Suchergebnisse

Seitdem die OAU die Bildung einer afrikanischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft beschlossen hat, haben sich mehrere Projekten mit Vorstellungen über eine Umstrukturierung der Staatengemeinschaft beschäftigt. In diesem Zusammenhang behandelt der Artikel die Einrichtung eines ständigen juristischen Organs, um durch Spezialisten neue Regeln internationalen Rechts angesichts der entstehenden Probleme entwickeln zu lassen und bestehende Regeln zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten zu harmonisieren. Es wird für eine zahlenmäßig möglichst große Kommission plädiert, deren Aufgaben im internationalen afrikanischen Wirtschaftsrecht, in den interafrikanischen Beziehungen und in der Erstellung von Expertengutachten für die OAU oder Sonderkonferenzen liegen sollen. Die Auswahl der Mitglieder für die Kommission soll nach Qualifikation, angemessener regionaler Verteilung und Beachtung aller in Afrika vertretenen Rechtssysteme erfolgen. Standort soll Addis Abeba sein, die Finanzierung durch die Umwidmung der Mittel der früheren Komitees zur Befreiung im südlichen Afrika gewährleistet werden. (DÜI-Wgm)

Includes index. ; Bibliography at end of each chapter. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Lecture given by Mr. Hugh E. McClelland, Director, Agricultural Development & Marketing, Dept. of Primary Industries at the Waite Campus, University of Adelaide, 21.7.1993. This lecture is part of the Campus Seminars and Distinguished Lecturer Series, Waite Campus, University of Adelaide, 1991 – 1997. https://figshare.com/projects/Campus_Seminars_and_Distinguished_Lecturer_Series_Waite_Campus_University_of_Adelaide/17756

Conflicts involving religion have returned to the forefront of international relations. And yet political scientists and policymakers have continued to assume that religion has long been privatized in the West. This secularist assumption ignores the contestation surrounding the category of the "secular" in international politics. The Politics of Secularism in International Relations shows why this thinking is flawed, and provides a powerful alternative.

The contemporary global community is increasingly interdependent and confronted with systemic risks posed by the actions and interactions of actors existing beneath the level of formal institutions, often operating outside effective governance structures. Frequently, these actors are human agents, such as rogue traders or aggressive financial innovators, terrorists, groups of dissidents, or unauthorized sources of sensitive or secret information about government or private sector activities. In other instances, influential "actors" take the form of climate change, communications technologies, or socioeconomic globalization. Although these individual forces may be small relative to state governments or international institutions, or may operate on long time scales, the changes they catalyze can pose significant challenges to the analysis and practice of international relations through the operation of complex feedbacks and interactions of individual agents and interconnected systems. We call these challenges "femtorisks," and emphasize their importance for two reasons. First, in isolation, they may be inconsequential and semiautonomous; but when embedded in complex adaptive systems, characterized by individual agents able to change, learn from experience, and pursue their own agendas, the strategic interaction between actors can propel systems down paths of increasing, even global, instability. Second, because their influence stems from complex interactions at interfaces of multiple systems (e.g., social, financial, political, technological, ecological, etc.), femtorisks challenge standard approaches to risk assessment, as higher-order consequences cascade across the boundaries of socially constructed complex systems. We argue that new approaches to assessing and managing systemic risk in international relations are required, inspired by principles of evolutionary theory and development of resilient ecological systems.

When we speak of an international system, we start with the presumption that there is something habitual and regular about the behavior of the nations that constitute it. Unfortunately, the concept of an international system has had a singularly hollow ring in the works of many scholars who have employed the term. It is frequently compared to an incredibly complicated watch or thermostat, or alternatively it is defined so abstractly that it would appear to have no specific empirical referents—and therefore practically everything in one way or another would qualify as a "system."The abstract and shadowy significance of the concept in international relations studies has retarded its usefulness for exploring the regularities that underlie the interactions of nations. More than ever before, however, the actions of nations have multiple reverberations on each other and can be ascribed meaning only within the context of the relations of many nations with each other. Because the configuration of inter-nation relations has become increasingly complex, it has become more and more difficult to trace out these relations and determine what structure, if any, there is in the "system."We shall see later that any definition of a system is arbitrary to the extent that its inclusion and exclusion rules are arbitrary. If we can specify the simplifying assumptions which create this arbitrariness, however, then the problematic cases included or excluded in a system or component subsystems can usually be identified and explained. This approach seems preferable to positing systems criteria that are either ambiguous or non-operational, enriching the vocabulary but not the analysis.