We develop a quantitative heterogeneous-agents general equilibrium model that reproduces the income inequalities of 32 countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Using this model, we compute the optimal income tax rate for each country under the equal-weight utilitarian social welfare function. We simulate the voting outcome for the utilitarian optimal tax reform for each country. Finally, we uncover the Pareto weights in the social welfare functions of each country that justify the current redistribution policy.
Although there are plenty of quantitative cross-national analyses on the influence of population age structure on revolutionary risks, there are currently not enough studies that examine its impact on the risks of armed and unarmed revolutions taken separately. Assuming that the dependence of potential political destabilization on the median age will differ for armed and unarmed revolutions, we propose the following hypothesis. High median age and the level of a country's economic development will negatively correlate with armed revolutions. A moderately young median age will have positive influence on the risks of non-violent rebellions, while the overall dependence of unarmed revolutions on median age will be slightly positive and curvilinear. Relying on materials from NAVCO 1.3 and the UN Population Division databases and by means of utilizing cross-tabulations, correlations and logistic regression, we analyze about 250 revolutionary episodes between 1950 and 2019. All of our hypotheses turn out to be supported. The higher the median age of the population — the less likely the occurrence will be of armed revolutionary instability. On the other hand, as the population ages, the risks of unarmed revolutionary actions first grow, but then decline.
