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Currently, the development of a modern economy is based on the rapid development of the latest achievements of science and technology, which in turn are the dominant indicators of state development. Globally, economic globalization and trade liberalization are accelerating, leading not only to the international division of labor, the expansion of markets and the corresponding increase in production, but also to an even greater intensification of competition, increasing the need for innovation and their sound legal protection. The principle (doctrine) of equivalence, which the courts apply in the event of patent disputes, is inextricably linked to these processes. The article reveals the essence and specifics of applying the principle of equivalents by studying the specialized literature and conducting comparative legal analysis of foreign jurisprudence.Despite the fact that the principle of equivalence has attracted the attention of many experts in the field of patent law, however, no criteria and approaches have been developed to put it into practice. An analysis of the literature indicates that researchers focus their attention on determining the principle of equivalence.As a result of the analysis of doctrinal approaches to determining the principle of equivalence, it is concluded that at the legislative level there is no differentiation of features (elements), but there is an indication of the identity of the feature as equivalent. Therefore, the substitution of the characteristic (element) indicated in the claims by the equivalent may be recognized as equivalent from the technical point of view and not from the legal position. Usually, the principle (doctrine) of equivalents is applied after the grant of the patent, and the possibility of assigning features (elements) to equivalents can be evaluated by the real technical means that appeared after the grant of the patent.The principle of equivalents or the doctrine of equivalents is a legal doctrine that was developed in the United States of America in 1850-1860 to counteract imitation, substitution of minor or minor components of a patented invention, while maintaining its other essential identity, to avoid liability.In Germany, the courts have widely used the principle of equivalents in interpreting the formula when dealing with patent infringement cases. In England, the doctrine of equivalents was not used, and the traditional British approach to determining the scope of protection was to interpret the claims literally. The analysis of the jurisprudence of foreign countries on the application of the principle of equivalence in the resolution of patent disputes allows us to draw the following conclusions: the application of the principle of equivalence in resolving the question of the scope of patent protection of inventions strikes a balance between the fair protection of the exclusive rights of the patentee and a certain variation of the elements of the claims by third parties, which will not infringe the patent rights of the patent owners; in determining the limits of patent protection by interpreting the claims, the German courts resort to the principle of equivalence when the claims contain ambiguous restrictions such as numerical ranges; in English courts, patent infringement and patent jurisdiction issues are dealt with in a single trial, whereby judges' reasoning in the prior art has a greater influence on the understanding of the claims, in contrast to German courts that exclusively deal with patent infringement rights without touching on the aspects of the patent power.The analysis of the Ukrainian legislation has led to the conclusion that the understanding of the principle of equivalence coincides with a literal interpretation of the claims, while the new application of a known product or process is not foreseen, since the scope of legal protection of such inventions is exhausted only by their formula, and equivalent features are not taken into account. ; В настоящее время развитие современной экономики базируется в первую очередь на быстром освоении последних достижений науки и техники, которые в свою очередь являются доминирующими показателями развития государства. Происходящее на международном уровне ускорение процессов глобализации экономических связей и либерализации торговли приводит не только к международному разделению труда, расширению рынков сбыта и соответствующему росту производства, но и к обострению конкурентной борьбы, усилению потребности в инновациях и их надежной правовой охране. Неразрывно с этими процессами связан принцип (доктрина) эквивалентов, применяемая судами в случае возникновения патентных споров. В данной статье раскрывается сущность и специфика применения принципа эквивалентов в контексте анализа иностранной судебной практики. ; Наразі розвиток сучасної економіки базується на швидкому освоєнні останніх досягнень науки і техніки, які своєю чергою є домінуючими показниками розвитку держави. На міжнародному рівні відбувається прискорення процесів глобалізації економічних зв'язків і лібералізації торгівлі, що сприяє не лише міжнародному поділу праці, розширенню ринків збуту і відповідному зростанню виробництва, а й загостренню конкурентної боротьби, посиленню потреби в інноваціях і їх надійної правової охорони. Нерозривно з цими процесами пов'язаний принцип (доктрина) еквівалентів, який застосовується судами в разі виникнення патентних спорів. У статті розкривається сутність і специфіка застосування принципу еквівалентів у контексті аналізу зарубіжної судової практики.

Constitutional law as a fundamental legal branch within one state always had prevailing national characteristics. National constitutional provisions were result of a multiple historical, political, economic and other significant forces which have been realized within one state. On the basis of the principle of national sovereignty, states were solely responsible for realization of social, economic and political reality on their territory as well as for the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms which are inalienable part of the constitutional law regulation. All revealed horrors of the World War II pointed out to the conclusion that contemporary states can not and must not be solely responsible for protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Instead, international community as a unit must assure legal mechanisms which can ensure realization of particular minimum human rights standards across the globe. One of such contemporary mechanism is the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with Protocols which is the most important international agreement devoted to the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Signed in Rome 1950, the Convention has developed from "just one more" international agreement related to the human rights protection to the one of the most important legal source of the human rights law in contemporary time. Impacts of the Convention on national legal orders of the Council of Europe member states are unprecedented and the Convention is commonly attributed as the Constitution for Europe or as the top of the European constitutional architecture. Such position of the Convention is based upon the procedural provisions of the Convention where supranational and independent European Court of Human Rights on the grounds of the autonomous interpretation of the Convention and individual application pursuant to the Art. 34 of the Convention secures realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms which are guaranteed by the Convention. On the other side, contracting states (member states of the Council of Europe) pursuant to the provision of the Art. 46 of the Convention must undertake all actions in order to fully and properly execute all final judgements of the European Court. Such organization of contemporary European (regional) human rights framework has significant impacts within constitutional law. Human rights and fundamental freedoms which are protected by the Convention's provisions are in the same time substantially and grammatically similar (convergent) with human rights and fundamental freedoms which are guaranteed within national constitutional provisions of the contracting states. This fact points out to the conclusion that within the Council of Europe member states exist national but also supranational legal framework for the human rights protection. This supranational legal framework is positioned on the European Court which accepted in its practice evolutive interpretation of contemporary human rights and fundamental freedoms. By determination of the European Court that violation of particular provision of the Convention has occurred in particular case and by full execution of the final judgement of the European Court, constitutional law of respondent state assumes one particular and rather extensive context. On the other hand, the European Court by exercising its function becomes that institutional link that connects national constitutional orders of the contracting states on one qualitatively higher (supranational) level which gives inputs for evolution of contemporary human rights and fundamental freedoms. Given the fact that protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms is an inherent part of contemporary constitutional law regulation and that the European Court and the Convention are substantially devoted to the protection and realization of that same human rights and fundamental freedoms which are also protected on national constitutional level, this dissertation will assess can contemporary constitutional law be constructed trans-nationally on the basis of judicial activism of the European Court and evolutive interpretation of the Convention. In other words, this dissertation will assess can contemporary constitutional law be de-nationalized on the basis of activism of one supra-national court. From the methodological perspective, this task will be fulfilled by analysis regarding legislative and judicial adjustments which have been undertaken in the process of execution of final judgements of the Court in particular cases. Respective legislative and judicial adjustments after the European Court's judgement indicate that national legal orders are changing and are becoming more and more similar pursuant to the judicial activism of the European Court in the line of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms which are an inherent part of contemporary constitutional law regulation. And if we aggregate all impacts of the European Court's activism in the line of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms on national legal orders of contracting states maybe we can theoretically construct one new concept in the contemporary constitutional law, i.e. the particular constitutional law. ; Ustavno pravo kot temeljna pravna veja znotraj ene države je imelo vedno prevladujoče nacionalne značilnosti. Nacionalne ustavne določbe so bile rezultat večkratnih zgodovinskih, političnih, gospodarskih in drugih pomembnih sil, ki so se uresničile znotraj ene države. Na podlagi načela nacionalne suverenosti so bile države izključno odgovorne za uresničevanje družbene, gospodarske in politične realnosti na svojem ozemlju ter za uresničevanje človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin, ki so neodtujljivi del ustavnopravne ureditve. Vse razkrite grozote Druge svetovne vojne so pokazale da sodobne države ne morejo in ne smejo biti izključno odgovorne za varovanje in uresničevanje človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin. Namesto tega mora mednarodna skupnost kot enota zagotoviti pravne mehanizme, ki lahko zagotovijo uresničevanje določenih minimalnih standardov človekovih pravic po vsem svetu. Eden od takih sodobnih mehanizmov je (Evropska) Konvencija o varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin s protokoli, ki je najpomembnejši mednarodni sporazum, namenjen varstvu in uresničevanju človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin. Konvencija je bila podpisana v Rimu leta 1950 in iz "samo še enega" mednarodnega sporazuma o varstvu človekovih pravic izhaja iz enega najpomembnejših pravnih virov prava človekovih pravic v sodobnem času. Vplivi Konvencije na nacionalne pravne rede držav članic Sveta Evrope so brez primere in Konvencija je običajno pripisana kot Ustava za Evropo ali pak vrh evropske ustavne arhitekture. Takšno stališče Konvencija temelji na postopkovnih določbah Konvencije, v katerih je nadnacionalno in neodvisno Evropsko sodišče za človekove pravice na podlagi avtonomne razlage Konvencije in individualne vloge v skladu s čl. 34 Konvencije zagotavlja uresničevanje človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin, ki jih zagotavlja Konvencija. Na drugi strani pa so države pogodbenice (države članice Sveta Evrope) v skladu z določbo čl. 46 Konvencije morajo sprejeti vse ukrepe, da bi v celoti in pravilno izvedli vse pravnomočne sodbe Evropskega sodišča. Takšna organizacija sodobnega evropskega (regionalnega) okvira človekovih pravic ima pomemben vpliv v okviru ustavnega prava. Človekove pravice in temeljne svoboščine, ki jih varujejo določbe Konvencije, so hkrati bistveno in slovnično podobne (usklajene) s človekovimi pravicami in temeljnimi svoboščinami, ki so zagotovljene z nacionalnimi ustavnimi določbami držav pogodbenic. To dejstvo kaže na ugotovitev, da v državah članicah Sveta Evrope obstajajo nacionalni, pa tudi nadnacionalni pravni okvir za varstvo človekovih pravic. Ta nadnacionalni pravni okvir je postavljen na Evropsko sodišče, ki je v svoji praksi sprejelo evolutivno interpretacijo sodobnih človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin. Z odločitvijo Evropskega sodišča, da je v določeni zadevi prišlo do kršitve posamezne določbe Konvencije in s popolno izvršitvijo pravnomočne sodbe Evropskega sodišča, ustavno pravo tožene države prevzame določen in precej obsežen kontekst. Po drugi strani pa Evropsko sodišče s svojo funkcijo postane institucionalna povezava, ki povezuje nacionalne ustavne ureditve držav pogodbenic na eni kvalitativno višji (nadnacionalni) ravni, ki daje vložke za razvoj sodobnih človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin. Glede na to, da je varovanje in uresničevanje človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin neločljiv del sodobne ustavnopravne ureditve in da sta Evropsko sodišče in Konvencija bistveno namenjeni varovanju in uresničevanju istih človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin, ki so prav tako zaščitene na nacionalni ustavni ravni bo ta disertacija ocenila, ali je sodobno ustavno pravo mogoče oblikovati transnacionalno na podlagi sodnega aktivizma Evropskega sodišča in evolutivne razlage Konvencije. Z drugimi besedami, ta disertacija bo ocenila, ali je mogoče sodobno ustavno pravo de-nacionalizirati na podlagi aktivizma enega nadnacionalnega sodišča. Z metodološkega vidika bo ta naloga izpolnjena z analizo zakonodajnih in sodnih prilagoditev, ki so bile izvedene v postopku izvrševanja pravnomočnih sodb Sodišča v posameznih primerih. Ustrezne zakonodajne in sodne prilagoditve po sodbi Evropskega sodišča kažejo, da se nacionalni pravni redi spreminjajo in postajajo vse bolj podobni v skladu s sodnim aktivizmom Evropskega sodišča v okviru varstva človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin, ki so neločljiv del sodobno ustavnopravno ureditev. In če združimo vse vplive aktivizma Evropskega sodišča v linijo zaščite človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin v nacionalnih pravnih redih pogodbenih držav, lahko teoretično zgradimo nov koncept v sodobnem ustavnem pravu, to je partikularno ustavno pravo.

L'affermazione delle cosiddette "democrazie costituzionali" dotate di costituzioni rigide, ha portato a compimento un complesso processo storico ed ha condotto alla realizzazione quasi completa del "costituzionalismo", dove la legge, per la prima volta, viene sottoposta ad un giudizio di tipo assiologico. In tale contesto è di notevole importanza il complicato e delicato lavoro del giudice costituzionale, il quale deve interpretare la Costituzione, nel cui tessuto sono introdotti direttamente una serie di principi contenenti valori etico-politici , la cui applicazione non assume più la forma classica sillogistica della sussunzione, bensì della ponderazione. Le più note teorie giuscostituzionaliste e dell'argomentazione giuridica hanno dedotto che i principi sono delle norme di ottimizzazione che descrivono un valore da realizzare il più possibile, con riguardo a quanto risulta effettivamente realizzabile, sia sotto il profilo fattuale che giuridico, talché il loro adempimento non dipende soltanto dalle possibilità reali, ma anche da quelle giuridiche, oltre che da regole e da principi controversi. Nell'interpretazione costituzionale, seguendo il metodo argomentativo, la gerarchia assiologica, la scala di priorità tra i principi costituzionali diversi si rende necessaria, perché essa si riferisce a particolari tipi di norme date da una stessa fonte del diritto, ossia la Costituzione: nel balancing test tra diritti concorrenti la Corte Suprema americana parla di preferred position per taluni diritti riconducibili ad un valore costituzionale primario, come la libertà di espressione e di associazione, la libertà religiosa, i diritti della personalità e di partecipazione politica. Ma anche la nostra Corte Costituzionale è continuamente costretta a scegliere nel caso da decidere, con ragionevolezza e proporzionalità, non solo nell'ipotesi di giudizi di eguaglianza, alla luce dell'art. 3 della costituzione, ma anche quando, nel reperire la norma parametro, deve scegliere tra principi, diritti e valori contrastanti, come ad esempio tra diritto di libertà individuale e diritto alla salute o tra diritto di proprietà e di impresa e riconoscimento del valore "primario" del paesaggio. La difficile ricerca di una gerarchia tra i valori costituzionalmente tutelati esige un'opera continua e incessante di ridefinizione e di ri-armonizzazione dei principi costituzionali sulla base degli elementi specifici forniti dai casi da decidere. Gli enunciati costituzionali debbono perciò tener fermo un nucleo identificativo del valore originariamente tutelato, domandando, nel contempo, attraverso una ragionevole varietà di interpretazioni e di applicazioni, di essere continuamente rimodellati ed adeguati alla storia e alla politica, nonché al mutare delle assunzioni di senso e dei significati sociali. I principi che si trovano alla base delle costituzioni, e attorno ai quali i documenti costituzionali si sono formati, con l'aprirsi di nuovi orizzonti e di nuovi problemi, debbono continuamente essere aggiornati, rielaborati e ricomposti in un insieme dotato di senso. Essi hanno bisogno di rinnovata giustificazione da un interprete dotato di un peculiare ed elevato habitus giuridico, idoneo a rendere un giudizio complesso e articolato come quello di costituzionalità. . Dal punto di vista della metodologia ermeneutica, l'habitus del giudice costituzionale corrisponde alla precomprensione critica, attraverso la quale si può individuare se il giudizio costituzionale sia stato effettuato da un giudice privo di habitus e invalidare tale giudizio, anche a prescindere dalla corretta motivazione del giudice stesso. Se poi si tiene presente che la Costituzione è essa stessa il risultato dell'interpretazione dei principi costituzionali, risulta di tutta evidenza l'importanza di un "circolo ermeneutico" tra i principi conformatori della società e valutazioni della società stessa. Nel giudizio costituzionale la circolarità ermeneutica è molto accentuata, infatti, tra il giudice interprete, la collettività e la Costituzione, oggetto interpretato, si instaura un intimo rapporto circolare diacronico, dal momento che la Costituzione contiene dei principi e dei valori appartenenti alla società della quale lo stesso giudice costituzionale fa parte. Nell'attività giudiziale della Corte costituzionale italiana è possibile riscontrare l'accezione scettica dell'interpretazione giuridica, tipica dei sistemi di common law: laddove, sul piano della creatività, le sentenze interpretative di rigetto, sentenze additive e sentenze manipolative sono tutte varianti suggerite o imposte dalla necessità nei singoli casi di un unico modello di pronuncia del giudice delle leggi, che in presenza di determinate condizioni, consente di superare i confini prestabiliti dai canoni legali dell'interpretazione giudiziaria per addentrarsi verso una funzione che non è solo etero-integrativa del diritto ordinamentale e costituzionale, ma anche suppletiva del potere legislativo. L'utilizzo dell'ermeneutica giuridica, come metodo d'interpretazione, trova particolare rilievo dinanzi alle Corti de-statalizzate operanti in ambiti giuridici ad ordinamento pluristatale come la Corte di Giustizia dell'Unione Europea e dinanzi alle Corti Costituzionali di diversi Stati, riconoscendo l'attività creativa ed etero-integrativa da parte del giudice costituzionale di civil law. Tramite la precomprensione critica e la circolarità tradica e diadica, l'ermeneutica giuridica si pone sempre più come metodo interpretativo indispensabile per l'interpretazione dei principi fondamentali, preesistenti al testo Costituzionale, e per la costruzione e l'impiego dei cosiddetti "parametri non scritti", utilizzati, a volte, dai giudici costituzionali italiani, al di là dei limiti tracciati dal metodo giuridico argomentativo: dove il punto di partenza del ragionamento deduttivo-assiologico dovrà sempre esser il testo scritto, dal quale l'interprete potrà denotare il valore del principio. Pur riconoscendosi nell'alveo delle teorie scettiche dell'interpretazione giudiziale, la metodologia ermeneutica offre una valutazione della decisione di costituzionalità capace di non lasciare alla discrezionalità del giudice uno spazio illimitato, dal momento che precomprensione critica e circolarità ermeneutica, dalle quali discende la canonistica ermeneutica, garantisce un metodo per la controllabilità del giudizio, senza che possa sfociare in decisioni arbitrarie o di opportunità politica. Dopo la riforma del titolo V, con il novellato art.117, primo comma, della Costituzione, la dottrina giuscostituzionalista ha parlato di una possibile estensione della legalità costituzionale, qualora i principi discendenti dal diritto comunitario-europeo ed internazionale andrebbero ad integrare i parametri ermeneutici utilizzati nel giudizio di costituzionalità: nel caso in cui il giudice a quo, in via incidentale, e lo Stato e le Regioni, in via diretta, sollevassero la questione di costituzionalità, per violazione del suddetto articolo della Costituzione. L'estensione della legalità costituzionale, tuttavia ha, anche, il suo risvolto "inverso", nel caso in cui fossero i principi esterni a ledere i principi fondamentali dell'ordinamento Costituzionale Repubblicano. Nel contemporaneo costituzionalismo europeo, che accomuna più vicende ordinamentali diverse, risulta essere di peculiare interesse l'esperienza giuridica della Svezia, una delle più solide ed efficienti democrazie mondiali, caratterizzata da un' antica tradizione costituzionale e da una lunga vaganza del controllo di costituzionalità delle leggi. Quest'ultime, fino a poco tempo fa, venivano interpretate dalle Corti nell'assoluto rispetto e subordinazione alla volontà storica del legislatore. Ultimamente, con l'entrata della Svezia nell'Unione Europea, a seguito delle recenti riforme costituzionali ed attraverso l'introduzione di un controllo di costituzionalità diffuso, le corti svedesi stanno gradualmente cambiando i loro tradizionali criteri interpretativi, per una più ampia ed efficace tutela dei diritti umani, nell'ambito giuridico costituzionale ed europeo. ; The claim of so-called "constitutional democracy" with rigid constitutions has completed a complex historical process and has led to the almost complete implementation of "constitutionalism", where for the first time the law is submitted to a value judgment. In this context, it is of great importance to the complicated and delicate work of the Constitutional Judge, who must interpret the Constitution, whose tissue directly holds a set of principles containing ethical and political values, and whose application does have the classic syllogistic form of subsumption, but that of weighting. Most of the Laws are rules, i.e. require something to run to the occurrence of specific conditions, and, therefore, one can refer to them as "conditional rules". In addition, rules can take a categorical form, such as total ban on access. If the rule is valid and applicable, it is absolutely crucial to impose the exact performance means that the rule prescribes. If this happens, one can determine whether the provisions were complied with or not. For the theories of constitutionalism and of the legal argumentation, principles, however, are rules that require that some value shall be fully accomplished with regard to what is actually feasible, both at the legal and factual levels. Consequently, principles are "rules of optimization", thus characterized by the fact that these can be viewed in differing degrees, and because the measurement of their performance depends not only on real possibilities, but also on legal ones, as well as issues on rules and principles. Following the method of the legal argumentation, in the constitution interpretation, hierarchy, the priorities among the various constitutional principles, is necessary so that it refers to specific types of norms laid down by the same source of law, the Constitution: in the balancing test between competing interests, the U.S. Supreme Court talks about preferred position for certain rights related to a primary constitutional value, such as freedom of expression and association, religious freedom, personal rights, and political participation. But even Italian Constitutional Court is constantly forced to choose according to what is being decided on, not only in the event of equality judgments according to Article 3 of the Constitution, but also when, in raising the standard parameter, it must choose - for example - between the right to individual freedom and right to health, or between property and company rights and recognition of the value of "primary" value of the context. The difficult search for a hierarchy of constitutionally protected values requires constant work and constant redefining and re-harmonizing of constitutional principles on the basis of the details provided by the cases to be decided upon. The statements should therefore take constitutional firm identification of an originally protected core value, requiring at the same time, through a variety of reasonable interpretations and applications, to be continually reshaped and adapted to history and politics, and to the effect of changing assumptions and of social meanings. The principles that lie at the heart of constitutions and upon which constitutional documents were formed, with the opening of new horizons and new challenges, must be continually updated, revised and put back together reasonably. They require renewed justification by judge with particular juridical habitus and critical pre-understending: he/she must have acquired, throughout his/her legal career, technical skills needed to make appropriate assessments in constitutional judgment. From the prospective of hermeneutic methodology, the habitus of the Constitutional Judge corresponds to critical pre-understanding through which one can identify whether the constitutional judgment was conducted by a judge lacking a habitus and invalidate that judgment, even regardless of proper motivation presented by the Judge. If one bears in mind that the Constitution itself is the result of the interpretation of constitutional principles, the importance of a "hermeneutic circle" between the principles in accordance with assessments of society and society itself is quite evident. In Constitutional judgement, hermeneutic circularity is highly stressed, in fact, between the court interpreter and the Constitution, the subject interpreted; it establishes a circular diachronic relationship, since the Constitution contains the principles and values belonging to the society which the constitutional Judge is part of. In the activity of the Italian Constitutional Court, it is possible to find the skeptical conception of legal interpretation, typical of common law systems: where, in terms of creativity, the Constitutional Court, through the "manipulative decisions", exceeding the legal boundaries of legal interpretation, integrates the constitutional law and carries a substitute function of the State legislature. The use of the "juridical hermeneutic" as a method of interpretation is particularly relevant before de-nationalized courts operating in legal fields having multi-state regulations, as the Court of Justice of the European Union and before the Constitutional Courts of several countries, recognizing the creative activity by the constitutional judges of civil law. Through the pre-comprehension and the circularity triadic and dyadic , the juridical hermeneutic, has became an indispensable element for interpretation of fundamental principles and for the construction and use of so-called "unwritten parameters" used, sometimes, by Italian constitutional Judges, leaping the methods based on logical argumentation techniques, for which the judge-interpreter must begin his/her legal reasoning always from the written text, to denote the value of the principle. Although the methodology hermeneutic belongs to the skeptical theory of the judicial interpretation, it provides an assessment of constitutional decision without leaving unlimited space to the will of the Judge, since hermeneutics secures a method for the controllability of the interpretive process, to prevent to the judgment of constitutionality is arbitrary or political. After the constitutional reform of 2001, the doctrine has spoken of a possible extension of constitutional legality, because the new Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution allows the principles descendants from European Union law and international conventions of integrate parameters of the constitutional control on the State laws. The extension of constitutional legality could have its inverse implication in the case some international law violates the fundamental principles of Italian Republican Constitution. In the contemporary European constitutionalism, that unites various juridical cultures, it appears to be of particular interest the juridical experience of Sweden: one of the most solid and efficient democracies in the world, characterized by an old constitutional tradition and a long absence of a control of constitutionality over state laws. Until recently, all the laws were interpreted by the swedish courts in full compliance and subordination to the will of the historical legislator. Lately, with the entry of Sweden in the European Union, following the recent constitutional reforms and through the introduction of a more stronger "widespread" control of constitutionality, the Swedish courts are gradually changing their traditional interpretation criteria for a more comprehensive and effective protection of human rights. ; Dottorato di ricerca in Persona, impresa e lavoro: dal diritto interno a quello internazionale (XXVIII ciclo)

The subject of the article is legal regulation at the transition stage from e-government to digital government in Russia and France.The purpose of the article is confirmation or confutation of the hypothesis that in the practice of digital interaction between administrative bodies and individuals, there are problems that must be clearly identified and can be solved using the French experience of legal regulation of the digitalization of public administration.The methodology of the study includes comparative analysis, description as well as particular academic legal methods (interpretation of legal acts, judicial acts and state programs of digitalization in Russia and France, formal legal method).The main results and scope of their application. Russia and France are similar because of not only belonging to the continental legal system, but also existing in the transition stage from e-government to digital. Public administration and law in both countries have to cope with the challenges of digitalization. In this regard, the experience of implementing reforms in France, which is known for its administrative and legal traditions and successes, is of particular interest to the Russian Federation. The legal support of public administration digitalization is clearly lagging behind the rapid development of digital technologies; moreover, new information solutions are significantly ahead of their legal implementation. A comparative analysis between the strategic plans of public administration, relating to digitalization of control and supervision activities in the Russian federation, and the e-government's present and future legislative framework, indicates a lack of coherence between the plans and their legislative counterparts. The initial implementation of public administration digitalization strategic plan through legislation on services is generally supported in the "Digital Public Administration" federal project through the legislation of services. At the same time, the draft of the new Federal law on state control (supervision) and municipal control in Russia offers its own information infrastructure for control and supervisory activities.Conclusions. In order to overcome the fragmentation in the regulation of electronic interaction between private entities and public administration, the French experience of regulating the general principles of administrative procedures and guarantees of good public administration in a single act is very useful. Such an approach would also ensure compliance with the basic principles of proportionality and the prohibition of excessive formalism in the meaningful differentiation of errors and violations committed in the course of electronic communication. In addition according to French experience, it is necessary to maintain alternative ways of communication with administrative authorities including electronic ones, and consider any legislative exceptions. Also, it is necessary to define additional guarantees to citizens during interactions with technical support services; defining standards for the legal qualification of technical failures, pre-trial and judicial appeal mechanisms against automatically made decisions. ; Рассматривается переходный этап от электронного правительства к цифровому в России и Франции, известной своими административно-правовыми традициями и успехами. Отмечается, что правовое обеспечение цифровизации публичного управления пока явно отстает от стремительного развития цифровых технологий. Проводится анализ стратегических планов цифровизации государственного управления и контрольно-надзорной деятельности в Российской Федерации, с одной стороны, и законодатель-ной основы электронного правительства с учётом перспектив её развития – с другой. В целях преодоления разрозненности и фрагментарности в регулировании вопросов электронного взаимодействия частных субъектов с публичной администрацией предлагается использование французского опыта регулирования общих принципов осуществления административных процедур и гарантий надлежащего государственного управления в едином акте. Такой подход позволил бы также обеспечить соблюдение базовых принципов соразмерности и запрета чрезмерного формализма при содержательной дифференциации ошибок и нарушений, допускаемых в ходе электронной коммуникации. Также с учётом французского опыта предлагается сохранить, наряду с электронными, альтернативные формы коммуникации с административными органами и законодательно предусмотреть соответствующие исключения, а также закрепить дополнительные гарантии работы с обращениями граждан служб технической поддержки, стандарты юридической квалификации технических сбоев, механизмы досудебного и судебного обжалования автоматически принятых решений.

The article considers the essence of the principles of independence and impartiality of judges as the basic principles of civil proceedings. The dynamics of reforming the Ukrainian judicial system as a whole and civil proceedings change periodically, but it is necessary to state the insufficient observance of the principles of independence and impartiality of the court during the judicial protection of human and civil rights in Ukraine. The purpose of this article is to study the essence of the principles of independence and impartiality of judges through the prism of civil proceedings, as well as to analyze the compliance of these principles with the European system of values and human rights standards. The task is to analyze the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in civil cases, to investigate the state of ensuring the independence of judges, to identify current issues of compliance with these principles in civil proceedings, as well as to identify areas for improvement. Today in Ukraine there is a tendency to increase the number of cases of illegal interference in the activities of judges in the administration of justice. These and other facts of unlawful interference create risks to the independence of the judge in the consideration and resolution of civil cases. In addition, a comprehensive approach to the study of this problem has shown that civil procedural law does not contain a single rule that would fully reproduce the content of the principles of independence and impartiality of judges in the interpretation of the ECtHR, and therefore legislative regulation of this issue in civil proceedings of Ukraine. It is concluded that civil proceedings as a certain organized set of civil procedural legal relations should be based on the principles of independence and impartiality of the court, as these principles are integral attributes of justice. The administration of justice should reflect the social purpose of the judiciary, i.e. to ensure fair, impartial and timely consideration and resolution of civil cases in order to effectively protect violated rights, freedoms or interests of individuals and legal entities, the interests of the state. ; У статті розглянуто сутність принципів незалежності та безсторонності суддів як основних засад цивільного судочинства. Динаміка реформування української судової системи в цілому, так і цивільного судочинства періодично змінюється, однак необхідно констатувати недостатнє дотримання принципів незалежності і безсторонності суду під час судового захисту прав людини і громадянина в Україні. Метою цієї статті є дослідження сутності принципів незалежності та безсторонності суддів крізь призму цивільного судочинства, а також аналіз відповідності цих засад європейській системі цінностей та стандартів захисту прав людини. Ставиться завдання проаналізувати практику Європейського суду з прав людини в цивільних справах, дослідити стан забезпечення незалежності суддів, з'ясувати актуальні проблеми дотримання цих принципів в цивільному судочинстві, а також визначити напрями удосконалення цих основоположних засад. Сьогодні в Україні простежується тенденція збільшення кількості фактів неправомірного втручання у діяльність суддів щодо здійснення правосуддя. Ці та інші факти неправомірного втручання створюють ризики для незалежності судді під час здійснення розгляду та вирішення цивільних справ. Крім того, завдяки комплексному підходу до вивчення зазначеної проблеми доведено, що цивільне процесуальне законодавство не містить єдиної норми, яка повністю відтворювала б зміст принципів незалежності та безсторонності суддів в інтерпретації ЄСПЛ, а тому законодавче врегулювання даного питання сприятиме правильному тлумаченню цих основоположних засад та їх дотриманню у цивільному судочинстві України. Зроблено висновок, що цивільне судочинство як певним чином організована сукупність цивільних процесуальних правовідносин має будуватися на засадах незалежності та безсторонності суду, оскільки ці принципи є невід'ємними атрибутами правосуддя. Здійснення правосуддя має відображати соціальне призначення судової системи, тобто забезпечувати справедливий, неупереджений і своєчасний розгляд і вирішення цивільних справ із метою ефективного захисту порушених прав, свобод чи інтересів фізичних осіб та юридичних осіб, інтересів держави.

El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos abre en su sentencia Negrepontis-
Giannisis c. Grecia una vía de ampliación de las posibilidades a la libre circulación de
decisiones extranjeras como un derecho derivado del derecho a un proceso equitativo reconocido
en el art. 6.1 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos. La evolución de esta
línea jurisprudencial del TEDH arranca con las decisiones Wagner y J.M.W.L. c. Luxemburgo
y McDonald c. Francia pero en la que nos ocupa se produce un avance considerable
porque no se ata el derecho al reconocimiento a otro derecho sustantivo sino que se
plantea como un derecho en sí mismo. Además se establecen notables consideraciones
en cuanto a la excepción de orden público como freno a la ejecución de decisiones judiciales
extranjeras y se suaviza su efecto. Es especialmente interesante para su aplicación en
aquellas decisiones que escapan del ámbito de aplicación de los correspondientes reglamentos
de la UE donde desaparece el exequátur como procedimiento ad hoc pero se mantiene
la posibilidad de oposición al reconocimiento por la parte afectada. En este sentido,
los argumentos utilizados por el TEDH en Negrepontis son de especial relevancia, teniendo
en cuenta el carácter inspirador del Derecho de la Unión que tiene el CEDH y por ende de
la interpretación que dicho tribunal haga de su articulado.
Giza Eskubideen Europako Auzitegiaren Negrepontis-Giannisis vs. Grezia
epaiak atzerriko erabakiak libre zirkulatzeko bidea zabaldu du, prozesu zuzen bat izateko
eskubidetik etorria, Giza Eskubideen Europako Hitzarmeneko 6.1 artikuluan aitortua. GEEAren
jurisprudentzia-lerro horren eboluzioa abiatzen da Wagner eta J.M.W.L. vs. Luxenburgo
eta McDonald vs. Frantzia erabakiekin, baina guk aipatzen duguna aurrerapausoa handia da,
eskubidea ez zaiolako lotzen beste zuzenbide substantibo bati, eta berezko eskubidea dela
planteatzen da. Gainera, ohar aipagarriak egiten dira atzerriko epai judizialak geldiarazteko
ordena publikoko salbuespenari buruz, eta haien eragina leuntzen da. Oso interesgarria da
EBko arautegien aplikazio-esparrutik ihes egiten duten erabakietan aplikatzeko, non exequaturra
desagertzen den ad hoc prozedura gisa, baina eragindako alderdiak hura ez aitortzeko
aukera mantentzen da. Ildo horretan, GEEAk Negrepontis-en erabilitako argudioak garrantzi
berezikoak dira, kontuan hartuz GEEHk inspiratzen duela Batasuneko Zuzenbidea eta auzitegiak
egiten duen artikuluen interpretazioa.
The European Court of Human Rights in its judgment Negrepontis-
Giannisis v. Greece opens the extension of the possibilities for a free movement of foreign
decisions as a right derived from the right to a fair hearing of article 6.1 of the European
Convention of Human Rights. The evolution of this case law trend of the ECHR begins
with decisions Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg and McDonald v. France but in the
judgment we are now analyzing a considerable development is made because the right to
the recognizition is not linked to other substantive right but it is considered as a right itself.
Besides remarkable considerations are established as far as the exception to the public
order is concerned as a brake to the execution of foreign judicial decisions and it softens its effect. It is especially interesting for its application in those decisions that go beyond
the scope of application of the corresponding regulations of the EU where the exequatur
as an ad hoc procedure is missing but it maintains the possibility of opposition to the
recognizition by the affected party. In this sense, the reasoning of the ECHR in Negrepontis
is of special relevance, taking into account the inspiring character of the European Law for
the ECHR and hence the interpretation of that Tribunal of its articles.

TFM en Derecho Penal, curso 2013-2014 ; [ES] El objetivo de este trabajo es responder a la siguiente pregunta: ¿existe alguna razón para justificar la censura penal con el objetivo de proteger a las generaciones futuras? Primero, en el capítulo II, identificaré las diferentes razones que han sido proporcionadas para justificar la censura penal. Realizaré la tarea en el reino de la moral y, luego, analizaré el impacto que tales ideas tienen en el reino de los estudios del derecho. Segundo, en el capítulo III, construiré, basado en la filosofía política republicana, un criterio capaz de justificar a las prohibiciones penales. Después de los capítulos II y III, concluiré que aquellas prohibiciones que tratan de promover un estado de cosas enel que cada persona tendrá la posibilidad de ser autor de su propia vida tendría que estar justificado. En el capítulo IV, primero argumentaré que la posibilidad de censurar penalmente algunos comportamientos descansa sobre la idea de que tenemos deberes hacia las personas que intentamos proteger. Segundo, analizaré algunas objeciones a tal tesis. Tercero, trataré de identificar la mejor teoría posible capaz de proteger a las personas futuras. En el capítulo V, propondré un modo de solución del llamado problema de la no-identidad en el contexto del derecho penal. Trataré de mostrar que el criterio republicano - desarrollado en el capítulo III - es un modo prometedor de justificar a las prohibiciones penales destinadas a proteger a las personas futuras en esta clase de casos. En el capítulo VI, realizaré un paso adicional. Yo trataré de analizar el modo usual en que las leyes penales prohiben comportamientos destinados a proteger a las personas futuras, es decir, los delitos acumulativos. Finalmente, en el capítulo VII, analizaré un caso judicial con el objetivo de mostrar que las consideraciones proporcionadas en este trabajo son de ayuda como criterio interpretativo para resolver algunas situaciones en los tribunales. ; [EN] The aim of this work is answering the following question : is there any reason to justify a criminal prohibition in order to protect future generations ? First, in Chapter II, I will identify the different reasons that have been provided for justifying criminal prohibitions. I will perform this task in the moral realm and, then, I will analyze the impact of such ideas in the realm of law's studies. Second –in Chapter III- I will build, grounded on the Republican political philosophy, a criterion capable of justifying criminal prohibitions. After Chapter II and III, we will conclude that those censures that try to promote a state of affairs in which each person will have the capacity of being the author of their own life would be justified. In Chapter IV, firstly, I will argue that the possibility of criminal censuring some behaviour relies on the possibility of having duties toward the we try to protect. Secondly, I wil analyze a series of objections against such a thesis. Thirdly, I will try to identify the best possible theory able to protect future persons. In Chapter V, I will propose a way of a solution to the so called non-identify problem in the context of criminal law. I will try to show that the Republican criterion –developed in Chapter III- is a promising way to justify criminal prohibitions to protect future people in this kind of cases. In Chapter VI, I will make a step further. I will try to analyze the usual way in which criminal statutes forbid behaviours to protect future people, that is, accumulative crimes or accumulative harms. Finally, in Chapter VII, I will analyze a judicial case in order to show that the considerations provided in this work are helpful as interpretation criteria to solve some situations in courts of Law.

Abstract: The death penalty is a punishment that is imposed by a court or no court , gross misconduct or serious criminal offenses and the death penalty is a component that is related , it is still found to overlap the interpretation and implementation of the judicial power of authority between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court against a provision of law legislation , particularly with regard to capital punishment , and the judiciary has yet to implement fully implement the provisions of the legislation containing the threat of the death penalty and the execution of death row inmate still lead to discrimination and problems , so that it raises issues and legal uncertainty. Research shows that, in the perspective of the Constitutional Court against the death penalty principle that capital punishment is not contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945 . While the Supreme Court in a ruling decided that the death penalty is contrary to the Human Rights and the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945 , but there are also other decision affirming the death penalty , so the Supreme Court looks inconsistent . The application of the provisions of the legislation that contains a sentence of death for every criminal there is still discrimination, particularly the imposition of the death penalty is still limited to the crime of murder and terrorism . Process execution on death row there is still a problem , namely the existence of discrimination against the execution of the convict . Konstistusi Court and the Supreme Court as a judicial institution and other relevant state institutions , in every decision and future changes in the Penal Code , relating to the death penalty should be maintained and be consistent . Of the offenses punishable by death , and certain other criminal offenses judiciary is advisable to carry out fully and be objective . As well as the execution process , either period or the rights of death row inmates and the concrete rules should be formulated in a verdict dikontruksikan , so the legal certainty of the execution process , and the rights of death row inmates. Keywords:The Death Penalthy, Justice, Inodesia. Abstrak: Pidana mati adalah hukuman yang dijatuhkan pengadilan terhadap kejahatan berat atau tindak pidana serius. Saat ini masih ditemukan tumpah tindih penafsiran dan pelaksanaan kewenangan kekuasaan kehakiman antara Mahkamah Konstitusi dengan Mahkamah Agung terhadap sebuah ketentuan undang-undang khususnya berkaitan dengan pidana mati, dan lembaga peradilan belum sepenuhnya melaksanakan ketentuan undang-undang yang memuat ancaman berupa pidana mati dan proses eksekusi terhadap terpidana mati masih menimbulkan diskriminasi dan masalah, sehingga hal tersebut menimbulkan masalah dan ketidakpastian hukum.Penelitian menunjukkan bahwa, perspektif Mahkamah Konstitusi terhadap pidana mati berprinsip bahwa pidana mati tidak bertentangan dengan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara RI Tahun 1945. Sedangkan Mahkamah Agung dalam beberapa putusannya memutuskan terlihat tidak konsisten. Penerapan ketentuan peraturan perundang-undangan yang memuat ancaman pidana mati bagi setiap pelaku tindak pidana masih terdapat diskriminasi, terutama penjatuhan pidana mati masih terbatas pada pembunuhan berencana dan tindak pidana terorisme. Proses pelaksanaan eksekusi terhadap terpidana mati masih terdapat permasalahan, yaitu adanya diskriminasi, baik jangka waktu maupun pelaksanaan eksekusi terhadap terpidana mati. Mahkamah Konstistusi dan Mahkamah Agung sebagai lembaga peradilan maupun lembaga negara terkait lainnya, disarankan dalam setiap putusan dan dalam perubahan KUHP kedepan, berkaitan dengan pidana mati hendaknya dipertahankan dan bersikap konsisten. Terhadap tindak pidana yang diancam dengan pidana mati dan tindak pidana tertentu lainnya lembaga peradilan disarankan untuk melaksanakan sepenuhnya dan bersikap objektif. Serta proses pelaksanaan eksekusi, baik jangka waktu maupun hak-hak terpidana mati hendaknya dirumuskan aturan konkrit dan dikontruksikan dalam putusan hakim, sehingga adanya kepastian hukum terhadap proses eksekusi dan hak-hak dari terpidana mati. Kata kunci : pidana mati, peradilan, Indonesia.

International audience ; The present article is concerned with the interpretative work of the judge of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court. This judicial institution is taken as witness of a logic of judicial action in an institutional and textual framework and an economic and political context. The textual frame is constituted by the Egyptian Constitution of 1971, amended in 1980, the formulation of which was largely inspired by the principles of Nasserian socialism. As for the institutional framework, it is the creation of a court competent to examine challenges as to the constitutional validity of the law which are brought before it by way of appeal. The economic context is the infitāh and the Egyptian adjustment to liberalisation programmes and, consequently, to privatisation. This study is carried out in two times. It is first a matter of retracing the stages of the elaboration of the 1971 Constitution and of its amendments, then of situating the Supreme Constitutional Court by offering a historical account of its creation and by underscoring the main lines of its jurisprudence, particularly as regards questions of ownership and privatisation. In a second step, we shall consider a specific judgment by the Court, that of 1 February 1997, and we shall undertake to meticulously examine the action of this jurisdiction, an action which is theoretically interpretative of the constitutional provisions and which, in practice, creates new rules. This action of the constitutional judge is strictly circumscribed by the textual framework. The judge, however, avails of two major and closely interconnected instruments to prepare an interpretation. Judge of the meaning of the text, he in effect refers to legal standards and enlists authoritative arguments. It would be advisable to more clearly circumscribe the nature of these instruments and to show to which extent they reveal that the normativity of the legal rule is not determined so much by its written formulation as by its interpretative pronouncement. ; Cet article s'intéresse au travail interprétatif du juge, celui de la Haute Cour constitutionnelle égyptienne en l'espèce. Cette institution judiciaire est prise comme témoin d'une logique d'action judiciaire dans un cadre institutionnel et textuel et un contexte économique et politique. Le cadre textuel est constitué par la Constitution égyptienne de 1971, amendée en 1980, dont la formulation est largement inspirée des principes du socialisme nassérien. Quant au cadre institutionnel, c'est celui de la création d'une Cour compétente pour examiner les recours en constitutionnalité de la loi qui lui sont soumis par voie d'exception. Le contexte économique est celui de l'infitâh et de l'alignement égyptien sur les programmes de libéralisation et, partant, de privatisation. Cette étude procédera en deux temps. Il s'agira d'abord de retracer les étapes de l'élaboration de la Constitution de 1971 et de ses amendements, puis de situer la Haute Cour constitutionnelle en proposant un historique de sa création et en soulignant les grandes lignes de sa jurisprudence, particulièrement sur les questions de propriété et de privatisation. Dans un deuxième temps, on s'intéressera à un arrêt précis de la Cour, celui du 1er février 1997, et on tentera d'étudier minutieusement l'action de cette juridiction, action théoriquement interprétative des dispositions constitutionnelles et pratiquement créatrice de nouvelles règles. Cette action du juge constitutionnel est strictement contrainte par un cadre, celui du texte. Le juge dispose toutefois de deux instruments majeurs et étroitement imbriqués pour en aménager l'interprétation. Juge du sens du texte, il se réfère en effet à des standards juridiques et mobilise des arguments d'autorité. Il conviendra de mieux circonscrire la nature de ces instruments et de montrer dans quelle mesure ils sont révélateurs de ce que la normativité de la règle juridique n'est pas tant déterminée par sa formulation écrite que par son énonciation interprétative.

International audience ; The present article is concerned with the interpretative work of the judge of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court. This judicial institution is taken as witness of a logic of judicial action in an institutional and textual framework and an economic and political context. The textual frame is constituted by the Egyptian Constitution of 1971, amended in 1980, the formulation of which was largely inspired by the principles of Nasserian socialism. As for the institutional framework, it is the creation of a court competent to examine challenges as to the constitutional validity of the law which are brought before it by way of appeal. The economic context is the infitāh and the Egyptian adjustment to liberalisation programmes and, consequently, to privatisation. This study is carried out in two times. It is first a matter of retracing the stages of the elaboration of the 1971 Constitution and of its amendments, then of situating the Supreme Constitutional Court by offering a historical account of its creation and by underscoring the main lines of its jurisprudence, particularly as regards questions of ownership and privatisation. In a second step, we shall consider a specific judgment by the Court, that of 1 February 1997, and we shall undertake to meticulously examine the action of this jurisdiction, an action which is theoretically interpretative of the constitutional provisions and which, in practice, creates new rules. This action of the constitutional judge is strictly circumscribed by the textual framework. The judge, however, avails of two major and closely interconnected instruments to prepare an interpretation. Judge of the meaning of the text, he in effect refers to legal standards and enlists authoritative arguments. It would be advisable to more clearly circumscribe the nature of these instruments and to show to which extent they reveal that the normativity of the legal rule is not determined so much by its written formulation as by its interpretative pronouncement. ; Cet article s'intéresse au travail interprétatif du juge, celui de la Haute Cour constitutionnelle égyptienne en l'espèce. Cette institution judiciaire est prise comme témoin d'une logique d'action judiciaire dans un cadre institutionnel et textuel et un contexte économique et politique. Le cadre textuel est constitué par la Constitution égyptienne de 1971, amendée en 1980, dont la formulation est largement inspirée des principes du socialisme nassérien. Quant au cadre institutionnel, c'est celui de la création d'une Cour compétente pour examiner les recours en constitutionnalité de la loi qui lui sont soumis par voie d'exception. Le contexte économique est celui de l'infitâh et de l'alignement égyptien sur les programmes de libéralisation et, partant, de privatisation. Cette étude procédera en deux temps. Il s'agira d'abord de retracer les étapes de l'élaboration de la Constitution de 1971 et de ses amendements, puis de situer la Haute Cour constitutionnelle en proposant un historique de sa création et en soulignant les grandes lignes de sa jurisprudence, particulièrement sur les questions de propriété et de privatisation. Dans un deuxième temps, on s'intéressera à un arrêt précis de la Cour, celui du 1er février 1997, et on tentera d'étudier minutieusement l'action de cette juridiction, action théoriquement interprétative des dispositions constitutionnelles et pratiquement créatrice de nouvelles règles. Cette action du juge constitutionnel est strictement contrainte par un cadre, celui du texte. Le juge dispose toutefois de deux instruments majeurs et étroitement imbriqués pour en aménager l'interprétation. Juge du sens du texte, il se réfère en effet à des standards juridiques et mobilise des arguments d'autorité. Il conviendra de mieux circonscrire la nature de ces instruments et de montrer dans quelle mesure ils sont révélateurs de ce que la normativité de la règle juridique n'est pas tant déterminée par sa formulation écrite que par son énonciation interprétative.

This book highlights that an independent judiciary is indispensable for the very existence of any society based on democratic values, such as the observance of the rule of law and respect for the human rights of individuals. In order to ensure that the judiciary's interpretation of the law is not bound by the will of the executive and that it is able to call the executive to account by protecting the life as well as liberty of the governed, it is imperative to guarantee, among other things, a transparent method of appointment and the security of tenure of the judges. Taking into account the importance of an independent judiciary in a democratic society, the framers of the Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972, following in the footsteps of the framers of the Constitutions of India and Pakistan, incorporated in the Constitution the ideal of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary as one of its basic features. This book, however, makes it manifestly evident that the key elements for realising such an ideal have not adequately been guaranteed by the Constitution. Consequently, this book sheds light on how succeeding generations of executives have sought to undermine the independence of the judiciary.Accordingly, this book puts forward recommendations for the insertion of detailed norms in the Constitution of Bangladesh for establishing the best means for excluding patronage appointments to the bench and for guaranteeing the security of tenure of the judges. This book asserts that the incorporation of such norms, safeguards the independence of the superior judiciary to decide cases without fear or favour. This book, therefore, seeks to address the gap that exists between the theory and practice concerning the independence of the judiciary in Bangladesh.Since no book is currently available in the market that critically examines these issues in a systematic and structured manner, this research enhances knowledge by not only identifying the flaws, deficiencies and lacunae of the constitutional provisions concerning the method of appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh but also the measures undertaken by the current Bangladeshi regime to dispense with the transparent method of removal of the judges involving a body of judicial character

Introduction : the handbook of the United States Constitution -- The Constitution from 1620 to the early republic / David Brian Robertson -- Constitutional developments from Jackson through reconstruction / Michael Les Benedict -- The gilded age through the progressive era / Ken I. Kersch -- From the new deal through the Reagan revolution / Lucas A. Powe, Jr -- The Reagan revolution to the present / Thomas M. Keck -- Constitutions as basic structure / Neil Komesar -- The constitutional politics of Congress / Neal Devins -- The constitutional politics of the executive branch / Mariah Zeisberg -- The constitutional politics of the judiciary / Justin Crowe -- The uneasy place of parties in the constitutional order / Russell Muirhead, and Nancy L. Rosenblum -- Social movements and the Constitution / Mark Tushnet -- The administrative state : law, democracy, and knowledge / Adrian Vermeule -- The resilience of the American federal system / Jenna Bednar -- Empire / Bartholomew H. Sparrow -- The evolution of America's fiscal Constitution / Bill White -- The executive power / Stephen M. Griffin -- Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment / Ellen D. Katz -- The power of judicial review / Keith E. Whittington -- Delegation, accommodation, and the permeability of constitutional and ordinary law / Gillian E. Metzger -- Federalism / Michael S. Greve -- Equality / Julie Novkov -- Liberty / James E. Fleming, and Linda C. McClain -- Property in the United States Constitution / Jedediah Purdy -- Gender, sex, and the U.S. Constitution / Leslie F. Goldstein -- Racial rights / Girardeau A. Spann -- Autonomy (of individuals and private associations) / Dale Carpenter -- Citizenship / Gerald L. Neuman -- Religion / Winnifred Fallers Sullivan -- Free speech and free press / Stephen M. Feldman -- Criminal procedure / Carol S. Steiker -- Habeas Corpus / Paul D. Halliday -- Native Americans / Matthew L. M. Fletcher -- Positive rights / Emily Zackin -- The right to bear arms / Saul Cornell -- Constitutionalism / Mark E. Brandon -- Emergency powers / Oren Gross -- Constitutional authority / Wayne D. Moore -- Is constitutional law really law? / David A. Strauss -- Constitutionalism outside the courts / Ernest A. Young -- State constitutionalism / John Dinan -- Interpretation / Jamal Greene -- Constitutional change / Gerard N. Magliocca -- The U.S. Constitution and international law / Vicki C. Jackson -- The Constitution in comparative perspective / Heinz Klug -- Education and the Constitution : defining the contours of governance, rights, and citizenship / Elizabeth Beaumont -- The economics of constitutional law / Maxwell L. Stearns -- The Constitution and United States culture / Paul W. Kahn

I Introduction -- 1.Tales from the Tartan Chambers -- Diane Hansen-Ingram -- II The Scottish Perspective -- 2. What Waldemar Saw-A Young German's View of the Scottish Legal System -- Lord Rodger of Earlsferry -- 3. Justice Seen to be Done -- Lord Clyde -- 4. Unfinished Business -- Lord Clarke -- 5. Devolution and Community Law -- Christine Boch -- III EU Institutional Issues -- 6. The Convention and the Court -- President of the Court, Judge Rodríguez Iglesias and Julio Baquero Cruz -- 7. The Judicial Architecture of the European Union-the Challenges of Change -- Judge Nicholas Forwood -- 8. Judge Edward Acting as Advocate General -- Professor Rosa Greaves -- 9. Enlargement of the European Union-the Council Process -- Elizabeth Willocks -- IV EU Competition Issues -- 10. Certain Reflections on Recent Judgments Reviewing Commission Merger Control Decisions -- President of the Court of First Instance, Judge Vesterdorf -- 11. The National Courts and the Uniform Application of EC Competition Rules. Preliminary Observations on Council Regulation 1 -- 2003 -- Judge Sevón -- 12. The A M & S Judgment -- John Temple Lang -- 13. Collective Dominance-The Contribution of the Community Courts -- Mark Clough -- 14. Some Reflections on Procedure in Competition Cases -- Sir Christopher Bellamy QC -- V EU Substantive Issues -- 15. Free Movement and the Environment: Seeing the Wood for the Trees -- Imelda Higgins and Marie Demetriou -- 16. The Dangers of too Much Precaution -- Ian Forrester QC -- 17. Different but (Almost) Equal-The Development of Free Movement Rights Under EU Association, Co-Operation and Accession Agreements -- Eleanor Sharpston QC -- 18. Diplomas and the Recognition of Professional Qualifications in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice -- Dr Dieter Kraus -- 19. The Transformation of the Rome Convention -- Richard Plender QC -- 20. Standard of Review in WTO Law -- Professor Claus Dieter Ehlermann and Nicolas Lockhart -- VI EU Remedies Issues -- 21. Approaches to Interpretation in a Plurilingual System -- Advocate-General Francis G Jacobs -- 22 Private Enforcement-A Complete System of Remedies -- Anneli Howard and Deok Joo Rhee -- 23. Article 234: A Few Rough Edges Still -- Dr Robert Lane -- 24. Discretionary References: To Refer or not to Refer? -- Mark Hoskins -- 25. Direct Applicability or Effect -- Dr Joxerramon Bengoetxea -- 26. Du concept de l'effet direct à celui de l'invocabilité au regard de la jurisprudence récente de la Cour de justice -- Judge MelchiorWathelet

Topicality. The relevance of the study is due to the lack of a single approach to understanding fiduciary legal relations in civil studies, which prevents the disclosure of the essence of the doctrine of fiduciary duties; insufficient analysis of the concept of "fiduciary duties", which makes it impossible to determine the content of duties arising from the subject of fiduciary legal relations; the lack of clarification of the essence of the doctrine of fiduciary duties, which prevents its full application to the regulation of civil legal relations, the prosecution of persons who have fiduciary duties.
The purpose of the article is to reveal the essence of the doctrine of fiduciary duties through the prism of fiduciary legal relations and the principles of civil law, in particular, justice, good faith, reasonableness and loyalty, using the example of corporate law.
Research methods. A complex of methods was used in the study of the problem. The theoretical and methodological basis is dialectical, historical and comparative methods, with the help of which the processes of formation, development and application of the doctrine of fiduciary duties in Ukraine and foreign countries were investigated and a complex conceptual and categorical apparatus of this doctrine was developed. Methods of analysis, synthesis, logical generalization, scientific abstraction, and formal-logical methods were used. Using the classification method, groups of fiduciary duties were identified. The method of theoretical generalization made it possible to establish subjects that have fiduciary duties.
Results. An analysis of fiduciary legal relations, their relationship with the doctrine of fiduciary duties, the mechanism of functioning of the latter in the Romano-Germanic and Anglo-American legal systems was carried out; special legal methods of interpretation of legal norms, with the help of which the conceptual principles of the functioning and development of the doctrine of fiduciary legal relations, as well as the directions of its practical implementation in judicial practice, are defined; the norms of the current legislation relating to fiduciary duty in corporate law, the application of the doctrine of fiduciary duty in the practice of the Supreme Court were investigated; the components of the doctrine of fiduciary duties are defined: fiduciary legal relations, fiduciary powers, fiduciary duties, principles of justice, good faith, reasonableness and loyalty; the essence of the doctrine of fiduciary duties in corporate law is revealed.

RESUMEN. La Gran Sala del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea ha dictado sentencia sobre la cuestión prejudicial planteada en diciembre de 2019 por el Tribunal de Primera Instancia de Riga al objeto de interpretar los arts. 11.a), 17 y 22.1 del Protocolo nº 7 sobre los privilegios y las inmunidades de la Unión Europea. En ella se acomete el análisis de la posibilidad de que los gobernadores de los bancos centrales nacionales puedan beneficiarse de la inmunidad de jurisdicción cuando realizan actos de carácter oficial como miembros de un órgano de la Unión, al tiempo que se emprende una revisión en profundidad de cuestiones esenciales tales como el objeto y alcance de esa protección, el papel que juega el Banco Central Europeo a la hora de determinar la suspensión o no de la inmunidad cuando se puedan ver afectados intereses de la Unión, e incluso si la inmunidad alcanza también a las diligencias penales o a las pruebas obtenidas por los órganos nacionales competentes. ; ABSTRACT. The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled on the question referred for a preliminary ruling in December 2019 by the Court of First Instance of Riga for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of arts. 11(a), 17 and 22(1) of Protocol No 7 on the privileges and immunities of the European Union. It analyses the possibility of national central bank governors being able to benefit from immunity from jurisdiction when they perform official acts as members of a Union body, while undertaking an in-depth review of key questions such as the purpose and scope of this protection, the role of the European Central Bank in determining whether or not to waive immunity when Union interests may be affected, and even whether immunity also covers criminal proceedings or evidence obtained by the competent national bodies. ; Este trabajo se realiza en el marco de los Proyectos «EU External Action & Global Challenges», Erasmus+ Programme - Jean Monnet Activities (Ref. 620579-EPP-1-2020-1-ES-EPPJMO-MODULE) y «Judicialización y diálogo judicial europeo e internacional», UC, Ref. 07.P148.64004.