V magistrskem delu obravnavamo različne politike internacionalizacije visokega šolstva v Sloveniji in na Nizozemskem. Glavni temelj naloge predstavlja analiza in primerjava strateških dokumentov internacionalizacije visokega šolstva obeh izbranih držav. V teoretičnem delu izpostavimo internacionalizacijo v zgodovinski perspektivi. Na kratko opišemo družbenoekonomski kontekst razvoja nizozemskih univerz ter obravnavamo nastanek in razvoj slovenskih in nizozemskih univerz. Osredotočimo se na njihovo poslanstvo ter z njim povezanim položajem jezika v raziskovalni in pedagoški dejavnosti. Opredelimo tudi termin internacionalizacije in navedemo različne definicije. Nato predstavimo oblike internacionalizacije: internacionalizacijo doma, internacionalizacijo kurikuluma ter internacionalizacijo v tujini. V okviru razvoja bolonjskega procesa predstavimo nastanek evropske gospodarske skupnosti, začetke samega procesa ter kritiko njegove neoliberalne zasnove. Raziščemo tudi zelo relevantno temo – transfer izobraževalnih politik. Zaključimo s predstavitvijo jezikovne problematike, to je vedno večja vloga angleščine v pedagoškem in raziskovalnem visokošolskem prostoru ter položaj nacionalnih jezikov. V okviru empiričnega dela najprej ugotavljamo podobnosti in razlike med nacionalnimi politikami internacionalizacije visokega šolstva v Sloveniji in na Nizozemskem ter med politikami na institucionalni ravni – opravimo torej primerjavo Univerze v Ljubljani in Univerze v Amsterdamu. Analiza nacionalnih strateških dokumentov dokazuje, da tako slovensko kot nizozemsko visoko šolstvo sledi podobnim ciljem internacionalizacije. Kot prvo bistveno razliko pa lahko izpostavimo težnjo Nizozemske po povezovanju visokošolskih institucij z gospodarstvom in posledično prevlado gospodarskih motivov za internacionalizacijo. Nasprotno pa internacionalizacijo slovenskega visokega šolstva usmerjajo predvsem politični motivi, saj želi država utrditi prepoznavno podobo nacionalnega visokega šolstva. S tem pa je povezana tudi druga pomembna razlika. V nizozemskih strateških dokumentih je poudarjena namera po konkurenčnosti in prepoznavnosti države na globalni ravni, medtem ko je v slovenskih strateških dokumentih v ospredju potreba po vzpostavitvi regionalne identitete. Nizozemska se torej usmerja v bolj globalno internacionalizacijo, Slovenija pa v regionalno. Državi sta si podobni v tem, da vidita internacionalizacijo kot poglavitni dejavnik pri razvoju svojega visokega šolstva, ki rezultira v izboljšanje njegove kakovosti. Analiza politike internacionalizacije dveh osrednjih univerz v obeh država pokaže, da je zaradi statusa mednarodne in dvojezične univerze Univerze v Amsterdamu internacionalizacija njena ključna značilnost, medtem ko je ljubljanska univerza pri svoji internacionalizaciji dokaj omejena. Zaradi svoje izrazite mednarodne usmerjenosti Univerza v Amsterdamu izvaja pouk v t. i. mednarodni predavalnici. Nizozemska in njene univerze so že – gledano z zgodovinske perspektive – veliko bolj mednarodno odprte. Slednje pa je prispevalo k temu, da Nizozemska spada med najbogatejše države na svetu. Prednost bogatih držav pa niso le zadostna finančna sredstva za implementacijo optimalne internacionalizacije, ampak tudi »privilegij« postavljanja trendov na področju internacionalizacije. Preučujemo tudi medsebojno skladnost strateških dokumentov v posamezni državi ter način odražaja ciljev bolonjskega procesa v ciljih strateških dokumentov. Ugotovimo, da je v nizozemskih strateških dokumentih v primerjavi s slovenskimi prisotno bistveno večje ujemanje v ključnih oziroma prioritetnih ciljih, kar je mogoče pripisati aktivni vključenosti nizozemskih univerz pri oblikovaju politik. Bolonjski cilji so izraženi v obeh državnih in obeh institucionalnih strategijah internacionalizacije. Izpostavili bi cilj pospeševanja mobilnosti, ki se pojavi v vseh štirih strategijah. Na koncu raziskujemo, kako državi urejata oziroma rešujeta vprašanje jezika visokega šolstva. Ugotovili smo, da v obeh državah zakona, ki urejata področje visokega šolstva, izpostavljata skrb za materinščino. Ta naloga spada v okvir visokošolskih zavodov. Univerza v Amsterdamu ima – za razliko od Univerze v Ljubljani – oblikovano svojo jezikovno strategijo, v kateri je pojasnjeno, na kakšen način se izbere oziroma določi jezik poučevanja, s čimer je odločitev o jeziku poučevanja olajšana. Kot je pokazala primerjava različnih dokumentov s področja visokega šolstva in strategij, je današnja internacionalizacija v različnih državah pod vplivom tako sodobnih procesov, konkretneje bolonjskega procesa, kot tudi različnih zgodovinskih dejavnikov oziroma okoliščin. Enake politike internacionalizacije se torej v različnih okoljih implementirajo različno. S tem tudi potrjujemo ugotovitev de Wita in F. Hunter (2015, str. 2), da ni modela internacionalizacije, ki bi ustrezal vsem. ; Internationalisation of Higher Education in Slovenia and the Netherlands After the Implementation of the Bologna Process In this thesis, we discuss the different internationalisation policies of higher education in Slovenia and the Netherlands. Analysing and comparing the strategic documents about the internationalisation of higher education in the chosen countries is the basis of the following thesis. In the theoretical part, we put internationalisation in a historical perspective. We concisely describe the socioeconomic context of the development of Dutch universities and analyse the origins and development of Slovene and Dutch universities. Furthermore, we focus on the mission of universities and their related position of language in research and teaching. We also define internationalisation and present its different definitions. Additionally, we introduce the forms of internationalisation: internationalisation at home, internationalisation of the curriculum, and internationalisation abroad. In the context of the development of the Bologna Process, we present the emergence of the European Economic Community, the beginnings of the process itself, and a critique of its neo-liberal concept. Moreover, we also explore the transfer of educational policies. We conclude by presenting the language issues, i.e., the growing role of English in teaching and research in higher education, and the position of national languages. In the empirical part, we first identify similarities and differences between national policies on the internationalisation of higher education in Slovenia and the Netherlands. Then we examine the policies at the institutional level by comparing the University of Ljubljana and the University of Amsterdam. Analysis of national strategy documents shows that both Slovenian and Dutch higher education pursue similar internationalisation objectives. However, the first significant difference is the Dutch tendency to connect higher education institutions with the economy. Consequently, economic motives for internationalisation prevail. In contrast, the internationalisation of Slovenian higher education is driven primarily by political motives, as the country wants to consolidate a recognisable national higher education. Nonetheless, there is another important difference. The Dutch strategy documents emphasise the intention to make the country competitive and visible on a global level, while the Slovenian strategy documents focus on the need to establish a regional identity. The Netherlands is therefore moving towards a more global internationalisation, whereas Slovenia moves towards a regional one. At the same time, they both perceive internationalisation as the crucial factor in developing higher education. Particularly, in the context of increasing its quality. The two countries are similar in the way they see internationalisation – as the major factor in the development of their higher education and as means to enhance its quality. An analysis of the internationalisation policies of the two central universities in both countries shows that, due to its status as an international and bilingual university, internationalisation is a leading feature of the University of Amsterdam. On the contrary, the University of Ljubljana is somewhat limited in its internationalisation. Due to its strong international orientation, the University of Amsterdam holds its classes in a so-called "international classroom." Historically viewed, The Netherlands and its universities have been much more internationally opened. This has contributed to the Netherlands being one of the wealthiest countries in the world. The advantage of rich countries is not only having sufficient financial resources to implement optimal internationalisation, but also the "privilege" of setting trends in the area of internationalisation. We also look at the coherence between the strategic documents in each country and how the objectives of the Bologna Process are reflected in the objectives of the strategic documents. We have found out that there is a significantly higher congruence in the key objectives in the Dutch strategic document compared to the Slovenian ones. The reason for that could be the active involvement of Dutch universities in policymaking. The Bologna objectives are reflected in both national and both institutional internationalisation strategies. We aim to highlight the objective of promoting mobility, which appears in all four strategies. Lastly, we explore the way of how countries are addressing the issue of the language of higher education. We have discovered that the laws governing higher education emphasise care for the mother tongue in both countries. The University of Amsterdam has constructed a language strategy that explains how the instruction language is chosen and determined. By doing so, the decision for the instruction language is less complicated. At the moment, the University of Ljubljana still does not have the same approach. By comparing different higher education documents and strategies, we have shown that contemporary changes (specifically the Bologna Process) and various historical factors have influenced internationalisation today. The same internationalisation policies are therefore implemented differently in various contexts. This also confirms the observation made by de Wit and F. Hunter (2015, p. 2) that there is "no one model that fits all".
Not Available ; The land resource inventory of Adavalli-2 microwatershed was conducted using village cadastral maps and IRS satellite imagery on 1:7920 scale. The false colour composites of IRS imagery were interpreted for physiography and these physiographic delineations were used as base for mapping soils. The soils were studied in several transects and a soil map was prepared with phases of soil series as mapping units. Random checks were made all over the area outside the transects to confirm and validate the soil map unit boundries. The soil map shows the geographic distribution and extent, characterstics, classification, behaviour and use potentials of the soils in the microwartershed. The present study covers an area of 313 ha in Koppal taluk and district, Karnataka. The climate is semiarid and categorized as drought - prone with an average annual rainfall of 662 mm, of which about 424 mm is received during south –west monsoon, 161 mm during north-east and the remaining 77 mm during the rest of the year. An area of about 97 per cent is covered by soils, three per cent by waterbodies, settlements and others. The salient findings from the land resource inventory are summarized briefly below. The soils belong to 9 soil series and 11 soil phases (management units) and 4 land use classes. The length of crop growing period is 150 cm). Entire area has clayey soils at the surface. About 44 per cent of the area has non-gravelly soils, 45 per cent gravelly soils (15-35 % gravel) and 7 per cent very gravelly (35- 60% gravel) soils. About 40 per cent area has very low (200mm/m) available water capacity. Entire area has very gently sloping (1-3%) lands. Entire area has moderately eroded (e2) lands. Entire area has soils that are strongly alkaline (pH 8.4 to 9.0) to very strongly alkaline (pH>9.0). The Electrical Conductivity (EC) of the soils are dominantly 0.75%) in organic carbon. Available phosphorus is low (20 ppm). Available boron is low (4.5 ppm) in the entire area. Available zinc is deficient (<0.6 ppm) in the entire area. Available manganese and copper are sufficient in all the soils. The land suitability for 24 major crops grown in the microwatershed were assessed and the areas that are highly suitable (S1) and moderately suitable (S2) are given below. It is however to be noted that a given soil may be suitable for various crops but what specific crop to be grown may be decided by the farmer looking to his capacity to invest on various inputs, marketing infrastructure, market price and finally the demand and supply position. Baseline socioeconomic characterisation is prerequisite to prepare action plan for program implementation and to assess the project performance before making any changes in the watershed development program. The baseline provides appropriate policy direction for enhancing productivity and sustainability in agriculture. Methodology: The Adavalli-2 micro-watershed (Koppal taluk and district) is located in between 15018' – 15019' North latitudes and 75056' – 75058' East longitudes, covering an area of about 312.58, bounded by Kavalura villages. It falls under Agro Ecological Region (AER)–3: (Deccan plateau, hot arid ecosubregion) Karnataka Plateau (Rayalseema as inclusion), hot arid ESR with deep loamy and clayey mixed red and black soils, low to medium AWC and LGP 60-90 days We used soil resource map as basis for sampling farm households to test the hypothesis that soil quality influence crop selection, and conservation investment of farm households. The level of technology adoption and productivity gaps and livelihood patterns were analyses. The cost of soil degradation and ecosystem services were quantified for each watershed. Results: We found that Social Indicators; Male and female ratio is 56 to 44 per cent to the total sample population. Younger age groups of population are around 63 per cent to the total population. Literacy population is around 74 per cent. Wood is the source of energy for a cooking among 80 per cent. About 40 per cent of households have a Yashiswini health card. Majority of farm households (80 %) are having MGNREGA card for rural employments. Dependence on ration cards through public distribution system is around 100 per cent Swach bharath program providing closed toilet facilities around 20 per cent of sample households. Institutional participation is only 14.8 per cent of sample households. Rural migration to unban centre for employment is prevent among 33 per cent of farm households. Women participation is decisions making are around 40 per cent of households were found. Economic Indicators; The average land holding is 5.12 ha indicates that majority of farm households are belong to marginal and small farmers. 2 Agriculture is the main occupation among 56 per cent and agricultural labours is predominant subsidiary occupation for 39 per cent of sample households. The average value of domestic assets is around Rs 16744 per household. Mobile and television are mass popular mass communication media. The average farm assets values is around 1.05 lakhs, about 40 per cent of sample farmers are owing tractors. The average per capita food consumption is around 683 grams (1860 kilo calories) against national institute of nutrition recommendation at 827 gram. Around 80 per cent of sample farmers are consuming less than the NIN recommendation. The annual average income is around Rs 21973 per household. About 75 per cent of farm households are below poverty line. The per capita monthly expenditure is around Rs 776 per household. Environmental Indicators-Ecosystem services; The value of ecosystem service helps to support investment to decision on soil and water conservation and in promoting sustainable land use. The onsite cost of different soil nutrients lost due to soil erosion is around Rs 8468 per ha/year. The total cost of annual soil nutrients is around Rs 2560349 per year for the total area of 312.58 ha. The average value of ecosystem service for food production is around Rs 8749/ ha/year. Per ha food production services is maximum in chillies (Rs 34357/ha) followed by Bengal gram (Rs 5289/ha), Green gram (Rs. 4483/ha), Maize (Rs. 3801), sunflower (Rs. 3484) and onion (Rs. 1080/ha). The average value of ecosystem service for fodder production is around Rs 4613/ ha/year of maize crop. The data on water requirement for producing one quintal of grain is considered for estimating the total value of water required for crop production. The per hectare value of water used and value of water was maximum in Bengal gram (Rs 41564) followed by Green gram (Rs 40906), Sunflower (Rs 20351), Maize (Rs 15217), chillies (Rs. 2438) and Onion (Rs 672). Economic Land Evaluation; The major cropping pattern is onion (39.32%) followed by sugarcane (17.1%), maize (13.76 %), Bengal gram (9.83 %), green gram (8.2 %), sunflower (7.86 %) and chillies (3.93 %). In Adavalli-2 micro watershed, major soils are Muttal (MTL) series are having shallow soil deep cover around 34 % of area. On this soil farmers are presently growing onion (38 %), sunflower (33 %), bengal gram (19.5 %), maize (5.7 %) and chillies (3.8 %). Dambarahalli (DRL) soil series are having moderately deep soil depth cover around 7 per cent of area, major crops grown are maize. 3 Belagatti (BGT) soil series are having very shallow soil depth covers around 5.23 % of area, the major crop grown is green gram. The total cost of cultivation in the study area for maize ranges between Rs. 17038/ha in MTL soil (with BCR of 1.60) and Rs. 14774/ha in DRL soil (with BCR of 1.34). Green gram in the cost of cultivation of Rs. 20579/ ha in BGT soil (with BCR of 1.15). In bengal gram the cost of cultivation in MTL soil is Rs. 19989 /ha (with BCR of 1.26). In chillies the cost of cultivation in MTL soil is Rs. 27301/ha (with BCR of 2.17). In onion the cost of cultivation in MTL soil is Rs. 7207/ ha (with BCR of 1.1) and sunflower cost of cultivation in MTL soil is Rs. 18680/ha (with BCR of 1.07). Suggestions; Involving farmers is watershed planning helps in strengthing institutional participation. The per capita food consumption and monthly income is very low. Diversifying income generation activities from crop and livestock production in order to reduce risk related to drought and market prices. Majority of farmers reported that they are not getting timely support/extension services from the concerned development departments. By strengthing agricultural extension for providing timely advice improved technology there is scope to increase in net income of farm households. By adopting recommended package of practices by following the soil test fertiliser recommendation, there is scope to increase yield in bengal gram (32.3 %), chillies (97 %), green gram (4.1 %), maize (72.5 to 83.7%), onion (98.9%) and sunflower (49.4%). ; Watershed Development Department, Government of Karnataka (World Bank Funded) Sujala –III Project
Integrity is fundamental to everyone involved in education – students, parents, teachers, lecturers, administrators and future employers, as well as the general public. It is hardly surprising therefore, that research on educational integrity continues to gather momentum, as evidenced by the growing number of conferences and seminars on this subject around the world. I am very pleased to report that while student cheating and plagiarism continue to be topics of interest, practitioners and researchers are also exploring the broader, social context and the changing, globalised and increasingly commercialised nature of education itself. The current issue of the International Journal for Educational Integrity is introduced by William Astore's Plenary Address from the Annual International Center for Academic Integrity Conference, held at Washington University in St Louis, Illinois in October this year. Astore spoke boldly to conference delegates of the 'wider dimensions of academic integrity', using anecdotes from his own experience as a military instructor at the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, and as a history professor at the Pennsylvania College of Technology. He convincingly argued that systemic breaches of integrity are far more harmful than individual lapses such as student cheating because they compromise the institution as a whole. In his Address, Astore was openly critical of the marketisation of higher education, a topic which was also explored at the 4th Asia-Pacific Conference on Educational Integrity: Creating an Inclusive Approach, held in September at the University of Wollongong in NSW, Australia. The four best refereed papers from the Asia-Pacific Conference are included in this issue of the IJEI. Kim awyer from the University of Melbourne, and Jackie Johnson and Mark Holub from the University of Western ustralia, provide a candid analysis of the decline in academic standards and integrity in Australian higher education. This paper provides a thorough overview of recent changes in Australian higher education. As Richard Davis commented in his review, "Critics of the modern university face an uphill task. Accused of advocating old, inefficient ways and lamenting a decadent past, they are easily silenced by self-satisfied colleagues enjoying their large research grants and consultancies. Some critics can do little more than condemn local personalities. All would be well if the vice-chancellor was less authoritarian or the university council less mean in its refusal of salary increases. The strength of the current paper lies in its remorseless analysis of the system which developed inexorably from the government's determination to educate more students while cutting its higher education costs. The 'new' corporate market-based university replaced the 'old' university dedicated to the ideals of free enquiry and education as an end in itself". Moving from the broad educational context to specific practices, the next four papers in this issue investigate issues of learning, teaching, assessment and adjudication. Clair Hughes from the University of Queensland addresses an apparent shortfall in Australian universities' implementation of 'Graduate Attributes' (GA), including the GA relating to ethical conduct. Hughes maintains that to authentically operationalise GAs, much more is needed than simply mapping specific attributes against existing programs and courses. Hughes argues for a whole of programme approach, the explicit inclusion of ethics in course teaching and assessment plans, and provides specific examples of how this may be achieved. Jon Yorke, Kathryn Lawson and Graham McMahon from Curtin University of Technology in Western Australia, ask how those who adjudicate breaches of academic integrity can reliably determine 'intent' in cases of plagiarism. The authors draw on a desktop study of institutional policies and procedures in 20 universities from Australia, US, Singapore, Hong Kong, India and the UK to analyse the way that 'intent' is defined and determined. Their findings indicate that despite the espoused significance of 'intent' in determining outcomes for alleged academic misconduct in many policies, there is inconsistency in the way that it is treated. The authors provide a preliminary series of 'probability factors' which might be used to determine 'intent' and call for further research in this little explored aspect of academic integrity. Grace McCarthy and Ann Rogerson from the University of Wollongong in NSW, Australia, share the results of a trial at the Sydney Business School where 61 international students were encouraged to use 'originality reports' provided by the software program Turnitin to assess the originality of their own work and thus avoid inadvertent plagiarism. In conjunction with hands-on support from teaching staff, students were permitted to submit as many drafts as necessary to Turnitin, with the result that all final submissions had a text match of 5% or less. As a consequence of the positive results of the trial, the use of Turnitin as a drafting mechanism, coupled with an extensive program of embedded support and supplementary workshops, has now been mandated for all subjects. The authors share further qualitative and quantitative data to support their thesis that "the use of text-matching software can be a powerful aid to help students improve their writing and to help academic staff identify potential plagiarism". The final paper in this issue is the only one not previously presented at one of the international conferences on academic integrity held during 2009. Mary Davis and Jude Carroll from Oxford Brookes University, using data collected over three years from cohorts of international students in the UK, also explore the role of text-matching software in plagiarism education, with a focus on the importance of formative feedback through tutorial intervention. As one part of an overall educative approach, students worked hand in hand with their tutors to read and interpret the Originality Reports of ungraded drafts of assignments prior to final submission. Students were also surveyed at the end of the module to ascertain their perceptions of the value of using Turnitin in this way. The data indicated that the approach taken at Oxford Brookes University resulted in reductions in the amount of plagiarism, over-reliance on sources, citations errors and insufficient paraphrasing. This study provides an example of best practice in the educational use of text-matching software and provides a potential counter to those who are concerned that the sole function of such software is to police and punish students. I hope that you enjoy this issue of the International Journal for Educational Integrity, and invite you to submit a paper for review directly to me at tracey.bretag@unisa.edu.au or respond to the Call for Papers for Volume 6(2) below. Tracey Bretag, IJEI Editor December 2009 Call for papers, Volume 6(2) 2010 Special issue of IJEI on 'digital technologies and educational integrity' Edited by Chris Moore and Ruth Walker This special issue seeks articles that address the impact of digital technologies on educational integrity. Many different terms have emerged in an attempt to capture the shifting terrain of media and users in various networked environments: 'social', 'participatory', 'user-generated' or simply 'new' media. Common to the online and interactive spaces of Web2.0 is the challenge of technologies and practices that are capable of changing the way we teach, learn, and share knowledge. How can we best engage and support students and colleagues coming to terms with the dynamics of these technologies and the development of new literacies? We are particularly interested in innovative research from scholars in cultural and media studies and/or the scholarship of teaching and learning, and welcome interest from the other disciplinary researchers, who might consider a broad range of questions about digital technologies that critically unpack the conversation about education integrity that goes beyond preoccupation with plagiarism and research ethics. Critical voices of concern, examples of best practice and consideration of the perceived impact of digital technology on institutional boundaries are keenly sought as is research exploring the collaborative approaches to social and participatory media that challenge conceptions about authorial identity and scholarly writing practices. Research examining the development of new literacies that celebrate the appropriation, adaptation and transformation of source material would fit well within the scope of this special issue. Abstract due date: 31 March 2010 Full paper deadline: 1 July 2010 Special issue release date: December 2010 Send all enquiries and 500 word abstract to the guest editors at ruth_walker@uow.edu.au With thanks to our reviewers in 2009: Kate Andre, University of South Australia Peter Bowden, University of Sydney Kylie Brass, University of Western Sydney Deborah Churchman, University of South Australia Geoffrey Crisp, University of Adelaide Richard Davis, University of Tasmania John Dearn, Australian National University Fiona Duggan Lawrence B. Ebert Teddi Fishman, Clemson University Neera Handa, University of Western Sydney Beverley Kokkin, University of South Australia Margaret Lightbody, University of Adelaide Nancy Matchett, University of Colorado Paul Moore, University of Wollongong Gerry Mullins, University of Adelaide Nicholas Proctor, University of South Australia Wendy Sutherland-Smith, Monash University Daniel Wueste, Clemson University
La investigación se propuso analizar el "regreso" del Estado en la escena del desarrollo en los países latinoamericanos en medio de un persistente escenario capitalista global de raigambre neoliberal. Centrándose en la experiencia argentina reciente (2003-2015), el trabajo analiza la estructura y la implicación estatal en el ámbito industrial-pyme. Sistematiza los recursos institucionales que se pusieron en movimiento (financieros, humanos, organizativos) para dinamizar el desarrollo industrial, entendiendo a este como un proceso de transformación de la matriz productiva y de los actores dominantes. Este trabajo aborda al Estado, y a las políticas públicas que implementa, como un objeto disputado en un marco histórico y espacial amplio de hegemonía e intereses neoliberales. En ese carácter disputado se expresa la presencia de redes políticas y económicas globales que buscan deshabilitar y fragmentar las estructuras estatales y con ello el poder del Estado como actor estratégico para dinamizar el desarrollo industrial. La dinámica y trayectoria doméstica son importantes en su configuración, pero bajo la globalización los actores globales han ganado mayor influencia con el objetivo de ampliar la dinámica global de acumulación capitalista. Desde esta perspectiva, si bien el Estado condensa y estructura recursos (financieros, humanos, organizacionales) que resultan estratégicos para concretar el desarrollo industrial, la influencia de las dinámicas y actores globales se aprecia en la adopción de determinada la modalidad de implicación o posicionamiento estatal que configura esa estructuración. El análisis se propuso dos objetivos. Por un lado, uno de carácter teórico referido a analizar la estructura estatal y la implicación estatal en el desarrollo y la incidencia de las redes políticas globales. Como un área donde las reformas neoliberales afectaron con mayor profundidad, el ámbito industrial-pyme se presenta como una particular arena de política pública para estudiar el modo en que organismos internacionales tales como BM, BID, o PNUD, incidieron la modalidad de implicación y configuración estructural del Estado nacional. Por otro lado, como objetivo práctico referido al análisis empírico, se evalúa una de las experiencias neodesarrollistas latinoamericanas. Tomando la experiencia argentina como ejemplo, el período kirchnerista (2003-2015) (Néstor Kirchner y Cristina Fernández) fue un campo fértil para analizar las instancias estatales específicas, y buscar allí alguna explicación sobre la continuidad de ciertos rasgos heredados (concentrada, extranjerizada y centrada en los recursos naturales) que impidieron avances en materia de complejidad y densidad industrial y acentuaron las restricciones propias de la dinámica de desarrollo en los países periféricos. Desde el lente teórico planteado y frente a un regreso estatal que culminó resultando poco satisfactorio, ¿cuál fue la centralidad que asumió la el Ministerio de Industria para direccionar a los actores productivos industriales-pyme hacia dinámicas y sectores más avanzados y complejos? ¿cómo incidieron los organismos internacionales en su estructura o en alguno de sus componentes? Combinando una metodología cualitativa y cuantitativa en donde se analizaron fuentes documentales y se realizaron entrevistas a funcionarios y gestores estatales, la investigación se centró en examinar el Ministerio de Industria de la Nación creado en 2009, y los canales por los cuales los organismos internacionales incidieron en su configuración. El análisis giró en torno a la trayectoria del ministerio, sus competencias, su organización, los recursos financieros y humanos disponibles en sus secretarías, políticas y programas, así como en la implementación del Plan Estratégico Industrial 2020. Así mismo, se profundizó el análisis en dos programas pyme vinculados a organismos internacionales: el Programa de Acceso al Crédito y Competitividad (PACC) (BID), y el Programa Sistemas Productivos Locales (SPL) (PNUD). Los hallazgos de la investigación muestran que la jerarquización del ámbito industrial, no obstante constituirse en un acontecimiento institucional relevante, se presentó también como un proceso de ahuecamiento de competencias y recursos, lo que redundó en la ausencia de centralidad como instancia estratégica para el desarrollo industrial. Se observó la pérdida del control y coordinación de la gestión del comercio exterior en 2011, como un bajo nivel de financiamiento e incentivo al sector industrial, el cual tendió a reproducir la matriz sectorial y actoral preexistente. Además, fue el ministerio con menor cantidad de personal y un índice de contratación superior a otras instancias estatales. Al mismo tiempo, al focalizar en el ámbito pyme, se observó un proceso de fragmentación basado en la profundización de la modalidad de implicación por programas vinculada a los organismos internacionales, donde la implementación del Plan Estratégico Industrial 2020 en 2011 con su impronta de cadena de valor y con escasos recursos asignados, no introdujo cambios significativos. ; The research proposed to analyse the "return" of the State in the development scene in Latin American countries amid a persistent global capitalist scenario with neoliberal roots. Focusing on the recent Argentine experience (2003-2015), the work analyses the structure and state involvement in the industrial-SME sector. It systematizes the institutional resources that were set in motion (financial, human, organizational) to boost industrial development, understanding this as a process of transformation of the productive matrix. This work to examine the State, and the public policies it implements, as an object contested within a broad historical and spatial framework of neoliberal hegemony and interests. Under this contested character is expressed the presence of global political and economic networks that seek to disable and fragment state structures and with it the power of the State as a strategic actor to boost industrial development. The dynamics and domestic trajectory are important in their configuration, but under globalization, global actors have gained greater influence to expand the global dynamics of capitalist accumulation. From this perspective, although the State condenses and structures resources (financial, human, organizational) that are strategic to achieve industrial development, the influence of global dynamics and actors can be seen in the adoption of certain modalities of state involvement or positioning. that configures that structuring. The analysis proposed two objectives. On the one hand, one of a theoretical nature referred to analyse the state structure and the state involvement in the development and incidence of global political networks. As an area where the neoliberal reforms affected in greater depth, the industrial-SME sector is presented as a public policy arena to study the way in which international organizations such as the World Bank, IDB, or UNDP, influenced the modality of involvement and configuration structural of the State. On the other hand, as a practical objective referred to the empirical analysis, one of the Latin American neo-developmental experiences is evaluated. Taking the Argentine experience as an example, the Kirchner period (2003-2015) (Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández) was a fertile ground to analyse the specific state instances, and to find there some explanation about the continuity of certain inherited traits (concentrated, foreignized and focused on natural resources) that impeded progress in terms of complexity and industrial density and accentuated the constraints of the dynamics of development in peripheral countries. From this framework and in front of a state return that ended up being unsatisfactory, what was the centrality that the Ministry of Industry assumed to direct the productive industrial-SME actors towards more advanced and complex dynamics and sectors? How did international organizations influence its structure or any of its components? The research combining a qualitative and quantitative methodology in which documentary sources were analysed and interviews were conducted with officials and state managers. It focused on examining the Ministry of Industry of the Nation created in 2009, and the channels through which the international organizations had an impact on your configuration. The analysis focused on the ministry's trajectory, its competencies, its organization, the financial and human resources available in its secretariats, policies and programs, as well as the implementation of the Strategic Industrial Plan 2020. Likewise, the analysis was deepened in two SME programs linked to international organizations: Access to Credit and Competitiveness Program (ACCP) (DIB), and the Local Productive Systems Program (SPL) (UNDP). The research shows that the hierarchy of the industrial sphere, despite becoming a relevant institutional event, was also presented as a process of hollowing out competencies and resources, which resulted in the absence of centrality as a strategic instance for industrial development. The loss of control and coordination of foreign trade management was observed in 2011, as a low level of financing and incentive to the industrial sector, which tended to reproduce the pre-existing sector matrix. In addition, it was the ministry with the least amount of personnel and a hiring index superior to other state agencies. At the same time, by focusing on the SME area, a fragmentation process was observed based on the deepening of the program implication modality linked to international organizations. Here, the implementation of the Strategic Industrial Plan 2020 in 2011 with its chain value approach and with scarce resources allocated, did not introduce significant changes. ; Fil: Seiler, Cristhian Rubén. Universidad Nacional de Entre Ríos; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
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The toing and froing of proposals and counterproposals for a ceasefire in Gaza has been going on for months now. The talks between the Israeli government and Hamas, however, have never really been about numbers: how many hostages to release, which ones, in return for how many and which prisoners, and how many days of truce. The sticking point is another: Hamas calls for the end of the war, and the Israeli government for the end of Hamas. This means that, in reality, the stand-off is all about the "day after". How can a government be established in Gaza that ensures freedom and development on one side, and security on the other one? And yet, that's what no one has been working on. While most mediators admit by now that Hamas will not be destroyed, in the ceasefire talks the issue of the "day after" continues not to be factored in.A question of political agency In the dock there is especially Benjamin Netanyahu. But ultimately, from the Palestinian perspective, Netanyahu plays his role: the role of the enemy. He pursues his own interests. And the Palestinians have been clear from the beginning: they want to master their future. They do not want the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) to stay in Gaza, but neither do they want for it to be replaced by the United Nations, or Arabs countries. And rightly so. But they have not said much else. And of the famous national unity government that they swear is almost ready, there is no trace. For the record: that's what they have been swearing since the start of the rift between Fatah and Hamas, and the first of many attempts at mending it, the Prisoners' Document drafted by Marwan Barghouti. It was 2006.[1] Vladimir Putin too tried to mediate with a reconciliation summit. Even Xi Jinping. But obviously, the most active are the Arab countries. Contrary to appearances, yet, they are the least suited to such an effort. First, because they support, and often fund, this or that faction, this or that figure, and thus, they are not seen by the Palestinians as neutral. Second, and above all, because they are not democratic countries. How can we expect the Palestinians to form a legitimate and representative government with the advice of Egyptian president Abdel al-Sisi, who has no such government in Cairo? Or of the government of the Emirates, whose parliament is only consultative? Or of Saudi Arabia, where people do not even vote? Indeed, these actors are all focused on the reconstruction. Nothing else. But the priority is another: Palestinians must be again a political subject. Elections were last held in 2006. The term of Mahmoud Abbas, who is 88 years old, in a population whose average age is 21.3, expired in 2009. And in 2018, the Legislative Council was dissolved. From then onwards, Mahmoud Abbas has ruled by decree.[2] Alone. Since 7 October, he has still never addressed the Palestinians.Bringing the Palestinian Authority out of the doldrums It is a deeper issue, of course. The Palestinian Authority has structural flaws that derive from the very Oslo Accords it was established by: giving the Authority many responsibilities and little power. Under occupation, it is not easy to be a political subject. With the territorial fragmentation and the unrelenting raids and round-ups, it is a challenge just to meet. But it is inescapable: the "day after" demands first and foremost a radical change, a change at the top. While so far, Mahmoud Abbas' only innovation has been the appointment of a new prime minister, Mohammad Mustafa – his main advisor. This time, there is really national unity. The name agreed upon is that of Nasser al-Qudwa, a veteran diplomat from Fatah, but from Marwan Barghouti's Fatah – as well as Yasser Arafat's nephew. Firm and determined, but never uncompromising, he is used to dealing with Israel, and above all, with Hamas: to which he openly asked for evolution. An evolution some in Hamas say they are ready for, should there be a similar evolution on Israel's side: according to its 2017 Charter, while revendicating the Palestinian right to an "integral territorial unit" from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean, and from Ras al-Naqurah in the North to Umm al-Rashrash in the South, Hamas states (art. 20) that it "considers the establishment of a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital along the lines of the 4th of June 1967, with the return of the refugees and the displaced to their homes from which they were expelled, to be a formula of national consensus."[3]According to Mousa Abu Marzouk,[4] who is in charge of its International Relations, and other senior members, Hamas is now ready to take a step back, to enter a national unity government, and in perspective, also to lay down arms.[5] I might be wrong: but of all the Hamas leaders I have met, Yahya Sinwar is the least ideological. He insists that the Arabs serve Palestine, not the other way around, and has a primary goal: the end of the Occupation.[6] This does not mean that Hamas recognises Israel's right to exist, neither does it mean that it does not support the idea of "Palestine from the river to the sea". It simply means that repeated statements by Hamas's leaders suggest that this goal is not within reach.What Europe can do That's where Europe comes in. In the Middle East, the European model of society is largely viewed as a role model. Guarantee of rights, protection of minorities, welfare systems, true elections: it is an example for many. You go to the Gulf for the salary, you are told by the twenty-year-olds looking for a visa: but for life, you go to Europe. No one has more authority, and more skills, to help the Palestinians outline a strategy for the "day after". Europe knows how to form a national unity (or a coalition, or a caretaker) government. What's more, Europe has close and longtime relationships with the Palestinians. Relationships that are not just institutional, but personal – and thus, independent of the political orientation of those in power. Why did Ireland, along with Spain and Norway, just recognise the State of Palestine? Because of the Troubles, of course, of the sensitivity of those who have experience of war, but also because of the relational capital built over the years by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mairead Maguire.[7] Ministers and prime ministers and presidents, past and present, diplomats, academics, activists, NGOs, parties, think tanks: those the Palestinians trust, and listen to, are many.Time to make a difference (in Ramallah) The Palestinians fear that by forcing Mahmoud Abbas to step down, together with all the cronies mentioned in the Panama Papers, there would be street-fighting. But Mahmoud Abbas is 88 years old: he will soon be forced out anyway. And with no deal, what will happen? Spend a night in Jenin Hospital: with so many M16s around, there are more casualties from family feuds than from IDF raids. So far, Europe's actions have just resulted in importing and amplifying the conflict, splitting into pro-Israelis and pro-Palestinians. It's time for Europe to do its part. And make a difference. Because to prepare the ground for the "day after", the main stumbling block is not in Gaza; it is in Ramallah.Francesca Borri is an Italian journalist specialising in the Middle East. She writes for La Repubblica and for Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel's largest newspaper.[1] The Prisoners' Document was signed in 2006 by all most influential Palestinian prisoners following Hamas's victory in the legislative elections. It calls for a national unity government within the PLO framework. See Marwan Barghouti et al., National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners, 28 June 2006, https://www.un.org/unispal/?p=208621. It was the first of many reconciliation attempts, up to the Cairo Declaration of 2021, when Fatah and Hamas agreed on a new proportional electoral law and called for new elections – later annulled by Mahmoud Abbas. See ECFR web project: Mapping Palestinian Politics: Legislative Elections (2021) – Cancelled, https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/legislative-elections.[2] Kali Robinson, "Who Governs the Palestinians?", in CFR Backgrounders, last updated on 28 May 2024, https://www.cfr.org/node/250515#chapter-title-0-5.[3] "Hamas in 2017: The Document in Full", in Middle East Eye, 2 May 2017, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hamas-2017-document-full.[4] "Senior Hamas Leader: We Seek to Join the PLO and Be Part of Its Commitments", in Al Quds, 14 December 2023, https://www.alquds.com/en/posts/104169.[5] Abby Sewell, "Hamas Official Says Group Would Lay Down Its Arms If an Independent Palestinian State Is Established", in AP News, 25 April 2024, https://apnews.com/article/4912532b11a9cec29464eab234045438. See also Mustafa Barghouti, the main Fatah-Hamas mediator, in this interview with German daily TAZ in January 2024: Francesca Borri, "Hamas ist Teil unserer Gesellschaft", in TAZ, 27 January 2024, https://taz.de/!5986884.[6] Francesca Borri, "Gaza. It's Time for Change", in Il Venerdì di Repubblica, June 2018, https://www.europeanpressprize.com/?p=9963.[7] Website of the World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates: Mairead Maguire, https://www.nobelpeacesummit.com/?p=4691.
Since 2007, after the election of the economist Rafael Correa Delgado for president of the Republic of Ecuador, the country has been experiencing a series of ideological, structural and political changes. A Constitutional Assembly, demanded by a Popular Consultation, materialized Correa's project of "homeland refoundation" (Ulloa, 2020, p. 19). In 2008, once the Constitution had been drafted, 63,93% of the voting population said "Yes" to the new Constitution, thus establishing what would be a turning point in national politics.On the one hand, until the fall of Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez (2003-2005), the country had undergone turbulence during the nineties due to significant political-institutional instability. There were three political leaders toppled in total; an armed conflict with its neighbor country, Peru; and a deep economic crisis that led the country to embark on dollarization. Correa's presidency, on the other hand, lasted ten years (2007-2017), after which time he left one of his vice-presidents Lenín Moreno as successor (2017-2021). In addition, despite the corruption during his government, he continues to lead the second largest political party, as can be seen in the 2021 elections.His Plan of Government, called 'Plan Nacional para el Buen Vivir,' introduced the indigenous worldview of Sumak Kawsay. Translated from quichua language as Buen Vivir, this philosophy enabled the adoption of social inclusion measures, the enlargement of minority rights, including the expansion of the liberal juridical anthropocentric concept, by offering nature rights (Hernández, 2017). Sumak Kawsay means "life in its fullness […] in its material and spiritual excellence […] in its inner and outer balance of the community" (Macas, 2010, p. 14).Based on this philosophy, Ecuador started moving towards social change, which was impossible without the inclusion of gender equality (Zaragocín, 2017, p. 64). In that sense, many public policies have been planned, creating debates on economic, political and social issues (Acosta, 2012; Acosta y Cajas-Guijarro, 2018; Hernández, 2017; Radcliffe, 2017). Furthermore, these policies targeted one of the most hermetic institutions: the Armed Forces.In this respect, this paper aims to analyze the discursive reproductions and disruptions in gender categories (masculine and feminine) based on an analysis of Ecuadorian defense documents. The masculinities constitute a gender category that reflects the subjugation of the feminine by the masculine, and is connected to a superiority associated with strength, rationality, command, in opposition to feminine values (weakness, emotionality, anarchy) (Hooper, 1999). Nevertheless, masculinities are not personal characteristics concerning individuals. Instead, they should be understood as configurations produced by social actions in a particular context (Connell y Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 832). In this paper, Maya Eichler's militarized masculinities (MM) concept is used as a reference to the stereotypical masculine characteristics created by the exacerbation of virility in military rituals (military service, combat) (Eichler, 2014, pp. 83-85). The author highlights that the MM are regularly and dynamically produced, making necessary an analysis on its features. Therefore, it is used to identify discursive and ideological formations and interdiscourses associated with gender notions present in the documents through a post-structural feminist approach and a discourse analysis methodology.Gender equality constitutes an unavoidable issue in contemporary democracies and consequently the inclusion of women in the Ecuadorian Armed Forces is an ongoing challenge. Recent studies on the integration of women in the military demonstrate that public policies, mainly regarding gender equality and interculturality, have been militarized (Zaragocín, 2018, p. 436). In other words, the potential for social change has been lost. From this fact, this paper argues that the militarization of gender equality, besides undermining the transformative potential of social inclusion, allowed the reproduction of new manifestations of militarized masculinities in the defense documents, updating the dynamics based on a dialectic and negative masculine/feminine dichotomy.Furthermore, the existence of a gap in the Ecuadorian security and defense literature is identified; despite the increase of women in the military, studies on this phenomenon remain incipient (Chacón, 2014; Iturralde, 2015; Morales et al., 2017; Zaldumbide, 2020; Zaragocín, 2018). Issues concerning military masculinities, hegemonic masculinity in these places and in Ecuadorian society —and their discursive reproductions, continuities and resistances— constitute a fertile ground for the analysis of the consequences of militarization for social inclusion. This paper fills this gap by analyzing the transformation in militarized masculinities in national defense discourse, and it does so through innovative methodological resources that allow a critical perspective on the results of the policies implemented since 2007.In terms of methodology, a framework of analisis is used consisting of defense documents published from 2002 to 2017, namely: Libro Blanco de Defensa (2002, 2006), Agenda Política de Defensa (2009-2013 and 2014-2017), Política de Género de las Fuerzas Armadas del Ecuador (2013) and the Cartilla de Género Fuerzas Armadas del Ecuador (2017). This framework refers to the year of 2002 due to the release of the first Libro Blanco during Gustavo Noboa's administration (2000-2003). This permits us to determine to what extent the inclusion of gender politics was an unavoidable issue in national defense politics during the documents' transition.The body of analysis is addressed through the combination of a discourse analysis and a post-structural feminist perspective on gender, using Laura Shepherd's theoretical lens. The connection between these methodologies permits the identification of the ways that gender manifests itself as an element of power in discourses. It is highlighted how the post-structural feminist perspective allows us to question how the texts signify, enabling the realization of profound analyses that address the documents' discursive meanings (Shepherd, 2010, p. 9). Discourse should be understood as "word in motion", whose purpose is the production of effects of meaning (Orlandi, 2012, p. 15). Discourse is represented by oral and written word, and symbols that dispute meanings in subjective and ideological fields (Brandão, 2012, p. 9). For this study, the texts that form the body of analysis are considered discourses. In this way, discourses are understood as neither transparent nor inert (Orlandi, 2012, p. 15), but dynamic and contingent.Besides the introduction and the final considerations, the work has three sections. The first section presents the conceptual tools that will be used to understand the relation between gender and masculinities. After that, a brief description of the methodology employed in the study is developed. Finally, the analysis is conducted on the manifestations of militarized masculinities in the documents. The work finishes by presenting a final argument, that is: besides undermining the transformative potential of social inclusion, the militarization of gender equality allows for the reproduction of new manifestations of militarized masculinities in the defense documents. The dynamics are updated based on a dialectic and negative masculine/feminine dichotomy.Through this analysis three illustrative images of women's presence in the defense documents were created: "partial citizen", "authorized citizen" and "military woman". The three representations show, in a "before" and "after" comparison of gender politics, that women continue experiencing rejection in military spaces, being the "Other", and inherently a stranger to the ideal of militarized masculinity that prevails in the barracks. The conclusion is that militarized masculinities have experienced a discursive metamorphosis, demonstrating the subtle and resistant armor of the masculine military ethos. ; El presente trabajo busca analizar las manifestaciones, reproducciones y rupturas discursivas que experimentan las nociones de género a partir de las masculinidades militarizadas presentes en los documentos de defensa del Ecuador. El corpus de análisis está constituido por las políticas de defensa producidas entre 2002 y 2017, considerando el periodo presidencial de Rafael Correa (2007-2017). La Constitución de 2008, con la inclusión de la filosofía indígena del Buen Vivir (Sumak Kawsay), permitió la promoción de políticas públicas direccionadas a alcanzar la equidad de género y la interculturalidad. Las instituciones castrenses se han mostrado especialmente reticentes a los cambios producidos por dichas medidas, generando una militarización de las políticas de género. Es decir, el potencial de cambio que las caracteriza ha sido contenido por la supremacía del ethos militar masculino. El efecto de esa contención —en un país que se autodenomina plurinacional, que reconoce la presencia de diversos pueblos en su territorio— necesita ser analizado, puesto que impacta directamente con las propuestas de inclusión social. Se argumenta que la militarización de elementos como la equidad de género y la interseccionalidad del Buen Vivir, además de corroer el potencial transformador de inclusión social, permite reproducir nuevas formas de manifestación de las masculinidades militarizadas en los documentos de defensa, actualizando las dinámicas que responden a la dicotomía masculino/femenino en un sentido dialéctico y negativo. Para el análisis se emplea una perspectiva de género feminista aliada al análisis del discurso de vertiente francesa, visando examinar las manifestaciones discursivas de las masculinidades militarizadas en los documentos de defensa. A partir del análisis se crearon tres categorías ilustrativas de la presencia de la mujer en los documentos de defensa: ciudadana parcial, ciudadana autorizada, mujer militar. Las tres representaciones muestran, en un antes y un después de las políticas de género, que las mujeres continúan vivenciando rechazo en los espacios militares, ocupando el lugar de un otro. Se concluye que las masculinidades militarizadas han experimentado una metamorfosis discursiva, mostrando el blindaje resistente y sutil del ethos militar masculino. En términos de estructura, el trabajo posee tres secciones. En la primera, se despliegan los instrumentos conceptuales para comprender la relación entre género y masculinidades. Enseguida, se desarrolla una breve descripción de la metodología utilizada. Finalmente, se aplica el dispositivo de análisis a la localización de las manifestaciones de las masculinidades militarizadas en los documentos.
15 Years of Predictions and Realities With this issue we begin our fifteenth year of publication. This decade and a half has certainly seen a number of changes to the field, and to the academy in general. If we compare the present state of the field, and higher education in general, to what was predicted for us 15 years ago, we can get a 30,000-foot view on some interesting advancements and disappointing stalls. We'd like to look at just two of those predictions, where the current state of affairs illustrates just how fluid and nuanced higher education is as we crawl out of the global pandemic. Parsing the field in any way we choose, via institutions, or disciplines, or geographic regions, or modes of instruction, etc., we can see but one commonality: we are not monolithic, and do not move in lockstep. Online / Digital / Remote instruction Perhaps the most ubiquitous and incessant prediction, one that began in the mid-1990s and which we are still working hard to manifest, is that online education will conquer the digital divide and democratize higher education. We can all point to successful online programs, degrees, and even entire universities. However, as we have learned in the past year, the potential for remote instruction is still high, but other factors, unanticipated fifteen years ago, mitigate against it becoming the panacea for all the ills of higher education. ZOOM fatigue is real, and a student's success in an online environment relies heavily on their internal locus of control. Remote instruction, we have learned, requires students to be far more responsible for their own time and effort than any face-to-face instruction ever required. We're not sure if this is the reason why students dislike remote instruction, but the fact is that they do, or at least they did. A survey of undergraduates conducted by SimpsonScarborough in March of 2020 (at the beginning of the lockdown of higher ed here in the US) revealed that 63% of the respondents said that online instruction was worse than the in-person instruction they received at their school. When SimpsonScarborough repeated the same survey just a month later, than number had risen to 70%.1 But, oh, what a difference a year makes. The Digital Learning Pulse survey of undergraduates in the US, published in April of 2021 by Bay View Analytics (in partnership with a number of entities heavily invested in the use of technology in education), notes that 73% of their respondents either somewhat agreed or strongly agreed that they would like to take some fully online courses in the future.2 Maybe we got better at remote instruction once we had a chance to breathe after the mad scramble to jump online in the spring of 2020. Maybe students rose to the occasion and remained persistent in their coursework. Or maybe the real explanation here is the distinction between being forced to have all your courses online and choosing to take some fully online courses. And there are other reasons why we are not all teaching MOOCs as we sit poolside, relying on ZOOM to make us look engaged with a nicely academic virtual background. Even before the pandemic, the rise (and subsequent fall) of many for-profit online universities painted online instruction with a broad brush, and soured many on it as just a cash grab. Some not-for-profit institutions, looking to cut instructional expenses and get good returns on their investments in large Learning Management Systems, played fast and loose with intellectual property rights, and the professoriate (whom those institutions saw as merely content providers) balked at having their instructional designs and course materials co-opted into turnkey courses that could be taught by adjuncts or teaching assistants. Fortunately, the tide has turned in this matter at least, as many institutions have articulated IP policies that benefit greatly from faculty input. Other enhancements or appendages to online instruction, things like the gamification of learning or the use of virtual reality, have sputtered and seen little penetration in the culture. Big Data Another prediction that has been proven true, but in unexpected ways, is one bruited about for decades. Decisions in higher education, this prediction states, will rely less on historical models, institutional or disciplinary inertia, and the vagaries of theoretical models. Rather, these decisions will be driven by data. And those data sets are overwhelmingly numerical rather than verbal. Everything from student ratings of instruction to annual reviews of faculty members, from your methodology for evaluating student performance to Comprehensive Administrative Review dashboards, relies on numbers. While the distinction between, say, a score of 4.6 and a score of 4.7 out of 5 may be minute, for many faculty members such fine distinctions matter a great deal, because they are tied to their compensation packages. We can, in good faith, argue both sides of the tendency to boil our professional lives down to a series of numbers, but the movement away from anecdotal evidence and the "it works for me" mentality has, in large part, improved both curricula and instruction. The SoTL field, more than almost any other discipline in higher education, has sorted itself over the period of the last fifteen years, demonstrating a strong preference for data-driven decision-making. IJSoTL itself illustrates this point. If you look at the articles from our first year of publication, you see a far wider variety of article types. There are some articles that follow the social science model--where data is generated then analyzed, but there are a number of other forms, like essays, reflections, and personal narratives. Our most recent issues are almost completely filled with articles that follow the social science model, since what it offers is reliability and repeatability. In other areas, however, this drive toward data has moved in fits and starts. Predictive analytics, where instructors can drill down into huge data sets to predict the success or failure of individual students, has been one of the largest carrots dangled in front of us in recent years. It represents the most enticing promise of data, yet it still cannot offer the level of certainty that the big data sales teams continue to claim. But the efficacy and the possibility of data for transforming higher education is seen at its most engaging in what we might call the rise of assessment culture. As we employ the Continuous Quality Improvement or Total Quality Management cycles first used in the US in the 1950s, honed to their streamlined perfection in Japan in the 1970s, then rediscovered in the west in the 1980s, we participate in the "plan-do-study-act" process that is the foundation for any sound and lasting change in a culture or institution. And the grist for this mill, the fuel for this engine, is the data we generate then analyze. We think we can say with certainty that nothing in higher education has had such a positive impact, or possesses such still-untapped potential, as the data generated through program assessment. A Special Issue Moving from the past to the very immediate future, we will be celebrating our fifteenth year of publication with a special issue that will come out in January of 2022.That issue will focus on the scholarship of teaching and learning here where the journal is housed, at Georgia Southern University. We would like to show the innovative work that our colleagues are doing here, in the hope that you may be able to use what they're doing in your own work. We'll still be publishing our regular issue in May of 2022 so this special issue is a bonus, and this volume will contain three issues rather than two. A Change to the Masthead Before we show you a variety of our colleagues on our several campuses in our special issue, we'd like to introduce just one, a new addition to our masthead. Nikki DiGregorio is an Associate Professor in the School of Human Ecology and a member of the Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Executive Board at Georgia Southern. She joins the journal as an Editor-in-Chief. Nikki teaches courses in sexuality and diversity in human development, public policies affecting families, as well as programming and evaluation, and conducts research on the interplay between social policy, language appropriation, and the experiences of gender and sexual minorities. Nikki has published in SoTL, examining especially the effectiveness of teaching strategies centered around concepts including diversity-related issues, homophobia, trauma-informed care, objectification, and sexualization. She is also the current Vice President of the Family Science Association, the premiere teaching-focused organization in the discipline. As many of us head back to face-to-face instruction in the fall of 2021, we hope you all can keep safe, and will find both fulfillment and joy in the new normal, whatever that may be. The Editors Notes 1. See "Higher Ed and COVID-19: National Student Survey," SimpsonScarborough, April 2020, available at https://f.hubspotusercon- tent30.net/hubfs/4254080/SimpsonScarborough%20National%20Student%20Survey%20.pdf, and "Higher Ed and COVID-19: April Replication of the National Student Survey," SimpsonScarborough, April 2020, available at https://f.hubspotusercontent30.net/ hubfs/4254080/The%20April%20Replication%20of%20the%20National%20Student%20Survey%20by%20SimpsonScarb orough.pdf. 2. For complete results, see https://info.cengage.com/wrec_PulseSurveyResults_1470945, which requires a free registration. For a summary of results, see "Students Want Online Learning Options Post-Pandemic," by Lindsay McKenzie, in Inside Higher Ed, 27 April 2021, available at https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2021/04/27/survey-reveals-positive-outlook-online-instruction-po st-pan- demic#:~:text=The%20majority%20of%20students,%2073,in%2Dperson%20and%20online%20instruction.
학위논문 (박사) -- 서울대학교 대학원 : 법학전문대학원 법학과, 2020. 8. 전종익. ; 우리나라의 제9차 개정헌법인 현행 헌법으로의 개정이 이루어진 지 만 32년이 지난 지금, 당시 헌법개정을 둘러싼 논의가 어떠한 과정을 통해 이루어지고 그것이 어떻게 지금 우리에게 적용되고 있는 헌법규정들을 낳았는지를 구체적으로 확인하는 일은, 그 해석을 위한 자료를 제공할 수 있을 뿐 아니라 그 양상에 대한 평가를 통해 현행 헌법 그 자체에 대한 평가를 보충할 수 있을 것으로 기대된다. 그리하여 이 연구는 최근까지 나온 사료들을 가급적 망라하여 개별 헌법규정들의 개정논의 과정을 재구성하고 그 부문별 양상을 고찰함으로써 개정의 의미내용에 대한 평가를 시도한다. 새로운 헌법에 대한 필요는 유신헌법에 이어 국민의 의사와 국가권력의 성립·유지가 괴리되어 있었던 1980년 헌정체제의 성격으로부터 제기되었다. 그러나 기존 헌법상의 절차에 따른 개헌은 종전 집권세력과의 공존을 수반하는 것이었기 때문에, 헌법문제의 해결을 위한 대안으로 처음부터 대통령직선제 개헌이라는 방편에 대한 사회적 합의가 이루어지지는 못하였다. 직선제를 향한 요구와 그에 대한 수용으로 그에 대해 여야뿐만 아니라 범사회적인 합의가 이루어지는 것은, 전두환 정권과 그에 대한 저항세력 모두 기본적인 정치체제에 대한 여타의 대안을 각자 제시하고 그 모두를 서로 받아들일 수 없음이 분명해진 뒤에 비로소 가능했다. 여야 정당들과 기타의 사회주체들 모두 개헌시안을 마련함에 있어서 시민사회의 요구를 광범위하게 반영하는 구체적인 구상을 제시하지 못하였고, 그보다는 종전의 구상들을 답습하거나 임시방편적으로 수용하는 경향을 보였다는 점을 확인한다. 이는 양대 정당의 경우 정권의 획득이나 유지가 보다 중요했기 때문이라고 볼 수도 있다. 하지만 보다 근본적인 관점에서 이는 강력한 물리력을 배경으로 정부가 국민의 자유의사에 따른 개헌을 가로막는 한 아무리 구체적으로 개헌구상을 입안하더라도 그것이 현실화할 전망이 없기 떄문이기도 하였다. 연구의 후반부를 이루는 각 헌법 부문별 논의 과정은 1987년 초반부터 야당뿐 아니라 저항세력 전반에까지 수렴된 대통령직선제 개헌이라는 대안이 정부와의 극한대립 끝에 6. 29 선언을 통한 수용으로써 합의로 넘어간 당시의 상황을 반영한다. 헌법의 기본성격, 그리고 헌법을 통해 보호해야 할 영역을 획정하는 것으로서 정치제도 못지않은 중요성을 지니는 전문과 기본권에 대하여는 양대 정당의 의견이 서로 과정과 내용의 면에서 모두 대체로 대등한 수준에서 반영되었다. 특히 전문에 관한 양대 정당의 논의는 양자의 어느 쪽도 정치적 우위를 점하지 못하고 중립적인 타협을 이룬 새 헌법의 성격을 잘 보여준다. 한편 정치제도에 관하여는 국회해산권의 폐지나 국회의 일부 권한에 관하여 치열한 논쟁이 벌어지기도 하였지만, 결국 국회의 국정감사권과 헌법소원제도가 헌법상 규정된 등의 몇몇 성과를 논외로 하면 전반적인 수준에서 국회나 정부의 지위에 대한 변혁이 이루어졌다고 보기는 어려운 것으로 평가된다. 이와 같은 개헌논의의 결과에 대하여는 기성의 양대 정당이 정권획득을 둘러싼 경쟁질서에만 관심을 가졌기 때문에 급속하고 불충분한 타협만이 이루어졌다는 평가도 가능할 것이나 다른 한편 현행 헌법은 이로써 이후의 정권교체에 불구하고 안정성을 확보할 수 있었다. 이는 국민의 선택에 따라 정치적 책임을 지는 집권세력이 국민의 기본권으로부터 통제되는 헌법으로서의 규범력이 강화된 만큼, 종전의 헌정체제들과 달리 현행의 체제에서는 국민의 책임성 또한 강화되었음을 간과해서는 안 될 것이다. ; 32 years have passed since the 9th revision to the current Constitution in 1987. The author deems the time ripe enough to say that now we give a careful look into how this Constitution was deliberated in what process, and how it led to the provisions that apply to our lives today. Hopefully it can provide new grounds for interpretation thereof, as well as tools to supplement previous evaluations on the Constitution at large, with retrospect to the general trends of the discussion. As no small amount of historical records have been disclosed recently, this study attempts to make as extensive use of them as available, so to reconstruct the discussions pertaining to each provisions amended, and to set forth a reevaluation of the implications to the revision itself, based on contemplations on the tendencies of discussions on each constitutional sphere. A successor to the Yushin system, the 1980 constitutional system formulated and buttressed the Chun Doo Hwan regime which was divored from the will and support of the people, and that was the main source of the necessity to found a new constitutional regime. However, in which way to achieve this was the question unsolved up to 1986. A revision following the existing constitutional procedures leaving the current ruling clique intact was not readily accepted by the resisting social groups as an alternative, whether or not it provided for direct presidential election. It was acknowledged as the only choice only after both the Chun regime and resisting groups had exhausted all other alternatives and it became mutually clear that neither of them could accept any other option. In the course of the struggle before constitutional revision with direct election was mutually accepted, the dynamics among and inside each of the major political actors including the leading parties and other social movements show that they had failed to incorporate the various social needs into their designs, and rather chose to follow previous lines or adopt a new one only as an expedient measure. It should be admitted that, at least for the political parties, taking or retaining power was the primary issue at hand. But we would also have to admit that as long as the strong military government denied the possibility of constitutional change based on the will of people, the more 'realistic' vision that a constitutional plan could give was a prospect of political change, which could only then realize other more pluralistic needs. After the June Uprisings had exhausted all other alternatives for Chun regime, time left for deliberation on the content of Constitution was no longer than a month and a half. A detailed retrospect and a phased-in induction on the tendency shows that the negotiation, in its process and content as well, was tailored to make a roughly equal balance between the two major participants. The pattern of constitutional provisions largely attests to this. The preamble, initially a symbolic battlefield of political powers, was diluted to signify more neutral values. Discussion on fundamental rights was, with a few exceptions where major political interests were involved, a relatively smooth interchange of mutual suggestions, which led to an accommodation at least to the most urgent needs raised in the Chun regime. As for political institutions, the most urgent questions were tacitly solved as the plans of both parties accorded to each other. Thus relatively residual needs were answered in the course of negotiation, which led to a few institutional progress including parliamentary power to inspect the government and the newly devised jurisdiction for constitutional complaint. But aside from those, neither legislative or administrative power can be said to have been subject to thorough change. Some might, with good reason, conclude from the results of the negotiation that the existing major parties were concerned only for their upcoming struggle for power and thus made haste for an insufficient outcome. But on the other side, this course of revision led the Constitution to become stable in spite of periodic interchange of power between the political factions. This enabled people to compare the performances between the factions under largely static insitutional settings, and then choose between them to hold the worse one politically responsible. Unlike previous constitutional regimes, this feature enhanced the actual normativity of the Constitution. ; 제1장 서 론 1 제1절 연구의 필요성과 목적 1 제2절 연구의 방법과 범위 5 제2장 1987년 헌법개정의 정치적 과정 10 제1절 1980년 헌정체제의 성립과 초기 운영 10 1. 1980년 헌법의 개정과정과 내용 10 2. 헌정체제의 구체적 형성과 초기 운영 18 3. 1980년 헌정체제의 성격에 대한 평가 28 제2절 헌법개정 방향에 관한 여야 대립 31 1. 위성정당 체제의 붕괴 31 2. 정부·여당의 개헌노선 수정 40 3. 1986년 개헌논의 정국에서의 여야 대립 59 4. 1986년 말까지의 개헌논의 과정에 대한 평가 71 제3절 1987년 합의개헌으로의 이행 74 1. 박종철 고문치사 사건과 대치국면의 전환 74 2. 개헌논의 국면으로의 이행 77 3. 8인 정치회담 81 4. 1987년 개헌논의 과정에 대한 평가 92 제4절 소 결 95 제3장 헌법개정 시안의 변천과 성격 98 제1절 서설 및 관련 사료 98 제2절 민정당 개헌시안의 형성과 변천 102 1. 1986년의 민정당 개헌시안 형성 102 2. 1987년 민정당 개헌시안으로의 변천 120 3. 민정당 시안에 대한 평가 125 제3절 신한민주당·통일민주당 개헌시안의 형성과 변천 127 1. 제1야당 개헌구상의 효시인 '헌법개정대강' 127 2. 1980년 신민당 개헌시안 130 3. 1985년 신한민주당 시안 139 4. 1986년 신한민주당 시안 144 5. 통일민주당 시안으로의 변천 145 6. 제1야당 개헌시안들에 관한 평가 148 제4절 재야 사회단체 등의 시안 기타 개헌구상 150 1. 대한변호사협회 시안 151 2. 한국노동조합총연맹의 개헌요구 10개항 154 3. 민주헌법쟁취국민운동본부의 헌법개정요강 158 4. 한국여성단체연합의 '민주헌법에 대한 견해' 162 5. 헌법·행정법 교수단체의 의견 164 제5절 소 결 167 제4장 헌법 총론 및 기본권·경제제도 규정의 개정과정 171 제1절 헌법 전문·총강의 개정 171 1. 전문의 개정 171 2. 총강의 개정 189 3. 전문·총강의 개정에 대한 평가 191 제2절 기본권 및 경제질서 규정의 개정 193 1. 기본권 규정의 개정 193 2. 경제질서에 관한 규정의 개정 246 3. 기본권 및 경제관련 규정의 개정에 대한 평가 273 제3절 소 결 275 제5장 헌법상 정치제도 규정의 개정 278 제1절 국회와 정부 관련 규정의 개정 278 1. 국회 관련 규정 278 2. 정부 관련 규정 301 제2절 법원과 헌법재판소 관련 규정의 개정 335 1. 법원 관련 규정 335 2. 헌법재판소 관련 규정 342 3. 법원·헌법재판소 관련 규정의 개정에 대한 평가 354 제3절 기타 정치제도 관련 규정 356 1. 국민투표 및 선거관리 356 2. 지방자치단체장의 "선임" 359 3. 헌법개정절차 360 4. 함의에 대한 평가 362 제4절 소 결 364 제6장 결 론 368 참고문헌 373 Abstract 505 ; Doctor
학위논문 (박사) -- 서울대학교 대학원 : 법학전문대학원 법학과, 2020. 8. 전종익. ; 우리나라의 제9차 개정헌법인 현행 헌법으로의 개정이 이루어진 지 만 32년이 지난 지금, 당시 헌법개정을 둘러싼 논의가 어떠한 과정을 통해 이루어지고 그것이 어떻게 지금 우리에게 적용되고 있는 헌법규정들을 낳았는지를 구체적으로 확인하는 일은, 그 해석을 위한 자료를 제공할 수 있을 뿐 아니라 그 양상에 대한 평가를 통해 현행 헌법 그 자체에 대한 평가를 보충할 수 있을 것으로 기대된다. 그리하여 이 연구는 최근까지 나온 사료들을 가급적 망라하여 개별 헌법규정들의 개정논의 과정을 재구성하고 그 부문별 양상을 고찰함으로써 개정의 의미내용에 대한 평가를 시도한다. 새로운 헌법에 대한 필요는 유신헌법에 이어 국민의 의사와 국가권력의 성립·유지가 괴리되어 있었던 1980년 헌정체제의 성격으로부터 제기되었다. 그러나 기존 헌법상의 절차에 따른 개헌은 종전 집권세력과의 공존을 수반하는 것이었기 때문에, 헌법문제의 해결을 위한 대안으로 처음부터 대통령직선제 개헌이라는 방편에 대한 사회적 합의가 이루어지지는 못하였다. 직선제를 향한 요구와 그에 대한 수용으로 그에 대해 여야뿐만 아니라 범사회적인 합의가 이루어지는 것은, 전두환 정권과 그에 대한 저항세력 모두 기본적인 정치체제에 대한 여타의 대안을 각자 제시하고 그 모두를 서로 받아들일 수 없음이 분명해진 뒤에 비로소 가능했다. 여야 정당들과 기타의 사회주체들 모두 개헌시안을 마련함에 있어서 시민사회의 요구를 광범위하게 반영하는 구체적인 구상을 제시하지 못하였고, 그보다는 종전의 구상들을 답습하거나 임시방편적으로 수용하는 경향을 보였다는 점을 확인한다. 이는 양대 정당의 경우 정권의 획득이나 유지가 보다 중요했기 때문이라고 볼 수도 있다. 하지만 보다 근본적인 관점에서 이는 강력한 물리력을 배경으로 정부가 국민의 자유의사에 따른 개헌을 가로막는 한 아무리 구체적으로 개헌구상을 입안하더라도 그것이 현실화할 전망이 없기 떄문이기도 하였다. 연구의 후반부를 이루는 각 헌법 부문별 논의 과정은 1987년 초반부터 야당뿐 아니라 저항세력 전반에까지 수렴된 대통령직선제 개헌이라는 대안이 정부와의 극한대립 끝에 6. 29 선언을 통한 수용으로써 합의로 넘어간 당시의 상황을 반영한다. 헌법의 기본성격, 그리고 헌법을 통해 보호해야 할 영역을 획정하는 것으로서 정치제도 못지않은 중요성을 지니는 전문과 기본권에 대하여는 양대 정당의 의견이 서로 과정과 내용의 면에서 모두 대체로 대등한 수준에서 반영되었다. 특히 전문에 관한 양대 정당의 논의는 양자의 어느 쪽도 정치적 우위를 점하지 못하고 중립적인 타협을 이룬 새 헌법의 성격을 잘 보여준다. 한편 정치제도에 관하여는 국회해산권의 폐지나 국회의 일부 권한에 관하여 치열한 논쟁이 벌어지기도 하였지만, 결국 국회의 국정감사권과 헌법소원제도가 헌법상 규정된 등의 몇몇 성과를 논외로 하면 전반적인 수준에서 국회나 정부의 지위에 대한 변혁이 이루어졌다고 보기는 어려운 것으로 평가된다. 이와 같은 개헌논의의 결과에 대하여는 기성의 양대 정당이 정권획득을 둘러싼 경쟁질서에만 관심을 가졌기 때문에 급속하고 불충분한 타협만이 이루어졌다는 평가도 가능할 것이나 다른 한편 현행 헌법은 이로써 이후의 정권교체에 불구하고 안정성을 확보할 수 있었다. 이는 국민의 선택에 따라 정치적 책임을 지는 집권세력이 국민의 기본권으로부터 통제되는 헌법으로서의 규범력이 강화된 만큼, 종전의 헌정체제들과 달리 현행의 체제에서는 국민의 책임성 또한 강화되었음을 간과해서는 안 될 것이다. ; 32 years have passed since the 9th revision to the current Constitution in 1987. The author deems the time ripe enough to say that now we give a careful look into how this Constitution was deliberated in what process, and how it led to the provisions that apply to our lives today. Hopefully it can provide new grounds for interpretation thereof, as well as tools to supplement previous evaluations on the Constitution at large, with retrospect to the general trends of the discussion. As no small amount of historical records have been disclosed recently, this study attempts to make as extensive use of them as available, so to reconstruct the discussions pertaining to each provisions amended, and to set forth a reevaluation of the implications to the revision itself, based on contemplations on the tendencies of discussions on each constitutional sphere. A successor to the Yushin system, the 1980 constitutional system formulated and buttressed the Chun Doo Hwan regime which was divored from the will and support of the people, and that was the main source of the necessity to found a new constitutional regime. However, in which way to achieve this was the question unsolved up to 1986. A revision following the existing constitutional procedures leaving the current ruling clique intact was not readily accepted by the resisting social groups as an alternative, whether or not it provided for direct presidential election. It was acknowledged as the only choice only after both the Chun regime and resisting groups had exhausted all other alternatives and it became mutually clear that neither of them could accept any other option. In the course of the struggle before constitutional revision with direct election was mutually accepted, the dynamics among and inside each of the major political actors including the leading parties and other social movements show that they had failed to incorporate the various social needs into their designs, and rather chose to follow previous lines or adopt a new one only as an expedient measure. It should be admitted that, at least for the political parties, taking or retaining power was the primary issue at hand. But we would also have to admit that as long as the strong military government denied the possibility of constitutional change based on the will of people, the more 'realistic' vision that a constitutional plan could give was a prospect of political change, which could only then realize other more pluralistic needs. After the June Uprisings had exhausted all other alternatives for Chun regime, time left for deliberation on the content of Constitution was no longer than a month and a half. A detailed retrospect and a phased-in induction on the tendency shows that the negotiation, in its process and content as well, was tailored to make a roughly equal balance between the two major participants. The pattern of constitutional provisions largely attests to this. The preamble, initially a symbolic battlefield of political powers, was diluted to signify more neutral values. Discussion on fundamental rights was, with a few exceptions where major political interests were involved, a relatively smooth interchange of mutual suggestions, which led to an accommodation at least to the most urgent needs raised in the Chun regime. As for political institutions, the most urgent questions were tacitly solved as the plans of both parties accorded to each other. Thus relatively residual needs were answered in the course of negotiation, which led to a few institutional progress including parliamentary power to inspect the government and the newly devised jurisdiction for constitutional complaint. But aside from those, neither legislative or administrative power can be said to have been subject to thorough change. Some might, with good reason, conclude from the results of the negotiation that the existing major parties were concerned only for their upcoming struggle for power and thus made haste for an insufficient outcome. But on the other side, this course of revision led the Constitution to become stable in spite of periodic interchange of power between the political factions. This enabled people to compare the performances between the factions under largely static insitutional settings, and then choose between them to hold the worse one politically responsible. Unlike previous constitutional regimes, this feature enhanced the actual normativity of the Constitution. ; 제1장 서 론 1 제1절 연구의 필요성과 목적 1 제2절 연구의 방법과 범위 5 제2장 1987년 헌법개정의 정치적 과정 10 제1절 1980년 헌정체제의 성립과 초기 운영 10 1. 1980년 헌법의 개정과정과 내용 10 2. 헌정체제의 구체적 형성과 초기 운영 18 3. 1980년 헌정체제의 성격에 대한 평가 28 제2절 헌법개정 방향에 관한 여야 대립 31 1. 위성정당 체제의 붕괴 31 2. 정부·여당의 개헌노선 수정 40 3. 1986년 개헌논의 정국에서의 여야 대립 59 4. 1986년 말까지의 개헌논의 과정에 대한 평가 71 제3절 1987년 합의개헌으로의 이행 74 1. 박종철 고문치사 사건과 대치국면의 전환 74 2. 개헌논의 국면으로의 이행 77 3. 8인 정치회담 81 4. 1987년 개헌논의 과정에 대한 평가 92 제4절 소 결 95 제3장 헌법개정 시안의 변천과 성격 98 제1절 서설 및 관련 사료 98 제2절 민정당 개헌시안의 형성과 변천 102 1. 1986년의 민정당 개헌시안 형성 102 2. 1987년 민정당 개헌시안으로의 변천 120 3. 민정당 시안에 대한 평가 125 제3절 신한민주당·통일민주당 개헌시안의 형성과 변천 127 1. 제1야당 개헌구상의 효시인 '헌법개정대강' 127 2. 1980년 신민당 개헌시안 130 3. 1985년 신한민주당 시안 139 4. 1986년 신한민주당 시안 144 5. 통일민주당 시안으로의 변천 145 6. 제1야당 개헌시안들에 관한 평가 148 제4절 재야 사회단체 등의 시안 기타 개헌구상 150 1. 대한변호사협회 시안 151 2. 한국노동조합총연맹의 개헌요구 10개항 154 3. 민주헌법쟁취국민운동본부의 헌법개정요강 158 4. 한국여성단체연합의 '민주헌법에 대한 견해' 162 5. 헌법·행정법 교수단체의 의견 164 제5절 소 결 167 제4장 헌법 총론 및 기본권·경제제도 규정의 개정과정 171 제1절 헌법 전문·총강의 개정 171 1. 전문의 개정 171 2. 총강의 개정 189 3. 전문·총강의 개정에 대한 평가 191 제2절 기본권 및 경제질서 규정의 개정 193 1. 기본권 규정의 개정 193 2. 경제질서에 관한 규정의 개정 246 3. 기본권 및 경제관련 규정의 개정에 대한 평가 273 제3절 소 결 275 제5장 헌법상 정치제도 규정의 개정 278 제1절 국회와 정부 관련 규정의 개정 278 1. 국회 관련 규정 278 2. 정부 관련 규정 301 제2절 법원과 헌법재판소 관련 규정의 개정 335 1. 법원 관련 규정 335 2. 헌법재판소 관련 규정 342 3. 법원·헌법재판소 관련 규정의 개정에 대한 평가 354 제3절 기타 정치제도 관련 규정 356 1. 국민투표 및 선거관리 356 2. 지방자치단체장의 "선임" 359 3. 헌법개정절차 360 4. 함의에 대한 평가 362 제4절 소 결 364 제6장 결 론 368 참고문헌 373 Abstract 505 ; Doctor
A Comment on: "Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Europe" by Thomas Ertman(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, 350 pp.)Understanding the origins of the modern state –and the different forms these political units eventually took- is a central enterprise in the discipline of political science. Relevant not only as a necessary first step in the development of several fields inside political science (e.g. how can we talk of an international, or better inter-state system, if we do not know where this concept of "inter-state" comes from?) but also for the contemporaneity of state-building in the 21st century. Pivotal as it is, the literature still has too many open-ended pathways and many more to discover. It is in this scenario that Thomas Ertman's Birth of the Leviathan appears as a very welcome contribution to the study of the origins of the Modern State.The problem Ertman poses is not entirely new. In his own words: "Why had some states developed in a constitutionalist direction during the formative centuries of European state-building, while others had become absolutist? And why had military pressures driven some states to construct effective, proto-modern bureaucracies, while others remained wedded to administrative methods that seemed highly dysfunctional?" (p. xi). The resemblance to the questions in which, to take a well-known example, Charles Tilly had been working on for a long time is strong. (1) Notwithstanding, three features stand out in the Birth of the Leviathan: a) the type of intra- and inter-state changes that the author discusses along the extended process of state-building (the time frame for the study is circa the fall of the Roman Empire and the French Revolution), b) the complexity of the theory proposed, and c) the impressive empirical research undertaken to support his theory.As Ertman's quote above suggests, the goal of the book is to explain why some states developed an absolutist regime while others came up with a constitutionalsystem. Moreover, and reaching to Max Weber's thought, the author also provides an answer to the diversity (divergence??) in the paths of state infrastructure –that is: why some states ended up with a modern bureaucratic administration while others remained, to their own detriment, with patrimonial systems. Thus four variables define the typology of states presented: patrimonial absolutism (France and Spain), bureaucratic constitutionalism (Great Britain), bureaucratic absolutism (Germany), and patrimonial constitutionalism (Poland and Hungary).There are two sets of dependent variables. The political regime on one side – i.e.absolutism and constitutionalism- respond to differences in the strength of representative institutions. Grosso modo, polities situated inside those territories characterized by large-scale and mostly unsuccessful experiments to install homogeneous political regimes during the Dark Ages will be more prone to an absolutist regime. (2) On the other hand, states on the periphery of these historical processes could "begin their state-building from zero" and thus were more prone to develop constitutional regimes with strong representative institutions that constrained royal power.The other dependent variable is the one concerning state-infrastructure. This can take the form of patrimonialism or bureaucracy. The core of the explanatory or independent variable would be that the states involved in early conflict (3) –"early" being defined as pre-1450- tended to build state infrastructures with "outmoded and even dysfunctional" institutional arrangements (most commonly office-holding and the grant of state functions, such as taxing, to private hands). On the contrary, latecomers to war were able to take a bureaucratic path for two reasons: a) they could benefit from the know-how and learn from the errors of states which had been involved in the expansion of the state-authority for a long time, and b) the exponential increase in the supply of personnel professionally trained to run state affairs. (4)A problem the author encounters is that this scheme cannot explain two of its four cases: bureaucratic-constitutionalism and constitutional-paternalism. Why did Great Britain follow the bureaucratic path given it was a clear case of early state-builder for war purposes? And why is it that Hungary and Poland, two cases of latecomers to war, ended up with patrimonial administrations? The explanation for this anomaly rests in the existence of strong representative institutions that influenced state infrastructure. In the case of Great Britain, redirecting the state in a bureaucratic path (against the attempts of interest groups to impose patrimonialism), in the cases of Hungary and Poland, acting as an agent of patrimonial administration.Let me offer some final comments (in an unjustly oversimplified manner) that follow from the reading. Ertman's book turns out to be a rigorous and intensely (with historical descriptions that might be too dense in some instances) researched study. His comprehension of the subtleties of state-building in modern Europe certainly surpass most of the work this reader has seen in the literature. While the work of a Charles Tilly analyzed the role of war, coercion, and capital in trying to explain why such different paths of state-building ended up with the same outcome -i.e. the nation-state- Ertman's book goes much deeper. The inclusion of the analysis of changes in the domestic structures is particularly welcome. In other words, where Tilly saw a path towards convergence in the form of the nation-state, Ertman disentangles a process that leads to the formation of critically different types of states. This divergence becomes particularly relevant when one reflects on the contemporaneity of this work, since it was not only the convergence in the nation state form, but also the stark differences –especially in state infrastructure- that defined and continue to define the European countries studied. (5)Some final thoughts, that would have to be more developed to do the author justice, will be irresponsibly thrown as questions for further consideration:The author seems to focus too much in the methods of resource extraction (e.g. taxing) without taking seriously the given pool of resources each territory had. A better consideration of this issue –for example benefiting from Tilly's hypothesis on the importance of cities as centers of capital and their interplay with central governments- might be a good idea (Was it the same for a King to have a Madrid than a Ghent?)What is the real role of war? The author measures the effectiveness of state administration by their fighting performance. But, is losing a war, let's say Jena, a valid yardstick to define efficient and inefficient administrations, or as in the case of Jena other things might be in play (Napoleon's mighty army)?Is it acceptable to have such a flexible theoretical model? Are not the explanatory variables modified to fit the cases, thus incurring in a grave methodological problem? In general, how heavy are the costs in parsimony of such a detailed and complex study?In any case, The Birth of the Leviathan is an essential study for anyone trying to understand where the central political unit in international relations comes from, and why has this institution differed, not only in its path –as Tilly tells us- but also in its final form. The interested reader should save some time to seriously engage in a dialogue with Ertman and his Birth of the Leviathan.(1) "What accounts for the great variation over time and space in the kinds of states that have prevailed in Europe since A.D. 990, and why did European states eventually converge on different variants of the national state? Why were the directions of change so similar and the paths so different?" Tilly, Charles, "Cities and States in Europe, 1000-1800"; Theory and Society, Vol. 18, No. 5, Special Issue on Cities and States in Europe, 1000-1800 (September, 1989, p.565). Nevertheless, there is one important distinction between these two questions that will be discussed at the end of this essay.(2) It is not completely clear though, at least to this reader, the logical explanation for this hypothesis. Is it that the post-Dark Ages and its failed attempts to impose working political systems (e.g. the Carolingian Empire) generated such a marked decentralization in the political landscape that the only viable solution for the Crowns was to try to impose a severe centralization over the aristocratic landlords? Or that such decentralization and the pattern of landlord aristocracy that followed were not compatible with the bicameral representative organizations (typical of constitutional regimes)? Or both? This is particularly troublesome since the author defines the variance in political regime as "a ruler who was relatively constrained (constitutionalism) or unconstrained (absolutism)" (p. 19).(3) Here the author wisely sticks to Tilly's maxim "War made the state and the state made war." (4) A phenomenon linked to the proliferation of the University as a social institution.(5) As the author remarks at the end of the book: "…patrimonial institutions can also have nagging long-term consequences. Despite the reforms of the 19th century, patron-client relations, lack of clear boundaries between politics and administration, and redistribution of public funds towards political insiders remain a serious problem in Spain, Portugal, France, and Italy…" p. 322. *Ph.D. StudentDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of Pennsylvania.Profesor Depto. Estudios Internacionales. FACS - Universidad ORT Uruguay. MA en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di TellaE-mail: gcastro@sas.upenn.edu
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
"The EU ahead of a new political cycle and a new geopolitical era" was the subject of the 22nd edition of the "War and Peace in the 21st Century" conference, held in Barcelona on March 16th, 2024. Organised by CIDOB in collaboration with EsadeGeo - Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics, and supported by "La Caixa" Foundation, Barcelona City Council and the rest of the CIDOB board, the conference provided expert insights on the internal and external challenges facing the EU in view of the elections to the European Parliament in June 2024, the wars raging in the EU's neighbourhood, and the potential outcomes of the US elections in November 2024.
The European Union (EU) is facing a new political cycle marked by the European Parliament elections to be held in June 2024 and a shifting geopolitical landscape shaped by the war in Ukraine and in Gaza. Issues such as enlargement, institutional reform, the green transition, technological transformations, migration and asylum policy and European defence are taking centre stage on the European agenda. CIDOB's Annual Conference aimed to identify the challenges that lie ahead, both internally and in terms of external action, and discuss opportunities for a more inclusive and cohesive EU. In his opening address, Antoni Segura (Chairman of CIDOB) noted the importance of analysing the EU's internal dynamics, considering the negative consequences of the rise of the extreme right ahead of the European Parliament elections. Segura reflected on the contributions of CIDOB's Annual Conference to the study of global politics from Barcelona since its first edition, held in 2002. Speaking on behalf of the Mayor of Barcelona, Pau Solanilla (Commissioner for International Relations and City Promotion of Barcelona City Council) welcomed all the participants and highlighted the importance of reflecting on the global agenda from Barcelona, a global city and a non-state capital that benefits from the work of CIDOB, founded 50 years ago by civil society representatives. Cities can bring a human dimension and help build bridges for peace through city diplomacy, responding to today's global calls for a new way of conceiving international relations, he said. Reminding us to "never cut ties between humans in conflicts", Barcelona should once again provide a platform for dialogue for peace in Europe and the Mediterranean. Javier Solana (President of EsadeGeo and Honorary Chairman of CIDOB) began by underlining that "the project of Europe is a project of peace", requiring it to go beyond mere geopolitics. Regarding relations with the United States, he said the upcoming US elections in November made it imperative for the EU to foster its own technological sector and to construct its defence in a way which is not like America's. He addressed the EU's own upcoming elections and the need to take decisive steps to prevent populism from gaining control of European institutions. Finally, Solana underlined the geopolitical importance of China for the EU. Reforming and enlarging the European Union for a new era The first panel, moderated by Cristina Gallach (Member of Global Women Leaders' Voices), followed CIDOB's report "The World in 2024: ten issues that will shape the international agenda", which defines the geopolitical situation in two words: ballots and bullets. Ms. Gallach proposed instead to discuss ballots and policies and underlined that, with expectations of a shift from the centre to the right in the upcoming elections, the EU has never faced a set of ballots which will have such a direct influence on its green, digital, reform and enlargement policies. This set the stage for an exchange of ideas on how democratic processes intersect with policy debates. Daniela Schwarzer (Member of the Bertelsmann Stiftung Executive Board) highlighted that in the present geopolitical context, enlargement policy could be a tool to bring regional stability and security, as it was in the past, but a larger union of 35 member states, and voting based on unanimity, also carries the risk of weakening the EU's decision-making capacity. The EU will only emerge stronger from enlargement if it is paired with internal reforms addressing the question of qualified majority voting and the responsibilities of the European Commission. At the same time, differentiated integration and specific policies with rule of law conditionality – as was the case with the successful Next Generation EU funds – could provide ways to protect the fundamental principles of the EU. However, if it is to be credible in expecting candidate countries to fight corruption, the EU also needs to address its own internal challenges. Loukas Tsoukalis (President of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, ELIAMEP) remarked that while enlargement may be called "the most successful foreign policy of the EU" because it helps new members to become more stable and prosperous (as it did in the case of Spain and Greece), it is not a panacea that cures all ills (referring to the problems with the rule of law in countries such as Hungary and Poland). He noted that enlargement comes at a cost: more members in a system that works through consensus and unanimity risks becoming a model for dysfunctionality. Tsoukalis said that the current challenge for the EU is reform on two levels, namely institutional reform and funding, without which it will be impossible to address any enlargement successfully. How could the EU consider exporting pax europea when neither it itself is ready to introduce the required internal reforms and budget increases, nor are the proposed countries for enlargement ready to fulfil the criteria? Brigid Laffan (President of the European Policy Centre) highlighted how the EU has moved from a technocratic to an increasingly politicised union. She reflected on how the EU has matured as a political system through crises, especially since 2009, becoming more resilient, adaptable and flexible. Laffan also pointed to four challenges for the EU if it is to be ready for the next stage. First, she focused on heterogeneity among European countries in terms of democratic capacities, with Hungary constantly blackmailing the EU and threatening unity over EU support for Ukraine. Second, she outlined the risks related to the geopolitics of war, with the resurgence of conflict in the continent and in Gaza, making relations with the US and China more problematic. Third, the EU's enlargement towards weak, aid-dependent, democratically challenged states risks undermining EU policy-making capacity. Fourth, ahead of the next European elections Laffan observed the centre-right's fatal tendency to move further right. She concluded that it remains to be seen whether the EU has the capacity to rise to these challenges and noted that a more fitting motto for the EU today is not "unity in diversity" but Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes" to continue to be a zone of peace and prosperity. The contributions from the three panellists were followed by a round of debate centring on the contradictions and challenges for the European integration and enlargement project, the need for a more consolidated budget, and the question of immigration. On the subject of European integration, some participants suggested the creation of subgroups within the EU where honest discussion among geopolitically aligned countries could take place, in addition to acknowledging the need for coalitions "of willing and able" within the EU, and the need for the EU to invest in relationships between member states and those with waiting-room status to smooth the candidates' transition processes. As far as funding was concerned, the need for greater financial resources was noted, and it was argued that the EU should avoid relying solely on national contributions (and therefore taxation) and instead explore alternative methods of funding (i.e. carbon taxes). Lastly, the issue of immigration triggered a huge discussion as a divisive topic within the European community that goes to the heart of European identity. There was a consensus that Europe will need migration and that more attention and resources should be allocated to integration. The issue of controlling immigration and borders was also raised during the discussion, as well as the conflation of immigration and diversity, pointing to the ethnic and religious diversity within European societies and warnings about political exploitation of migration by far-right parties. The EU in a new geopolitical context The second panel was moderated by Xavier Mas de Xaxàs (Diplomatic Correspondent of La Vanguardia). It aimed to elaborate on the needs and efficiency of EU external action when it comes to tackling the challenges of an increasingly complex geopolitical reality, with open conflicts in European territory and its neighbourhood, including in Ukraine and Gaza; competition between the US and China; rivalry with Russia; and necessary engagement with the so-called Global South. Jean-Marie Guéhenno (Director of the Kent Global Leadership Program on Conflict Resolution, Columbia University) warned of the consequences of the return of war in Europe. He reflected on how double standards in the EU's responses to the war in Ukraine and Gaza have undermined its soft power and global respect for the universality of European values. He emphasised the importance of legitimacy for the future of European integration, hence the need to preserve the identity and core values of the EU such as the rule of law, human dignity and solidarity. In his concluding remarks, he highlighted the urgency of reinforcing the EU's industrial capacity in defence and artificial intelligence to address the existing security challenges in Europe. Drawing on some of the points raised during the first panel, he also stressed the need for multi-speed integration, especially in security and defence, and increasing financial resources for AI, research and development and technology. Natalie Nougayrède (Member of the Council, European Council on Foreign Relations) focused her contribution on the importance of putting people at the centre of geopolitics, and the objective of democratisation for a peaceful Europe. Through the examples of the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2014 Maidan revolution, and the ongoing popular resistance to Russia's invasion, she reflected on how Ukrainians have shaped geopolitics, arguing that geopolitics can also be made by people. Similarly, Nougayrède saw the empowerment of Russia's civil society and the reinforcement of democratic institutions in Russia as a necessary step towards the end of the Ukraine war. The latter, she argued, is indeed a direct result of the autocratic power system that Putin has built in Russia, for which the EU needs to think of a different Russia if peace is to be restored in the continent. Wang Huiyao (Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization, CCG), began by saying that it is vital for the EU (and the rest of the world) to play a bigger role to prevent the scenario of "lose-lose" geopolitics. In the face of the uncertainty that comes with the prospect of a victory for Trump, he emphasised the importance of more strategic autonomy, noting that, as one of the world's great powers, China can act as a stabilising force in peace-making, global governance and the economy. He called for a trust-building process between major powers in global politics and a real and efficient multilateral system that reflects the current multipolar world. Given we all live on the same planet and face common threats, and therefore cannot afford to be rivals, Huiyao proposed working together on projects like climate change, the economy, green development, the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Gateway to tackle huge infrastructure deficits, while noting the need to rebuild Ukraine and Gaza. He also said that as China can mediate between Ukraine and Russia, the EU can do the same in US-China relations, making the EU, the United States and China work well as a trilateral relationship and making the world more stable. Maha Yahya (Director, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center) referred to the Gaza war as a game changer with direct implications for Europe. For too long, the conflict has been swept under the carpet, with an idea of peace and security in the region based on a process of normalisation. The blame game over who was responsible for the failure of the Oslo peace process and the negotiations for a ceasefire made the debate on a two-state solution unviable, while new settlements continued to be established. She also underlined the absence of leadership, not just in Israel (with its most far-right government for a long time) and the region as a whole, but also in the US and the EU, where leaderships are fragmented. While the European Commission takes a pragmatic approach, there is a lack of brainpower and political solutions in the European debate, noting that Borrell's appeals for peace will go unheeded for as long as the EU fails to send a clear, united message. Given the horrific humanitarian situation, Yahya criticised the EU's double standards in response to Ukraine and Gaza. She said that the recognition of Palestinian statehood is one leverage that European countries should use, either collectively or individually. Lastly, she noted that the perception in the region and the Global South is that the Gaza war is an incomplete decolonisation process. During the discussion with the audience, the following issues were raised: the possibility of a change of government in Israel; the necessity of reform for EU enlargement; Europe's dark colonial past and how it could engage differently with the Global South; whether it is in the interest of Europe to open negotiations with Russia; and how the green transition is impacted by war. In response, Jean-Marie Guéhenno stressed that, for a better relationship with the Global South, Europe will need a stronger stance on the Middle East, including recognising the Palestinian state. Wang Huiyao reaffirmed the importance of ending both wars, calling for a high-level peace summit. He then noted that although China was pushed towards Russia by the US, Henry Kissinger brokered US-China relations in the 1970s. Unfortunately, he added, there is "no Kissinger of the EU" now. Finally, Maha Yahya mentioned that there is no hope of an Israeli leadership change, therefore there is no significant window for peace talks. She mentioned some urgent necessities for the short term: a ceasefire, a firmer position from the EU; averting an invasion of Lebanon owing to the high risk of regional escalation; and the need to link the reconstruction of Gaza to a political track of the conflict. In his concluding remarks, Pol Morillas (Director of CIDOB) summarised the conference themes by highlighting the intersection between politics and geopolitics in both panel discussions. He concluded by stating that, while the EU has matured enough to hold discussions on critical issues such as migration, the far right or the environment, it is still in the process of defining how the challenge of enlargement and reform will be addressed to strengthen the EU in the future. By asking whether the EU is ready to do "whatever it takes" on issues like security and defence and the green and the technological transitions, he argued that the main challenge for the EU will be approaching these issues through political discussions rather than policies alone. Reflecting on the second panel, Morillas referred to the idea of geopolitics defining our identity, and the impact of people and private actors on the shaping of geopolitics, too. He noted the imperative to rebuild trust among citizens and within the global community and argued that "at a moment when politics is most needed for the challenges we are facing, geopolitics is preventing global politics from solving our shared global problems".
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
"The EU ahead of a new political cycle and a new geopolitical era" was the subject of the 22nd edition of the "War and Peace in the 21st Century" conference, held in Barcelona on March 16th, 2024. Organised by CIDOB in collaboration with EsadeGeo - Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics, and supported by "La Caixa" Foundation, Barcelona City Council and the rest of the CIDOB board, the conference provided expert insights on the internal and external challenges facing the EU in view of the elections to the European Parliament in June 2024, the wars raging in the EU's neighbourhood, and the potential outcomes of the US elections in November 2024. The European Union (EU) is facing a new political cycle marked by the European Parliament elections to be held in June 2024 and a shifting geopolitical landscape shaped by the war in Ukraine and in Gaza. Issues such as enlargement, institutional reform, the green transition, technological transformations, migration and asylum policy and European defence are taking centre stage on the European agenda. CIDOB's Annual Conference aimed to identify the challenges that lie ahead, both internally and in terms of external action, and discuss opportunities for a more inclusive and cohesive EU. In his opening address, Antoni Segura (Chairman of CIDOB) noted the importance of analysing the EU's internal dynamics, considering the negative consequences of the rise of the extreme right ahead of the European Parliament elections. Segura reflected on the contributions of CIDOB's Annual Conference to the study of global politics from Barcelona since its first edition, held in 2002. Speaking on behalf of the Mayor of Barcelona, Pau Solanilla (Commissioner for International Relations and City Promotion of Barcelona City Council) welcomed all the participants and highlighted the importance of reflecting on the global agenda from Barcelona, a global city and a non-state capital that benefits from the work of CIDOB, founded 50 years ago by civil society representatives. Cities can bring a human dimension and help build bridges for peace through city diplomacy, responding to today's global calls for a new way of conceiving international relations, he said. Reminding us to "never cut ties between humans in conflicts", Barcelona should once again provide a platform for dialogue for peace in Europe and the Mediterranean. Javier Solana (President of EsadeGeo and Honorary Chairman of CIDOB) began by underlining that "the project of Europe is a project of peace", requiring it to go beyond mere geopolitics. Regarding relations with the United States, he said the upcoming US elections in November made it imperative for the EU to foster its own technological sector and to construct its defence in a way which is not like America's. He addressed the EU's own upcoming elections and the need to take decisive steps to prevent populism from gaining control of European institutions. Finally, Solana underlined the geopolitical importance of China for the EU. Reforming and enlarging the European Union for a new era The first panel, moderated by Cristina Gallach (Member of Global Women Leaders' Voices), followed CIDOB's report "The World in 2024: ten issues that will shape the international agenda", which defines the geopolitical situation in two words: ballots and bullets. Ms. Gallach proposed instead to discuss ballots and policies and underlined that, with expectations of a shift from the centre to the right in the upcoming elections, the EU has never faced a set of ballots which will have such a direct influence on its green, digital, reform and enlargement policies. This set the stage for an exchange of ideas on how democratic processes intersect with policy debates. Daniela Schwarzer (Member of the Bertelsmann Stiftung Executive Board) highlighted that in the present geopolitical context, enlargement policy could be a tool to bring regional stability and security, as it was in the past, but a larger union of 35 member states, and voting based on unanimity, also carries the risk of weakening the EU's decision-making capacity. The EU will only emerge stronger from enlargement if it is paired with internal reforms addressing the question of qualified majority voting and the responsibilities of the European Commission. At the same time, differentiated integration and specific policies with rule of law conditionality – as was the case with the successful Next Generation EU funds – could provide ways to protect the fundamental principles of the EU. However, if it is to be credible in expecting candidate countries to fight corruption, the EU also needs to address its own internal challenges. Loukas Tsoukalis (President of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, ELIAMEP) remarked that while enlargement may be called "the most successful foreign policy of the EU" because it helps new members to become more stable and prosperous (as it did in the case of Spain and Greece), it is not a panacea that cures all ills (referring to the problems with the rule of law in countries such as Hungary and Poland). He noted that enlargement comes at a cost: more members in a system that works through consensus and unanimity risks becoming a model for dysfunctionality. Tsoukalis said that the current challenge for the EU is reform on two levels, namely institutional reform and funding, without which it will be impossible to address any enlargement successfully. How could the EU consider exporting pax europea when neither it itself is ready to introduce the required internal reforms and budget increases, nor are the proposed countries for enlargement ready to fulfil the criteria? Brigid Laffan (President of the European Policy Centre) highlighted how the EU has moved from a technocratic to an increasingly politicised union. She reflected on how the EU has matured as a political system through crises, especially since 2009, becoming more resilient, adaptable and flexible. Laffan also pointed to four challenges for the EU if it is to be ready for the next stage. First, she focused on heterogeneity among European countries in terms of democratic capacities, with Hungary constantly blackmailing the EU and threatening unity over EU support for Ukraine. Second, she outlined the risks related to the geopolitics of war, with the resurgence of conflict in the continent and in Gaza, making relations with the US and China more problematic. Third, the EU's enlargement towards weak, aid-dependent, democratically challenged states risks undermining EU policy-making capacity. Fourth, ahead of the next European elections Laffan observed the centre-right's fatal tendency to move further right. She concluded that it remains to be seen whether the EU has the capacity to rise to these challenges and noted that a more fitting motto for the EU today is not "unity in diversity" but Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes" to continue to be a zone of peace and prosperity. The contributions from the three panellists were followed by a round of debate centring on the contradictions and challenges for the European integration and enlargement project, the need for a more consolidated budget, and the question of immigration. On the subject of European integration, some participants suggested the creation of subgroups within the EU where honest discussion among geopolitically aligned countries could take place, in addition to acknowledging the need for coalitions "of willing and able" within the EU, and the need for the EU to invest in relationships between member states and those with waiting-room status to smooth the candidates' transition processes. As far as funding was concerned, the need for greater financial resources was noted, and it was argued that the EU should avoid relying solely on national contributions (and therefore taxation) and instead explore alternative methods of funding (i.e. carbon taxes). Lastly, the issue of immigration triggered a huge discussion as a divisive topic within the European community that goes to the heart of European identity. There was a consensus that Europe will need migration and that more attention and resources should be allocated to integration. The issue of controlling immigration and borders was also raised during the discussion, as well as the conflation of immigration and diversity, pointing to the ethnic and religious diversity within European societies and warnings about political exploitation of migration by far-right parties. The EU in a new geopolitical context The second panel was moderated by Xavier Mas de Xaxàs (Diplomatic Correspondent of La Vanguardia). It aimed to elaborate on the needs and efficiency of EU external action when it comes to tackling the challenges of an increasingly complex geopolitical reality, with open conflicts in European territory and its neighbourhood, including in Ukraine and Gaza; competition between the US and China; rivalry with Russia; and necessary engagement with the so-called Global South. Jean-Marie Guéhenno (Director of the Kent Global Leadership Program on Conflict Resolution, Columbia University) warned of the consequences of the return of war in Europe. He reflected on how double standards in the EU's responses to the war in Ukraine and Gaza have undermined its soft power and global respect for the universality of European values. He emphasised the importance of legitimacy for the future of European integration, hence the need to preserve the identity and core values of the EU such as the rule of law, human dignity and solidarity. In his concluding remarks, he highlighted the urgency of reinforcing the EU's industrial capacity in defence and artificial intelligence to address the existing security challenges in Europe. Drawing on some of the points raised during the first panel, he also stressed the need for multi-speed integration, especially in security and defence, and increasing financial resources for AI, research and development and technology. Natalie Nougayrède (Member of the Council, European Council on Foreign Relations) focused her contribution on the importance of putting people at the centre of geopolitics, and the objective of democratisation for a peaceful Europe. Through the examples of the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2014 Maidan revolution, and the ongoing popular resistance to Russia's invasion, she reflected on how Ukrainians have shaped geopolitics, arguing that geopolitics can also be made by people. Similarly, Nougayrède saw the empowerment of Russia's civil society and the reinforcement of democratic institutions in Russia as a necessary step towards the end of the Ukraine war. The latter, she argued, is indeed a direct result of the autocratic power system that Putin has built in Russia, for which the EU needs to think of a different Russia if peace is to be restored in the continent. Wang Huiyao (Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization, CCG), began by saying that it is vital for the EU (and the rest of the world) to play a bigger role to prevent the scenario of "lose-lose" geopolitics. In the face of the uncertainty that comes with the prospect of a victory for Trump, he emphasised the importance of more strategic autonomy, noting that, as one of the world's great powers, China can act as a stabilising force in peace-making, global governance and the economy. He called for a trust-building process between major powers in global politics and a real and efficient multilateral system that reflects the current multipolar world. Given we all live on the same planet and face common threats, and therefore cannot afford to be rivals, Huiyao proposed working together on projects like climate change, the economy, green development, the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Gateway to tackle huge infrastructure deficits, while noting the need to rebuild Ukraine and Gaza. He also said that as China can mediate between Ukraine and Russia, the EU can do the same in US-China relations, making the EU, the United States and China work well as a trilateral relationship and making the world more stable. Maha Yahya (Director, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center) referred to the Gaza war as a game changer with direct implications for Europe. For too long, the conflict has been swept under the carpet, with an idea of peace and security in the region based on a process of normalisation. The blame game over who was responsible for the failure of the Oslo peace process and the negotiations for a ceasefire made the debate on a two-state solution unviable, while new settlements continued to be established. She also underlined the absence of leadership, not just in Israel (with its most far-right government for a long time) and the region as a whole, but also in the US and the EU, where leaderships are fragmented. While the European Commission takes a pragmatic approach, there is a lack of brainpower and political solutions in the European debate, noting that Borrell's appeals for peace will go unheeded for as long as the EU fails to send a clear, united message. Given the horrific humanitarian situation, Yahya criticised the EU's double standards in response to Ukraine and Gaza. She said that the recognition of Palestinian statehood is one leverage that European countries should use, either collectively or individually. Lastly, she noted that the perception in the region and the Global South is that the Gaza war is an incomplete decolonisation process. During the discussion with the audience, the following issues were raised: the possibility of a change of government in Israel; the necessity of reform for EU enlargement; Europe's dark colonial past and how it could engage differently with the Global South; whether it is in the interest of Europe to open negotiations with Russia; and how the green transition is impacted by war. In response, Jean-Marie Guéhenno stressed that, for a better relationship with the Global South, Europe will need a stronger stance on the Middle East, including recognising the Palestinian state. Wang Huiyao reaffirmed the importance of ending both wars, calling for a high-level peace summit. He then noted that although China was pushed towards Russia by the US, Henry Kissinger brokered US-China relations in the 1970s. Unfortunately, he added, there is "no Kissinger of the EU" now. Finally, Maha Yahya mentioned that there is no hope of an Israeli leadership change, therefore there is no significant window for peace talks. She mentioned some urgent necessities for the short term: a ceasefire, a firmer position from the EU; averting an invasion of Lebanon owing to the high risk of regional escalation; and the need to link the reconstruction of Gaza to a political track of the conflict. In his concluding remarks, Pol Morillas (Director of CIDOB) summarised the conference themes by highlighting the intersection between politics and geopolitics in both panel discussions. He concluded by stating that, while the EU has matured enough to hold discussions on critical issues such as migration, the far right or the environment, it is still in the process of defining how the challenge of enlargement and reform will be addressed to strengthen the EU in the future. By asking whether the EU is ready to do "whatever it takes" on issues like security and defence and the green and the technological transitions, he argued that the main challenge for the EU will be approaching these issues through political discussions rather than policies alone. Reflecting on the second panel, Morillas referred to the idea of geopolitics defining our identity, and the impact of people and private actors on the shaping of geopolitics, too. He noted the imperative to rebuild trust among citizens and within the global community and argued that "at a moment when politics is most needed for the challenges we are facing, geopolitics is preventing global politics from solving our shared global problems".
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY SMALL-SCALE FARMERS' STRATEGIES IN DEALING WITH CRISES: AN ANALYSIS OF HOUSEHOLD RESPONSES TO CRISIS IN FOUR VILLAGES IN RURAL ZIMBABWE Crises caused by natural and human-induced disasters have always been part of farmers' lives, but recently they have proliferated through the emergence of new economic, political and environmental challenges. Generally, it is the ordinary poor people, many of them living in the vulnerable contexts of the rural tropics, who are bearing the brunt of these changes. This is particularly true for many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, where more than two-thirds of the population still depend on agriculture, and a large proportion of rural households suffer from poverty, food insecurity and social unrest. In such contexts, national governments and numerous NGOs, often supported by international donors, become active in supporting small farmers with training programs, the diffusion of technology, credits, social payments, subsidies and infrastructural investments. These efforts have had a remarkable success, except in stopping a general process of local marginalization and environmental degradation. In the end, the vast majority of small-scale farming families are left on their own to face the challenge of sustaining their livelihoods and guarantee food for their families under precarious conditions. More effective measures to support poor rural farmers in Africa are urgently needed that take better account of and stimulate their adaptive capacity to find responses to the manifold challenges. The research in this thesis aimed to generate empirical insights into farmers' responses to crises as a basis to supporting small-scale farmers more effectively, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa, in times of crisis. This includes three specific objectives: (1) to describe how crises changes the conditions for small-scale farmers' activities; (2) to learn how small-scale farmers are responding to these changes; and (3) to find out what factors are driving farmers' 'decisions. To comply with these objectives, the study analyzed in depth the dynamics in four rural villages in Zimbabwe, which represent three typical agricultural contexts in Sub-Saharan Africa: (1) communal agricultural lands with traditional social configurations; (2) agricultural landscapes formed by individualized settlers; and (3) areas resettled in the course of land redistribution programs. Zimbabwe was chosen because it is a prime example of a crisis that brought about severe multi-layered political, economic, social and environmental challenges, especially during the presidency of Robert G. Mugabe between 2000 and 2017. Data were gathered, processed and analyzed using a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach. Household surveys were conducted with lead farmers and extension agents to gain an understanding of the factors and conditions that influence farmers' behavior and choices and to establish categories of farmers. Households were surveyed to determine their characteristics at the personal level (family size, head, level of education, financial situation, and farm experience), the farm level (assets, size, land tenure, remoteness) and the institutional level (extension services, financial support, social organization). Besides, farmers' households that represented the strategies typically used to cope with the situation of crisis were selected for in-depth interviews to learn about the operational details, underlying rationalities and effects of the strategies they had adopted. Expert interviews and participatory mapping exercises with local experts and leaders were conducted to gain an understanding of how the Zimbabwean crisis changed the conditions under which the farmers live and to grasp the range and spatial relevance of strategies adopted by the farmer in response to the changed conditions. Also, secondary sources were systematically explored for relevant information, including reports from international organizations, non-governmental agencies, local NGOs, public research organizations, farmers' groups, dairy associations, Internal Savings and Lending Clubs (ISACs) and government agencies. The study made three principal findings: (1) crises strongly affected farming households; (2) most farmers managed to respond effectively to crisis situations; and (3) support and resource endowments are critical to overcoming crises. The crises strongly affected farmers. More than fifteen years of political and economic crises in Zimbabwe, in combination with frequent droughts, profoundly changed the conditions under which rural farmers live and produce. Most strikingly, the manifestation of this complex situation of crises was the breakdown of public services, including progressive reductions of public services providing farmers with technical and financial assistance and, partly related to this, increases in corruption. For example, although the ruling party announced million-dollar tractor and farm mechanization programs during elections, not one of the farmers from the four case studies received anything. Most critical was also the fact that the state-driven Grain Marketing Board failed to continue offering support to maize farmers with regard to pricing and payment patterns, which led to a massive decline in the production of maize, the key business of many farmers at that time. This withdrawal of the state was further compounded by a massive distortion of markets, which for the farmers made the profitable marketing of their own production considerably more difficult or even impossible, as well as making agricultural input prices unaffordable. The latter development forced a majority of farmers to skip using fertilizers, certified seeds and pesticides. Some few only managed to apply sub-optimal amounts of fertilizers occasionally on smaller parts of their fields. Devastatingly, farmers also suffered animal losses to drought (especially the extreme drought of the 2015/2016 season) and animal diseases that hampered their practice of using manure to maintain soil fertility. In parallel, farmers were heavily affected by climate change, manifested through an increase in dryness, soil erosion and unpredictable rainfall. This was especially hard for farmers acting in the dry conditions that are typical of large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, where water is the limiting factor of production and where agricultural activities depend on the predictability of rainfall during the sowing period and the availability of groundwater or water reservoirs in the mountains during the growing period. This critical situation was, at least partly, mitigated for more than a third of farmers (38%) through the intervention of donors, NGOs and private companies, who, in contrast to the government's initial strategy of diffusing technical packages, promoted low-cost technologies in the case of development organizations and contract farming in the case of private companies. Nevertheless, the situation of crisis resulted in considerable losses of harvests, plants and animals, particularly in very dry years (2002-2003, and 2015-2016), when some crops were a complete write-off, but also due to political violence, when livestock and harvests were looted, for example, in the aftermath of the 2008 election. Despite these difficulties, the vast majority of families remained on their properties and tried to cope with the challenging situation. In the resettlement area too, where the government distributed the land of expropriated white farmers, all those farmers who had settled there at the beginning of 2000 remained on their farms and in 2015were joined by new farmers settling on grazing land. Roughly a third of households (29%), however, decided to send a member or two to urban centers, abroad or other farms to search for remunerative employment off the family farm. As it was mostly young male adults who were drawn into leaving the farm for jobs, across all case studies it was common for women, children and the elderly to be left with the task of managing farm operations. Effective responses of the farmers. In response to the situation of crisis, the farmers in the case studies employed a wide range of strategies. Responses included orientation towards livestock, the reduction of the land area under cultivation, the adoption of low-input farming systems, intensification, and on and off-farm diversification, as well as migration, a re-orientation to subsistence farming and the unsustainable exploitation of common resources. Most farmers combined two or more of these responses. Where possible nearly all households (84%) started to buy livestock when a crisis broke, whether cattle or small livestock, the latter being seen as resistant to drought and more easily convertible into cash. To improve food security, many farmers (71%) reduced and concentrated inputs on the most suitable parcels of land to optimize the application of scarce resources. Upon realizing surpluses, some farmers (15%) then included tobacco as a cash crop, or even diversified their production portfolios more strongly (20%). Only traditional dairy farmers (10 %) mostly continued their production because, often belonging to the second or third generation of farmers, they had the knowledge and experience to continue and even intensify production. Also, migration and, relatedly, the transfer of remittances became a central resource for many families (29%). Accordingly, concentration and diversification were closely linked with an orientation to the market. The farmers who produced for markets were well connected with relevant platforms and networks (e.g., tobacco auction floors, milk collection points, the Grain Marketing Board, millers, etc.) and used their surpluses to invest in the farm and grow their asset base. Those farmers who received remittances also invested in farming, often accompanied by a diversification of production. The switch to low-cost technologies and the concentration of production on the most suitable parcels of land massively reduced the dependence on government subsidies. In parallel, many farmers managed to significantly enhance their areal productivity, so that overall production remained stable, despite a significant reduction in the land area under cultivation. Some farmers even managed to increase their gross incomes by intelligently combining on-farm with non-farm strategies. The concentration of farming activities on the most fertile land parcels also allowed fields to be left fallow and promoted other ecologically valuable land-use resources, such as woodlots. This effect was particularly visible in contexts that already showed a high level of degradation. Only 7% of farmers became engaged in unsustainable exploitative activities, but, every tenth household was forced to re-orient itself towards subsistence farming. However, about 75% of households in the case-study sites had somehow found effective ways to cope with crises, implying that the vast majority of farmers substantially changed or strongly adapted their livelihood strategies. While in 2000 most farmers were dedicated to the production of maize and dairy for income generating purposes, in 2016 livelihood strategies were diversified and included the production of food, dairy and cash crops, as well as off-farm employment. Support and resource endowments are critical. The specific choice and quality of farmers' responses varied strongly in accordance with institutional, farm and personal features, except the consistent orientation towards livestock across all farmers and case studies. In particular, a set of four factors had a highly significant positive influence on the successful actions of farmers, based on concentration, market orientation and diversification, namely the availability of farm assets (particularly ownership of cattle), financial support, the level of social organization and formal tenure arrangements. Market orientation was also favored by accessibility. Other factors had a comparatively low influence on farmers' responses, except a preference for diversification by older and female-headed households. Concerning remittance support, higher educational levels and the good financial situation of the households played a moderately positive role. The picture was less clear concerning factors that influenced responses with questionable livelihood outcomes, such as re-orientation towards subsistence farming (lack of assets, low level of education, households headed by females without husbands) and exploitative strategies (male-headed households and households headed by females without husbands). There were also large differences between the case studies in respect of the factors listed above, partly due to important contextual differences. Most strikingly, the better the situation of a case study with regard to accessibility, water availability and social organization, the stronger the external support. In response, more farmers in the favored case studies exploited the opportunities offered to them mainly by tobacco companies and development organizations (irrigation and dairy farming). One exception was the resettlement case study, which, as a contested area, was disregarded by development organizations, despite favorable environmental conditions. Accordingly, in the least favorable case study, "community in impoverished landscape", households were largely left to face their difficult situations alone. They were more likely to re-orient themselves to subsidence farming and switched to small livestock, thereby managing at least to secure their food basis. In particular, these results provide three important suggestions for how farmers can be better supported in crises. First, effective water management is key. There is an urgent need to diffuse in- field water-harvesting techniques and to further optimize appropriate agricultural practices, such as mulching and gravity-fed irrigation. Second, farmers are creative in finding solutions. This includes farming responses, as well as off-farm strategies. Both are effective from a local perspective. However, only the better-off farmers may have the means and capacities for the necessary investments, whereas the challenges may exceed the possibilities of poorer farmers. The proper management of livestock and the use of manure in agricultural production is another important requisite. Third, support measures are critical. However, rather than distributing of costly technology packages, support should take advantage of and promote capacity of farmers to take meaningful decisions. Thus, support should build on the resources and capacities that are available locally and accordingly highlight low-cost strategies and efficient water-use management, stimulate financially attractive options for diversification, and develop existing market opportunities further rather than creating new ones. In this regard, in particular, the frequently observed strategy of farmers to reduce and concentrate inputs on the most suitable land shows an immense potential for optimization. Supporting such promising attempts by farmers to build robust farming systems following their capacities and interests can help achieve development, social equality and sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa. To operationalize such an approach requires well-trained extension agents working in well-equipped organizations. Also, the provision of tenure security plays a critical role in motivating farmers to invest and develop the land, as well as to turn land into a bankable asset and collateral that enables farmers to secure bank loans for farm improvements. Equally important is investment in research and development regarding basic infrastructure, particularly the maintenance of public infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, which have largely been neglected due to economic hardships. The government can also assist farmers by providing market facilities for small livestock and small grains whose markets are still limited. The private sector has and continues to play an important role in supporting farmers through contract farming arrangements. But they need to consider more intensively weaker farmers who are located far from markets and have to cope with unfavorable situations. Farmers' associations should prioritize programs and actions that support the frequent and most common response of concentration, as well as market participation and diversification of production. Through the local sharing of information and knowledge, they can guide farmers in reducing their dependence on government subsidies and the use of costly inputs such as fertilizers, certified seeds and pesticides. The farmers themselves need to organize themselves better in order to lobby collectively and campaign for technical assistance, credits and secure tenure arrangements. Farmers should intensify crop–livestock integration with livestock, thus equipping farmers with the means to produce much needed inexpensive animal manure to improve soil fertility and to opt for long-term strategies that protect their resource base. Finally, research also has its part to play. More knowledge is needed about farmers' actions and rationalities as a basis for finding more effective ways of consolidating the socio- ecological diversity of Zimbabwe, Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, despite the political, economic and climatic challenges that are to be expected in the future.
Not Available ; The land resource inventory of Govankop-1 Microwatershed was conducted using village cadastral maps and IRS satellite imagery on 1:7920 scale. The false colour composites of IRS imagery were interpreted for physiography and the physiographic delineations were used as base for mapping soils. The soils were studied in several transects and a soil map was prepared with phases of soil series as mapping units. Random checks were made all over the area outside the transects to confirm and validate the soil map unit boundaries. The soil map shows the geographic distribution and extent, characteristics, classification and use potentials of the soils in the microwartershed. The present study covers an area of 600 ha in Shirahatti taluk of Gadag district, Karnataka. The climate is semiarid and categorized as drought- prone with an average annual rainfall of 633 mm of which about 363 mm is received during south –west monsoon, 165 mm during north-east and the remaining 105 mm during the rest of the year. An area of about 96 per cent is covered by soils, four per cent by waterbodies, settlements and others. The salient findings from the land resource inventory are summarized briefly below. The soils belong to 11 soil series and 32 soil phases (management units) and 7 land management units. The length of crop growing period is about 150 days starting from the 3rd week of June to 1st week of October. From the master soil map, several interpretative and thematic maps like land capability, soil depth, surface soil texture, soil gravelliness, available water capacity, soil slope and soil erosion were generated. Soil fertility status maps for macro and micronutrients were generated based on the surface soil samples collected at every 250 m grid interval. Land suitability for growing major agricultural and horticultural crops were assessed and maps showing the degree of suitability along with constraints were generated. About 96 per cent area is suitable for agriculture. About 9 per cent of the soils are deep (100 - 150 cm) to moderately deep (75-100 cm), 59 per cent are moderately shallow to shallow (25-75 cm) and about 28 per cent are very shallow (9.0). The Electrical Conductivity (EC) of the soils are dominantly 0.75%) in organic carbon. Entire area in the microwatershed is low (337 kg/ha) in available potassium. Available sulphur is low (20 ppm). Available boron is low (0.5 ppm) in about 52 per cent area, medium (0.5-1.0 ppm) in 21 per cent area and high (>1.0 ppm) in 23 per cent area. Available iron is deficient in about 15 per cent area and sufficient in 81 per cent area. Available manganese and copper are sufficient in all the soils. Available zinc is sufficient (>0.6 ppm) in 4 per cent and deficient (<0.6 ppm) in 92 per cent area of the Microwatershed. The land suitability for 21 major crops grown in the Microwatershed were assessed and the areas that are highly suitable (S1) and moderately suitable (S2) are given below. It is however to be noted that a given soil may be suitable for various crops but what specific crop to be grown may be decided by the farmer looking to his capacity to invest on various inputs, marketing infrastructure, price and finally the demand and supply position. Land suitability for various crops in the Microwatershed Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Sorghum - 191 (32) Jackfruit - 16 (3) Maize - 72 (12) Jamun - - Bengalgram - 146 (24) Musambi - 52 (9) Groundnut - 72 (12) Lime - 16 (3) Sunflower - 52 (9) Cashew - 16 (3) Cotton - 138 (23) Custard Apple - 108 (18) Banana - 52 (9) Amla - 108 (18) Pomegranate - 52 (9) Tamarind - 16 (3) Mango - 16 (3) Marigold - 138 (23) Sapota - 16(3) Chrysanthemum - 138 (23) Guava - 16 (3) Apart from the individual crop suitability, a proposed crop plan has been prepared for the 7 identified LMUs by considering only the highly and moderately suitable lands for different crops and cropping systems with food, fibre and horticulture crops. Maintaining soil-health is vital to crop production and conserve soil and land resource base for maintaining ecological balance and to mitigate climate change. For this, several ameliorative measures have been suggested to these problematic soils like saline/alkali, highly eroded, sandy soils etc., Soil and water conservation treatment plan has been prepared that would help in identifying the sites to be treated and also the type of structures required. As part of the greening programme, several tree species have been suggested to be planted in marginal and submarginal lands and also in the hillocks, mounds and ridges. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS Baseline socioeconomic characterisation is prerequisite to prepare action plan for program implementation and to assess the project performance before making any changes in the watershed development program. The baseline provides appropriate policy direction for enhancing productivity and sustainability in agriculture. Methodology: Govankop-1 micro-watershed (Kanakvad sub-watershed, Shirahatti taluk, Gadag district) is located in between 1500' – 1501' North latitudes and 75038' – 75041' East longitudes, covering an area of about 600 ha, bounded by Kerikoppa, Belhatti, Kanakvad and Kerikoppa villages with length of growing period (LGP) 150-180 days. We used soil resource map as basis for sampling farm households to test the hypothesis that soil quality influence crop selection, and conservation investment of farm households. The level of technology adoption and productivity gaps and livelihood patterns were analyses. The cost of soil degradation and ecosystem services were quantified. Results: The socio-economic outputs for the Govankop-1 micro-watershed (Kanakvad sub-watershed, Shirahatti taluk, Gadag district) are presented here. Social Indicators; Male and female ratio is 52.3 to 47.7 per cent to the total sample population. Younger age 18 to 50 years group of population is around 67.8 per cent to the total population. Literacy population is around 80 per cent. Social groups belong to other backward caste (SC) is around 80 per cent. Fire wood is the source of energy for a cooking among 80 per cent. About 70 per cent of households have a yashaswini health card. Majority of farm households (50 %) are having MGNREGA card for rural employment. Dependence on ration cards for food grains through public distribution system is around 70 per cent of sample households. Swach bharath program providing closed toilet facilities around 80 per cent of sample households. Institutional participation is only 1.5 per cent of sample households. Women participation in decisions making is among all the households were found. Economic Indicators; The average land holding is 1.02 ha indicates that majority of farm households are belong to small and medium farmers. The dry land of 80.6 % and irrigated land 19.4 % of total cultivated land area among the sample farmers. 2 Agriculture is the main occupation and agriculture labour is subsidiary occupation among 90.8 per cent and agriculture is the main and government services are a subsidiary occupation for 1.5 per cent of sample households. The average value of domestic assets is around Rs. 97362 per household. Mobile and television are popular media mass communication. The average farm assets value is around Rs. 142619 per household, about 30 per cent of sample farmers having plough and sprayer. The average livestock value is around Rs. 29731 per household; about 71.43 per cent of household are having livestock. The average per capita food consumption is around 1014 grams (2227.5 kilo calories) against national institute of nutrition (NIN) recommendation at 827 gram. Among all sample households are consuming less than the NIN recommendation. The annual average income is around Rs.16631 per household. About 100 per cent of farm households are below poverty line. The per capita monthly average expenditure is around Rs.1929. Environmental Indicators-Ecosystem Services; The value of ecosystem service helps to support investment to decision on soil and water conservation and in promoting sustainable land use. The onsite cost of different soil nutrients lost due to soil erosion is around Rs. 1044 per ha/year. The total cost of annual soil nutrients is around Rs. 600606 per year for the total area of 600.4 ha. The average value of ecosystem service for food grain production is around Rs. 3187/ha/year in maize crops. The average value of ecosystem service for fodder production is around Rs. 2805/ ha/year. The data on water requirement for producing one quintal of grain is considered for estimating the total value of water required for crop production. The per hectare value of water used and value of water was maximum in maize (Rs. 27159). Economic Land Evaluation; The major cropping pattern is maize (100 %). In Govinkoppa-1 micro-watershed, major soil is Hanganakatti (HGK) and Shirol (SRL) soil series is having very shallow soil depth cover around 10.40 per cent and 17.43 per cent of areas, respectively. On this soil farmers are presently growing maize. Yelisirunj (YSJ) and Beladadi (BLD) soil series are having shallow soil depth cover around 6.38 per cent and 8.85 per cent of area, respectively the crop is maize. Kabulayathakatti Tanda (KKT), Attikatti Tanda (ATT) and Venkatapur (VKP) soil series are having moderately shallow soil 3 depth covers around 12.24 per cent, 5.0 per cent and 13.89 per cent of areas, respectively on crop is maize. Jelligeri (JLG) soil is having moderately deep soil depth cover around 6.0 per cent of area the crop on maize. The total cost of cultivation and benefit cost ratio (BCR) in study area for maize ranges between Rs.48232/ha in BLD soil (with BCR of 1.34) and Rs.12643/ha in YSJ soil (with BCR of 1.80). The land management practices reported by the farmers are crop rotation, tillage practices, fertilizer application and use of farm yard manure (FYM). Due to higher wages farmer are following labour saving strategies is not prating soil and water conservation measures. Less ownership of livestock limiting application of FYM. It was observed soil quality influences on the type and intensity of land use. More fertilizer applications in deeper soil to maximize returns. Suggestions; Involving farmers is watershed planning helps in strengthing institutional participation. The per capita food consumption and monthly income is very low. Diversifying income generation activities from crop and livestock production in order to reduce risk related to drought and market prices. Majority of farmers reported that they are not getting timely support/extension services from the concerned development departments. By strengthing agricultural extension for providing timely advice improved technology there is scope to increase in net income of farm households. By adopting recommended package of practices by following the soil test fertiliser recommendation, there is scope to increase yield in maize (63.1 to 79.8 %). ; Watershed Development Department, Government of Karnataka (World Bank Funded) Sujala –III Project
