighth year of the Syrian conflict. There are no words to express our frustration over the collective failure of the international community to end this war, but that frustration is nothing compared to the suffering and destruction visited ceaselessly upon the Syrian people. We are here again today because the brief respite that the Council unanimously demanded only days ago in resolution 2401 (2018) has not materialized, as Mr. Lowcock just described. The air strikes, shelling and ground offensives continue. There are even reports of yet another chlorine gas attack. What we need is the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), and that is not happening. Nearly seven years since the peaceful protests in Dar'a and the reaction that set in motion what would eventually become all-out war, we are still grasping for a political solution, which is the only way to end the bloodletting. The Secretary-General has called eastern Ghouta a hell on Earth. The United Nations will continue to work with Syrians and the international community to help bring about a durable political solution. We will also continue to demand that all the parties involved in the conflict respect international humanitarian law — the rules of war — and protect civilians. We will continue to demand the release of those who have been arbitrarily detained and the end of enforced disappearances. We will continue to forcefully call for justice and accountability. Those responsible for the catalogue of horrors that mark daily life in Syria, including chemical and terrorist attacks, torture and sexual violence, sieges and attacks on hospitals, schools and other civilian infrastructure, must be held accountable. Those outrages continue in large part because the perpetrators have so far enjoyed impunity. As the Secretary-General said earlier this week, "Security Council resolutions are only meaningful if they are effectively implemented". The United Nations acknowledges Russia's announcement of a daily five-hour pause for eastern Ghouta. In addition to Mr. Lowcock's briefing and what the International Committee of the Red Cross has stated, we respectfully remind all parties that resolution 2401 (2018) demands the sustained delivery of humanitarian aid for a minimum of 30 consecutive days. The Secretariat and relevant agencies are united and pulling in one direction towards the immediate and continuous cessation of hostilities that can be sustained beyond 30 days for unimpeded aid delivery. We also urgently need to get humanitarian aid and services in and the sick and critically wounded evacuated from besieged eastern Ghouta and other locations. We are ready to deliver. The Secretary-General has repeatedly reminded parties of their absolute obligation under international humanitarian law and human rights law to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. Earlier this month, Emergency Relief Coordinator Lowcock told the Council (see S/PV.8186) in no uncertain terms that that is an obligation, not a favour. He has just updated us all on the humanitarian situation and provided an update on the United Nations readiness to deliver aid and services, and the tireless efforts of humanitarians to reach all in need, wherever they are. But right now we must address the particular needs of those in besieged eastern Ghouta. Resolution 2401 (2018) affirms that the cessation of hostilities shall not apply to military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al Qaida, the Al-Nusra Front, and "all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida or ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the Security Council". (resolution 2401 (2018), para. 2). In our view, that rightly maintains the parameters set out in resolution 2254 (2015), but there must be 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 5/22 a frank assessment of what that means in relation to the humanitarian tragedy that we are witnessing in eastern Ghouta. First, we condemn all violations of international law by all parties, including shelling from eastern Ghouta, which has injured or killed civilians in Damascus. The scale of the Government's indiscriminate military attacks against eastern Ghouta — an area with a civilian population of 400,000 — cannot be justified based on targeting Jabhat Al-Nusra fighters. Efforts to combat terrorism do not supersede obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law. Secondly, the United Nations has not seen any confirmation by the Government of Syria of its commitment to implement resolution 2401 (2018), although at the resolution's adoption Syria's Permanent Representative to the United Nations said, "As a State, we bear a responsibility towards our citizens and we have a sovereign right to counter terrorism" (S/PV.8188, p. 12). Thirdly, yesterday the Head of the Syrian Negotiations Committee transmitted to the Secretary- General a letter on behalf of the three major non-State armed opposition groups — Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham — and civil groups in eastern Ghouta regarding their full commitment to the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Specifically, they committed to ensuring the necessary environment for United Nations humanitarian access as well as, "to expel all elements of Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham, Jabhat Al-Nusra and Al-Qaida and all who belong to these groups from eastern Ghouta". Fourthly, the United Nations has no independent verified reports that those three non-State armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta created a coordination centre, as has been alleged regarding Jabhat Al-Nusra, nor has the United Nations seen any public announcement by those groups of such a centre. Jaysh Al-Islam has denied that claim. What the United Nations can verify is that non-State armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta, over the past 24 hours, have expressed their readiness in writing to evacuate Jabhat Al-Nusra fighters. Previous negotiations on that issue among those groups and key members of the International Syrian Support Group humanitarian task force in Geneva and Damascus have not resulted in success. Alleviating the tragic situation in eastern Ghouta has the Council's full attention. Yet we cannot forget that resolution 2401 (2018) demands a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria. Violence continues in Afrin, Idlib and the eastern part of the country. Council members have heard about the humanitarian challenges and suffering of the people in those areas as well. I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize that developments in those areas will undoubtedly render the situation in Syria even more complex. There will be no sustainable solution if the Council's resolutions are not implemented. That will require that the parties step back from the brink and fulfil their obligations to end the fighting in Syria. All our efforts will be in vain if there is no serious investment in a political solution. As Council members are aware, resolution 2401 (2018) calls on all Member States to use their influence with the parties to ensure the implementation of the cessation of hostilities. The United Nations calls for a renewed commitment by all concerned Member States to work seriously to implement the cessation of hostilities. The United Nations also cautions against drawing the Organization into monitoring exercises. That has been tried in the past without success — not for lack of trying — but in the absence of political will among Member States to underpin United Nations efforts. Member States, especially those working within the Astana and Amman arrangements, should use their resources and clear influence over the parties to ensure the implementation of a sustained cessation of hostilities throughout Syria. The conflict in Syria continues to threaten regional and international stability because the warring parties believe there is a military solution. There is not. The United Nations remains convinced that a political solution is the only way forward. Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura is pressing forward on facilitating the establishment of a constitutional committee in Geneva, as part of the overall intra-Syrian political process towards the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015), for which the United Nations requires the positive and constructive engagement of both negotiating delegations. Special Envoy De Mistura will need the full support of the Council and the international community as a whole if the United Nations efforts are to have a chance of reinvigorating a serious and meaningful political process. I trust that he will have that support. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 6/22 18-05507 The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Mr. Feltman for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements. Mr. Orrenius Skau (Sweden): I make my remarks today on behalf of Sweden and Kuwait as co-penholders for the humanitarian track of the Security Council's work on the situation in Syria. I would like to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock once again for a very sobering update. We share his sense of urgency following the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) last weekend to fully take advantage of the 30- day pause so that the United Nations and its partners can dispatch life-saving aid convoys and begin medical evacuations. Since the resolution's adoption, we have been asked, as penholders, when the resolution would take effect and to whom it would apply. We are very clear: the resolution took effect upon its adoption and applies to all parties across the entire country. The clock is ticking. There is no time to lose. Let me also sincerely thank Mr. Jeffrey Feltman for his briefing today. We share his deep concern concerning reports of the flagrant lack of compliance with the ceasefire in eastern Ghouta. We would like to extend our sincere appreciation to all members of the Council for their constructive cooperation, which enabled the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). The resolution represents decisive and meaningful action by the Council in response to the calls from the United Nations, the humanitarian community and, above all, the civilian population in Syria. However, the value of a resolution is not in its adoption, but in its implementation. We must now all build on the spirit of cooperation that led to the resolution's adoption and work together to ensure that it is enforced. Compliance with the resolutions of the Security Council is not optional; it is an obligation of all Member States. The humanitarian community stands ready to do its part. Having adopted this resolution, the Council must do its part. For the next few weeks, let us seize the opportunity that this resolution represents and focus on its implementation. We would like to make four concrete recommendations on the way forward. First, existing de-escalation agreements must be complied with most urgently in eastern Ghouta. We call on the three Astana guarantors to spare no effort to achieve this end. Resolution 2401 (2018) clearly demands that all parties cease hostilities; air strikes, the ground offensive and shelling must stop. We take note of the initial positive indications from armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta that they are ready to comply with the resolution. We also note their commitment to expel the Al-Nusra Front from the area. We must build on this, and we call on those with influence over armed opposition groups to secure their commitment to the cessation of hostilities. Clearly the Council has demanded in resolution 2401 (2018) that the Syrian Government cease all military operations without delay. Secondly, as Mr. Lowcock has told us, the United Nations and its implementing partners in the field are ready to commence life-saving convoys and medical evacuations. We urge the Syrian authorities to immediately issue facilitation letters for the convoy to Duma to proceed this week as a necessary first step. It can no longer be business as usual; the Council has demanded weekly convoys to all areas and populations in need. Thirdly, existing structures to strengthen compliance with and monitoring of the cessation must urgently be activated. We look to the Chairs of the Task Force on the Ceasefire of the International Syria Support Group to undertake more frequent meetings, which are needed at least on a weekly basis. The Amman operations room should also be utilized. We see merit in making a clearer link between monitoring mechanisms and the Security Council. Fourthly, the Council must remain actively seized of this matter. Sweden and Kuwait will request an open briefing from the incoming presidency on the Secretary-General's report on implementation and compliance that is due 15 days after the resolution's adoption. We should also stand ready to meet and take appropriate action at any time necessary so as to ensure implementation of this resolution. Finally, we welcome any efforts to de-escalate violence and to allow and facilitate humanitarian access in Syria, but let us be clear — resolution 2401 (2018) demands a 30-day, nationwide ceasefire, with immediate access for weekly convoys and medical evacuations. A five-hour ceasefire does not meet the requirements of the resolution. The resolution is not primarily about the evacuation of civilians, but demands humanitarian access to civilians and medical evacuations. The 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 7/22 cessation of hostilities must be implemented fully and without delay. It is imperative that all parties uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law at all times. Last Saturday's unanimous action reinforced the legitimacy and credibility of the Security Council (see S/PV.8188). Today's briefings demonstrate that there is no time to rest on the laurels of this achievement. We must now move without delay to ensure our action here last Saturday is translated into the relief and assistance expected by the millions of people affected by this conflict. It is now incumbent on all the parties and all those with influence over the parties to spare no effort and use all channels available in order to advance the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): First of all, I want to thank Mark Lowcock and Jeffrey Feltman for their very clear briefings. I would like today to focus my remarks on our shared road map, namely, the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), which we adopted unanimously last Saturday (see S/PV. 8188). On behalf of France, I would like to express three main messages today. My first message is that we must not pay lip service. The situation on the ground remains dramatic and has not improved in recent days. Since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), the offensive against the eastern Ghouta has continued relentlessly. France, of course, strongly condemns these indiscriminate bombings, which affect inhabited areas and civil infrastructure. In this context, the disastrous humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. No United Nations convoy has been able to reach the eastern Ghouta or any of the other besieged areas, no emergency medical evacuation has been carried out, no siege has been lifted. The Syrian regime is maintaining its stranglehold on the civilian population and is methodically pursuing its policy of destruction. More than 400,000 people remain under siege in eastern Ghouta, including 130,000 children. The demand sent by the United Nations to authorize a priority convoy for Duma, the main city in eastern Ghouta, has not received any response from the Syrian authorities to date. My second message is this. The resolution adopted by the Security Council on 24 February makes very specific demands on the parties. Hostilities must cease without delay in order to establish a lasting humanitarian truce for at least 30 days, in order to allow both the delivery of humanitarian aid and the evacuation of the wounded and sick. Let me stress this point. These demands are perfectly clear and cannot be distorted or reinterpreted. Contrary to what some would have us believe, the demands made by the resolution are absolutely clear. Our responsibility today is to implement, fully and in their totality, the provisions that we have unanimously adopted. If we do not that, what credibility can be given to our commitments? What credibility can be given to Security Council resolutions? The United Nations and its partners tell us that they are ready to deliver aid to the people of eastern Ghouta and other priority areas. There is therefore not a minute to lose because every minute that passes can turn lives upside down. At the conclusion of difficult negotiations, the Council managed to unite in the face of the gravity of the humanitarian situation and the escalation of the Syrian conflict in recent months. We must now work together, in the same spirit of unity, to effectively implement on the ground the resolution we unanimously adopted. This is my third message. Following yesterday's meeting in Moscow with French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, France is putting forward four concrete proposals for making progress and for doing so without delay. The first is to ensure that all parties implement the cessation of hostilities that resolution 2401 (2018) demands. I note that the three main opposition groups present in eastern Ghouta as well as Nassar Al Hariri, head of the High Negotiations Committee of the Syrian opposition, have written to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Council to state that they would respect the truce. It is therefore urgent in the extreme — if I can put it that way — that the Damascus regime also unambiguously express its willingness to respect the Council resolution and to formalize it in writing. We have taken note of the Russian proposal of a daily five-hour humanitarian truce. It is a positive first step, but it is insufficient. We must go further. Resolution 2401 (2018) demands of the parties a minimum period of 30 consecutive days of cessation of hostilities. Respecting that demand is non-negotiable. That goal requires more than just symbolic declarations or political posturing. At a minimum, it requires that humanitarian personnel be allowed to do their work. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 8/22 18-05507 These workers are used to taking risks on a daily basis, but the parties must allow them to do their work. Given that the opposition groups have formally committed to doing just that, the regime must do so as well, and without delay. To that end, supporters of the regime, beginning with Russia, must bring the necessary pressure to bear. Our second proposal, by way of a demand, pertains to the need to immediately open the relevant, clearly identified checkpoints — beginning with Wafideen — in order to allow the access of priority convoys of the United Nations. We therefore demand that the Syrian authorities submit without delay the necessary letter to facilitate the deployment of humanitarian convoys. Thirdly, it is extremely urgent to allow medical evacuations for the most critical cases, giving priority to children. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent indicates that 1,065 people need emergency medical evacuations. We have not a minute to lose. Finally, France considers it essential to create a monitoring mechanism to ensure the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and compliance with the resolution by the parties. We are working diligently to establishing that mechanism now. Those are the French proposals to address the urgent need to put an end to the bombing and protect civilians, who beyond resolution 2401 (2018), are protected under international humanitarian law. It is also crucial to intensify our efforts to reach a political solution in the framework of the Geneva process and resolution 2254 (2015). It is the only way out of the conflict and the only way to prevent a looming escalation of tensions. France will not deviate from that path. The overall credibility of the Security Council and the responsibility of each of its members are crucially at stake today in the context of the Syrian tragedy. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-Generals Lowcock and Feltman for their clear, factual briefings and for reiterating to all of us on the Security Council the ongoing horror of the conflict in Syria — and in particular in eastern Ghouta, because that is where it is clear the situation is most dire by a huge order of magnitude. It was five days ago (see S/PV.8188) that we sat in this Chamber and all of us raised our hands in support of a 30-day ceasefire, which we hoped would provide some relief to Syria's people. That was a desperately needed step, one that came too late for many. In eastern Ghouta alone, Médecins Sans Frontières reported that at least 630 people were killed and 3,000 injured in the week before resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted, with women and children representing nearly 60 per cent of the wounded and 50 per cent of the deceased. We also continue to condemn attacks on Damascus from eastern Ghouta. Let us recall the demands of our resolution. It called for at least a 30-day ceasefire without delay to allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid and medical evacuation. "Without delay" means right now, immediately — that there should be no delay. We all voted for those demands and we committed to using our influence to ensure that. In response, Russia has declared a five-hour daily humanitarian window. That is not what the Council demanded, nor what Russia agreed to use its influence to ensure. A five-hour window has not delivered and cannot deliver any meaningful improvement on the ground. Under-Secretary-General Lowcock has made clear that the United Nations cannot get humanitarian convoys in and out within that time frame, as has the International Committee of the Red Cross. Humanitarian pauses of a few meagre hours are no substitute for a sustained ceasefire, which is vital to ensuring the delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance and medical evacuations. If Russia is able to deliver a five-hour pause, let it deliver a 24-hour pause, as it agreed on Saturday. Let us now take stock of the situation in Syria, and specifically in eastern Ghouta, where the situation is at its most desperate. Let us review if any real change has occurred in the past five days. Has the resolution been implemented? Has there been a ceasefire? Has there been any delivery of humanitarian aid or any medical evacuations? Has the adoption of the resolution brought any relief to the people of Syria? The fighting has not stopped. All of the main armed opposition groups have committed to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). The Al-Assad regime has not, and has in fact ignored the resolution we adopted. Reports of attacks and air strikes by pro-regime forces continue. Twenty-two air strikes reportedly took place even during Russia's so-called humanitarian pause. And, as if it could not get any worse, there have been disturbing reports of the use of chlorine gas. Doctors in eastern Ghouta reported to the Syrian-American Medical Society that 16 patients, including six children, were suffering from symptoms 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 9/22 indicative of exposure to chemical compounds, following an alleged regime attack on Sunday — only one day after the resolution was adopted. Since Saturday not a single aid convoy has been able to access eastern Ghouta to provide relief to the desperate civilians. The World Health Organization estimates that 1,000 people are now in need of medical evacuation from eastern Ghouta. None have been evacuated since the resolution was adopted. The consequences of the failure to implement the resolution are clear: the casualties continue to rise and the horror continues. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reports at least 14 civilians, including three children, were killed on Sunday. In short, in the words of one doctor from eastern Ghouta, "Nothing has changed." It is the responsibility of us all to ensure that resolution 2401 (2018) is enacted in full. In the words of my Foreign Secretary, the Al-Assad regime must allow the United Nations to deliver humanitarian aid, in compliance with resolution 2401 (2018), and we look to Russia and Iran to make sure this happens, in accordance with their own promises. I implore all those with influence over the Syrian regime to act now to ensure that the ceasefire that they supported in the Chamber is implemented in full and immediately. To do anything less is an affront to the Council, the United Nations and the international system that we live by. We will continue to monitor the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and commit to returning to the Council regularly until we see it respected. Ms. Eckels-Currie (United States of America): Every time the Security Council attempts to address the humanitarian crisis in Syria, we take a small leap of faith. I say "we" in reference to the Security Council. I speak of faith because all Council members and most States Members of the United Nations still genuinely try to uphold the responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations, including abiding by and fully implementing Security Council resolutions. Despite the grim updates we heard today, we must maintain the hope that we can help the Syrian people. If we do not have that hope, we are wasting our time here. Just four days ago, the Security Council took another leap of faith. We adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding a 30-day ceasefire for all of Syria, unimpeded and sustained humanitarian access to deliver desperately needed food and medical supplies, and immediate and unconditional medical evacuations based on need and emergency. Our goal was clear and simple. The Al-Assad regime and its supporters have been pummelling eastern Ghouta, where 400,000 people live under siege and constant bombardment. Resolution 2401 (2018) demanded that the assault stop. That was the Council speaking in one, clear voice. The opposition groups operating in eastern Ghouta have made clear their commitment to the ceasefire. The Free Syrian Army, Jaysh al-Islam, the Al-Rahman Legion and Ahrar al-Sham all committed to implementing resolution 2401 (2018). Against all odds, we hoped that Mr. Al-Assad might respect the resolution, cease hostilities and allow unfettered humanitarian access to all those who need it. Against all odds, we hoped that Russia would use its influence to ensure Mr. Al-Assad's commitment to resolution 2401 (2018). Once again, that hope has been crushed because so far, for the people of eastern Ghouta, nothing has changed. Despite the unanimous call for a ceasefire, the regime's attacks continue unabated. Hundreds of Syrians have been killed or injured since we adopted the resolution on Saturday. What is worse is that less than 24 hours after we demanded the ceasefire, there were reports that the Al-Assad regime again used chlorine gas as a weapon. Such attacks demonstrate Syria's complete and utter contempt for the Council and the United Nations. On Monday one human rights organization reported 18 attacks that defied the Council's demands. On Tuesday another organization reported at least 23 air strikes and four barrel bombs in eastern Ghouta. Syrians on the ground are reporting that Tuesday was worse than Monday with regard to strikes from the regime. How can that be? On the humanitarian front, as Mark Lowcock stated, the Al-Assad regime has allowed no deliveries of assistance into eastern Ghouta — not one. Opposition groups in the area have expressed their commitment to allowing aid in, but the Al-Assad regime still says no. Since we adopted resolution 2401 (2018), Russia has announced a daily five-hour humanitarian pause in the aerial bombing of civilians in eastern Ghouta, which is cynical, callous and in flagrant defiance of the demands of resolution 2401 (2018). The cessation of hostilities is for at least 30 days — every day, all day. Russia does not get to unilaterally rewrite the terms of the resolution. It negotiated it and voted for it. Russia, S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 10/22 18-05507 Iran and the Al-Assad regime are not even trying to hide their intentions. They are asking civilians to leave eastern Ghouta on the false premise that they can then attack anyone left in the area as much as they would like. Let us call the actions what they are. Mr. Al-Assad and his allies want the civilians of eastern Ghouta to walk into the arms of a regime that has been attacking and starving them for the past seven years. That is not a humanitarian gesture. They do not care if the 400,000 people of eastern Ghouta suffer, as long as they can continue to pursue their military and political objectives. We know what Iran, Syria and the Al-Assad regime are doing because they have done the same thing in the past. It is the same playbook they used for Aleppo in 2016. Once again, we, including Russia, demanded in the Security Council Chamber that Mr. Al-Assad stop the bombing, and yet Russia, Iran and Mr. Al-Assad continue their attacks, defying the wishes of the Council and of the international community. Because we have been through this before, we know what Russia will say today. It will say that there are terrorists in eastern Ghouta so that the Al-Assad regime can bomb as ferociously and indiscriminately as it wants and kill as many civilians as it wants. That defies the principles governing the laws of war. The Al-Assad regime should not be allowed to bomb and starve its own people into submission under the guise of counter-terrorism. That Russian argument makes a mockery of the Council and of international law. Russia also accuses the United States of somehow being responsible for humanitarian crises in Syria, but such accusations are ludicrous. The United States does not block humanitarian aid in any area. In fact, the United States has provided more than $7 billion in humanitarian aid in response to the crisis. The Council must not fall for Russia's misdirections. When the ceasefire was adopted unanimously on Saturday, including by the Russians, Ambassador Haley stated that our resolve to stand by our demands in the resolution would be tested. It has come to pass. Despite everything that has happened since Saturday, we are not casting aside the ceasefire in Syria; just the opposite. We would like to redouble our efforts in the Security Council to implement it, but the only way to change the situation on the ground is for all of us — every single one of us — around the table and each State Member of the United Nations to speak the truth about what is happening. The past four days should show us that when it comes to demanding a ceasefire, it is not enough to say that all parties should show restraint or commit to the ceasefire because in eastern Ghouta there is only one party dropping barrel bombs, gassing the Syrian people and denying deliveries of food and medical assistance. It is the Al-Assad regime, operating with the full support of Russia and Iran. On Saturday we stated that the only way to restore the credibility of the Council was to make the ceasefire a reality. Russia, Iran and the Al-Assad regime have not complied with the Council's demands and have not silenced their guns. Unless we take action, they will stop at nothing to destroy eastern Ghouta and we will again fail to help the Syrian people. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): First, let me thank Under-Secretaries-General Lowcock and Feltman for their briefings. In my statement I will address three points: implementation, implementation and implementation. First, I will speak about the implementation of the cessation of hostilities. Since the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018) on Saturday, civilians are still dying in eastern Ghouta and elsewhere in Syria. The humanitarian disaster continues worsen. We need a full, nationwide cessation of hostilities and we need it now. The Russian proposal for a humanitarian corridor and pauses of five hours per day cannot be a substitute for a humanitarian pause of 30 consecutive days, as demanded in resolution 2401 (2018). Those five hours do not meet the obligations under the resolution and are not enough for the United Nations to be effective in delivering aid to the entire area of Ghouta, as Under- Secretary-General Lowcock just stated. We call upon the parties to the conflict and on those with influence on the parties to show decisive action and stop the violence. As Under-Secretary- General Feltman stated, three armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta have announced that they are committed to fully implementing resolution 2401 (2018). We expect the regime to do the same. The air strikes, the shelling and the shooting must stop. For the credibility of the Council, it is crucial that its resolutions be fully implemented. That is the obligation of all States Members of the United Nations, under the Charter. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 11/22 The Kingdom of the Netherlands repeats the call made by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, to the Astana guarantors. She called on the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Iran and Turkey to "take all necessary steps to ensure that the fighting stops, the Syrian people are protected and that urgent humanitarian access and necessary medical evacuations are taking place". My second point is about the implementation of humanitarian access. Resolution 2401 (2018) calls for sieges of populated areas, including eastern Ghouta, to be lifted immediately, and demands safe, unimpeded and sustained access for humanitarian convoys. As Under-Secretary-General Lowcock just explained, the United Nations stands ready with 45 trucks to deliver essential aid to eastern Ghouta. But the necessary facilitation letters are still lacking, and the security conditions do not permit those deliveries. At this point, more than 1,000 people are in urgent need of medical care, but they are still trapped in eastern Ghouta. If they are not given the care they need in hospitals in Damascus or elsewhere, they may die. The United Nations and the Security Council have consistently pleaded for these medical evacuations, and yet there are still no developments with regard to them. We also need to see access to aid for those fleeing the fighting in Afrin. More generally, there should be delivery of humanitarian aid to the areas that are not under Government control. As Mr. Feltman just said, we should reach all who are in need, wherever they are. My third point is about implementing the protection of civilians. The exception on the cessation of hostilities in paragraph 2 of the resolution allows targeted action against terrorists who are designated as such by the Council. However, that does not mean that absolutely anything is allowed. International humanitarian law applies to all military combat operations and counter-terrorism actions. The principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution must be respected in all circumstances. The civilians in the conflict must be protected. There is talk of humanitarian corridors for civilians who want to leave eastern Ghouta, but evacuations should always be voluntary. We are concerned about the possibility that humanitarian corridors will be used for forced population transfers. Civilians cannot be forced to leave, and neither should they be forced to stay. If voluntary evacuations do take place, we will call on the United Nations to monitor them. Currently, the most urgent humanitarian situation is in eastern Ghouta and Idlib, but needs remain high elsewhere in Syria as well. We welcomed the January delivery of aid to Rukban, but we want to stress the importance of sustained access and a durable solution. As others have said today, the demining activities in Raqqa should be increased, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands is doing its part in that regard. The media coverage of the issue of the exploitation of Syrian women in exchange for aid is very disturbing. There should be no tolerance of such behaviour, as the Secretary-General and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs have already said. The probity of any United Nations implementing parties should be beyond any doubt. In conclusion, we must ensure that resolution 2254 (2015) is fully implemented. There can be no military solution to the conflict, and we call on all the parties to engage seriously in the United Nations-led political process as a matter of urgency. The suffering of the people of Syria has lasted for more than seven years. For the sake of the millions of women, children and men trapped in this horrendous war, it is high time that all parties started putting the protection, interests and well-being of the Syrian people on the top of their agenda. Yesterday, my Minister, Ms. Sigrid Kaag, said that humanitarian access and the protection of civilians are cornerstones of international humanitarian law. They are part of our shared values and shared humanity. The Security Council must do justice to those values and to our shared humanity. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We thank you for convening today's meeting, Mr. President, and for the briefings by Mr. Lowcock and Mr. Feltman on the situation in Syria. On Saturday, when we adopted resolution 2401 (2018) after long and complex negotiations, we highlighted the commitment that Council members have shown to achieving a humanitarian ceasefire in Syria. As we said at the time, it will be crucial to closely monitor its proper implementation and to maintain the Council's unity with regard to its responsibility to protect the civilian population, in line with international law and international humanitarian law. Four days in, we are still being forced to lament and condemn the attacks on civilians and to reiterate S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 12/22 18-05507 our calls for the immediate and comprehensive implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). As the Secretary-General has pointed out, Council resolutions make sense only if they are effectively implemented. The credibility of the Security Council as a whole, and of those of its members with the greatest potential influence on the ground in particular, is at stake. In the light of this, we want to emphasize that the cessation of hostilities that the Council has demanded clearly covers the whole of Syrian territory, including eastern Ghouta and Afrin, and should last for a minimum of 30 days. If we are to ensure that, in our view we should mobilize the International Syria Support Group's Ceasefire Task Force. It is essential to ensure that all the parties to the conflict comply with the ceasefire provided for in resolution 2401 (2018), and that the Council is able to closely monitor that compliance. In that regard, we support the four recommendations outlined by Sweden and Kuwait. We must remind the Syrian authorities of their responsibility to protect their people, and we firmly condemn the military operations in eastern Ghouta and other areas of the country that have continued even after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). However, we welcome the strenuous efforts of the Organization, and of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in particular, to prepare 45 trucks carrying supplies and ready to enter eastern Ghouta as soon as the necessary permits are granted. The first report on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) will be presented in less than two weeks, and we hope that it will be able to inform us that the humanitarian crisis caused by the Syrian conflict has been alleviated, because we cannot wait any longer. It is the Security Council's duty to continue working relentlessly to achieve what we have all unanimously agreed on. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I very much appreciate today's clear and informative briefings by Mr. Lowcock and Mr. Feltman, and I would like to share a few thoughts from Poland's point of view. Since the Council's adoption on Saturday of resolution 2401 (2018), we have been seeing yet more extremely worrying developments on the ground. As I said in my last statement on the subject (see S/PV.8188), the heavy fighting in Syria has unfortunately not only continued but is increasing. In that context, we should persist in our efforts to take every possible action to ensure the resolution's full and safe implementation. We call on all to work to alleviate the suffering of civilians, including children, by giving them free and safe access to humanitarian assistance. That should include voluntary evacuation, which should be strictly overseen by the United Nations and its implementing partners and based solely on medical need, in order to ensure that the process is genuinely voluntary. We would like to stress that all the relevant actors should use all their influence to help to improve the conditions on the ground immediately. We urgently call for a cessation of hostilities throughout all of Syria for 30 days, as stipulated in resolution 2401 (2018). In that context, it is also important to note that the cessation of hostilities may also offer an opportunity for the talks being held under United Nations auspices in Geneva to gain momentum, so that a political solution can finally be reached. For that reason, we call on all parties to fulfil their commitments to the existing ceasefire agreements. It should be emphasized that the implementation of the ceasefire announced by resolution 2401 (2018) should ensure the safe entrance and stay of humanitarian and medical personnel without prejudice to their health or life. When such personnel enter hard-to-reach areas, we should know precisely how long they can stay while delivering assistance under the ceasefire, otherwise their lives could also be in danger. In conclusion, let me stress the importance of maintaining the unity of the Council on the question of the implementation of humanitarian resolutions. The unanimous adoption of the resolution is just the beginning of the process. We call on all actors with influence on the ground to take all steps necessary to ensure that the fighting stops, that the Syrian people are protected and, finally, that urgent humanitarian access is enabled and that the necessary medical evacuations can take place. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We thank Mr. Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for their respective briefings. Once again, we would like to say how appalled we are at the terrible situation suffered by the Syrian people, as the past two months have been the most violent since the start of the conflict, and civilians, primarily women and children, are the ones that are suffering the gravest consequences of this intensification of the war. We call the attention of the Security Council to the continuing 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 13/22 violations of international law, especially international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as these attacks have targeted civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, schools and homes. My delegation would like to express once again its gratitude to the delegations of Sweden and Kuwait for their work in promoting the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which imposes a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria, which is as urgent as it is necessary. We urge the parties to implement the resolution immediately in order to speed up access of humanitarian assistance without any restrictions, allow urgent medical evacuations and the entry of humanitarian convoys, and ensure the protection of hospitals and medical facilities, especially in eastern Ghouta, Idlib and north of Hama. We wish to underscore once again the need for continued cooperation and coordination among the Syrian Government and the various humanitarian assistance agencies, so that the delivery of humanitarian assistance can be effective, especially in hard-to-reach areas, and to prevent administrative obstacles from derailing or negatively affecting the deployment of the required humanitarian assistance. We also stress the need to begin, as soon as possible, humanitarian mine-clearing in areas that require it, in particular in the city of Raqqa, to allow the return in dignified and safe conditions of people who were forced to flee their homes because of the conflict. As we have stated previously, we believe that if our aim is to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people in the face of armed violence, the Security Council has the major challenge of maintaining its unity so as to ensure that this organ's decisions are implemented. We reiterate that the solution to this conflict can be found only through an inclusive political process based on dialogue and coordination, led by the Syrian people and for the Syrian people, that will make it possible to reach a peaceful solution among all parties involved. With this in mind, we wish to highlight the various forums for dialogue, specifically the Astana process, at which de-escalation zones were agreed on that must be respected by all parties. We will be closely following the next round of the process. We wish also to highlight the other opportunities for dialogue that could make it possible to reach further compromises to achieve a definitive end to hostilities, such as the Sochi national dialogue, which is aimed at strengthening the Geneva political process, with respect for the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria and its right to choose its own political, economic and social system without any external pressure or interference. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Côte d'Ivoire thanks Mr. Jeffrey Feltman and Mr. Mark Lowcock for their respective briefings on recent developments in the situation in Syria following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2401 (2018), on the humanitarian situation in Syria. My delegation commends the Secretary-General for his unstinting efforts as part of the political dialogue among the Syrian parties with the aim of arriving at a lasting solution to the protracted crisis ravaging that country. In that regard, my country welcomes the holding of intra-Syrian peace talks on 25 and 26 January in Vienna in the framework of the Geneva process, followed by the talks held in Sochi on 29 and 30 January. My delegation cherishes the hope that the proposals stemming from the Sochi talks, including the establishment of a committee tasked with drawing up a new constitution, will receive consistent attention from the international community, as part of the concerted quest to find a lasting solution to the crisis in Syria. The situation on the ground is deeply alarming. Military operations that include the use of non-conventional weapons are leading to mass displacements of people, the loss of human lives, injuries and the destruction of public infrastructure, including hospitals and schools. The grave humanitarian crisis spawned by the fighting led to the adoption by the Security Council this past Saturday, 24 February, of resolution 2401 (2018), with a view to the cessation without delay of hostilities for a 30-day period to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in need as well as medical evacuations. My delegation notes with regret that the adoption of the resolution did not contribute to restoring calm on the ground. The ceasefire proposed was short-lived, despite the numerous appeals for a cessation of hostilities. Even the very minimum one called for by the Russian Federation, an ally of the Damascus Government, on Monday 26 February did not lead to a positive response. Air raids and rocket launches continue on the ground, thereby obstructing the work of humanitarian personnel. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 14/22 18-05507 We deplore the ongoing loss of life among humanitarian workers — 22 United Nations personnel and 66 staff members or volunteers of the International Red Cross — and we deplore also the material damage that has been wrought, which includes the destruction of 25 vehicles and 44 facilities, according to the information we have received. Nonetheless, Côte d'Ivoire welcomes the fact that United Nations humanitarian agencies and their partners have managed to assist people in need by conducting 1,567 deliveries. My country reaffirms that a resolution of the crisis in Syria must be part of an inclusive dialogue and political process, as set out in the road map under resolution 2254 (2015). In that regard, my country calls for full compliance with the 30-day ceasefire, in accordance with resolution 2401 (2018), which will not only allow humanitarian actors to respond to critical emergencies but also create the conditions for a return to the negotiating table by all parties to the Syrian crisis. To that end, Côte d'Ivoire urges the members of the Security Council to unite and surmount their differences in order to send a message of hope and solidarity of the international community to the Syrian people. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): As usual, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock and Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman just gave us detailed briefings on the humanitarian and political situation in Syria. Those were the first briefings to be delivered to the Security Council following the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), on 24 February. I take this opportunity to thank both Under-Secretaries-General, as well as to acknowledge the willingness of the United Nations and its partners to send convoys of trucks with the necessary humanitarian aid and begin medical evacuations as soon as conditions on the ground allow. As Secretary-General António Guterres said two days ago in his statement before the Human Rights Council, "Security Council resolutions are only meaningful if they are effectively implemented". The Republic of Equatorial Guinea hopes resolution 2401 (2018) is meaningful in that way in order to relieve the affected population of the suffering it has endured, especially in eastern Ghouta, that is, we hope for it to be immediately implemented. We want to reiterate that the Syrian conflict has no military solution. The opponents therefore must take a seat at the negotiating table to engage in direct and frank dialogue, without exclusions, however complicated it may be to do so. It must be the Syrians who determine the future they want for their country. The international community must redouble its efforts in making sure the opponents engage in negotiations, and the countries that have influence need to wield it to establish trust, with the ultimate goal of achieving lasting and just peace in Syria. We commend the intention expressed by the largest opposition groups — Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham — to respect the ceasefire, and we invite all the other parties involved to take the same decision. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea believes that the only reason that the humanitarian situation remains of concern is because the opponents do not agree on negotiating to reach a peace agreement, which consequently causes more civilian victims, leads to the destruction of hospital facilities and hampers humanitarian aid operations. The conflict has recently intensified around the town of eastern Ghouta and some other parts of Syria, which has resulted in civilian casualties, the destruction of a considerable number of medical and relief facilities and the obstruction of humanitarian relief operations led by the United Nations. Equatorial Guinea is very touched and horrified by the critical situation the Syrian people are experiencing, and we must not show indifference to so much pain and suffering. It is therefore imperative that the parties to the conflict implement and uphold the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially the most recent, resolution 2401 (2018), including allowing access to humanitarian aid, halting hostilities and ultimately, cooperating with the United Nations in its efforts to assuage the conflict and make humanitarian operations effective by ensuring aid deliveries reach the affected populations and evacuating the sick and seriously injured so that they can receive the necessary medical care. The international community, while striving to help Syria, must not forget the neighbouring countries that have welcomed refugees and shown a spirit of solidarity worthy of praise. I would like to conclude my statement by expressing well-deserved tribute to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and all those who work with it on the ground for their bravery and determination in fulfilling their humanitarian mission to deliver aid to 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 15/22 those in need. We encourage them to persist in their noble efforts. Mr. Tumysh (Kazakhstan): I join others in thanking Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under- Secretary-General Feltman for their comprehensive and sobering briefings. Kazakhstan welcomed the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). That document should be urgently implemented to ensure a comprehensive ceasefire in Syria. The ceasefire regime should be implemented fully, especially in the areas of eastern Ghouta, southern Idlib and northern Hama, to resolve their long-accumulated acute humanitarian problems, deliver aid to the most difficult regions and evacuate the wounded and sick. Turning to the situation on the ground in the country, according to our humanitarian colleagues, over the past 78 hours and to our deep regret, military operations continued to be reported in besieged eastern Ghouta, resulting in deaths, including women and children. Attacks on Damascus from eastern Ghouta are also continuing. To our great disappointment, a Syrian Arab Red Crescent warehouse in a Damascus suburb was reportedly struck by shelling. During the same period, attacks on the city of Damascus and the governorate resulted in 14 deaths and 214 injured. We are glad to know that the United Nations has mobilized and is ready to immediately support life-saving aid convoys in several areas in eastern Ghouta. We therefore call on the Council members and the wider United Nations membership to assist the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in operationalizing the delivery of humanitarian assistance in eastern Ghouta, as well as in carrying out hundreds of medical evacuations. We echo the United Nations calls on all parties to facilitate unconditional, unimpeded and sustained access to all people in need throughout the country and take all measures to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including schools and medical facilities, as required by international law. It is equally important to ensure, in close coordination with OCHA, the protection of medical and humanitarian workers. We must also insist that parties support United Nation agencies in the fulfilment of their mandates. In that context, Kazakhstan proposes that all-round assistance be provided to the inter-Syrian negotiations through the Astana process and that positive developments be taken advantage of to improve the humanitarian situation. My country stands for a solution in Syria based on resolution 2254 (2015), the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and agreements on the de-escalation zones reached through the Astana process. We regret the lack of full agreement and close coordination among the key stakeholders in managing the Syrian crisis. We also attach great importance to strengthening the inter-Syrian political dialogue with greater support from the world community. Lastly, Kazakhstan notes the need to establish closer interaction among the leading stakeholders in Syria, in particular between the Russian Federation and the United States, to improve the political process and ensure positive changes on the humanitarian track. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Feltman for their briefings. China commends the United Nations aid agencies for their humanitarian relief efforts in Syria. The security situation in various parts of Syria, including Damascus and eastern Ghouta, has escalated recently, causing significant civilian casualties. We sympathize profoundly with the suffering of the Syrian people and condemn all acts of violence against innocent civilians. The parties concerned should take immediate measures to de-escalate the tensions in line with the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) demonstrates the consensus and unity of its members on the humanitarian issue in Syria. We appreciate the positive efforts of the parties concerned. China welcomed Russia's announcement by Russia that it will implement the ceasefire measures and assist with the evacuation of people from conflict areas. We call on the parties in Syria to put an immediate end to hostilities in accordance with the resolution, actively coordinate with United Nations relief efforts and ensure safe humanitarian corridors in the relevant areas. A political settlement is the only viable solution to the Syrian issue. The Syrian National Dialogue Congress was recently held successfully in Sochi and has had positive results. Special Envoy de Mistura is making ongoing efforts to advance the Syrian political process. The international community should support the Syrian parties in resuming dialogue and negotiations under the auspices of United Nations mediation as soon S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 16/22 18-05507 as possible and in seeking a solution that is acceptable to all parties through a Syrian-owned and -led political process. That is the only way to fundamentally ease the humanitarian situation in Syria and end the suffering of the Syrian people without delay. Terrorist organizations are still launching attacks in Syria, causing significant civilian casualties and impeding United Nations humanitarian relief efforts. The international community should strengthen its cooperation on counter-terrorism, adopt unified standards and resolutely combat all terrorist organizations that are designated as such by the Security Council. Ms. Guadey (Ethiopia): We thank Under-Secretary- General Mark Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman for their comprehensive briefings. We would like to express our gratitude to the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for their continuing efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to millions of Syrians. As Mr. Lowcock said, the humanitarian crisis in Syria continues to be a devastating one. Military activities in various parts of the country, including eastern Ghouta, have affected the ability of the United Nations to deliver lifesaving assistance to all in need. As the report of the Secretary- General (S/2018/138) says, the conflict and other obstacles have had a disastrous effect on the level of humanitarian access. In order to address those challenges and to alleviate the Syrians' suffering, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding the institution without delay of a cessation of hostilities for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria so as to ensure the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and services and medical evacuations. As we all emphasized on Saturday after welcoming the resolution's adoption (see S/PV.8186), what is now required is its full and comprehensive implementation with the immediate engagement of all parties and those with influence on them. Of course, we understand and appreciate the fact that the United Nations is ready to provide immediate humanitarian aid across the country. However, as Mr. Lowcock just highlighted, there are still military activities in various areas. In that regard, we call on all the parties to fully implement resolution 2401 (2018) for the sake of the Syrian people, who have continued to bear the brunt of the conflict for almost eight years. We appreciate any measure taken by Member States to facilitate the implementation of the ceasefire, including the humanitarian pause and humanitarian corridor announced by the Russian Federation. At the same time, it is obvious that more needs to be done to fully implement the resolution. It is therefore imperative to take urgent and coordinated action to bring about an immediate ceasefire, thereby ensuring that the United Nations and its humanitarian partners have safe, sustained and needs-based access in order to deliver humanitarian aid to all Syrians in need of assistance. In conclusion, it is ultimately a comprehensive, Syrian-led political solution, facilitated by the United Nations on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015), that can sustainably end the humanitarian tragedy in Syria. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Feltman for their briefings. By the way, at the outset I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to ask Mr. Lowcock where the United Nations is getting its evidence and data on deaths in Damascus, for instance. According to the Syrian authorities' information, for example, just since 22 January, 12 people have died in Damascus, while the United Nations figure is 11 for the whole month. Where is he getting his information from? The White Helmets, maybe? Today, as has been usual recently, the United States delegation devoted its statement to Russia. It told us that it knew what we were going to say today, which it does not. And I am pleased about that, because it means that it did not see our statement before the meeting began. On 24 January, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), in an important decision aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Syria, especially in areas where the danger of military clashes remains or there are obstacles of one kind or another to the civilian population's access to essential assistance. Today many questions have been asked — emphatic questions, rhetorical questions, questions aimed directly at us. We answered the questions asked of us during our discussion at the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). There are a lot of people here who like to pick citations from the resolution that they like and forget the ones that do not suit them. If I may, I will quote two extracts from it, from paragraph 1 and paragraph 10. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 17/22 (spoke in English) "Demands that all parties cease hostilities without delay, and engage immediately to ensure full and comprehensive implementation of this demand by all parties, for a durable humanitarian pause for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria, to enable the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and … medical evacuations". "[U]nderscores the need for the parties to agree on humanitarian pauses, days of tranquillity, localized ceasefires and truces to allow humanitarian agencies safe and unhindered access to all affected areas in Syria". (spoke in Russian) Has everyone read the resolution? We have said, and we will say it again, that any sustained pause must be preceded by an agreement between the parties on de-escalation. The demands that military activity end overnight are either the result of a misunderstanding of the realities or a deliberate exploitation of this human tragedy. The statement by the United States delegation simply rewrote resolution 2401 (2018). What sort of joint effort, such as the Permanent Representative of France called for today, can we talk about in these circumstances after what we heard today in the United States delegation's statement? Russia has announced the establishment in eastern Ghouta of daily five-hour humanitarian pauses. Everything possible is being done to ensure that they function successfully. Specifically, medical and temporary accommodation posts have been equipped, ambulance teams organized, motor transport provided. We call on the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other recognized humanitarian organizations to join these efforts. However, on the very first day, the militias took advantage of the announcement of the pause to go on the offensive. The same thing happened on the second day. The mortar shelling continued, including in the humanitarian operations corridors. Not a single person was able to leave the danger area. We took note of the relevant letters submitted on behalf of the illegal armed groups. We were told previously that the most convenient way of informing Council members about them was being sought. It has been found and it is indeed highly original — directly through the work e-mail addresses of all the political coordinators, meaning that someone deliberately sent the relevant contact information to dubious individuals from the ranks of the radical Syrian opposition. It is very similar to the situation that occurred when information about the closed negotiations on humanitarian resolutions became available to Western media agencies. However, we hope that the opposition leaders are serious and that their deeds will match their words. We are expecting clear guarantees in that regard from the militias' foreign sponsors, many of whom are seated around this table. The first thing that is needed is a definitive repudiation of the terrorist organizations. It has to be understood that terrorists continue to be a legitimate target of military operations, and we will not stand on ceremony with them. Overall, we have to decide on the most effective way to neutralize Jabhat Al-Nusra in eastern Ghouta. Why can't some members show a willingness to cooperate on that issue? Or do they not want to? The information background to this issue is overheated to the point of no return. If we had not adopted resolution 2401 (2018), it is difficult even to imagine what the Western media outlets would have made of it or how they would have portrayed Russia. But even now, when the resolution has been adopted, our Western partners act as if everything in it pertains solely to Damascus and Russia, and that its successful implementation depends almost entirely on the will of our two countries, while they, the self-styled champions of humanity, somehow imagine that they have an exclusive right to lecture us on the subject. In various media outlets, especially American ones, there have been false allegations that we mock the tragedy of this war and the situation in eastern Ghouta, and that we say that the campaign is exaggerated and fake. I will ask these humanistic gentlemen once again: Where were they when American aircraft blew Raqqa off the face of the Earth? Where were the cries and the hand-wringing? Months have passed since the terrorists were banished from that city and yet it is still uninhabitable. On top of that, there are new reports of 24 civilian casualties from Coalition air strikes in Deir ez-Zor province. Who are they — second-class citizens? Or when innocent people die from democratic bombs, is that somehow immaterial — perhaps even honourable? We urge the United Nations — in fact, we insist — to send an assessment mission to Raqqa as soon as possible, and that the Coalition, which is in de facto control of the area, give it all necessary support. We also expect that instead of establishing quasi- S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 18/22 18-05507 administrations in areas liberated from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the Coalition leadership will come up with a plan to turn them over to the central authorities, in consideration of the Security Council's repeated affirmations of Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity. That would be a great deal more constructive than the relentless quest to find what is a non-existent basis in international law for maintaining its presence on Syrian territory. If Council members have interesting ideas on how to raise the profile of local Government and find effective ways to rebuild the ethnic and religious balance that existed before the war, they should present them to the Syrians in the negotiations in Geneva and let them decide the issues for themselves through the mediation of the United Nations. We also demand that the Coalition open humanitarian access to the territory it is occupying around the Al-Tanf military base in order to bring aid to the residents of the Rukban camp as soon as possible. By the way, that is also a provision of resolution 2401 (2018). It is not for nothing that we keep saying that what is going on is painfully reminiscent of the situation in eastern Aleppo when the West unleashed a wave of monstrous anti-Russian hysteria. We are the only country being asked to implement resolution 2401 (2018). We are being criticized for instituting humanitarian pauses. Some claim that there are not enough of them. Demands, demands, demands. For some reason, someone is always bossily demanding something of Russia. Britain's Foreign Secretary has altogether decided that he is the prosecutor who is threatening to punish our country. Apparently, he called for today's meeting to be convened. He said so himself. The Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic is making daily and hourly efforts to achieve a cessation of hostilities, establish humanitarian pauses and ease the suffering of civilians. May I ask what other members have done to implement resolution 2401 (2018)? Has even one of their countries lifted a finger? Have they brought their influence to bear on those whom they consider the moderate opposition? Have they persuaded them to lay down their weapons and stop taking hostages? The hugely complex issue that the Syrian conflict represents is being used for unscrupulous purposes. The rivers of tears roll down only when the next stronghold where militias and terrorists mingle is threatened, at which point an unheard-of level of action kicks in. The real aim is the regime, as some members like to refer to the lawful Syrian authorities. Any hint of its success in fighting terrorism on its own territory is a thorn in their side. They are ready to use any means to stop it. This is a warning. We know about the chemical evidence being fabricated in order to blame Damascus. We know about the meetings on the subject, where they are being held and who is taking part in them. Today we once again heard unsubstantiated allegations about the Syrian Government's use of chemical weapons. I am tired of asking if members understand the futility of Damascus using chemical weapons from both a military and a political point of view, and the completely believable probability of militias using chemical provocations. I think they do understand it perfectly, but they persist in seeking an excuse for military intervention. United States officials, and the head of the Foreign Office and others, have already talked about military strikes against Syria, and it is obvious where that intellectual activity is heading. We urge everyone to stop the dirty tricks and join the concerted efforts to alleviate the humanitarian situation in Syria by implementing the resolution we have just adopted. We hope that the United Nations generally and Mr. Lowcock personally, as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, will rise to the occasion. We have circulated a draft presidential statement on the resolution's implementation. We have placed it under the silence procedure until 1 p.m., and we call on the Council to adopt it. We hope that there will be no objections before one o'clock. I will take the liberty of reading it out. (spoke in English) The Security Council, with reference to its resolution 2401 (2018), urges all parties to implement it and, to this end, further urges all armed groups and all Member States with influence on them to ensure the safety of the announced humanitarian corridors for evacuation from eastern Ghouta. The Security Council calls for the establishment of similar humanitarian corridors in Al-Tanf and Rukban. The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to expeditiously send a mission to Raqqa to assess humanitarian needs there. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 19/22 (spoke in Russian) And by the way, we, like the other members of the Security Council, believe that there can only be a political solution to the Syrian conflict. We are doing everything we can to achieve that, and certainly somewhat more than those who have been spreading fire and fury today. We propose, as we have always proposed, that they join in these efforts, rather than throw up road blocks in an attempt to serve their own geopolitical agendas. The President (spoke in Arabic): I shall now make a statement in my national capacity. First of all, the delegation of Kuwait aligns itself to the statement made by the representative of Sweden on behalf of our two countries as co-penholders on the issue of Syria. We thank Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under- Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for their briefings. Four days after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which demands that all parties cease hostilities throughout Syrian territory for 30 days, I would like to make the following points. We have said from the outset that resolution 2401 (2018) is only the first step towards improving the humanitarian situation in Syria. However, to date we have not seen the implementation of the provisions of the resolution — not even a partial implementation — as we heard from Mr. Lowcock this morning, in particular in eastern Ghouta. The Council demonstrated unity in adopting the resolution and it is up to us now to ensure that all its provisions are implemented in full and immediately in order to alleviate the suffering of our brethren in Syria and to protect civilians. The resolution is binding on all, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. Secondly, we welcome the fact that the United Nations is ready to come to eastern Ghouta and other besieged areas so as to deliver all kinds of aid and assistance to those that need them. We call on all the parties to the conflict in Syria to uphold international humanitarian law and abide by the provisions of the resolution, which cover all the various aspects that are causing the daily suffering of the Syrian people. Thirdly, we underscore the importance of members of the Council making their contribution by spurring all the parties to the conflict in Syria to immediately implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018), keeping in mind that, as co-penholders, we are committed to closely follow its implementation, including ensuring a briefing by the Secretariat 15 days after the adoption of the resolution. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. In accordance with to rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): The Syrian Government has examined the forty-eighth monthly report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and, yesterday morning, as usual, we sent a formal letter to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council setting forth the position of the Syrian Government on the report. We are realistic. We know well that the United Nations is not a charitable organization. That is clear given that it has been unable to implement the principles of the Charter and international law since its inception — and the Palestinian question is a case in point. There have been other failures by the United Nations: in Iraq, Libya, the former Yugoslavia, Grenada — for those who have forgotten Grenada — Nicaragua, and the list goes on. However, I hope we can preserve the United Nations as an organization even as it continues to lack charitability. I would now like to make the following points. First, the Syrian Government is fully committed to the principles of international law and international humanitarian law, as well as Syrian law and the Syrian Constitution, all of which stipulate that the Syrian Government has the responsibility to ensure the safety and security of Syrian citizens and protect them from terrorist groups. Secondly, the current report, just like previous reports, has a great flaw, namely, that the authors of the report continue to rely on politicized sources, open sources and unreliable figures. At the same time, the report continues to ignore credible Government sources and even the reports issued by the representatives of the United Nations in Syria. Those representatives, along with the reports they have submitted to the United Nations in New York, acknowledge the efforts S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 20/22 18-05507 of the Syrian Government and its cooperation on the humanitarian issue. However, none of this information that reaches New York appears to be mentioned in the report, as if by miracle. Thirdly, the Syrian Government condemns the authors of the report — the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs — especially after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), for their failure to mention the Turkish aggression against the Syrian city of Afrin. That aggression has claimed the lives of many people, including women and children, destroyed public and private facilities and has led to the displacement of the city's inhabitants and a severe shortage of humanitarian goods. However, Afrin is not eastern Ghouta, eastern Aleppo, Fo'ah or Kefreya. Fourthly, the Syrian Government fully rejects the failure of the authors of the report to mention the catastrophic impact of the so-called International Coalition and its members. The Coalition, which has claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians and members of the Syrian forces who are fighting Da'esh, committed two new massacres yesterday that claimed the lives of 29 civilians and injured dozens, most of them women and children, in the villages of Sha'fa and Thahret Allouni in eastern Deir ez-Zor. It appears that the International Coalition is focused on this part of eastern Deir ez-Zor because it is home to civilians who do not host Da'esh or Al-Nusra Front terrorists. The Coalition has also destroyed the city of Raqqa, as my colleague the representative of the Russian Federation just noted. My Government calls once again for dismantling this illegitimate aggressive Coalition and for an immediately stop to its crimes against the Syrian people. The Russian military issued a communiqué today saying that the areas under the control of the allies and agents of the United States in Syria are witnessing the worst humanitarian crisis currently in the country. Those areas have become black holes, just like the black holes in outer space. With regard to the situation in eastern Ghouta, the Syrian Government believes that the current deterioration in the situation is due to the fact that terrorist groups there have launched attacks against residential zones and military targets. Up until yesterday, they had launched more than 2,180 missiles and mortars against the city of Damascus. Those attacks claimed the lives of 66 civilians and injured 474 others. Government forces have been forced to respond to those attacks and to carry out their constitutional responsibility in guaranteeing security and safety for the citizens. My Government condemns the use, by the authors of the report, of the term "besieged areas" when considering the situation in eastern Ghouta, in rural Damascus. Under pressure from influential countries in and outside of the Council, they continue to deliberately ignore the fact that people in eastern Ghouta are besieged from within by the various armed terrorist organizations operating there. Those terrorist organizations are exploiting civilians and using them as human shields. They are seizing and monopolizing humanitarian assistance, distributing the aid to their supporters or selling it at exorbitant prices, as was the case in eastern Aleppo. Syria regrets the failure of the authors of the report to refer to the suffering of thousands of kidnapped people who are in eastern Ghouta prisons and other places where the terrorist groups are spread. The kidnapped people include women, children and elderly. These people were kidnapped from their homes and places of work and have been subjected to the worst forms of torture. There are civilians, including from city of Adra and from Latakia, who were kidnapped from their homes five years ago. The Syrian Government also condemns the statements by the Secretariat and reports of the Secretary-General, which continue up till now to disregard the suffering of 8 million civilians in the capital Damascus as a result of hundreds of missiles and mortars launched daily from terrorist groups within eastern Ghouta. The accusations by the authors of the report, like those of the Western countries that have influence on them, that the Syrian Government is allegedly besieging Ghouta have been consistently refuted. They have proven to be unfounded, as we have seen in recent reports noting that the Saudi regime provided "aid" to eastern Ghouta in February. That proves, first, that eastern Ghouta is not besieged and, secondly, that it is possible to access it. In particular, the terrorist groups in Ghouta continue to receive arms and munitions from Governments that support terrorism, including Saudi Arabia's so-called humanitarian assistance. The Syrian Government is more committed than anyone to protecting its citizens across Syria. In that 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 21/22 regard, it has taken all necessary measures to protect its citizens and to respond to the attacks of terrorist groups in eastern Ghouta. We have sought to protect these civilians from the terrorists by establishing a humanitarian corridor to ensure their exit from eastern Ghouta. We announced the humanitarian corridor only hours after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) in order to ensure the safety of civilians — in cooperation with our Russian friends and allies. We have provided them with shelter, food, medicine and medical care at the expense of the Syrian Government, not the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The Syrian Government has also called on members of the armed groups to lay down their weapons, cease their terrorist activities inside residential areas and engage in national reconciliation efforts. However, those terrorist groups, including the Al-Nusra Front, Jaysh al-Islam and Faylak ar-Rahman, have forcibly prevented civilians from reaching the corridor, as some members of the Council may know. They also sought to target the humanitarian corridor after it was announced, through the use of mortars. As for the letter sent by the terrorist Mohamed Alloush, it is a clear indication that he rejects the exit of civilians from Ghouta. It is clear that he wants to use them as human shields. There seems to be a new trend in the United Nations to circulate a letter from a terrorist group as an official document. That is an innovation at the United Nations. There is no respect for the Member States concerned. We have followed closely the way resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted and today's statements and briefings. We can clearly say that the main goal behind the adoption of the resolution is neither to reach a clear truce or ceasefire, as some may claim, nor to protect civilians and meet their needs. The main goal was to use the Security Council once again as a means to prevent any progress by the Syrian army and its allies in the fight against the terrorist groups that are targeting the city of Damascus. I say that for the thousandth time. How else to explain the fact that the resolution fails to refer to any Council resolution on counter-terrorism? Who can explain to us the strong resistance of some States during the negotiations on the draft resolution to any text that excludes Da'esh, the Al-Nusra Front and the terrorist groups affiliated with them from the supposed ceasefire? For three days, the Council has continued to negotiate the issue of whether to include or exclude them. The false humanitarian propaganda on the situation in eastern Ghouta coincided with another campaign under the supervision of the United States, claiming the use of chemical weapons again in Syria, in areas under the exclusive control of terrorists or, I should say, the White Helmets. Today, The New York Times published a Tin-Tin style, childish report claiming that there is cooperation on the chemical issue between my country and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The article is a full-page report on the front page of The New York Times. It seeks to tarnish the image of the Syrian Government and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It ends by saying that this information is not substantiated. "Though experts who viewed the report said the evidence it cited did not prove definitively that there was current, continuing collaboration between North Korea and Syria on chemical weapons." That is a word-for-word quote from The New York Times. It seems that The New York Times is not up to date on what is going on in the world. It seems that the New York Times does not know that the American vessel, the MV Cape Ray, destroyed the chemical arsenal voluntarily submitted by the Syrian Government after joining the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as a full member. That is old information, déjà vu, as is said in French. However, it seems that The New York Times has decided to address this issue today. I will read a communiqué that we received just now of information that I think should be taken into consideration when addressing the issue of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. And I can tell the Council that terrorists will use chemical weapons in Syria. On the morning of 20 February, four days ago, three Turkish trucks carrying chlorine entered Idlib governorate through the Bab Al-Hawa crossing. I think that The New York Times should verify that information. Two trucks stopped in the village of Qalb Loze in Idlib, and the third continued its way to Al-Habit village in northern Idlib. Information available to the Syrian Government points to the fact that terrorists are currently preparing for a chemical weapon using the substance of chlorine on a large scale and to then accuse the Syrian Arab Army of using such weapons. Those terrorists have clear instructions from Western and Turkish intelligence to fabricate a chemical attack before 13 March, because S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 22/22 18-05507 it is on that date that the eighty-seventh session of the Executive Council of the OPCW will be held. According to the information I received just now, the two trucks are currently in the school of Qalb Loze village. Other cars and terrorists are also currently in the school, which they have turned into a warehouse for chemical weapons. As for the third truck, it is currently in a centre belonging to the Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham, which is a Turkish agent, in the north-eastern part of Al-Habit village. A vast number of terrorists are currently unloading the truck there. In providing the Security Council with this information, we affirm that these terrorists, at the instructions of their operators, will use these chemical weapons before 13 March. The main responsibility for ending hostilities lies with those countries that have real influence with terrorist groups in Ghouta and other parts of Syria. They should compel these terrorist groups to stop their terrorist activities and allow civilians to leave those areas, which are used by these groups as a base to launch their terrorist attacks. There is in this Organization a group of five countries that are shedding tears over the humanitarian situation in Syria. Unfortunately, some of them are members of the Council. They have invited Member States to watch a movie about the White Helmets, two days from now in the Economic and Social Council Chamber here at the United Nations. Some members of the Council are advocating for a group that has been designated as a terrorist group by the Council. I hope that the Council will address the information I have provided seriously and appropriately. The President (spoke in Arabic): As this is the last scheduled meeting of the Council for the month of February, I would like to express the sincere appreciation of the delegation of Kuwait to the members of the Security Council, especially my colleagues the Permanent Representatives, their respective staff and to the secretariat of the Council for all the support they have given to us. Indeed, February has been a busy month, and one in which we rallied to consensus on several important issues within our purview. We could not have done it alone or without the hard work, support and positive contributions of all the delegations and the representatives of the Secretariat, as well as all the relevant conference service officers, interpreters, translators and security staff. As we end our presidency, I know I speak on behalf of the Council in wishing the delegation of the Netherlands good luck in the month of March. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.
Bei den Daten handelt es sich um Indikatoren aus den World Values Surveys (Wellen 1-6), die auf Länderebene aggregiert wurden.
Themen: Index Emanzipatorischer Werte (Emancipative Values Index, EVI); Index Emanzipatorischer Werte Kurzversion basierend auf den Komponenten reproductive choice (Reproduktionsentscheidungen) und gender equality (Gleichberechtigung); Komponente reproductive choice (Akzeptanz von Homosexualität, Scheidung und Abtreibung); Komponente Sprache (Priorität auf Redefreiheit und die Stimme der Menschen in nationalen und lokalen Angelegenheiten); Komponente gender equality (Unterstützung für die Gleichberechtigung von Frauen in den Bereichen Beruf, Bildung und Politik); Autonomiekomponente (Unabhängigkeit, Phantasie statt Gehorsam als geschätzte Eigenschaft von Kindern); Index säkularer Werte (Secular Values Index; SVI); Index säkularer Werte Kurzversion basierend auf den Komponenten disbelief (Ungläubigkeit, Zweifel) und defiance (Trotzhaltung, Renitenz); Komponente Ungläubigkeit (schwacher Glaube an Religiosität und wenig religiöse Praxis); Komponente Renitenz (geringer Nationalstolz, geringer Respekt vor Autoritäten und geringe Konformität mit elterlichen Erwartungen); Komponente Skepsis (geringes Vertrauen in die Polizei, Behörden und Gerichte); Komponente Relativismus (nur leichte Ablehnung von Bestechung, Steuerhinterziehung und Gebührenbetrug); Social movement activities (Beteiligung an Petitionen, Boykotten und Demonstrationen); Verknüpfung mit Informationsquellen (Nutzung von Internet, E-Mail und PC); wahrgenommene Stimulation: durchschnittliche Wahrnehmung der täglichen Aufgaben als kreativ, kognitiv und autonom; kognitive Mobilisierung; individuelle Befähigung (individual empowerment); Index zur Temperatur und Wasserversorgung (Cool Water Index); liberales Demokratieverständnis: freie Wahlen, Bürgerrechte und Gleichberechtigung; illiberales Demokratieverständnis: militärische Intervention; religiöse Autorität, Arbeitslosengeld; aufgeklärtes Demokratieverständnis; wahrgenommener Grad der Demokratisierung im eigenen Land; demokratisches Bestreben: Wunsch, in einem demokratisch regierten Land zu leben; Mobilisierungspotential für Demokratie; wahrgenommene Fairness anderer Menschen; Vertrauen: allgemeines Vertrauen; Vertrauen in Familie, Bekannte und Nachbarn; Vertrauen in Unbekannte und Menschen mit anderer Nationalität und Religion; unspezifisches und generalisiertes Vertrauen; Aktivitäten in zivilen Organisationen (z.B. Freizeit, Kirche, Parteien, etc.); Zufriedenheit mit der finanziellen Situation des Haushalts; Selbsteinschätzung des Gesundheitszustands; Fähigkeit zur Gestaltung des eigenen Lebens; Glück; Lebenszufriedenheit; Kampfbereitschaft für das eigene Land im Falle eines Krieges.
Zusätzlich verkodet wurde: für alle Länder: Nummer; Jahr, Name; Erhebungsjahr; Erhebungswelle; Kulturzone; Filterdummy für die letzte Welle je Land; numerischer Ländercode; 3-Buchstaben-Ländercode; Ländercode Weltbank; Index demokratische Rechte 1996 bis 2006; Index Bürgerrechte 1995 bis 2005; Index ehrliche Regierung 1996 bis 2006; Index wirksame Demokratie 1996 bis 2006; Index ehrliche Demokratie; Index Loyalitäts-Normen: Vertrauen in den öffentlichen Dienst, Polizei und Armee; Index Protest-Normen: Beteiligung an Demonstrationen, Boykotten, Petitionen.
International audience ; The collective work presents the study and publicationof excavated materials of an archaeologically known twoapsechurch from the first half of the 9th to the first half ofthe 10th century at the top of the Tuzluk Hill in the Yedi Evlerarea, Crimean Peninsula, near the village of Semidvorie(Alushta, Crimea, Ukraine). This sanctuary was linked tothe large agricultural and pottery producing settlement thatexisted in this economically developed and populous regionin the second half of the 8th/9th - first half of the 10th century.The settlement was situated 150-250 meters to the east andsoutheast from the church. Just 350 meters southeast fromthe church was a medieval cemetery of the "Suuksu" typeof the 7th – 8th / 9th (?) centuries existed which was left by thepopulation usually identified as Crimean Goths tribes.In 2007, an area of around 96 m2 was investigated andchurch ruins and surrounding cultural layer were studied.The stratigraphical analysis managed to identify here 44archaeological layers or contexts, one medieval grave withdouble burials, and a Bronze Age cultual place. The studyof ruins shows that the sanctuary was rebuilt multiple times.The church consisted of two communicating compartmentsof different sizes. As for characteristic features, the southernmain apse is bigger in size than the northern one, andthere was an entrance in the main part of the church throughthe northern compartment as well as two other doorwaysfrom the west and from the south. The western portal of thenorthern compartment was completely open and no traces ofwall masonry here were attested. In contrast to the southerncompartment, the foundation of the northern part was cutin natural. The three-layer masonry wall was made of localpoor faceted rectangular stones of various sizes. For buildingmortar, mud solutions with clay loam as a binder elementwere mostly used. The inside of the southern churchwalls was plastered with lime mortar, which in some placesis preserved in situ, and painted with red linear and geometricpatterns including letters or even inscriptions that aretoday illegible. The roof likely had two slopes covered bylocally made tiles of different types.The overall dimensions of the church were: width – 5.60-5.70 m, length - 8.50 m. The thickness of the wall was about0.7 m. Structure remains are preserved to a height of 0.80 m.Both apses have shoulders connecting apsidal semicirclesand walls. The external diameter of the southern apse is 2.13m. The internal dimension of the southern main compartmentis 2.34×4.15 м. The external diameter of the northernapse is 1.20 m, while the internal is 0.63 m. The width in thewestern part of the northern compartment is 1.34 m, and inthe eastern part it is reduced to 1.26 m. The church was orientedto the northeast. The azimuth of its central axis is 47°,which roughly corresponds to the azimuth point of sunriseduring the summer solstice for Crimean latitude.SUMMARYIn the first chapter, written by V. Kirilko, the buildinghistory of the church and its architectural peculiarities arepresented. The double apse sanctuary belongs to the relativelyrare type of churches of the Middle Byzantine periodthat could be described as a two-apse church with unequalapses of different sizes. G. Dimitrokallis (1976), the authorof the most representative corpus of double apse byzantinesanctuaries, classified them as "pseudobiconques." Thereare some examples of double apse churches in the Crimea(Sotera near Alushta, Sudak, Funa near Luchistoe settlement,Chembalo fortress in Balaklava). Yet, these sanctuariesmainly date back to the 14th century, with the one exceptionbeing the Sotera church that belonged to the periodof the 8th-10th century, and none of them provides an exactparallel to the church of Yedi Evler.During the short period of its history, the church wascompletely rebuilt at least once. The first building periodinvolved the creation of the main southern church with theapse and the three entrances from the west, south and north.It is highly likely that the church was intentionally conceivedby priests, ktitores or the Christian community as a doubleapse and two-part building. Immediately after the perfectionof the southern church, the additional northern compartmentwith open western portal and separate apse was added. Thispart of the church was connected to the main church via aspecial doorway in the wall dividing the compartment thatpreviously served as the northern entrance to the southernchurch. In fact, the second building period is distinguishedonly theoretically as a final step in the construction of thechurch. The chronology of the first two periods of the building'shistory, based mainly on the study of pottery and ceramicmaterials from the complex, dates back to the firsthalf of the 9th century, or more precisely the second-third tothe middle of the century.After a short period the church was completely destroyed,most likely due to inadequate construction worksor an earthquake. The third building period is determined as860-880s, when the sanctuary was rebuilt and reconstructed.After reconstruction, the northern compartment was buriedby earth and ruined stones and preserved according tocanon law practices for unused sacral Christian objects. Inthe third building period, the northern part was not active asa liturgical zone. The sanctuary became an ordinary ruralByzantine one-apse, one-nave church. A narthex was constructedin the eastern part of the sanctuary. The doorwaybetween the southern and northern parts was closed off bywall masonry. During the third building period, only twoentrances — the southern and western — were still active.The main entrance was the southern one, which was addedby a wooden apprentice. After the second deterioration ofthe church in the first half of the 10th century, no more renovations were carried out. The ruins were reused by the localpopulation for ordinary purposes no earlier than in the secondhalf of the 14th -15th century, as pottery fragments fromthe ruins show. Most probably, the narthex and apse wereused at this time as a temporary living structure in what isregarded in the chapter as the fourth building period. Theauthor proposes graphical reconstruction of the sanctuaryaccording to fourth building periods and shows architecturalparallels to this building among contemporary churches ofthe Northern Caucasus and Minor Asia.Chapter two, author I. Teslenko, deals with the stratigraphyof the site and description of archaeological layers.The analysis of excavated materials provided in the chapterallowed for the presentation of all steps of anthropogenicactivity on the Tuzluk Hill from the Bronze Age to moderntimes. The description of materials is organized by archaeologicallayers, with general characteristics of different findsincluded. Every layer inside and outside the church is attributedto a corresponding building period. A hypothesison the formation of each layer and its causes are also given.The most important layers are linked to two dilapidationsof the church, and some of them are attributed to regular liturgicallife and different rituals practiced in and around thesanctuary. Several layers may be left from construction andreconstruction works. A detailed description of the archaeologicalfinds and a cultural and liturgical interpretation ofstructures, layers and bones are given in the next chapters.In the third chapter, I. Teslenko provides an analysis ofceramic and pottery materials from the church. During theexcavation, 2,589 fragments of roof tiles and kalypters (55%of all ceramic materials), 637 fragments of kitchen and tablewares (13.5%) and 1,485 pieces of pithoi and amphora (31.5%) were recorded. Among them 9 intact rectangular rooftiles that were still preserved and 5 kalypters can be fragmentarilyreconstructed. Several tiles have a constructionsign or craftsmen marks as tridents and Greek letters «λ»,«ρ», «π» «В», «V». A theoretical estimation on the numberof tiles, including kalypters for covering the roof, has beendone. The amount is between 374 tiles / 376 kalypters and396 tiles / 397 kalypters in the second and third buildingperiod respectively. Accordingly, in the second period theweight of the roof was about 3893-3897 kg, for the thirdperiod – 4118-4122 kg.Nearly all excavated ceramic materials came from localproduction. The author lists the characteristics and providesa description of clay pottery and ceramic items, which showtwo craftsmen traditions. The first one emerged locally andis characteristic of primitive treatments, the use of a handpottery wheel and unsatisfactory baking. The second craftsmentradition reflects well-organized, high-technology commodityproduction oriented on the external wine trade. It ispresented specially by amphora. Today, there are more than40 known pottery workshops with high-technology kilns inthe southern part of the Crimean peninsula. Such a potterytradition was most likely brought here in the 8th-9th centuryfrom Minor Asia. The author discusses chronologies ofvarious types of local pottery, particularly amphora, and hemakes comparisons to groups of amphora known from differentregions of the Byzantine World. Local amphoras arepresented by so-called "Black Sea type" (second variant),which was produced until the mid-10th century, according tothe author. At the archaeological site, only two fragments ofimported pottery have been recorded: the bottom of a highneck brown clay jug with wide flat handles, no earlier thanthe mid-9th century, and a fragment of Glazed White Ware II,according to J.W. Hayes, from 10th century Constantinople.The kitchen pottery which were in use in Khazar kaganateis also absent. Ceramic finds in the church date back mainlyto the end of 8th-10th century; only several fragments of twored glazed sgraffito bowls and one fragment of a brown unglazedpot come from the 14th-15th century.The fourth chapter presented by I. Teslenko and A.Musin describes and studies the collection of glass lampfragments (342 items) that are partially not indentified.The bulk (91%) of the lamps comes from the third buildingperiod and is concentrated near the southern entrance tothe church, where the liturgy should start. Precisely withinthe same zone, micropieces of flint made by strike-a-lightfor making "liturgical fire" were recorded, and kitchen andbone remains from community meals were also attested.Glass lamps are presented by two main groups: polycandelonor beaker-shaped lamps with hollow stems, and singlelamps with handles on the rim. All lamps have close parallelsamong glass finds from other Middle Byzantine sanctuaries,for instance, Myra-Demre in Turkey, Thessaloniki inGreece, Chersoneses in Crimea, etc. The glass is mainly coloredlight green and blue. A slowly increased percentage ofpotassium oxide recorded by optical emission spectroscopymay point to glass production centers in the southeasternpart of Asia Minor or Levant.Chapter five, written by A. Musin, analyzes and classifiesmetal crosses found in the church. The excavation recordedat least 30 crosses and their fragments. Crosses wereused throughout the entire period of the church's existence.Crosses are regarded as an ex-voto offering. Most of themwere concentrated in the altar zone of the sanctuary andnear the southern entrance to the church. Two crosses wereput in wall masonry that closed the doorway between thenorthern compartment and the main church during the thirdbuilding period, evidently with apotropaic magic purposes.Presumably, crosses were suspended on the church wall oron elements of the church's interior, or inserted in them. Thecorpus of crosses is divided into five typological groups.The main group consists of iron crosses with an extendedlower branch made of two plates connected with a rivet thatderived from individual processional crosses and turned inex-voto. Some crosses with splayed arms were cut from thinsheet-metal, including copper alloy and probably silver,and decorated with punch ornamentation. Two crosses weremade of silver coins: Umayyad dirham (661 – 750 AD) andimitation of Arab-Sassanian half-drachma of the Sassanidking Kosrou II (590-629 AD).The two last groups of crosses can be compared to thecrosses of the type 1.2.2 according to J. Staecker found inEarly Rus' and Scandinavia in the 10th – 11th century, especiallyknown to be in graves in Birka (Sweden), Gnezdovonear Smolensk, Timerevo near Yaroslavl (Russia), Kiev,Iskorosten (Ukraine) and other political and economic centersof the formation of early medieval states in Russia andSweden. Several scholars have insisted that the crosses havean Anglo-Saxon origin and appeared in Sweden around930-940s AD with the mission of bishop Uni from BritishIslands. However, after the Yedi Evler excavation, the Byzantineorigin of these crosses is quite clear. Crosses fromEastern and Northern Europe may have been created usinga Byzantine example or brought directly from this regionin several cases. During the cultural transformation of theChristianization period, crosses that initially belonged to liturgicalpublic culture were turned in barbarian society intoprivate devotion objects and used as an element in burialcustoms.Nearly all crosses found in the Yedi Evler church haveparallels in other regions of the Byzantine Empire and theneighboring region in the Black Sea coastland, Mediterranean,Asia Minor, Northern Caucasus and Balkans. Suchex-voto crosses illustrate a special feature of post iconoclasticculture in the beginning of the Middle Byzantine period,as well as large distribution of personal reliquary-crossesof the end of the 9th – 11th century. However, prior to becomingan ex-voto offering in church interior, both types ofcrosses were generally used in private Christian devotion.It is largely accepted that the 9th -11th century was a periodof increasing individualism, social atomism and growingemphasis on personal piety. With that in mind, individualcrosses were evidence of the new post-iconoclasm Orthodoxyas a manifestation of personal activity in church lifeand a sign of the victory of polis community tradition overimperial tyranny.The process of donating personal crosses to churchesshould be regarded as a special way of reconciling personaldevotion with the liturgical needs of the local communityencouraged by Church hierarchy. The present hypothesisis confirmed by information in the Byzantine MonasticTypikons, especially that of Empress Irene Doukaina Komnenefor the Convent of the Mother of God Kecharitomenein Constantinople founded between 1100 and 1118, whichprescribed that each Saturday laymen would offer crosses-stauria in the sanctuary for the commemoration of thedeceased, and that other crosses must be brought similarlyeach Sunday on behalf of the living who are recorded on thediptychs. Crosses from the Yedi Evler church and in othercases should be regarded as an archaeological illustration ofsuch a ritual.Other small finds from the church like nails, chain linksfor the suspension of lamps, fragment of bronze wire, leadplates from a wick holder, buttons of bronze, small greenglass beads, and an iron arrow-head characteristic of EasternEurope military culture in the 10th/11th - 13th century aredescribed and analyzed in chapter six by I. Teslenko. Twoamulet-pendants found in the church that are made of clamshell of Cerithium vulgatum and tooth of deer of Cervuselaphus, which could also be offered in the sanctuary asex-voto, are presented in chapter seven by G. Gavris and I.Teslenko.Chapters eight to twelve compiled by G. Gavris, V.Logvinenko, and S. Leonov deal with bones and faunisticremains including birds, mammals, fishes, marine mollusks,and land snails recorded during the excavations. As a result,information is exhausted on the repertoire of animal sacrifices,a normal practice in rural parish Byzantine churches,and the composition of church festive meals has been determined.Among 139 identified bones of mammals, 64% belongto Ovis aries and Capra aegagrus hircus, 16% to Sus scrofadomesticus, 6% to Lepus europaeus and 2 % to Bos Taurus.Birds are presented with 148 individuals of 19 species,including 78% of Gallus domesticus and Gallus domesticussm. and an insignificant quantity of bones of Otis tarda,Cygnus olor, Perdix perdix etc.It is quite interesting to note that fishes are nearly absentfrom the collection, and consequently, on the table of parishmen who lived along the sea coast, only 13 bones ofAcipenser gueldenstaedtii and Perciformes were recorded.Evidently, bones from the excavation present the remainsof a festive meal and not an everyday diet. However, shellfishesare recorded here in 1900 fragments of Mytilus galloprovincialis(95% of mollusk) and a small number ofPatella ulyssiponensis and Ostrea lamellose. Eriphia spinifronspresented in 4-5 individuals should also be noted. Terrestrialgastropods mollusks are mainly presented by Helixalbescens (72.4%), Monacha fruticola (24.2%) Chondrulatridens (3.2%), and only one shell of Brephulopsis cylindrical.Some remarks on the distribution of animal bonesin the excavated complex will be provided in the followingchapters.In chapter thirteen, I. Teslenko proposed and arguedthe chronology of the site based mainly on pottery analysis.Coins from the 7th – mid-8th century that were used forthe manufacturing of crosses give only large terminus postquem for the church building. Amphora with small horizontalmultiple grooves on the surface well-known in Crimeanot later than the beginning - first half of the 9th century arenot recorded among the excavation materials; so the beginningof the church complex must date back to the secondthird-middle of the 9th century. The find of the fragment of ahigh neck jug with wide flat handles in layers of the secondbuilding period, and their absence later on, puts the date ofthe rebuilding of the church at 860-880 AD. The presence oflocal "Black Sea type" amphora of the second variant andthe absence of forms similar to amphora of types I and IIbaccording to N. Günsenin allow to propose the first half –mid of the 10th century as the final stage of the church's existenceand that of surrounding settlements. Another find isthe fragment of Glazed White Ware II, dated no earlier thanthe beginning of the 10th century. The history of the churchactually spans about 100 (± 20-25) years.Chapter fourteen by A. Musin discusses liturgical ritualspracticed in the sanctuary against the large background ofByzantine church culture and shows parallels from relatedterritories. To explain the meaning and origin of the two unequalapse church building in the Yedi Evler area, the authorprovides a thorough account of the phenomenon of doubleapse churches with unequal apses from Transcaucasia andthe Northern Caucasus through Asia Minor and the GreekIslands up until biapsidal churches were recorded in medievalItaly in the 9th-13th century. As a result, a conclusionhas been made that the Mediterranean World did not havea unique genesis of double apse churches. Late Antiquitychurches with two symmetrical naves and apses cannot beregarded as a direct prototype for the Yedi Evler church andrelated building. The architecture of Transcaucasia and theNorthern Caucasus sometimes gives similar features, forexample Mgvimevi, Georgia, the end of the 13th century,but all of them were built later than the monument underconsideration.The "pseudobiconques" churches with a reducednorthern apse are also known in medieval Italy and Corsicaof the 10th-12th century (see for example: San Venerio,La Spezia-Migliarina, Liguria; San Tommaso al Poggio,Rapallo, Liguria; Santa Maria della Chiappella, Rogliano,Haute-Corse; Santa Maria di Sibiola, Serdiana, Sardegna).However, they hardly could be a source of inspirationfor builders of the Yedi Evler church for cultural andchronological reasons. The Italian architecture of the "chiesebiabsidate" did, however, deeply influence the appearanceof two apse churches in Crimea and Muscovite Russia inthe end of the 14th-15th century. Nevertheless, early Italiantwo apse sanctuaries, especially with different apses and anadditional northern entrance, could initially reflect the sameprocess of the change of liturgical planning as in the YediEvler church.It should be acknowledged that "pseudobiconques"churches are not very characteristic for the Greek Island.Some indirect parallels can bee seen in the planning ofthe church of St Spyridon – Panagia Protothroni Halkia,Halki, Naxos Island; church of St Pantaleon, Kotraphi,Peloponnesus; church of St Athanasius, Phaturu, PatmosIsland; church of St Athanasius, Phaturu, Patmos Island. Inall cases, it is difficult to say whether the additional reducedcompartment was initially intended for this or that particularliturgical ritual. It is quite possible that both naves wereused for the Eucharist. However, in the Middle Byzantineperiod, the appearance of double churches of Sts John andGeorge, Sarakini, Samos, and the Monastery of St JohnChrysostomos at Koutsovendis, Cyprus can be attested.The double apse church was renewed in the 10th century inÜçayak, near Kirşehir, Central Anatolia, Turkey. The mostnotable fact is that the high density of two apse middlebyzantine churches, including the "pseudobiconques"sanctuary, is known to have existed in the ancient Pontprovince and near Trabzon, Turkey, for example in Koralla,Görele Burunu fortress or Gantopedin fortress (Matzouka,Zana Kale), Labra, Maçka Dere, near Köpruna Köy. Thisregion always had direct ties with the northern Black Seacoast and Crimea during Antiquity and Middle Ages.At the same time, the closest parallel to the Yedi Evlerchurch can be seen in the 10th-11th century double apsechurch in the Upper City of Middle Byzantine settlementin Boğazköy (Hattusa, Asia Minor), Turkey, excavated by P.Neve in the early 1980s. At the small northern compartmentthat served as the principle entrance in the southern mainchurch, obviously meant for the Eucharist, a considerablenumber of metal ex-voto crosses was recovered. Thecombination of such features attested both in Yedi Evlerand Boğazköy and the chronological coincidence cannot beaccidental.The author argued that different liturgical functions of twochurch compartments and the subsidiary role of the northernpart may be stressed by their sizes and architectural volumesand expressed in the exterior of churches in an architectonicway and by means of architecture. An additional means ofspecial organization of two parts of liturgical space involvedthe arrangement of a separate doorway to the main churchvia the northern compartment as a supposable place of initialworship rituals.Such a change in liturgical planning finds its possibleexplanation in the reform of Prothesis/Proskomedia,which took place in Middle Byzantium during and rightafter the iconoclasm period. The Euchologion Barberinigr. 336, the oldest Orthodox liturgical book of the end ofthe 8th century, reported the appearance of the first priest'sprayer for the preparation of bread and wine as gifts for theEucharist. There was a time when the clergy and monksestablished control over the expression of community andindividual piety within the bringing of liturgical gifts. Thechapter argues in support of a hypothesis on the Prothesisfunction established in the northern compartment in MiddleByzantine churches with two unequal apses such as YediEvler, Sotera, Boğazköy, several sanctuaries of Pont andTrabzon, etc. as a materialization of church reforms at thattime. It is quite possible that contemporary Italian churcheswith two unequal apses were also influenced by the samearchitectural and liturgical innovation in the beginning of theMiddle Byzantine period, especially since the EuchologionBarberini is a manuscript of southern Italian provenance,which reflects, however, practices of Constantinople.Architectural studies let us assume that initially, for anewly performed ritual, the northern annexes or nave ofchurch could be reserved, but later such liturgical planninginnovation did not catch on in church practice. Both preanaphoraand anaphoric rituals were concentrated in thealtar zone.The architectural implementation of the Prothesisreform could be reflected in another way, for example, in theconstruction of rectangular annexes to Middle Byzantinechurch as monastery Kisleçukuru, Antalia, and in İnişdibifortified settlement, Istlada, near Kekova – Myra/Demre,both in Turkey provide examples. In fact, the MiddleByzantine period is generally characterized by the risingof additional architectural volumes and a compartmentaround the main church building within the multiplicationof liturgical rituals and "Privatisation" of Liturgy.As proof for the given hypothesis, a find of liturgicalequipment in the church can be added. At the central partof the northern compartment just opposite the doorway tothe main church, an almost rhomboidal flat stone with dimensionsof 0.5 х 0.7 m (weight 75 kg) was attested. Itshorizontal position in situ was fixed by two roof tiles andfragments of amphora. A considerable number of potteryand glass fragments was concentrated around the stone, aswell as some animal bones. At the east end of the northernapse, the bottom of pithos and fragmentary sheep skullwere also recovered, which indicate some unknown ritual.It is quite possible that such flat stones laying directly on thechurch floor and serving as the Prtothesis table for offeringliturgical bread and wine were typical for rural Byzantinechurches, as the information of Pratum spirituale by JohnMoschus suggests.No remains of the altar table or distinct elements of thealtar screen were recorded during the excavations. This impliesthat the Holy table in the church could be made ofwood and the altar screen existed as a cloth curtain or katapetasma.However, the altar zone was separated from thenaos by a terrace cut in natural as a kind of bema. Near thebema, there was a pit, most likely for a water reservoir usedfor church needs and ritual purification purposes. Beside thispit within the altar zone, several roof tiles were stocked as aspecial construction associated with finds of metal crossesand glass lamp fragments that may be regarded as an elementof an unpreserved altar barrier.Such liturgical elements as the offering of ex-voto crossesand new arrangement of the Prothesis ritual may suggesta monastic influence in the area. Additionally, this possibilityis confirmed by some features of burial custom of thegrave excavated near the church to the southeast from themain apse, i.e. the fixation of the head of one buried senilisman with the help of small stones or a special head-supportknown in the practice of Mont Athos monasteries and in theTypikon of Studios monastery in Constantinople. This observationallows for a revision of the role of Byzantine monasticismin the development of Crimean Christian cultureof the iconoclasm and posticonoclasm period, especiallysince an erroneous hypothesis on the "mass migration" ofByzantine monks-iconodoules to the Crimean peninsulabased on an uncritical review of the information of the Lifeof Saint Stephen the Younger has been abandoned after newresearch.However, rituals practiced in the Yedi Evler church werelinked not only to monastic practices but also to popularChristianized rituals, as finds of animal bones in and aroundthe church suggest. Without a doubt, these kitchen remainstestify to animal sacrifice and parish community or familyfestive meals organized in the church. The finds of oxremains, an animal usually offered as a sacrifice in ruralGreek communities during sanctuary consecration, nearthe western and southern entrances to the church may referto rituals of dedication of the church after its constructionand reconstruction in the second and third building periods.Other bones and faunal remains are relatively proportionallyspread out in the church complex. It is difficult todeterminate where exactly the common meals took place.Most likely, during the first period of church life it was thenorthern part of the church; the joint offering of gifts forthe Eucharist and ordinary meal in the same place near theflat stone in the northern part of the church shows a kindof syncretism of liturgical and popular rituals. During thelast period, when the northern compartment was buried accordingto canon law postulates the main part of the kitchenremains was concentrated near the southern entrance to thesanctuary.The practice of animal sacrifices and parish meals waslargely in use in Byzantine popular religion, or so-called"parish Orthodoxy." In spite of prescriptions against suchpractices, which can be found in canon law, it was regardedas a norm in society, and even hagiographical texts, for example,the Life of Saint Nicolas of Sion in Asia Minor, tellabout such rituals without any fulmination. Rituals of animalsacrifices are also known in the North Caucasus, Transcaucasia,and the Balkans and are still preserved in ethnographicpractice until the beginning of the 20th century andon several territories up until the present age. For example,in the Farassa area, Cappadocia, modern Feke, Adana Province,Turkey, in the Greek parish the ritual of animal sacrificeswas recorded in the church opposite the main altar on abig stone. This parallel may suggest that the flat stone in thenorthern part of the Yedi Evler church, apart from its Prosthesisfunction, could have also served as archaic sacrifice.The remains of rituals of church consecration are alsoknown from the excavations. They have been attestedthanks to one-time concentrations of charcoals and fireplacesas well as kitchen remains opposite to the entrances of thesanctuary. For the first church consecration, three fireplaceswere recorded to the north, west and south of the church.The second consecration left one fireplace to the south fromthe church according to the position of the main doorwayduring the third building period.Within the last zone, micropieces of flint made by strikea-light were found. It is obvious that there was a specialplace here for making 'liturgical fire' before the beginningof office of vespers. Evidently, the celebration in the churchwas not conducted every day, but on special days includingFeast and Sunday Liturgies. Today the ritual of makingnew fire before offices is still preserved in Latin andGreek parish life, only on the eve of Easter Day when theliturgical light for the ceremony is normally lit from a bonfireburned outside the church. In Russian and UkrainianOrthodoxy, such practice has been abandoned. A specificderivate of such practices is the ritual of 'Holy Fire' in thechurch of Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem on Great Saturday,the day before Orthodox Easter, presented in mass mentalityand church propaganda as a miracle. However, the practiceof making 'new' or 'holy' fire, especially at the beginningof spring, is well known thanks to ethnological research inWestern and Central Europe, and relations between churchrituals and folklore customs are difficult to establish. Multiplefragments of glass lamps in the same zone hardly referto any rituals, nor do presented remains of lamps accidentallybroken during manipulation. Only one church customthat involves the intentional breaking of wedding glass cupsof wine was first attested in the Euchologion Paris Coislin.213 in 1027 AD. However, until the 12th century, the churchblessing of wedding was practiced in the aristocratic milieuand was not very widespread in rural society.In sum, the local parish community had enough cultivatedlevel of religious life and combined innovations ofliturgical mainstream of Byzantine society issued from culturalcenters and archaic practices belonging to the provincialrural population.The conclusions presented by I. Teslenko and A. Musinsummaries research results and give future perspectives.For the first time in the history of excavations of Crimeanmedieval churches, thanks to careful digging and fieldfixation, architectural archaeology managed to record manyliturgical features and everyday life elements characteristicof Byzantine rural churches. It allowed for determining acharacteristic of the material culture of the local populationduring the "demographic boom" and establishing of themataadministrative division in Byzantine Empire in the 8th-9thcentury. Church planning kept the very important step inthe development of the initial part of East-Christian Liturgyas ritualisation of Prothesis. Archaeological contextspreserved intact bones of animal sacrifices and communitymeals appropriated to Byzantine popular religion, tracesof making of 'holy' or liturgical fire as micropieces of flintmade by a light-a-strike, and ex-voto offering in the formof metal crosses, and amulets pendants that at the sametime could serve as interior church decoration. Such findsallowed us to establish byzantine origin of several typesof Christian devotional crosses pendants from the 10th-11th century originated from the territories of Early Rus'and Scandinavia. The church in Yedi Evler is an examplemonument of the Middle Byzantine period for the study ofliturgical devotion, rural sacral architecture and everydaylife of provincial settlements, which should be useful forthe understanding of both Crimean medieval culture and thehistory of other parts of the Byzantine World.The study of the Yedi Evler church permits us todraw some conclusions about the historical developmentand cultural situation in the southern part of the Crimeanpeninsula at the end of the 8th – mid 10th century. The materialculture of the local population known from the result ofthe church excavation and investigation of surroundingsettlements and pottery workshops suggests importantinnovation, such as stone housebuilding using roof tiles,high-technology pottery production with very effectivekilns, winemaking oriented to local and long distancetrade, and ecclesiastical architecture of basilica-type parishchurches. All these improvements were previously unknownfor the autochthonic people, which may be indentified tothe Crimean Goths. The settlement archaeology in the areashows that the above-mentioned innovations were broughthere with the wave of mass migration, and newly-establishedresidences of the new population existed quietly side by sidewith previous habitations. This situation may demonstratethe process of mutual integration and even acculturation ofautochthonic people in higher organized society. Most likely,the main group of migrants came from Asia Minor andbrought the mentioned traditions of Byzantine-Rhômaioscivilization, including high technology in pottery andliturgical innovations reflected in ecclesiastical architectureand devotional practices.Undoubtedly, the colonization of the southern part of theCrimean peninsula was organized by the administration ofthe Byzantine Empire in the framework of the establishingof the themata system. The theme ta Klimata in this areawas constituted in 841 AD, and later in the 850s it wasreorganized in the theme of Chersoneses. In the same vein,the new church administration was established here. Theregion under question had probably been included in themetropolitan of Ghotia or Doros, whose eastern borderseparating it from another one new diocese of Sougdaia orSourozh, now Sudak, was exactly across from the Yedi Evlervalley. The Goths diocese is referred to as "a certain regionalong the coast there called Dory," mentioned by Procopiusof Caesarea in his panegyric on the building activity of theemperor Justinian De Aedificiis.The chronology of pottery materials suggests that thechurch in Yedi Evler and the local agglomeration, as wellas a considerable part of settlements in Southern and South-Western Crimea, ceased to exist at the same time in the firsthalf of the 10th century. Such a social collapse may be linkedto the politically unstable situation in the area caused by theconflict between the Byzantine Empire and Khazar kaganateand active military raids of the Rus' from the Middle Dnieperarea to the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, Asia Minorand Constantinople. The local population moved to moresecure regions or fled behind city walls for protection.This publication is supplemented by appendixes withcatalogues of finds of various categories including metals,glass, and faunal artifacts (I. Teslenko, N. Turova), pottery,ceramic and stone materials (O. Ignatenko, I. Teslenko),architectural elements (V. Kirilko), find of Bronze Ageperiod (I. Teslenko), description and results of opticalemission spectroscopy of glass finds (A. Egor'kov) andstudy of flint finds (V. Chabai).
