Suchergebnisse

Dieser Artikel versucht die Regulierung des Finanzsystems durch nationale Politik zu erklären. Basierend auf Evidenz aus 22 Industrieländer wird argumentiert, dass das Wahlsystem - insbesondere inwieweit es zentrifugal oder zentripetal ist - einen signifikanten Einfluss darauf hat, ob Banken oder ihre Konsumenten für die Sicherheit des Bankensystems zahlen. Ausserdem beeinflusst die politische Dynamik, die durch das Wahlsystem ausgelöst wird, die Form und das Ausmass sachverständiger Regulierung, die Länder an die Stelle von Bankkartellen setzen. (SWP-Jns)

In this paper, we first evaluate 13 seat distributions in the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament by means of several indices of voting power. Subsequently, we search for the occurrence of the paradox of redistribution, the paradox of new members, & the paradox of large size for each power index. The indices used are the Shapley-Shubik index, the normalized Banzhaf index, the Penrose-Banzhaf index, the Holler index, & the Deegan-Packel index. 10 Tables, 26 References. Adapted from the source document.

The institutionalization of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the World Trade Organization in 1995 has been widely hailed as a triumph of impartial law over national power. The authors argue that the reality of the power of the WTO's Appellate Body falls short of the legalistic model in three essential respects: complainant nations often refrain from bringing cases where the violator is likely to refuse to abide by a negative decision by the Appellate Body; the Appellate Body itself commonly bends the rules of the WTO when confronting powerful defendants; and losing defendants often procrastinate beyond set time limits for compliance, entering into a post-DSU bargaining process with the complainant outside the mechanism of the World Trade Organizaton.

The resiliency of the contemporary welfare states is investigated. An overview of comparative approaches to studying the welfare state is provided, emphasizing such thoughts as the association of the welfare state with a social democratic government system. G. Esping-Andersen's (1990, 1999) theory of the welfare state is subsequently used to determine whether the welfare state is truly resistant & durable over time. In addition, Pierson's (1994) contention that the welfare state has proved relatively stable despite pressures for retrenchment is also discussed. After considering how social security systems diversified in contemporary democracies, the systemic differences between multiple Western welfare states are highlighted. It is subsequently asserted that welfare systems in these countries must address the financial burdens created by an aging population & growing unemployment rates. Future recommendations for comparative studies of the welfare state are offered. 2 Tables. J. W. Parker