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We develop the notion that the choice of alliance scope materially affects the character of benefits that alliance participants receive, and thereby affects a range of issues having to do with the initiation, evolution, and termination of the alliance. Indeed, while under-emphasized by academics, determining alliance scope ranks among the most important tasks undertaken by practitioners of alliances. Restricting ourselves to alliances where mutual learning is the primary raison d'être, we first define private benefits as those that accrue to subsets of participants in an alliance, and common benefits as those that accrue collectively to all participants. We demonstrate how the choice of alliance scope affects the mix of private and common benefits, and draw on earlier work to show how this, in turn, affects alliance partners' incentives to invest in learning. As illustrations of the utility of the framework of private and common benefits, we consider two applications. A simple model illustrates the relationship between the choice of alliance scope, the realization of private and common benefits, and the stability, or lack thereof, of the alliance. A second application sheds light on alliance evolution. It examines factors affecting both (a) how a particular alliance evolves, and (b) how firms manage sequences of alliances. Two broader theoretical points also emerge from this discussion of alliance scope. First, we argue that an analytical focus solely on the individual alliance may be inappropriate for studying a wide range of issues. Of the multiple sources of benefits that accrue to alliance participants, there are some whose realization depends on activities in which the firm is engaged, but that may have little to do with the alliance in question. Second, in contrast to much of the literature on alliances, our analysis is based upon the primitives of benefit streams, rather than on transaction cost reasoning. This complementary perspective is better suited to the task of highlighting how activities not governed by an alliance might nonetheless affect multiple aspects of the alliance.

In the theoretical literature, alliances have been hypothesized to lead to war as well as away from war. This study statistically examines the relationship between the size of alliances and the war proneness of their members. Analyzing data on the war record of 126 major power alliances formed during the period 1816-1980, it is shown that the larger the alliance, the more wars each of its members is likely to be involved in. This result is consistent with, and enhances the credibility of, past empirical research showing that alliance membership affects the expansion of wars rather than their outbreak. This study also explains a puzzle that threatened the validity of past aggregate analyses of the alliance-war relationship: the mysterious reversal of the sign of the relationship around the turn of the twentieth century. The source of the puzzle is demonstrated to have been a failure to think through the theoretical implications of the operationalization of war, not a fundamental change in the nature of the underlying linkage between alliances and war.

Alliances are usually understood as a way for states to aggregate military capabilities in the face of a common threat. From this perspective, the willingness of relatively powerful states to form alliances with much weaker partners is puzzling. The weaker ally often adds little to the stronger state's security and may increase its chance of military entanglement. This article presents evidence that international trade helps explain these alliances. States that have the power to do so have incentives to protect their trading relationships against interference from either third states or internal conflict. Alliances are one means of providing this protection. This argument differs from most other research on trade and alliances, which reverses the causal arrow and suggests instead that alliances increase trade. Empirical analysis indicates that trade increases the probability of alliance formation in major power—minor power dyads and decreases the chance that alliances will dissolve. These results are robust to a variety of changes in the specification of the model and the data used for estimation. They also do not stem from any influence of alliance relationships on trade. An analysis of the effect of alliance formation on change in the level of bilateral trade turns up no evidence that the formation of an alliance increases commerce.

"The study of alliance governance is a significant component needed for the analysis of economic organization and the execution and performance of alliances. This authoritative volume covers the most important research conducted on strategic alliances and their governance. The editors have selected seminal papers which consider a number of important issues, including when firms use alliances relative to other organizational forms (e.g., acquisitions), alternative types of alliances, and the most important governance arrangements for inter-firm collaborations. The collection also carefully examines the specific means by which firms design alliance contracts and other dimensions of alliance governance. This indispensable volume is particularly well suited for scholars and students in strategic management, international business, management, and economics." -- P. [4] of cover

I begin with a discussion of globalisation, of New Social Movements and a critique of "identity politics". Taking for granted that actors in social movements want to create alliances, I identify domination/subordination as a possible common bond among actors. Then, I discuss the obstacles to the building of alliances: anger and guilt, denial of responsibility, inability to really listen and hear, rejection of difference. I end by proposing that to build alliances, we must engage in dialogue, that is collective and individual self-reflection, within beloved communities.

A review essay on a book by Andrew Roberts, Masters and Commanders: How Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall and Alanbrooke Won the War in the West (Allen Lane).