Suchergebnisse

The use of design within government institutions is a rapidly accelerating trend of global dimensions. The emergent nature of these design practices, and cultures, raises questions about what exactly is happening in the interactions between design and political institutions, and how that might be understood in broader socio-economic and political terms. This paper reports on a series of interviews with senior level civil servants working in UK central government, all of whom have had some exposure to design methods and techniques through interaction with the UK Policy Lab. The paper sets out the ways in which the epistemology and practices of design, as introduced through Policy Lab, both expose and challenge those of the political institutions and policy professionals they seek to change.

The use of design within government institutions is a rapidly accelerating trend of global dimensions. The emergent nature of these design practices, and cultures, raises questions about what exactly is happening in the interactions between design and political institutions, and how that might be understood in broader socio-economic and political terms. This paper reports on a series of interviews with senior level civil servants working in UK central government, all of whom have had some exposure to design methods and techniques through interaction with the UK Policy Lab. The paper sets out the ways in which the epistemology and practices of design, as introduced through Policy Lab, both expose and challenge those of the political institutions and policy professionals they seek to change.

Electoral politics effects democracy and political system. Elections are essential component of modern democracy.The authoritarian pattern of government is harmful for institutional development process. The constitutional and institutional developmental process is weak in Pakistan. The federal system government is not work in Pakistan in true sense. These issues weakened political system of Pakistan. The institutions may get proper development to strengthen democratic system. The political structures and governing experience is not matched to democratic world. The power politics contributed to inability of parliamentary democracy to govern new country effectively. Democracy remained poor in Pakistan. Military rulersgoverned in Pakistan more than half of time. The assumption is that democracy is controlled by the electoral process. The paper covers electoral politics of Pakistan from 1947 to 1985.

Why do some state leaders engage in genocide and politicide while others do not? Extant theory focuses on how large openings in the domestic political structure of a country, such as civil or interstate war, increase the likelihood that a government will respond with violence against its civilian population. This article builds from this previous theory to argue that smaller crises can provide governments with the same incentives and opportunities to engage in political mass murder. Statistical tests of all cases of genocide and politicide since 1955 support this argument. In addition to civil wars, assassinations, coups and strikes increase the likelihood of political mass murder, especially genocide. These findings are important as they caution the international community against fixating on large-scale crises as the impetus for genocide and politicide.

Nature of the media and the expectations of politicians in Italy The author analyzes political consequences of the transformation of the Italian media system, which is the result of the political crisis of the '90 – and the fall of the First Republic. He presents shape of the contemporary Italian media policy and its specificity in terms of conflict of interest, unprecedented in Europe. A conflict of interest was the result of the fact that the exercise of public functions, coming from a political choice, had been charged directly to the economic group, the head of which became of the former Prime Minister of the Italian government. Moreover, this conflict was intensified by the legislative initiatives of Italian government aimed to weaken the position of Silvio Berlusconi's media empire market competitors.

The complexities of the Iranian media ecosystem become most apparent during the election season when the heightened political climate leads to intensified scrutiny to and reliance on print media. In the absence of political parties, the press serves as a valuable tool during election campaigns, and this report highlights the shifting allegiances in national publications with a focus on politics, economics, and society. Newspapers are divided by faction (Pro-government Conservative, Traditional Conservative, Critical-of-the-Government Conservative, Affiliated with Reformists, and Reformist), and labeled with their 2009 political affiliations, their expected affiliations for 2013, and their stance on reformists. Once the Guardian Council releases the final vetted candidates on May 24th, these newspapers will become active in supporting their preferred factions or candidates.

This article compares the political strategies used by conservative governments in Australia (John Howard) and Canada (Stephen Harper) to manage public impressions of climate change and climate change policy. These cases are significant in part because both governments acted against the weight of domestic public opinion. While many studies of political resistance to climate change mitigation focus on the role of denial, skepticism, and counter-claims, our comparison finds a significant role for what we call "affirmation techniques," namely the rhetorical acceptance of the consensus position on climate change followed by concerted attempts to control precisely what acceptance means. We draw on recent theoretical work on anti-reflexivity and the sociology of ignorance to explain the political effectiveness of these strategies.

ObjectiveTo understand how changes in the partisan control of the institutions of government may condition the effect of corporate political activities on bureaucratic decision making.MethodsI examine the variation in the effectiveness of corporate political expenditures in reducing workplace safety (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) violations across partisan contexts between 1981 and 2006 for a large number of corporations.ResultsCorporate expenditures have a greater suppressant effect on workplace safety violations (but not inspections) when the Republicans control the Congress or presidency.ConclusionsCorporations are able to influence bureaucratic decision making, but bureaucrats balance the demands of corporations against those of other party constituencies and their political principals. Thus, the partisan control of government importantly conditions corporate influence in the bureaucracy.

This study examines the effects of fragmented governments and fiscal authorities on budget deficits in Turkey along with political business cycle effects. For econometric analysis we will use annual data from the period 1960 to 2009. This article sheds light on various dispersion indices and their use in the field of political power and fiscal performance. The results show that the power dispersion indices of governments and fiscal institutions significantly explain the increases in the ratio of budget deficit to gross national product. The article draws attention to the unification and better coordination of fiscal authorities in Turkey. The analysis has important policy implications for Turkey and other developing countries from the viewpoint of fragmented political and administrative dispersion of power and poor budget performances. (JEL P16, H72, C22, C43)

This study examines the effects of fragmented governments and fiscal authorities on budget deficits in Turkey along with political business cycle effects. For econometric analysis we will use annual data from the period 1960 to 2009. This article sheds light on various dispersion indices and their use in the field of political power and fiscal performance. The results show that the power dispersion indices of governments and fiscal institutions significantly explain the increases in the ratio of budget deficit to gross national product. The article draws attention to the unification and better coordination of fiscal authorities in Turkey. The analysis has important policy implications for Turkey and other developing countries from the viewpoint of fragmented political and administrative dispersion of power and poor budget performances. (JEL P16, H72, C22, C43)

Political coalition formation games can describe the formation and dissolution of nations, as well as the creation of coalition governments, the establishment of political parties, and other similar phenomena. These games have been studied from a theoretical perspective, but the resulting models have not been used extensively in empirical work. This paper presents a method of estimating political coalition formation models with many-player coalitions, and then illustrates this method by estimating structural coefficients that describe the behaviour of municipalities during a recent set of municipal mergers in Japan. The method enables counterfactual analysis, which in the Japanese case shows that the national government could increase welfare via a counter-intuitive policy involving transfers to richer municipalities conditional on their participation in a merger.

ObjectiveDoes increasing a political party's power lead to Leviathan state governments? The evidence is mixed. We use the Economic Freedom of North America (EFNA) Index to measure governmental activity to study the impact of political parties on government outcomes.MethodsWe employ instrumental‐variable, panel data methods to regress states' EFNA scores on median voter and differentiated‐party variables.ResultsParty effects are negligible, but a simple median voter explanation emerges.ConclusionAs political power is consolidated in either party, economic freedom increases. This is consistent with a model wherein the median voter has effective agency control with positive monitoring costs and prefers a particular level of so‐called economic freedom. These results are inconsistent with Leviathan models of state legislatures.

Using a new data set on Swiss state and local governments from 1890 to today, we analyze how the adoption of proportional representation affects fiscal policy. We show that proportional systems shift spending toward broad goods (e.g. education and welfare benefits) but decrease spending on targetable goods (e.g. roads and agricultural subsidies). Our evidence does not suggest that proportional representation increases the overall size of government. We provide new evidence on the mechanism behind these estimates. We show that proportional elections lead to better political representation of left-wing parties, which are associated with more spending. Furthermore, proportional elections lead to higher political fragmentation. However, since political fragmentation increases spending in a plurality system only, proportional elections reduce spending through its more moderate effects of fractionalized parliaments.

В статье рассматриваются вопросы взаимоотношений между политическими партиями и местным самоуправлением в России. Показано, что фундаментальные взаимоотношения партии и института местного самоуправления во многом зависят от того, насколько эффективно работа политической партии будет построена на муниципальном уровне. Успешные результаты этого сотрудничества приведут к развитию в России настоящей политической конкуренции и строительству гражданского общества. ; The issues of the relationships between political parties and the local governments in Russia are examined in the article. It is proved that fundamental relationships between parties and the institution of the local government depend mostly on a wel-built effective work of political parties on a municipal level. The author states that successful outcomes of this collaboration will lead to the development of a real political competition and civil society formation in Russia.