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The issues that increasingly dominate the 21st century cannot be solved by any single country acting alone, no matter how powerful. To manage the global economy, prevent runaway environmental destruction, reign in nuclear proliferation, or confront other global challenges, we must cooperate. But at the same time, our tools for global policymaking - chiefly state-to-state negotiations over treaties and international institutions - have broken down. The result is gridlock, which manifests across areas via a number of common mechanisms. The rise of new powers representing a more diverse array of interests makes agreement more difficult. The problems themselves have also grown harder as global policy issues penetrate ever more deeply into core domestic concerns. Existing institutions, created for a different world, also lock-in pathological decision-making procedures and render the field ever more complex. All of these processes - in part a function of previous, successful efforts at cooperation - have led global cooperation to fail us even as we need it most. Ranging over the main areas of global concern, from security to the global economy and the environment, this book examines these mechanisms of gridlock and pathways beyond them. It is written in a highly accessible way, making it relevant not only to students of politics and international relations but also to a wider general readership.

This article examines the question to what extent the provisions of the Austrian Federal Constitution on the direct applicability of international treaties on the one hand and customary international law on the other can be regarded as "open" (or "friendly") towards public international law. The question can, in principle, be answered in the affirmative for both constellations, even if direct applicability is of greater practical importance for international treaty law. On closer examination, the specific Austrian instrument of the "reservation of (statutory) implementation" for international treaties also proves to be an instrument that is potentially "friendly" to international law. Consequently, it can be concluded that, with regard to the direct applicability of international law, the Austrian constitution is "relatively" open (or "friendly") towards public international law.

This article examines, through a two-level game model, the case of the first investment dispute under NAFTA between a private US firm & the Mexican government. It argues that the clue to understanding why the Mexican president could not cooperate with the US president lies in Mexico's domestic "ratification" process. The analysis yields two theoretical propositions. First, federalism represents an important variable in explaining foreign economic policy. Second, two-level game logic should not be applied only to formal international negotiation situations; instead, by specifying the dependent variable as cooperation or noncooperation, these models connecting domestic & international politics can be productively applied to study foreign economic policy. 1 Figure, 49 References. Adapted from the source document.

Auf der Basis einer "eingehenderen Betrachtung des transatlantischen Konflikts über die Kontrollen des Technologietransfers und seiner Bearbeitung in Form des CoCom-Regimes" wird gefragt, unter welchen Bedingungen es zur transatlantischen Kooperation über Exportkontrollen kam und wie der Gehalt dieses internationalen Regimes erklärt werden kann. Hierzu werden zunächst die Entstehung des CoCom-Regimes sowie alternative Strategien des Osthandels und Konflikte im CoCom-Regime dargestellt. Es schließt sich eine Evaluation von drei rationalistischen Theorien über kollektives Handeln in der internationalen Politik in bezug auf die untersuchungsleitende Fragestellung an. Hierbei handelt es sich um (1) die Theorie der hegemonialen Stabilität, (2) die Hypothese vom innenpolitisch "schwachen" und außenpolitisch "starken" amerikanischen Staat und (3) die auf die situationsspezifische Verteilung von Einflußchancen orientierte spieltheoretische Erklärung kollektiven Handelns. Der Verfasser zeigt, daß Entstehung und Ausgestaltung des CoCom-Regimes am besten mit dem situationsstrukturellen Ansatz erklärt werden können. (ICE)

A maioria dos países integrantes do Fórum das Ilhas do Pacífico(1) foi colônia ou protetorado britânico. Essa condição resultou na transposição de leis britânicas relativas à saúde pública que necessitam de revisão e reforma. Estes países também contam com uma rica tradição de direito consuetudinário e métodos de organização social anteriores à experiência colonial(2). Acrescente-se a esse ambiente legal pluralista, o fato de que todos os países do Pacífico ratificaram tratados de direitos humanos internacionais ou tratados que criam obrigações no direito internacional em relação à saúde. ; Most Pacific Island countries which are members of the Pacific Islands Forum have a history as British colonies or protectorates. This delivers a legacy of transplanted British style public health laws from the first half of the twentieth century, which are out of date and in need of review and reform. Pacific Island countries also have a rich tradition of customary laws and methods of social organisation predating their colonial experience. Added to this pluralist legal environment, all Pacific countries have ratified some international human rights treaties or treaties creating obligations at international law in relation to health.