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As the current chair of BRICS, Russia is pursuing a rather extensive agenda related to finance that includes enhancing the role of member countries in the international monetary and financial system and developing interbank cooperation and settlements in national currencies. BRICS is an intergovernmental organization founded by Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa that recently expanded and now includes Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates. There has also been discussion of a potential BRICS currency as part of a strategy of de-dollarization — the substitution of the dollar as the primary currency for international financial transactions. The U.S. trade war with China, as well as U.S. sanctions on China and Russia, are central to this ongoing discussion.Although much U.S. media attention was paid to the enhancement of military and political cooperation during the summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing earlier this month, financial issues also figured high on the agenda. The Russian delegation included Putin's new defense minister, Andrei Belousov, whose appointment is believed to help ensure that the Russian economy better serves the strategic needs of the military. Russia's Finance Minister Anton Siluanov and the governor of the Central Bank, Elvira Nabiullina, also participated. Nabiullina's participation was particularly noteworthy as she does not regularly accompany Putin on overseas visits. However, her participation would have been crucial for any discussion regarding sanctions workarounds and Moscow's interest in de-dollarization. Also noteworthy was Putin's mention that trade turnover between the two countries in 2023 increased by some 25 percent, reaching over $227 billion. He was also keen to underscore that 90 percent of bilateral trade between the two countries was conducted in rubles and/or yuan. It must be mentioned that Chinese banks are under increasing pressure from the U.S. to stop funding these arrangements. In any case, Putin's observations were clearly intended not only for the Chinese leadership but also for the "global majority" or Global South as well to promote global joint Sino-Russian initiatives, such as de-dollarization, which have received increased support recently. Indeed, it was probably no coincidence that during Putin's visit it was announced that Beijing dumped a total of $53.3 billion of U.S. Treasuries and agency bonds combined in the first quarter, according to calculations based on the latest data from the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Belgium, often seen as a custodian of China's holdings, also disposed of $22 billion of Treasuries during the same period. These figures underscore China's continuing commitment to de-dollarization.As of March 2024, over half (52.9%) of Chinese payments were settled in RMB while 42.8% were settled in U.S. dollars. Furthermore, according to data released by the People's Bank of China, China's gold reserves rose to 2264.87 tons in the first quarter of 2024, up from 2235.39 tons in the fourth quarter of 2023.This is double the share from the previous five years. According to Goldman Sachs, foreigners' increased willingness to trade assets denominated in RMB continues to contribute to de-dollarization in favor of China's currency. Early last year, Brazil and Argentina announced that they would begin allowing trade settlements in RMB. With the onset of the global de-dollarization trend, numerous countries have sped up diversifying their reserves by augmenting their gold holdings and adopting local currencies for international transactions.At the ASEAN finance ministers and central banks meeting in Indonesia in March, policymakers discussed cutting their reliance on the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the euro and moving to settlements in local currencies instead. And, in early April, Indian media widely reported that the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had announced that India and Malaysia were starting to settle their trade in the Indian rupee. India already conducts most of its energy trade with Russia in rupees or rubles.As de-dollarization accelerates, the BRICS nations continue efforts to establish a new reserve currency backed by a basket of their respective currencies. BRICS members have not developed their own currency; however, a BRICS blockchain-based payment system is in the works, according to Kremlin aide Yury Ushakov in March 2024. The payment system, referred to as the BRICS Bridge, would connect member countries' financial systems using payment gateways for settlements in central bank digital currencies. Ideally, a BRICS currency would allow these countries to assert their economic independence while competing with the existing international financial system. The current system is dominated by the U.S. dollar, which accounts for about 90 percent of all currency trading. Until recently, nearly 100 percent of oil trading was conducted in dollars; however, in 2023, one-fifth of oil trades were reportedly conducted with non-dollar currencies.The potential impact of a new BRICS currency on the U.S. dollar remains uncertain, with experts debating its potential to challenge the dollar's dominance. According to an article on Nasdaq.com, "Any such currency, if stabilized against the dollar, would weaken the power of U.S. sanctions, by reducing the influence of the dollar globally…weakening the status of the dollar as a global currency and mitigating risks associated with global volatility due to the lessening of dependence on the dollar…As more countries would seek alternatives to the dollar this would only accelerate the trend toward de-dollarization."In a recent interview, Sergey Ryabkov, Russia's deputy foreign minister, revealed that the de-dollarization agenda would take center stage at the BRICS summit scheduled to take place in Russia in October 2024. The alliance will become stronger after the summit, ushering developing nations into a "whole new ball game." The BRICS has also created the BRICS Bank in 2015. Now known as the New Development Bank, or NDB, it mobilizes resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in the BRICS and other emerging market economies and developing countries. In 2021, the NDB expanded its membership and admitted Bangladesh, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Uruguay as new members. In March its board of directors concluded its 43rd meeting at its headquarters in Shanghai. During meetings a robust project pipeline for 2024 was discussed, aligned with the development objectives of NDB's member countries.Although the threat of de-dollarization and a digital BRICS currency do not appear imminent, there is no doubting the commitment, particularly by China and Russia, to the creation of an alternative to the existing financial architecture underpinned, as it is, by the U.S. dollar. If successful, the addition of a competing system could prove particularly enticing to countries in the Global South and would hopefully lead U.S. policy makers to exercise greater restraint regarding the use of sanctions as a foreign policy hammer, especially given the current domestic environment of inflationary pressure and ever-growing national debt.

On May 23, Kenyan President William Ruto and his delegation dined with President Biden at the White House in the first state dinner hosted by an American president of an African head of state since Ghanaian President John Kufuor visited George Bush for a state dinner in September 2008.
Although these events are typically symbolic gestures meant to signify the close diplomatic connection between the United States and an ally, Ruto's visit bears greater significance than that which traditionally accompanies these dinners.
The visit coincided with Kenya gearing up to send a police force to Haiti in an attempt to quell long-standing violence in the Caribbean country. Although the United States has stated that it has no interest in leading an international police or military mission to end the violence there, it has long sought another country to lead a security intervention in its place.
With approval from the UN Security Council and with American financial and political support, Kenya agreed to lead the mission. The state dinner served as an expression of U.S. support for Kenya's imminent security mission to Haiti.
This point was explicitly emphasized by President Biden during a press conference with President Ruto at the White House on May 23. In response to a question about Washington's perspective on the crisis in Haiti and Kenya's decision to lead a security mission, Biden said, "we concluded that for the United States to deploy forces in the hemisphere just raises all kinds of questions … about what we're trying to do. … So we set out to find a partner or partners who would lead that effort that we would participate in, not with American forces but with supplies and making sure they have what they need. And so I'm very grateful for President Ruto's leadership here for a multinational effort."
To support the mission, Biden said, "we're going to supply logistics, intelligence, and equipment…Kenya is stepping up with police and other countries plan to do so as well. The United States is going to support the collective effort here." On America's financial support for the Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission in Haiti, Biden said "we're working with Congress to provide $300 million to the MSS and an additional $60 million for equipment and assistance."
When pressed by a Kenyan journalist on his decision to send Kenyan troops to Haiti rather than deploying them to respond to domestic security threats, President Ruto argued that Kenya has long taken action in neighboring African countries to promote peace and security by sending in forces, such as sending troops to Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to help fight against non-state armed groups. Ruto then formed a parallel between these African security missions and the one planned for Haiti — a country 7,500 miles away — saying, "Haiti should not be an exception. Sending 1,000 security men to Haiti speaks to the same belief and commitment to peace and security."
The MSS Mission has already faced plenty of criticism and skepticism that it will be able to provide adequate security amid the overwhelming gang violence and political turmoil plaguing Haiti right now. It also follows a tradition of failed outside interventions by the U.S. and the UN. The difficulty of this task has complicated the deployment of Kenyan police, and continues to delay their arrival. Scheduled to touch down in Haiti on the same day as Ruto's visit to the White House, the Kenyan police deployment has been delayed, with no firm date for their arrival yet announced.
Beyond an expression of support for Kenya's planned police intervention in Haiti, the state visit also served as an opportunity for President Biden to indicate his administration's attention to African affairs and his continued interest in the continent. This comes as his administration has faced criticism for failing to deliver on promises to invest in Africa's prosperity, instead prioritizing U.S. diplomatic energy and resources on other issues, such as great power competition with China, the Russia-Ukraine War, and the Israel-Gaza War.
Despite hosting the U.S.-Africa summit at the Convention Center in Washington in December 2022 — during which African leaders joined American officials to discuss ways in which the United States can work with African governments and institutions to meet Africa's interests and needs — the Biden administration has indeed done little to respond concretely to Africa's challenges and deepen its ties with the continent.
Biden has failed to keep his promise to visit Africa during his first term in office and was slow to provide diplomatic support to seek an end to the Sudanese Civil War. African governments have also accused the United States of carelessly lecturing them on the importance of democracy and the appropriate responses to local security threats. And the United States has struggled to maintain diplomatic and security ties with African governments, having recently had its military expelled from Niger and Chad by each country's government.
Among the countries of East Africa, Kenya has been among the most stable in recent years. This has provided reassurance to the United States that Kenya — rather than its more traditional East African partner, Ethiopia — can be trusted with increased diplomatic and military cooperation.
On the largely symbolic front, the Biden administration named Kenya as a "major non-Nato ally" of the United States. This falls short of a formal military or security treaty between the two governments, but does enhance defense ties between the two militaries by giving Kenya access to American military loans and the purchase of American military technology.
The United States and Kenya also announced the U.S.-Kenya Climate and Clean Energy Industrial Partnership. This looks to increase American investment in clean energy solutions and green infrastructure in Kenya. In conjunction with this effort, major American government agencies announced their intention to invest in Kenya's infrastructure and development. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) announced in September 2023 a $60 million grant to support a four-year program to improve transportation in Kenya, emphasizing climate-friendly public transportation projects.Meanwhile, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) also announced $15 million for new projects focused on poverty reduction and food security in Kenya.
In a speech delivered at Johns Hopkins University's School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) on May 23, Ruto — who holds a PhD in plant ecology from the University of Nairobi — emphasized his desire to see greater American investment in green infrastructure and climate-friendly technology across Africa.
Ruto said: "With our massive, untapped renewable energy potential, the world's youngest and fastest-growing workforce, and abundant natural assets, our continent has the fundamentals to be a major player in the three critical areas needed to avert climate catastrophe."As the United States looks to respond to Russia's and China's growing engagement with the continent, it should do so by working with African states in the climate, development, and humanitarian spheres.This will provide the nuanced and deeply interconnected relationships that might help the U.S. meet security needs while promoting the stability and prosperity of Africa, as the continent seeks to provide jobs and resources for a booming population whose median age is just 19.

With NATO's 75th anniversary summit drawing near, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz told the Munich Security Conference in February that Germany would this year meet NATO's 2% of GDP target for defense spending and would sustain this level "through the 2020s and 2030s."But Bastian Giegerich, the head of the London-based International Institute for Security Studies, has said that reversing the effects across Europe of more than 20 years of underfunding of defense capabilities will take at least a decade of substantially increased defense spending. He's not alone in thinking this way, and for good reason. Germany's 2024 budget allocates 51.8 billion euros for defense, by itself short of the 2% of GDP NATO benchmark. Germany seems on course, however, to meet the target by drawing down the 100 billion euro emergency fund announced by Scholz in his famous Zeitenwende (epochal change) speech to the Bundestag in February 2022. Disbursements from this fund are projected to keep Germany's defense spending at or above the 2% of GDP mark through 2028, after which Germany plans to fund defense through the regular budget process. Achieving this will require an increase of approximately 30 billion euros over the 2024 defense outlay. An increase of this magnitude to defense spending from the regular budget process will require overcoming very serious obstacles. Germany has well established limits on the fiscal deficit, which will create politically destabilizing distributional conflict when other spending priorities are forced to adjust to make room for a bigger defense budget.. This constraint will be even more binding if the economy, expected to grow at only 0.2% this year, remains weak. Fiscal probity is baked into German political culture and shored up by formal legal constraints. The "debt brake" written into the constitution in 2009 holds the federal budget deficit to 0.35% in any budget year. The opposition Christian Democratic (CDU/CSU) party, which, according to current polling trends, seems likely to return to power in the 2025 elections, is wary of any attempt to circumvent or reform the debt brake, which legally can be suspended only by invoking "emergency" conditions, as was done to fund pandemic spending, and to unlock 100 billion euros for defense spending in 2022. Last November, Germany's Constitutional Court ruled against the government's plan to repurpose 60 billion euros of unspent COVID funding to pay for green energy transition programs. The ruling coalition had to scramble to fill the hole in its budget, exposing the vulnerability of Germany's fiscal policy to distributional constraints. Farmers took protests onto the streets of Berlin to demand restoration of their diesel fuel subsidy. This kind of social tension is likely to follow any attempt to shift massive resources to the defense sector by cutting other programs. The green energy transition remains a priority for the coalition's two main parties — the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens — even though both are fully convinced of the need to boost defense spending. The fiscally conservative Free Democrats (FDP) and their leader, Finance Minister Christian Lindner, adamantly oppose reforming the debt brake or raising taxes. The only obvious way to square this circle would be to consider the continuing war in Ukraine an emergency and thereby unlock another 100 billion euros. This is obviously not an ideal way to finance a program of rearmament that might take decades, and such a maneuver might not survive scrutiny by the Constitutional Court in any case. It is becoming evident that, even with the provision of emergency funding, the defense industrial base can expand only gradually, and weapons procurement processes are limited by the time needed to manufacture new weapons and equipment, whether from Germany, elsewhere in Europe or the United States. For example, the 18 Leopard 2 battle tanks ordered to replace those supplied to Ukraine will arrive two years from now at the earliest. Meanwhile, Ukrainian president Zelensky recently assailed Germany for not delivering the Taurus missiles; he claimed Berlin decided the missiles were necessary for defending Germany instead.Social Constraints: Leadership and Public AttitudesThe German military was underfunded for years before February 2022, because the political leadership absorbed the liberal triumphalism of the 1989 democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and believed history pointed to global convergence on the liberal democratic model.Efforts to expand military recruitment began after the 2014 Russian takeover of Crimea, but has failed to attract new recruits in sufficient numbers. The number of troops remains stuck at 180,000. Some are now calling for reinstituting mandatory military service.The most effective and vocal advocate for Germany's rearmament is Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, an SDP politician widely touted as a possible successor to Scholz. Pistorius has said that the Bundeswehr must be made "kriegstüchtig" (war ready) and warned that Russia might attack a NATO member within the coming 8-10 years.These statements, very much against the grain of Germany's antecedent anti-militarist political culture, have not dented Pistorius' popularity. German elites and, to a lesser extent, the broader society seem to be moving toward greater acceptance of the need for national rearmament.The European Vision: Too Many Cooks?The European Commission has advanced its own plans to coordinate the financing of rearmament across Europe, favoring and fostering synergies among European defense-industrial firms. In principle, this initiative should pose no problem for Germany since Scholz, a committed European, has repeatedly stated that the EU is the framework for Germany foreign and security policy.Nevertheless, the Commission risks competing with member nations for available resources for equipment and weapons acquisition. Most member countries, including Germany and France, conceive of defense cooperation in a multilateral pan-European context, but would insist that member nations remain in the driver's seat.Emmanuel Macron's exhaustive vision for Europe— the "Sorbonne II" speech of April 26 — dealt extensively with the European imperative to develop a more capable conventional deterrent, albeit within NATO.His framing of the issue was the stark warning that "Our Europe can die," but he did not endorse any pooling of national sovereignty on defense policy. On the contrary, he pledged personally to convene "all partners" to develop a "new defense paradigm" for the "credible defense of the European continent."This is an intergovernmental framework rather than one featuring a leading role for the European Commission.Why the Path Ahead is DifficultBastian Giegerich of IISS says that for Germany "the mental shift, the societal resilience" needed to underpin rearmament "has not happened." This is true, but it is not only a matter of changing hearts and minds. Germany's limitations are embodied in its institutional framework and very resistant to change, given the perceived challenges from the populist right, the climate policy imperative, its generous social safety net, the fragmented party system, the self-imposed but broadly popular fiscal constraints, and complex coordination problems with key partners (above all France) and the European Commission. This transformation, even if embraced without reservation by Scholz or his successors, is a vastly complex and fraught agenda.

Last year's Hamas-led incursion into southern Israel and the subsequent Israeli war on Gaza, which has killed roughly 35,000 Palestinians, have impacted relationships within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — members appear to be moving closer together. As the Gaza war expands into Lebanon, Yemen, the Red Sea, and elsewhere, and while Iran and Israel's hostilities brought the region into uncharted waters earlier this month, the monarchies on the Arabian Peninsula are strengthening ties within the larger Gulf Arab family.In a historical context, this makes complete sense. To understand why, it is useful to first go back to the chaotic period of the late 1970s and early 1980s.For the Persian Gulf's Arab monarchies, 1979 was a terrifying year. To varying degrees, the Western-backed Gulf Arab leaders saw both Iran's Islamic revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as dangerous developments. By 1981, the six conservative Gulf Arab states — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — came together to bolster their collective security by establishing the GCC.Over the decades, the GCC states have put their ideological and geopolitical differences aside in the interest of growing Gulf Arab unity, particularly during periods of increased instability. Cases include the 1990/91 Kuwaiti crisis, the 2010/11 Arab Spring uprisings, the meteoric rise of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in mid-2014, and the Taliban's return to power in 2021. By the same token, at times of greater stability in the region and fewer threats to the Gulf Arab monarchies, internal divisions and differences between the GCC members have tended to elevate to the surface.It was no coincidence that the first GCC crisis broke out in March 2014. At that time, the revolutionary tide of the Arab Spring had largely dissipated and the counter-revolutionary Gulf Arab states — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain — felt the need to pressure Qatar into abandoning the pro-revolutionary and Islamist-friendly policies that shaped Doha's approach to many of the 2010/11 uprisings which shook the Arab world. Yet, that GCC spat ended later that year after ISIL had usurped large portions of Iraq and Syria. Then, the second GCC crisis, which was an outcome of basically the exact same issues that led to the first GCC crisis, erupted in mid-2017 when ISIL was significantly less powerful.Although the Gulf Arab states — unlike Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria — do not share land borders with Israel-Palestine, all six GCC members are extremely worried about the situation in Gaza and its ramifications for the wider region, including the Persian Gulf. Among the Gulf Arab monarchies, there is much common cause and shared concerns about further regionalization of the Gaza war. These concerns have led to Gulf Arab officials becoming increasingly frustrated with U.S. leadership in the region and the Biden administration's refusal to pressure Israel into agreeing to a ceasefire."[The] war in Gaza has unified GCC [states] in terms of moral, political, and diplomatic solidarity with Gaza and the Palestinians," said Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a Dubai-based Emirati political scientist, in an interview with RS. "Israel has become a killer machine in Gaza for the past 200 days and this is to nobody's liking in the Arab Gulf states," he added.There are important domestic ramifications to consider too. Officials in the Gulf Arab monarchies fear the potential for the Palestinian cause to mobilize and/or radicalize their own citizens in ways that could upset the status quo in GCC states and the wider region. Palestine-related protests in Egypt and Jordan have potential to fuel significant unrest in those two countries, whose stability is vitally important to the Gulf Arabs.Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) recently spoke by phone with the president of the UAE Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) and the emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim. In these two conversations, the Gulf Arab leaders discussed the heightening of regional tensions and threats to stability and security in the Middle East. MbS, MbZ, and Emir Tamim all agreed on the need to mitigate security risks and take measures to prevent the region's crises from spiraling out of control.On April 22, Oman's Sultan Haitham paid his first visit to the UAE since he became his country's head of state in January 2020. While in Abu Dhabi, Sultan Haitham and MbZ discussed a host of issues at the bilateral, regional, and global levels. During Sultan Haitham's visit, companies from Oman and the UAE signed $35.12 billion worth of deals in various sectors such as transport and energy. The Omanis and Emiratis are focused on advancing their countries' economic integration through various projects and initiatives, most notably the Etihad Rail which links Oman's Sohar port to Abu Dhabi.The GCC states have come a long way in terms of mending fences since the historic al-Ula summit of January 2021 officially ended the Emirati- and Saudi-led blockade of Qatar. Indeed, it was not long ago when a phone call between MbS and Emir Tamim, or between MbZ and the Qatari emir, would have created many headlines given the extent to which Saudi-Qatari and Emirati-Qatari relations had deteriorated. "The Gaza war has brought Qatar and the UAE closer," Abdulla told RS.These past rifts within the GCC were not only about Qatar. The UAE and Oman were having their share of problems in bilateral affairs throughout Sultan Qaboos's final decade on the throne. Yet, Sultan Haitham's recent visit to the UAE underscored how the leadership in both Muscat and Abu Dhabi are focused on both playing their diplomatic cards to try to bring regional crises under control while also pushing ahead with their economic transformations at home through ambitious visions aimed at eliminating their economic dependence on hydrocarbons.In all GCC states, there is an understanding that more discussions between their leaders and growing levels of inter-GCC cooperation across a host of domains is necessary to achieve progress on both fronts. The Gulf Arab monarchies realize that this is not a time for internal divisions and friction between the different royal families to prevent the six GCC members from reaching their potential through greater Gulf Arab unity.GCC states have strengthened their relationships with each other since October 7 because "there needed to be coordination given that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE are playing leadership roles in this conflict," said Aziz Alghashian, a fellow with the Sectarianism, Proxies & De-sectarianisation project at Lancaster University.Nonetheless, while the GCC members are bolstering their cooperation as Israel's war on Gaza rages, some experts believe that competition between the Gulf Arab states vis-à-vis Gaza might emerge after the dust settles and the post-war phase begins in the Palestinian enclave."There is potential that it could be turbulent in the future once there is a real process of addressing the day after in Gaza and that could [relate to] aspects of burden sharing [and] aspects of competition," Alghashian said. "So, there is that to look out for in the future. Maybe it's speculative for now, but I don't think we should count it out."

With the pendulum of war swinging in Russia's favor and the Western alliance only now clearing the way for more aid to Ukraine, many have been waiting for the Institute for the Study of War to offer its take on who is to blame and what is to be done. ISW has been one of the most referenced think tanks in mainstream media reporting on the war in Ukraine and has played a prominent role in creating and sustaining war optimism in the West in 2022 and 2023. Its daily battlefield reports have repeatedly played up Ukrainian victories and emphasized Russian failures and losses, almost always uncritically reproducing the version received from Kyiv.Such reporting is unsurprising when we consider the specific nature of ISW as a think tank. Funded by important military contractors in America's military industrial complex such as General Dynamics, DynCorps International, and CACI International, ISW is also a creation of the "Kagan industrial complex." It was founded by Kimberly Kagan, the wife of military historian Frederick Kagan, who in turn is the brother of Robert Kagan — co-founder of the infamous neo-conservative think tank the Project for a New American Century. It would be remiss not to mention that Robert Kagan is married to none other than Victoria Nuland, who was until recently heading up the U.S. State Department's policy on Ukraine and Europe.Given the hawkish and neoconservative ideological bent of ISW's leadership, one would not expect their stance on the war in Ukraine to change even in the light of new developments. Yet, its recent report "Denying Russia's Only Strategy for Success" is a remarkable double down. Not only does it present the recent deterioration of Ukraine's military prospects as a Kremlin disinformation campaign, it is also a manifesto for military escalation.Instead of examining where the Western alliance has come up short, or any concession of Russia's resilience and adaptation to the challenge of war, the ISW report is squarely focused on the apparent superpowers the Kremlin enjoys in the domain of "perception manipulation." It claims the Kremlin "floods Western discourse with false and irrelevant narratives" to condition Western publics to "freely reason to a conclusion that Russia's prevailing in Ukraine is inevitable." Reviewing the references the report is based on, it is clear the authors have no direct proof of Kremlin activity. Their work mostly relies on other ISW reports and cites tweets by Elon Musk and David Sacks or cherry-picked media articles as evidence of Westerners being duped by Russia. Unpacking the central thesis of Russian disinformation, the report goes on to claim that the West has a vast superiority over Russia in terms of resources and technology and that all that is needed to defeat Vladimir Putin is "strategic clarity." As ISW are experts in military history, it seems incredible they have forgotten the numerous historical examples of countries with superior GDP being defeated by economically and technically inferior opponents. Sidestepping such inconvenient points, the ISW report focuses on the West's loss of clarity — be it the genuine divisions and fear within NATO or distractions caused by other issues. The blame for this is placed squarely on the Kremlin, implying that Russia has almost superhuman capacities to control Western perception. Unsurprisingly, the report urges Westerners (referred to as "we" and "us" throughout the text) to blow this Kremlin-induced fog from their minds. In other words, if only the West can eradicate "defeatism," return to its core "values" and "virtues" and understand the true nature of the Russian threat is in its disinformation capacities, then the rest will be simple. The Western alliance will bridge its "need gap" and produce a "surge" in support to Ukraine to ruin Putin's dream of a Russian victory. Once again, there is not a single sentence here that refers to the real war-making capacities of NATO or Ukraine. Where do the munitions come from? What about the manpower? Which NATO members are ready to step up their commitment? The ISW report fits into the previous track record of poor quality military analysis from neo-conservative think tanks on the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. One must conclude that the purpose of this ISW report is in fact to boost the morale of analysts overwhelmed by pessimistic questions about the war's new trajectory. Indeed, the ISW report dismisses talk of peace as "surrender" to Putin. It also rejects those concerned about escalation and a NATO-Russia war and explicitly saying that the West must escalate to resist Putin's aggression. Failure to resist is tantamount to surrender.The discourse of discrediting previous Western diplomacy with Russia as cowardly and failed appeasement is well-established and repeated in the report. ISW goes one step further by calling for the rejection of all "Russian premises" in understanding the conflict in Ukraine. This is a sure way to ensure there can be no basis for any negotiations with Russia.This brings us to the crucial final part of the report where, having "debunked" a spectrum of points as merely part of the Kremlin's grand perception manipulation campaign, the authors outline the logical next step in the war: a new escalation. The first part is to "deny Russia's sanctuaries," by which the authors mean encouraging Ukraine to have free rein in attacking targets inside the Russian Federation. Second, they call for NATO to support new forms of asymmetric warfare to catch Russia off guard and somehow offset their increasing dominance on the frontlines. Finally, the report vaguely calls for the West to "target Russia's capability globally," which appears to advocate espionage, political and economic warfare, and perhaps even terrorism. In summary, the report advocates blowing up various targets connected to Russia in the hope this derails their summer offensive in Ukraine. ISW has issued a clear call for the West to fearlessly up the ante against Russia. In reading it, one recalls the strong influence ISW has had up to this point in shaping perceptions of the war in Ukraine. What is striking is the way the group has revealed its own hand as a crucial agent not in supplying objective and accurate military reports but in waging information warfare. One could even say that ISW itself "floods Western discourse" to condition U.S. public opinion to "freely conclude" that it is necessary to escalate against Russia. Although deeper research is needed, it would seem likely that ISW is far more successful in spreading discourses on the war than any Kremlin agency. Indeed, Russia has no equivalent to ISW's global influence and reach in the information domain. The Kremlin's presentation of its war aims or ability to contest key points has been clearly weak in the West. Despite all the ISW claims, it appears that Russia has long given up on serious "perception manipulation" in the West in favor of hard power. As a debacle looms for the Western alliance in Ukraine, the Institute for the Study of War is offering a Plan B of escalation to solve the current situation. With the anniversary of NATO this month, we can expect their arguments will be heard in various meetings across the Western world. One only hopes the counter-argument for restraint can be made without being shouted down as a Kremlin propaganda tactic.

The RAND corporation's Samuel Charap and Johns Hopkins University professor Sergey Radchenko published a detailed timeline and analysis of the talks between Russian and Ukrainian negotiators just after the Russian invasion in February 2022 that could have brought the war to an end just weeks after it had begun.
Much of the piece confirms or elucidates parts of the narrative that had previously been reported. In the spring of 2022, the two sides appeared relatively close to a deal, one that, according to the authors, would "have ended the war and provided Ukraine with multilateral security guarantees, paving the way to its permanent neutrality and, down the road, its membership in the EU."
But due to a combination of changing battlefield dynamics that convinced Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he could win the war militarily, Western allies' hesitance to engage diplomatically with Russia and simultaneous ramping up of military support for Ukraine, and the discovery that Russian forces had committed atrocities in Bucha, the talks eventually fell apart.
On some of these points, the authors contend that earlier accounts have been overstated. The idea that the U.S. and the UK "forced" Zelensky to back out of peace talks is "baseless," say Charap and Radchenko, though they acknowledge that "the lack of Western enthusiasm does seem to have dampened his interest in diplomacy."
On the suggestion that the discovery of war crimes convinced the Ukrainian president to abandon negotiations, the authors note discussions "continued and even intensified in the days and weeks after the discovery of Russia's war crimes, suggesting that the atrocities at Bucha and Irpin were a secondary factor in Kyiv's decision-making."
But taken together, these factors, along with certain details of the agreement that were never finalized, were enough to imperil the negotiations.
In the two years since Ukrainian and Russian interlocutors last convened, the realities on the ground have changed. By April 2022, Vladimir Putin had likely realized that he would fail to achieve his most maximalist war aims. Now, with Western aid stalled and the war tilting in Moscow's favor, Ukraine is in a less favorable negotiating position than it was and Russia may be less inclined to enter talks.
But, as George Beebe and Anatol Lieven detail in a recent Quincy Institute paper, all sides still have a reason to pursue a diplomatic solution, one that could both end the war and provide for a new European security architecture once the fighting ceases.
As Charap and Radchenko note in their Foreign Affairs piece, one of the reasons the original talks broke down was because the two sides were more focused on the broader endgame rather than on shorter-term solutions.
"A final reason the talks failed is that the negotiators put the cart of a postwar security order before the horse of ending the war," they write. "The two sides skipped over essential matters of conflict management and mitigation (the creation of humanitarian corridors, a cease-fire, troop withdrawals) and instead tried to craft something like a long-term peace treaty that would resolve security disputes that had been the source of geopolitical tensions for decades."
The two years of war have only increased distrust between Russia, Ukraine, and Kyiv's Western backers, and diplomacy appears to be more difficult today than it was in 2022. But, say Charap and Radchenko, Zelensky and Putin surprised us once before with the concessions they may have been willing to make, and perhaps they will do so again. The consequences of that failed first effort at diplomacy are clear, as Thomas Graham, former senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff, argued this week.
"The great tragedy of the Russian-Ukrainian war is that it will ultimately prove to have been futile. The likely outcome — territorial adjustments in Moscow's favor, security guarantees for Ukraine and Russia — could have been peaceably negotiated beforehand had leaders had a firmer grasp of the real balance of power or greater political courage," he wrote in the Hill. "The cost of failed diplomacy is already hundreds of thousands of lives lost and hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of property destroyed."
In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:
— After months of waiting, the House may hold a vote to give Ukraine another tranche of aid over the weekend. On Wednesday, Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) introduced four separate bills, including one that will provide approximately $60 billion in aid for Kyiv. The House Speaker is already facing backlash from members of his own party, but the legislation is likely to have enough bipartisan support to pass if it is brought to the floor for a vote.
— There are reportedly increasing points of tension between Washington and Kyiv as Ukraine awaits more aid and its war effort falters. Zelensky was frustrated that Washington has not offered his country the same missile defense help as it provided to Israel during Iran's strikes over the weekend. "European skies could have received the same level of protection long ago if Ukraine had received similar full support from its partners in intercepting drones and missiles," Zelensky wrote in a post on X. "Terror must be defeated completely and everywhere, not more in some places and less in others."
Moreover, Kyiv has expressed frustration over Washington's recommendations that Ukraine not strike Russian oil refineries, according to The Washington Post. Vice President Kamala Harris reportedly privately made the suggestion to Zelensky in February at the Munich Security Conference.
"The request, according to officials familiar with the matter, irritated Zelensky and his top aides, who view Kyiv's string of drone strikes on Russian energy facilities as a rare bright spot in a grinding war with a bigger and better-equipped foe. Zelensky brushed off the recommendation, uncertain whether it reflected the consensus position of the Biden administration, these people said." according to the Post. "Instead of acquiescing to the U.S. requests, however, Ukraine doubled down on the strategy, striking a range of Russian facilities, including an April 2 attack on Russia's third-largest refinery 800 miles from the front."
— Russia and Ukraine nearly struck a deal late last month to renew the agreement that allowed for the safety of shipping in the Black Sea before Kyiv suddenly pulled out, according to Reuters.
"A deal was reached in March 'to ensure the safety of merchant shipping in the Black Sea', and though Ukraine did not want to sign it formally, Kyiv gave its assent for Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan to announce it on March 30, the day before critical regional elections, the sources said," reports Reuters. The reason for Kyiv's withdrawal is unclear. Russia and Ukraine previously struck a deal to allow for safe shipping in June 2022 but Moscow withdrew from that agreement after one year.
U.S. State Department News
In a press briefing on Wednesday, State Department spokesman Vedant Patel urged the House to pass the aid bill for Ukraine quickly.
"So it certainly would not be hyperbole to say that every day matters, and the House, we believe, needs to act this week to support Ukraine and Israel as they respectively defend against Putin and the Russian Federation and the Iranian regime. And so this is something that we need Congress to provide urgently," Patel said.

The Biden administration has reimposed economic sanctions on Venezuela's oil industry in response to President Nicolás Maduro's attempts to hold onto power by blocking candidates who want to run against him in the July elections.Maduro's government is clearly violating the conditions of the 2023 Barbados Agreement that it made with the Venezuelan opposition alliance Plataforma Unitaria Democrática in October and that stipulates that the government create conditions for free and fair elections. The U.S. conditioned its easing of oil sanctions on the Maduro government's compliance with this agreement. Experts say reimposing sanctions, however, is the wrong move. U.S. sanctions have already helped to cripple the ailing Venezuelan economy and exacerbated the country's humanitarian crisis. General License 44, which lifted the sanctions, has not been in place long enough to alleviate the strain on the economy or deter Maduro's regime, Michael Galant of the Center for Economic and Policy Research told RS. Analysts argue that the Biden administration should instead undertake a multilateral effort to facilitate negotiations among Venezuelan political leaders so that Venezuelans can take further steps towards democratization as they head into a pivotal election year. Re-imposing sanctions will just be a step backward.The sword hanging over Venezuela's headThe U.S. has imposed targeted sanctions on Venezuela since 2005. But the Trump administration expanded them beginning in 2017 as part of a "maximum pressure" campaign against the Maduro government for alleged corruption and human rights abuses.
Trump's sanctions prohibited oil sales between the U.S. and Venezuelan oil companies. Given Venezuela's dependence on producing and exporting oil, the sanctions drove Venezuela's economy toward collapse, Galant said.
"There were already significant economic challenges, but there are very clear inflection points in Venezuela's oil output at the moment that additional sanctions are imposed," he said.
The impact on Venezuelan society and economy has been disastrous. Shortages of basic goods and a climbing cost of living have plunged much of the population into poverty and drove more than seven million citizens to emigrate, most of them to neighboring countries and the United States.
The Biden administration eased these sanctions after the so-called Barbados Agreement between the government and the opposition coalition was signed. But while reimposing sanctions could have drastic consequences on Venezuela's economy and people, Galant adds that the waiver's impact should not be overstated, as the relief it has provided has always been limited. Years of sanctions have deterred foreign investment in Venezuela and hampered the country's capacity to produce oil.
"There's always been this sword hanging over [Venezuela's] head, the fact that sanctions could be reimposed at any time," he said.
Certain kinds of sanctions can be effective in holding specific individuals, including government officials, accountable for corrupt practices and human rights abuses, said Carolina Jiménez Sandoval, president of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). But these differ from sanctions on the entire oil sector, sanctions that affect Venezuelan society as a whole, but have failed to deter Maduro's regime from committing human rights abuses and engaging in corruption.
Reimposing all sanctions means returning to a status quo that doesn't work, Jiménez Sandoval said. "That means you need to craft something different."
An electoral year in Venezuela provides a window of opportunity for the U.S. to proceed with a new strategy, she said, adding that it should be one that does not return to economic coercion in hopes that Maduro will change and that instead focuses on facilitating opportunities for Venezuelans to exercise their vote freely and fairly in July. A window of opportunityA primary election last October suggests Venezuelans are ready for major change, with an overwhelming majority of the more than two million participants voting for the opposition leader María Carina Machado. But a new opposition candidate will need to take Machado's place after Venezuela's highest court upheld a decision to bar her from running in the July general elections, alleging she committed fraud and supported U.S. sanctions.
The question now is whether the opposition can unite behind a single candidate, said Miguel Tinker Salas, a professor at Pomona College and non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute. The opposition has been divided for years, making it difficult for the population to rally around a single challenger to Maduro.
Given Washington's close ties to the opposition, the Biden administration may be able to play a role in facilitating negotiations among the various factions to settle on one candidate who can rally the support of all, according to Jiménez Sandoval. "Because [the U.S.] has been their ally, it also has leverage over them," she said.Selecting candidates thus far has largely been confined to the political elite in Venezuela, says David Smilde, a senior fellow at WOLA who teaches at Tulane University. He takes a similar view that the U.S. can take advantage of its influence with the opposition. But he also advocates incorporating civil society into those negotiation processes to move Venezuela in the direction of a more democratic society.
These efforts have also involved Venezuela's neighbors. Colombian President Gustavo Petro, whose country has been most affected by the outflow of migrants from Venezuela, met with Maduro before sitting down opposition candidate Manuel Rosales in Caracas just last week, the same day that the U.S. officials sat down with members of Maduro's administration in Mexico to discuss possible democratic reforms.
Reports indicate that Rosales has been "approved" by Maduro to run against him and that the meeting with Petro had Maduro's blessing too. However, Tinker Salas says the culmination of diplomatic pressure from other Latin American countries carries significant weight nonetheless.
"It has become clear that the entire region has high stakes when it comes to bringing democracy back to Venezuela," Jiménez Sandoval said, noting concerns that the U.S. and other leaders in the region have over increased migration of Venezuelans and more recently, whether Venezuela will escalate its claims to the disputed oil-rich Essequibo region in Guyana by engaging in armed conflict.
Tinker Salas adds, however, that the issue of Essequibo has long been raised by Venezuelan politicians hoping to harness nationalist sentiment to garner more political support. Maduro's recent moves on the issue, experts say, is mostly likely politically motivated, as opposed to being a real threat of invasion.
The effects of the political crisis in Venezuela are not confined to within its borders, and how political actors in and outside of Venezuela and Venezuelan civil society will come together by July election remains to be seen. But Galant insists that Washington's path forward should be one that focuses on facilitating diplomacy rather than proceeding with more sanctions, highlighting the importance of the humanitarian emergency above all.
"That outweighs the other questions. That needs to be what is held at the core of any discussion of broad economic sanctions, is understanding that this is harming millions of people," he said.

An American government delegation recently traveled to Niger to, according to the State Department, "continue ongoing discussions since August with leaders of the National Council for Safeguarding the Homeland (CNSP) regarding Niger's return to a democratic path and the future of our security and development partnership."The CNSP is the junta that took power in Niger in July 2023, in a coup that extended a trend of military takeovers in the Sahel. For the U.S., the Nigerien coup was the most consequential of these putsches, given longstanding and intensive security cooperation, including the presence of a major U.S. drone base in the northern city of Agadez.The visit went poorly. Initially scheduled for March 12-13, the delegation extended its stay by one day in hopes of meeting military head of state General Abdourahamane Tiani, but was denied. Then, on March 16, the CNSP announced that it was rejecting the military cooperation agreements between Niger and the U.S. The junta has suggested that in the absence of what it considers a viable and legal status of forces agreement (referring to a 2013 document that the junta now rejects), American civilian and military personnel are no longer welcome in Niger. The Pentagon and the wider U.S. government are working through the implications of that statement while attempting to convince the Nigerien authorities to let U.S. personnel stay.Diplomatically, the U.S. side appears to have stumbled in several ways. The CNSP's spokesman criticized the U.S. for its "unilateral" announcement of the delegation's arrival date and composition and said that the Nigerien authorities received the delegation out of simple courtesy and hospitality. It's also possible that the Americans inadvertently insulted their hosts by sending what the U.S. regarded as a "high-level" team but what the Nigeriens may have seen as insufficiently senior. The delegation was headed by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee and AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley and included other senior officials such as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander.This episode has been a flashback to my yearlong fellowship in the State Department in 2013-2014. During that time, one thing that shocked and dismayed me is that the assistant secretary of state — as a position — was implicitly considered within the State Department as a position equivalent in rank to an African head of state.Within State (and I assume within Defense and within AFRICOM), senior officials are treated with extraordinary deference and sometimes fear by their own subordinates. But there is no reason why an African leader should see things that way. To be lectured at by an American official whose rank is far junior to one's own is an experience that many African officials tolerate, but it cannot be pleasant. For the Sahel's newly minted juntas, who emphasize a particular brand of sovereignty and who have not been shy about antagonizing Paris, it is not a stretch to rebuke Americans over perceived (and, I would argue, actual) arrogance.The delegation met Nigerien Prime Minister Ali Lamine Zeine along with senior members of Niger's junta, such as Generals Salifou Mody and Mohamed Toumba. But I suspect one reason the delegation could not see Tiani is because they misread how seriously the Nigeriens want to be taken.Substantively, the conversation also seems to have gone badly. According to some reports, the American officials seem to have been criticizing Niger's turn towards Russia and to a lesser extent Iran. The junta also appears to have tired of criticism over the generals' handling of the "transition" back to civilian rule — criticism that is well deserved, since no serious transition appears to be underway, but that is nevertheless unwelcome.The episode underscores both the misguidedness of America's pre-coup policies towards Niger and the incoherence of current policymaking. In terms of pre-coup policies, Niger was a darling of American counterterrorism in Africa. Looking the other way over civilian overreach (particularly under President Mahamadou Issoufou from 2011-2021) and military abuses was long justified in the name of the "partnership."But one thing for American policymakers to reflect on is why the supposed closeness of the two militaries — including longstanding relationships at the senior level — has not translated into any substantial American influence over the junta. If huge investments in training and infrastructure can evaporate with a change in political fortunes, and if those investments cannot be proven to have flattened the curve of the Sahelian insurgency in the first place, then what are they worth?In terms of current policymaking, American officials don't seem to know what they want — an ambivalence that was easily detectable during the months of foot-dragging over invoking U.S. law that calls for suspensions of security assistance to coup-afflicted countries. The U.S. has sometimes appeared to view the Nigerien junta more favorably (or be more desperate to curry its favor) than the juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso, again due to the massive U.S. investments and sunk costs in Niger. Yet the U.S. also appears to lecture Niger over democracy, Russia, and more. Perhaps the delegation calculated that the might, prestige, and resources of the U.S. would continue to impress the Nigeriens— they calculated wrong, and so achieved neither of the two contradictory pulls in U.S. policy, advancing neither democracy nor security cooperation.I was not in the room, obviously, but it also strikes me that AFRICOM's preferred rhetorical frames may play very badly on the ground in the Sahel now. In their annual posture statements, successive AFRICOM commanders depict Africa as a place where outsiders (al-Qaida, the Islamic State, Russia, China, etc.) cause havoc, to be opposed by a stalwart coalition of the U.S. and its "partners." This is a view of Africa that offers little room for Africans to exist other than as victims of some outside force or as junior partners to the U.S., junior partners within their own story. That might play well to Congress — but it did not go over well in Niamey, and it would be received even less warmly in Bamako or Ouagadougou. The juntas could also easily read how negatively they are depicted by AFRICOM; while AFRICOM's criticisms of the juntas are largely fair (I shared many of them), U.S. officials cannot expect to dismiss the juntas as malevolent and incompetent but then go to make asks of them.Going forward, one thing to watch for advocates of restraint is whether and how easily the U.S. can pivot out of Niger. It may turn out that the drone base there, billed as essential to the fight against Sahelian jihadism, is not so essential after all. The critical question to ask will not be whether things get worse — security has steadily degraded since approximately 2015 in many parts of the central Sahel — but whether there is any proof that the presence or absence of vast American military expenditures makes any discernable difference.The U.S. may yet salvage something in Niger, but if it exits, that will not necessarily be a tragedy for Nigeriens or Americans. And sadly, U.S. policy incoherence and diplomatic missteps may have squandered, for the medium term, whatever opportunity had existed to place meaningful pressure on the junta over democracy and human rights.

Last week brought us the news that Dr. Craig Steven Wright, an eccentric Australian who has long claimed to be Bitcoin's pseudonymous creator Satoshi Nakamoto, was bench-slapped by the High Court, where Mr. Justice Mellor ruled at the conclusion of the proceedings that Wright was not Satoshi Nakamoto, not the author of the Bitcoin white paper, not the author of its software and, by extension, not the creator of Bitcoin.This bench ruling comes after years of litigation and weeks of hearings around the question of the provenance of the Bitcoin white paper and software. Full details of the court's findings on these points will be provided in a written judgment at a later date so I refrain from offering my own conclusions on the evidence, or an assessment of correctness of the ruling, here.As is public knowledge, I was one of the first lawyers – if not the first lawyer – to represent a client on the business end of Wright's years-long litigation campaign, when, in 2019, a Twitter user I know was the first crypto community member to receive legal threats from Wright's lawyers for claiming that Wright was not Satoshi, the very conclusion Mr. Justice Mellor also reached today. A short time later, an acquaintance of mine, Peter McCormack, dared to say the same thing. Peter was promptly sued by Wright in England. Wright won his case against Peter, albeit winning only nominal damages of £1 due to certain deficiencies in Wright's case.In my view, Wright's legal team chose to bring these claims in England for one reason, and one reason only: England is, and long has been, the easiest place in the English-speaking world to win a defamation action, because in England, the playing field is tilted so to the advantage of a claimant that even weak claims can win.This is not a new problem, and its roots go deep. Defamation is an ancient tort with its origins in the landed aristocracy seeking to protect their names and reputations from lesser men. The Anglo-Saxon tort of scandalum magnatum, a "fake news" tort for defaming great men of the realm (and thus not a tort capable of being inflicted on lesser men), was used as early as the 13th century. In later years, various other torts like seditious libel were used to punish political dissent – even where that dissent should be substantially true – and the imposition of these ancient rules in the Thirteen Colonies, most famously in the John Peter Zenger trial of 1735, served as focal points around which a new, young nation, the United States of America, began to develop its fledgling judicial system which led, eventually, to its free speech doctrine embodied today by First Amendment jurisprudence.In the modern formulation, defamation is the publication of a statement of fact to a third party, which is false, which is likely to cause serious harm to their reputation. In this respect it differs little from the tort in the United States. However, in England, the history of the tort – protecting the powerful from the powerless – has never been fully written out of its bones, because the burden of proof in a defamation action rests not with the claimant but with the defense. Not with the Saxon noble with the ear of the King, but with the humble pamphleteer who dared to speak out about his abuses. Not with the Member of Parliament accused of some lecherous or disreputable conduct, but the journalist who reported on it. Not with a person claiming to be Bitcoin's creator, offering nothing approaching definitive proof that he or she is (being a transaction or message signed with one of Satoshi's private keys), and armed with institutional financial backing, but the humble Twitter user who simply observed what appeared to be true, based on a cold assessment of the facts, and dared to repeat what he thought was true in writing. Put simply, at any time, in any defamation claim, the deck is always stacked against speakers and favors those who are most likely to be spoken about.On a practical level, this means that it is conceivable that a future plaintiff in England seeking to conceal certain truths or propound certain falsehoods, but with knowledge of the totality of the circumstances concerning that conduct, confidence that he or she can control those variables, and possessing the resources to reasonably predict that he or she will be able to use lawfare to intimidate others from discussing it, can stifle freedom of speech by using the threat of defamation litigation and, in some cases, being less than forthright with the courts. We need not look back to the Saxons to find a proven example of this: see, e.g., Jeffrey Archer, Baron Archer and former Deputy Chairman of the Conservative Party, who famously won a defamation case against the Star newspaper over a visit to a prostitute whose life was ruined by the case in the late 1980s, only to be sent to prison a decade and a half later, when his testimony was discovered to have been false.The point is not that Archer lied, or that he was punished for a lie. The point is that his initial case was so weak that he should never have won a civil action in the first place, or assumed that victory was possible, but the structure of English defamation law made a victory possible if not inevitable, thus incentivizing Archer to bring it anyway. Requiring a defendant to prove the truth of his statement, particularly where seeking to prove a negative, can be nearly impossible. It is far fairer and in the interests of justice to require a claimant, who starts the dispute, seeks the remedy, possesses direct knowledge of all of relevant facts about his past conduct, and is the party asking the state to intercede on his or her behalf with the full might of its power, to prove the truth under these circumstances.I offer no view on the truth or falsity of Wright's statements or evidence in this case. That is a matter for the High Court to address in its fuller ruling. What I do know is that the question of the truth of his claims should have been addressed years ago in Wright v. McCormack, but it was not dealt with because the burden of proof was on the defense and the cost of going through the exercise COPA - a coalition of very well-funded corporations - just went through was likely too much for an individual defendant like Peter to bear. In future, it is possible to make England a fairer place for speakers and help the English marketplace of ideas be a home for the truth. Ask claimants in a defamation action to bear the burden of proving their case. It's a simple change. Parliament should make it.

The Pentagon released its proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2025 this week. There were no major surprises, unless you're shocked by the fact we are continuing to over-invest in a strategy and a military force structure that is making the world less secure.If this budget goes through as requested, the Pentagon and related activities like work on nuclear warheads at the Department of Energy will come in at $894 billion. That's slightly less than the number being debated for this year, but far more than the levels achieved at other major turning points like the Korean and Vietnam wars or the peak of the Cold War. Meanwhile, Congress has shown little ability to provide adequate input or oversight of these huge figures. Over five months into the new fiscal year, it has yet to even pass a 2024 budget.What could possibly justify devoting these enormous sums to the Pentagon at a time of urgent national need to address other threats to our lives and livelihoods, from climate change to epidemics of disease to rampant inequality? The primary answer is the same one we have heard repeatedly in recent years: China, China, and China.But as I have noted in a recent paper for the Brown University Costs of War Project, by any measure the United States already spends two to three times as much on its military as China does, and outpaces it by far in basic military capabilities like nuclear weapons, naval firepower, and modern transport and combat aircraft. In the areas where there is room for doubt about the relative military power of the two rivals, from emerging technology to the likely outcome of a war over Taiwan, dialogue and diplomacy offer a far better chance of reaching a stable accommodation than spinning out scenarios for "winning" a war between two nuclear-armed powers, or by running a costly new arms race.Unfortunately, the rhetoric and resources underpinning the new Pentagon request are more consistent with arms racing than accommodation. The department remains firmly committed to its plan to build thousands of "autonomous, attritable systems" by August 2025, with the express purpose of developing the ability to overwhelm China in a conflict in Asia. In plain English, this means building swarms of drones and other high-tech systems controlled by artificial intelligence. And the plan is for these systems to be cheap and readily replaced if large numbers are destroyed in battle.The idea that the U.S. arms industry can produce large numbers of new systems quickly and affordably, and build replacements on short notice, runs contrary to the experience of recent decades. It's an exercise in wishful thinking that could result in the worst of both worlds — spurring China to increase its investments in next generation military technology even as it is unclear whether the United States can develop and integrate it successfully in any reasonable time frame.Far from increasing our security, once these new systems are developed and fielded they will almost certainly make the world a more dangerous place. This point is underscored in a new report from Public Citizen which notes that "[i]ntroducing AI into the Pentagon's everyday business, battlefield decision-making and weapons systems poses manifold risks."For example, although current Pentagon guidelines pledge to keep humans in the loop in decisions to engage in lethal force, once autonomous weapons are produced on a large scale the temptation to use them without human intervention will be great. This in turn will have a cascade of potential negative effects, from dehumanizing the targets of these systems, to making it easier to contemplate going to war, to risking mass slaughter caused by a malfunction in one of these complex systems.And as Michael Klare has written in an analysis for the Arms Control Association, the dangers of AI and other emerging military technologies are likely to "expand into the nuclear realm by running up the escalation ladder or by blurring the distinction between a conventional and nuclear attack."Klare also rings the alarm bell about the real risks of technical failures involving next generation technologies:"Non-military devices governed by AI, such as self-driving cars and facial-recognition systems, have been known to fail in dangerous and unpredictable ways; should similar failures occur among AI-empowered weaponry during wartime, the outcomes could include the unintended slaughter of civilians or the outbreak of nuclear war."These are all strong reasons to go slow and evaluate the consequences of applying AI to military operations, not engage in uncritical cheerleading that gives lip service to risk assessment while moving full speed ahead towards deployment of autonomous systems. To his credit, President Biden has pledged to promote talks with China on "risk and safety issues related to artificial intelligence." An analysis by Sydney Freedberg of Breaking Defense points out that "the Chinese have been showing signs they are receptive, particularly when it comes to renouncing AI command-and-control systems for nuclear weapons." More discussions of this sort are urgently needed before moving full speed ahead on AI-driven weapons.The urge to deploy AI and other emerging military technologies without adequate deliberation or scrutiny is just one of the troubling elements to come out of this week's Pentagon budget release. Staying the course on the Pentagon's plan to build a new generation of nuclear weapons and continuing to subsidize a policy of global military reach that has helped spark the disastrous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are more likely to fuel future conflicts than prevent them. And despite President Biden's recent, tougher rhetoric in response to Israel's slaughter of tens of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza, the White House fact sheet issued in conjunction with the Pentagon budget release provides a whitewashed, wildly misleading description of the U.S. role in enabling Israel's brutal attacks:"After Hamas's horrific terrorist attacks against Israel, the President has led the United States to support Israel's right to defend its country and protect its people in a way that upholds international humanitarian law, while ensuring the Palestinian people have access to vital humanitarian aid and lifesaving assistance."It is impossible to square these claims with the actual situation in Gaza, and attempting to do so makes a mockery of the administration's repeated references to supporting a "rules-based international order."The bottom line is that the United States is spending far too much on the Pentagon, much of it in service of goals that are likely to cause far more harm than good. It's time to reverse course, but neither the White House nor a majority in Congress are likely to do so of their own accord.We must pay closer attention to the consequences of the massive military spending and widespread military activities being carried out in our name, and stand up for more realistic policies that can set the stage for a future free of unnecessary conflicts and dangerous arms racing. We can't afford to let the Pentagon and the policies it underwrites continue on autopilot, promoting military approaches to problems that don't have military solutions, all too often with disastrous results.

Chinese diplomat Li Hui, the Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs, traveled to Ukraine, Russia, and elsewhere in Europe this week in what he described as an effort to build consensus among various parties for eventual peace talks. It is Li's second round of shuttle diplomacy since Russia's invasion just over two years ago. The diplomat first traveled to Russia and Ukraine in May 2023, shortly before Kyiv launched its unsuccessful counteroffensive.The latest visit also comes at a crucial time in the war, as Russia recently made its first major territorial gain in months, and the next tranche of aid from the United States continues to be held up in Congress.During his trip, Li is also expected to visit Brussels, Paris, Berlin and Warsaw to get a sense of whether, given these developments, thinking in European capitals has changed, and there is an opportunity for Beijing to assume the role of peacemaker.Reports suggest that there is little optimism for any substantial breakthroughs during the trip. "Beijing's continued diplomatic and economic support of Russia since the war has been a sticking point in relations with Europe, which said its trust in Beijing has eroded as it steps up scrutiny of its trade with China," according to Bloomberg. "There's also skepticism over China's 12-point peace proposal issued in February 2023 to end the war." The Bloomberg report adds that the Ukrainian ambassador in Beijing has also been given the "cold shoulder," as only a handful of his more than 40 requests to meet with Chinese ministries have been granted.Public opinion polling also shows that Ukrainians have an increasingly negative view of China and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, however, has made clear that he wants China to be present at the series of "peace summits" that Ukraine and its allies have put together since last summer. "Ukrainian people see China as a hostile country. But at the same time, the Ukrainian president and officials still want to see China at the same table with other countries to discuss [Zelensky's] peace talks," Vita Golod, chair of Ukrainian Association of Sinologists, told the South China Morning Post. "I think Ukraine still sees a Chinese mediating role because China is the only country who is welcome to Moscow and Kyiv at the same time." Kyiv may also welcome Chinese involvement in mediation because it may legitimize Ukraine's stance with the Global South, which Zelensky has been trying to win over since the start of the war. As the SCMP article notes, Ukraine is unlikely to have confidence that Beijing can act as a neutral arbiter, given China's perceived closeness to Moscow. . "On his last trip to Kyiv, Li was given a list of steps China could take – short of condemning Russia – to help Ukraine," according to the SCMP. "These included working to return children transported to Russia; maintaining the openness of the Black Sea grain corridor; and helping ensure the safety of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station, which has been occupied by Russian forces."Speaking at a press conference on Thursday, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi said that Chinese "efforts point to one goal: that is to pave the way for ending the conflict and starting peace talks." "Past experience shows that a conflict when prolonged tends to deteriorate and escalate even beyond the expectations of the parties involved," he added. "In the absence of peace talks, misperception and miscalculation will accumulate. (...) China supports the holding of an international peace conference at the right time" When China first indicated interest in playing a peacemaking role, Washington tepidly endorsed the possibility, but there is little indication that the two countries are willing to work together to end the conflict. In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Sunday that he hopes that Ukraine and Russia can negotiate a cessation of hostilities soon, given the current battlefield dynamics. "On the issue of Ukraine, our view is that both sides have reached the limits of what they can get by war. We think that it is time to start a dialogue for a ceasefire," Fidan said, according to the online Turkish media outlet Duvar. "That doesn't mean recognizing the occupation [by Russia], but issues of sovereignty and ceasefire should be discussed separately." Ankara has remained non-aligned during the conflict, providing Ukraine with some military support but refusing to join Western sanctions on Moscow. On Thursday, the Turkish president's office announced that Zelenksy would visit Istanbul for talks with his counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Friday. — Speaker of the House Mike Johnson (R-La.) maintains that he is in no rush to bring the foreign aid bill that passed the Senate in mid-February to the House floor. There are two discharge petitions, one led by Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Mass.), the other by Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick (R-Pa.), that are looking to collect signatures that could force the bill to the floor over the Speaker's objections. "In the end, this all comes down to trust, which is in short supply in the Capitol right now," according to a report in Punchbowl News. "Can Democratic leadership work with Republican Ukraine hawks on a discharge petition that would force Johnson's hand? Is there any way Johnson and House GOP leaders [can] seek a deal with Democrats on this?"— Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has been unable to forge a political consensus in Ukraine over the recruitment of thousands of new soldiers that he says are necessary to combat Russian attacks, according to The Washington Post. The lack of a clear plan "has fueled deep divisions in Ukraine's parliament and more broadly in Ukrainian society. It has left the military relying on a hodgepodge of recruiting efforts and sown panic among fighting-age men, some of whom have gone into hiding, worried that they will be drafted into an ill-equipped army and sent to certain death given that aid for Ukraine remains stalled in Washington," according to the Post. "The quandary over how to fill the ranks has confronted Zelensky with perhaps the greatest challenge to his leadership since the start of the February 2022 invasion."— A Russian missile struck the Ukrainian port city of Odessa while Zelensky was there on Wednesday. The attack hit approximately 500 to 800 meters away from Zelensky, who was visiting Odessa alongside Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, a source told Reuters. "We witnessed the strike today," Zelensky told reporters following the strike. "You see who we're dealing with; they don't care where to hit. I know that today there were victims, I don't know all the details yet, but I know that there are dead, there are wounded." U.S. State Department news:State Department spokesman Matthew Miller was asked about the attack on Odessa during a press briefing on Wednesday. "I think the strike is yet another reminder of how Russia continues to strike Ukraine every single day, and it's a reminder of Ukraine's need for air defense interceptors, and it's a reminder that the United States Congress needs to take action, as we have called on them to do, to support Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression," Miller said.

This paper examines humanitarianism in the Global South through engaging with resilience projects in the
Sahel and Lake Chad Basin (LCB). It addresses how recent humanitarianism has moved away from top-down interventions which seek to either intervene to save those that have been rendered "bare life" (Agamben, 1998, p. 4) by their own governments or improve the state's —especially fragile and failing ones— capacity to govern, towards society-based projects which seek to produce resilient subjects through addressing the broader social milieu. While previous accounts of security and development emphasized why fragile states and authoritarian regimes could constitute a threat to the international system, society or community which thus serves as justification for interventions, sometimes militarily, which such regimes flouted specific international norms and conventions. However, humanitarianism has become less targeted at regime change as was evident with the reluctance that followed the unproductive cases in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya where assumptions that regime change, or democracy promotion could promote the ends of liberal governance. Moving away from these statist focus, post-intervention has moved towards strengthening the capacities of communities to withstand shocks, but this is merely a pre-requisite for the objectives of the resilience project.
My contention is that the move towards resilience is not only an acknowledgement of the cognitive imperfections of the liberal subject but more importantly (Chandler, 2013b), it raises questions —about liberal subjecthood. These imperfections have historically been reserved for non-whites and non-Europeans since the Enlightenment, for example, issues related to (ir-)rationality and (un-)reason; the homo economicus is a myth after all (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009; Chandler, 2013a). By moving away from humanitarian activities that require intervention to post-intervention, which involves claims about the subject's internal capacity to "self-govern" (Chandler, 2012; Chandler, 2013a), migration, development and security have become closely intertwined with some suggesting a migration-development-security nexus where humanitarian aid serves the purpose of accomplishing global governance of complexity (Stern and Öjendal, 2010; Truong and Gasper, 2011; Deridder et al., 2020). While useful, this paper problematizes this understanding of resilience which concerns itself with the biopolitics of enhancing life's capacity to self-govern by unpacking the various ways in which "resilience processes are marked by inequities and by the consequences of a history of the coloniality of power, oppression, and privilege" (Atallah et al., 2021, p. 9), which manifest when these projects are implemented within contexts or on bodies from the Global South. In particular, the move towards resilience has entailed further incursions into people's lives such that various rationalities and techniques of governmentality are directed at the population which may raise further questions when these populations are those of other countries or within regions that have a history of colonisation and subjugation.
By reconceptualising biopolitics as a racial biopolitics and by decentring the state and instead looking at assemblages, that is, a multiplicity of actors and rationalities and technologies, and practices which function as totalities and produce passive or active agents with or without capacity for resistance, Deleuze and Guattari's concept of agencement which is translated to English as "Assemblages", is useful to capture the rationalities and techniques of resilience projects in the Sahel and LCB. I reconceptualise this powerful concept as "racialised assemblages", made up of a set of "racial components" that produce "racialised ensembles", that is, a multiplicity of actors and rationalities and technologies, this paper shows how resilience projects by Western state and non-state actors such as the United Kingdom, France and the EU and other humanitarian actors such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in the Sahel and the LCB are both exclusionary and raced and how these attempts seek to exploit the historical infantilization of the non-white subject or subjectivity within the Sahel and the LCB. Engaging with some humanitarian activities in the Sahel and LCB, the paper argues that through a racialised and exclusionary racial biopolitics that function through racialised assemblages, European humanitarian aid and assistance through upstreaming border control management through biometrics, exploit and sustain colonialities that seek achieve European outcomes. While projects such as migration and border control in the Niger-Nigeria border through biometric management and development projects that seek to address the root causes of insecurity, underdevelopment and forced displacement are promoted as humanitarian issues and facilitated through development aid, such racialised discourses are a continuation of racist historical depictions associated with whiteness and non-whiteness which made assumptions about humans, the environment, and the relationship between the two.
For those who emerged in European discourse as lacking the capacity to transform their environment, Access to full personhood was either denied or delayed which remerges in claims that attempt to interpellate persons and communities in the Sahel as vulnerable, poor, fragile, failing to highlight their deficient resilience and how this could impact on others who have achieved better resilience. For example, the attempts to build resilience through border control and management in the Sahel and LCB through the regularization of some types of desirable movements and criminalisation of irregular movement within the Sahel and LCB, especially where these are viewed as potentially constituting a risk to European security interests. For example, border policing and management posts in Konni-Illela and Eroufa in the Tahoua region of Niger which both seek to manage and control movement across the Niger-Nigeria border are promoted as enhancing Niger's own border management policy while it was set up through collaborative humanitarian efforts of various actors and was funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) of the U.S. Department of State (IOM, 2023). In addition to the other actors, these all constitute racialised biopolitical assemblages which attempt to govern complexity within the African context which is a continuation of various historical colonialities. Finally, in addition to the various infantilizing tendencies of racialised versions of resilience where the subject is viewed as incapable of full self-governance, and self-transformation, these projects when enforced on non-Western contexts such as the Global South perpetuate colonialities and within the Sahel, may stifle other possibilities of non-Western resilience such as those associated with human relationality. It becomes necessary to problematize the various resilience projects, including those that have apparently explicit humanitarian dimensions such as assistance and aid by asking critical questions about what they do which could also expose the ways in which those that are exposed to these rationalities and technologies resist these attempts. Further research should investigate the various ways in which individuals and communities in the
Sahel interact with these resilience projects and also how various so-called African partners —state and non- state— who play integral roles in facilitating and implementing them are positioned and how they position themselves. Such research could adopt focus groups, in-depth interviews, or ethnographic methods to capture ways in which these attempts may be reproduced, modified or even resisted by these people that emerge as targets of European post-interventionist biopolitics.

 A controversy broke out on social media this weekend: Taylor Lorenz interviewed the (or one of the) truly horrible people behind the far right Libs of Tiktok account.  It raised questions of whether one should platform the truly awful.  I have been thinking of platforming such for awhile  now, so I am using this as an opportunity to think through my stance (which is not at all based on a strong standing of the legalities of all of this).Let's start with the basics that people get so very confused about:No one is entitled to a platform, everyone is entitled to free speech.To be clear, when we talk about free speech, we need to be clear that the 1st amendment in the US (and probably the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Canada) only restricts governments from restricting people's right to engage in free speech.  Clubs and, yes, businesses can restrict the speech of their members/employees in ways that the state cannot. Free speech does have some restrictions--the classic is you can't yell fire as a prank in a crowded theater as that is dangerous.  Inciting violence is also not so free, although your mileage may vary on what counts as incitement.  Is "Free Palestine" incitement? I don't think so.  Now, that whole platform is not the same thing as free speech thing. One is not obligated to give time/space/bandwidth/whatever to anyone (in ye olde days, US tv stations had to give equal time, and when it went away, that gave room for Fox and its ilk).  Universities, for example, don't have to provide stages and fora and audiences to far right speakers or even not so far right speakers.  Or far left ones. In an op-ed, I argued that the Conservative Party of Canada should not provide a prominent speaking position to a far-right retired general as that would politicize the Canadian armed forces.*  Of course, the supposedly cancelled retired general then used his perch at the National Post, a right wing newspaper, to argue that I was trying to deny him free speech.  Nope, I didn't say he couldn't rant in public, I was just arguing it was a bad idea for the CPC to amplify him.  He is entitled to say what he wants, he is not entitled to having his speech amplified.  There is a distinction here, and he is smart enough to get it, even if wants to play coy about how a dual citizen might dare to question him.So, the question is rarely whether to deny someone free expression (although when it comes to jury tampering or inciting violence, gag orders on the Trump family seem to be not only fair but wise), but rather who to platform and under what conditions.  Obviously, the starting point is the intention of the potential actor that might be platforming someone.  The example of the CPC: they wanted to attack the government and found a handy tool that might make it look like they presenting mainstream military views that contradict the government.  Yeah, tis bad faith bullshit, but they had that intent so they didn't care what the downstream effects will be on the military.The example of this weekend is a lot different: it is not just giving space for a hater to speak at length, but providing a critical interview where the interviewer pushes back and gets the hater to be revealed as shallow, incoherent, virulently racist and xenophobic.  To be honest, I haven't watched the entire thing because, well, yuck.  I am online enough (understatement) to know what Libs of Tiktok have been doing--inciting violence against Black Americans first and now LGBTQ+ folks. That the account deliberately names individuals so that its followers can then threaten those people.  Truly, truly awful.  But folks who are not so online may not be aware of this, so a WashPo reporter doing an extended interview with the source of all this hate is a good way to expose what's going on.  People can disagree about whether we need to hear from the source directly, but this is not platforming in the sense of giving someone a megaphone and letting them spread their views.  Recently, the governor of Oklahoma gave this far right white nationalist a position on the state's library advisory council.  That is giving someone a platform.  And then a non-binary kid gets killed, and the governor then acts all shocked.  Anyhow, sometimes these decisions are tricky because we want to expose awful people, but we don't want to provide awful people with greater audiences.  Folks might argue that we need the marketplace of ideas to sort this out, but like most markets and most invocations of the market metaphor, it really doesn't work like the metaphor. Ideas do not win or lose based on the quality of their debaters or the quality of the ideas themselves.  They win or lose based on what people do and who has the power.  That a far right white supremacist owns and controls twitter is a real problem that cannot be sorted out by everyone sharing their competing ideas online.  Musk is platforming far right racist and xenophobic stuff, and he is blocking stuff that is critical.  Suspending Navalny's wife a day or two after his death is a real tell.  Ultimately, journalists and organizations have to be prudent about who they give platforms and who they do not.  Again, no one is entitled to the front page or the editorial page or the university's biggest stage. Every decision to give someone a platform is just that a decision, which should be based on the benefits and the costs.  Academic freedom suggests giving space to a wide range of views, but there is no need to bring back that which has been thoroughly discredited--like flat earthers or those who buy into eugenic stuff or bell curves and IQ tests or antivaxxers.And, yes, we live in a time where Democracy is under threat. Which is a bigger danger: giving anti-democratic forces the megaphone or denying them platforms and then having those forces try to make those institutions feel bad for being hypocritical?  The bad faith actors want to use our values against ourselves.  It can be tricky about how to respond but respond we must.  So, that's my incoherent rambling on this topic.  You are required to read it, to respond, or to share it via social media.* I realize that folks can argue whether Maisonneuve is right wing or far right, but my coding rule these days if one uses "woke" disparagingly and essentially slurs those who are not cis straight folks, they are far right. If right wing folks want to say that is not fair, that those are mainstream views of the right, well, they are telling on themselves about where they are. 

The White House is steering the United States into a budgetary ditch it may not be able to get out of.The Biden administration is supersizing the defense industry to meet foreign arms obligations instead of making tradeoffs essential to any effective budget. Its new National Defense Industrial Strategy lays out a plan to "catalyze generational change" of the defense industrial base and to "meet the strategic moment" — one rhetorically dominated by competition with China, but punctuated by U.S. support for Ukraine's fight against Russia and Israel's military campaign in Gaza.Instead of reevaluating its maximalist national security strategy, the Biden administration is doubling down. It is proposing a generation of investment to expand an arms industry that, overall, fails to meet cost, schedule, and performance standards. And if its strategy is any indication, the administration has no vision for how to eventually reduce U.S. military industrial capacity.When the Cold War ended, the national security budget shrank. Then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and deputy William Perry convened industry leaders to encourage their consolidation in a meeting that later became known as the "Last Supper." Arms makers were to join forces or go out of business. So they ended up downsizing from over 50 prime contractors to just five. And while contractors needed to pare down their industrial capacity, unchecked consolidation created the monopolistic defense sector we have now — one that depends heavily on government contracts and enjoys significant freedom to set prices.In the decades since, contractors have leveraged their growing economic power to pave inroads on Capitol Hill. They have solidified their economic influence to stave off the political potential for future national security cuts, regardless of their performance or the geopolitical environment.Growing the military industrial base over the course of a generation would only further empower arms makers in our economy, deepening the ditch the United States has dug itself into for decades by continually increasing national security spending — and by doling about half of it out to contractors. The U.S. spends more on national security than the next 10 countries combined, outpacing China alone by over 30%.Ironically, the administration acknowledges in the strategy that "America's economic security and national security are mutually reinforcing," stating that "the nation's military strength depends in part on our overall economic strength." The strategy further states that optimizing the nation's defense needs typically requires tradeoffs between "cost, speed, and scale." It doesn't mention quality of industrial output — arguably the biggest tradeoff the U.S. government has made in military procurement.Consider, for instance, the B-2 bomber, the F-35 fighter jet, the Littoral Combat Ship, the V-22 Osprey, and many other examples of acquisition failures that have spanned decades. More recently, the Government Accountability Office has reported that while the number of major defense acquisition programs has fallen, both costs and average delivery time have risen.So what is the military really getting from more and more national security spending? Less for more: Fewer weapons than it asked for, usually late and over budget, and, much of the time, dysfunctional. Acquisition failures are a major reason the Congressional Budget Office projects that operations and maintenance spending will significantly exceed the rate of inflation for the next decade — a considerable budgeting issue for a military that seemingly has no plans to reduce either its force structure or its industrial capacity. Quite the opposite, in fact.Biden's new National Defense Industrial Strategy specifically states there is a need for the U.S. to "move aggressively toward innovative, next-generation capabilities while continuing to upgrade and produce, in significant volumes, conventional weapons systems already in the force." Ironically, the military has spent over two decades developing the F-35, next-generation technology that the Pentagon still hasn't greenlit for full-rate production.Throwing more money at an industrial base comprised of businesses too big to fail won't increase the quantity or quality of its output. But that's exactly what the strategy urges. One of the priorities is to "institutionalize supply chain resilience." It's an important goal, but one the administration proposes the Pentagon tackle, in part by investing in "spare production capacity," what the strategy defines as "excess capacity a company or organization maintains beyond its current production needs."But building factories to sit empty is not supply chain resilience. It's wasting money on unnecessary infrastructure, creating a profit motive for arms makers to make more weapons. And for an industry constantly sounding the alarm about the need for consistent "demand signals" from Congress, the Pentagon's plans to invest a generation of U.S. taxpayer money in "spare production capacity" sounds a lot like throwing the demand-supply principle out the window. In that case, the U.S. might as well consider nationalizing the defense industry, which already lacks competition and relies almost entirely on the government. Why not eliminate the profit motive? It's not like making money drives contractors to produce quality products on time or within budget.Besides supply chain resilience, another priority laid out in this strategy is "flexible acquisition." The stated goal is to reduce costs and development times while increasing scalability. In pursuit of that goal, the administration proposes "a flexible requirements process" for multiyear contracts, and the expansion of multiyear contracting writ large. It reasons that as priorities shift in an "evolving threat environment," so too should contractors' deliverables. But pairing flexible requirements with an increasing number of multiyear contracts is a recipe for disaster.Before Russia attacked Ukraine, multiyear contracts were relatively rare — limited to major aircraft and ships. The Congressional Research Service notes that estimated savings on these programs have historically fallen within the range of 5% — 10%. But those are estimates, and they may not apply to other munitions now produced under multiyear contracts. The report also confirms that actual savings are "difficult to observe," in part because the Pentagon does not track the cost performance of multiyear contracts.Just because multiyear contracting is more common doesn't mean it's cheaper. And while the Pentagon argues that multiyear contracts give contractors the so-called demand signal they need to ramp up production, contractors don't usually spend their extra money on identifying efficiencies or making capital investments to increase output at a lower cost — and the Pentagon isn't checking.The strategy also proposes "aggressive expansion of production capacity." It notes that during peacetime, weapons acquisition tends to focus on "greater efficiency, cost effectiveness, transparency, and accountability." Taking caution not to assert that the United States is in wartime, the strategy contrasts peacetime acquisition policy with "today's threat environment," calling for "crisis period acquisition policy" that revitalizes the industrial base and shifts focus from efficiency and effectiveness to ensuring that military contractors are "better resourced." But contractors don't have a resource problem, and "crisis acquisition policy" puts the United States on a "permanent war footing."Lawmakers must challenge the administration's maximalist national security strategy by interrogating its push to expand military industrial capacity so drastically. It's critical that they do, not only because the U.S. is limited in what it can produce and provide to other countries but also because arms industry greed is boundless — and without off-ramps or constraints, the U.S. government may find in 20 or 30 years that it's in a ditch it can't get out of.

Deaths from terrorism in Africa have skyrocketed more than 100,000 percent during the U.S. war on terror according to a new study by Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a Pentagon research institution. These findings contradict claims by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) that it is thwarting terrorist threats on the continent and promoting security and stability.Throughout all of Africa, the State Department counted a total of just nine terrorist attacks in 2002 and 2003, resulting in a combined 23 casualties. At that time, the U.S. was just beginning a decades-long effort to provide billions of dollars in security assistance, train many thousands of African military personnel, set up dozens of outposts, dispatch its own commandos on a wide range of missions, create proxy forces, launch drone strikes, and even engage in ground combat with militants in Africa. Most Americans, including members of Congress, are unaware of the extent of these operations — or how little they have done to protect African lives.Last year, fatalities from militant Islamist violence in Africa rose by 20 percent — from 19,412 in 2022 to 23,322 — reaching "a record level of lethal violence," according to the Africa Center. This represents almost a doubling in deaths since 2021 and a 101,300 percent jump since 2002-2003.For decades, U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in Africa have been centered on two main fronts: Somalia and the West African Sahel. Each saw significant spikes in terrorism last year.U.S. Special Operations forces were first dispatched to Somalia in 2002, followed by military aid, advisers, and private contractors. More than 20 years later, U.S. troops are still conducting counterterrorism operations there, primarily against the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab. To this end, Washington has provided billions of dollars in counterterrorism assistance, according to a 2023 report by the Costs of War Project at Brown University. Americans have also conducted more than 280 air strikes and commando raids there and created numerous proxy forces to conduct low-profile military operations.Somalia saw, according to the Africa Center, "a 22-percent increase in fatalities in 2023 — reaching a record high of 7,643 deaths." This represents a tripling of fatalities since 2020.The findings are even more damning for the Sahel. In 2002 and 2003, the State Department counted a total of just nine terrorist attacks in Africa. Today, the nations of the West African Sahel are plagued by terrorist groups that have grown, evolved, splintered, and reconstituted themselves. Under the black banners of jihadist militancy, men on motorcycles — wearing sunglasses and turbans and armed with AK-47s — rumble into villages to impose their harsh brand of Sharia law and terrorize, assault, and kill civilians. Relentless attacks by these jihadis have destabilized Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. "Fatalities in the Sahel represent a near threefold increase from the levels seen in 2020," according to the Africa Center report. "Fatalities in the Sahel amounted to 50 percent of all militant Islamist-linked fatalities reported on the continent in 2023."At least 15 officers who benefited from U.S. security assistance have been involved in 12 coups in West Africa and the greater Sahel during the war on terror. The list includes officers from Burkina Faso (2014, 2015, and twice in 2022); Chad (2021); Gambia (2014); Guinea (2021); Mali (2012, 2020, and 2021); Mauritania (2008); and Niger (2023). At least five leaders of the Nigerien junta, for example, received American assistance, according to a U.S. official. They, in turn, appointed five U.S.-trained members of the Nigerien security forces to serve as that country's governors.Such military coups have undermined American aims of providing stability and security to Africans, yet the United States has been hesitant to cut ties with these rogue regimes. Despite the Nigerien coup, for example, the United States continues to garrison troops at, and conduct missions from, its large drone base there. Juntas have also amped up atrocities. Take Colonel Assimi Goïta, who worked with U.S. Special Operations forces, participated in U.S. training exercises, and attended the Joint Special Operations University in Florida before overthrowing Mali's government in 2020. Goïta then took the job of vice president in a transitional government officially charged with returning the country to civilian rule, only to seize power again in 2021.That same year, Goita's junta reportedly authorized the deployment of Russia-linked Wagner mercenary forces to fight Islamist militants after close to two decades of failed Western-backed counterterrorism efforts. Wagner — a paramilitary group founded by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former hot-dog vendor turned warlord — went on to be implicated in hundreds of human rights abuses alongside the longtime U.S.-backed Malian military, including a 2022 massacre that killed 500 civilians.U.S. law generally restricts countries from receiving military aid following military coups, but the U.S. has continued to provide assistance to Sahelian juntas. While Goïta's 2020 and 2021 coups triggered prohibitions on some forms of U.S. security assistance, American tax dollars have continued to fund his forces. According to the State Department, the U.S. provided more than $16 million in security aid to Mali in 2020 and almost $5 million in 2021. As of July 2023, the department's Bureau of Counterterrorism was waiting on congressional approval to transfer an additional $2 million to Mali. (The State Department did not reply to Responsible Statecraft's request for an update on the status of that funding.)Similarly, Burkina Faso's military killed scores of civilians in drone strikes last year, according to a recent report released by Human Rights Watch. The attacks, targeting Islamist militants in crowded marketplaces and at a funeral, left at least 60 civilians dead and dozens more injured. For more than a decade, the U.S. poured tens of millions of dollars into security aid to Burkina Faso. U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM is, according to spokesperson Kelly Cahalan, "not currently providing assistance to Burkina Faso." But she did not respond to questions clarifying what, exactly, that means. Last year, in fact, AFRICOM commander Gen. Michael Langley admitted that the U.S. has continued to provide military training to Burkinabè forces. Those troops, for example, took part in Flintlock 2023, an annual training exercise sponsored by U.S. Special Operations Command Africa. Still, Burkina Faso suffered 67 percent of the militant Islamist-related fatalities in the Sahel (7,762) in 2023, according to the Africa Center.U.S. Africa Command touts that it "counters transnational threats and malign actors" and promotes "regional security, stability and prosperity" helping its African partners to ensure the "security and safety" of their people. The fact that civilian deaths from militant Islamist violence have reached record levels, according to the Africa Center, and spiked 101,300 percent during the war on terror demonstrates the opposite.AFRICOM directed queries on the findings of the Africa Center's new report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Pentagon did not respond to the questions prior to publication.