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'Alcohol-fuelled violence' has been a concerted focus of recent criminal justice policy debates and legal reform. This study was motivated by the prominence of an essentialised paradigm that claims a direct causal relationship between use of alcohol and other drugs (AOD) and crimes of violence and other offending, and asserts that AOD should routinely be regarded as an aggravating factor. This approach belies the wide variety of ways in which AOD 'intoxication' features in the content and operation of Australian criminal laws. The study analysed more than 500 crime-related statutory provisions which attach significance to a person's 'intoxication', and more than 300 court decisions involving evidence that the accused, the victim or a witness was 'intoxicated' at the time of the alleged offence. These analyses found that significance is attached to 'intoxication' for a wide variety of criminal justice purposes – including to enliven police powers, to evaluate the veracity of witness testimony, to assess criminal responsibility and to determine punishment. In both statutory formulations and criminal court adjudication, there is a widespread problem of under-definition and imprecision as to meaning. 'Intoxication' is often assessed on the basis of highly subjective criteria – in contexts as diverse as public order policing and assessments of victim credibility in sexual assault trials. In the absence of legislative guidance, courts tend to assign only a relatively marginal role to medical/scientific expert evidence, and frame the question of whether a person was relevantly 'intoxicated' as one that can be answered by applying 'common knowledge' about AOD effects. Given the magnitude of the consequences that can flow from criminal justice decisions, the study recommends that consideration be given to standardising definitions of 'intoxication', with greater attention paid to evidence-based insights drawn from the scientific and social scientific literature.

AbstractThis article offers a critical discussion of two influential positions in contemporary legal and political theory, which will be referred to as 'political constitutionalism' and 'strong popular sovereignty'. Despite their important differences, both share a sceptical approach to the dominant constitutional practice in liberal democracies, hence they are brought together here under the term 'weak constitutionalism'. They both highlight the political dimension of the constitution, arguing that democratic legitimacy requires institutional arrangements that give the people and/or their representatives the last word in settling fundamental issues of political morality. By contrast, this article underlines the legal dimension of the constitution as the repository of the moral principles that make possible a practice of public justification in constitutional states. It is from this second constitutional dimension that the critical arguments are developed, both against the desire to take the constitution away from the courts and the aspiration to recognize the constituent power as pre-legal constitution-making faculty.

In this article, the author reveals the problems of the legal regulation of the international distribution contract and the legal settlement of the distribution contract in the legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

In this article, the author reveals the problems of the legal regulation of the international distribution contract and the legal settlement of the distribution contract in the legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The economic, political, and social volatility of the sixties and seventies, out of which clinical legal education was born, has certain mythical qualities for most law students, and perhaps some law professors. America still bears the scars of the economic policies of those previous eras, such as redlining, blockbusting, poverty and urban decay. While the realities of the era may seem out of reach for many of our students, those policies arising out of that era have contributed to the wealth gap in this country, which has worsened over the last twenty years. Now more than ever, society needs social justice lawyers, not just practice-ready lawyers, and, in particular, not just litigators. Despite this need, transactional clinical pedagogy prioritizes the practice-readiness of students. While an important concern, prioritizing student practice-readiness seems misguided at best and fails our students at worst.This Article challenges the dichotomy between practice-readiness and client service in a business law clinic and expands transactional clinical pedagogy by reinforcing the public interest and social justice functions served by such clinics. Further, this Article highlights the socio-historic contexts of transactional lawyering and argues that transactional lawyering and, specifically, the uniqueness of a transactional clinic, can offer a public service model to students. The primary contribution of this Article is a perspective on transactional clinical pedagogy that is inclusive of the civil rights movement and the fight for economic rights.

Preface -- Contents -- Table of Cases -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Chapter 1: Megatrends and Air Transport: An Overview -- 1.1 Future of Aerospace Transport -- 1.2 The Future of Air Transport Law -- 1.3 Where Is the World Headed? -- 1.4 Challenges Facing Air Transport Law -- 1.4.1 Nationalism and Sovereignty -- 1.4.2 Market Access -- 1.4.3 The Role of ICAO in Air Transport -- 1.4.4 Commercial Space Transport -- 1.4.5 Rights of the Passenger -- 1.4.6 Conclusion -- 1.5 Digital Transformation of Air Transport -- 1.5.1 Technology and Air Transport -- 1.5.1.1 Drones -- 1.5.1.2 Robotic Pilots -- 1.5.2 Human-Robot Interface and The Law: The Pilot -- 1.5.3 Cognitive Computing -- 1.6 Empowerment and Connectivity of the Passenger -- 1.7 The Overview -- 1.8 The United Nations Megatrend -- 1.9 The Eleven SDG´S Relevant to Aviation -- 1.9.1 Good Health -- 1.9.2 Quality Education -- 1.9.3 Gender Equality -- 1.9.4 The Climate Change Equation -- 1.9.5 Work Leading Up to the 39th ICAO Assembly -- 1.9.6 Considerations of the 39th ICAO Assembly -- 1.9.7 The Assembly Resolution -- 1.9.8 The Climate Change Megatrend: Renewables and Alternative Fuels -- 1.9.9 Economic Issues -- 1.9.10 Industry Innovation and Infrastructure -- 1.9.11 Obstacles to ICAO Supporting the SDGs -- 1.10 ICAO´S Approach to Megatrends -- 1.10.1 The Assembly Resolutions: The Legal Field -- 1.10.1.1 Conflict of Interest in Civil Aviation -- 1.10.1.2 Assistance to Victims of Aviation Accidents and Their Families -- 1.10.1.3 The Montreal Convention (1999) -- 1.10.1.4 The Beijing Convention and Protocol -- 1.10.1.5 The Consolidated Statement on Legal Issues -- 1.10.2 The Assembly Resolutions: Safety And Security -- 1.10.2.1 Safety -- 1.10.2.2 Security -- References -- Chapter 2: Global Balance of Power and Aviation

In little over a year, the possibility of a complete ban on autonomous weapon systems—known colloquially as "killer robots"—has evolved from a proposal in an NGO report to the subject of an international meeting with representatives from over eighty states. However, no one has yet put forward a coherent definition of autonomy in weapon systems from a law of armed conflict perspective, which often results in the conflation of legal, ethical, policy, and political arguments. This Article therefore proposes that an "autonomous weapon system" be defined as "a weapon system that, based on conclusions derived from gathered information and preprogrammed constraints, is capable of independently selecting and engaging targets." Applying this definition, and contrary to the nearly universal consensus, it quickly becomes apparent that autonomous weapon systems are not weapons of the future: they exist and have already been integrated into states' armed forces. The fact that such weaponry is currently being used with little critique has a number of profound implications. First, it undermines pro-ban arguments based on the premise that autonomous weapon systems are inherently unlawful. Second, it significantly reduces the likelihood that a complete ban would be successful, as states will be unwilling to voluntarily relinquish otherwise lawful and uniquely effective weaponry. But law is not doomed to follow technology: if used proactively, law can channel the development and use of autonomous weapon systems. This Article concludes that intentional international regulation is needed, now, and suggests how such regulation may be designed to incorporate beneficial legal limitations and humanitarian protections.

SUMMARYThe law shifts the risks borne by individuals in society and thereby influences the allocation of resources in society, the distribution of income and economic growth. Consequences for economic efficiency of the legal sanctioning of risk spillovers or externalities are analysed using the Kaldor‐Hicks criterion. Examples are given in which the law encourages excessive risk‐taking from a social point of view along with a few cases in which it leads to an excessive reduction in risk‐taking. It is observed that the legal practice of compensating for actual damages sustained, rather than for the risk or possibility of damage, is least costly to parties creating the risk. Product liability is discussed. It is argued that the distribution of income rather than gains in economic efficiency provides the main rationale for strict product liability.

Institutional and political developments since the end of the Cold War have led to a revival of public interest in, and anxiety about, international law. Liberal international law is appealed to as offering a means of constraining power and as representing universal values. This book brings together scholars who draw on jurisprudence, philosophy, legal history and political theory to analyse the stakes of this turn towards international law. Contributors explore the history of relations between international law and those it defines as other - other traditions, other logics, other forces, and other groups. They explore the archive of international law as a record of attempts by scholars, bureaucrats, decision-makers and legal professionals to think about what happens to law at the limits of modern political organisation. The result is a rich array of responses to the question of what it means to speak and write about international law in our time

This paper provides a reflective analysis of the nature of normative critiques of law generally, and within medical law specifically. It first seeks to establish the context within which critical analysis of law and legal measures takes place, and develops an argument that critiques should focus on political norms. Entailed in this claim is the contention that positions that seek to address controversial social problems can not resort simply to moral philosophy. It then provides a brief account of political liberalism that can contain and expose normative constraints on questions of moral and social contention. The focus then moves to a more direct reflection on medico-legal analysis. Considering both medical law as a discipline, and the study of end-of-life issues, the argument highlights the range of relevant issues that must be accounted for, and addresses the question of whether these are well conceived as ones of medical law. It is argued that a political framing offers a good general analytic context, but that when working in legal sub-disciplines analysts risk allowing 'locally' pertinent norms to dominate or unduly constrain wider debate. Thus it is questioned whether 'medical law' provides a coherent frame for social questions related to assisted-dying.