We can observe signs of development of civilization processes in Ukraine everywhere on a daily basis. Such achievements of mankind as computers, smart phones, digital photography, tablets, etc. are becoming common and natural. Along with the positive signs of the development of civilization, we see many achievements that are difficult to grasp by the mind of an ordinary person. In particular, along with the positive achievements of mankind, we must learn to recognize and counter the new inventions used by some states to wage aggression in time.The article highlights the visible aspects of a new type of modern war, which the state of Russia, is waging against its neighbors, including Ukraine, whenever it is convenient to them. These are the so-called «hybrid wars», which Russia is testing on the neighboring countries.In the article it is pointed out, that Russia never starts aggression openly; it always covers its intentions with «peaceful» rhetoric. As usual, Russia's victims are those neighboring countries that are unable to show power and information confrontation. It has become a tendency that when the time comes, the Russian leaders begin aggression, and their armed forces act according to a motto deduced by Machiavelli and later applied by the Bolsheviks in the 1920s: «You're either with us, or against us». Starting aggression, Russia continues to declare tales about friendship and peace to the whole world.In the main part of the article, the author emphasizes that all the wars that Russia is embarking on with neighboring countries have a common feature - the geographic location of these states, easily accessible to the Russian armed forces. The author of the article implicitly emphasizes the aggressive features of the historical path of Russia, in particular, the period when it began to transform from Muscovy to Russia. In the article, the author emphasizes that Russia by its behavior, in fact, convinces many prescient people that it is the heir to the robbery mind, which it adopted back in the XIII century from the Golden Horde. Actually, the Russian leadership inherited the habit of stealing another's living space and another's territory from Batu Khan's Horde. This habit gradually gained importance of the national feature of the Russians.One of the most dangerous methods that precedes Russia's use of firearms is intensification of the war in the information space. As usual, Russia's aggression against the nations it has sacrificed is a sign of interference with the humanitarian sphere of these peoples' lives. In other words, in the Russian version, information war is a mandatory prelude to the start of an actual war.An example of one of the anti-Ukrainian special operations of information war against Ukraine is given in an article by a famous historian from Ukraine, Serhii Terno, in which he reveals the purpose of an information war, which became quite evident after analyzing the content of a class book for fifth grade students recently published in Ukraine. Serhiy Terno convincingly, by demonstrating examples and evidence, proves that the information war that Russia is imposing on Ukraine has a final goal - the complete assimilation of the Ukrainian ethnos and the transformation of the Ukrainian living space into a «Russian dimension». Usually, such behavior in Russia precedes an armed attack, and it always happens if the victim of Russian aggression refuses to obey Russia's orders.In the article, the author indirectly helps the reader to recognize that there are new and improved old methods of waging war in the modern evolutionary development of world civilization processes.Experts specializing in the study of the development of interethnic relations, only after the open military aggression of Russia, which began in 2014, acknowledged that Russia is waging an aggressive war against Ukraine, which political scientists called «hybrid». One of the aspects of "hybrid" war is the war in the information space, and the battle for historical memory is at the forefront of information battles. Revealing this aspect, it would be appropriate to clarify the explanation of the term «historical memory» with an expanded explanation of the right to interpret national history, which we understand with the help of historical knowledge.By way of conclusion, the author cites vivid examples of participation in the information war of the representatives of the aggressor state to emphasize the importance of so called «battles» in the information space. The Ukrainian intellectuals' struggle for the right of young people for historical memory and justice is described in a convincing and successful way. Much attention is given to the Ukrainian historians' assessment of the value of research and study of historical memory. The article provides incontrovertible evidence that historical knowledge is a type of information weapon, which in many cases is more effective than a firearm. If we treat «historical memory» as one of the modern information weapons, the article covers examples of the use of these weapons in the context of the information war.Finally, quotes of influential scholars on how they assessed the importance of informational influence on the well-known historical figures are stated in the article: the queen of the Russian Empire, Catherine II and the German propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels. ; Признаки развития цивилизационных процессов в Украине мы наблюдаем повсеместно и ежедневно. В современном мире такие прогрессивные достижения человечества, как компьютер, смартфон, цифровая фотография, планшет и многие другие новшества – обычные вещи. Вместе с тем рядом с позитивными достижениями имеют место достижения, которые трудно поддаются здравомыслию. В связи с этим мы должны научиться вовремя распознавать и противодействовать новым изобретениям, направленным против человечества, в частности новой методике ведения захватнических войн, используемой некоторыми государствами.В предлагаемой статье освещены аспекты нового типа современной войны, которую, соседствующая с Украиной держава – Россия, выбрав удобный момент, всегда начинает против своих соседей, в том числе и против Украины. Мы имеем ввиду так называемые «гибридные войны», эффективность которых Россия испытывает на ближайших соседних государствах.В статье акцентировано внимание на том, что Россия никогда не начинала агрессию открыто, она всегда прикрывает свои намерения «миролюбивой» риторикой. Обычно жертвами России становятся те государства-соседи, которые не в состоянии продемонстрировать силовое и информационное сопротивление. Стало закономерным, что при наступлении удобного момента руководство России начинает агрессию, российские вооруженные соединения действуют согласно правилу, сформулированному Макиавелли, а позднее одобренному большевиками в 20-х годах ХХ ст.: «кто не с нами, тот против нас». Тем не менее, начиная агрессию, Россия не устает декларировать всему миру сказки о дружбе и мире.В главной части статьи автор акцентирует внимание на том, что все войны, которые инициирует Россия с соседними государствами, имеют общий признак – легко досягаемое для российских вооруженных сил географическое расположение стран, против которых направлена агрессия. Автор статьи ненавязчиво обращает внимание на агрессивные особенности исторического пути России, в частности на том периоде, когда она начала превращаться из Московии в Россию. В статье автор акцентирует внимание на том, что Россия своим поведением убеждает всех дальновидных людей в том, что она является наследницей разбойнических привычек, которые она унаследовала еще в ХІІІ ст. от Золотой Орды. Собственно, от орды Батыя предводители России унаследовали привычку воровать чужую территорию. Эта привычка постепенно обрела значение национальной черты россиян.Один из самых опаснейших методов, который предшествует применению огнестрельного оружия и всегда применяется Россией, – это информационная война, которая интенсифицируется перед началом военных действий, то есть война в информационном пространстве. Обычно признаком начала агрессии со стороны России против народов, которые она избрала своими жертвами, является вмешательство в гуманитарную сферу жизни этих народов. Если выразиться другими словами, в российском варианте информационная война – это неотъемлемая прелюдия перед началом полномасштабной «горячей» войны. Пример проведения одной из антиукраинских спецопераций информационной войны России против Украины подается в статье известного в Украине историка из города Запорожье Сергея Терно. Анализируя содержание школьного учебника для пятиклассников, не так давно изданного в Украине, он раскрывает цель информационной войны, которая стала явной. Сергей Терно довольно убедительно доказывает, что информационная война, навязанная Украине Россией, имеет главную цель – ассимиляцию украинского этноса и превращение украинского жизненного пространства в «Русский мир».Обычно такое поведение России предшествует вооруженному нападению и всегда так случается, если жертва агрессии отказывается выполнять распоряжения Российского правительства.В предлагаемой статье автор ненавязчиво помогает читателю узнать, что в развитии современных эволюционных процессов существуют современные и усовершенствованные методы ведения захватнических войн. Ученые, которые специализируются на исследовании межнациональных отношений, только после открытой военной агрессии России против Украины, которая началась в 2014 г., признали, что Россия начала против Украины захватническую войну. Политологи навали ее «гибридной». Война в информационном пространстве – один из вариантов гибридной войны, а на переднем крае информационных «битв» ведется борьба за историческую память. Раскрывая этот аспект, будет целесообразным термин «историческая память» уточнить расширенным толкованием, которое должно звучать как борьба за право трактовки отечественной истории, к которой мы пришли на основании исторических знаний.В итогах статьи для того чтобы подчеркнуть значение «боев» в информационном пространстве, автор подает яркие примеры участия в информационных войнах первых личностей государств-агрессоров. Убедительно и довольно удачно подаются примеры борьбы украинской интеллигенции за отстаивание права подрастающему поколению на историческую память и справедливость. Значительное внимание в предлагаемой статье уделено оценкам украинских историков значения исследований и изучения исторической памяти. В статье приводятся неоспоримые доказательства того, что исторические знания есть одним из видов информационного оружия, которое во многих случаях действует более эффективно, чем оружие огнестрельное. В том случае, если мы «историческую память» объясняем как один из видов современного информационного оружия, то в предлагаемой статье освещаются примеры применения этого оружия в условиях информационной войны.В заключительной части статьи автор цитирует украинских историков, из высказываний которых мы узнаем, что украинские историки придавали большое значение информационному влиянию на общество. Пример такого влияния автор демонстрирует цитатами царицы Российской империи Екатерины ІІ и министра пропаганды Германии Йозефа Геббельса. ; Ознаки розвитку цивілізаційних процесів в Україні ми спостерігаємо повсюдно і щодня. Стають звичними і закономірними такі досягнення людства, як комп'ютер, смартфон, цифрова фотографія, планшет тощо. Поряд із позитивними ознаками розвитку цивілізації, ми бачимо багато досягнень, які важко осягнути розумом людини, яка тверезо мислить. Зокрема, поряд з позитивними досягненнями людства ми повинні навчитися вчасно розпізнавати і протидіяти новим винаходам, які використовуються деякими державами для ведення загарбницьких війн. У пропонованій статті висвітлено видимі аспекти нового типу сучасної війни, яку сусідня з Україною держава – Росія, відчувши зручний момент, розпочинає проти своїх сусідів, зокрема і проти України. Йдеться про так звані «гібридні війни», ефективність яких Росія апробовує на найближчих сусідніх країнах. У статті акцентовано увагу на тому, що Росія ніколи не починає агресію відкрито, вона завжди прикриває свої наміри «миролюбивою» риторикою. Звичайно жертвами Росії стають ті держави-сусіди, які не в змозі показати силове та інформаційне протистояння. Стало закономірністю, що у зручний момент керманичі Росії розпочинають агресію, і їх збройні сили діють за правилом, виведеним Макіавеллі, а пізніше облюбованим більшовиками в 20-ті роки ХХ ст.: «кто не с нами, тот против нас». Розпочавши агресію, Росія не вгаває декларувати для всього світу казки про дружбу і мир. В основній частині статті автор наголошує на тому, що всі війни, які розпочинає Росія з сусідніми державами, мають спільну ознаку – легкодосяжне для російських збройних сил географічне розташування держав, проти яких спрямована агресія. Автор статті ненав'язливо робить акценти на агресивних особливостях історичного шляху Росії, зокрема, на тому періоді, коли вона стала перетворюватись з Московії на Росію. У статті автор наголошує, що Росія своєю поведінкою, по суті, переконує всіх далекоглядних людей в тому, що вона є спадкоємцем розбійницького норову, який перейняла ще у ХІІІ ст. від Золотої Орди. Власне, від орди Батия керманичі Росії успадкували звичку красти чужий життєвий простір та чужу територію. Ця звичка поступово набула значення національної риси росіян. Одним із найнебезпечніших методів, який передує застосуванню Росією вогнепальної зброї, є інтенсифікація війни в інформаційному просторі. Звичайно ознакою початку агресії з боку Росії проти народів, які вона обрала своїми жертвами, є втручання в гуманітарну сферу життя цих народів. Якщо сказати іншими словами, у російському варіанті інформаційна війна – це обов'язкова прелюдія перед початком повномасштабної «гарячої» війни. Приклад проведення однієї із антиукраїнських спецоперацій інформаційної війни проти України наведено у статті відомого в Україні історика із Запоріжжя, Сергія Терно, у якій він розкриває мету інформаційної війни, що стала цілком очевидною після аналізу змісту шкільного підручника для п'ятикласників, не так давно виданого в Україні. Сергій Терно переконливо, вдаючись до демонстрації прикладів і доказів, доводить, що інформаційна війна, яку Росія нав'язує Україні, має остаточну мету – цілковиту асиміляцію українського етносу і перетворення українського життєвого простору на «русскій мір». Зазвичай така поведінка Росії передує збройному нападу, і це відбувається завжди, якщо жертва російської агресії відмовляється піддаватися наказам Росії. У пропонованій статті автор ненав'язливо допомагає читачеві визнати, що в сучасному еволюційному розвитку світових цивілізаційних процесів існують нові і вдосконалені старі методи ведення загарбницьких війн. Фахівці, які спеціалізуються на вивченні розвитку міжнаціональних відносин, лише після відкритої військової агресії Росії, яка почалася у 2014 р., визнали, що Росія веде проти України загарбницьку війну, яку політологи назвали «гібридною». Одним із аспектів гібридної війни є війна в інформаційному просторі, а на передньому краї інформаційних «боїв» знаходиться боротьба за історичну пам'ять. Розкриваючи цей аспект, буде доцільним термін «історична пам'ять» уточнити розширеним поясненням, яке має звучати як боротьба за право трактування вітчизняної історії, до якого ми приходимо на основі історичних знань. У висновках, щоб підкреслити значення «боїв» в інформаційному просторі, автор статті наводить яскраві приклади участі в інформаційній війні перших осіб держави-агресора. Переконливо і досить вдало описано прояви боротьби української інтелігенції за право молоді на історичну пам'ять і справедливість. Значну увагу в статті приділено оцінкам українських істориків значення дослідження і вивчення історичної пам'яті. У статті наводяться неспростовні докази того, що історичні знання є одним із видів інформаційної зброї, яка в багатьох випадках є ефективнішою від зброї вогнепальної. Якщо ми «історичну пам'ять» трактуємо як один з видів сучасної інформаційної зброї, то у пропонованій статті висвітлюються приклади застосування цієї зброї в умовах інформаційної війни. У заключній частині статті подаються цитати впливових науковців про те, як вони оцінювали значення інформаційного впливу на суспільство відомих історичних осіб: цариці Російської імперії Катерини ІІ і міністра пропаганди Німеччини Йозефа Геббельса.
Threats To International Peace And Security. The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8225 Security Council Seventy-third year 8225th meeting Monday, 9 April 2018, 3 p.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Poland. . Mr. Radomski Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-09955 (E) *1809955* S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 2/26 18-09955 The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. Mr. De Mistura is joining today's meeting via video-teleconference from Geneva. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I now give the floor to Mr. De Mistura. Mr. De Mistura: This emergency meeting of the Security Council underscores the gravity of the events in recent days in Syria, of which there are severe consequences for civilians. It takes place at a time of increased international tensions, drawing national, regional and international actors into dangerous situations of potential or actual confrontation. It is an important meeting. There is an urgent need for the Council to address the situation with unity and purpose. How did we reach this point? The month of March saw devastating violence in part of eastern Ghouta, which resulted in at least 1,700 people killed or injured in opposition-controlled areas, dozens and dozens of people killed or injured in Government-controlled areas and, ultimately, the evacuation of 130,000 people, including fighters, family members and other civilians. However, in Douma there was a fragile ceasefire, which continued for most of March. The United Nations good offices played an important role in that regard. Since 31 March, the United Nations has no longer been able to be involved in talks, since, at that time, the Syrian Government did not agree to our presence, although we made efforts to propose concrete ways to address the issues that we understood were arising in the continuing contacts, including the proposal to activate the detainee working group agreed in Astana. However, that proposal was not taken up at the time. From 2 April, the evacuation of some 4,000 fighters, family members and other civilians from Douma to northern Syria took place. However, on 6 April there was a major escalation in violence. There were reports of sustained air strikes and shelling against Douma, the killing of civilians, the destruction of civilian infrastructure and attacks damaging health facilities. There were also reports of shelling on Damascus city, which reportedly again killed or injured civilians. Jaysh Al-Islam requested our involvement in emergency talks in extremis, but there was no positive response to that request when it conveyed the same message to the other side. At approximately 8 p.m. local time on 7 April, reports of an alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma started to emerge. Pictures immediately circulated on social media showing what appeared to be lifeless men, women and children. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the ground claimed to have received hundreds of cases of civilians with symptoms consistent with exposure to chemical agents. The same NGOs claimed that at least 49 people had been killed and hundreds injured. I wish to recall what the Secretary-General, Mr. António Guterres, noted, namely, that the United Nations "is not in a position to verify these reports". However, he also made it very clear that he cannot ignore them and that he "is particularly alarmed by allegations that chemical weapons have been used against civilian populations in Douma" once again. He further emphasized "that any use of chemical weapons, if confirmed, is abhorrent and requires a thorough investigation". I note that a number of States have strongly alluded to or expressed the suspicion that the Syrian Government was responsible for the alleged chemical attack. I also note that other States, as well as the Government of Syria itself, have strongly questioned the credibility of those allegations, depicting the attacks as a fabrication or/and a provocation. My comment is that this is one more reason for there to be a thorough independent investigation. 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 3/26 The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has said that it has made the preliminary analysis of the reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons and is in the process of gathering further information from all available sources. My colleague Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, who is with us in the Chamber today, will further address this matter. But I urge the Security Council, in accordance with its own mandate to maintain international peace and security and uphold international law, to, for God's sake, ensure that a mechanism is found to investigate these allegations and assign responsibility.Returning to the narrative of the events, at around midnight on 7 April, hours after the alleged chemical-weapons attack, Jaysh Al-Islam informed the United Nations that it had reached an agreement with the Russian Federation and the Syrian Government. The Russian Federation Ministry for Defence stated that the agreement encompasses a ceasefire and Jaysh Al-Islam fighters laying down their arms or evacuating Douma. The Russian Federation also reported that up to 8,000 Jaysh Al-Islam fighters and 40,000 of their family members were to evacuate.As I brief the Security Council now, we understand that additional evacuations from Douma are already under way. We have also received reports that some detainees — the ones we had heard about before — had begun to be released from Douma today. We note reports that the agreement provides for civilians who decide to stay to remain under Russian Federation guarantees, with the resumption of services in coordination with a local committee of civilians.I urge the Syrian Government and the Russian Federation to ensure the protection of those civilians so that as many civilians as possible can stay in their homes if they choose to, or leave to a place of their own choosing or return as per international law. I urge that there be, for there should be, an immediate refocusing for the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). What we have see is basically an escalation before a de-escalation.Clearly, the dangers of further escalation arise from situations beyond Ghouta as well. We have received reports of missiles targeting the Syrian Government's Tiyas, or T-4, airbase early this morning. No State has claimed responsibility for that reported strike. The United States and France have explicitly denied any involvement. The Syrian Government, the Russian Federation and Iran have suggested that Israel could have carried out the attack, with Iranian State media reporting that over a dozen military personnel were killed or injured, including four Iranian military advisers. The Government of Israel has not commented. The United Nations is unable to independently verify or attribute responsibility for that attack, but we urge all parties to show their utmost restraint and avoid any further escalation or confrontation.We are also concerned about the dynamics in other areas of Syria. Syrians in Dar'a, northern rural Homs, eastern Qalamoun, Hamah and Idlib have all expressed to us their own fears that they may soon face escalations similar to what we have seen in eastern Ghouta. We therefore urge the Security Council and the Astana guarantors and those States involved in the Amman efforts to work towards reinstating de-escalation in those areas and elsewhere in Syria. The indications are the opposite at the moment.Meanwhile, following its operations in Afrin, the Turkish Government has indicated the potential for further operations in other areas of northern Syria if Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat and Kurdish People's Protection Units forces are not removed from those areas. Military operations in such areas have the potential of raising international tensions. We therefore urge all parties concerned to de-escalate, show restraint and find means to implement resolution 2401 (2018) through dialogue and fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. Let me also highlight the fact that we have recently seen — and this is particularly tragic when we consider the efforts all of us, including all members of the Security Council, have made in the last year — the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant launch new operations within Syria, south of Damascus, in rural Damascus, in remote areas near the Iraqi border.I would like to conclude with some bottom lines, if I may.First, civilians are paying a very heavy price for the military escalation. We are not seeing de-escalation; we are seeing the contrary. Today our first priority must be to protect civilians from the war, from the conflict, from chemical weapons, from hunger. We call on all sides to ensure respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law, including humanitarian access across Syria to all people in need. We urge once S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 4/26 18-09955 more for concrete respect for resolution 2401 (2018) throughout Syria, which is, after all, a resolution of the Security Council.Secondly, continued allegations of the use of chemical agents are of extremely grave concern. Those allegations must be independently and urgently investigated. Any use of chemical weapons is absolutely prohibited and constitutes a very serious violation of international law, the Chemical Weapons Convention and resolution 2118 (2013). Preventing impunity and any further use of chemical weapons and upholding international law must be an utmost priority for all members of the Security Council.Thirdly, I have to say this very slowly because today is the first time, in over four years of briefing the Security Council in person, that I have reached a point in which I have to express a concern about international security, not just regional or national or Syrian security, but international security. Recent developments have more than ever before brought to the surface the dangers that the Secretary-General warned about recently at the Munich Security Conference, when he spoke of "different faultlines" in the Middle East that are interconnected and crossing each other, of conflicting interests of both global and regional Powers, and forms of escalation that can have absolutely devastating consequences that are difficult for us to even imagine. The Council cannot allow a situation of uncontrollable escalation to develop in Syria on any front. Instead, it must find unity and address the concrete threats to international peace and security in Syria today.I am sorry to have been this brief, but I wanted to focus on one specific concern, namely, the threat to international security related to what we are seeing now in Syria and the danger of the alleged chemical-weapons attacks being repeated. Next time I will brief the Council on humanitarian and other issues and on the political process, which I know we are all interested in focusing upon, but today is the day for talking about security — international security — and peace.The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank Mr. De Mistura for his very informative briefing.I now give the floor to Mr. Markram.Mr. Markram: I thank you for the opportunity to address the Council again today, Mr. President. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, is away on official travel.It has been less than a week since I last briefed the Council (see S/PV.8221) on the issue of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. In the intervening period, new and deeply disturbing allegations of the use of chemical weapons have come to light. Over the past weekend, there have been reports on the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma, in the Syrian Arab Republic. According to reports that came in yesterday, it is alleged that at least 49 people were killed and hundreds more injured in a chemical-weapon attack. More than 500 other individual cases reportedly presented with symptoms consistent with such an attack. The Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in touch with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the matter. The OPCW, which implements the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria is a State party, is gathering information about the incident from all available sources, through its Fact-finding Mission in Syria. After completing its investigation, the Fact-finding Mission will report its findings on the alleged attack to the States parties to the Convention.Sadly, there is little to say today that has not already been said. The use of chemical weapons is unjustifiable. Those responsible must be held to account. That those views have been stated on many previous occasions does not lessen the seriousness with which the Secretary-General regards such allegations. Nor does it lessen the truth behind them, which is that what we are seeing in Syria cannot go unchallenged by anyone who values the decades of effort that have been put in to bring about the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the body charged with the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council must unite in the face of this continuing threat and fulfil its responsibilities. To do otherwise, or simply to do nothing, is to accept, tacitly or otherwise, that such a challenge is insurmountable. The use of chemical weapons cannot become the status quo, nor can we continue to fail the victims of such weapons.Just over one year ago, in responding to the attack on Khan Shaykhun, the Secretary-General called for those responsible to be held accountable, stating that there can be no impunity for such horrific acts. Just over one week ago, speaking on behalf of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, I noted that unity in the Security Council on a dedicated mechanism for accountability would provide the best foundation for success in that regard. I reiterate that belief here, as 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 5/26 well as the readiness of the Secretary-General and the Office for Disarmament Affairs to assist.The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank Mr. Markram for his informative briefing.I now give the floor to members of the Security Council who wish to make statements.Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): If you imagine, Mr. President, that I derive pleasure from the subject of my statement today, or from speaking at great length, you are wrong. Unfortunately, however, the situation is such that I have a lot to say today. And you will have to listen to me.We thank Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their briefings.The Russian Federation asked that this meeting be convened under the agenda item "Threats to international peace and security" because we are deeply alarmed about the fact that a number of capitals — Washington first and foremost, with London and Paris blindly following its lead — are purposely steering a course designed to supercharge international tensions. The leadership of the United States, Britain and France, with no grounds and no thought for the consequences, are taking a confrontational line on Russia and Syria and pushing others towards it too. They have a broad range of weapons in their arsenal — slander, insults, bellicose rhetoric, blackmail, sanctions and threats of the use of force against a sovereign State. Their threats against Russia are brazen, and the tone they take has gone beyond the limits of the permissible. Even during the Cold War their predecessors did not express themselves so crudely about my country. What next?I remember the rhetorical question that President Putin of Russia put to our Western partners, and especially the United States, from the rostrum of the General Assembly in 2015 (see A/70/PV.13), about their careless geopolitical experiments in the Middle East, when he asked them if they at least realized what they had done. At the time, the question went unanswered. But there is an answer, and it is that no, they do not realize what they have done. As they do not realize what they are doing now. It is not only we who are perplexed at their lack of any coherent strategy on any issue. It perplexes most of the people in this Chamber. They just do not want to ask them about it openly. Wherever they go, whatever they touch, they leave behind chaos in their wake in the murky water where they have gone fishing for some kind of fish. But the only fish they catch are mutants. I will ask them another rhetorical question. Do they understand the dangerous place they are dragging the world to?One of the areas where the hostility manifests itself most strongly is Syria. The terrorists and extremists supported by external sponsors are being defeated. Let me remind those responsible that these are the terrorists and extremists whom they equipped, financed and dumped into the country in order to overthrow the lawful Government. Now we can see why this is causing hysteria among those who have invested their political and material capital in such dark forces.In the past few weeks, thanks to Russia's efforts to implement the Security Council's resolutions, a massive operation has been carried out to unblock eastern Ghouta, whose residents have been forced to endure the humiliation of the rebel militias for several years. More than 150 thousand civilians were evacuated from this suburb of Damascus, completely voluntarily and under the necessary security conditions. Tens of thousands of them have already been able to return to liberated areas and many have been taken in by relatives. The changes in their demographic composition that the defenders of the Syrian opposition have been screaming about have not happened. That is a lie. Some extremely complex negotiations were conducted with the leaders of the armed groups, as a result of which many left the neighbourhoods they were occupying, with full guarantees for their security. Incidentally, there were several attempted acts of terrorism during these transport operations when militias tried to bring suicide belts onto the buses and were prevented. Others preferred to regulate their status with the Syrian authorities. Thanks to the presidential amnesty, they will now be able to return to civilian life, and may even eventually be able to join Syria's security forces. That represents the implementation of the United Nations principle of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration.However, not everyone is so keen on such positive dynamics. The outside sponsors — that is, the leading Western countries — were ready to grasp at any straw in order to hang on to any centre of terrorist resistance, however tiny, within striking distance of the Syrian capital, so that the militias could continue to terrorize ordinary residents, taking their food and begging humanitarian aid from the international community. Incidentally, they were not about to S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 6/26 18-09955 share medicines with those ordinary civilians, as an inspection of the strongholds left behind by the fighters revealed. As happened previously in eastern Aleppo, the improvised hospital facilities in basements were full of medicines that thanks to Western sanctions were not to be had for love or money in Damascus and other Government-controlled areas. Mass graves and bodies that showed evidence of torture were also discovered. The dimensions of the tunnels that the jihadists used were astonishing. Some of them could easily accommodate small trucks travelling in both directions. Those impressive underground facilities connected the positions of groups that some view as moderate to the strongholds of Jabhat Al-Nusra.On 6 April, at their sponsors' instructions, Jaysh Al-Islam's new ringleaders prevented the fourth group of militia fighters from evacuating Douma and resumed rocket and mortar fire on residential areas of Damascus, targeting Mezzeh, Mezzeh 86, Ish Al-Warwar, Abu Rummaneh and Umayyad Square. According to official data, eight civilians were killed and 37 were wounded. It is regrettable that we seen no statements from Western capitals condemning the shelling of a historic part of Damascus.The next day, 7 April, militias accused the Syrian authorities of dropping barrel bombs containing a toxic substance. However, they got their versions mixed up, referring to it sometimes as chlorine and sometimes as sarin or a mixture of poison gases. In a familiar pattern, the rumours were immediately seized on by non-governmental organizations financed by Western capitals and White Helmets operating in the guise of rescue workers. These so-called reports were also just as quickly disseminated through media outlets. I should once again point out that many of these dubious opposition entities have an accurate list of the email addresses of the representatives of Security Council members, which leads us to conclude that some of our colleagues, with a reckless attitude to their position, have been leaking sensitive information to those they sponsor. Incidentally, we all should remember the incident in which the White Helmets accidentally posted on the Internet a video showing the preparation stages for filming the next so-called victim of an attack allegedly perpetrated by the Syrian army. The chemical "series" that began in 2013 has continued to run, with each subsequent episode designed to top the impact of the previous one.In Washington, London and Paris, conclusions have immediately been reached as to the guilt of the Syrian authorities, or regime, as they call it. Has no one wondered why Damascus needs this? While the Syrian leadership has received its share of insults, the main burden of responsibility has been laid at the door of Russia and Iran, to no one's surprise, I believe. As is now customary, it has occurred at lightning speed and without any kind of investigation. On 8 April, Syrian troops searching the village of Al-Shifuniya, near Douma, discovered a small, makeshift Jaysh Al-Islam chemical-munitions factory, along with German-produced chlorine reagents and specialized equipment.The Istanbul-based opposition journalist Asaad Hanna posted a video on his Twitter feed that was allegedly from the area of the incident. In it, an unidentified individual in a gas mask, presumably from the White Helmets, is posing against a backdrop of a homemade chemical bomb that allegedly landed in a bedroom in a building in Douma. It is accompanied by commentary about what it calls another of the regime's attacks on civilians. There can be no doubt that this production was staged. The trajectory of the alleged bomb is entirely unnatural. It fell through the roof and landed gently on a wooden bed without damaging it in any way and was clearly placed there before the scene was shot.In an interesting coincidence, the chemical act of provocation in Douma on Saturday, 7 April, occurred immediately after the United States delegation in the Security Council was instructed to call for expert consultations for today, Monday, 9 April, on its draft resolution on a mechanism for investigating incidents involving chemical weapons. Today far-reaching changes were made to the initial text. In such murky circumstances, of course, we have to determine what happened. But we have to do it honestly, objectively and impartially, without sacrificing the principle of the presumption of innocence and certainly not by prejudging the process of an investigation.Despite this provocation, the Russian specialists have continued their efforts to resolve the situation in eastern Ghouta. On Sunday afternoon, 8 April, according to new agreements, the evacuation of Jaysh Al-Islam combatants was resumed. Following Douma's liberation from militants, Russian radiological, chemical and biological protection specialists were sent there to collect evidence. They took soil samples that showed no presence of nerve agents or substances 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 7/26 containing chlorine. Local residents and combatants who were no longer fighting were interviewed. Not one local confirmed the chemical attack. At the local hospital, no one with symptoms of sarin or chlorine poisoning had been admitted. There are no other active medical facilities in Douma. No bodies of people who had died from being poisoned were found, and the medical staff and residents had no information about where they might have been buried. Any use of sarin or chlorine in Douma is therefore unconfirmed. By the way, representatives of the Syrian Red Crescent refuted statements allegedly made on their behalf about providing assistance to victims of toxic gases. I call on those who plan to denounce the regime when they speak after me to assume that there was no chemical-weapon attack.Sweden has drafted a resolution calling for the incident to be investigated. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) does not need a resolution to investigate it, but we are willing to consider it. Today we propose to do what is envisaged in the draft resolution, which is to let the OPCW, which Mr. Üzümcü, Director-General of its Technical Secretariat, has announced is ready to deal with the situation, fly to Damascus immediately, if possible tomorrow. There the Syrian authorities and the Russian military will ensure the necessary conditions so that the OPCW experts can travel to the site of the alleged incident and familiarize themselves with the situation. That, by the way, is what President Trump and other Western leaders have been urging us to do.The Syrians have repeatedly warned that there might be chemical provocations. At the Russian Centre for the Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic they are saying that the equipment needed to film the next purported chemical attack has already been brought in. We have also made statements to that effect in the Security Council. Everyone has heard those warnings, but has deliberately ignored them because they do not correspond to the doctrinal positions espoused by those who dream of seeing the legitimate Government of yet another Arab country destroyed.There has still been no attention given to the discovery in November and December 2017 of a significant quantity of chemical munitions on Syrian territory that had been liberated from militias. In terrorist warehouses in Az-Zahiriya and Al-Hafiya in Hama governorate, 20 one-ton containers and more than 50 pieces of ordnance containing toxic chemicals were discovered. In Tel Adel in Idlib governorate, 24 tons of toxic chemical, presumed to be chlorine, were discovered. At a storage site in Moadamiya, 30 kilometres to the north-east of Damascus, 240- and 160-millimetre-calibre munitions and plastic canisters of organo-phosphorous compounds were found. In the area around As-Suwayda in Idlib governorate, an manufacturing facility for synthesizing various toxic substances was found, along with 54 pieces of chemical ordnance and 44 containers of chemicals that could be used to manufacture toxic substances.Since the beginning of this year alone, four instances of militias using toxic chemicals against Government troop positions have been established in Suruj and Al-Mushairfeh districts, and more than 100 Syrian troops have been hospitalized. On 3 March, during the liberation of Khazram and Aftris in eastern Ghouta, soldiers from a sub-unit of Government troops discovered an auxiliary workshop for homemade chemical munitions. This far from exhaustive list is an indication of the misdeeds of the still unreconciled opposition. And yet we have seen no eagerness to send OPCW expert groups there to collect evidence of these events. We demand that the OPCW verify all of these areas. They are accessible. We are also seeing information that American instructors in the Al-Tanf camp have trained a number of groups of fighters to carry out provocations using chemical weapons in order to create a pretext for a rocket strikes and bombings.It has been clear to us that sooner or later there would be an attempt to bring the jihadists out of harm's way and at the same time to punish the regime that some Western capitals hate. The talking heads on television have thrown themselves into urging a repeat of last year's effort at a military attack on Syria. This morning there were missile strikes on the T-4 airfield in Homs governorate. We are deeply troubled by such actions.The provocations in Douma are reminiscent of last year's incident in Khan Shaykhun, with their shared element being the planned nature of the attacks. Analysis of the operations conducted by the United States in April 2017, on the eve of the incident in Khan Shaykhun and after it, shows that Washington prepared its operation in advance. From 4 to 7 April of last year — in other words, from the day that a toxic substance was used in Khan Shaykhun until the strike on the Al-Shayrat airbase — the USS Porter and Ross naval destroyers S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 8/26 18-09955 were already present in the Mediterranean Sea, where they were engaged in planned operations. They did not call into any ports where an exchange of munitions could have been effected as a way to increase their quantity of cruise missiles.Specifically, from 4 to 5 April, the USS Porter was located south-east of Sicily and the Ross was en route from the Rota naval base to an area south of Sardinia. Later, on 6 April, both ships were observed moving at accelerated speed towards the area of the firing positions to the south-west of Cyprus, from where they launched a massive strike on Al-Shayrat on 7 April. However, the 59 Tomahawk missiles that were launched would have exceeded the two destroyers' total munitions capacity if they had actually been engaged in the anti-missile defence operations that they were assigned to, which required only 48 units. That means, therefore, that even before the chemical incident in Khan Shaykhun, these United States naval vessels undertook a military operation with a strike capability above the number of cruise missiles necessary for their anti-missile defence operations, which could be evidence of advance planning by Washington of an action against Damascus.Among other things, Saturday's fake news from Douma was aimed at diverting the public's attention from the circus that is the Skripal case, in which London has become terminally mired, hurling completely unproven accusations at Russia and accomplishing its basic purpose of extracting solidarity from its allies in order to construct an anti-Russian front. Now the British are shifting away from a transparent investigation and concrete responses to the questions they have been asked while simultaneously covering their tracks.At the Security Council meeting on 5 April on the Skripal case (see S/PV.8224), we warned the Council that the attempt to accuse us, without proof, of involvement in the Salisbury incident was linked to the Syrian chemical issue. There was an interesting new development regarding the issue yesterday. As Britain's Foreign Minister Boris Johnson was continuing his display of rapier wit "exposing" Russia, another gem emerged. The Times informed us that Royal Air Force experts in southern Cyprus had intercepted a message sent from outside Damascus to Moscow on the day of the Skripals' poisoning that contained the phrase "the package has been delivered" and said that two people had "successfully departed". Apparently this formed part of the intelligence that London provided to its allies before expelling our Russian diplomats. Is not it obvious to everyone that there is an irrefutable Syria-Russia-Salisbury connection? I will give the British intelligence services one more huge hint, for free. Why do they not assume that the Novichok they are so thrilled about reached Salisbury directly from Syria? In a package. To cover its tracks. How pathetic.Ambassador Haley recently stated that Russia will never be a friend of the United States. To that, I say that friendship is both reciprocal and voluntary. One cannot force a friendship and we are not begging the United States to be friends. What we want from it is very little — normal, civilized relations, which it arrogantly refuses, disregarding basic courtesy. However, the United States is mistaken if it thinks that it has friends. Its so-called friends are only those who cannot say no to it. And that is the only criterion for friendship that it understands.Russia has friends. And unlike the United States, we do not have adversaries. That is not the prism through which we view the world. It is international terrorism that is our enemy. However, we continue to propose cooperating with the United States. That cooperation should be respectful and mutual, and aimed at resolving genuine problems, not imaginary ones, and it should be just as much in the interests of the United States. Ultimately, as permanent members of the Security Council, we have a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.Through the relevant channels, we already conveyed to the United States that military action conducted on false pretences against Syria, where Russian troops are deployed at the request of its legitimate Government, could have extremely serious repercussions. We urge Western politicians to temper their hawkish rhetoric, seriously consider the possible repercussions and cease their feeble, foolhardy efforts, which merely produce challenges to global security. We can see very good examples of what becomes of the military misadventures of the West in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya. No one has invested Western leaders with the power to take on the roles of the world's policeman and its investigators, prosecutors, judges and executioners as well. We urge them to return to the world of legality, comply with the Charter of the United Nations and work collectively to address the problems that arise rather than attempting to realize its own selfish geopolitical dreams at every step. All our energy should be focused on supporting the political process in Syria, and for that, all stakeholders with influence must unite in a 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 9/26 constructive effort. Russia is always ready for that kind of cooperation.In conclusion, I would like to take this opportunity to request a briefing of the Security Council on the results of the United Nations assessment mission in Raqqa and on the situation in the Rukban camp. We can see how the coalition members are trying to complicate a resolution of the problems resulting from their actions in Syria, particularly the carpet-bombing operation designed to wipe out Raqqa. No chemical provocations will distract our attention from that issue.Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): We thank Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Thomas Markram for their briefings.Only five days ago, here in this Chamber (see S/PV.8221), we mourned as we remembered the sarin attack at Khan Shaykhun that occurred a year ago. This weekend another devastating gas attack was carried out in the city of Douma, killing more than 45 civilians and injuring more than 500. It was another in a series of chemical-weapon attacks in Syria. That is unacceptable. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is one of nine Security Council members that requested today's emergency meeting because we all believed that it was critically important to address this horrific attack. We must reinstate the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. We must underscore the basic norms of the international legal order and stop the ongoing tragedy in eastern Ghouta and Douma.We almost met twice today because one permanent member of the Council seemed not to want a focused discussion on the issue at hand, the chemical attack in Douma. That begs the question of whether that particular member State would prefer the international community to stand by and watch like a spectator while it covers for the crimes of its ally, the Syrian regime, some of which amount to serious war crimes. The Council must not stand idly by. It is high time for us to act in three ways, condemning, protecting and holding to account. First, today we should condemn in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons. International law has been trampled on. Silence and impunity are not an option. However, condemnation alone is not enough.Secondly, we must deliver on our responsibility to protect. The protection of civilians must remain an absolute priority. We call on the Astana guarantors to use their influence to prevent any further attacks. They must ensure a cessation of hostilities and a de-escalation of the violence, as per resolution 2401 (2018). An immediate ceasefire is needed in Douma so that humanitarian and medical aid can reach the victims of the attack and so that humanitarian personnel can continue their life-saving work. We owe it to the men, women and children of Douma and of Syria. We owe it to our own citizens.Furthermore, the Kingdom of the Netherlands would also like to point out that the majority of the States Members of the United Nations count on the permanent members of the Council not to use their veto in cases of mass atrocities. The international community should be able to count on the Council to uphold international humanitarian law and the international prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, and to act when international law is trampled. Let me be clear. We support the humanitarian work of the White Helmets. They do extremely important humanitarian work for civilians in Syria in dire circumstances.Thirdly, all members of the Council regularly stress the importance of accountability for perpetrators who use chemical weapons. Yet the Council has not been able to move forward on that issue for months owing to one permanent member's use of the veto. We have been unable to tackle this crisis because one permanent member is a direct party to the conflict and has proved that it will defend the Syrian regime at all costs. We must intensify our efforts to establish a mechanism that can continue the meticulous work of the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and investigate and identify perpetrators independently of the politics in the Council. The JIM has identified both the Syrian regime and a non-State actor as responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. As I said last week (see S/PV.8221), the discontinuation of the JIM mandate cannot be the end of the story — all the more so because since the JIM ceased to operate, we have received reports that the regime has carried out at least six more chemical-weapon attacks and perhaps even more. For those who claim that chemical-weapon attacks have not taken place or that such accounts have been fabricated, I have a clear message. The establishment of an effective, impartial and independent attribution and accountability mechanism must not be vetoed.Let us not forget that the United Nations is bigger than the Council alone. We have strong leadership at the helm of Organization and a powerful General S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 10/26 18-09955 Assembly. Both must consider all instruments to advance accountability for the use of chemical weapons. The work should build on the important work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission and the JIM. We welcome the Fact-finding Mission's immediate investigation of the terrible incident in Douma this weekend. It should be given full access and cooperation by all parties. We reiterate our strong support for, first, the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011; secondly, the Commission of Inquiry; thirdly, the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, initiated by France; and fourthly, a referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court in The Hague as the most appropriate path to accountability and justice.In conclusion, the Council must act. The OPCW Fact-finding Mission must complete an investigation as soon as possible, and there can be no impunity for the use of chemical weapons. To do otherwise is tantamount to condoning such appalling attacks, failing in our responsibilities and undermining the international architecture that we have collectively designed to stop such attacks. It is time for the Council and the international community as a whole to act.Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I thank Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their briefings.Almost exactly one year ago, I stood on the floor of the Security Council and held up pictures of dead Syrian children (see S/PV.7915). After that day, I prayed that I would never have to do that again. I could; there are many truly gruesome pictures. Many of us have worked hard to ensure that one day we would not have to see images of babies gassed to death in Syria. However, the day we prayed would never come, has come again. Chemical weapons have once again been used on Syrian men, women and children. And once again, the Security Council is meeting in response.This time I am not going to hold up pictures of victims. I could; there are many, and they are gruesome. Worse are the videos imprinted in our minds that no one should ever have to see. I could hold up pictures of babies lying dead next to their mothers, brothers and sisters — even toddlers and infants still in diapers, all lying together dead. Their skin is the ashen blue that is now tragically familiar from chemical-weapon scenes. Their eyes are open and lifeless, with white foam bubbles at their mouths and noses. They are pictures of dead Syrians who are unarmed, not soldiers and fit the very definition of innocent and non-threatening. Rather, they are women and children who were hiding in basements from a renewed assault by Bashar Al-Assad. They are of families who were hiding underground to escape Al-Assad's conventional bombs and artillery, but the basements that Syrian families thought would shelter them from conventional bombs were the worst place to be when chemical weapons fell from the sky. Saturday evening, the basements of Douma became their tombs.It is impossible to know for certain how many have died, because access to Douma is cut off by Al-Assad's forces. Dozens are dead that we know of, and hundreds are wounded. I could hold up pictures of survivors — children with burning eyes and choking for breath. I could hold up pictures of first responders washing the chemicals off of the victims and putting respirators on children, or of first responders walking through room after room of families lying motionless with babies still in the arms of their mothers and fathers. I could show pictures of a hospital attacked with chemical weapons. I could show pictures of hospitals struck by barrel bombs following the chemical attack. Ambulances and rescue vehicles have been repeatedly attacked, maximizing the number of dead civilians. Civil defence centres have been attacked in order to paralyse the medical response so as to increase the suffering of the survivors. Who does that? Only a monster does that. Only a monster targets civilians, and then ensures that there are no ambulances to transfer the wounded, no hospitals to save their lives and no doctors or medicine to ease their pain.I could hold up pictures of all of that killing and suffering for the Council to see, but what would be the point? The monster who was responsible for those attacks has no conscience, not even to be shocked by pictures of dead children. The Russian regime, whose hands are all covered in the blood of Syrian children, cannot be ashamed by pictures of its victims. We have tried that before. We must not overlook Russia and Iran's roles in enabling the Al-Assad regime's murderous destruction. Russia and Iran have military advisers at Al-Assad's airfields and operation centres. Russian officials are on the ground helping direct the 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 11/26 regime's starve-and-surrender campaign, and Iranian allied forces do much of the dirty work.When the Syrian military pummels civilians, they rely on the military hardware given by Russia. Russia could stop that senseless slaughter if it wanted, but it stands with the Al-Assad regime and supports without any hesitation. What is the point of trying to shame such people? After all, no civilized Government would have anything to do with Al-Assad's murderous regime. Pictures of dead children mean little to Governments like Russia, who expend their own resources to prop up Al-Assad.The Council, which saw the pictures last year, has failed to act because Russia has stood in its way every single time. For a year we have allowed Russia to hold the lives of innocent Syrians hostage to its alliance with the Al-Assad regime. That also allowed Russian to weaken the credibility of the United Nations. We are quick to condemn chemical weapons in the Security Council, but then Russia prevents any action. It vetoed five draft resolutions on this issue alone and used 11 vetoes all together to save Al-Assad. Our lives go on as usual.The Council created the Joint Investigative Mechanism. It found the Syrian regime responsible for the attack at Khan Shaykhun a year ago. Because Russia supported Al-Assad and his actions, Russia killed the Mechanism. We condemned it, and our lives went on as usual. We pushed for a ceasefire. The Council unanimously agreed, but it was immediately ignored by Russia and Al-Assad. We condemned it, and our lives went on as usual. Now here we are, confronted with the consequences of giving Russia a pass in the name of unity — a unity that Russia has shown many times before it does not want. Here we are, in a world where chemical-weapons use is becoming normalized — from an Indonesian airport to an English village to the homes and hospitals of Syria. Since the Al-Assad regime used chemical weapons at Khan Shaykhun one year ago, chemical weapons have been reportedly used dozens of times, and the Council does nothing.What we are dealing with today is not about a spat between the United States and Russia. It is about the inhumane use of chemical agents on innocent civilians. Each and every one of the nations in the Council is on record opposing the use of chemical weapons. There can be no more rationalizations for our failure to act. We have already introduced and circulated to the Council a draft resolution demanding unrestricted humanitarian access to the people of Douma. Al-Assad is doing all he can to assure maximum suffering in Douma. Our priority must be to help the starving, the sick and the injured who have been left behind. We also call on the Council to immediately re-establish a truly professional and impartial mechanism for chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, including the attack this weekend. We hope that our colleagues on the Council will join us, as they have before.That is a very minimum we can do in response to the attack we just witnessed. Russia's obstructionism will not continue to hold us hostage when we are confronted with an attack like that one. The United States is determined to see the monster who dropped chemical weapons on the Syrian people held to account. Those present have heard what the President of the United States has said about that. Meetings are ongoing. Important decisions are being weighed, even as we speak. We are on the edge of a dangerous precipice. The great evil of chemical-weapons use, which once unified the world in opposition, is on the verge of becoming the new normal. The international community must not let that happen. We are beyond showing pictures of dead babies. We are beyond appeals to conscience. We have reached the moment when the world must see justice done. History will record this as the moment when the Security Council either discharged its duty or demonstrated its utter and complete failure to protect the people of Syria. Either way, the United States will respond.Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): I thank the Peruvian presidency for having convened this emergency Security Council meeting, at the request of France, together with eight other Council members. I also wish to thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, and the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Thomas Markram, for their insightful briefings.There are times in the lives of nations where what is essential is at stake: life or death; peace or war; civilization or barbarism; the international order or chaos. That is the case today following the dreadful chemical carnage that once again pushed the boundaries of horror on Saturday in Douma. We are aware that two new and particularly serious chemical-weapons attacks took place in Douma on 7 April. The provisional toll of human life is appalling. There are nearly 50 dead, including a number of children, and 1,000 wounded. S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 12/26 18-09955 That toll is likely to be even higher, as assistance cannot reach some areas. Once again, toxic substances have been dropped to asphyxiate, to kill and to terrorize civilians, reaching them even in the basements where they sought refuge. Chlorine gas has the particular characteristic of being a heavy gas, capable of entering basements. For that reason, it is used. That is the level of deadly cynicism that has been reached in Syria.There are no words to describe the horror of the images that surfaced on 7 April, nearly one year after the Khan Shaykhun attack, which killed nearly 80 people. What we see in the thousands of photos and videos that surfaced in the course of several hours after the 7 April attacks reminds us of the images we have seen far too often: children and adults suffocating due to exposure to concentrated chlorine gas. What we also see are people suffering from violent convulsions, excessive salivation and burning eyes, all of which are symptomatic of exposure to a potent neurotoxin mixed with chlorine to heighten the lethal effect. As I mentioned, in total more than 1,000 people were exposed to that deadly chemical compound.The experience and the successive reports of the Joint Investigative Mechanism leave no room for doubt as to the perpetrators of this most recent attack. Only the Syrian armed forces and their agencies have the requisite knowledge to develop such sophisticated toxic substances with such a high degree of lethality. And only the Syrian armed forces and its agencies have a military interest in their use. This attack took place in Douma, an area that has been subjected to relentless shelling by the Syrian armed and air forces for several weeks. Unfortunately, the use of such weapons enables much swifter tactical progress than conventional weapons.We are all aware that the Syrian regime has already been identified by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism as the party responsible for the use, on at least four occasions, of chlorine and sarin gas as a chemical weapon. There are no illusions as to the sincerity of the declaration delivered by Syria on the state of its chemical stockpiles in 2013. Unfortunately, we once again we have proof in the form of empirical evidence. This dovetails with the regime's strategy of terror against civilians. We have already experienced this. At the worst, this is bad faith or, even worse, complicity. The Damascus regime clearly seeks, by sowing terror, to accelerate the capture of other urban areas that it wishes to control. What could be more effective to prompt those who resist the regime to flee than sieges, a tactic worthy of the Middle Ages, in addition to chemical terror. Let us make no mistake: the children frozen in an agonizing death are not so-called collateral victims. They are deliberate targets of these chemical attacks, designed and planned for the purpose of waging terror. The Damascus regime is conducting State terrorism, with its litany of war crimes and even crimes against humanity.The offensive and the shelling conducted by the regime, as well as by its Russian and Iranian allies, over the past 48 hours prove the degree to which they have engaged in a military race without any consideration of the human cost. This latest escalation of violence, punctuated by a new instance of the use of chemical weapons, brings us face to face with the destructive madness of a diehard regime that seeks to destroy its people completely. And that regime's Russian and Iranian allies are either unable or unwilling to stop it. We are aware of the fact, and the Russian authorities have confirmed this on several occasions, that Russian military forces have a presence on the ground and in the air in eastern Ghouta. On 7 April, as the second chemical attack took place in Douma, Russian aircraft were also taking part in air operations in the Damascus region. Russian and Iranian military support is present on the ground and at all levels of the Syrian war machinery. No Syrian aircraft takes off without the Russian ally being informed. These attacks took place either with the tacit or explicit consent of Russia or despite its reluctance and military presence. I do not know which is more alarming when it comes to our collective security.The stakes revolving around this recent attack are extremely grave. This is the latest proof of the normalization of chemical weapons use, which we should attribute not only to a regime that has become uncontrollable and continues to gas civilians with complete impunity, but also to its supporters, including a permanent member of the Security Council. That member failed in its commitment to implement resolution 2118 (2013), which it, itself, co-sponsored. That member's responsibility in the endless tragedy that is the war in Syria is overwhelming.France therefore of course turns towards Russia today in order to put forward two demands. The first demand is a cessation of hostilities and the establishment of an immediate ceasefire in Syria, in line with resolution 2401 (2018), adopted on 24 February, 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 13/26 which to date has never been upheld by the Damascus regime. France deeply deplores the fact that, although it was unanimously adopted, it was not possible to implement that resolution, which provides for a truce and emergency humanitarian access. The second demand is the establishment of a new international investigative mechanism that will be able to document all of the factors of the attack in Douma and ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice. The end of the Joint Investigative Mechanism last November due to two successive Russian vetoes has stripped us of an essential tool of deterrence. For that reason, we support any initiative to bridge that gap. And in that spirit France has committed to a partnership to combat impunity for the use of chemical weapons. In that same spirit, we endorse the draft resolution that has been put forward today by the United States.With this attack the Al-Assad regime is testing yet again the determination of the international community to ensure compliance with the prohibition against chemica-weapons use. Our response must be united, robust and implacable. That response must make it clear that the use of chemical weapons against civilians will no longer be tolerated, and that those who flout that fundamental rule of our collective security will be held accountable and must face the consequences. The Al-Assad regime needs to hear an international response, and France stands ready to fully shoulder its role alongside its partners.Ultimately, we know that only an inclusive political solution will bring an end to the seven-year conflict, which has claimed the lives of 500,000 people and pushed millions to take the route of exile. That is why France will remain fully committed alongside the United Nations Special Envoy and in line with the Geneva process. However, in the light of this most recent carnage, we can no longer merely repeat words. Without being followed up by deeds, such words would be meaningless. I wish to reiterate here what President Macron has stressed on several occasions: France will assume its full responsibility in the fight against the proliferation of chemical weapons. France's position is clear. It will uphold its commitments and keep its word.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and Mr. Markram for their briefings. I also thank all the United Nations teams on the ground for the important and incredibly difficult work they do.As Staffan de Mistura said, this is an important Security Council meeting. My Government shares the outrage that other colleagues have eloquently described today. It is truly horrific to think of victims and families sheltered underground when the chlorine found them.This is the third time in five days that the Council has convened to discuss chemical weapons. This is dreadful in the true sense of that word. The Council should dread what we risk happening — for chemical weapons to become a routine part of fighting. As one of the five permanent members of the Council (P-5), the United Kingdom believes that we have a particular responsibility to uphold the worldwide prohibition on the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). We agree with the Netherlands Ambassador that the P-5 has specific responsibilities. I believe that four members of the P-5 do believe that, but there is one that does not. The Russian Ambassador referred to a resurgence of the Cold War. This is not the Cold War. In the Cold War there was not this flagrant disregard for the prohibitions that are universal on the use of WMDs.The Special Representative of the Secretary-General also referred to the risks of escalation, and to international peace and security more broadly. We share his fears, but it is the Syrian Government and its backers, Iran and Russia, who are prolonging the fighting and risking regional and wider instability. There are real questions about what is happening in the T-4 airbase, with its foreign fighters and its mercenaries.We have been challenged today by our Russian colleague to say why we believe the attack was carried out by Syria and why we believe, further, that chemical weapons were used. The reasons are as follows. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism found six uses of chemical weapons between 2014 and 2017. Two it ascribed to Da'esh for the use of mustard gas, three it ascribed to the regime for the use of chlorine and one further use it ascribed to the Syrian regime for the use of sarin. That is the attacks that we talked about in the Council just last week at Khan Sheykhoun, which led to the United States strike — which we support — on Al-Shayrat. In addition, as the French Ambassador has said, we had reports of Russian and Syrian warnings before the chemical-weapon attack took place and of a pattern of Mi-8 Hip helicopters flying overhead. Those reports have come from the ground.S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 14/26 18-09955 I listened carefully to the Russian Ambassador's argument. As I have just set out, we, as the United Kingdom believe that the Syrian regime is responsible for these latest attacks. But there is one way to settle this — to have an independent fact-finding mission followed by an independent investigation — as we all know that fact-finding missions are there to determine whether chemical weapons have been used and, if they have been used, what sort of chemical weapons. But only an investigation can determine who is responsible for their use, and therefore start the path to accountability.I was very interested to hear the Russian offer that an OPCW fact-finding mission could visit and would have the protection of Russian forces. I believe that this is an offer worth pursuing, but it would, of course, be necessary for the OPCW mission to have complete freedom of action and freedom of access. That still leaves us with the question of who committed these atrocities. That is why we support the United States text for a draft resolution and we believe that there is no legitimate reason not to support the call for the Council to set up an independent investigative mechanism. As I said before, we have nothing to hide, but it appears that Russia, Syria and their supporters, Iran, do have something to fear.The Russian Ambassador singled out the United Kingdom, the United States and France for criticism. I would like, if I may, to turn to that. The responsibility for the cruelty in Syria belongs to Syria and its backers — Russia and Iran. The use of chemical weapons is an escalatory and diabolical act. It strikes me that what Russia is trying to do is to turn the debate in the Council away from the discussion of the use of chemical weapons into a dispute between East and West, presenting itself as the victim. It is far too important to play games with the politics between East and West in respect of chemical weapons. Russia's crocodile tears for the people of eastern Ghouta has an easy answer. It is to join us in the non-political attempt to get in humanitarian and protection workers from the United Nations to do their job of looking after and mitigating the risk to civilians. Russia's concern about attribution for the use of chemical weapons also has an easy answer. It is to join us in allowing the United Nations to set up an international investigative mechanism to pursue the responsible parties. I repeat here the two demands of my French colleague, and I hope we will be able to make progress.I had not intended to address the Skripal case in Salisbury, but since my Russian colleague has done so, I will address it today. He asked what the similarities were between Salisbury and Syria. I think it is important that I point out that the cases are different in the following respects. First, there is a thorough investigation under way in Salisbury. As we have heard, there is no investigation under way in Syria. The British Government in Salisbury is seeking to protect its people, as is its duty. The Syrian Government, on the contrary, as we have heard today, attacks and gasses its people. I am sorry to say that what the two do have in common though, is Russia's refusal to assume P-5 responsibilities to prevent the use of WMDs and its reckless support for the use of WMDs by its agents and by its allies.It is not we who want to alienate Russia. It alienates herself by not joining in the vast majority of the Council who wish to find a non-polemical way through and to address the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria. The Russian Ambassador mentioned friends of the United States. My Government and its people are proud to be a friend of the United States. We stand with everyone on the Council who wants to find a way through the chemical weapons problem, to have a proper fact-finding mission and to have a proper investigation as the first step to bringing this dreadful conflict to a close.Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China would like to thank Special Envoy de Mistura and the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Markram, for their briefings. China takes note of the reports alleging that chemical weapons were once again used in Syria and caused civilian casualties. That is of great concern to China.China's position on chemical-weapons has been consistent and clear. We are firmly opposed to the use of chemical weapons by any State, organization or individual under any circumstances. Any use of chemical weapons, whenever and wherever, must not be tolerated. China supports a comprehensive, objective and impartial investigation of the incident concerned so that it can reach a conclusion based on substantiated evidence that can stand the test of history and facts so that the perpetrators and responsible parties can be brought to justice.The Syrian chemical-weapons issue is closely linked to to a political settlement of the Syrian situation. China 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 15/26 supports the ongoing important role of the Security Council and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as the main channels for dealing with the Syrian chemical-weapons issue. We hope that the parties concerned will take a constructive approach so as to seek a solution through consultations, establish the facts, prevent any further use of chemical weapons, preserve the unity of the Security Council and cooperate with the efforts by the parties concerned to advance the political process in Syria.The Syrian conflict has entered its eighth year and is inflicting tremendous suffering on the Syrian people. A political settlement is the only solution to the Syrian issue. The international community must remain committed to a political settlement of the question of Syria, while fully respecting its sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity.China has always opposed the use or threat of force in international affairs. We always advocate adherence to the Charter of the United Nations. All parties should increase their support for the United Nations mediation efforts and compel the parties in Syria to seek a political settlement under the principle of Syrian leadership and ownership in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015).The fight against terrorism is an important and urgent issue in the political settlement of the Syrian question. The international community must strengthen its coordination, uphold uniform standards and combat all terrorist groups identified as such by the Security Council.At a recent Security Council meeting, China set out its principled position with regard to the Skripal incident (see S/PV.8224). China believes that the parties concerned should strictly comply with their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and, in line with the relevant provisions of the Convention, carry out a comprehensive, impartial and objective investigation and deal with the issues concerned within the framework of the OPCW. China hopes that the parties concerned will work in accordance with the principles of mutual respect and equality, engage in consultations, cooperate, avoid politicization and measures that might further exacerbate tensions and resolve their differences properly through dialogue.Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura and Mr. Thomas Markram for their briefings this afternoon. I would also like to thank you, Mr. President, for acceding to our request for an emergency meeting.We are dismayed by the general escalation of violence in Syria, as described today by Staffan de Mistura, in clear violation of the various resolutions, including resolution 2401 (2018). In that regard, I want to plea with the Syrian authorities represented in the Chamber and with the Astana guarantors to live up to the Security Council's resolutions.We asked for this meeting today because over the weekend we were yet again faced with horrifying allegations of chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, this time in Douma, just outside Damascus. There are worrying reports of a large number of civilian casualties, including women and children. The graphic material that has been shared is beyond repugnant. We are alarmed by those extremely serious allegations. There must now be an immediate, independent and thorough investigation.Let me reiterate that Sweden supports all international efforts to combat the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State or non-State actors anywhere in the world. We unequivocally condemn in the strongest terms the use of chemical weapons, including in Syria. It is a serious violation of international law and constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The use of chemical weapons in armed conflict is always prohibited and amounts to a war crime. Those responsible must be held accountable. We cannot accept impunity.Addressing the use of chemical weapons in Syria has become a central test of the credibility of the Council. How we respond to the most recent reports from Douma is therefore decisive. Despite the odds, we must put aside our differences and come together. Now is the time to show unity. In our view, the following needs to happen.First, we must condemn in the strongest terms the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria.Secondly, our immediate priority must be to investigate the worrying reports from Douma. In that context, we welcome the announcement by the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that the Fact-finding Mission for Syria — to which we reiterate our full support — is in the process of gathering information from all available sources. We express our hope that the Fact-finding Mission can be urgently deployed to Syria.S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 16/26 18-09955 Thirdly, all States, as well as the parties to the conflict, including the Syrian authorities, must fully cooperate with the Fact-finding Mission. What is particularly needed is safe and unhindered access to the site in Douma, as well as any information and evidence deemed relevant by the Fact-finding Mission to conduct its independent investigation.Fourthly, we need to urgently redouble our efforts in the Council to agree on a new independent and impartial attributive mechanism to identify those responsible for chemical-weapons use.Finally, if the allegations of chemical-weapons use are indeed confirmed and those responsible are eventually identified, the perpetrators must be held to account.We are ready to work actively and constructively with other members for urgent Council action. To that end, we have circulated elements as input to our discussions. We must immediately engage in consultations in order to break the current deadlock and to shoulder our responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations. We owe that to the many victims of the crimes committed in this conflict.Mr. Radomski (Poland): Allow me to thank Special Envoy Mr. Staffan de Mistura and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Mr. Thomas Markham for their important briefings.We are horrified by the news of another deadly attack in eastern Ghouta, which took place on Saturday evening. Dozens of people perished as a result of a vicious act of violence against civilians in Douma. The available information about the symptoms of the victims affirm that they are consistent with those caused by a chemical agent.Poland condemns that barbaric attack, and expects that it will be possible to hold the perpetrators accountable. No military or political goal can justify the extermination of innocent vulnerable people, especially those seeking help in medical facilities. That atrocious crime seems to be a cynical response to the debates in the Council last week, when we commemorated the first anniversary of the attack in Khan Shaykun (see S/PV.8221).We call on the actors affecting the situation in Syria, especially the Russian Federation and Iran, to take all the necessary actions to prevent any further use of weapons of mass destruction and to achieve the full cessation of hostilities in the whole territory of Syria. We insist that all parties to the conflict comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law.As has been stated many times by members of the Council, as well as United Nations officials and European Union representatives, it is highly regrettable that the renewal of the mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism was vetoed, thereby allowing those responsible for the subsequent chemical attacks to remain unpunished. Today we face the results of that impunity, witnessing further attacks against civilians with the use of chemicals as weapons.We urge all our partners in the Council to engage in a serious discussion in good faith in order to re-establish an accountability mechanism for chemical attacks in Syria. That is the minimum that we owe the victims of Ghouta, Khan Shaykun, Al-Lataminah and the numerous other places where chemical weapons have been used.Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We would like to thank Special Envoy De Mistura and Mr. Thomas Markram for their briefings.Reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma on Saturday and the videos and pictures that we saw through media outlets are indeed very worrisome. It is also deeply disturbing that such reports of the use of chemical weapons have continued in the ongoing military activities in Syria. As we have repeatedly stated, we strongly condemn any use of chemical weapons by any actor under any circumstances. There is no justification whatsoever for the use of chemical weapons. Those responsible for these inhuman acts must be identified and held accountable. This is absolutely vital, not only for the sake of the victims of chemical weapons in Syria but also for maintaining international peace and security and for preserving the non-proliferation architecture.As the Secretary-General said in his 8 April statement, cited by the Special Envoy earlier, any use of chemical weapons, if confirmed, is abhorrent and requires a thorough investigation. That includes the need to establish accountability — something on which the Council has yet to achieve consensus. In the meantime, we believe the reported use of chemical weapons in Douma, and in other parts of Syria, should be investigated by the Fact-finding Mission, and all parties should extend full cooperation in that 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 17/26 regard, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.While we all agree that accountability is indispensable for deterring and stopping the use of chemical weapons in Syria and beyond, there is currently, as has already be said, no independent, impartial and professional investigative mechanism that could identify those individuals, entities, State or non-State actors that use chemical weapons in the country. In that regard, the Council should recover its unity and engage in a positive and constructive discussion that could address the existing institutional lacunae.We all know that the threats to international peace and security we face today are becoming increasingly more complex by the day. We are seeing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is posing a real danger and that the international norms on the use of chemical weapons are also being undermined. Since the end of the Cold War, the trust among major Powers has never been so low as it is currently, which has enormous implications not only for global peace and security but also for the transformative agenda that we have set for ourselves in the development sphere. We cannot think of making any meaningful headway towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals without creating the necessary global security environment. At the moment, we really cannot say that this is an environment conducive to making any progress on that account.The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. Unfortunately, it has not been able to effectively address the new and emerging threats and challenges to peace and security that we are facing today. It has been all the more apparent that the lack of unity and cohesion among members is undermining the credibility of the Council. Perhaps we, the elected members, have to look for ways and means to have a greater impact, with a view to contributing to increasing the Council's effectiveness. Without dialogue among the major Powers to build the necessary trust and understanding, it will be extremely difficult to address some of the most difficult and complex security challenges we have ever seen, including the situation in Syria.Things are in fact bound to get even worse unless something is done. We cannot afford to bury our heads in the sand. The dangers are very palpable. That is why every opportunity should be seized. That is also why we consider the news about the upcoming summit-level meetings being planned to be encouraging. We can only hope that those meetings will help to defuse tensions and allow for serious discussions to take place with a view to finding a common approach to tackling current threats and challenges. The sooner those discussions happen, the better for preserving global peace and stability, which, as we speak, is becoming a source of extremely great concern. In fact, I am understating the magnitude of the potential danger we are facing.Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): The Ivorian delegation thanks Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their respective briefings on the latest developments in Syria, after the resumption of fighting in Douma and eastern Ghouta and the bombing of the city of Damascus, following the relative calm of recent weeks. My delegation would like to focus its statement on three main points.First, we remain deeply concerned about recent reports of chemical-weapons attacks against innocent civilian populations, which have reportedly resulted in numerous casualties who have shown symptoms of exposure to a chemical agent. While reaffirming its categorical rejection of any use or resort to chemical weapons, be it in times of peace or in times of war, Côte d'Ivoire strongly condemns such acts and calls for these events to be placed under an intense spotlight, with the contribution of all stakeholders.In the face of allegations of recurrent use of chemical weapons by the warring parties in the Syrian conflict, the Ivorian delegation stresses that it is more important than ever that the international community send a strong signal to show, beyond the usual principled condemnations, its determination to put a definitive end to this infernal cycle.The use of chemical weapons violates the most fundamental norms of international law and poses threats to our collective security. That is why we must engage in a unflagging fight against impunity in the use of chemical weapons and preserving the international chemical non-proliferation regime, which is one of the fundamental pillars of our common security.My second point concerns the need for the international community to put in place a mechanism for accountability and for the fight against impunity for those who use chemical weapons, in order to put an end to the repeated use of these weapons. In that regard, the Ivorian delegation expresses its readiness to work S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 18/26 18-09955 towards the establishment of such a mechanism and calls on the Council to return to the unity it had when it established the Joint Investigative Mechanism, whose mandate unfortunately could not be renewed despite our common efforts.Thirdly, Côte d'Ivoire notes with regret that resolution 2401 (2018), which remains the framework for our joint action, has not been implemented and that the humanitarian situation in Syria has further deteriorated. In the light of the distress of the civilian populations trapped in the fighting, the urgency for a cessation of hostilities remains more relevant than ever. In the face of the deteriorating situation, my country would like once again to call on all parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and to respect international humanitarian law, including unhindered humanitarian access to persons in distress, in accordance with resolution 2401 (2018).In conclusion, Côte d'Ivoire reiterates its conviction that the solution to the crisis in Syria cannot be military. Only an inclusive political process can put a definitive end to this conflict. Such a political solution must be in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) and imbued with the results of the Geneva negotiations. My country believes that the Geneva talks remain the right framework for achieving a lasting solution to the Syrian conflict.Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura and Mr. Thomas Markram and their respective teams for their exhaustive briefings.The Republic of Equatorial Guinea expresses its gratitude to the French Republic and to the other members of the Council that called for the convening of this afternoon's meeting. We also thank the President of the Security Council for having decided to hold this afternoon's meeting under the agenda item "Threats to international peace and security: The situation in the Middle East". This is an appropriate topic, since recent events in the Middle East represent a genuine threat to peace and security, not only in that region but at the international level as well. From the protests in the Gaza Strip, with their loss of human lives, to the missile attacks on Syria, as well as the horrendous chemical weapons attack in the Syrian town of Douma, those are all situations of deep concern for the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.This past weekend we awoke to news that added a new low to the saddest and bloodiest episodes of the Syrian conflict. According to reports published in the international media, on 7 April, in the Syrian town of Douma in eastern Ghouta, more than 40 people, mostly women and girls, died from asphyxiation caused by inhaling a poison gas.As we heard in this Chamber on 4 April from the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Thomas Markram (see S/PV.8221), the conclusions and recommendations of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic are not binding and do not attribute responsibilities in the case of evidence of the use of chemical substances prohibited under the relevant international treaties. In the light of that fact, we take this opportunity to recall the obligation of all parties to take essential steps towards the full implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), and we underscore the need to establish an independent investigation mechanism of the United Nations whose task should be focused on preventing impunity, identifying those responsible and preventing future attacks to the best of its abilities.As far as the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is concerned, no use of chemical weapons should go uninvestigated or unpunished. As a result, the alarming information coming out of Syria, especially that pertaining to the use of chemical weapons targeting civilians, both the case of Douma, which we are discussing today, as well as similar events in the past, must be investigated exhaustively, fairly, objectively and independently by international bodies in accordance with OPCW standards. The results of such investigations must be made public and those responsible must answer for their crimes before the implacable face of justice.The fact that chemical substances continue to be used, especially against civilians, is cause for serious concern to the Government of Equatorial Guinea. During the general debate of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, His Excellency Mr. Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, condemned in the strongest terms the use, manufacture, possession and distribution of chemical weapons in armed conflicts (see A/72/PV.13). It is worth recalling that no member of the Council should be considered exempt from that obligation, which also reflects Chapter I of the Charter of the 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 19/26 United Nations, which enshrines the determination of Member States to build a world of peace and ensure the well-being of humankind.The Security Council now finds itself at a crossroads with respect to its options. It can either strengthen the presence of international forces with a view to future military intervention, as some military Powers have been suggesting, or we can pursue international negotiations, be they in Geneva, Astana, Sochi or Ankara. However, history continues to teach us that military interventionism has never resolved conflicts; rather, it exacerbates and entrenches them, sowing desolation and ruin in its wake.As far as the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is concerned, the only solution to the Syrian conflict is to be found in the words spoken yesterday by Pope Francis in the traditional Sunday mass in Saint Peter's Square in the Vatican:"There is no such thing as a good war and a bad war. Nothing, but nothing, can justify the use of such instruments of extermination on defenseless people and populations . military and political leaders choose another path, that of negotiations, which is the only one that can bring about peace and not death and destruction."In conclusion, we reiterate the appeal made by the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the countries and actors with influence in Syria, as well as in Israel and Palestine, to wield that influence in order to force all parties involved in those conflicts to mitigate the suffering of their people and to sit down to negotiate to put an end to that chronic threat to international peace and security which persists in the Middle East.Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We thank Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Thomas Markram, for their briefings. We express our gratitude to Council members for initiating this emergency meeting, which we hope will lead to the launching of a timely and objective investigation of the incident in Douma.We firmly believe that the Security Council remains the main and sole body authorized to counter threats to international peace and security. Unfortunately, the situation within the Council is becoming increasingly strained. In order to achieve an appropriate solution to these critical issues, it is of utmost importance that the Council act unanimously, in a balanced and pragmatic manner. To that end, we must demonstrate greater flexibility and negotiability, rising above our national interests in order to achieve peace and stability. Any controversy that involves prejudices and mutual accusations and lacks conclusive results and irrefutable evidence will have only a destructive effect and will not lead to the results that the world community expects from us.With regard to the chemical attacks in Syria, we mourn together with the families of those killed and express our solidarity with them in the face of such atrocities, by which innocent civilians become victims of the relentless confrontation of the opposing parties. Kazakhstan has always taken a firm and resolute stand, uncompromisingly condemning any use of chemical weapons as the most heinous action and an unacceptable war crime.With regard to the situation in Douma, we call for an investigation into this alleged incident to be carried out and for all the circumstances to be clarified as soon as possible. The Council has the great responsibility to act on verifiable facts, not only before the world community, but before ourselves. Furthermore, history itself will ultimately be the judge of our decisions. Therefore, we need to verify all the details of the incident. In that regard, we would like to draw attention to the following aspects.First, are there any other reliable sources, in addition to White Helmets' claims, and who can verify the veracity of the assessments and testimonies of those sources? Some claim that the number of victims is 70, while others report that there were more than 150 victims and still others believe there were only 25 victims. Even one victim is too many. However, today, the Russian Federation denied the attack altogether. There are many allegations and assumptions regarding the very facts concerning the use of a toxic chemical substance.Secondly, we consider it important to take into account the fact that the Government of Syria has repeatedly notified us and requested that we check its reports that a number of terrorist groups on the side of the opposition were making attempts to transfer chemical weapons and prepare chemical attacks on the territory of eastern Ghouta. Actually, these allegations have not been given due attention and we have had no opportunity to verify all the facts. We are not advocating for any side in this conflict, but rather demanding a full S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 20/26 18-09955 and objective investigation on the basis of which we can make a thoughtful decision.Thirdly, we believe that it is imperative to conduct an independent investigation. We again recall the urgent need for an investigative mechanism, the establishment of which depends on the permanent members of the Council. They must make every possible effort to find common ground on the issue. We urgently need objective and verifiable information, as well as an immediate, independent, transparent and unbiased investigation before any decision or action, unilateral or otherwise, is taken.We fully support the proposal that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission be sent at the earliest. We are certain that the Syrian people are very interested in an objective investigation. Therefore, Damascus and opposing parties should provide all assistance and secure access for the speedy visit of the OPCW inspectors to the incident sites to collect facts on the ground.Finally, we again call for the preservation and strengthening of the unity of the Council to reach a consensus-based decision to preserve peace and stability in the world.Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, we thank you, Mr. President, for the prompt convening of today's meeting. We were one of the countries that requested it.We also thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for their briefings.Since the beginning of this year, the State of Kuwait has occupied the Arab seat in the Security Council. One of our most important priorities, which we made clear before we joined it, is to defend and uphold Arab issues, voice the concerns about them and work to find peaceful solutions. We deeply deplore the lack of any real and genuine progress on any of these issues, in particular that of the Syrian crisis, which regrettably continues to deteriorate. Security Council resolutions on such issues are not implemented. The Council is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security but is unable to shoulder that responsibility. It is divided as it faces those dangers and threats. Therefore the crises continue, along with the suffering of the people in the region.The State of Kuwait condemns in the strongest terms the heinous rocket and barrel bomb attacks against residential areas under siege in eastern Ghouta, including the latest attack on Douma, on 7 April. Five days ago we marked the first anniversary of the Khan Shaykhun incident (see S/PV.8221), in which chemical weapons were used, as confirmed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. It also identified who used them.Two days ago, scores of civilians, including children and women, were killed or injured in attacks and air strikes against Douma. Many cases of asphyxiation were recorded. Several international reports confirmed that the crimes committed in both incidents were tantamount to crimes against humanity and war crimes, which reminds us once again of the request we all made in the Chamber for the establishment of a new mechanism to determine whether or not and by whom chemical weapons had been used, and to hold the perpetrators in Syria accountable. The mechanism must guarantee impartial, transparent and professional investigations in all chemical attacks in Syria in order to end impunity. For the past five years — specifically, since August 2013 — the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria have enjoyed impunity. They have not been punished, even when we witnessed the very first crime of the use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta.We do not want to mark the first anniversary of the attack in Douma without a conviction. We call for the Council to establish an accountability mechanism that would determine the perpetrators of the chemical-weapons crimes anywhere in Syria — be they a Government, entity, group or individual — so that they can be held accountable in accordance with the provisions of resolution 2118 (2013). The Council must shoulder its responsibility with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. The use of chemical weapons in Syria is a genuine threat to the non-proliferation regime. The continued attacks against civilians in medical facilities and residential areas, through air strikes or artillery, are all flagrant violations of the international community's will and relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 2401 (2018), which demanded a 30-day ceasefire, at the very least, without delay.09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 21/26 The provisions of resolution 2118 (2013) are clear and definite. They call for accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, which is a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law. However, current events are a clear violation of the provisions of the resolution. As members of the Council, we cannot accept the status quo, which is the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria. It is another disappointment for the Syrian people, whose suffering caused by the use of such weapons in different parts of Syria we have been unable to end.The Council has a collective responsibility. The suffering Syrian people are sick and tired of tuning into meetings of the Council without seeing tangible results on the ground. At several junctures throughout this bloody conflict the Council has been able to find common ground to end the crisis. However, we must overcome our political differences and establish a new accountability mechanism in Syria that is professional, credible and impartial. Such elements are available in the draft resolution under discussion, which has been put forward by the United States. It includes updates on the incident in Douma. We call on all members of the Council to build on that draft as a good basis for negotiations on a future mechanism.We continue to seek a political solution as the only means to end the crisis in all its dimensions. The political road map is clear and agreed, based on the 2012 Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and on resolution 2254 (2015). It seeks to maintain the unity, independence and sovereignty of Syria and meet the legitimate aspirations and ambitions of the Syrian people towards living a dignified life.Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for their briefings.We are deeply concerned about the reported use of chemical weapons in the city of Douma. Bolivia reiterates its condemnation of the use of chemical agents as weapons and considers it to be an unjustifiable criminal act. There can be no justification for their use, regardless of the circumstances or by whom they are used, as it constitutes a serious violation of international law and a grave threat to international peace and security.We believe that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission, in line with its mandate, should verify in the most objective, methodological and technical manner the reported use of chemical weapons. Should their use be verified, it must be investigated in an effective and transparent manner in order to ensure that the perpetrators can be identified and tried by the appropriate bodies so as to prevent impunity. We therefore need an independent, impartial and representative entity that will conduct a comprehensive, credible and conclusive investigation. Our major challenge is to ensure that we do not politicize or exploit the Security Council for our own purposes. We regret that so far there have been obstacles to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), and we call on all the parties involved to make every effort to effectively implement it throughout Syrian territory. We emphatically reject the ongoing bombardments and indiscriminate attacks, especially those on civilian infrastructure such as health facilities, and we deplore all military activity in residential areas. Such actions only cause more displacements, injuries and deaths. We call on all the parties to respect international humanitarian law and human rights law, including authorizing humanitarian access throughout Syria and to all persons in need, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.We reiterate that there can be no military solution to the Syrian conflict and that the only option is an inclusive, negotiated and coordinated political process, led by the Syrian people for the Syrian people, aimed at enabling sustainable peace to be achieved in the area without any foreign pressure, as provided for in resolution 2254 (2015). We also reject any attempt at fragmentation or sectarianism in Syria.Bolivia wants to once again make clear its firm rejection of the use of force or the threat of use of force. We also reject unilateral actions, which are illegal and contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and undermine any effort to achieve a political solution.Lastly, with regard to the events in the city of Salisbury, we reiterate the importance of conducting an independent, transparent and depoliticized investigation in accordance with current rules and regulations of international law, especially as set forth by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 22/26 18-09955 We believe that cooperation among the relevant parties will be essential to making progress through the appropriate diplomatic channels in solving the crime and strengthening the non-proliferation regime.The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make a statement in my national capacity.We thank Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their briefings. Peru is deeply concerned about the new reports of the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria, including minors, in the town of Douma. In that regard, we note the urgent need for a thorough investigation. Peru condemns any use of chemical weapons wherever it may take place. We want to point out that it is a heinous crime, a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security and a violation both of the non-proliferation regime and international humanitarian law.In the short term, we believe that the Syrian Government and all parties to the conflict, including countries with influence on the ground, should abide by and implement the humanitarian ceasefire that the Council provided for in resolution 2401 (2018), and to cooperate with the Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. To that end, we once again reiterate the importance of establishing an independent and impartial accountability mechanism. The investigations should result in the prosecution and punishment of those responsible. The members of the Council cannot permit impunity.We must also remember that any response to the conflict in Syria and the atrocities committed there must be conducted in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Peru opposes any use or threat of use of force contrary to international law. We reiterate our deep concern about the serious consequences that the ongoing atrocities in the Syrian conflict may have for the stability of the Middle East and for an international order based on minimum standards of humanity and coexistence. In that regard, I would like to conclude by calling on the members of the Council to restore a sense of unity and the common good to our discharge of our high responsibilities. In the case of Syria, that means implementing the ceasefire and ensuring the effective protection of civilians, investigating and punishing atrocity crimes and resuming a serious process of political dialogue, based on resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex), with a view to promoting the sustainable peace that the Syrian people so badly need.I now resume my functions as President of the Council.The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor to make a further statement.Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Like my Dutch colleague and friend, I too have three points to make.I would first like to respectfully request of my colleague Mrs. Nikki Haley, Permanent Representative of the United States, that from now on she refrain from labelling any legitimate Governments as "regimes". Right now I am referring specifically to Russia. I have made that request once before, but Ambassador Haley was not present, and I asked for it to be conveyed to her by her colleagues. Now I am requesting it personally. If it happens again, I will interrupt the meeting on a point of order.Secondly, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom said that Syria is different from Salisbury in that there no investigation is being conducted in Syria, while one is under way in Salisbury. We would very much like to know more about the details of that investigation and would be grateful if she could communicate them to us. However, for the time being we know nothing other than that all of a sudden the alleged victims of a chemical warfare agent, thankfully, turn out to be alive and, apparently, almost completely well. However, nobody has seen them yet, and we fear for the condition of those important witnesses. At the moment, we have learned from newspaper reports, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has offered to shelter the Skripals in the United States under new identities. The CIA's participation in this is itself revealing. But it also means that we may never see these people, who are key witnesses to what happened, again.What else do we know? We know about the speedy euthanization of the Skripals' pets and the cremation of the cat and dead guinea pigs. We are also aware of the intention to demolish their house and the restaurant and pub they visited. We also know that Yulia Skripal's sister, Viktoria, who wanted to see her, was denied a British visa. Why? That is all we know. I repeat that we would very much like to learn more details about what is going on, and we would be grateful to our British 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 23/26 colleagues if they could keep us regularly informed during the investigation.Thirdly, and lastly, we did not meet here today to address the situation in Douma. The agenda item is entitled "Threats to international peace and security", although, needless to say, it was the situation regarding Douma and the so-called chemical attack that prompted the meeting. In today's meeting, as Mr. De Mistura mentioned and the Secretary-General has previously discussed, we are moving towards a dangerous area. Unfortunately, the people who are playing these dangerous games and spewing irresponsible threats do not understand that. Today we heard once again what we have already heard many times. None of our Western colleagues want to hear or listen to objective information. None of them has expressed any doubts about the one and only version that has been given of what transpired. So what is the point of an investigation? Why bother? They have accused Damascus of a chemical-weapon attack not just before any investigation has been carried out but before the incident was even known about.They are not convinced by the information that we have provided today. They simply do not want to listen. We have already said that there are no witnesses to the use of chemical weapons at all. There are no traces of chemicals, no bodies, no injuries, no poisoning victims. Nobody went to the hospital. The footage was all clearly staged by the White Helmets. We demand that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) mission immediately visit Douma and the area of the alleged chemical weapons attack, interview the residents and medical staff and and collect soil samples. My British colleague said that only an investigation can establish who is to blame. We agree, except that did not stop her from blaming the so-called Syrian regime. Those two things do not really jibe. We insist that the OPCW mission visit Douma immediately. The Syrian authorities and Russian troops are ready to provide the necessary conditions for this to take place.Lastly, we too wish there were an independent investigative mechanism. I would like to remind the Council that our draft resolution, which includes a proposal for establishing such a mechanism, is in blue, and we are ready to adopt it today, if necessary.The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I apologize for taking the floor again, but I want to clarify something. The Russian Ambassador's English is far too good for him not to have understood me when I spoke on 5 April (see S/PV.8224). The investigation of the Salisbury incident that is under way is an independent police investigation, and the United Kingdom will be very pleased to update the Council as and when we have something to say.If I may, I would like to add one more thing. The other difference between Salisbury and Syria is that the United Kingdom is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention in good standing, and the Syrian Government has not complied with its obligations as certified by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.The President (spoke in Spanish): I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): The American representative said that Russia spends its resources to support what she calls the regime in Syria. My question to her is: What does the United States spend its resources on in Syria? Does it spend its resources providing milk and medicine to Syrian children, or on providing weapons and munitions to its terrorist groups, which have committed the most heinous crimes against the Syrian people? Or is it spending resources on the its alliance's aircraft, which have wreaked destruction in many places in Syria, particularly in the city of Raqqa? What about the continuous threats that are made against my country at nearly every meeting of the Security Council on this issue? Does she acknowledge that her Administration has no respect for the Security Council, this international Organization or the principles of international law?Let us test the credibility of what my colleague the United States Ambassador said. I ask members to note that I do not refer to the American Administration as the "American regime" because that would be legally shameful in this Chamber. Let us test the credibility of what my colleague the American Ambassador said when she asked the Security Council to act in order to achieve justice in Syria. Well, my test is to request that her Administration and her country allow the disclosure of the results of the United Nations Special Commission that investigated the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq for 18 years. The Commission was headed for some time by a Swede, Mr. Hans Blix.S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 24/26 18-09955 As Council members know, after 18 years of investigation the Commission found no chemical weapons in Iraq. Nor did they find Coca-Cola or Pepsi Cola. Nevertheless, in a semi-confidential meeting towards the end of 2008, the Security Council decided to end the Commission's work and bury its archives in iron boxes. I repeat — it decided to bury its archives in iron boxes. Only the Secretary-General knows the code that opens those boxes. There was one condition, which was that the boxes could not be opened for 60 years. What is so shameful in those archives? Why did they have to be buried in boxes that cannot be opened for 60 years? That question is directed to the American Ambassador.The Government of my country condemns in the strongest terms the ruthless Israeli aggression that took place this morning on the T-4 airbase in Homs governorate, in which a number of civilians were killed and injured. It was a flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 350 (1974) and of various Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism, and would not have occurred were it not for the American Administration's unlimited and consistent support for Israel. The American Administration guarantees Israel immunity so that it will not be held accountable in the Council. That allows Israel to continue to practice State terrorism and to threaten peace and security in the region and beyond. Of course, Western countries did not even mention the Israeli aggression in their statements today, which shows that the Governments of their countries are complicit in it and are covering for it. Unfortunately, my dear friend Mr. De Mistura did not hear Netanyahu say this morning that it was Israel that launched the attack. That is why I was surprised when he said that the United Nations has not been able to verify the identity of its perpetrators. If Netanyahu himself says that he launched this aggression, why does Mr. De Mistura not refer to Israel as the aggressor?This Israeli aggression is an indirect response to the successes of the Syrian Arab Army in expelling armed terrorist groups from the suburbs of Damascus, its rural area and other Syrian territory. Those groups have been killing the Syrian people, kidnapping civilians, detaining them and using them as human shields. They targeted Damascus alone with 3,000 missiles over the course of three months, killing 155 martyrs and injuring 865 civilians, most of them women and children. The Syrian Government underscores that the repeated Israeli aggression did not and will not protect Israeli agents operating within terrorist groups, nor will it divert the attention of the Syrian Army from its decisive military achievements in combating terrorism.The American anti-racism activist Martin Luther King Jr. said that "a lie is like a snowball: the further you roll it the bigger it becomes". It would seem that this wise saying holds true at any time and at any place. The Governments of some countries lie incessantly. Fortunately, though, they have not quite perfected the details of their web of lies, much like the famous Baron Munchausen of German literature. How many roosters truly believe that sunrise is the result of crowing?Some permanent members have become professional liars, and that in itself is a weapon of mass destruction. Through their lies, Palestine was stolen. The lies of these countries fuelled the war in the Korean peninsula. Through their lies, they invaded Viet Nam. Through their lies, they invaded Grenada. Through their lies, they destroyed Yugoslavia. Through their lies, they occupied Iraq. Through their lies, they destroyed Libya. Through their lies, they created takfiri terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaida, the Taliban, Da'esh, Al-Nusra Front, Jaysh Al-Islam — and the list goes on and on. Through their lies, the same countries are trying to defeat Syria and prepare the ground for an assault today.It is worth noting that the today's negative statement of the United States representative is in absolute contradiction with a statement made by United States Secretary of Defence General Mattis in an interview with Newsweek two days ago with journalist Ian Wilkie. Mr. Wilkie used the following title for the interview: "Now Mattis Admits There Was No Evidence Assad Used Poison Gas on His People." That was said by the American Defence Secretary, not the Syrian Defence Minister. What a harmonious Administration!On 10 December 2012, some six years ago, we submitted a formal letter to the Council (S/2012/917), before the operators of terrorist groups claimed, for the first time, that sarin gas was used in Khan Al-Assal on 19 March 2013. We informed the Council that the United States, the United Kingdom and France had launched a campaign of allegations claiming that the Syrian Government may have used chemical weapons. Back then, we warned that such allegations would encourage Governments that sponsor terrorists to provide chemical weapons to armed terrorist groups and then claim that the Syrian Government had used such weapons. What happened in the past few years 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 25/26 in Khan Al-Assal, Ghouta, Kafr Zita, Lataminah, Tal Minis, Khan Shaykhun and many other villages and towns in Syria confirms unequivocally what we had warned of five to six years ago, and during all these six years.The United States, the United Kingdom and France have been extremely eager to hold one meeting after another based on fabricated information. That is part of the deep crisis that we are witnessing. They want to involve other Council members in that crisis. Since 2013, those three countries have created a big elephant of lies and deceit in the Security Council. That elephant is living in the Chamber today and is stomping on the credibility of the Council with its huge feet. It seems that these countries called for the holding of today's meeting to support terrorists and to obstruct the agreement reached about Douma.However, those countries were a bit late because the terrorists had hoped this meeting would be held before they were forced to reach an agreement with the Syrian State to leave their strongholds and hand over their weapons. These countries were late in fulfilling their promises to the terrorists. It would have been better not to repeat their nasty story and not to rely on false reports from mercenaries — so-called White Helmets, founded by British intelligence officer James Le Mesurier. He is British, but his name is French. What proves that these countries were lying is that the residents of Douma left the city safely — 170,000 civilians left the city safely. Those terrorists chose to reach an agreement with the Syrian State as a last resort for them and their families. Many buses are transferring them and their families to the city of Jarabulus, after they refused to settle their affairs and chose to go there. However, the vast majority of residents chose to stay in their houses and resort to the Syrian State.It has been proven that the allegations of certain States, including some States members of the Council, on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta were lies, just as we saw in Aleppo and other places. As it turned out, terrorist group warehouses were full of medication and food, monopolized by their elements who sold some of those items to civilians at exorbitant prices. At this point, I must ask: Did the three countries call for this meeting in order to legitimize the Israeli aggression that occurred this morning or to impede the implementation of the agreement reached with their terrorist tools?In this context, I must thank the delegation of the Russian Federation for recognizing the true nature of what these countries were preparing for, and aptly called for the meeting to be held under the agenda item "Threats to international peace and security". That is the correct agenda item.We have conveyed to the Security Council, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and what used to be called the Joint Investigative Mechanism 145 letters, the latest on 1 April 2018. I thank the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan for pointing out that the Council members do not read and that the Council does not respond to those letters. The letters contain accurate information. They indicate that armed terrorist groups possess toxic chemical substances, notably chlorine and sarin. We have warned time and again that those groups were preparing to commit crimes involving chemical weapons against innocent Syrians, and were working with the White Helmets to fabricate evidence, photograph locations and film Hollywood-like scenes with everything staged in order to blame the Syrian Government and influence public opinion against Syria and its allies. Those countries call for the holding of meetings such as this in order to create a pretext that would justify any military aggression against Syria.It seems that the directors of that terrorist scene failed to perfect their web of lies. We note that in each of those theatrical scenes on the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Government, the substances never seem to affect the armed elements, but only women and children. These chemical weapons seem to discriminate against women and children and do not affect armed men. It suffices to wash away these chemicals with water in front of the camera. Water appears to heal everything. Rescue workers never need to wear protective masks. The Syrian Arab Army does not use these substances because it does not possess them to begin with. The Americans destroyed them on the vessel MV Cape Ray in the Mediterranean. So, the Syrian Arab Army uses these substances, which it does not possess, only when it is making military progress. How strange that is!This vehement campaign lacks the minimum standards of credibility. It relies on fabricated information on social media by elements of armed terrorist groups and their operators. I announce from this table that the Syrian Government is fully prepared to facilitate an OPCW fact-finding mission to Douma, S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 26/26 18-09955 where the incident is alleged to have occurred, as soon as possible to investigate and verify these allegations. We endorse the Russian proposal to hear a briefing on the fact-finding mission's report after its visit to Al-Raqqa. We welcome this visit as soon as possible.I hope that this offer does not suffer the same fate as the first offer we made to former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon after the Khan Al-Assal incident of chemical substance use in March 2013. At that time, we asked the Secretary-General to provide assistance to the Syrian Government in immediately investigating what happened in the town of Khan Al-Assal. It took the United Nations four months and 11 days to send Mr. Sellström, as Council members recall. Yes, it took the United Nations four months and 11 days. That is how the United Nations interpreted the term "immediately" — four months and 11 days. When Mr. Sellström arrived in Damascus to investigate what had happened in Khan Al-Assal, terrorists in Ghouta were instructed to use chemical substances again. Mr. Sellström therefore left Khan Al-Assal and moved to Ghouta. Council members should be aware that since March 2013, investigations into what happened in Khan Al-Assal have not taken place.Today, we directly accuse Washington, D.C., Paris, London, Riyadh, Doha and Ankara of providing Da'esh, Al-Nusra Front, Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and scores of other affiliated terrorist groups with toxic chemical substances to be used against Syrian civilians. We accuse them of inciting those massacres and of fabricating evidence to falsely blame the Syrian Government for the use of toxic chemical substances in order to prepare the ground for an aggression against my country, just as the United States and the United Kingdom did in Iraq in 2003.Yes, we say to the United States, the United Kingdom and France that, in Syria and Iraq, we eliminated the vast majority of Da'esh elements within three years — not within 30 years, as President Obama has said. Those States have plans to justify undermining the stability of the region. Yes, we say to Saudi Arabia today that we cut off its terrorist tentacles — the gangs of Jaysh Al-Islam — in eastern Ghouta. Yes, we say to Qatar and Turkey that we cut off their terrorist tentacles — the gangs of the Al-Nusra Front and Faylaq al-Rahman — in eastern Ghouta. I say to all those who sent moderate, armed, genetically modified opposition fighters to our land that we eliminated these toxic exports. We call on those exporters to bear the consequences of their actions, as some surviving elements will return to their original countries.The issue is very simple. Let me just say that on our borders with Turkey and in the separation zone in the Golan with Israel, there are tens of thousands of good, moderate terrorists with their light weapons, long beards, black banners and white helmets. Whoever wants to adopt them should submit an application to their operators. They are ready to go to Europe and the West as refugees.In conclusion, the Syrian Arab Republic stresses once again that it does not possess chemical weapons of any type, including chlorine. We condemn anew the use of chemical weapons at anytime, anywhere and in any circumstances. My country, Syria, reaffirms its readiness to cooperate fully with the OPCW in fulfilling its commitments under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.The Russian Centre for Reconciliation in Syria announced today that Russian military experts have carried out investigations in Douma and confirmed that they have found no sign of the use of chemical weapons there. While treating the sick in the hospitals of Douma, Russian doctors have proven that these patients have not been subjected to any chemical substance. What we were seeing there was nothing but Hollywood-style scenes.The President (spoke in Spanish): There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.
The Situation In The Middle East This Record Contains The Text Of Speeches Delivered In English And Of The Translation Of Speeches Delivered In Other Languages. ; United Nations S/PV.8164 Security Council Seventy-third year 8164th meeting Tuesday, 23 January 2018, 3 p.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Umarov. . (Kazakhstan) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Shen Bo Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Ms. Guadey France. . Mr. Delattre Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Tenya Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-01889 (E) *1801889* S/PV.8164 The situation in the Middle East 23/01/2018 2/11 18-01889 The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I should like at the outset to apologize to the members of the Security Council and the Secretariat for the fact that I ruined their siesta today. We have requested the convening of an open meeting of the Security Council because the issue that we intend to raise is far too important for the discussion to be held in closed consultations. We have nothing to hide. When we discussed Syria in consultations yesterday, many touched on the importance of establishing a new structure to investigate instances of chemical-weapons use in Syria to supplement the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), which fully discredited itself. We have never forgotten this issue, and we have consistently recalled in meetings our readiness to continue consultations on this matter, as noted by Minister Lavrov to the Secretary-General last week. Yesterday, however, we were unable to rise to that call. Today, upon instruction from our capital, it is my honour to report the following. Russia has consistently stressed the importance of taking the most serious approach to the problem of the manufacture and use of chemical weapons. We are troubled by manifestations of chemical-weapons terrorism in the Middle East, which are not limited to Syrian territory. Unfortunately, the JIM, which no longer exists, caused the collapse of the investigation, which from a scientific and technical perspective was an utter failure and became an instrument for political manipulation. Members of the international community and the Security Council were well aware of the Russian specialists' scrupulous analysis of the conclusions of the JIM. In an attempt to interpret certain elements of the Russian approach, during consultations on 9 January the United States delegation circulated the relevant document. However, at no point in the document was there even an attempt to approach the matter from a professional standpoint. The so-called refutations of our position do not stand up to any criticism. I invite Council members to familiarize themselves with the material supporting our position in the response that we circulated yesterday as an official Security Council document. Today, incidentally, senior representatives of the United States Department of State made further unfounded accusations alleging that Russia is hindering international verification of the facts of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We have already responded to that, and anyone who wants to can read Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov's comments on the issue. No one has called more than we have for a further investigation — a professional one rather than a simulacrum — into the incidents involving the use of chemical weapons in Syria, and at the moment we are still trying to get the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to send its specialists to Syria to see for themselves the stockpiles of chemical weapons left by militants in liberated areas that the Syrian Government has discovered. By the way, during yesterday's consultations, following the reports of various recent incidents involving the use of toxic substances in Syria, which have yet to be verified, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom — without a second's pause or any evidence, let alone an investigation — hastened to declare them the work of what they refer to as the Syrian "regime". Now they are trying to drag Russia into it too. Secretary of State Tillerson brought this up in Paris today at the meeting of the so-called international partnership of States against impunity for the use of chemical weapons, basing his argument on an incident that allegedly occurred yesterday in eastern Ghouta. However, his statement was devoted almost exclusively to Russia. By the way, does nobody find it strange that this alleged incident, whose genuineness has yet to be confirmed — as does the identity of its perpetrators, if it is genuine — coincided very conveniently with the meeting in Paris and the forthcoming Syrian national dialogue conference in Sochi? An amazing coincidence. Some States are persisting in their attempts to push through an anti-Damascus verdict at the OPCW at all costs, and thereby undermining that respected organization's authority. Others are seeking to scrape together a narrow alliance of anti-impunity-ites through non-legitimate formats. In November of last year, Russia, working with others of like mind, put together draft resolution 23/01/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8164 18-01889 3/11 S/2017/968, which would have ensured that the JIM's activities conformed to the the high international standards of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which guarantee a genuinely impartial and professional investigation. The initiative was blocked by a number of delegations at the time. We want to rise above those differences and propose creating a new international investigative body that could establish the facts that the Security Council needs in order to identify those who used toxic substances as weapons, based on irreproachable, irrefutable information from transparent, credible sources. It must be professional and non-politicized. We have prepared a draft of such a resolution and ask that the Secretariat circulate it. We hope that Council members will study our initiative with their capitals as soon as possible. We are ready for substantive consultations. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): Russia has convened us with almost no notice, and then put forth a proposal that it hopes will distract from the new French initiative to hold accountable those who use chemical weapons. Today, Russia is again doing what it does best with regard to chemical weapons. It is running from the facts. It has the audacity to lecture the Security Council about how to stop the use of chemical weapons. I know that I have said this before, but it is worth repeating. In the past year, Russia exercised the right to veto three times to kill the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) in Syria. All by itself, Russia killed the Mechanism, which we had specifically tasked with identifying those responsible for using chemical weapons in Syria. Russia should look in the mirror before bringing us into the Security Council to talk about chemical weapons. Earlier this week, we received yet another report that the Al-Assad regime had used chlorine gas on its own people. Dozens of civilians had to be treated for suffocation. Syrian children were literally gasping for breath as chlorine gas surrounded them. Of course, it is no coincidence that this week's chlorine-gas attack reportedly happened in the exact place that the Al-Assad regime is trying to take over militarily. We know that it resorts to such brutal tactics when it wants to retake territory, without any regard for innocent civilians, and we know that Russia has looked the other way for years while its Syrian friends use those despicable weapons of war. Russia is complicit in the Al-Assad regime's atrocities. Will the representative of the Russian Federation say anything at all today about the suffering caused by Al-Assad's barbaric tactics? Will it hold Al-Assad to account? Of course not. It never does. It is therefore fitting that Russia brought us here on the same day that a new initiative on accountability for chemical weapons has been introduced in Paris. Today, France launched an international partnership against impunity for chemical weapons. We strongly support that effort and commend France for its leadership. More than 25 like-minded countries have come together to share and preserve information on who has used chemical weapons and to make sure that the perpetrators will be held accountable. Make no mistake — the United States, together with the Council, will continue to pursue those who have used chemical weapons to ensure that they are held accountable for their atrocities. Russia says that it has concerns about this French initiative to share evidence of the use of chemical weapons. That is no surprise. Russia opposed the Joint Investigative Mechanism because it collected facts about who used chemical weapons in Syria. Now Russia is questioning the French effort to collect facts on who used chemical weapons. What can we conclude? To put it simply, when Russia does not like the facts, it tries to distract the conversation. That is because the facts come back over and over again to the truth that Russia wants to hide, which is that the Al-Assad regime continues to use chemical weapons against its own people. Today, Russia once again threw around many different accusations. Again, that is not surprising. Russia often puts out misleading and unfounded claims to confuse the conversation about chemical weapons. In fact, this happens so often that we recently wrote to the Security Council with a detailed assessment of Russia's misleading claims. The letter is public and available for anyone to see. We encourage everyone to take a look at it for themselves. Here is the bottom line. The Security Council gave the Joint Investigative Mechanism a mandate to tell us who used chemical weapons in Syria. When investigators found the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham to be responsible, Russia was fine. When the investigators found that the Al-Assad regime had used them, Russia tried to find any excuse to poke holes in the investigation and threw up smoke to question the findings. But hat is not how independent investigations work. You do not get to question the findings when they do not go your way. We are therefore not going to accept any Russian proposal that undermines our S/PV.8164 The situation in the Middle East 23/01/2018 4/11 18-01889 ability to get to the truth or that politicizes what must be an independent and impartial investigation. If the Russians want to work in good faith towards that goal, we are ready to re-establish the JIM, with its original, independent and impartial mandate, right now. But anything less is unacceptable. To be crystal clear: the United States supports accountability for anyone who uses chemical weapons. We agree with Russia that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham must be held accountable for its use of such weapons, as the Joint Investigative Mechanism has found. But the difference between the United States and Russia is that we believe that no one should be let off the hook. Chemical weapons must never be used. Russia can continue to talk for as long as it wants about chemical weapons. It can bring it up in the Security Council Chamber as often as it wants. We welcome the debate. The United States and the international community will not be fooled. We remain steadfast in pursuing accountability for those who use chemical weapons. We stand strong in doing all we can to preserve the norm against their use. We remain forever committed to preserving the truth about what the Al-Assad regime has done in Syria and, sadly, what it will likely continue to do. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): We meet today after receiving news about another chemical attack in Syria — this time in Douma — which resulted in more than 20 victims, including women and children. Furthermore, the attack was penetrated in a de-escalation zone. We are closely following all available information. We expect that the international investigative mechanism in place — in particular the Fact-finding Mission — will shed light on the attack. As we commemorate the one hundredth anniversary this year of the end of the First World War, during which chemical weapons produced on an industrial scale were used for the first time in history, repeated chemical-weapon attacks in Syria are an affront to the human conscience and a violation of the most fundamental norms of international law. The facts prove that the scourge continues to exist. Last year in Syria, on 4 April, more than 80 people, including women and children, were killed by a powerful nerve agent. Four years prior, 2,000 Syrian civilians were gassed in Ghouta with sarin gas. The use of chemical weapons was confirmed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) clearly determined that the Syrian regime and Da'esh were responsible for those attacks. France itself independently confirmed that the Syrian regime was responsible for the attack perpetrated on 4 April. Since 2013, investigations have revealed more than 100 allegations of the use of chemical weapons, primarily in Syria but also in Iraq and Malaysia. Chlorine gas, sarin, mustard gas and VX — all deadly nerve agents — have returned to the forefront of the international arena a century after the horrors of the First World War. Gruesome images of the victims of such weapons of terror, which we thought we had long ago left behind, have also resurfaced. We cannot allow the use of such loathsome weapons to become commonplace. They destabilize entire regions and threaten everyone's security. They increase the risk of chemical terrorism, which we all fear. They also weaken the regime against chemical weapons as well as the entire non-proliferation regime. They undermine international law and call into question the outcome of international forums that have been held for decades. That is why we must take action. We owe it to history; it is a responsibility we must shoulder together. Those of us who claim to be committed to the non-proliferation regime and helped to build it should bear that in mind. Let us be clear: those who hamper our efforts to combat impunity endorse de facto impunity for the perpetrators of such chemical attacks. They prevent us from deterring and bringing to justice those who participated in chemical-weapon programmes and those Governments and entities that give the orders to carry out attacks. We therefore cannot turn a blind eye and allow them to continue — and all the more so, and I repeat this, given that the chemical-weapon non-proliferation regime is the most developed and successful of all international non-proliferation regimes. Allowing it to be weakened without taking action would be tantamount to accepting the erosion of the entire non-proliferation regime on weapons of mass destruction, which we built together, step by step, over decades and which now serves as the backbone of the international security architecture and one of multilateralism's main accomplishments. France has therefore proposed the establishment of a new international partnership to combat impunity for the use of chemical weapons by anyone — State and non-State actors alike. That partnership was launched yesterday in Paris at a conference convened by the 23/01/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8164 18-01889 5/11 French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jean-Yves Le Drian, at which representatives of 24 States were in attendance to reiterate their willingness to work together to counter the threat. I should like to mention just a few of the partnership's ambitious commitments. They include the transfer and sharing of information, when possible, about the perpetrators of attacks; a commitment to impose national or international sanctions against entities and individuals concerned; assistance for building State capacity with regard to designations and sanctions; and the publication of a single, consolidated list of the names of individuals involved in attacks. Criminals who claim responsibility for developing and using such barbaric weapons must know that they will not go unpunished. Once again, this is about the future of the entire collective security system. One should not be able to violate the most basic norms without eventually facing the consequences. Owing to obstruction on the part of certain countries, we were unable to renew the JIM's mandate at the end of last year. Yesterday's consultations on Syria confirmed that an overwhelming majority of the members of the Security Council do not agree with the current impasse. In that regard, we take note of the proposal made today by Russia. We will consider it in the light of the principles I have just outlined. The new partnership launched in Paris does not aim to replace international instruments and the investigative mechanism established by the United Nations and the OPCW. Instead, it seeks to complement and bolster that structure by making a new operational instrument available to the multilateral system and the international community. It will assist investigations and help the international justice system in its work. It is neither an anti-Syrian instrument nor an exclusive club of countries. All countries can join this pragmatic and open partnership by adhering to its statement of principles. Through the partnership, they will show their commitment to law, international stability, justice and security in order to end impunity for the perpetrators of chemical attacks and their accomplices. We must therefore work through the partnership to consolidate the regime prohibiting chemical weapons. The cornerstone of the partnership was laid in Paris and embodies our faith in effective and demanding multilateralism. In an effort to take immediate action, I can confirm that France has imposed asset-freezes on networks involved in the proliferation of chemical weapons in Syria. In conclusion, I recall that there will be no justice or sustainable peace in Syria without putting an end to impunity. How can we continue to defend the regime and reiterate its willingness to speak in good faith and seek a political solution when that very same regime employs barbaric weapons against its own people? There has never been a larger gap between words and deeds. At the United Nations in both Vienna and Geneva, I said that we must work together to reach a political solution in Syria. Implementing an inclusive political solution as outlined in resolution 2254 (2015), which serves as our guidepost now more than ever, will depend upon a neutral environment in Syria guaranteed by the regime's clear commitment to credible constitutional change and democratic elections. It is the only way to permanently end the suffering of Syrians. We continue to believe that we can, and must, bring the Security Council together to proceed in that direction. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): When I heard today that Russia had called for an urgent meeting on the use of chemical weapons in Syria, I was glad that we could return to an issue on which the Council has a duty to ensure that those responsible are held to account. That duty is even more pressing today, because yet another heinous attack on civilians was reported yesterday to the Council by the Secretariat. In that attack, in Douma, in eastern Ghouta, at least 21 civilians were treated for symptoms consistent with exposure to chlorine. That followed another reported attack in eastern Ghouta on 13 January, affecting six people. In 2016, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) found in three cases that the Syrian regime had used chlorine gas to attack civilians. Last year, it found that the regime had used sarin in Khan Shaykhun. Now, as the regime is escalating its attacks on eastern Ghouta in an attempt to force the besieged opposition to surrender, we remain deeply concerned about continuing reports of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In all of this, we should not forget that it was the regime's 2013 attack on eastern Ghouta, using sarin, that led to the Council's adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), which had the clear, unanimously endorsed aim of disarming Syria's chemical-weapon programme. Throughout that process, Russia has claimed to be acting as a leading Power, a guarantor. But when the Al-Assad regime deliberately ignored its obligation to stop using chemical weapons and continued to do so with careless regard for human life, Russia chose to S/PV.8164 The situation in the Middle East 23/01/2018 6/11 18-01889 abuse its power of veto to protect that regime. Russia says that it supported the renewal of the JIM mandate and that it was the rest of us who killed it, because we could not agree with Russia's terms. Yet Russia's proposed draft resolution would have removed the JIM's ability to investigate the Al-Assad regime, which has been found responsible for multiple attacks. Russia has made it clear several times that it will not support a new investigative mechanism as long as it has the power to hold to account a State Member of the United Nations, and it seems, from a rapid reading of the latest text, that this proposal is another attempt to shift attention to non-State actors. The Russians have even claimed that Syria is a signatory in good standing to the Chemical Weapons Convention. It is not. It has not completed its declaration. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has repeatedly warned of inconsistencies, gaps and omissions. Russia has great influence over the Al-Assad regime. For the sake of the Syrian people and for preventing the future use of chemical weapons, we call on Russia to persuade its Syrian friends to get rid of their chemical weapons and comply fully with the Chemical Weapons Convention. By ending the JIM, Russia also stopped its investigations of chemical attacks by Da'esh. The investigators had found that those terrorists had carried out at least two such attacks. We condemn Da'esh unreservedly for its use of these vile weapons, which is yet another reason why we must defeat those terrorists once and for all. The United Kingdom was proud to join the international partnership against impunity for the use of chemical weapons led by our French colleagues today in Paris. The use of chemical weapons is barbaric, illegal under international law and must stop. We must ensure that we can re-establish a mechanism to ensure accountability. We all know where the obstacle to that lies. In response, we will only redouble our efforts to pursue accountability for these crimes. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): The Kingdom of the Netherlands is deeply shocked by the ongoing attacks using chemical weapons in Syria. The Secretariat briefed the Council yesterday on yet another alleged chemical-weapon attack, the second this month. Two surface-to-surface projectiles targeted eastern Ghouta, releasing what is suspected to be chlorine. The attack resulted in injuring 21 people through exposure to chlorine, of whom eight were men, six women and seven children. Furthermore, there are shocking estimates of 130 chemical attacks between 2012 and 2017, with more than 60 pending allegations of chemical-weapon use in Syria still to be investigated by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its Fact-finding Mission. The Netherlands condemns in the strongest terms the use of chemical weapons by any State or non-State actor. I would now like to make three points. First, accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria is neither optional nor negotiable. Secondly, it is unacceptable that four years after Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, its declaration is still unable to be verified as accurate and complete. Thirdly, the Netherlands will use its membership of the Security Council to bring accountability to the fore. We regret the dismantling of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). We were convinced of the professionalism and independence of the JIM's work, and its results still stand. The Council should shoulder its responsibility in that regard. In particular, the countries on the Council with influence on Syria should use it with the Syrian regime to convince it to refrain from further chemical-weapon attacks, acknowledge its past use of such weapons and complete its chemical-weapon declaration. As long as the Council remains deadlocked, our focus on accountability will not stop here. We will look for complementary measures so that impunity will not prevail. We therefore thank France for taking the initiative to establish an international partnership against impunity for the use of chemical weapons. The Netherlands participated in the meeting of the partnership that took place in Paris today. The Paris initiative aims to collect evidence of the use of chemical weapons anywhere in the world. It will enable States to take action to uphold the international norms against the use of chemical weapons. It represents a political commitment to increasing pressure on those responsible for the use of chemical weapons, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands is fully committed to that goal. Furthermore, the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011; the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic; and national prosecution in third countries, as well as sanctions, remain instrumental for achieving accountability for the crimes committed 23/01/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8164 18-01889 7/11 against the Syrian people. We must use all the tools available to us to achieve accountability. In conclusion, the Netherlands remains convinced that a referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court in The Hague is by far the best option for achieving accountability for the extremely serious crimes that have taken place in Syria. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): Yesterday the Council members were briefed by Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman on yet another alleged chemical-weapon attack in Syria. Allegations of the use of such weapons continue to be reported. There are some 60 cases of the reported use of chemical weapons in Syria that are currently being examined by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and that its Fact-finding Missions continue to investigate and report, including a case of a sarin attack in Lataminah in March of last year. I would like to reiterate once again that Sweden condemns the use of chemical weapons in the strongest terms. It is a serious violation of international law and its use in armed conflict amounts to a war crime. Bringing the perpetrators of such crimes to justice remains a high priority. There must be no impunity for those responsible. That is why we participated in the meeting of the international partnership against impunity for the use of chemical weapons held today in Paris. As a member of the Council and the OPCW Executive Council, Sweden attaches great importance to all international efforts to combat the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State and non-State actors alike, anywhere in the world. We trust that the French initiative will complement and support our collective work in multilateral forums, as well as the existing multilateral mechanisms to achieve unity around those important goals. That also includes the Human Rights Council's Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic and the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic, which play an important role in collecting information. It was highly regrettable that the Council was not able to agree on an extension of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. It is a critical to establish a similar new impartial and independent attributive mechanism now. The Council needs to come back together and speak with one voice. We need to be forward-looking and overcome our differences with a view to protecting the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime and ensuring accountability. That should be possible if everyone engages seriously, constructively and genuinely in good faith. We stand ready to engage in such efforts in order for the Council to fully shoulder its responsibilities. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): We are deeply concerned about the reported use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta, which is in clear violation of international law and deserves condemnation in the strongest possible terms. This alleged use of chemical weapons, as with other incidents, including in Talmenes, demonstrates the need to hold perpetrators accountable. There is no space for impunity in this regard. We support taking all the necessary measures to fill the gap left by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, so as to ensure that no one goes unpunished for using chemical weapons, which cause unacceptable harm and suffering. Those responsible for chemical attacks must realize that they will be held accountable because their acts are an affront to all humankind and the basic rules of civilization. We support the tireless work done by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We are convinced that it is the responsibility of the Security Council to establish and maintain a suitable institution to investigate alleged cases of the use of chemical weapons. Let me take this opportunity to thank France for today's hosting of a high-level meeting to launch a new initiative to protect the core values underpinning the credibility of the non-proliferation regime on chemical weapons established by the Chemical Weapons Convention. Poland joined that new partnership with the sole purpose of using all the tools at our disposal to end impunity for those responsible for chemical attacks and to promote and complement existing standards and mechanisms against the use of chemical weapons. We look forward to working on this issue in the Council in the months to come. Mr. Tenya (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): The Security Council has the highly sensitive responsibility of contributing to the prevention of the use of chemical weapons, which entails identifying and prosecuting those responsible for atrocities such as the one perpetrated yesterday in Syria. S/PV.8164 The situation in the Middle East 23/01/2018 8/11 18-01889 Peru participated in the meeting convened by France today to establish a partnership to combat impunity for the use of chemical weapons, at which a declaration of principles was adopted. The document sets out a series of measures aimed at ensuring that individuals and entities responsible for the use of chemical weapons are brought to justice. During that meeting, Peru's Ambassador to France referred in particular to paragraph 3 of the terms of reference, which had been circulated in advance, wherein it is expressly stated that the purpose of the initiative is not in any way meant to replace, reproduce or supersede international inquiry and investigation mechanisms that serve the same purpose. Our Ambassador also expressed his satisfaction with those words, insofar as Peru, as a member of the Security Council and a member of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, encourages the necessary action to be taken by those competent bodies. Peru condemns in the strongest possible terms the lack of accountability in the continuing incidents involving chemical weapons in Syria, for we believe it undermines international regimes on the matter and weakens peace efforts in the region. Mr. Shen Bo (China) (spoke in Chinese): China expresses its grave concern about the use of chemical weapons in Syria and extends its deepest sympathy to the Syrian people for their suffering. China's position on chemical weapons has been clear and consistent. We firmly oppose the use of chemical weapons by any country, group or individual for any purpose and under any circumstances. The use of chemical weapons is unacceptable, whenever or wherever they are used. China supports a comprehensive, objective and fair investigation into such incidents in order to arrive at a conclusion that can stand the test of time and to shed light on the facts in order to bring the perpetrators to justice. China welcomes the draft resolution circulated by the delegation of the Russian Federation that would establish a new investigative mechanism on Syrian chemical weapons. China appreciates the efforts made by Russia in the Security Council to continue to advance the work on the Syrian chemical weapons issue. China will seriously study the draft resolution and actively participate in consultations on it. It is imperative to establish a new investigative mechanism to find out the truth and to deter further use of chemical weapons in Syria. We hope that Council members will participate in the consultations in a constructive manner and strive to reach consensus on the establishment of a new mechanism. The Syrian chemical weapons issue is closely linked to a political settlement to the Syrian question, and it requires a comprehensive, balanced and integrated approach. China supports the role of the Security Council and of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons as the main channel for achieving an appropriate resolution to the Syrian chemical weapons issue. We hope that all the relevant parties will adopt a constructive attitude and seek appropriate solutions during consultations. We must maintain the unity of the Council and coordinate with the relevant parties in an effort to actively promote the political process in Syria. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): Bolivia reiterates its strong, categorical condemnation of the use of chemical weapons and chemical substances as weapons as unjustifiable and criminal acts — wherever, whenever and by whomever they are committed. We believe that there can be no justification for the use of such weapons, regardless of the circumstances and of who uses them, as it constitutes a serious crime under international law and a threat to international peace and security. We emphatically condemn the reported use of chemical weapons in the city of Douma, in eastern Ghouta. That incident must be investigated in order to identify the perpetrators, bring them to justice and ensure that their actions do not go unpunished. Accordingly, we reiterate our support for the work carried out by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic. However, as we have stated on other occasions, we emphasize the urgent need for an investigative mechanism with a clear mandate that can carry out its assigned tasks of investigating methodically, transparently, technically, faithfully, with assistance and in a fundamentally depoliticized way. We must have a mechanism that can develop an independent, impartial, complete and conclusive investigation to hold accountalbe those responsible for such horrific crimes. We believe that, if what we want is an independent and transparent mechanism, we have the challenge of not exploiting the Security Council by bringing geopolitical interests on the ground into the Chamber. We have 23/01/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8164 18-01889 9/11 the challenge of demonstrating to the international community the unity of the Council. To that end, we must not turn the Chamber into a sounding board for warring confrontation and, even less so, transfer the immediate interests of the battlefield to this setting. In that regard, we welcome the proposal put forward by the Russian Federation today. We will study the text, and we hope that consultations will be convened as soon as possible and that they will result in the Council and the international community having on an independent investigation mechanism. It is essential that we overcome the lack of trust that exists in the Council. Furthermore, we must always bear in mind that no initiative, however well intended, should supplant our responsibilities, as established by the Charter of the United Nations. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): The ongoing use of chemical weapons in Syria represents one of the deplorable elements of this crisis, which has been continuing for seven years. It is all the more deplorable when we see that there is an absence of justice and accountability and that there is impunity for every criminal who has contributed to and participated in such crimes against civilians. Following the attack when chemical weapons were used in Ghouta, where most of the victims were civilians, we witnessed the unity of the Council in ensuring that such a crime would not be repeated and that perpetrators would be held accountable through the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013). However, unfortunately, we note that there are still reports of chemical attacks in Syria, most recently by Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, yesterday regarding a chemical attack on the city of Duma on 13 January. We would therefore like to express our disappointment that the Security Council has been unable to reach consensus on renewing the mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, which, we believe, carried out its work in a professional, impartial and independent way. As a result, the failure to renew the mandate meant the complete absence of a tool for accountability in Syria. For that reason, the perpetrators of such crimes will go unpunished and there is no guarantee of holding them, or any perpetrator of such crimes in future, accountable. The State of Kuwait has a firm, principled position strongly condemning any use of chemical weapons at any time, anywhere and by anyone, since the use of chemical weapons is a grave violation of international law. We underscore the need to hold perpetrators — individuals, entities, non-State groups or Governments — accountable. As members of the Security Council, we are responsible for maintaining international peace and security. We must therefore seek alternatives and mechanisms, agreeable to all members of the Security Council, to ensure the independence, impartiality and professionalism of any new future mechanism to ensure that criminals are held accountable. We note that there is a draft resolution before us on establishing a new mechanism. We recall the clear and decisive language in resolution 2118 (2013), which stipulates the need to hold accountable those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In that regard, the State of Kuwait welcomes the French initiative to convene the Paris meeting on an international partnership against impunity for use of chemical weapons. Along with a number of countries, the State of Kuwait participated in that event to underscore the importance of strengthening the values of justice and accountability and to implement the principle of ending impunity. We support the international mechanisms established by the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council to gather evidence regarding any crimes related to human rights violations in Syria. In conclusion, we emphasize that it is important for the Security Council to stand united when dealing with issues that threaten international peace and security, such as the incidents mentioned in reports on the Syrian crisis, through the unanimous adoption of such resolutions as resolution 2118 (2013), on chemical weapons; resolution 2165 (2014), on the humanitarian situation; and resolution 2254 (2015), on the political track of the Syrian crisis. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): My delegation thanks the Russian Federation for having called for this emergency meeting of the Security Council with a view to once again discussing the issue of the use of chemical weapons in general, and in Syria in particular, where, it seems, that atrocious weapon is being used. My country, which is opposed to the use of chemical weapons, ratified the Convention on the Prohibition S/PV.8164 The situation in the Middle East 23/01/2018 10/11 18-01889 of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in order to show the world our determination to work with other international stakeholders for the complete elimination of such weapons. To that end, on this very day, 23 January, we signed in Paris the declaration of principles, issued by the meeting held at the initiative of France on the topic of combating impunity through the international partnership against impunity for the use of chemical weapons. Côte d'Ivoire extends its full support to that initiative and vehemently condemns any use of chemical weapons, regardless of the reasons or perpetrators. In firm support of the values of equity and justice, Côte d'Ivoire wishes to draw the attention of the Security Council to the need to set up a new consensus mechanism aimed at combating the use of chemical weapons. In that regard, we welcome the Russian initiative to propose the establishment, by means of a resolution, of a new mechanism. We assume that such a mechanism, like the previous one, would be tasked with identifying perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons, in general. In the specific case of Syria, the perpetrators of such acts must be identified and be held accountable for their actions. Inaction by the Council on this important issue would be a bad sign and send a message of encouragement to those who indulge in the use of chemical weapons with impunity. To conclude, my delegation calls on the Council to act in a consensus-based and coordinated manner in order to establish a new mechanism, for our action must prompt us not only to protect and to help victims, who are martyrs in the endless war in Syria, but also to work to uphold international peace and security. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): The use of chemical weapons, the issue we are considering is critically important to the Republic of Equatorial Guinea. We categorically repudiate and condemn their use by any country, State or non-State actor. We also condemn in the strongest terms the recent chemical-weapon attacks in Syria. With regard to the issue of who is responsible for the use of such weapons, there is no consensus among the members of the Security Council on that. We realize that the Security Council must address the issue of the use of chemical weapons in a spirit of understanding and unanimity, with a view to combating impunity, thereby sending an unambiguous message to anyone who has used such weapons or is thinking of doing so that they will be held responsible for their actions. We repeat that we categorically condemn the production, stockpiling and use of chemical and other weapons of mass destruction. If we are to take steps against those who have used such weapons, we must clearly identify the responsible parties in a way that leaves no room for doubt. That is why, given the lack of consensus among the members of the Council and the need to identify those responsible for the use of such weapons, we are of the view that the proposal that the Russian Federation has just made is worth considering as a new opportunity for conducting a fully transparent investigation whose results all Council members would have to accept, thereby fostering the unanimity and consensus within the Council that would enable it to take the necessary steps against the perpetrators of the heinous act of using chemical weapons. The President: I shall now make a statement in my national capacity as the representative of Kazakhstan. We are deeply worried about the fact that chemical weapons continue to be used in Syria. It is regrettable that this inhuman and illegal type of weapon is being used with the specific purpose of intimidating ordinary people, since it mostly affects unprotected civilians. Another discouraging fact is the lack of unity and the deepening confrontation among the parties on the chemical dossier, which complicates our ability to address this threat in an appropriate way. It is therefore urgent to start thinking about developing a new investigative tool that can effectively counter all such chemical crimes. Any delay or inaction on the part of the Council could lead to an increase in the commission of such acts in the absence of clear plans and mechanisms to end impunity. We welcome the Russian Federation's proposal to establish a new mechanism, giving us a new opportunity to look into the matter. Since we will have to start over with the creation of an investigative mechanism, we must try to get it right from the very beginning, on a basis of consensus. The mechanism should be impartial, depoliticized, professional, representative, and with a clear mandate that will preclude any doubts and ensure the credibility of its work. That does not mean that we think the previous mechanism was unfit for its purpose, but it is obvious that accountability requires a Security Council that is united in its decision-making. 23/01/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8164 18-01889 11/11 Kazakhstan is ready to contribute and to assist in finding the best way to move forward together. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. The representative of the Russian Federation has asked to make a further statement. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I am taking the floor to further clarify our position. It is a pity that my friend Mrs. Haley has left the Chamber. She mentioned that we convened this meeting today on short notice, for which I apologize. As I recall, however, we have frequently been convened by Mrs. Haley's call, and we are ready to do it again. Please let her know that I am doing it because I am always very pleased to see her here. Once again, everything that we heard from the United States in its statement today was about Russia. The fact that it is rejecting our proposed draft resolution from the get-go says a great deal. It once again betrays a truth that we are sadly familiar with. The United States has no need of any independent professional mechanism. It is not only betraying a truth, it is betraying itself in the eyes of the international community. Let me say straight out what I spoke about before in a rhetorical question. It was no accident that the allegations — which will remain allegations until they are confirmed — about the use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta emerged on the eve of some important political events for Syria, the meeting in Vienna and the Syrian national dialogue conference in Sochi. Furthermore, I will say it again, why does the United States need an investigative mechanism when both yesterday and today, before any kind of investigation, it asserted, without apparently a shadow of doubt, that it was the Syrian Government that did it? It has taken the role of both judge and prosecutor. Does the United States at least understand that it is betraying itself by this? If it genuinely wants to establish a professional, independent attributive mechanism, it should at least read the draft resolution before rejecting it. Did we not discuss a new mechanism with Council members of the Council at the conclusion of the multiple acts in the political spectacle surrounding the closure of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism? We did not time our draft resolution to coincide with any events or partnerships. However, I want to reiterate something that I spoke about at a Council meeting presided over by President Nazarbayev on 18 January, which is that no commissions, partnerships or so-called independent mechanisms in this area can be legitimate unless they are approved by the Security Council. That must be our premise. I would like to echo what the Permanent Representative of Sweden — and he was not the only one — said in his statement, which is that we must overcome our differences, engage in dialogue and try to restore the Council's lost unity. That is the aim of our proposal. The meeting rose at 4.10 p.m.
Transcript of an oral history interview with William Sawyer Gannon, conducted by Joseph Cates at Gannon's home in Manchester, New Hampshire, on 18 July 2016 as part of the Norwich Voices oral history project of the Sullivan Museum and History Center. William Gannon was a member of the Norwich University Class of 1958; his family history, experiences as a student at Norwich University, seminary education, and post-Norwich career as a church priest are all discussed in the interview. ; 1 William S. Gannon, Class of '58, Oral History Interview July 18, 2016 Bedford, New Hampshire Interviewed by Joseph Cates JOSEPH CATES: This is Joseph Cates. Today is July 18, 2016. I'm interviewing William S. Gannon. This interview is taking place at his home in Bedford, New Hampshire. This interview is sponsored by the Sullivan Museum and History Center and is part of the Norwich Voices Oral History Project. Do you go by Rev. Gannon? WILLIAM S. GANNON: Rev. Gannon, Father Gannon, Mr. Gannon or Bill. JC: [Chuckles] Or Bill. Okay. WG: (Chuckles) JC: Well, I'll tell you what, tell me your full name. WG: William Sawyer Gannon. JC: And what's your date of birth? WG: May 30, 1936. JC: Okay. And where were you born? WG: In Manchester, New Hampshire. JC: Okay. And what Norwich class are you? WG: Class of '58 JC: Tell me about where you grew up and what you did as a child. WG: Well, I grew up in Manchester, New Hampshire for the first 6 years. And being born on the day that the whole country celebrated Memorial Day, which was always May 30th, whenever it fell. We lived opposite Stark Park. And there were cannons at Stark Park. The Gannons lived by the cannons. And the parade ended at Stark Park. And when I was three years old, they shot their guns off three times. So, I of course, assumed that that was in honor of my birthday. And when I was four and they still shot them only three times, I was upset. JC: (Laughs) 2 WG: (Laughs) So, that was the first part of life here. I still have my three-year-old nursery school report and I'm very impressed with the quality of the thinking of the writer of the report. It was a page and a half. And I was amused by some of the comments that every dog I met I thought was my own. And, that when I was asked to do something I didn't understand, I would cry. But once it was explained to me, I was alright. I love to say, "And nothing has changed." JC: (Chuckles) WG: (Chuckles) And I guess I feel especially blessed by both my early – my preschool education, which started at the age of three and my musical education which started before I was born because my mother was a concert pianist and the church organist and a teacher of piano. So, I was hearing Bach, Mozart, Beethoven and Chopin, and Romanov and Debussy before I was born. And much later in life is when I had a very deep and still do have, a love of progressive jazz. That's the jazz from the 40s, 50s and 60s and 70s I'd say. I read somewhere something that lead me to realize that my hearing Debussy early on had set me up for the cords that are present in modern jazz. And recently some social psychologist was telling me that when babies are adopted at the year of one year old from Russia, they come to this country, something that is often unanticipated by the parents is, all they have heard, even though they aren't speaking yet, are the sounds of Russia, the Russian language. They have to pick up on the sounds of English language. As adults, we tend to think that language is only important once you start speaking, but clearly, it's important even before you're born, you're hearing sounds from people's speech. So, I really thank my mother. She started me on the piano at age five and I still play but not publicly, on the piano. It never took with the seriousness that I wish it had. And I went on later, that was 11 or 12 to a piano teacher, another teacher in high school and nothing really got started until I took up the trombone in high school. But, my mother was very important to my early life, I now know, in ways that I didn't always appreciate when I was growing up and when I was an adult. We moved to Concord when I was six. I went to the first grade in Manchester. And, then we moved from Concord to Chester, New Hampshire, when I was ten and that would have been 1946. My father had always been, or for a long time, a grain salesman and he also owned a couple of grain stores. And he had bought a coal company in Derry, New Hampshire, and stopped his traveling. He worked for a grain company, a national company that sold to grain stores called, Park & Pollard. And their slogan was Lay or Bust and on his stationary, there was a picture on one side, at the top, of a chicken laying an egg. And on the other side, of a chicken busting apart. And in between was the slogan, "Lay or Bust." And, I kind of felt delighted in realizing how profoundly in the 20s, 30s, 40s when he was on the road as a salesman, agriculture was where most people earned their living and got their sustenance. And it was coming to an end that was probably part of 60, 80 maybe 100-year decline in this country. So, that was partly brought home to me, as I think back. When I was 11, I believe it was, he bought a chicken coop and got 25 little chicks, and grew them. And, I became 3 their keeper. And, I had an egg route. And then the next year, we added onto the garage and I had the use of a horse and it was borrowed from a company that rented horses out during the summers; summer camps and places like that. And I'm surmising that we did them a favor by feeding and boarding the horse for the winter. And they did us a favor in giving me a horse to ride. And that was all part of the fact that my father had been in World War I in the cavalry, which sounds amazing. And that's partly probably why Norwich's cavalry past had some appeal to him and to me. And that's partly how we got the horse. So, in high school, which was Pinkerton Academy in Derry, New Hampshire, I guess I had a somewhat uneventful time. I played football on the varsity team, beginning my junior year and also my senior year. And then, when I came to Norwich, it seemed as if everybody was too big on the football team and I was heavily into the trombone. And I had practiced eight hours a day, as I noted in a piece that the Norwich Record had published, because I was afraid I wouldn't make it into the Norwich band. And – but I did. And, the trombone was the important thing to me and I can remember, and I think I mentioned this in the article, being at an alumni reunion and standing at the old SAE house, where I had been a member, with three or four other alums who I didn't know until that moment, and they were talking about the sports they played at Norwich. And they turned to me and said, "What did you play?" Then I said quite proudly, "The trombone." So, I started thinking I was going to be a businessman in my father's business. I'd worked part time, and on Saturdays for him, from the age of 13 on up to when I left for Norwich. And, it turned out that an ambition of my mother took over. So, in my sophomore year, I changed my major to history in preparation to going to law school. My grandfather had been a New Hampshire chief justice and the William Sawyer in my name was his name, William H. Sawyer. So, that lasted through a couple of years at Norwich, even up into my senior year. I'd been accepted at law school, but changed my mind at the last minute to go to seminary. And that was the influence of an episcopal church chaplain who was also a professor at the school of a number of courses that I took, and I just had a very deep interest in the subject matter, and those courses included Old and New Testament, one course for each. And, ethics and there was a political philosophy class that I took that was also, I would say, in the philosophy direction. And it was basically a love of the subject matter that brought me to seminary. I was commissioned in the signal corps. So, that was deferred for four years. Normally a seminary education is a three-year event, but I stayed for an extra year and got two master's degrees when I graduated. Actually, one was – the first three years was then a bachelor and was later changed to a master's degree. It was a Master of Divinity. But, I had some sense that I wanted to be like my mentor. His name was Hershel Miller, Father Hershel Miller. And he had an extra year of seminary. And I discovered when I was in full time church work in Manchester, that the extra degree, I guess, helped me get a part time teaching job at St. Anselm College, and I think I was the first Protestant in their religion department. And, that went on for a couple of years. And, it led me into full time teaching, which 4 was first at the Groton School in Groton, Massachusetts. And then at St. Paul's School in Concord, New Hampshire. And from there, I went to being a head of a school in Peekskill, New York, and later, briefly, the head of a New York City private school. And about that time, I got divorced and needed to make more money, so I went into the business world in New York City for 13 years. And, I enjoy telling people I worked for 10 years for a company, American Credit Indemnity, selling a product to businesses on their business to business transactions in which we insured the transactions so if their customer didn't pay them, and we'd insured it, we paid them and we went after the debt. And, at a certain point, my boss, who in many ways was a real scoundrel, but I enjoyed working for him, he retired. And, for some reason, I didn't have the same feeling for the new sales manager and began to think that I was really better at the church stuff than at the selling game. Although I think I was pretty good at it. And, I sort of euphemistically say that I made a lot of money in New York, but I got no respect. And then I went back to being the church priest where I got a lot of respect and no money. And a friend of mine, who is an Episcopal bishop, when I told him that he said, "Well, if you were a bishop, you'd make no money and you'd get no respect." (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: That was only partly true, all that stuff. And, the church I went to was a – named Christ Church. It was in Glen Ridge, New Jersey. And, it had a reputation of being a rector, that's the position I had, a rector killer church. My immediate predecessor had been in there only three years. He was fired by the bishop because he first divorced his wife, kicked her out of the rectory and brought in some other woman. And, of course, enraged the congregation with that behavior. So, the bishop did what he should do and fired him. And, 30 years prior, this was 1991 when I went there, the rector had had some involvement with, probably a parishioner. He was married with children. And in a New York City hotel, he killed himself. JC: Oh, my goodness. WG: And it was – in some ways it was as if that event has still clung to the walls of the church. Its impact was so profound. I met somebody that had attended the church for eight months after that event and did not know about it, indicating that nobody talked about it. It was too painful to communicate. So, I was taking – I knew I was taking on a church that was a tough place and it took, I would say, a good three to four years before things really calmed down and we got going again. And, when I retired in '03, I continued to do part time interim work as a priest in Episcopal churches. And I realized very quickly that when you come newly into a leadership position, whether it's a church or something else, you are inheriting a great deal and the trust relationship that either did or didn't exist with the prior administrator, is going to bedevil you or bless you. And, places where there's been a profound leadership, I discovered it was very easy to come in and I 5 would be immediately trusted and we'd get going and have fun. And places where there had been a succession, would have to be more than one succession of bad leadership, it was going to be a battle of sorts to exert any kind of leadership. And, at this point, I'm just a pew sitter. (Laughs) And enjoying it. JC: Well, we're going to back up a little bit – WG: Sure. JC: -- and we're going to fill in some questions. You talked a little bit about why you chose Norwich. Can you elaborate more on that, why you chose to go to Norwich? WG: Well, I think I chose mostly because of my father. I'd had relatives that went to Dartmouth, and perhaps – and UNH. Perhaps that would have been my mother's choice. But, it was the military that intrigued me. I had a cousin who had been in World War II and I worked with him – he worked for my father. He was about 10 years older and I had, just a high regard for him and I would guess that it was the military side. And I had a classmate, Harry Parkinson at Pinkerton who also got interested in Norwich. And, I remember him saying that he had had an uncle who'd been a soldier in World War II and had died. And I think that was part of his interest in going to Norwich. JC: And you said your major, you majored in history and you kept with that? WG: Yes. JC: Why do you think you chose history, particularly? WG: Good question. I think I had a love of history born of my mother and she had genealogy interests. We were – I learned early on we were descended from Mayflower people and – on her side, not on my father's side. In fact, my ancestors on my father's side fought on the other side during the Revolutionary War. (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: And went from New York City to Canada (chuckles) – came back through New Brunswick, through Maine at a certain point later, several generations later. That kind of had something to do with it. And, I guess other than I'm – I still love history, read a good amount of military history. I sort of think I may be drawn to military history as one who hadn't served because when I got out of seminary there was nothing happening. And, I think if I had thought I should go into the service, it wouldn't be as a chaplain, it would be in the signal corps where I'd started out. I'm not sure if that would be true. And, where was I headed with this – what was the question again? 6 JC: Why you chose history as your major. WG: Oh, why I chose history as my major. I just – I'm not sure. Oh, I was talking about military history. Oh, and I think I had in the back of my head -- When I was a priest in Harrington Park, New Jersey, in a second church, I had a celebration for Veteran's Day in November, whether it fell on Sunday or one of the days before or after. So, I had a breakfast for veterans and their families. And the World War II veterans have a great reputation that no one ever talked about their experience. Well, this was in between an 8:00 and a 10:00 service and I discovered that when the veterans got together, whether it was World War II or later, you couldn't shut them up! (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: And it made sense that they were talking because they knew the people they were talking to would understand where they're coming from. That was their military service. And I wonder if maybe my father's – he was in every battle in World War I, in Europe and was never wounded. So, I sort of grew up with hearing all that kind of stuff. JC: Was he in the first division or was he in the 76th? WG: The 76th Field Artillery Horse Drawn Cavalry. That's where the cavalry part came out of there. But he trained with horses. JC: Who were your roommates at Norwich and where did you live? WG: It was Jackson Hall. I can picture them. I'm not sure I can remember their names. Harry Parkinson was one. And there was a kid from Vermont that went on to West Point after the first year. And we were all bandsmen. And there was a guy, Lemons was one of the guys. He was an upper classman. That was in a subsequent year. But that leads me to an event that happened, I think, in my junior year, when there was a shooting in a room. I think I was on the first floor of Jackman. And across the hall, a guy named Tony Reddington, was with a roommate who had a .45 pistol. And an upperclassman of mine, Norm Elliott, came in the room and saw it and said – the two guys being rooks, "Let me see that." Pick it up. Took the clip out of the handle and aimed it at Tony Reddington and pulled the trigger. And it hit him in the body somewhere. Just unthinkable behavior. You would think. So, he, Tony was taken by ambulance to Hanover. The first successful aorta transplant kept him alive. He was able to survive about an hour's trip at least. However long it took the ambulance to get there and he came back to the school I think the next year and graduated. I'm pretty sure he graduated. And just recently, last year, I think it was last year. Or the year before. No, it was last year, I think, at a Saturday evening dinner at the hotel in Montpelier, I was 7 sitting at a table with my wife and I heard this voice saying, "Who are you?" And I didn't recognize him. And he said – "I'm Bill Gannon." And he said, "Bill Gannon?" And it was Tony Reddington. (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: First time I was seeing him I think, since Norwich. And there he was. JC: Now, you were in band company. WG: Yes. JC: What can you tell me about band company? WG: Well, I'm sure we had – I'm trying to think if we ever played our instruments. I think we did. But I'm not sure when we might have done that. We got to play quite a bit, as a band. And, I think that was daily, which is important to do. I still play the trombone every day, because I play in a couple of concert bands. And I also play in a swing band. A couple of different ones. So, that was an important aspect because you have to keep your armature up if you're a brass player. And we would be playing for the bringing of the flag down. And that would be a daily event. And one of my favorite stories and memories of a time when our band had a major leader, not the professional guy but the cadet, determined that he was going to have a yacht cannon that would shoot, just a blank, and it was positioned under one of the real cannons by the flag pole, and nobody knew that he was going to be doing this, that we were going to be doing it. And he had explained to us, probably about this time, that the bass drum was always hit, this was something we did to simulate a cannon going off. And then we would start with the National Anthem. And on this occasion, I remember seeing a rook standing at attention, holding a string. His arm was up, he was holding a string and he was going to pull the string on – connected to the yacht cannon. So, he was given the command. And he pulled the string. And there was this huge roar and blue or black smoke and we started playing. And I remember looking because the trombones are in the front line, so I remember seeing both columns of cadets down the parade ground. And I was looking at the ones on the left as we faced east, I guess, and the whole column jumped at the cannon sound. And I'm sure the same thing was happening on the other side. There were three regimental officers in the middle and the cannon was sort of aimed at them. I'm not sure of this, but I believe I saw them leave the ground. JC: (Laughs) WG: And, the best part is, they came down saluting. (Laughs) 8 JC: (Laughs) WG: And held the salute for the duration of the National Anthem. (Chuckles) Well, our leader got fired from his – he was reduced from a sergeant to a private. And, (laughs) was discipline. I'm not sure how else he was disciplined and eventually became a leader again. That's a story worth – and, that was the beginning of a tradition of a 105 howitzer being deployed in the things that take place with the flag coming down on the parade ground. JC: Okay. Now, you said you didn't play any sports, you just played the trombone. WG: Right. JC: And, did you participate in any other activities? WG: I skied, but not on the ski team. And, I think that was part of the appeal of Norwich. And back then, there was a ski slope right across from the school. And, on a Saturday for sure and on Sunday, you could just walk across with their skis and just ski. And I remember that those of us in the signal corps course were a part at Mt. Mansfield, of setting up a communication system for some ski races that occurred there and to do that of course, we all got free skiing (laughs) as part of our setting of it up. JC: What did you do to relax when you were at Norwich? WG: Well, I think an important part of my Norwich experience was the fraternity life which we – we joined fraternities – was it our freshman year? I think so. And if it wasn't, it was the sophomore year. Because we ate in – the mess hall is the current chapel, and after the chapel mess hall, it was in the fraternities that most, but not all, that most of the school had their meals, lunch and dinner. And, the social life of the fraternity, I think, was very important. We had parties just about every Saturday night and we had a beer keg. And the commandant came around to make sure we weren't drinking. And the word went out ahead of his visiting, to the first fraternity. There were six, I think. And, that fraternity spread the word around the others that he's on his way. And when we got that word, we all had paper cups, so that by the time he got there, the keg was behind a two-part door. When it was open, the top part was open, but when he was coming, the top part was closed so you couldn't see the keg. And he would come down, this was in the basement, and he'd come down and we'd all start singing "For He's a Jolly Good Fellow." (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: And I'm sure he knew what was going on. And I would have to say, I would expect that the benefit in part was, and I don't know if anybody's studied this, but I'll bet there was a minimum of drunken driving accidents on the highways if all 9 the drinking was happening at the school. So, the social life centered – and Vermont College was a place where we got dates. Sometimes we went south, I can't remember the name of the school or the town, but it was in south Vermont. Some guys went to New York state for drinking purposes, because you could drink at 18 in New York state. And I remember one – I had a very close friend, Carl Haskell, who was a year older. And I remember on one occasion he had a musket and he and I went out to a nearby bridge and I got to fire the musket and the fun part of that was learning that you pull the trigger and then you wait. (Laughs) JC: Yes. (Laughs) WG: And I swear I could see the bullet flying through the air! JC: (Laughs) WG: (Laughs) And I know that there were some others who – I didn't go hunting. I hunted squirrels when I was growing up in Chester. But some guys were hunters and that was part of the relaxing. I played the trombone in a dance band, The Grenadiers. There was some pick up jam sessions. I remember a classmate who has become a famous military historian, Carl Estes, Este, I'm not sure which it is. JC: I think it's Este1 WG: Este, right. And he played the jazz guitar in the group. So that was – I've always been a big reader. Tony Reddington told me when I saw him that he started reading Soren Kierkegaard because he saw a copy in my hip back pocket of the paperback, by that Danish existentialist philosopher. JC: What fraternity were you in? WG: SAE. Sigma Alpha Epsilon. JC: Okay. And, tell me a little bit more about The Grenadiers. WG: Well, it was a dance band. I think there were – there's a full sax section or if not full, at least almost. Which would mean four saxes, full would be five, usually. And there were either two or three trumpets. There were two or three trombones. Maybe there are four, I'm not sure. Double bass, stand-up bass, drums and I'm not sure if we had, we probably had a pianist. And that was the standard – maybe also guitar, I'm not sure about that. That was the standard makeup of dance bands in those days. Still is for that matter. And, I don't remember – we must have 1 Carlo D'Este 10 played for dances. I don't remember doing it. But, the music was fully, I would have to say, at the top of my relaxing moments. I can play the piano. When I was 12, I had lessons from a jazz piano player who taught me the chords and I had – as I said, this was on the piano, of all the chords. So, what happens is, you can get what's called a fake book which has the melody line and the chords. Guitar players use them, of course. But on the piano, you can play the chord with the left hand, melody with the right. And, I used to do some of that stuff in the fraternity house on the piano. And I remember one fun time at the fraternity house, at a party, they had – I didn't have anything to do with this – but they had taped the girl's restroom. And at the conclusion, after all the dates had been taken home or left to however they got home, I mean, I think it was around 12:00 or 12:30 at night, we gathered in the kitchen to listen to the tape. And we roared with laughter when we heard one girl say, "This party shits. Let's go down to Dartmouth where they really know how to party!" JC: (Laughs) WG: (Laughs) JC: Do you remember any particular song that y'all would play? WG: Songs? Well, the songbook back then, which is still true for me now, "How High the Moon," "Sunny Side of the Street," "Body and Soul," "There Will Be Another You," "The Very Thought of You," and all those. I mean there are about – there's got to be over a thousand of them that are in my head. JC: What about some Norwich songs? WG: Well, there is the school song, which I don't think I ever fully learned the words to. JC: (Chuckles) WG: It doesn't really impress me, musically. (Chuckles) JC: Most alma maters don't. (Laughs) WG: Right. JC: What about "On the Steps of Old Jackman?" WG: Is that a song? JC: Do you remember that one? 11 WG: No, I don't. JC: Oh, okay. WG: I think that's since my time there. And I remember it being sung at some reunion recently. JC: That's one a lot of people sometimes mention. What instructor – who were the instructors who were most influential to you during your time at Norwich? WG: Well, Rev. Hershel Miller was one, and he was the priest of a small Episcopal Church in Northfield as well as on the faculty of Norwich University in the religion department. There was a Roman Catholic priest who taught courses in the religion department and Hershel and that was the makeup of the department. In the – the head of the history department was a Dr. Morse, who was a Harvard graduate, I'm pretty sure. And, my – I took a number of courses, and the name is escaping me, but he was published. He was Eisenhower's historian. [Albert Norman?] And probably the name will come to me. And he lived a long time after retiring, and always sent me Christmas cards. And, I wasn't always an "A" student in his classes, usually a "B" student, I guess. But he seemed to have taken – I think he liked the fact that I went on to seminary. Eber Spencer was the government professor that I had in philosophy – political philosophy course. And he wrote my recommendation for law school. I was very fond of him. There was an English teacher who was the – this was a big part of my life were the Pegasus Players. And the advisor for the Pegasus Players, I think his name was Nelson but I'm not sure. But, in my sophomore year, a friend got me involved in the Pegasus Players and a play called "Time Limit." And, for some reason, I got to lead. I don't know why. And that was the beginning of – that changed my life. My first year I was basically a "C" student. And my second year, I became a dean's list student. And I think that was true for the rest of my life at Norwich. And it was theatre that did it for me. And I found that after getting involved in theatre that I studied less and got better grades. So, I was being more purposeful and with it in my studying. And, in my junior year, I think, I was playing King Creon in the Sophocles play "Antigone" and I think it was somewhat influential in my life. I had a line that I gave in the play. I was speaking to a subordinate person in the play, and the line was, "You dazzle me." And it was a put-down. And the mostly cadet audience roared. It was a total surprise to me that that would happen. And I think I grew to like hearing people laugh. (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: And it's been true in my teaching and church (?) [0:47:04] life since I tended to be somewhat entertaining. 12 JC: What were your favorite classes and least favorite classes? WG: My history classes were – that was one of my favorites. The philosophy classes were all my favorite. I took economics and I would say that had less interest to me but money had less interest to me later. Biology was okay and my first-year math class was so-so. I had had everything in high school, including calculus and I think I could have gone on and majored in math if I wanted to, but the math class was business math. And, much later in life, this could be the reason I didn't like it as much, I got tested for what I should be doing which really didn't provide any surprises. Part of the test was a math test and I'm surprised to have the guy tell me, this was a phycologist that administered the tests, that I'd gotten all the easy questions wrong and all the difficult questions right. (Chuckles) JC: (Chuckles) WG: Which, I guess, means if I'm not entertained, my mind goes to sleep. (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: And I don't pick up on stuff, which could mean I should never fly an airplane. JC: (Laughs) Probably so. What do you remember about being a rook? WG: Well, I remember being yelled at. I remember, I almost didn't come back. And, I think that that was partly – I got one – I remember getting 16 demerits one month. 12 was the limit. And for every demerit over 12 you had to march with a rifle for an hour around the parade ground. So, when I was doing my four hours, I was saying to myself, "This will never happen again," proving that harsh punishment can educate. I remember, but this was true later on too, but I remember feeling somewhat awed and admiring of the senior leaders in the barracks. The company commander and the first and second lieutenant. And I remember in the junior ROTC summer camp, which was Ft. Gordon in Georgia for me in signal (?) [0:50:43] corps, finding one of my first-year cadet officers who had inscribed his name in the firing range. When you were firing, you were behind the targets, underground, the bullets flying over your head, and it was a great pleasure that I saw that. And I have since made a great deal, I think, in my own mind, and to a few people who are considering Norwich, of the importance of the cadre that first year. And I believe that it is somewhat rare today for young people whose peer group up through last year of school, is their age group, and that's somewhat adjusted by the Norwich experience because your peer group at Norwich, your first year is your age group and then the rest, older cadets who are teaching you and that makes a lot of sense to me. And whether they're being nice about it or not, you still learned how to make the beds the way they wanted you to and shining your shoes and polishing your brass, pressing your pants and shirt and where to keep 13 stuff in a drawer, in a bureau drawer in the room. And the other aspects of getting ready for a daily inspection. And I think, generally, post-Norwich thinking, that most people, it's not until they hit the work world, that their peer group is other than their age group and it makes it, in my mind, much more important to have intergenerational experiences. This is true in the music world. And I think when you learn an instrument you have a non-parent teaching you how to play something, that's different. And parents are probably not so good at teaching because they have such an emotional investment. And when I was teaching in my private schools, three of them being boarding schools, I always thought that we teachers were doing a better job of parenting because we didn't have the emotional investment that the parent has. And very recently I've read that up until the 1970s, the nurturing community in a family wasn't just the two parents. It was grandparents, aunts and uncles, cousins, older kids, non-relatives that were functioning as aunts and uncles and somehow, at some point, maybe it's not the 70s, maybe it's the 50s, who knows. Life changed in the nurturing experience growing up, which could make the Norwich experience that much more important. JC: Now, you said you got 16 demerits. Do you remember what you did? WG: I don't. It was sloppy, whatever it was. I didn't – I may have missed a class. That was worth two. And, I don't know, if I didn't shine my shoes or something. But it was dumb stuff. JC: What was the hardest part of attending Norwich? WG: I would guess the first three months was the hardest part. And what you learned over the four years was – and I retained this in my head at least – is the non-military person is just clueless about what's happening in the military. And what's happening is you're gaining mastery over a whole culture and living in that culture. And once you gain the mastery, you're just doing what you knew how to do. And, that's relaxing. (Laughs) And the – I can remember coming back as the sophomore and how happy everybody was. And when we visit Norwich, we – and they mix the cadets up with the visiting people, it seems as if the cadets all have a very high spirit of being at ease and happy and on top of things and I think that's part of, that's part of the musical experience, is gaining mastery at an early age over something. And somebody's written a book recently called Grit, I don't know if you know of it. JC: I've heard of it. WG: You've heard of it. And she's a social psychologist. And her main point, which is present in advertising for the book is, it's not the smartest people who become 14 the most successful. It's people who've learned perseverance. And I think that's part of the Norwich experience for those who don't drop out. JC: What was your favorite part about Norwich? WG: Going back. (Laughs) And not being part of the cadet corps. JC: (Laughs) WG: (Laughs) I guess the mess hall was a favorite part. The fraternities were a favorite part. I loved the parading, in the band. That was a favorite part. Still, when I hear a marching band drums, I get a special tingle. And the two bands that I play in, we're playing mostly serious and semi-serious music. Stuff like medleys from Duke Ellington or Broadway show medleys, that kind of stuff, but we also play marches. And I always enjoy playing the marches. And, I think the dance band is the direct descendent of the marching band. JC: What was the most important thing you think that Norwich taught you? WG: Good question. I would think it was perseverance. Now, that's somewhat influenced having just read this book. But, I tend to – well I'll tell you a musical story. I was living – I was single, living – having broken up with my wife, in Peekskill, New York and all – forever after Norwich, I was always active as a musician, mostly in jazz swing bands. So, I had a job at a New York City college, Hofstra I think, but I'm not sure that that's in New York City, but there's one that is in New York City. And, I was to play, I also play the double bass, I was to play there one night and my car broke down. I was to play both instruments, trombone and bass. So, I determined that I would try, by taxi and then by train, to get into the city with a standup bass and a trombone. Most of my playing in these swing bands is without music because it's usually improvised. So, I got myself into the city. Got through the subway turnstile, was standing on the subway, bass in one arm and trombone being held by the other, and a Chinaman came up and looked at me and twisted around me, and I was saying to myself, "Is this guy going to steal one of my instruments and run off and how will I chase after him?" And it looked up, and in sort of broken English, he said, "You musician?" (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: Which, of course I was. And the thought now of the effort I went to get from Peekskill to the gig and back, was rather extraordinary. But it has been true of my life generally that I push hard. JC: Norwich's motto is "I Will Try." What does that mean to you? 15 WG: Well, I always thought it was a dumb motto. I thought they could do better. Even "Lay or Bust" is a better motto, maybe. (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: I mean, it's clear that some ad man hasn't designed it. But I actually think, my second and third thoughts about it is, it's pretty good. And I just read that infants – we saw a 12 month or 14-month-old boy in a restaurant waiting room with grandparents, parents surrounding it and he was standing with his arms out, back and forth as he maintains his balance. Is he going to take a step, or isn't he? That being hugely entertaining to the family and everybody else. That infants have to try again and again and again and they don't experience shame or failure. So, that could say that one of the more inhibiting aspects of adult life is when we fail and get all hung up over it, rather than trying again. And, it turns out, in science and in life generally, so much of the best stuff that happens, happens because you don't give up. JC: What does Partridge's idea of a citizen soldier mean to you? WG: Well, it means that I would vote for universal military training. (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: I think that there is a national community that is being addressed by that identity. And the contributions that we make as citizens to our national life are going to all be happening locally, to be sure. But, we are citizen soldiers in any – in many of the contributions that we make whether it's in the military or not. And, I just think – especially at the late adolescence early adulthood stage of life, there are advantages to the military experience. I had a cab – a driver from an automobile company give me a ride home while they fixed my car and she'd just gotten out of a four-year air force stint and she told me – I asked her if she'd gone back to college because she had gone into the air force after high school. She said she had tried community college but it just didn't take, and my sense of it was that she couldn't stand the people she was going to school with. That they didn't have the dedication and seriousness that (inaudible) [1:05:21] the air force had had. And I've also read recently, I don't know if you've read Sabastian Junger's book Tribe but I can recommend it. It's short. The pages are short. And it's about our society and its brokenness and how people coming out of the military, coming from such a self-sacrificing, dedicated community oriented life into a me-too-ism, lack of community life in our country generally. And he's attributing that, rightly or wrongly, I'm not sure, but it makes some sense. Attributing to that, the post – PTSD depression. He points out that after 9/11 in New York City, the murder rate was cut in half, the suicide rate was cut in half because it was such – it was a greater sense of community. And I think Norwich has that sense of community that he's saying is missing. So, maybe Norwich 16 people should be prepared for the dysfunctional world they're entering and how to cope with it. JC: Now, after graduation, you went on to seminary. You never did join the military. WG: Right. JC: How did your training at Norwich prepare you for life? WG: Well, I think that's the same question as earlier. I think it prepared me for perseverance. I was a preacher at Norwich after I graduated from seminary. And, Herbert Spencer, my philosophy politics teacher, told me after the sermon that he was just amazed at how much more mature I was than I was at Norwich. And I believe that this may be true of graduate study generally that you learn to think in a more disciplined way than you did in college, which is not a commentary on Norwich necessarily but perhaps on our expectations of what college is supposed to do. And my experience in graduate school was reading a – I'm a big reader – and when I got there I took a speed reading course knowing that a huge amount of time was going to be spent reading. And it was very effective. But I believe part of what was happening to me was, in seminary I was learning how other people of great skill think. Doesn't mean that I bought their thought, but I knew how they were thinking. And I think that's – that was something that I – I would have to say that whatever I learned at Norwich, that deepened the thinking aspect of life that I received. JC: How do you think your professional life would have been different had you not been a Norwich graduate? WG: Well, that's good. I don't know. It could go back to perseverance. I've been a very outspoken person in my professional life. And, I think that could have been nurtured at Norwich, calling a spade a spade when I would see it, regardless of the consequences. And I think I sort of have a reputation in that way. Some people tell me that they are amazed at my courage, that I don't seem to be scared by what other people are scared of. And I think I was a very fearful person my first year at Norwich. And that may have – when I went to the summer camp training, I had what I regard as a very important experience. There were about 750 or 800 cadets. And we were taken into a field and told to yell as loud as we could. And so I was chosen of the three to be the regimental cadet colonel for marching all of the cadets from the barracks area to a parade area and doing the parade thing and marching back. And a regular army lieutenant took me – I didn't have any misgivings about this because part of the Norwich experience, even if you weren't in a command position, I was a private all first three years, was that you've seen people do this over and over again. So, you're ready to mimic what you see. And – but he took me over the trip I'd be taking, so we rehearsed. I knew what the commands were going to be but I'd hadn't known where I'd being going. So, we rehearsed the whole thing. 17 Now, I can tell you, as a priest, it became – that inspired me always to have wedding rehearsals. (Laughs) JC: (Laughs) WG: And the value of rehearsing is huge in my head. And I think that could be part of the Norwich experience. But, by the time I got to Ft. Gordon, Georgia, I was relatively fearless at, I think, a lot of the military stuff that other people were probably somewhat wary of because of the Norwich experience. And when I didn't go in the military, my feeling was, because of Norwich, I've done that. I'm not interested in doing it again. (Chuckles) JC: (Chuckles) WG: I want to get onto other things. JC: Do you think being a Norwich graduate opened doors for you that wouldn't have been open otherwise? WG: Well, that's a good question. I don't know. I also would say, and I think it's important to know this, that when I was there, partly the influence of this religion teacher, there were a high number of Norwich guys that went to seminary, and it could be partly the military because a big part of Sunday morning life is ritual. But – and I think it could be the emphasis on surface that the military had and Norwich has. And I don't know what the situation is now. I don't think being a minister today has the social significance that it once had. It's not something everybody's dying to do. But that, I think there was a – I would think that probably more people were going to seminary in those old days from that school than perhaps from others. JC: Do you think Norwich graduates have a special bond that other military or civilian schools don't have? WG: I don't know. JC: What about band (?) [1:14:33] company? Now I've heard – WG: Oh yes. Yes. Yes. JC: -- that kids have very close knit bonds. WG: Yes, yes. That's also true in my jazz life. You meet a jazz musician anywhere, you're totally at ease. And he may be totally untrustworthy but you don't know that and you're willing to trust him until he proves otherwise. And, yes, I would guess that the Norwich – certainly the band's people at Norwich this is true of. And it's just partly because you know – you both know what the other one has 18 been through. And, to a certain extent, I wouldn't be surprised if the same thing is true for all of the Norwich graduates. JC: Now, have you been involved with Norwich since you graduated? WG: I was part of the alumni association in the 80s. I was asked to be the baccalaureate speaker at a graduation in '86, when the president was – JC: General Todd? WG: Yes. General Todd. And, I've occasionally gone to the send offs of, and to the occasional (sic) when Schneider came to Bedford within the past year. And, that's what I think. JC: Do you stay in touch with any of your classmates? WG: I've got one that I stay in touch with, who has been forbidden from coming to the school because he threatened to tear off the veil of a Muslim – JC: Oh! (Laughs) WG: -- cadet. And I just don't agree with that at all. I think there's a lot of stupidity at work in the anti-Muslim feeling. And the real situation is that Saudi Arabian Wahhabism which merged the tribal culture of Saudi Arabia with Islam and which has been exported both to this country and to other parts of the world which has resulted in ISIS and such a bad reputation for Muslims. But, there you go. JC: What advice would you give a rook today on how to survive and thrive at Norwich? WG: (Laughs) They should try. JC: (Laughs) WG: Whatever it is. Keep trying. JC: Now, did you have any other relatives that attended Norwich? WG: No. JC: Is there anything else you'd like to add or have a comment? WG: I'll probably think of it after you leave. 19 JC: (Laughs) WG: (Laughs) JC: That's generally the way it goes. Alright, well I thank you very much for this interview. WG: You're welcome. It's been very enjoyable. JC: Thank you. (end of audio)
Azerbaijan is a secular, majority-Shiite, oil and gas-rich country whose per-capita income quadrupled in real terms during the period 2004-10. While rising incomes have reduced poverty, steps towards a more secure, diversified economy are held back by a public sector that rests on vested interests, patronage-based incentive structures, and ingrained patterns of behavior that include significant rent extraction, particularly from the non-oil economy, with minimal checks and balances from Parliament, the private sector, and civil society. Bank engagement in Azerbaijan at the country level focused on areas which had government support. Some modest results have been achieved, even though in many cases modern laws and practices were adopted without adequate plans for implementation. At the project level, the Bank has supported the strengthening of project implementation units (PIUs) and tools for monitoring, and governance and institutional filters have signaled that Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) processes need to be embedded in the Bank projects. At the sector level, the Bank's work was highly relevant in supporting oil revenue transparency, primary education, roads, and the development of safeguards. It was substantially relevant in public financial management, and private sector development and procurement. Bank engagement was moderately relevant in decentralization, civil service reform, and accountability institutions.
The international business environment is still changing dramatically and, although international growth may introduce added complexity it may be unavoidable for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) mainly due to the increasing globalization of markets (Levitt 1983) and industries (Yip 2003). In the face of rapid globalization, SMEs are a vital part of the economic systems of both emerging and developed countries. As Veloso (1991) points out, this type of companies may be an important organ for increasing the level of competitiveness of emerging markets. Some studies, for example, Yasuf (2001), go to the extent of suggesting that growth and employment in developing countries depend on the fate of SMEs. The incentive and the legal structures within which firms must operate have been drastically altered. SMEs are no longer protected from foreign competition and local buyers and suppliers are becoming more sophisticated. To compete effectively, SMEs must adapt and reshape themselves to facilitate adjustments and enhance learning for their growth and economic development. This article provides a typology to explain the degree of internationalization of SMEs. At one extreme is tangible internationalization, which is short-term and depends on macro and microeconomics factors exogenous to firms; at the other is a combination of tangible and intangible internationalization, which implies a strong commitment by firms to become competitive at international levels.I argue that different forces have forced the internationalization not only of firms, but also of markets, so that SMEs can become global without a physical presence in foreign markets. Furthermore, it may be necessary for these companies to become global if they are to remain competitive in their local markets. As a result of this paradigm shift, internationalization is based not only on geographical aspects, which are closely related to firm internationalization, but also on intangible considerations, which are closely related to market internationalization.Tangible internationalization is a restricted approach defined as a physical presence in a foreign market; it consists mainly of foreign sales, foreign direct investment (FDI), physical presence in foreign markets, and foreign suppliers. It fluctuates with exchange rates, costs of inputs, and other resource endowments that are tied to a particular geographic location. On the other hand, intangible internationalization implies a change in the comprehensive approach to the way firms should reconfigure, develop and secure resources. Intangible internationalization requires facilitating learning at all levels of a firm to increase the stock of knowledge, and, therefore, to improve flexibility on the production side and increase the likelihood of developing new resources and processes, thus enhancing the firm's critical invisible assets (Itami and Roehl 1987). An SME should aim for both in order to take advantage of a physical presence in foreign markets and provide constant incentives to facilitate learning and new organizational capabilities and processes. Tangible internationalization is a short-term expansion in foreign markets because it takes advantage of temporary macro- and microeconomics conditions; it does not require changes at the firm level. On the other hand, a combination of intangible and tangible internationalization has a higher probability to be sustainable in the long term and mostly depends on the firm's actions to meet international standards.This article emphasizes 5 crucial aspects of that managers need to be aware of: I. A matter of having an strategic plan II. An internal perspective of the firm III.The need of expanding the knowledge bases of SMEs IV.How to access and secure resources: networks V.The entrepreneurial aspectsI. A Matter of Having an Strategic PlanWhile firms have an important degree of freedom to make their own decisions, the effect of the environment cannot be discounted. This matter becomes critically important in the context of emerging economies because firms are not only facing changes in the structure of the industry in which they operate, but also in the surrounding and institutional environments. To be aware of the different courses of action available, decision makers must understand all the pro-market reforms, not just those that most affect their own industry. According to Weick (1995), the strategic decisions that managers make depend on their cognitive structures and how they make sense of the environment. Managers need to understand any intended change in a way that makes sense or fits an interpretative schema or system of meaning (Bartunek 1984). Andrews (1980) compares the role of the owner-manager to an architect who is in charge of doing the synthesis. Senior managers have the role of analyzing, interpreting, and making sense of clues so as to formulate and implement strategies. Senior managers should act as catalysts to understand and create new interpretative frameworks that provide purpose and direction to the members of the organization (Westley 1990).Laying a Formal Foundation: Making the Implicit Explicit The fact that SMEs have inadequate organizational structures and managerial expertise is a real problem in a changing environment. SMEs do not have the same level of support to increase their competitiveness, and given the lack of managerial expertise, building an adequate structure is not a straightforward process, even though it is a central one. Formalizing routines and processes within firms to make them less dependent on a specific individual is key. This is an important concern because SMEs not only have a less highly developed structure, but their fate is closely linked to one or a few individuals who posses knowledge or resources that have not been made explicit to the rest of the firm.Nevertheless, in a changing environment managers need to be proactive and to rethink their approaches regarding the future activities of their firms. A mere replication of previous strategies may no longer be a valid option when firms are competing in the international arena. The future can be imagined and enacted and that companies must be capable of fundamentally reconciling themselves by regenerating their core competencies and reinventing their industry. The role of managers is not to plan for the future, but to manage the process of learning and to be open to the possibility that new strategies can emerge.II. Analyzing the Firm's ResourcesAn analytical examination of the resources of a firm may help to develop an understanding not only of possible short-run business strategies, but also of future diversifications (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988), growth strategies (Penrose, 1959), and sustainability of long-term rents (Rumelt, 1984). SMEs can compete in the international arena, but they will face international competition from foreign SMEs as well as from multinational enterprises (MNEs). Focusing only on product-market strategies is not enough; instead, the long-term survival of a firm depends on the characteristics and endowment of its resources, which should be valuable and difficult to imitate (Mahoney and Pandian 1992; Grant 1991; Amit and Schoemaker 1993). To be able to compete, the manager-owners of SMEs must know the internal resources and capabilities of their companies. As Andrews (1980: 18-19) suggested, a firm should make its strategic plans "preferably in a way that focuses resources to convert distinctive competence into competitive advantage."Firms are a bundle of different kinds of resources and a set of commitments to certain technologies, human resources, processes, and know-how that manager-owners marshal. This issue is particularly important to the present study because it is not unusual that are controlled, managed, and run by one or a small group of individuals that have a deep, but tacit, knowledge of the firm. What is important is a clear identification—not just a vague idea—of the different resources on which a firm can depend.How to Reconfigure a Firm's Resources? Capabilities exist when two or more resources are combined to achieve a goal and they "emphasizes the key role of strategic management in appropriately adapting, integrating and reconfiguring the internal and external organization skills, resources, and functional competences to match the requirements of changing environment" (Teece et al. 1997: 515). It is important to note that the relative endowment of firms may not necessarily relate to their financial performance because "only the service that the resource can render and not the resources themselves provide inputs into the production process" (Penrose 1972: 25). It is the deployment of a combination of those services that are critical to the rent generation of the firm. Firms need to exploit the existing firm-specific capabilities and also develop new ones (Penrose 1959; Teece 1982; Wernerfelt 1984) to compete internationally and to grow. Over time, SMEs have seen the nature of their rents change; we should expect a shift from Ricardian to Schumpeterian rents. A company may not have better resources, but achieve rents because it makes better use of its resources (Penrose 1959). Rents depend not only on the structure of the resources, but also on the ability of firms to reconfigure and transform those resources. The above discussion leads to the formation of the following hypotheses:III. The Need of Expanding the Knowledge Bases of SMEsThe capacity to exploit a new set of opportunities depends partly on the strategic decisions made by managers. In some cases, these opportunities require at least a reconfiguration of the activities of the firm, but more often, they require the incorporation of new resources and, especially, the introduction of new processes.Firms are as systems of purposeful actions engaging in economic activities to achieve objectives, therefore, they must learn adapt and survive in a complex environment. Organizational learning is the process by which firms can cope with uncertainty and environmental complexity, and their efficiency depends on learning how the environment is changing and then adapting to those changes (March and Olsen, 1976).SMEs need to enhance their learning in two different aspects. First, internal knowledge should be coded and made available to selected members in the company. The manager-owner is knowledgeable about almost all aspects of the business (Mintzberg 1979), and his or her knowledge is personal in the sense that it is located in the mind and not always encoded or available to the rest of the firm. Routines should be created in order to secure the long-term existence of the firm because routines capture the experiential lessons and make that knowledge obtainable by the members of the organization that were not part of the history of the company (Levitt and March 1988).The second way SMEs need to enhance their learning is to make changes in their knowledge base. When socio-economic environments change, firms need to assess the change in order to reformulate how they react to new incentives. The first step is developing a capability to understand the new dynamics. When regulatory and competitive conditions change rapidly, persistence in the same routines can be hazardous because managers and employees use organizational memory or knowledge to make decisions and to formulate the present strategy of the firm.The effectiveness of decisions taken by an SME is greatly influenced by its knowledge base which, in turn, is the result of learning processes that are no longer applicable and may be misleading. Changes in the knowledge base are probably requisite for any firms competing in an industry with tradable products. Supporting infrastructure and routines may prove essential to increase the learning pace and to effectively integrate the new knowledge and reduce the inertia due to outdated knowledge.IV. How to Access and Secure Resources: NetworksSMEs, compared to larger firms, face major challenges in terms of securing and updating resources. Where internal resources are important to accounting for a firm's performance (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001), resources also can be secured within networks that may allow firms to be competitive locally and internationally. Increasingly, networking is seen as a primarily means of rising required resources. Resources, such as information, equipment, and personnel, can be exchanged in networks because of relationships between. Networks are important instruments to ease the constraints facing SMEs in terms of access to: a) capital markets to obtain long-term finance both locally and internationally, b) narrow and highly regulated labor markets, c) information and technologies, d) inefficient tax codes, and e) highly bureaucratic and expansive legal procedures. SMEs may be part of a network not only because it may find complementary resources, but also because owners and managers may have friendship ties with other owners and mangers. These non-economic reasons may be as important as economic ones.A Particular Kind of Network: Industry Clusters An extensive literature exists on the topic of industry clusters. Ricardo's "comparative advantages" can be considered as a pioneering concept of industrial clusters; and Marshall's exposition about externalities is based on industrial localization. Industrial clusters are characterized by having extensive interfirm exchanges and an advantageous environment to pursue business activities. Marshall (1961) argues that industry localization may be an important factor because a) it creates a market for workers with certain industry-specific skills, b) it promotes production and exchange of non-tradable specialized input, and c) firms may take advantage of informational spillovers. Krugman (1991) points out that given the existence of market imperfection, pecuniary externalities may also play an important role in determining the concentration of industry in a specific geographic location. Pouder and St. John (1996) argue that clustered firms have a greater legitimacy than firms outside a cluster. Clusters can provide a critical mass to counterbalance the political influence of large firms and to increase the pressure for investments that affect the productivity of the cluster. Furthermore, competition within clusters increases productivity and new firm development (Porter 1998).V. The Entrepreneurial AspectsIntangible internationalization requires facilitating learning by its employees in order to constantly transform the firm. Implementing mechanisms to expand the knowledge base and to diffuse information should allow SMEs to increase their capacity to develop new goods and services, and to compete in new markets. Key characteristics of this type of internationalization are common interests, trust and openness that allow employees to challenge assumptions. Intangible internationalization is a more difficult international expansion, but it provides sustainable competitive advantages. Consequently, SMEs would become competitive by reducing their costs, introducing new products and expanding their potential markets.It is not possible to engage in tangible internationalization without having a minimum level of intangible internationalization or being competitive without some degree of valuable, rare, in-imitable, non-substitutable resources (Barney 1991). SMEs should aim for both types of internalization in order to take advantage of physical presence in foreign markets and constantly provide the incentives to facilitate learning, new organizational capabilities and processes.Firms have different combinations of internationalization. In order to analyze how SMEs can take advantage of both tangible and intangible internationalization, the foundation of the potential competitive advantages need to be identified. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how firms deliver products that have value for customers, but also to understand what makes these firms different from the rest (Hall 1998). I argue that there are three major categories of differential that have a strong impact on the nature of internationalization of SMEs. The first is called firm differential, and includes a) organizational (team level), b) managerial (individual level), c) physical endowment and d) technological capabilities differentials. The second category is based on the home country characteristics and it is called country differential. The final category,market differential, takes into consideration the specific features of local markets and industries. These differentials deeply influence the role of owner-manager. There are three basic approaches that a SME can adopt while anticipating and responding to the needs of its customers. The first one is the approach of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur (Schumpeter, 1934), a leader who breaks away from routine and introduces either new goods/services or new production processes for existing goods/services. The second one is related to Porter's (1980) concept of cost leadership even though Porter studied larger firms from developed countries. The last style of owner-manager is the Kirznerian entrepreneur, who is a person alert to opportunities (see figure 1). This type of role implies that the owner-manager acts as a broker in order to take advantage of over-optimistic or over-pessimistic reactions of economic agents (Kirzner 1973); therefore, the owner-manager will act "in regard to the changes occurring in the data of the markets" (Mises 1949: 255).ConclusionIn the business literature, internationalization involvement usually results from one of two factors: a) the firm possesses some monopolistic advantage that it can use in another country, or b) the host country owns resources that are valuable to the foreign firm. While these reasons may be necessary and sufficient conditions for larger companies, is not necessarily the case for SMEs whom have no option but to internationalization.Those two factors do not necessarily apply to SMEs because they need to become international even if they do not compete in international markets. The average level of competitiveness of SMEs is below that of multinational enterprises. SMEs are faced with international competition whether they decide to internationalize or to remain "local." Even SMEs providing non-tradable goods face a "demand side" pressure to meet the characteristic of similar product sell in other countries. SMEs may not have the time required, according to this model, to meet world-class standards. ReferencesAmit, R. and Schoemaker, P. (1993). "Strategic assets and organizational rent". Strategic Management Journal,14(1):33-46. Andrews, K. (1980). The concept of corporate strategy. Homewood, Irwin. Barney, J. (1991). ¨Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage.¨ Journal of Management, 17(1): 99-120. Bartunek, J. (1984). "Changing interpretative schemes and organizational restructuring: the example of a religion order." Administrative Science Quarterly, 29(3):355-372. Child, J. (1972). "Organizational structure, environment and performance: the role of strategic choice". Sociology,6(1):1-22. Gnyawali, D. and Madhavan, R. (2001). "Cooperative networks and competitive dynamics: A structural embeddedness perspective." Academy of Management Review, 26(3):431-445. Grant, R. (1991). Contemporary Strategic Analysis: Concepts, Techniques, Application. Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, MA. Itami, H. and Roehl, T. (1987). "Mobilizing Invisible Assets". Harvard Business School Press. Kirzner, I. (1973). "Competition and entrepreneurship". University of Chicago Press, Krugman, P. (1991). "Increasing Returns and Economic Geography." The Journal of Political Economy, 99(3):483-499. Levitt, T. (1983). The globalization of markets. Harvard Business Review, 61(May-June): 92-102. Levitt, B. and March, J. (1988)."Organizational Learning." Annual Review of Sociology, (14):319-340. Mahoney, J. and Pandian, R. (1992). "The Resource-Based View Within the Conversation of Strategic Management." Strategic Management Journal, 13(5):363-380 . March, J. and Olsen, J.(1976). Ambiguity and choice in organizations. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget. Marshall, A., (1961 (1890)). Principles of Economics. London: Macmillan. Mintzberg, H. (1979). The structuring of organizations: a synthesis of the article. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Mises, L. (1949). "Human action; a treatise on economics". Yale University Press. Montgomery, C. and Wernerfelt, B. (1988). "Diversification, Ricardian Rents, and Tobin's q". RAND Journal of Economics, 19(4):623-632. Penrose, E. (1959). The theory of the Growth of the Firm. John Wiley: New York. Penrose, E. (1972). The theory of the Growth of the Firm. Originally published in 1959, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Porter, M. (1998). On Competition. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Porter, M. (1990). The competitive advantage of nations. Free Press: New York. Pouder, R. and St. John, C. (1996). "Hot Spots and Blind Spots: Geographical Clusters of Firms and Innovation."The Academy of Management Review, 21(4):1192-1225. Rumelt, R. (1991). "How much does Industry Matter?" Strategic Management Journal, 12(3):167-185. Schumpeter, J. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development. Harvard University Press. Teece, D. Pisano, G. and Shuen, A. (1997). "Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management." Strategic Management Journal, 18(7):509-533. Teece, D (1982). "Toward an economic theory of the multiproduct firm". Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3:39-63. Veloso, P. (1991). "International Competitiveness and the creation of an enabling environment." International competitiveness, ed. By Irfan ul Haque, pp. 29-36. Washington, DC: Economic Development Institute of the World Bank. Weick, K. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Wernerfelt, B. (1984). ¨A resource based view of the firm.¨ Strategic Management Journal, 5(2):171-180. Westley, F. 1990. "Middle Managers and Strategy: Microdynamics of Inclusion." Strategic Management Journal,11(5): 337-351. Yasuf, S. (2001). "Globalization and the Challenge for Developing Countries." Policy ArticleWorking Paper 2618, the World Bank Yip, G. (2003). Total Global Strategy II. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey.Sobre el autorCoordinador Académico de Finanzas FACS, Universidad ORT Uruguay
Background of the research This study intends to analyses the involuntary resettlement of an indigenous Dayak community due to the implementation of the Bakun Dam Project in Sarawak, Malaysia. The significance of this research is that it raises important questions on the impact of development imposed by the state government of Sarawak on the indigenous people who have been regarded as in need of change and to be brought closer to urbanization vis-à-vis modernization through resettlement. Involuntary resettlement due to development projects or infrastructure improvements is not a singular phenomenon and in this context it is often argued that development projects provide employment to the local population and enforce development. However, a dam project also displaces local people from their homes and traditional livelihood. This research focuses on the forced displacement of the indigenous communities at Sg. Asap resettlement because of the implementation of the Bakun Hydro-electric Project (BHP). It is viewed as an involuntary resettlement as the indigenous communities who were residing within the area of the planned BHP had no choice but to move to the resettlement. Their villages and native lands were claimed by the state government for the implementation for the BHP. Thus, the whole problem is focused on the question of why is the resettlement that is promised as a development program for the people by the state government of Sarawak being regarded as forced displacement. In this research, forced displacement is observed at three different levels. First, prior to resettlement, potential settlers are faced with the critical decision of abandoning their homes and livelihoods, causing emotional distress. Secondly, after moving to the new settlement, settlers are often confronted with inadequate compensation for their loss of natural resources, social heritage and land, adding misery to their already distressed situation. Thirdly, resettling people into an area without any supportive resources, i.e. resources whose, purpose is to improve the lives of the settlers compared to their previous situation, fails to accomplish the very purpose of such resettlement. Research objectives and Questions This research utilizes Michael Cornea's analysis, the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model (2000), which brings to the main objective of this research that is to examine the outcomes of involuntary resettlement of the indigenous people. This research compares the situation confronted by the settlers in Sg. Asap resettlement to that definition of "involuntary population resettlement" advanced by Michael Cernea (1998). In this definition, there are two sets of distinct but related processes: displacement of people and dismantling of their patterns of economic and social organization, and resettlement at a different location and reconstruction of their livelihood and social networks. Other than that, the objectives of this research are: to observe if involuntary resettlement planned for meeting the labor needs for the oil palm estates is a catalyst for socio-economic development for settlers. And for policy recommendations, the sub-objectives are: •To subsequently evaluate the problems of accessing resources. •To study to what extent the involuntary resettlement has affecting the social and power structures. •To show the level of changes in social and power structure influencing livelihood strategies. •To examine the most effective network that has provided the people a platform to generate their livelihood. This research details the process and impact of the forced and involuntary displacement faced by the settlers. Factors highlighted include the indigenous people's coping mechanism and strategy in dealing with various issues related to land rights and usage, disagreement and differences in the new social structure, competition over limited natural resources and changing power structure and relations. Issues such as the problems within the household because of the changing family structure and changing role of elderly, men and women in the domestic unit are also highlighted in this research. Most important, this research focuses not only at the displacement issue but also illustrates how settlers rebuild and restructure their life and livelihood. Therefore, based on important concepts, livelihood, coping strategies and power structure, research questions raised are: 1.How do settlers cope with the fact of being involuntarily resettled and what do they do to deal with unanticipated consequences of the social changes that occur? 2.How do settlers manage the new social structure, conflict over limited resources and changing power structures and relations within their own community? 3.Which strategies currently used by these settlers have the potential to build a sustainable livelihood in the new settlement? Theoretical background This research takes the approach of regarding resettlement first and foremost as a catalyst for social change. However, resettlement in the context of 'force' or 'involuntary,' certainly does not ensure positive changes. Dessalegn (1989) defined resettlement in a different context: land settlement, colonisation, or transmigration, all referring to the phenomenon of people distribution, either planned or 'spontaneous'. Accordingly, 'resettlement as in Ethiopia implies moving people or people moving to new locations; colonization as in Latin America implies opening up or reclaiming lands for utilization; and transmigration is favoured by those writing on the Indonesian experience and the word suggests cross-ocean or cross island relocation' (Dessalegn, 1989:668). Palmer refers to resettlement as 'a planned and controlled transfer of population from one area to another' (1979:149). Tadros (1979:122), in analyzing resettlement schemes in Egypt, applied the United Nations definition of human settlement as: 'development of viable communities on new or unused land through the introduction of people' and further defined resettlement in two models: spontaneous and paternalistic. The spontaneous model leaves full scope for individual initiatives, and no support is provided by national or international organisations. No attention is paid to the proper place and function of the settlement within the national context. In the paternalistic model, technical support such as education, tools, equipment and other assistance is provided to the settlers (Tadros, 1979:122). The above definitions can be used in a different fashion for this research, thus the term 'forced' or 'involuntary resettlement'. In reality, despite the good intentions for developing communities, resettlement can also 'under develop' communities in the sense that such communities face greater hardship compared to life before resettlement. To this extent, the working definition of 'resettlement' in this research is a poorly planned resettlement through a forced, involuntary relocation of communities onto unused land that is inadequate for communities to develop a productive and fully functional socio-economic system. This research has adapted the concepts proposed by Michael Cernea (1998), looking at involuntary resettlement in general. The concept of involuntary resettlement (in this research also termed as forced resettlement), which is the comprehensive concept most often used in the current social science literature, integrates 'displacement' and 'resettlement' into one single term, in which the emphasis on involuntariness directly connotes the forced displacement. The usual description of 'involuntary population resettlement' consists, as mentioned earlier, of two sets of distinct but related processes: displacement of people and the dismantling of their patterns of economic and social organization, and resettlement at a different location with reconstruction of their livelihood and social networks. Resettlement refers to the process of the physical relocation of those displaced, and to their socio-economic re-establishment as family/household micro-units and as larger communities. Displacement implies not only physical eviction from a dwelling, but also the expropriation of productive lands and other assets to make possible an alternative use of the space. This is not just an economic transaction or a simple substitution of property with monetary compensation. Involuntary displacement is a process of unravelling established human communities, existing patterns of social organization, production systems and networks of social services. Overall, forced displacement of communities causes an economic crisis for most or all of those affected, entails sudden social disarticulation, and sometimes triggers a political crisis as well (Cernea, 1998:2-3). This research investigates the implications of resettlement and the reconstruction of the livelihood of the affected settlers. Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction Model (IRR) provides important variables to explore these issues further. Several important variables in the IRR model are utilised to create an independent framework for this research, and is explained in the following section. As Cernea explained, the IRR is a model of impoverishment risks during displacement, and of counteractions to match the basic risks where the multifaceted process of impoverishment was deconstructed into its fundamental components. The components are: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property assets, and community disarticulation. This analytical deconstruction facilitates understanding of how these sub-processes interlink, influence, and amplify each other. Reconstruction, then, is the reversal of the impoverishment processes, and can be understood and accomplished along the same variables, considered in a holistic, integrated way (Cernea, 2000:5; 2003:40). IRR focuses on the social and economic contact of both segments of the process: the forced displacement and the re-establishment. The model captures processes that are simultaneous, but also reflects the movement in time from the destitution of displacement to recovery resettlement (Cernea, 2000:18). There are three fundamental concepts at the core of the model: risk, impoverishment and reconstruction. Each is further split into sets of specifying notions or components (as mentioned above) that reflect another dimension, or another variable of impoverishment or reconstruction (for example, landlessness, marginalisation, morbidity or social disarticulation). These variables are interlinked and influence each other; some play a primary role while others play a derivative role in either impoverishment or reconstruction (largely as a function of given circumstances). The conceptual framework captures the disparity between potential and actual risk. All forced displacements are prone to major socio-economic risks, but they are not fatally condemned to succumb to them. Cernea further explains that in this framework the concept of risk, as stated by Giddens (1990), is to indicate the possibility that a certain course of action will trigger future injurious effects – losses and destruction. Following Luhman (1993), the concept of risk is posited as a counter-concept to security: the higher the risk, the lower the security of displaced populations (Cernea, 2000:19). The model's dual emphasis – on risks to be prevented and on reconstruction strategies to be implemented – facilitates its operational use as a guide for action. Like other models, its components can be influenced and 'manipulated' through informed planning to diminish the impact of one or several components, as given conditions require or permit. That requires considering these variables as a system, in their mutual connections, and not as a set of separate elements. The model is also flexible as a conceptual template, allowing for the integration of other dimensions, when relevant, and for adapting to changing circumstances (Cernea, 2000:20). This model can be linked with other conceptual frameworks, to achieve complementary perspectives and additional knowledge (Cernea, 2000:21). There are four distinct, but interlinked, functions that the risks and reconstruction model performs: A predictive (warning and planning) function A diagnostic (explanatory and assessment) function A problem-solution function, in guiding and measuring resettlers´ reestablishment A research function, in formulating hypotheses and conducting theory-led field investigations For this research, the function falls under the third function, the problem-resolution. As Cernea explained, the problem-resolution capacity results from the model's analytical incisiveness and its explicit action orientation. The IRR model is formulated with an awareness of the social actors in resettlement, their interaction, communication, and ability to contribute to resolution. The model becomes a compass for strategies to reconstruct settlers´ livelihoods (Cernea, 2000:22). The IRR model clearly points out the results of social change and social disorganisation caused by involuntary resettlement. For the purpose of analysis, the two major variables used for the framework are: loss of access to common property assets and; social and community disarticulation, give a crucial foundation to exhibit the implications of forced displacement. Both of the major variables have been linked to understand the problems that are occurring in the community and households (shown as dependent variables - the coping mechanisms, the way settlers manage risks and the type of resources that people engage to strategise their livelihood). Each component respectively points out the results of change caused by involuntary resettlement i.e. competition over forest resources, state land and living space, and; dismantling of traditional power structure, communal structure and family structure. Although the central theme of the theoretical framework is forced displacement, the framework is expanded to the investigation of coping mechanisms, power structure and relations, and the way settlers strategize their livelihood. The research framework has aimed clearly at the impact of involuntary resettlement which is concluded in this research as causing the changes and social disorganization in the social structure of the settlers. However, the framework also extends to another level for the investigation of the strategies of rebuilding and restructuring of settlers. Main research findings With regard to the perspective to develop the indigenous people through resettlement program, as shown in this research, there are more losses than gains being achieved especially on the settlers' side. What they have left behind (history, livelihood, rights and identity) at their natural environment cannot be retrieved, and uncompensated. And it is also a fact, as proven in this research that the uncompensated losses continue to be the sole grievances of settlers and the factor of causing continuous displacement amongst settlers. This research concludes that as much as the involuntary resettlement has brought many new challenges to the Kenyah-Badeng, many of these challenges are beyond their capability to manage. The underlying problem is settlers were not actively involved in designing their future in the new settlement from the very beginning the project was proposed. The settlers were receiving diminutive information about the resettlement program, and very limited public platform for them to participate or to voice out their concerns and suggestions before its implementation. The factor that causes their continuous displacement is the non-existence of natural resources and land (other than the three acres given to them as part of the compensation) for them to generate income (remember that most of them are farmers without any skill useful to work in non-agricultural activities). Their life in the former village was hard but they were free to explore as much resources as possible, and they owned their native land. In the resettlement, they are as much strangers to the place as to the way of life they are faced with at the new settlement. In other words, settlers simply do not know how to behave appropriately in radically changed social situations because they are not equipped with necessary living tools. The study of the displacement of the Kenyah-Badengs is concluded in three important aspects as follows: Power structure and relations - In power structure and relations, kinship has always been an important aspect that became the reference for any struggle over leadership issue. Kinship is viewed on a larger scale that includes not only blood relation, but also aspects such as others who came from the same root, indicating that kinship in that term was very much related to sharing of the same history of settlement, migration and culture. It has been proposed that kinship was one crucial aspect that binds this community together, but not likely to be true at the new settlement. The power structure in the Kenyah-Badeng community at the resettlement stand as a separate system, failed to bind the people together, no orders from the leader and not accepting orders by the people. However, they carry out the norm of being as peaceful community, as they have always been. Coping through family network – Because of the failure of power structure and relations, the Kenyah-Badeng become family/household oriented in their livelihood strategies. The family network proves to be the most important coping mechanism for such challenging social environment. The family network provides a platform for its members to generate income, employment, social and moral support, education, and security in general. Livelihood strategies – With the absence of promised resources, settlers are faced with many problems with regards to economic aspects at the new settlement. Their agriculture knowledge is insufficient to success them for employment in town. They mainly work on their allocated three acres of land with other problems tagged along as the lands are located at sloppy and slumps area, as well as faced with low grade soil. For their agriculture productions, they are faced with marketing problem because of the established sellers who refused to allow them to get into the network. This research also humbly suggesting an alternative for settlers to improve their livelihood based on the available resources at the resettlement with the assistance of the state government, at least to initiate strategies for marketing. Settlers need "retooling" in many aspects of agriculture knowledge as that is what they have known best to build their livelihood. Government agencies should assist in terms of skill training related to effective methods to produce quality agriculture productions on their three acres of land. Horticulture should be encouraged on their three acres plot and this method has been carried out by the settlers in their swidden agriculture (slash and burns) at their former village areas. At the new settlement, the prospect of horticulture on pesticide free and organic food can be very encouraging. Methods The information and data for this research were obtained through formal and informal interviews, household survey, household in-depth interviews, and secondary data from available sources in prints, documents and internet. Questions for the interviews were formulated first based only on the research questions. At the field site, questions were expanded and added after numerous trial interviews with key informants to improve the questions before the real interviews were conducted. There were 55 household surveys, and from this survey, 20 households were selected randomly for the household in-depth interviews. The head of households were both male and female. Outline of the thesis This research is organized in chapters as the following summary: Chapter 1 provides the background information of the research area i.e. descriptively introduces Belaga, the region where Bakun Hydroelectric Project (BHEP) was implemented, the implementation of BHEP and the reaction of the local inhabitants. The resettlement in Sg. Asap, and the composition of the settlers are also discussed in this chapter. Chapter 2 touches the historical perspective of the Kenyah-Badeng focuses on their livelihoods at Long Geng, their former village before they resettled at Sg. Asap. This chapter also includes a brief history of their migration and settlement to Long Geng, and also the political structure in Long Geng. Chapter 3 discusses the power structure and relations of the Kenyah-Badeng. This chapter draws on the first stage of displacement i.e. processes of losing common property and space with prominent issues such as compensation, land rights and the expected involvement of local leaders in the whole process of the resettlement as highlights of the discussion. Brief history of land legislation in Sarawak based on the interpretation of Native Customary Land and native's rights over ancestral land based on literature reviews is illustrated in this chapter. The purpose of this illustration is to understand the background and general problems of land identification within the Kenyah-Badeng community prior to payment of compensation. Chapter 4 focuses on the discussion of the coping mechanisms employed by the settlers in handling crucial issues pertaining to their livelihood at the resettlement. In fact, this chapter continues the discussion of the stages of displacement highlighting the other two stages by discussing in-depth the situation of "loss of access to common property and space" and "social and community disarticulation". The headings of objectives outlined by State Planning Unit, Sarawak in the development plan of the resettlement are utilized as the base to explain the cause of the displacement and to illustrate the reality at present life of the Kenyah-Badeng. Chapter 5 focuses on the livelihood strategy in which family network is important as the platform for pooling resources. Departing from forced displacement, this chapter illustrates the emergence of coping reaction amongst the settlers by analyzing the family network discovered within the households interviewed in this research. Chapter 6 highlights the changing livelihood of the settlers highlighting the significant of wage employment where remittance is crucial to support their family who are living at the resettlement. The current perspective of settlers towards education and their willingness to invest into their children's education is also discussed in this chapter. Chapter 7 summarizes the research findings and concludes the research.
Transcript of an oral history interview with Richard S. Schultz, conducted by Sarah Yahm at Norwich University on 8 April 2015, as part of the Norwich Voices oral history project of the Sullivan Museum and History Center. Richard Schultz was a member of the Norwich University Class of 1960; his interview focuses on discussion of his connections to Norwich University, his military service, and his law practice. ; 1 Richard Schultz, NU 1960, Oral History Interview April 8, 2015 Interviewed by Sarah Yahm SARAH YAHM: And you're bragging. (laughs) DICK SCHULTZ: That's what this is all about. SY: No, but it's not bragging, it's really just, but we'll, the whole point is it's sort of a casual conversation, so I'll ask questions and it's going to trigger your memory. And the point of oral history, too, is that it's not just like, you know, you've probably told the same stories a thousand times at dinner, you know. DS: Well, they get better as you -- SY: And you get better as you go along. But so, but maybe I'll ask a question that will make you rethink that story or remember another detail and things like that, you know. So that's kind of how it works. So anyway, so you're going to get, so for instance, you know, I interviewed somebody and, and I'm talking about, well, you'll get it back and you'll get to, you know, edit out things that are uncomfortable. So for instance, I've interviewed a bunch of the Iranian students who were here in the '70s, we're going to have to redact large parts of those interviews because if they ever want to go back to Iran, or their relatives in Iran, things need to be wiped out. Right? So there's that, which is serious, and then there's somebody who said something mean about her mother-in-law and was like, "You have to get that out of the tape!" right. So it spans the whole gamut. So let's get you close to this microphone, skooch in and close to the microphone. And then I have to test levels. So tell me what you ate for breakfast today. DS: Well, we had breakfast at the Capital Grill, I had two eggs, over light, some bacon, some good toast and several cups of coffee. SY: Oh my god, several cups of coffee. It's going to take me a lot to keep up with you. I haven't had my first sip of tea yet today. So you're going to be way faster than me, but that's okay. Hold on now, I'm checking my levels, okay, my levels are good. Your levels are good. okay. So I am here, what's the date? I should know that. But remember, you had the coffee. DS: Today's the eighth. SY: OK. So it's April 8th, I'm here at the Sullivan Museum and History Center with Richard Schultz, but you go by Dick, right? DS: Yes, I do. SY: With Dick Schultz, class of '60. DS: The great class of '60. SY: The great, so what made the class of '60 so great? DS: We're so active. Even the president, when he refers to us, we are the "great class of '60." SY: What do you think makes you so active? DS: Spirit, love of Norwich. SY: Yeah? So let's go back. So, well first of all, where were you born? DS: I was born in Brockton, Massachusetts. SY: OK, and when you were a kid, what did you want to be when you grew up?2 DS: An adult, I think. (laughs) I have no idea. I really had no idea as a very young child what I wanted to be. But this leads into Norwich because my father was a Reserve Army lieutenant colonel and I always saw the uniform. And I think as a kid, I wanted to have a uniform. And Dad was a Norwich graduate. And I'm a legacy. He was class of 1934. SY: Wow. Huh. And would he tell you stories about Norwich? DS: Not a lot. He would tell me that in 1934, before they marched to breakfast, they had to go down to the horse stable and take care of their horse. I remember that. SY: Yeah. So your dad was in World War II, I assume. DS: Yes. SY: Where did he serve? DS: He served in the States and in Europe. SY: Yeah. And so let's see, so you were probably a little kid when -- DS: Yeah, I was about seven years old when I really started to notice this. SY: How old were you when he was at war? Four? DS: Yeah, maybe four. SY: Yeah. Do you remember him coming home? DS: I remember coming home. I was, I think I came, after the war we came back to Brockton, Massachusetts, and I started the third grade. So what would you -- SY: But do you remember your dad coming home? Do you remember seeing him? DS: Not really. S: Not really? DS: No. S: Yeah, yeah. And did your mother move in with relatives while he was away? DS: Yes, yeah. SY: Yeah. That was a common thing to do, right? DS: Yep, common thing in those days, yeah. SY: OK, so your dad in uniform, so the military appealed to you. DS: It did, very much so. My dad was there. I had an uncle who served, saw a lot of combat in the Pacific theater and I had another uncle who died as a bombardier over Germany during World War II. SY: And did they talk about World War II, or was it not really discussed? DS: It wasn't discussed. SY: Because you know and again, we think a lot about PTSD nowadays. Do you think that the war, that your father struggled with memories -- DS: No, my father wasn't in actual combat. Not like my uncle who was in Japan, in New Guinea and Guadalcanal and that type of place. My father didn't see that type of combat. My uncle who did see a lot of combat never wanted to speak to it until I got to Norwich, then he would tell me some stories. SY: Really? What would he tell you? So he felt like you were sort of in the brotherhood? DS: Yeah, yeah. What would he tell me? Some of the atrocities that the Japanese committed upon the Philippines, the natives in the Philippines -- the rapes, the murders, the stuff that, that he saw. SY: Yeah, he witnessed that, yeah.3 DS: And he also saw, he also was a very lucky guy. Patrolling through the jungles of New Guinea, I think it was, he had a trained monkey that was on his shoulder and the monkey could somehow sense the Japanese in the area and would start to screech and give him, he was a lieutenant, give him some warning. And one day a Japanese sniper aiming for him shot the monkey off his shoulder. SY: No, he lost his monkey. He lived, but he lost his monkey. DS: He lived, the monkey died. SY: Oh. Happy but sad at the same time. (laughs) That was a good story. OK, so you're a kid, you're growing up in Brockton, Mass, and did you -- this is something I ask everybody -- did you play war as a kid? DS: Oh, I'm sure we did, absolutely. I'm sure we played war games. SY: But you don't remember them? DS: I don't remember them. I think we did, we played more than, war more than we played cops and robbers or Indians. SY: Cowboys and Indians, yeah. Well, it was a great generation post–World War II, it makes sense, yeah. OK. So tell me how you ended up choosing to go to Norwich. DS: Interesting story. I was not -- in high school I broke no academic records. I was just barely surviving. And Dad said, "I think it's time for you to go to Norwich," and in those days I think, I think it's probably not true, but I think as long as you had a pulse you could get into Norwich, OK. And I qualified with a pulse and not much more. And sure enough, I'm admitted to Norwich and I remember the first day I came here, Sarah. I drove up to the main gate in those days and I was 18 years old and I was driving the car, I'm a hot shot. Dad's in the front seat, Mom's in the backseat, kid sister is a couple years, three years younger, she's in the backseat. And I drove up to the gate and there was a cadet standing there and he had a couple of stripes on his arm. And I rolled down the window and I said, "Hey, where do you register?" he looked at me, no answer. And I said it quite, a lot louder, "Hey, where do you register?" no answer. Finally I whistled very loudly at him and he came over to the door and he put his nose through the door, right to my face and he said, "Mister, when you talk to me you call me 'sir,'" and my dad leaned over to me and he whispered in my ear, "I made it through this goddamn place and you'd better, too," my mother had tears in her eyes and my kid sister said that she thought that the cadet was very cute. (laughter) I remember that incident. SY: So you must have been, were you freaking out? Were you like, what the hell have I gotten myself into? DS: I was concerned. And at that point they separated us from our parents. (clears throat) They shaved our heads. And it's my recollection is they issued us an M-1, a rifle. SY: With no bullets. DS: No bullets. And we were told, "Never let it out of your sight," and "Say goodbye to your parents," and, "If you really behave yourself as a class and get recognized, maybe you'll get out of here for Thanksgiving, no guarantees," and then the parents were told to go down to the armory. And Ernie Harmon, Major General 4 Ernie Harmon was president of Norwich and my mother remembered that Ernie, who spoke with a real deep gravel voice said to the parents in essence, "Now why don't you all get the hell off my hill so that I can try to make men out of these pathetic boys." SY: Sounds like something Ernie Harmon would say. DS: That's exactly what he said. And that was it. They left and -- SY: Your father's like, what's going to happen to my little boy? DS: Absolutely, no question. That was my introduction. And I loved it. SY: Interesting. So when did you really start loving it? Right away? DS: I loved it the moment I got there. SY: Really? What did you love? DS: I loved the atmosphere, I loved the camaraderie, I loved the, everybody's doing the same thing, everybody's dressed the same way, nobody's different. SY: And what about that did you like? DS: I just liked the regimentation. I just felt that, this was made for me. And I also had the challenge. My father made it through, I could do it and I could have a better record than he did. SY: And do you think regimentation is part of why you didn't do so well in high school is that you didn't have enough regimentation? You think you were hungry for structure? DS: Oh, I'm a high school kid, you know, I'm chasing girls. I'm not interested in tomorrow's geometry assignment. That's no different than anybody is today, I think. But I loved Norwich. SY: So OK, so do you remember, OK, so you're getting your head shaved, right, so you're losing your precious hair. What are you thinking of while it's happening? Are you like, oh, I don't want to lose my hair? DS: I knew it was going to happen. It wasn't a surprise. SY: And then what about the first time somebody gets in your face and yells at you? DS: (laughs) It's all part of the orientation. You know, you know from day one that if you are a good cadet, a solid cadet, you're going to be in his shoes next year. You're going to have a couple of stripes on your sleeve and you're going to be yelling at next year's rooks. And it's all a big joke. SY: Yeah. Were there any kids who didn't make it? Do you remember? DS: Yes. Statistically, 51%, and I know this because I did some research on it, 51% of the cadets that entered with me in the class of 1960 did not graduate. SY: Wow, and did you -- DS: Now that is because of academics, because of military or because of honor code violations. So we lost 51%. SY: Did you lose any good friends? DS: Not that I can remember. I'm sure I knew them. Sometimes, I don't know if you, sometimes, I've bumped into my old roommate a couple of years ago at one of these reunions and he said to me, "Dick, do you remember the third guy that was in our room in Alumni Hall?" and I said to him, "Billy, we didn't have a third guy," he said, "Yes we did. He stayed only a couple of weeks and you and I woke up one morning and the bed was empty. He was gone," and I said, "You know, you're right."5 SY: You didn't know why, you didn't know -- DS: Just couldn't take it. SY: Yeah, just couldn't take it. So did you ever have moments of doubt, where you were like, am I going to be one of those kids? Or did you know you were fine? DS: I never dared to think that way. SY: Because your father would have killed you. DS: I was going to make it. It never occurred to me to leave. SY: Interesting. So what were your Norwich high moments and your Norwich low moments? DS: High moments, I think involved -- being here at Norwich, as a general thing, I was very proud of being here. I was very proud of the fact that all of the sudden I started to -- not immediately excel, but I started to handle my academic courses. I made good friends. That's something, Sarah, that I -- I think is so important about Norwich. The friends you make here in four years are lifetime friends. SY: Why do you think that is? DS: It's like no other college is, probably because of the fact it was a fulltime military school. Don't forget, in those days there were no women. Everyone, the draft was in, if you left Norwich your name, your deferment ended and you went right back into the draft. SY: So OK, but I'm confused. Because you're in that window post Korea, pre-Vietnam. Right? DS: Yes. SY: So there wasn't a draft (overlapping) -- DS: Oh there absolutely -- SY: There was? DS: There absolutely was a draft in 1960. The draft continued until just before Vietnam. Let's see, Vietnam blew up in 1963 or so. SY: Because that's, I've been confused about that, because I mean knew, and Korea ended when? Fifty? DS: Fifty-five, '56, no maybe '56. SY: So I thought there was a gap of, you know, I don't know, five some odd years where there wasn't a draft, but there was continually. DS: There was definitely a draft. And if you left Norwich, Norwich notified your draft board. SY: OK. And then you were going to go in without any control. DS: That's right. And you were not going in as an officer. SY: Right. Well that certainly makes leaving less appealing, too. So you were saying the friends you make at Norwich are the friends you make for life. DS: Yes. And that stayed, that's true as of today. We're a very, very tight group. Another high point, of course, would be graduation. My -- mother and father pinned my second lieutenant bars on. Dad gave me the first salute, I had to give him a dollar. Those are proud days. And academically I did well, I started to make the dean's list. SY: What was your major? DS: Business administration. I don't know if anyone's ever mentioned to you, but responsibility is something that they teach at Norwich. And cadet officers are 6 responsible for everything that happens or fails to happen under their watch. If a rook is not doing well academically, it's his captain's fault. And they would knock on your door during study hours and you'd better be seated at your desk reading a textbook and not a comic book. And there were certain hours that the upperclassmen were not allowed to bother you, academic hours, study hours. But once the study hours were over, then all hell broke loose. Then you're matched out into the halls and you're bracing and you're doing pushups and you're parading through the shower in nothing more than a raincoat and anything that the upperclassman can do to harass you. And then at a certain hour, get in your sack, go to sleep, it all starts again tomorrow morning. SY: Right, right. So did you end up taking on leadership positions in the Corps? DS: Yes. I was promoted my second year to cadet corporal. My third year I was cadet sergeant. My fourth year I was a cadet officer. SY: So what made, you think you learned how to be a good leader? DS: Absolutely. SY: So what made you a good leader? Do you remember a moment when you -- DS: No, there's not a moment. It's the combination of your training. The first thing a leader does is take care of his men. They're most important. Just because you have some stripes doesn't mean you can abuse anyone. And here at Norwich the rooks look at their cadet lieutenants and captains and majors and what have you and say, "That was me, they were me three years ago, four years ago," so that's something I have to aim for. SY: Mm-hmm. Yeah and did you feel, do you remember, I don't know, I was just thinking if there's a moment where you felt like you really excelled as a leader, and a moment when you felt like you failed as a leader? DS: I don't. I don't have specific instances. SY: OK, so we've talked about Norwich highs. And were there any Norwich lows? Failed tests to -- DS: Oh sure. But lows -- I'm hard pressed to tell you about any particular low. To me Norwich was just wonderful. I just could not have made a better choice, even though it probably wasn't my choice. SY: Did you get in trouble? DS: Everybody gets in trouble. Everybody walks tours. Everybody -- (laughs) I remember one time I, as a rook, I was coming up from the mess hall and rooks are not allowed to walk across the Parade Ground at that time. And I was in a hurry to go somewhere, I don't know. In any event, I started walking around, walking across the Parade Ground. And someone from a corner room in one of the, in the hall, I've forgotten the name of the, of it, right next to the -- the path, yelled at me and I turned around and I gave him the bird. And then next thing I knew there were two corporals escorting me up to the third floor room and I knocked on the door and I walked in and I never saw so many stripes in my life. This was a high-ranking junior cadet that I had just given the bird to. And he gave me demerits, that took me 10 hours to walk off. (laughs) Walk back and forth with a rifle. OK? And, but it's all in good spirit. SY: Yeah. What did you guys do for fun?7 DS: What did we do for fun? There were all kinds of clubs and activities. I'd have to go through the yearbook. SY: Were you a member of any? DS: Oh, yeah. And I don't remember, but I was a member of a number of clubs. And -- after the first year when you've got some freedom you could go to Montpelier. You'd grab a ride with an upperclassman, you didn't have a car. But you'd get to Montpelier and sometimes go to Vermont College, known as VC. SY: I was just going to say, what about the girls? DS: The girls, absolutely. Went to see the girls. And -- I don't know, we were so busy. SY: You didn't have much time for fun. DS: No. SY: Let's see. Who were your favorite professors? DS: By name? Oh boy. SY: Any that made an impression on you? DS: I liked most of the professors. I was a business major, I know I liked my English professor. SY: Was Loring Hart your English professor? DS: Yes. Yes, and subsequently president of Norwich. And I liked history. I liked the military professors. I won a prize as a freshman history, military history student. I was awarded a book as a prize, very nice. OK, that was about it. SY: All right. So it's getting to the end of Norwich, right, and you're about to commission. Right. So you know, where did you commission and what was that like? DS: Okay, okay. Let me back up a little bit. Before commission, in my class there were, some of us who thought we might like to go to graduate school. And we were ready to be commissioned and one of my buddies said to me that he was going down to Boston to take the law school admission test and I started to joke with him, I said, "What are you wasting your time for? You're not smart enough, you couldn't get into law school if you wanted to," he said, "I'll bet you $10 that you can't get into law school" and conditioned upon "if you do go down to take the LSATs, you've got friends at Boston University, you get us dates." I said, "Okay, you're on," so I called up my buddies at Boston University and I said, "Myself and a friend are coming down, we're taking the LSATs. We've got a three-day pass, we need dates," done, okay. So sure enough, we take the LSAT and both apply to BU and BC. We want to go to law school together. (clears throat) And he gets accepted at BC and waitlisted at BU. I get accepted at BU, waitlisted at BC. So that was the end of that. Also in my class another, two other guys went to law school, Doug Auer, who is now deceased, and Stan Brown, who is deceased. Stan and I roomed together in Boston. And we got our commissions with the rest of the class and we became what Alden Partridge who founded the school for, we became citizen soldiers. We had, we had, I was offered a regular Army commission, because I was a distinguished military student, which is a certain level of, of that and I turned it down, the regular Army commission, in order to go to law school. The Army said 8 to all of us who went to graduate school, there was also a couple of doctors and a dentist, out of our entire class that was it who went to graduate school, excuse me. And the condition was, yes, you can go to graduate school provided you're in the active Reserve while you're in graduate school. That means that each week you go to a meeting and you go to summer camp during the time you're in law school. Now we're second lieutenants. Which is fine. And that system worked out just great. Then I graduated from the law school. SY: Now hold on a sec. Hold on a second. Because it sounds like you sort of went to law school on a lark. You were like, I'll see if I can get in. DS: Yeah. SY: And then you're like learning tort law and was there a part of you that was like, why did go down and take those LSATs? Or did you discover that you really liked it? DS: Nobody likes law school. Anybody who tells you they enjoyed law school is full of baloney. SY: That is true. I've heard that before. DS: Okay. I think -- I did what was necessary to graduate from the law school. At that point I had no idea what I was going to do. I knew I could have my regular Army commission if I wanted it. And I -- I was just -- I didn't know what I wanted to do with the law degree. And I had to go in the Army, I owed the Army two years of active duty. The Army then came to me and said, "Well, Lieutenant Schultz, you are a Norwich guy, which we like, and a lawyer. You've passed the Massachusetts bar. We're going to make you an instant captain and we're going to put you in the JAG Corps, which is Army lawyers. And I said to them, "No you're not. I have had college right up to here. I don't want to be behind a desk. In the Pentagon or someplace like that. I am a commissioned armored officer and I want to be in tanks," and they said, "Well, it's up to you," I said, "That's right, it is," and so I said, "Where are you going to station?" and this is where the Norwich, what they call the "Norwich Ring Knockers Club" comes from, okay. Norwich takes care of Norwich. And they said, well, "I see that Norwich, well, we can make you this offer. You can stay at Fort Knox, Kentucky and be an instructor," I said, "That's not interesting to me," "Would you like to go to Korea?" I said, "Well, you know, that's a possibility, "Well, would you like to go to Germany?" I said, "Sold, OK, Germany sounds great, send me to Germany," and so a matter of a few weeks after graduating from law school, I reported to Fort Knox, Kentucky, I did some training in Kentucky and then they shipped me off to Germany. Which were, among, Norwich and my active duty time were the most formative years of my life. Both in a very positive sense. I reported to my commanding officer, who was at that time Colonel Frank B. Clay, son of Lucius Clay, who was a famous World War II general and in charge of Germany after the German surrender. Well, Colonel Clay, I went into his office and he has all my, he has my what they call a 201 file, he has my file on his desk and he said, "I'm so glad you're from Norwich," he said, "I am a very busy guy. The only officers I want in this unit are West Point, Norwich, VMI and the Citadel. I don't have time for the others," I 9 said, "Yes, sir," I'm assigned to what is called the Second Armored Cav which is a very, very prestigious outfit. SY: That's my phone. I'm sorry. DS: That's OK. I wanted to ask you if we're doing all right. SY: We're doing great, we're doing great. I'm getting really interested in hearing your stories in Germany. I just have my phone -- DS: Am I getting too detailed? SY: No, no, no, no. This is great. I want to hear about all this stuff. By the way, what did this, your commanding officer, what did he think Norwich grads had that other officers didn't have? DS: OK, we back on? SY: Yeah, yeah. I never actually paused it. Kept it going. Edit out. DS: Well, Colonel Clay, one of the most respected leaders I've ever met, I just loved him, he became a major general -- he wanted the training that came from a military college. He didn't want the ROTC. So anyway, I was about to tell you, the Second Armored Cav is a unit where in, where regular officers go to what is called "get their ticket punched for higher advancement." How in the world they took a reserve officer like me, with a law degree and put me in the Second Cav is beyond me, it belonged to somebody who was going to make a career out of the Army. And it was a wonderful assignment -- we were on what is called the, what was the East German / West German / Czechoslovakian border, known as the tri-zonal point. On one side is a minefield with watchtowers and East German / Russian soldiers looking at us through binoculars and we're patrolling a dirt path, fully armed, which made it a very, very unusual outfit after, in the Cold War. Fully armed, reading to protect ourselves and our only job as border patrol people was to give early warning in case they came over the border. We were much too small a unit to stop them -- our job was just to say, "They're coming, get the hell out," and -- it was so much more interesting than a garrison job because this is something that was very, very necessary and important in the Cold War. SY: So what was a normal day like? DS: Well, you went out on the border for a month at a time and you stayed, after a month you rotated back to your home, "concern" it was called. And you stayed there for two months and then you'd go back out again. What was it like? You lived out in the woods. You slept out there. You patrolled 24 hours, 24/7. You had listening posts. And -- you made sure that they didn't come over. SY: What was a listening post? DS: It was really very, very close to the border with microphones, to see if anybody was trying to sneak over the border. SY: So did you catch anybody sneaking over? DS: I never did. SY: You never did. DS: No. SY: So OK. So were there also any civilians attempting, they wouldn't cross at that point, that point to cross, there were tons of people with guns.10 DS: Yeah, yeah, but there's tons of crazy people. Don't forget, a border is a two-way street. It keeps them out and it keeps us in. So we didn't, we didn't have much of a problem. But we were ready in case there was a problem. SY: Was there ever a time when you thought you guys were going to -- DS: There was a couple of scary times. SY: Tell me about those. DS: One time, you've got to picture, you're in a Jeep. And you're not very well protected. You're patrolling this dirt path. And all of a sudden we heard (machine gun SFX) and we saw about 100 yards in front of us the dirt kick up. Well, if I'm going to, my grandmother, if she wanted to shoot us, wouldn't miss by a 100 yards. They had no intention of hurting us. It was harassment. But we were right there in so-called front lines. So we make a telephone call to Air Force jet fighters who are constantly monitoring the border and we give them coordinates and in a matter of a few minutes, along comes this jet fighter, zooms right over our heads and stays on our side of the border, but makes a ton of noise. And what does that do? One, it scared the daylights out of us, but we knew they were coming. He was coming. And second, it showed whoever fired on the other side that this is not just a Jeep, it's the United States of America. And we're going to protect our people. So this was the type of thing. And -- SY: Any other scary things? DS: Yeah, there was one other one. I was patrolling the border and there was a -- a train, a train trestle on top, a little bit of a tunnel, tunnel is just the width of a train and I came up on my side of the tunnel and my counterpart, an East German or a Russian, came on the other side and we just simultaneously looked at each other through the tunnel. And before I could do anything, my gunner, who was right over my head with a machine gun, turned the gun toward the Russian or East German and all I heard was click, click, click, he armed the machine gun and before I could say a word I was thinking, don't shoot, don't shoot, don't start World War III, and the Russian on the other side looked at me and yelled, "Amerikanisch cigarette? Amerikanisch cigarette?" and I yelled, "Nein, nein," and I told the driver, "Move," and that was the whole, the whole thing. SY: Interesting. So he was actually, he, huh, he actually thought you guys might be able to connect. DS: Oh, what we wanted me to do was throw him a pack of American cigarettes. SY: Cigarettes, for sure, but still -- (laughs) DS: Yeah, but he was not the good guy. SY: OK. So you're out in the field. You have a couple of incidents like this. DS: Yeah, but that's over a two-year period. SY: Right, most of it is probably boring. DS: It was fun. It was fun. SY: How did you guys entertain yourselves? DS: We were single. And the exchange rate was four to one. I think we were being paid somewhere around $230 a month as lieutenants, times four, makes us rich. We could buy anything. On the German economy. A Volkswagen cost $600. A Mercedes I think was somewhere under $2,000, maybe $1,800. OK? We were 11 very wealthy guys. I roomed with a fellow who's a West Pointer, we lived off base. We had a poodle dog who rode in our tank. We both had Volkswagens. SY: Wait, wait, wait. You had a poodle who rode in your tanks? DS: Oh, absolutely. He was the tank commander. (laughs) SY: That's hilarious. DS: Yep. And he came to work. And when we weren't out in the border, he came to work with me every day. He was very good. And toward about I would say -- oh, six, nine months before my tour ended, Colonel Clay came to me and he said, "I need an assistant S-1, which is a personnel officer at regiments. Would you like to come up to Nuremberg and work in the headquarters?" I said, "Sure," and he, I moved up from a town called Bamberg to Nuremberg and I was a regimental assistant S-1, which is personnel. And that's when my roommate and I lived together in Nuremberg and it was a good life. Yeah. SY: It sounds like it. DS: Oh, it was not roughing it. And after my time came up and I rotated home and that's when we get back to Brockton. SY: Yeah. And had you thought about staying in at that point? DS: Yes, I did think about it. This Vietnam had -- I couldn't point out Vietnam on a map, this was 1962, I'm sorry, mistake, 1965. And I -- we didn't even know where Vietnam was. Everything was nice and quiet, it was good. And I always thought of staying in, but then with the law degree and my parents were so happy their son was a lawyer, I came back to Brockton. And started a law practice. In those days, this was 50 something years ago, in those days you could do that, you could hang out a shingle and you could say, "Here I am, I'm a lawyer, I'm very well known," the name is known in Brockton -- I became an assistant district attorney. I prosecuted because of connections, that happens. I prosecuted some attempted murder cases, rape cases, things like that. And then I decided, time to go to work for myself. And opened an office and defended the serious felonies. And divorces and breach of contract and what a general practicing lawyer does. And I enjoyed it very much. SY: Yeah. What did you like best? Did you like being a prosecutor? Did you like being defense? Did you like? DS: I enjoyed both ends of it. I didn't stay a prosecutor very long. Just long enough to get what they call "experience at government expense," that's how you learned to try a case. Let the government pay you to screw up their assault case, rather than let the client pay you and say you're the worst lawyer he's ever had. SY: There you go. DS: So let the government pay for it. So then we start to practice law. And I'm still single. And now I've got, now I'm 28 years old. And I'm talking to my, about one of my very, very, very close friends, who's now married and I had met his girlfriend before I, while I was in law school, I said, "How about that girl you were dating when I was in law school? She married?" he said, "No, she's not married, I think I still have her number," then he gives me her number, I call her up, I make a date with her, she remembered having met me and we get married. And we've been married now for 49 years. Two children. One lives an hour from us in Massachusetts in Sharon, two grandchildren. And another one lives in 12 McLean, Virginia, which is an airplane ride. And he has two children. So that's jumping the gun, that's getting the children, but I think you probably want to know what I did in my law practice. SY: Yeah, I want to go back to Germany for a second. Because I think, you know, one of the benefits of getting someone from a place like Norwich, right, is in addition to the military training, you've also taken some history classes, right, taken some English classes and maybe taken a sociology class or two, so when you were in Germany, did you have a sense of like the politics or what was going on? Were you thinking about that? Or were you just kind of just keeping your head down? DS: The German politics? SY: No, the politics of the Cold War. Were you like sort of aware of the role you were playing in US foreign policy, were thinking about that when you were in Germany? DS: This was very much the Cold War and the answer to your question is definitely yes and it brings to mind a very serious incident that happened. I was there when President Kennedy was assassinated and I remember being in the officer's club after hours and don't forget, this is a time when there was no Internet, no telephone communication, no news that, you didn't know what was going on. And the officer of the day came into the officer's club and very dramatically, just almost like you would see in the movies, went to the bar, took a piece of silverware and banged on a glass for quiet. And I remember that he said, "Gentlemen, the president of the United States has been shot," we didn't even know if he was alive, OK, "Everybody man your battle stations," we did not know if this was a Russian conspiracy. We had no idea what had happened and we all got in our tanks and we all rushed to our stations on the border, the entire regiment went to the border. And our guns were loaded and they were pointed toward Russia, so to speak. And we sat there for three days not knowing what had happened to Kennedy and finally the word came out that Kennedy had died and that this was not a conspiracy from the Warsaw Pact and everybody returned to their base. Very scary. And just like in the movies. SY: Yeah. And did you sort of live with this fear that World War III was going to start? I mean, you're right on this border, you see everybody armed, the Cold War is quite literal to you and it's not so cold. DS: It's a terrible, psychological and dumb feeling when that happens. Because here you are trained to do a job and we sat out there and everyone had the feeling, we hope this is a war because we're Americans, we're the good guys, we're going all the way to Moscow, nobody can stop us, bullets will bounce off us, we've got the white horse. What an immature, dumb mindset. But that was the feeling. Let us go. We'll teach these sons of bitches that shot our president a lesson. SY: And you think that's just being 24? DS: That's being 24 and macho. SY: Oh, yeah. So it's interesting, it's sort of amazing to me thinking about this border with sort of armed kids on either side.13 DS: Eighteen year olds. SY: Both feeling that way and you know, it sort of seems like the Cold War could have gotten hot accidentally very quickly. DS: Oh, no question about it. SY: Why do you think it didn't? DS: Leadership. Leadership. At the officer level. The lieutenants knew that it would be their necks if they fired the first shot. And the training that the officers gave the enlisted personnel -- "You don't have to agree with me, but do what I say. And I'm telling you, you don't fire the first shot," and it worked. SY: Do you think you were a good leader? DS: The Army thought I was. I was promoted to captain. I was recognized as a good leader. SY: Sounds like you were a good leader. DS: I think I was. I did my best. I did my best. And when I came back from, when I came back and I decided to practice law, I still owed the Army some time, Reserve time. So I stayed in an additional Reserve unit and for a total of seven years commission time. Two years on active duty and five in the Reserves. Three during law school, two years active duty and two more. SY: And were you scared that you would have to go to Vietnam? DS: No. SY: No, because you were -- DS: No, they didn't need me at that point. SY: Okay, so let's talk about your law practice. How do you think your training at Norwich and your time in the service affected who you were as a lawyer? DS: Good question. How did it affect? I was very surprised that when I came back in 1965, you couldn't, a lawyer couldn't advertise. The rules have changed. You could put an ad in the paper saying you're opening an office, but that was the extent of it. So the only way a lawyer could get to be known as a practitioner was frankly to run for political office and hope to lose. (laughter) Because you don't want the job anyway. And that's what I did. There were -- three openings on the Brockton School Committee and there were six candidates, I was one. Being a candidate permitted me to advertise my credentials in the paper and to go to the League of Women Voters and this club and that club and talk to people. And at Election Day, thank goodness there were three openings, I came in fourth. Thank god, because I didn't want the job. But I advertised and I found that World War II veterans, Korean veterans were very interested in a Cold War veteran. And Norwich, to the military, whether you're a Norwich guy or an enlisted soldier, it means something. It's got credentials. Everybody goes to Boston University and Boston College and Harvard Law. In all my practice no one ever came into my office and said, "Before I hire you I want to know what law school you went to," never ever once asked that question. But if they saw my Norwich diploma on the wall and they wanted to talk about it. SY: Hm. Do you think it's that because lawyers have reputations at times for being like shysters, right? DS: Oh, absolutely.14 SY: So do you think they were like, okay, maybe this guy has integrity because he has this background (overlapping dialogue; inaudible)? DS: Maybe that was their thinking, I can't get in their heads, but I think to a lot of my clients, businessmen and defendants as well, the Norwich diploma on the wall didn't hurt. SY: Yeah. Hey, what case are you most proud of? DS: I can't pick one. I really can't pick out, that goes back too far, I've been gone a long time. But -- and I also, I'm also thinking in, you know, this idea of Citizen Soldier. SY: Yeah, let's talk about that. DS: I also became very involved in Brockton itself. I was appointed a member of the Brockton Planning Board, the zoning board, the Consumer Protection Agency. I was president of the Jewish Community Center in Brockton and it evolved into a larger geographical area, the South Area Jewish Community Center. I just volunteered my time, not only because it's the right thing to do, but it was the right thing to give back to the community. SY: So hold on. I didn't realize you were Jewish. So now I have some questions. So first of all, what was it like to be a Jew at Norwich in the late '50s? There weren't that many. DS: There weren't that many. Good question. SY: I should have -- Schultz, I should have -- I thought about German, yeah. DS: Yeah, no big. There weren't a lot but there were some. I can't remember a single incident at Norwich of anti-Semitism. As far as my friends were concerned, that never ever came up. I was extreme comfortable. SY: Interesting. And did you go, let's see, because on Sundays people go to chapel, but there's a synagogue in Burlington. DS: There also, in my time was one in Randolph. SY: Really? DS: Yeah. I don't know if there is there anymore. SY: I don't think so. DS: But there was a rabbi in Randolph and there were, I would say maybe 20, 25 Jewish students. And we arranged for the rabbi to come up here and conduct services for holidays, right here on campus. SY: So you would do like Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur. DS: Yeah, if we weren't home, the rabbi would come up. But specifically to answer your question, it never was a problem. SY: Now that's interesting. I also interviewed a woman in town, Phyllis Greenway, and she remembered a song that one of the fraternities sang. This wasn't an anti-Semitic song, it was a funny song, that sort of had like a vaudeville flavor that involved a Jewish student, I don't remember what it was, but you don't remember a song? DS: No, but she, what was her position? SY: Phyllis? Oh, she was the girlfriend and then the wife of a Norwich student, and I think he lived in a house off campus and they had a -- okay, so -- DS: Was he a civilian?15 SY: No, no. He was, OK, wait, hold on. So then I think you being in Germany has a whole different valence. This is post Holocaust, you're this Jewish kid, you're going to Germany, right? DS: Yeah. SY: I mean first of all your parents were probably like, what the hell are you doing? DS: No, the only instruction my parents had was, "Don't bring home the daughter of a Nazi." (laughter) SY: They said don't bring home a shiksa, don't bring home a Nazi shiksa, that's it. (laughs) DS: Right, right, right. SY: But here you are in Germany. You're dating all these German girls. You're enjoying the German life. Did you think about being a Jew in Germany? DS: No, no, no. It's a very interesting thing, no. We, my roommate and I visited Dachau. And we were, of course, he wasn't Jewish but he was from West Point and one of my closest friends to this day and it just, Sarah, was never an issue. SY: It doesn't sound like it was something you were thinking about that (overlapping) -- DS: I wasn't thinking about it. I was very aware of the fact that when an American officer, emphasize "officer," walked down the streets of Germany in 1963 and if the street was narrow, the German citizen would give way to the American officer. They're very conscious of a caste system. This is going to be very difficult to describe, I think in this oral history, but the other thing that I remember to this day is when we drove our tanks down some of the narrow roads of Germany in 1963 and there's still some damage, everything had not been built up, if the scene had been transposed from Germany to the United States, an American seven- or eight-year-old kid seeing a tank go by would wave to the tank, the tank would wave back to the kid. In Germany the 10-year-old kid doesn't wave, he raises his right hand to the tank. In the salute. And we were very conscious of that. How they get that -- SY: And it's the Sieg Heil salute, right? So did it -- DS: Yeah. It was a tank. Germans love tanks. They've got tank mentality. They'd rather have a tank than 10 Mercedes. Yeah, they didn't, we were very conscious that the German kid did not wave, he saluted. SY: So it was a militaristic society. Yeah, yeah. And did you, when you were sort of hanging out with German girls, did you mention that you were Jewish? Or was it something, did it not come up? You didn't think about it. DS: Never thought about it. If they knew, fine, who cares? SY: Interesting. And did you, you were there for nine months. Did you celebrate any holidays? DS: Oh, I was there for 18 months. SY: For 18 months. So did you celebrate any holidays there? DS: Oh, yeah. SY: So where did you go? DS: Right there on the post. SY: There were enough men for a minyan.16 DS: Oh yes, absolutely. Are you Jewish? Oh, I didn't realize that. How do you spell your last name? SY: Yahm, Y-A-H-M. DS: YHM? SY: Y-A-H-M. We don't know, we don't know where it comes from. Sea in Hebrew but, yeah. DS: So this must be interesting to you, then. SY: Oh yeah, very interesting. That's why I was like, wait a second. I didn't realize that. Yeah, yeah, so that's interesting. But there are no, I mean but you weren't worshiping out in the community, you weren't going to like a synagogue in the community, there weren't any. DS: No. There weren't any. I wouldn't have understood them anyway. They'd be in German. Yeah. I should have known, bring home a shiksa, I should have picked that up. SY: You said the shiksa, exactly. (laughter) DS: Okay. SY: And that's interesting, too, because your dad was in career military, that was -- DS: No, he was a Reservist. SY: He was Reservist, but still, that was unusual for a Jewish man in that era. DS: Yeah. SY: Yeah, so how did he -- DS: I don't think he had any trouble. SY: But I mean, how did he get into that path? Like where did your family come from? Did you immigrate? Like what was the deal? DS: The usual story from Poland, from Russia. He's first generation, I'm second generation. He came to Norwich on an academic scholarship, my dad did. And I don't think he had any clue what he was getting into. But I think he -- was of a mindset that nobody's going to throw him out of here. SY: So he was a public school kid who did well and got the scholarship? DS: Yeah. SY: And this is in Brockton? This is in Brockton? DS: Yeah, in Brockton, yeah. Class of 1934, look him up in the yearbook. SY: Interesting. Okay. So he gets a scholarship, he gets up here, he's being sent into the WASPy wasteland, right? And then here he is and he did well and then he stayed in the military. DS: Reserve. SY: Reserves. DS: Don't confuse them. Reserve. Yeah, and then he got called up right after Pearl Harbor. SY: Okay. And then what did he do for a living? DS: He was in the real estate business. And -- Brockton at that time was a town of about 55,000 people. Everybody knew everyone. Everyone knew everyone who was entitled to be known. You walked down the street, it was safe. Today it's a city of well over 100,000 people. If you walk down the streets of Brockton you'd better have a flack vest and a helmet on. Because it's a tough town. But it's changed, yeah.17 SY: Has that been sad for you? DS: I'm sorry? SY: Has that been sad for you, to see your hometown change? DS: Yeah, yeah, it was too bad. Good for business. A lot of criminal work. (laughs) SY: There you go. (laughs) DS: What are you going to do? (laughter) So, want me to continue? SY: Yeah, yeah. DS: OK. So anyway, I'm very, very proud and loyal with Norwich. I think these formative years here are just invaluable. I started a Norwich Club on Cape Cod, for Rook Sendoff, you've heard of those. We started the first year with about 15 people in attendance. We now have over 200 that come to, it's the largest sendoff in the country. Rich Schneider comes down, he stays at my house, OK. Or at General Sullivan's house. Gordy lives about five miles from me. SY: Oh, he's out on the Cape, too? DS: Yeah, he's got a summer home. SY: Oh, I didn't know that. And you guys were in school together at Norwich. DS: He was class of '59. He lived across the hall. SY: Hah. Were you buddies? DS: So much, not close. Became better friends later. Carlo D'Este, who I mention, Carlo, if you look up Carlo, he was class of '58, he runs the Colby Symposium. He lives five miles from me. And Rich doesn't always stay at my house. One time he couldn't stay at Sully's. But he and Jamie come down. SY: And this is Falmouth. DS: Falmouth. Yeah. So we start the club and we got so large a few years ago that we had to change venues because we were afraid the fire marshal was going to come in and close us down. We have a golf tournament. Good leadership. I formed this club, I got this club going and then I got a successor, so I'm no longer president. This is good leadership. Yiddishe cup. SY: I was just going to say, (laughter) you're using your noggin. (laughter) DS: So what else can I -- I served on the Board of Fellows at Norwich. SY: (phone rings) Hold on, it's going to pass in a second. We're just going to wait. Have to wait 30 seconds for it to pass. Dadadadada to my phone. I should have put it on silent but I forgot. There we go. Delegating. Yiddishe cup, that's where we were. DS: (laughs) Oh, I served two terms on the Board of Fellows. Loring Hart appointed me. And I come up here with the great class of 1960 for, every year we have a mini-reunion. And I am very, very honored. I'm only a captain. Everybody in my class is a colonel and I am the guy that leads them onto the Parade Ground, okay, with The Guidon. You've probably seen these parades. That's nice. We're very tight, we're a very close group. SY: What do you think a Citizen Soldier brings to society? Like what you do think, versus somebody who's a career military guy, like how do you think your perspective is different? Because Alden Partridge was like, "We don't want a standing army, we want citizen soldiers," right? DS: Yeah. SY: What are your thoughts about that?18 DS: I think we need Citizen Soldiers. The mindset is different. The Citizen Soldier in business can't simply say, "This is an order, do it," because he's going to get nowhere. He has to be probably a little bit more diplomatic. He has to remember who he's talking to. He has to cajole, beg, borrow and barter. The career army officer that's wearing eagles on his shoulder or stars might have a more difficult time coming back into business because he's not used to asking for anything. But yet they do very well. The smart career officer that retires, especially one who has been in the Pentagon, retires with his Rolodex and can work wonders in military business. And there's an old saying in business, that you know you're important when people return your phone calls. And people return phone calls to generals and colonels. They don't necessarily return phone calls to the lawyer. Because they don't know if they're being sued or what's going on. SY: Or if they're going to get charged for it. (laughs) DS: That's right, that's right. That's right. But I think in retrospect, if you had asked me, what would I change -- I think I would answer you by saying, "Not a damn thing." SY: Hey, that's a good way to view your life, huh? DS: I think that I wouldn't, I would not change anything. I am very, very proud of my association with Norwich. Excuse me. I am extremely proud of my children. They've done very, very well. They're college graduates with advanced degrees. Neither one decided, wanted any part of Norwich. Maybe because of the information that I've given you today. It's kind of tough for a legacy because you want to do better than your predecessor and this is very self-serving, but I think I would be a tough act for them to follow. And I think that was, that was -- grandchildren are doing very well, one's in college. Another one is a tremendous athlete that's never met a sport he doesn't like. The others are kind of young right now. We have a wonderful relationship. My marriage is wonderful. It's, in fact it's one of those situations where my wife was saying to me the other day, "Some days I'm mad as hell at you and could kill you, but I could never live without you," and I thought that was pretty nice. SY: That was very sweet. DS: Yeah. What else can I tell you? SY: I don't know, that's good. And I also, we've been, I want to make sure you can get up to the president's house. DS: Oh, he'll wait. (laughs) SY: Oh yeah, all right. Because you're from the amazing class of 1960. DS: No, I will be on time, I've got time. SY: Yeah, I know, you sort of -- DS: I have such respect for Rich Schneider. I think he is the best thing that has ever, ever happened at Norwich. I think we're going to hard pressed when he retires. And hopefully we can pressure him not to. (laughs) SY: I'm not sure that he feels that way. (laughs) DS: No, I don't either. SY: Let's see. We talked a little about Citizen Soldier, we talked a little bit about service. And it seems like you talked about service to your community in 19 Brockton. Do you think service was something you learned at Norwich? But it also was something you learned growing up. DS: Yes. Service to the community. I owe the community. The community was very good to me. The community -- the community not only was good professionally, but I think respected what I do, who I am, where I've been. Everybody knows that I was in the service, everybody knows I was a Norwich guy. Where I live now, I wear by Norwich sweatshirts. I'm a Norwich ambassador, I love talking to potential students. I go out of my way to meet with them. SY: What advice would you give a rook coming in now? DS: The advice I give them is if you haven't been up to the campus on the hill, call the admission office, arrange for a tour and see what it is. See what you're getting into. I do not have much contact with civilian students. I'm not a big advocate of the civilian population, which comes from, where I'm coming from. But not that I turn them down or anything, but I just don't go out of my way. I'm much more interested in the kid that wants to be a cadet. SY: I don't know. Any last closing thoughts? Are we? DS: A closing thought? I hope this has been helpful. SY: Very helpful. DS: I hope it's not too abstract. I can't imagine why anyone would want to listen to it. SY: Everybody feels that way. DS: Do they really? Okay. SY: I bet if General Sullivan were sitting here he'd be like, "Why does anybody want to hear about my life?" DS: He is so smart. He is so polished. When General Sullivan speaks, do you remember an old ad that used to be on television, people are in a dining room and one, one table over there says, "My stockbroker is Merrill Lynch and they say," and then the whole screen goes silent in the dining room. When Gordon Sullivan speaks, people listen. He is so smart, so polished and such a wonderful person. SY: Was he like that at 20? DS: Yeah, good guy, good guy. Everybody liked him. SY: Yeah. So you weren't like, he has the authority to -- DS: He was a buck private. SY: I know. DS: Okay? Nobody thought he'd make corporal. When he got commissioned there was a, "Really?" (laughter) SY: A nice guy, but I didn't think that was going to happen. DS: Right. SY: So funny, you never know. Right? DS: Right. SY: You never know. All right, well I think, I think that's about it for my questions. I enjoyed this. DS: Okay. SY: Are you eating wheat this week? Or are you not eating -- DS: No, I've got some medical problems. I have -- END OF AUDIO FILE
Transcript of an oral history interview with William F. "Bill" Lyons, conducted by Sarah Yahm at his office in Boston, Massachusetts, on 10 March 2015, as part of the Norwich Voices oral history project of the Sullivan Museum and History Center. Bill Lyons is a member of the Norwich University Class of 1990; his interview includes a discussion of his experiences as an electrical engineering student at Norwich as well as his later educational endeavors and his career as a planner, engineer, and attorney. His military service in Bosnia and Iraq is also a focus of the interview. ; 1 COL William "Bill" Lyons, NU 1990, Oral History Interview March 10, 2015 At his Boston, MA office Interviewed by Sarah Yahm Transcribed by C.T. Haywood, NU '12 March 19, 2015 SY: I am at Bill Lyons' office in Boston. It is March 10? Is that correct? WL: I think so. It's in that range. SY: It's in that range. It's March 10, 2015 and we're going to be doing an oral history interview. So, yeah you were just, you just started telling me before I turned the tape on about how you ended up at Norwich. So how did you end up at Norwich? WL: So when I was about thirteen I decided that I wanted to be in the military, and I wrote a letter to the Marine Corps asking them when I could enlist. And they informed me that I'd have to wait until I was eighteen but they encouraged me to apply for service academies and for scholarships. So I did. I actually started the process to attend the Naval Academy. I was Barney Frank's nominee in 1986 to attend the Naval Academy. But I did not pass the physical, because I have a lazy left eye and color blindness. So that was traumatic in that that particular dream was not gonna come to fruition. And so it just so happened that two doors down from us on my home street was guy named Wally Burke, who's Class of '86 [siren in background] and Skull and Swords and Honor Committee and all that stuff. And Wally's dad and my dad were friends. Wally's dad was a cop and my father was a firefighter and so my father told me about Norwich, but he simultaneously discouraged me because he really didn't want me to be in the military. SY: Hold on one sec— WL: Sure thing. SY: Because I just realized, oops, that I have my questions right over here. WL: Okay. SY: Um so why didn't you dad want you to be in the military? WL: My father was in the Army from 1958 to 1960. He left the Army early. He got a compassionate discharge because his father was in a TB hospital here in Boston. And my father was in Germany at the time and his older brother was in the Army in Germany, and so one of the boys needed to come home to look after the family. And my father quickly responded to that call. Being a city boy he thought all the outdoorsmanship was really not up his alley. And he was a very disciplined, disciplined man but didn't like the constriction of military life so he took the opportunity to come home early so he only served about eighteen months. And it's not so much that he didn't want me to be in the military, he just thought that he didn't like it so I wouldn't like it and um— SY: Did he just like not being told what to do? 2 WL: Yeah I think that's part of it. He ended up raising his most of his siblings, he was a very independent minded person. So he, he was not accustomed to being directed. He was the director. So he was a private and I think he got busted twice in rank from PFC down to private, PFC to private so that should be some indicator of the fact the life wasn't for him. So, ah in the summer of, between my junior and senior year I only applied to one school. I applied to Norwich because having not having the opportunity to go to the Naval Academy I thought Norwich was a great, um, a great opportunity for me to do what I needed to do. And as I was mentioning I was a, awful awful teenager. SY: Oh come on give me some details. How were you awful? WL: I got into a lot of trouble. I was actually, I was a decent student, studying came too easy for me so I never really learned how to study and I got great grades without doing any work. I worked full time after school and on weekends I was the director of custodial services for a florist bran--chain here in Massachusetts. And because I was working full time I had a lot of money and I was actually making more money than my mother who was working full time at the phone company at the time [car beeps]. And that lead to trouble. I was drinking too much, spending too much time not focused on my studies. I totaled three cars my senior year, one of them was an outright explosion, blew my father's brand new station wagon up. So at the end of my senior year my dad had pretty much had it. But the good news is early, I had applied early admission to Norwich and I got in early. So in November of my senior year I already knew I was all set. And had a good side - I knew I was in. And had a bad side because I knew I didn't have to try anymore so it cut both ways. But I knew that Norwich was the right place for me and um… SY: Had you gone up and visited? WL: I had, I went up with my dad for a brief visit. SY: And what was your impression? WL: You know it's kind of hard to remember, but I remember saying to myself, "This is what I'm meant to do." My father on the other hand was like, "Oooh I don't know" [laughs]. SY: So I wonder about that. So what was your dream, your vision of what being in the military was gonna be like? WL: So another little nitnoid fact- I had applied for a Marine Corps NROTC scholarship and I was notified that I was a recipient, and then about two weeks before school started in August of '85, no I'm sorry August of '86, I was notified that I, they had made a mistake and that the scholarship was no longer available because of my eyesight. So I was like, "You already knew that because you screened me out of the Naval Academy." But nevertheless my father, God bless him, he came up with the cash to pay for tuition. And so it, it just all came together. It really came together quickly and the rest is kinda history. I mean I settled in, I wanted at the time to be a Navy officer and after I took two years of Navy ROTC, and then after realizing there was no way in heck I was ever gonna get a Navy commission I switched to Army ROTC. And they said, "You want to commission? Sure you can have a commission." 3 SY: They were like, "We don't care about that lazy eye." WL: Yeah, so they gave me a contract in February of my junior year and gave me credit for my Navy ROTC. And at that time I was turned off the active duty thing. I had kind of seen it and done it at Norwich and didn't feel the need to do more. So I signed a Guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty commission, and took a commission in the Army Reserve. There was also a way for me to guarantee myself military intelligence as a branch because if you're in a military intelligence reserve unit you automatically get a military intelligence commission which is what I wanted. So that part came together quite nicely. The summer between junior and senior year I actually got, of course I went to the Advanced Camp for ROTC, but actually get to go Airborne School for three weeks and that was a, it was a life altering time just learning, learning to redefine what I thought my limits were. Obviously I learned a lot more about what I was capable of doing and that was a, that was a really good experience for me. And I came back to school ready, you know, I was like, "You know what, I gotta finish this school thing up and get my commission and drive on with life," so. [sound of something falling] [laughs]. SY: Sorry. Dropping things. Yeah. So let's rewind a little bit and ask you about being a Rook. Do you remember your first, do you remember your first day? Do you remember the first? WL: I do, yeah, it's funny I showed up for my first day, I had long, blonde hair because I worked in the outdoors all summer and my hair gets kinda blondish in the summer. And I hadn't had my haircut since the beginning of my senior year in high school so it was just about a year since my hair had been cut. Intentionally, you know, I was like rebelling. And my arm was in a sling. I had actually just had been in an accident. I was body surfing off of Singing Beach in the North Shore of Massachusetts, and there was a hurricane at sea. It was beautiful on the beach but there was a hurricane at sea, the waves were just huge. So I was body surfing and a wave picked me up and threw me on the beach and dislocated my shoulder. So that was maybe two weeks before school started. So I showed up with my arm in a sling and my bleach blonde hair and long hair, so I was instantly labeled "surfer boy," which really wasn't apt for me but that's all they knew was a snap shot in time. And I remember the, they challenged me to do pushups with my arm in the sling. And I was in much, much better shape than I am today and I actually did one-armed pushups and that was like the instant challenge I needed to be able to push back. And so I kinda got their instant respect because I dropped and started doing one-armed pushups. And so that was an interesting time, you know, I did everything I could to fit in but you know running was a real challenge with a arm in a sling, so. But I adapted and it was fun. SY: Did they make any exceptions for you because your arm was in a sling? WL: Yeah, you know they were all like, "Oh you don't have to do this now," and I was like, "I just want to fit in. I want to, I don't want to be the kid that's off to the side, you know, getting special treatment." So I worked really hard to fit in. There were obvious, I couldn't do sit ups so that was kind of out of the question. So, but did everything I could to fit in. SY: Do you remember being scared? 4 WL: You know I--scared is kind of the wrong word in the sense that it was more bewildering like trying to take it all in and understand because people are barking at me from every direction and I'm sure they do that now. All the barking is intended to have that bewildering effect, and it was very effective on me and I was struggling just to focus on what was important and who seemed to be the person that was in charge so I could follow their instructions. And I don't ever remember being fearful in the sense of, you know for life and limb, more just alarmed that I had to keep up with this dizzying pace of things so that I didn't fall behind. Because I had seen kids fall behind and then they get targeted, and then when they get targeted they kind of get drummed out and I didn't want to be that person, so. It was all I could do to just make sure that I wasn't the person getting picked on. SY: So something I've been thinking about, you know not somebody who has a military background, I've been reading a little bit about comparative military training like in, you know in Scandinavia and various different places. So to what degree do you think the Rook training and that sort of boot camp model really does help you when you are in the field later? How much is a residue from sort of previous understandings and how much is it really what's needed? WL: Yeah, I'm a very strong believer in a rigorous Rookdom, and as near as I can tell it's gotten more rigorous. I know they have much more stringent physical fitness standards than we had, and its substantially longer - Rookdom is substantially longer, or at least unrecognized Rookdom is substantially longer. For me I thought it was critical because it really--the basic training model is really about tearing you down so that everybody is more or less equal in terms of their ego and their psyche and and all of the individuality, you know it's all designed to strip all that off and then build you back up in the model that they want you to be in. I thought Norwich was incredibly effective at that, very, very effective. And I think reflecting on that it was really important to me, like I had some really good core values that my father and mother inculcated into me - honesty, integrity, and all those. Hard work, I had a very hard work ethic. And that was all there but it wasn't completely formed. And so my, my ex—my Rook year experience at Norwich was they tore me down to that base level and figured out how to build on it and make it all fit together with my individual personality, but in a fairly structured way. And I think that that, personally I think that made all the difference in my success in life because it preserved my work ethic, it preserved my core values, and then showed me how to take those characteristics and use those to my advantage in business and in the military and in all facets of life, really. So I give Norwich a lot of credit for making me the man that I am. SY: Yeah, interesting. Do you remember sort of a high and a low of your time at Norwich? WL: Yes. So I'll give you the low. I discovered my entire Navy ROTC class cheating on a test. They were in the barracks. I walked into a room, they had the quiz that I had just taken and they were kibitzing about the answers on the quiz. And I said, "Guys, I'm not gonna say anything, but go back, give them the test and tell them you need a different test So that everything's good." And they didn't do it and I, I remember the gut wrenching decision to tell the instructor. And the instructor, I remember him vividly, a guy named Lieutenant Fricke, he said, "Well I didn't see it and I don't, there's no, nothing to suggest that it actually happened other than you." And I said, "Well, I'm telling you it happened." And he said, "Well in the absence of something else to 5 corroborate that there's nothing I intend to do about it." And so I complained to the school. I actually didn't, someday I can dig up all the letters I wrote to President Todd and to Tim Donovan, who I've since become quite friendly with, and I complained pretty vocally. I wrote a letter to the Guidon, complaining that the school wouldn't take action on this and how contradictory to the school's value it was. And that was a very troubling time, that was my junior year I believe. It was a very troubling time for me, I just felt that Norwich didn't rise to the occasion to seize an opportunity to, to live its values and… SY: And what about your peers? Did, they knew you had reported them? WL: Ah you know, obviously a lot of heartache with some of my peers. To this day some of them probably wouldn't say hello to me. I'm okay with that. It's, you know, it is what it is and they are who they are, and I'd rather pick friends that are, share my values. SY: And you acted with integrity so if they can't handle that they can't handle that, yeah. WL: Yeah. The friends that I had are still my friends and so, you know, they got it, they were like, "You did the right thing, so hold your head high and be proud of what you did," so. SY: You know I see that today with students, that they seem torn between two things that Norwich teaches - one is the loyalty to the Corps, right? WL: Yeah. SY: And the other is this idea of sticking up for what's right even if pushes against the group and I'm wondering, that's a really great illustration of that conflict. WL: Absolutely. SY: Did you notice any other conflicts like that? Any other people struggling with that? Did you have other incidents like that? WL: I can't point to any. You now there were rumored to be all kinds of activities on campus that were, were in one sense these incredible examples of loyalty - we'll use the Knight Riders as an example, right, this mythical organization that supposedly existed. And then, so they're loyal to each other, and supposedly to the University, and allegedly worked to the betterment of the University, at least in their own minds. And then of course there's the things that they were accused of doing that some would say that they did do in terms of beating people up that didn't fulfill the you know the model cadet role. And so you know I think that's another example of it. I didn't personally witness any of that, but I heard plenty of the, we call it the rumint, you know rumor intelligence about that sort of thing. I didn't, I have to say in my four years at Norwich I didn't really indulge in that much, so it wasn't an important part of my experience. But I think that in any organization, the Army is an excellent example, there are constant, there's constant tension between loyalty to your brothers and to your service and the integrity of doing the right thing all the time. And, you know, the history of the Army is rife with people that make wrong decisions for the right reasons, if you want to say it that way. And so, you know, it's very, very hard to straddle very important values that span or are in that dynamic tension. And that's a really good example of it. 6 SY Yeah and I think, I'm gonna sort of ask you about that as we go through and talk about your military career when you leave Norwich that theme, because the citizen soldier seems to me be about that, that conflict, right? Especially because you have the Corps and then you a liberal arts education, right? And I talk to professors all the time who are like, "And I'm teaching them critical thinking and they're also learning how to follow orders. And sometimes they don't know in my class that they're allowed to disagree." You know it's like a different mentality, yeah. Okay, so your senior year you get commissioned by the Army? WL: Yes. So that was probably the highlight and I, obviously you would hope that would be a highlight is graduation, commissioning, I think just prior to that I found out that I got an A on my senior project, and that was a huge milestone for me. My, my early years at Norwich were marked by severe underperformance academically. I finished my freshman year at a 1.8. SY: Why do you think? WL: I failed Calc I. That is really bad for Electrical Engineering students [laughs]. So I had to retake Calc I over the summer, but not taking Calc II in my second half of my freshman year prevented me from taking Physics I, and it had a huge snowball effect. So I ended up graduating from Norwich with a 2.32 grade point average which was, I think, the third worst in my class, or it's in that range. [clears throat] My roommate happened to be lower than me so there was at least one lower than me. SY: That's always nice [laughs]. WL He's still still one of my best friends. But the fact that I managed - first of all had to catch up. So I ended up, there was one semester I took 22 credits just to get back on track because I came home from my freshman year and I told my dad that, "I think I need to change majors. This electrical engineering thing, I'm, it's not working out for me." And he said, "I'm paying for the next three years. You can finish up in the next three years. Your best chance of doing that is to stay in electrical engineering. So go back to school and get it done." So I did. I really wanted to change to diplomacy, and it didn't work that way. So I really had to catch up, I really did take a huge course load which of course, you know all my grades suffered when I was spreading myself so thin and trying to do Corps activities, et cetera. SY: Do you think it was also you didn't have to learn study skills in high school? WL: Yeah oh yeah, definitely. I mean Calc I, I was totally unprepared for the academic rigor of Calc I. Just totally not prepared for that, and it showed. So I did, I did the whole catch up thing and so by senior year I actually had a relatively normal course load again. And the fact that I, I think I got a 3.1 my senior year, to imagine that 3.1 still only got me to a 2.32 overall [laughs] should tell you something. But the fact that I got an A on my senior project was just a moral victory for me. And then so you know the crowning achievement of course was commissioning and graduation and everything that went with that. I was only the third person in my father's extended huge Irish family to ever get a college degree at that point. SY: So was your family ecstatic? 7 WL: Yeah, so the whole clan descended on Northfield. My father had eleven sisters and brothers of which one had passed by then, so everybody else descended on Northfield. They rented like a whole slew of condos over at Suagrbush and it turned out to be like a weeklong celebration. It was really quite something um… SY: That's awesome. And these are all like working class Boston cops and firefighters? WL: Yeah so my dad grew up in Roxbury and he was a firefighter. He ended up in Natick. He was an outlier, he actually moved all the way out to Natick at the time. One of my uncles was a Boston firefighter; another one was teamster, he drove an oil truck; another one owned a cleaning business. So they were working class people. Proud people. And my father was a very, very bright man but he decided he wasn't gonna go to college so that others could. That was really his decision. And so it was, it was you know it was a celebration of kind of that, "Well finally somebody's gonna move up the middle class," type of thing. So it was great, it was a lot of fun. SY: Yeah, and then what'd you do right afterwards? WL: So my, my orders to my military intelligence officer basic course weren't, didn't even exist yet. I got commissioned and went back into my Army Reserve unit but I had to do my officer basic course, and the next available slot was the following February. So I worked the summer at the tent company where I had been working summers, and then that job ended because the summer ended, and then I went back to work for the florist that I had worked at all through high school. And I worked there until February and then I, so that was kind of interesting working as a electrical engineer as a custodian at a florist company. And then I went to my officer basic course in Fort Huachuca, Arizona for six months. And that just so happened to coincide with the kick off for the Gulf War. So I was, you know, sitting in classes in Arizona trying desperately to try and get released so I could go to the war which is, you know, that's, it was the big show, who knows if there's ever gonna be another one, you know that sort of thing. SY: Oh back in the days when we thought there were no more wars. WL: Yes, right, Cold War was over and the Gulf War was the big show and— SY: Right that was gonna be it, the end. WL: So yeah, so of course they weren't gonna release me because I needed my officer basic course before they released me and then by the time the course was over it was all over but the crying, so. It was such a fast war. SY: And did you know anything about, I mean, did you know about Iraq at that time? Did you know anything about Kuwait? Did you know anything about Saddam? Had that been something you'd gotten at Norwich? Like that geopolitical understanding? WL: Yeah I had no geopolitical understanding from my time at Norwich. I did get a lot of that in the reserves and at the officer basic course. So I had a very, very solid footing on the geopolitical issues kind of as it was happening, I suppose you'd say, but definitely not while I was at Norwich. I was very, I had you know my, my ROTC unit, I was the first sergeant of the 8 freshman company when I was there. And I had no Corps responsibilities, and I had my electrical engineering curriculum. I was the president of IEEE, the Institute of Electrical Electronics Engineers, the student chapter, so nothing like picking the kid with the lowest cume in your class to be president of the social club. So that really took up my time and ah, there really wasn't a lot of time for much else. SY: Yeah that makes sense. Okay so you're all ready to go and the wars over. WL: Yup. SY: So what do you do instead? WL: So I came home and that was probably a lifetime low point. The economy in late '91 was absolutely atrocious. It was awful. No jobs anywhere. I went on so many attempted job interviews, you know just showing up at companies and filling out an application. And all the tech companies all over New England, and there was just nothing. And I ended up, let's see I sold pots and pans for a little while. I worked in a call center for a little while, and I was pumping gas for five dollars an hour in April of '92, so this was just about two years after graduation, when a good friend of my dad's drove into the gas station where I was pumping gas. It just so happened that the guy that owned the gas station was a selectman and I had run his campaign because my father was very active in town politics, and the guy that pulled in was a very good friend of the gas station owner and my dad. And at the time he was the Deputy Commissioner of Massachusetts Highway Department. And so he looked at me and he said, "Bill, why are you pumping gas? Don't you have an electrical engineering degree?" I said, "Yup. But there's just no jobs." And he said, "Well show up on Monday, you'll have a job." And I was like, "Show up where?" [laughs] He said, "Show up at 10 Park Plaza, that's where the Highway Department is. I'm sure we could use an electrical engineer." So that was my big break. I ended going to work for the Highway Department for two and a half years, and found a home and a career in an industry that I'm, I've been very fortunate to grow up in. And, you know its proof positive that family and your connections are as important as what you know. And that certainly worked to my advantage. SY: Yeah absolutely, and then you gone on, you've got like a gazillion degrees. WL: [both laugh] Well I'm, despite my undergraduate experience I've really come to appreciate learning and growing intellectually. So I've pretty much been in school ever since I graduated in one capacity or another with short breaks. There was my officer basic course, then my advanced course, and then after that you go to the Combined Arms and Services Staff School. And sprinkled throughout there I took some graduate classes at Northeastern, at UMASS Lowell, and then I completed the Command and General Staff College. And I really got bit by the bug, I decided in 1999 that I wanted to go to law school. And I'd always dreamed of going to law school when I was at Norwich but I, with a cume of 2.32 it was highly unlikely that I was gonna get in. SY: Well you also didn't have time to take classes that weren't electrical engineering classes.9 WL: That's true that's true. So, and and I set out to be a patent lawyer to utilize my technical background in the field of law. And in the '90s I worked for a consulting firm called HTSD and they did a lot of Wal Mart related work - site planning and transportation planning, traffic engineering. And I really found a niche presenting to local planning boards. And it just so happened I was elected to my hometown's planning board from '94 to '97, I think. And so I found, kind of found a home, I found a comfort zone with the planning board process. And I was attending a lot of planning board hearings and there would be a big high falutin' downtown Boston lawyer, and there would be a local planning lawyer, and then they'd put me out because I was articulate and could present technical information in a way that lay people could understand it. And I was at that time billing out at about 120 dollars an hour and the [clears throat] two downtown, the two lawyers were well above that, and they just sat there and listened. And so it kind of occurred to me, I'm like, you know, "I can sit there and listen for a lot more money and be happy" [laughs]. So I really decided in my mind that I wanted to go to law school. And so in '99 I left the consulting firm and I went to work for the City of Somerville as the traffic and parking director and worked in that capacity directly for the mayor. And I was in her office one day, at that time I was, I don't know, thirty-one, and she said, "Bill, it's pretty clear to me you don't want to be traffic engineer the rest of your life. You've good political skills, and you've good communication skills, what do you really want to do?" and I said, "Well I really want to go to law school but I don't think I can get in. I have an application pending at Suffolk, you know I just don't have the grades. I did okay on the LSAT." And so she said, "Sit right there." So she went into her private office and then she came out and she said, "You're gonna get a letter of acceptance in three days. Don't embarrass me." So she pulled a string, again it's who you know not necessarily what you know, and I went to law school. It actually took me seven years to graduate because I deployed twice. I deployed in 2001 to Bosnia, and then 2003 to Iraq, and so uh I had to take military leaves of absence for those two. The school was great about it, but. So in 2007, believe it or not, I finally completed the law school program at night. And like I said, you know I've been very, very oriented towards continuing my academic interests ever since then. I did the Joint Forces Staff College, and I did the Army War College, and I did - of course the War College is a master's degree producing program. And then the, I did the master's in transportation and urban systems at North Dakota State University. So it's fun. SY: You have a lot of degrees. WL: Its fun. I enjoy it so you know it's something that I feel incomplete if I'm not constantly studying, learning something. SY: I mean you're preaching to the choir, I have two master's degrees and am gonna go for a third at some point. WL: There you go. SY: I hear you. So let's go back, let's rewind actually, and let's go back to your deployments. WL: Okay. SY: So it's 2001. 10 WL: Yup. SY: So can you tell me that story? WL: Sure, in December of 1999 I was alerted that I was gonna get mobilized. Is that right? No, December of 2000 I was alerted that I was gonna get mobilized for Bosnia rotation. And at this time it was strictly a peacekeeping mission and there were actually several opportunities for me to jump off that bandwagon. But once I was starting to go down the path I was like, you know, "I've spent my entire time in the Reserve wanting to someday get mobilized. And here I am, you know, I have an opportunity to get off the train and I just really wanted to fulfill that particular aspect of my life and go on a mobilization." SY: Yeah, what's the desire to mobilize? What was the…? WL: Well I think on several levels. One is you know you get so invested in all that training. I mean if there's one thing the Army is particularly good at is training, constantly training and it's a huge investment. And I felt like I just wanted to realize the return on that investment, on some level. I also felt like the citizen soldier mantra of Alden Partridge was kind of a river running through that whole thing, because at the time the active Army was trying to turn that mission over to the Reserve and National Guard, and it just seemed to me a very logical extension of everything that had been my life to that point. You know it was a peacekeeping mission, it wasn't a combat mission. I had, you know, I don't know how much time you've been in Somerville, it's a tough town so one could say some of what I did there is peacekeeping. And it was, you know, it was it was nation building it was community building and to me that felt very satisfying, it felt like a good match for everything that I had to offer at that time. And I just really wanted to see that through. SY: Yeah. WL: So we mobilized in August of 2001. So there was a nine month buildup of this constantly training and repetitive drills and paperwork. SY: And what was peacekeeping, I mean obviously the mission became different, but what was peacekeeping gonna look like? WL: Peacekeeping was supposed to be having a continuous presence in the communities that had been torn apart by the civil war. In part to provide a buffer between the warring factions, but perhaps more importantly to set the example of how to do things right, to provide that beacon of democracy and hope and and and what, you know, the model of western democracy should look like. So a lot of it was anticipated to be monitoring elections, and providing a presence in the towns so that there was no opportunity for the warring factions to engage in what could be provocative. SY: Weapons or no weapons? WL: Um weapons. SY: Weapons. 11 WL: Yup and there wasn't, it wasn't expected you'd need the weapons and not to split hairs but the Army calls that form of peacekeeping peace enforcement, whereas true peacekeeping is without weapons. And so you can argue one way or the other, you know, what the intended mission was. NATO calls it peacekeeping, we were calling it peace enforcement, but it's because we had weapons. So we mobilize in August. We went to Fort Bragg for a couple weeks to train up with our active duty counterparts, got on a plane on September 10, flew from Fort Bragg to Fort Drum, picked up a whole bunch of soldiers at Fort Drum, and then flew from Fort Drum to Ireland, and then landed in Ireland. And then when we took off from Ireland and flew to Tuzla Main, which is the airfield at the Eagle Base, in that time the attacks in 9/11 occurred. So we landed at Eagle Base, and the whole plane cheered [laughs] because it was the culmination of literally ten months of training. We're like, "Yes, we finally made it. " There was on our plane a whole bunch of reservists from New York, New York City in particular. So when we coasted to the end of the runway we all expected to get off fairly quickly and nothing was happening. So we were all kind of bewildered, you know. And then the post command sergeant major, we didn't know he was the command sergeant major at the time, but the post command sergeant major came on the plane and he said, "I regret to inform of what's taken place in the United States. And gentlemen, ladies, the United States is at war and stand by for further instructions." So me and a bunch of my friends on the plane we were, you know, we kind of concluded in our minds that this was a drill. The Army's prone to coming up with these ridiculous scenarios and saying, "Okay you have one hour to brief the commander on what you would do under these circumstances." So, you know, we're all huddling, "What do we do, you know, what do you think we should do?" And we really had resolved in our minds that it was an exercise. And then not too long after that junior enlisted guy came on the plane and he said, "Okay, we really don't know what's going on in the world but we're in a predominately Muslim country. Everybody is gonna get their ammunition basic load as they get off the plane, and stand by for further instructions. Most of you guys are standing post until all this gets sorted out." So right then we knew it was no kidding. So the kids that were from New York City on the plane were obviously were very concerned about their families, and there were lines set up to use the very few phone lines on base. SY: Hey and we're going. WL: Excellent. SY: Look at that. Okay I feel good about that. Here we go. Okay so you're in the intel business, the mission is changing. WL: The mission changed. My job was to be the requirements manager, which is to determine what things get collected on. And then there are different means of collection. There's foot patrols, which was the vast majority of our intelligence collection. We had aerial intelligence platforms, and signals intelligence platforms, and various other means of intelligence collection. But my job was to figure out which asset would collect against which requirement, and then my boss who was the collections manager, would task out all those tasks to the various subordinate elements. And, you know, I was anticipating that my job would be mostly collecting about economic intelligence, political intelligence, issues related to governance. And it turned out that 12 there was still some aspect of that, but I really had two tasks: one was to help catch persons indicted for war crimes, which was our exit strategy to catch the we call them PIFWCs (Persons Indicted for War Crimes), PFWCs. So one job was to try and track those folks down so they could be captured by Special Forces, and the other job was to do directed patrols in neighborhoods and areas that were the more conservative and known extremist-view Muslim groups. So when Bosnia had its civil war a lot of freedom fighters actually came from the Middle East and from Northern Africa to Bosnia and settled there, married into the community, and so those communities were obviously of great concern to us at the time because we really didn't know what exactly was gonna occur. So that was, that took up a lot of time. SY: And what [coughs] what did you end up concluding about those communities? WL: Um so some, there was some activity there that was responded to appropriately. I was tangentially involved in the, the detention of the Sarajevo group that was trying to break into to U.S. Embassy. And that group actually ended up in GTMO so I was partially involved in the intelligence lead up to that particular operation. And I think that's probably the biggest operation that we were involved in. We were involved in other couple other operations and then on the other side I was very involved in the PIFWC hunting, which I thought was probably one of more rewarding parts of my time there. SY: Yeah I would imagine. Yeah and so what ended up, did you capture some people? WL: Ah yes, whose names they are anymore I can't remember. SY: Right, unless it's Milosevic, I won't remember either. WL: No, we were—the guy that we were really hunting was Radovan Karadžić and we didn't catch him. The French dimed us out and he escaped because the French gave him a heads up. SY: Huh, why they do that? WL: Um, that's a really good question. The French were very sympathetic to the Serbs, and I don't really know why that was but they had a very sympathetic posture towards the Serbs in the conflict. So they caught the guy on his cell phone telling Karadžić to escape and so he made a very speedy exit out of Bosnia. But from that point forward there was some very deep soul searching about who we shared intelligence with and that was a pretty tough thing to lose out on, you know. SY: Hm. You don't think of the French being people U.S. intelligence has to watch out for. WL: Yeah well I mean they're, they're, you know on a geopolitical level they are actually one of our biggest adversaries from a spying point of view. SY: Really? WL: Yeah. SY: Fascinating. WL: Yeah there's all kinds of open source documents on that you can read about [laughs]. 13 SY: Okay I'll go educate myself about that later. Um okay, so that's Bosnia and then there's Iraq. That's 2003. WL: Yeah so I was home for 10 months and the Iraq War was spinning up, and one of my closest friends who was my boss in Bosnia called me up and said, "Bill, we're putting together the band. We're going back, we're going back on active duty. Do you want to come?" And I said, "Well, let me think about it, talk to my wife, see what I wanted to do." And after a lot of soul searching you it just seemed to be the right thing to do to go with people I knew rather than wait a couple of years and be an individual mobilization placement and go with people I didn't know. So, you know, a couple of days' worth of serious soul searching and you know thinking about all that it would mean to my family, I decided to go. So I got mobilized in February of 2003, went to Fort Dix for our pre-mobilization training and activities. Spent about a month there, then got sent to a forward operating base called Camp Virginia in Kuwait, spent another month there getting all of our final shots and getting our vehicles in country and getting ready to go. And then during the ground war we got the go-ahead to go over the berm and head into Iraq. So we had a seventy-five vehicle convoy that took off out of Camp Virginia and convoyed just about twenty-four hours straight all the way to Camp Balad, which had numerous different names over the years, but it was Balad Army Base. And we ended up there for abou--I was there for about a month and a half. When we got there everybody they just said, "Freeze wherever you at, the ground war is over. And now were gonna consolidate on the objectives." And so we stayed there and made camp for about a month and a half. And then there was a call for augmentees to go to Baghdad to help staff up the new headquarters for the theater - the entity was called Combined Joint Task Force 7. So I was deemed not essential to my battalion headquarters. I had been the assistant S3 battle captain for operations and plans, and so they just said, "Listen you get a whole bunch of extra captains down there at the 325th MI Battalion, cough up two and send them to Baghdad and please send ones with human intelligence experience." So I didn't actually have human intelligence experience, but they sent me anyways. And me and one of my best friends got sent to Baghdad. He ended up being the battle captain of the CJ2X which is Combined Joint, 2X is human intelligence section. And I ended up being the human intelligence operations officer for the theater. And that, phew boy, that was probably one of the most traumatic, interesting, dynamic, fulfilling, every possible emotion you can think of. SY: So let talk about 'em, let's tease it apart. So what's, what's traumatic, what's fulfilling, what's? WL: Well it was a fairly easy job from June, I think I got there June 6, until mid-to late summer, and then the insurgency started. So it was initially really exciting to be in to be involved in the setting up of this new headquarters and the staffing of it and the policies and procedures that went with it and standard operating procedures and writing. We were still doing detainment operations and one of my responsibilities was again was to think about the requirements, what we needed to collect intelligence on from a detainee point of view. And I had a hundred tactical human teams out in the field that were collecting intelligence, and my job was to figure what they should collect on. So I had this huge enterprise that I was working on. I was only an Army captain and it was a huge scope for somebody with very little experience in that realm. And I,14 you know I sip from a fire hose for about two months, and learned a lot, and filled my brain up with a lot of cool experiences that I only learned about in books. And so that's kind of the fulfilling part. And then when the insurgency started we had a commanding general named Ricardo Sanchez, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, and he turned out to be perhaps the most toxic leader I've ever met in my life. He would, he would question everybody's performance of their specific jobs without any inkling of what their job actually was. He was heard to say things like, in front of thousands of people in the battle update brief, he'd say things like, "Why are we catching so many people and detaining them, why don't we just kill them?" So that environment bread a lot of, just a toxic environment. And if you're, if you're a malevolent person looking for an excuse to be and have an outlet for that malevolency, that's a license. And, and what that ultimately, in my experience, devolved into was the Abu Ghraib problem. So for me in August, August-September of 2003 we had an interrogation and detention facility over at Camp Cropper which is on Baghdad International Airport, and the international community for the Red Cross came and said, "These are inhumane living conditions. You gotta get these detainees out of here." So working with the MPs we had to find someplace new to put them and it just so happened that the prison, the maximum security prison out of Abu Ghraib - they're actually four prisons on the Abu Ghraib complex - had just begun renovations and it was intended to be used by civi-by the Iraqis for civilian detainees. And, and so we went out to take a look at it at the provost marshal's suggestion, and determined that it would be an absolutely magnificent facility for this. And kind of reflecting on the citizen soldier model, on my team of intelligence guys my driver and NCO in his civilian life was a corrections officer at Rikers Island; and my company commander was the president of state correctional workers in Massachusetts, the Correctional Worker's Union and he was, he was a, correction he was a corrections officer here in Massachusetts. So I brought them with me and I said, "You know we have to find some place to put the worst of the worst, the people we want to interrogate, what do you think of this facility?" And they were like, "This is perfect. This is the right place." SY: What made it perfect? WL: It was, ah, it was well organized, it was clean, it was neat, it wasn't in the bombed out parts, it wasn't in a mud puddle. It was just in immaculate shape because it had been renovated and it was perfectly suited for an interrogation facility. SY: So the thinking in some ways was that it would be humane? WL: Yes. Absolutely that was the absolute intention was to—when you have high level detainees you don't want them to think about anything else other than what you want them to think about. You don't want them thinking about how to escape the mortar attacks at night, you don't want them to—you want them to be thinking about whatever, whatever you're working on with them in terms of intelligence collection. So it was really an optimal facility. And so that was, you know that was a high point in my deployment. It was. I actually have pictures of me behind bars at Abu Ghraib. SY: I saw those pictures. WL: That's the day I picked Abu Ghraib. It was my staff action that made Abu Ghraib happen.15 SY: And they're really chilling in retrospect but at the time, right? And then and then it looks like you're seeing all the remains of Saddam Hussein's prison too. It looks like a lethal injection bottle and signs for death row and so I'm-I was trying to imagine what you guys were talking about when you were walking—there's graffiti, super weird pornographic graffiti. What were you guys talking about when you were exploring that building? WL: You know we'd already been briefed that Saddam executed about 30,000 people at that jail in his reign of terror. And we also knew that some pretty despicable things had happened out there. And so, you know, it was all to us almost surreal to be walking around and seeing all that wild graffiti, and the, you know we don't really know what was in those bottles but you can [laughs], you can make all kind of informed guesses. And then to actually go in the death house which, which ultimately got walled in so that people wouldn't go into it so it could be preserved for war crimes. Um, I mean that that to me was the closest thing that I have ever felt to death because you could smell death. It was it was an awful, awful, awful place. So that, you know, was traumatic on some level but the breadth of the experience for me was just absolutely incredible in terms of the scope of what I was involved in. SY: So let's go back to the citizen soldier idea to the idea of the ethical soldier. So what do you think happened there? What turned it into what it became? WL: So there was this enormous pressure starting with Secretary of Defense - Undersecretary of Defense - all the way down to Ricardo Sanchez: "We need to get more intelligence, more actionable intelligence so we can stop this insurgency." And the pressure, I can't even begin to describe the pressure that these people, these senior leaders were under. And I, I have the luxury now at this point in my career to have a sense of what that strategic leadership's like and how, how difficult it is to manage political expectations and, you know, the realities of a war torn environment. And I guess I can see how a twisted mind can get twisted to the point of losing the ability to be a genuine leader. And that's what happened. At all ranks people that could twist their social values to suit ends that were inconsistent with those values, those people were everywhere. And it permeated all the way down to the lowest level, it really did. I wasn't, I didn't personally didn't meet any of the MPs that were involved in the atrocities that happened at Abu Ghraib. I did know two of the intelligence people that were involved, not on a friendly basis but they were they were junior enlisted and I knew who they were and they weren't bad people, they just caught up in a very ugly situation. And so I think it was that that just that tiered level of toxic leadership that permeated everything - results now, don't care what the cost is. And, and I learned a lot from that experience. I learned, I learned really how easy it is for well-intentioned, well-managed groups to get off track because there's this abject fear and and apprehension about failing. Because you're failing your brothers in arms when they're getting killed every night from mortar attacks and roadside bombs, and so this this constant drumbeat of "Your brothers are dying, your sisters are dying on the roads of Iraq. You have to do something, you have to get this intelligence." And so when people say that enough, and you live through enough depravity, it's not hard to imagine how people can lose it and I think that's what happened. I really do. SY: And now you're a colonel so now you are higher in the leadership. How, how as a leader do you think you can prevent this type of thing from happening again? 16 WL: That's a, that's a good question. I've taken the last five years of my career and really focused on mentorship. I sit down with every single officer that I rate or senior rate and I'm, unfortunately I'm one of the rare people that does this. One on one I devote an hour at a time to each and every one of them and really have a conversation about values and how values are the foundation of citizen soldiery, because all my soldiers are reservists, and how values are really the foundation of good ethical leadership. And it might sound weird to have an hour long conversation about values but that time goes quickly when you have people that are engaged in it, and I can tell which ones get it and which ones don't get it. And the ones that get it are the ones that I invest my time in and the ones that just sit there and go, "Yes sir, yes sir, yes sir." "Okay [laughs], you don't really get it, so you know, you're not really on track." And that's how my ratings fall out. So that's my way of giving back, I guess, is to try and identify the people that I think have the moral footing necessary to be a strategic leader. SY: And so [coughs] if you were gonna give Norwich advice about how to train ethical leaders, right, who can who can stand up when things are toxic right, who can have integrity. What advice would you give them? WL: Excellent question. When I was a cadet, not a Norwich cadet, but an Army ROTC cadet and to some extent the Norwich thing, making second lieutenants was kind of a cookbook operation. It was "Here's the recipe. Put him in the box, sprinkle all the dust around him, shake it up, enough will stick. Send him all to all these very regimented courses. Get him smart about how the Army works and stick him in the force." And I think that was, I know that was a very Cold War mentality - shake and baking officers. Today's world is so much more complex. SY: Okay hold on one sec [sirens outside of office, interview pauses]. [interview resumes] WL: So now we live in the age of the strategic corporal, where the lowest private through social media can literally influence the battle. Abu Ghraib is an example of that, those pictures got out. And ah, so you have to teach leaders—it's much less a recipe than it is a crafting. Every individual needs to be crafted. They have to understand the strategic implications, they need to be taught how to think critically and creatively. The very volatile world that we live in with globalization, urbanization, mass communications, climate change—all these things weren't even in our vocabulary when I was a second lieutenant, because we were focused on the Cold War. And now our threats are more likely than not, the future threats are less about kinetic threats, somebody shooting at you, and more like what happens when a city of 24 million people gets hit with a tidal wave. And then what do you do? And you're a second lieutenant and you get put in charge of a bunch of people in that environment. There's no way that you can possibly teach a second lieutenant how to handle every single one of those situations. Whereas when I was a second lieutenant you had a cookbook, you followed the cook book, "Don't deviate outside of this, you'll be good." Now we have to encourage them to look outside of the four corners of their little world and figure out how what's on the right and the left is gonna impact their operation. And, you know, the military talks now not about the unknown but the unknowable. So as an intelligence officer the unknown was pretty daunting. My job was to 17 figure out what wasn't known and how to go know it, how to collect that information. What we talk now about the unknowable, the implication being, you can't know [laughs]. You can come up with various constructs of what that unknowable thing might do, and how you cope with that, but it's literally unknowable, you'll never know. And so that framework has to be driven into the lowest levels because those kid—those are the kids that are gonna make it survive. They're gonna go into villages with people who are living primitively and try and infuse in them our democratic Western values, and help them with development and conflict at the most elementary level. And that is not something you can get out of textbooks at Norwich. You have to go out in the wide world and see that. I love the fact that Norwich has a very aggressive international program now, because that is absolutely - I am utterly convinced that the future of education has to involve an international component so that you see, touch and feel how other people live and have an appreciation for other, other value systems other than Western value systems. SY: Seems like anthropology classes should be required too. WL: Language class, anthropology class. I know it's awfully hard to do that when you have a technical discipline like electrical engineering, but I think that it's we are doing our nation a disservice if we don't educate our children and our young adults to live in an increasingly global world. Insularity is the enemy of America's success, it really is. So I'm utterly persuaded by that. And a little aside - when I grew up in the Army it was all about the Cold War, the Russians were our enemies, anything to do with Russia was like, "ooh." And so just as an example of how things change, in Bosnia in 2002 I had a Russian Spetsnaz colonel - full colonel, I was a captain - I had a Russian Spetsnaz full colonel working for me, doing collection plans for the intelligence that the Russians were doing in their sector. We had a Russian sector. And the guy's name was Colonel Volkov and I befriended the guy, professionally, not personally, I befriended the guy. And we ended up having a very good cordial relationship to the point where on Defenders of the Motherland Day in, I want to say it was February or March of 2002, he invited me to be his distinguished guest at the Defenders of the Motherland parade and ceremony. And I ended up getting placed in the front row right next to the CG, and the CG sat down and he goes, "You're in the wrong place, move back captain, you don't, you're not a distinguished visitor." And I said, "Actually, I am, Colonel Volkov invited me." And he looked at me like, "What? That doesn't make any sense." And Colonel Volkov showed me that cooperation, even in today's environment, is possible, you know when you get down to the human level. He invited us to that event and then held a private reception for us with vodka and smoked salmon and toast and cheese. And then we moved from to that private reception to his group's his little special forces bar on the Russian base and we drank there for like four hours. And then we were all trying to leave and one of the traditions is to cut the patch off your uniform and exchange patches. So I was in the middle of cutting my patch off my uniform and the colonel was looking very longingly at my Gerber knife, it was a very basic folding knife. And I said, "Sir, would you like my knife as a gift?" And he said, "I could never accept," through his translator, he was like, "I could never accept such a generous gift." And I said, "Come on it's a thirty dollar knife," and I put it in his hand. And he goes, "And I must repay you." So he takes me to his private quarters. Now you have to keep in mind I'm on a Russian Army base in the middle of Bosnia and me and this colonel walk off into the woods arm and arm, half in the bag. And I'm gone, and all my 18 colleagues are like, "Where did Lyons go?" So I disappeared for an hour. He took me back to his private quarters. We drank Slobovicz and chatted a little bit down there, and then he reached into uni-his closet and he took his uniform, and he took every badge off his uniform and he said, "Is this a good enough gift?" And I was dumbfounded like, I have now all these Spetsnaz badges from Russia. And I said, "Sure." I'd have taken two, but I'll take it, you know? So I put it in my pocket, we had another shot of Slobovicz and then it occurred to me, "Oh my God, like I've been gone like an hour with a Russian Spetsnaz colonel and if they're not totally freaking out, something's wrong." So we go back and you know frantic, "Oh my God, thank God you're okay." And I went back to Eagle Base that night and I just reflected that a mere three years earlier we were mortal enemies, and to have that experience at that juncture in my life was just remarkable, remarkable. And it just proof positive that whatever today's situation is three years now it is not what you think it's gonna be and and and if Norwich doesn't produce people that can anticipate those changes and be ready for those challenges. You can't know them all, but you have to have the intellectual capacity to cope with them all, to adapt to them all. SY: And not knee jerk prejudices against entire peoples and populations or religions, right? WL: Exactly. SY: Because lo and behold [laughs]. WL: Yup, exactly. So that really opened my mind up to how important it is be, and I used the word agile because you have to be intellectually agile. You have to understand and perceive on a very subtle level all the little changes that are going around the world, and if you're not capable of doing that, you know, we're gonna make colossal strategic mistakes. The strategic corporal is gonna make a big blunder and jeopardize an entire national security strategy. And who better than to do that than citizen soldiers that have one leg in the civilian world and understand things from the civilian populous point of view, and one leg in the military world who have a greater appreciation of military strategy and tactics and operations. I think the citizen soldier brings that dimension to, a very much needed dimension to the national security strategy. And incidentally many senior Army leaders after thirteen years of war get it, they have had reservists in their headquarters and have had one on one contact. I myself, my boss in Iraq was General Barbara Fast, active duty, one star promotable, and I was in her office one day and she was briefing me-not briefing me but, you know, bringing me up to speed on a particular initiative [coughs]. And she says, "What do you think of this?" and I said, "Ma'am I think that's really awful idea." And she was startled, she said, "Nobody talks to me that way. Why do you talk to me that way?" And I said, "Ma'am, I'm a Reservist. If I can't be honest with you than I'm doing something wrong. If you like my advice and change your plan because I was honest with you, then good, you changed the plan in a way that I think is constructive. If you don't like my advice and you say, 'piss off,' I just say, 'good,' because you know I was heard, different ideas were on the table, and I wasn't a yes man." So I said, "Ma'am, you're always gonna get a very honest answer opinion from me. You might not like it but it's gonna be a very honest and direct opinion." And she goes, "You know, I have like twenty majors that work for me" (at this point I was a major). She's like, "You know nobody, nobody gives me honest advice, you're the only one." And from that point forward I was her go-to guy for the "is this a stupid idea or a good idea or whatever." 19 SY: So what do you think gave you the chutzpah to be able to do that, to sort of to speak your mind in that context? WL: I think it was a lifetime of of—first of all confidence in your analytical abilities which I, I've always been fairly confident in my analytical abilities. But I think it was the, you know, the lifetime of values thing, the integrity that my parents inculcated in me, and the school inculcated in this this this, "Always stand up for what's right approach." And, you know, the truth of the matter is you know we live in a somewhat political world so you do have to when to pick your battles and not everything can be a fight because that person gets nothing done. But you really have to be perceptive and know when is the right time to speak your mind and make your thoughts heard. And if you're judicious and thoughtful about it you'll get a reputation for being the one that can be called upon to consult with in tough situations. And I, I've been fortunate that that's been the case for me. I've been counsel now to people that I started as company grade officers that are now generals, and it's satisfying and rewarding when somebody calls you up and says, "Hey I got this, you know, this really tough problem, just wanted to talk to you about it, you know. I don't need an answer. I just want to talk it out." And it's very satisfying, it really is. SY: I can imagine, you know it's interesting at this point I've done a bunch of these interviews and in my experience it's reservists and ah helicopter pilots— WL: [laughs]. SY: Who their identity as citizen soldiers is about, you know, standing up for what you think is right even if it is pushing back against authority. And then people who are more Regular Army, that is not their mentality. It's interesting. That's what I've observed so far, yeah. WL: One of my, one of the, my, the deputy intelligence officer for Iraq, he was our boss for a little while, and he was responsible for the day-to-day operations and General Fast was the big thinker policy person. So Colonel Boltz is the guy's name, he's a Norwich guy, Norwich, I want to say '78, '79, Steve Boltz. He's currently the Deputy G-2 for U.S. Army Europe, fantastic guy. So he would come into our—we were behind a purple curtain believe it or not in our little headquarters, and he would come in and he would flip the purple curtain open, and me and my buddy who was Ponce, this guy's name was Captain Ponce at the time, he's now Colonel Ponce. He'd go with his really strange accent, "Ponce, Lyons, tell me the truth, all my majors lie to me and you're the only ones that tell me the truth!" And we'd sit down and we'd have an hour long bull session with this colonel because he could trust us to just tell us the way it was. And when we were flat out wrong, he'd explain it, he'd mentor us and say, "Just because you have the chutzpah to be honest with me. I'm gonna invest in you and, and mentor you." And so Ponce and he actually ended up being very close friends, and Bill just visited him in Europe like just two months ago. And he's just a fantastic guy, fantastic leader. I mean he was the, he's the classic guy who got to colonel speaking his mind but couldn't get to general because he spoke his mind. That's Steve Boltz and I appreciated him for all of that he was a really straight shooting kind of guy. Really, really cool. SY: So it seems like you've seen examples of really toxic leadership and really good leadership? 20 WL: I have, yeah, yeah. SY: And I'm wondering if I have more questions to ask you about that. I mean and you've served, you've served at all your deployments as an officer. WL: I have, yeah. SY: And I guess how do you think the experience is different um for somebody - I mean this is such a huge question - but for somebody who's enlisted. I guess I've been doing interviews in part with some people who've dealt with PTSD and it seems pretty clear that PTSD is more prevalent among enlisted men than officers, and I don't know if that's true or not true but do you have thoughts about that? WL: Yeah, it's not my experience. I think that officers tend to manage and conceal their PTSD because they're expected to. You're expected to be the tough one, the guy that keeps it all together, but there's ample opportunities, ample examples of officers that didn't keep it together. I'll give an example, my, my brigade commander, a guy whose name is escaping me at the time, he had the single largest military intelligence brigade ever assembled, seven battalions. It was huge and he was responsible for Abu Ghraib, the intelligence side of Abu Ghraib. And I remember being summoned to his office and a guy named Jonathan Carpik came to me and he, Captain Carpik, and he said, "Hey Colonel." I can't re—he's the guy pinning the medal on in my picture, and I can't--I'm just drawing a complete blank as to his name. He said, "He wants you in his office." Now he had this little closet of an office, it was literally a closet with a desk in it. And so I went and the door was maybe three inches open and I could hear sobbing inside. So I was like, "Well that's weird." So I knocked on the door and he said, "Come in," and I kind of cracked the door a little bit and he said, "Come on in Lyons." He was visibly shaken, and he looked at me he goes, "You know I never thought I'd say this, but I hate my job and I hate my life." And that was a full colonel in the middle of a combat environment. And if that's not PTSD I don't know what it is. So, you know he clearly was struggling like the weight of the world around him. I myself struggled with survivor's guilt coming home. SY: Can you talk about that? WL: Well I spent about a year in therapy just coming to terms with the various losses. Two guys in my unit got killed, Travis Fredrich and um Gregory Bellanger two, one was a cook that was on a convoy, the other was an intelligence interrogator who was killed in a in a mortar attack. And that was a bit of a loss and I came home and my Norwich class president Rob Soltes was killed shortly thereafter. He was an optometrist on a Civil Affairs mission in northern Iraq and he got hit by a VB IED and he died [coughs]. So those were very traumatic experiences for me, and what it resulted for me was you know those were lives that were lost. And first of all it could have been me and maybe I would have felt better it was me so that their families didn't experience the loss. But it also made me reexamine all of my own priorities in life, like and this is gonna sound trivial and trite, but how can I live better to make their loss worth it? So that's really been sort of the driving force behind my life since then. And then my bo--my roommate in Bosnia, a guy named Harold Brown who's from Bolton, Mass., Army Reservist, he ended up getting recruited by the CIA when we left Bosnia. And he ended up being an intel operative for 21 them. and he is the one of the guys that gets killed in Khost in the movie Zero Dark Thirty. That was what? Four years ago now, Christmas-ish? That was a huge loss, I mean that was very very traumatic. He and I were very close in Bosnia. We stayed close. So I still work with his family and we try to remember him every year. It's a very big loss, so. SY: I also would imagine coming home and then the Abu Ghraib scandal breaking would also be a bit of an existential crisis in addition, right? WL: Yeah. Well I and Ponce ended up being interviewed extensively, ah what's an AR-15-6 investigation, which is an investigation into potentially criminal activity. It's like a precursor to like a grand jury type of investigation. A guy named Major General George Fay came and interviewed us because of Abu Ghraib. And I was interviewed extensively as was Ponce, and you know looking, they were looking deep and desperately to try and find the trigger that caused all that and I mentioned I don't think it was anything specific, I think it was just pervasive. But um, but reliving all of that was very, very traumatic. And I'll tell you probably one of the weirdest things that I experienced in Iraq was at six months under the Geneva Conventions if you are a detainee you are entitled to a review of your detention. And so in August, which was roughly two--six months after the war started, we had to start reviewing all these cases. And I was appointed the guy that was gonna be the intel person coordinating the review of all the files. So there was an MP officer that was reviewing for threats, and there was an intel officer reviewing to determine if there was intel value in that detainee and whether we should keep them for the intel value. And so we were reviewing all these files and we literally had something like 14,000 detainees at this point, and I'm reviewing the earliest ones first because they're entitled to their review. So one of the first manila folders I'm handed, handed has a detainee number on the, you know the little piece that sticks out, index, and a name. And you open it up and there was nothing in it and I go, "Hey anybody have the information on this file?" "Oh no, I didn't see anything." So I called down to the detention center I'm like, "Hey I got this manila folder with nothing in it" [laughs]. And they're like, "Yeah that's all we got." I'm like, "Well how am I supposed to make a decision on that?" you know, "Go debrief the guy and find out what the circumstances of, at least the circumstances of capture were." So somebody goes into the pen and now this guy's been tied up for six months and when they go, "So you know what's the circumstances?" And so he was walking back from the hospital after carrying his daughter several miles to the hospital, dropped his daughter off. On his way home, um, the 3rd Infantry Division captured him because he was out past curfew. Got rolled up, sent to Camp Cropper, then sent off to Abu Ghraib and had spent six months wondering what happened to his daughter, wondering if his family knew where he was, wondering anything. And so, I mean if we didn't make an enemy out of this guy I don't know what would, right? So I reflected a lot of that. That definitely troubled me, you know, as I, as I came home and unwound from the war that. That, you know, that haunted me a bit. So, you know, PTSD comes in a lot of forms. Those are my forms. And there are all different forms, you know. It's… SY: Yeah I talked to a guy last week who was in Vietnam and Korea. And in his words he was "cuckoo" after Korea, that's what he said. So he was, he had PTSD after Korea. And he said oddly he healed himself in Vietnam because in addition to you know developing a missile, he 22 personally created these two humanitarian missions. So like they took some rice from the Viet Cong and the Army was gonna burn it and he was like, "Yeah I'm taking that over to that village," right? There was another instance where he took the packing crates and brought it over to build a school. And he said really beautifully that he was able to maintain his sense of himself as an ethical person even though he was doing other things that he didn't feel good about. Because of that he was able to, to not feel so messed up when he got home. WL: Yeah, it's a good outlet. I think everybody, that's really what you need is an outlet. SY: Yeah, and maintaining a sense of yourself, right? WL: Yup. Yeah absolutely. I spent the last—the first—when I was deployed my mayor got voted out of office so I came home to no job. SY: Oh no! WL: So while I was trying to figure what to do a friend of mine said, "Hey, we're gonna start an engineering company. Do you know anybody that'd like to run it?" and I said, "Well, me." So I took that job and the weird thing was for the first two or three months I couldn't do anything. I would sit in front of the computer and stare at it, do internet searches about the war, because I needed the "vig," you know, the excitement of being engaged. And it just occurred to me one day I was like, "I'm a basket case [laughs]. I am totally lost." And that's when I decided to seek counseling because I knew that there was something wrong with me, and it was very standard behavior for somebody that was so amped up 24/7. I worked eighteen hours a day on military stuff and then [snap] gone. SY: Welcome home! WL: Yeah, welcome home, get normal, put a suit on, sit in front of the computer and and build a company. I was like uhh…. SY: Ahh! [laughs] what do I do? WL: So— SY: Did you have that hypervigilance stuff too that a lot of people describe? Like scanning and— WL: No, I, I honestly didn't. I did some pretty crazy stuff in terms of convoying in Iraq, but I never felt like the, and some people describe it to me as sort of the razor's edge experience, like you feel like you're right out on the edge of stuff. I did a lot of convoying in the Highway of Death and I don't know why but it never, and I was very very, I was very attuned to the threat and I did everything that I was supposed to do, but I never felt that particular high. The high I felt was more about working with Special Operators to identify targets, and to me that was the most exhilarating thing that I could do. So I, you know convoyed to Tikrit, and I convoyed to out to Abu Ghraib a bunch of times. I convoyed to Babylon. That was a wonderful experience, I got to explore all the ruins. Oh it was just fantastic experience, just very, very, um, very rewarding to do that. And yeah, I mean I spent a lot of time on my way out to visit other agencies that I 23 needed to coordinate with as part of my responsibilities. And it just never occurred to me, I knew how dangerous it was but it never felt as exhilarating as the other parts of my job. SY: Hm. That makes sense. WL: The other people that worked for me were like, "Why do you go out so much?" you know, "You shouldn't be so quick to go out on these convoys." I'm like, "But it's my job. I need to talk to these people." They're like, "Use a phone." I'm like, "I can't get the same information on the phone, I gotta go talk to these people," so. My driver who was uh, Freddy Klein, who probably would much have preferred that I did not go out. He tried on numerous occasions to talk me out of my road trips but he and I almost met our fate, we got shot at from behind by our own people who discharged a weapon when they shouldn't have, and it went right between us. I was sitting in the passenger seat of the truck and he was sitting in the driver's seat of the truck, went by his ear by about six inches. Yeah it was a pretty interesting day. So that's the closest I came to getting shwacked. SY: That's pretty close [laughs]. WL: It was a big, there was a night we got 57 millimeter rockets raining on us, and so that was another fairly close call. It was quite the experience to say the least. SY: How'd you get that teacup? WL: So, um, when I went to the, I think they call it the Al Faw Palace, it's the the palace that was in the middle of Camp Victory. Camp Victory was actually forming at that time, like they just barely had the perimeter secured when I showed up. And I had this guy who was a Marine Corps Major, a guy named Bob Sirks who was nominally my boss for three weeks or something. And he goes, "Have you been in the palace?" Now the palace was supposed to be off-limits, we weren't supposed to go there. I said, "I haven't." And he goes, "Let's go in." I said, "I don't know." He's like, "There's nobody over there, nobody will ever know." He's like, "I've been inside, it's cool." I said, "Okay." So we, we found a way into the building, I don't even remember what way we got in and it was opulent - gold toilet seats and gold leaf everything. And so he goes, "Hey, let's go in the kitchen." So we go in the kitchen and this huge china set, now this was a palace, one of the many palaces that Saddam used, but this huge china set with the tea cups and everything just left untouched. It's just sitting there. And he's like, "Oh let's get a souvenir." I'm like, "I don't know, you know." He's like, "Oh just a tea cup." So, "alright just a tea cup." So he gets a tea cup and I get a tea cup and he goes, "Now what?" I said, "That's enough for me." And so he took a whole bunch of other stuff and I was like, "Well I got my one war trophy, I'll take this." So that was the tea cup story, and that particular day, again because there was nobody in the palace. There are a whole bunch of pictures in my CDs of being inside the chandelier which is a totally cool experience. There's a chandelier in the pictures and you can actually go inside the chandelier. SY: I somehow must have missed that set of pictures because I—you know what? Maybe there were two Iraq discs and I only looked at one. I'll go back and look later. 24 WL: Yeah, that was cool. And then there's a picture of me on the roof, and there's a hole in the roof so it's kinda like straddling my, I'm straddling the hole. And that's where a JDAM1 went through the roof and then you can see the picture of Saddam's bedroom that's blown to smithereens. And so that one bomb went down three stories and basically blew up on his bed. Of course he wasn't there, but the intent was to target him. And that was really proof positive that I was on the right side [laughs] just to see to see the technological advantage that we had. It was really really amazing. And the rest of the building was intact. It was just that room that was blown up. Everything else, the tea cups were all where they were supposed to be, the, nothing was affected outside of that. I mean it was really— SY: The building wasn't even rattled enough that the tea cups fell? WL: Yeah it was it was totally illus—illustrative of how we were— SY: Illustrative? I never know how pronounce that word, yeah. WL: Yeah you get the message. It was the, technical, technological overmatch was on, you know, absolute display in that, in that particular moment to me. It was really amazing, really amazing. SY: What'd ya think when you were walking though Babylon? WL: You know that was almost surreal. The Marines had kind of secured Babylon to prevent looting, and they hired the chief archeologist of Iraq to give tours. So this guy who was Saddam's chief archeologist showed us around all of the ruins of Babylon. And one of the weird things is that Saddam had—he was very envious of Nebuchadnezzar, the king that ruled Babylon. And he built a huge castle above Babylon to show his supremacy, but he later thought better of it and he wanted his castle built on top of Nebuchadnezzar's castle. So he actually in the process he sank Nebuchadnezzar's castle because it was on filled marshlands. So you can see the sinking process going on because stacked all these bricks with his stamp on it over Nebuchadnezzar's bricks with Nebuchadnezzar's stamps on it. But we saw the procession street where he had all his military parades and civic parades, the Lion of Babylon was still there. We got—I got pictures in front of the Lion of Babylon. It was a very rewarding experience. I can't say that I had a very classical education and that sort of stuff so I was kind of learning it on the fly with the chief archeologist of Iraq, so I guess you couldn't ask for a better teacher than that. It was a very, it was a very interesting experience. Very fun. SY: That's pretty cool. I have to head to Northbridge soon and I want to beat some of the traffic. WL: I got to go pick up my kids. SY: Alright, any last thoughts? This has been a fantastic interview. WL: Oh it's my pleasure. Um no. I, you know I will say that I owe my success to Norwich and to a number of leaders that were Norwich, and weren't Norwich, along the ways. One of my best friends is now a commander of my command in the Reserves, the military intelligence readiness 1 This is an acronym for Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), a bomb guidance system. 25 command. The guy's name is Brigadier General Gabriel Troiano. He's not a Norwich guy but he exemplifies the citizen soldier in my mind. He was my boss in Bosnia, he was my boss in Iraq, and now he's a brigadier general and that to me is proof positive that the right values system and the right leadership really does make a difference. It really makes a difference and I applaud Norwich for staying on that path all these years, and I hope that they stay on it. SY: Yeah, hey thanks! WL: My pleasure.
The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8228 Security Council Seventy-third year 8228th meeting Tuesday, 10 April 2018, 3 p.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Tumysh/Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Poland. . Mr. Radomski Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-10187 (E) *1810187* S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 2/21 18-10187 The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Canada, the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them document S/2018/175, S/2018/321 and S/2018/322, which contain the texts of three draft resolutions, respectively. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/321, submitted by Canada, France, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. I now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): For years, as part of its responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security, the Security Council has been mobilized on the issue of chemical weapons. After the chemical attacks in Ghouta in 2013, the Security Council adopted resolution 2118 (2013), which provided for the complete dismantling of the chemical arsenal of the Syrian regime. Russia, as co-sponsor of that resolution, had guaranteed its implementation. Despite that guarantee, the Damascus regime has never complied with its obligations under resolution 2118 (2013) and has never renounced — as we saw again on 7 April — the use of chemical weapons against its civilian population. Five years after the Council's adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), we note that the general subject of chemical weapons remains tragically topical. The upcoming voting marks our fourth meeting in less than a week on this issue. Yesterday we met in an emergency meeting (see S/PV.8225) following a new chemical-weapons massacre in Douma, Syria, whose appalling images left us shocked. Last month we met to discuss the unacceptable attack in Salisbury (see S/PV.8203). Last year we met day after day after the terrible attack of Khan Shaykhun. That shows the deterioration of the situation and how serious the stakes are today for our security. The use of chemical weapons is so abominable that it has been banned for almost 100 years, and the international community began years ago to eliminate them. As such, the chemical non-proliferation regime, which we have patiently developed and strengthened, is one of the pillars of our collective security architecture, at the heart of our security system. Yet today it is under serious threat. We face the cynical, barbaric and all-out use of chemical weapons against civilian populations. The Douma attacks once again illustrated the abject brutality of the Syrian regime's resolute military strategy. Such acts constitute war crimes or even crimes against humanity. They increase the risk of dangerous normalization — tolerating the return of these agents of fear and death is nothing more than a blank cheque to all those who would like to use them. To allow the normalization of the use of chemical weapons without responding is to let the genie of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — which pose an existential threat to us all — out of the bottle. It would mark a serious and reprehensible setback to the international order that we have all patiently helped to develop. The consequences would be terrible, and we would all pay the price. That is why we cannot accept it. France will do all it can to prevent impunity for the use of chemical weapons. It is in that spirit that we launched an international partnership last January. The demise of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in November, due to the Russian veto to protect Al-Assad's regime, sent a dangerous signal of impunity. It deprived us of an essential deterrent tool. It left a vacuum that the Syrian regime has rushed to exploit, and which yesterday's atrocities have tragically reminded us of. The American initiative to re-establish an independent mechanism, based on a balanced approach and taking into account the concerns expressed by every member of the Council, enables us to fill that glaring void. Such a mechanism would support the inquiry that has already been launched by the OPCW. It would also respect the essential criteria of independence, 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 3/21 without any interference, and impartiality to which each member of the Council has committed. Such a mechanism would have a mandate to attribute responsibility for the attacks. Only the combination of those two criteria — independence and a mandate to attribute responsibility — will make that mechanism effective, and therefore dissuasive. Let me be clear: in view of the gravity of the 7 April attack, France will not accept any third-rate or sham mechanism whose independence and impartiality would not be genuinely ensured. That is what the Security Council owes today to the Syrian victims of chemical attacks and to the entire international community, whose security is threatened by the chemicals in the hands of the regime of Bashar Al-Assad. Since the threat is of an existential nature for us all, combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must, more than ever, be among the top priorities of the Security Council. If there is one area in which the Council has a moral and political responsibility to convene and act, it is this one. If there is one domain for which the credibility of the Council is at stake, where tactical games have no place, it is this one. This is one of those moments when we have no choice but to act because what is at stake is essential. We cannot allow the chemical non-proliferation regime, and with it our entire security architecture — along with the principles and values that underpin our action — to crack and disintegrate before our very eyes. Today's vote is one of those key moments, one of those moments of truth. On behalf of France, I therefore call on each member of the Council to properly gauge and assume its responsibilities now and to vote in favour of the American draft resolution (S/2018/321). Mrs. Haley (United States of America): We have reached a decisive moment as the Security Council. On Saturday the first haunting images appeared from Douma, in Syria. We gathered around this table yesterday (see S/PV.8225) to express our collective outrage. We then collectively agreed that the Council needed to take steps to determine exactly what happened in Douma and to put an end to these barbaric attacks. The United States has put forward a draft resolution (S/2018/321) that accomplishes those shared goals. For weeks we have been working with every single delegation on the Council to develop a new attribution mechanism for chemical-weapons attacks in Syria. We held open and transparent negotiations so that every delegation could provide its input. And we went the extra mile for one Council member. We adopted paragraph after paragraph of Russia's proposed draft resolution (S/2018/175). We tried to take every Russian proposal that did not compromise the impartiality, independence or professionalism of a new attribution mechanism. After the Douma attack, we updated our draft resolution with common sense changes. Our proposal condemns the attack. It demands unhindered humanitarian access for the people in Douma. It calls on the parties to give maximum cooperation to the investigation. And it creates the attribution mechanism that we worked so hard with each member to develop. The draft resolution is the bare minimum that the Council can do to respond to the attack. The United States did everything possible to work towards Council unity on this text. Again, we accepted every recommendation that did not compromise the impartiality and independence of the proposed attribution mechanism. I want to say a brief word about Russia's draft resolution, which is also before us for a vote. Our draft resolutions are similar, but there are important differences. The key point is that our draft resolution guarantees that any investigations will truly be independent. Russia's draft resolution gives Russia itself the chance to choose the investigators and then to assess the outcome. There is nothing independent about that. The United States is not asking to choose the investigators, and neither should Russia. The United States is not asking to review the findings of any investigation before they are final, and neither should Russia. All of us say that we want an independent investigation. Our draft resolution achieves that goal. Russia's does not. This is not an issue that more time or more consultations could have resolved. At a certain point, you are either for an independent and impartial investigation or you are not. And now that the Douma attack has happened, this is not a decision that we can delay any longer. The United States calls on all Security Council members to vote in favour of our draft resolution and to abstain or vote against the Russian draft resolution. The Syrian people are counting on us. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Today the delegation of the United States is once again trying to mislead the international S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 4/21 18-10187 community and is taking yet another step towards confrontation by putting to a vote a draft resolution (S/2018/321) that does not enjoy the unanimous support of the members of the Security Council. It is not true that it meets almost all our requirements. The text is nothing more than an attempt to resurrect, unchanged, the former Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), established to investigate cases of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Russia has always emphasized that it will not support that approach. The JIM became a puppet in the hands of anti-Damascus forces, and it covered itself with shame when it issued a guilty verdict for a sovereign State without credible evidence. The American draft resolution represents an identical reproduction of all of the former Mechanism's flawed working methods. The new mechanism would conduct investigations as it sees fit, with no reference to the standards of the Chemical Weapons Convention. That has nothing to do with independence, which the draft resolution's sponsors and its closest allies only pretend to care about. We know the worth of such independence. It is true anarchy and manipulation. At every stage of our work on the American initiative we have insisted that the Secretary-General should select the staff for the investigative mechanism on the basis of the broadest possible geographic representation, with subsequent approval by the Security Council. Visits to the sites of the incidents and strict adherence to the principle of sequential actions while ensuring the preservation of the material evidence should be not optional but mandatory working principles. In a collective decision, the Security Council would determine who was responsible in any given case of the use of chemical weapons, based on reliable evidence that would leave no room for doubt about the correctness of the conclusions. There is nothing about this in the American draft resolution. The authors know that it goes against the Russian position and will not be adopted. But they are obstinately sticking to their line. It is clear that today's provocative step has nothing to do with a desire to investigate what happened in Douma, Syria, on 7 April. An attributive mechanism is not necessary in order to initially establish the facts. Even if we could conceive of the improbable scenario in which the draft resolution creating the mechanism was adopted today, it would take several months to put the mechanism together and fine-tune its operations. Establishing who is to blame is the final link in a very long chain of actions. Here, in front of everyone, I would once again like to ask the sponsors why they need the mechanism when they have already identified the guilty parties before the investigation. They do not need it. They do not want to hear anything. They do not want to hear that no traces of a chemical attack were found in Douma. They have simply been looking for an excuse the whole time, and the provocateurs among the White Helmets have very kindly provided it. This is all reminiscent of a kind of spring fever. Exactly a year ago, in April 2017, a similar scenario unrolled with the chemical provocation in Khan Shaykhun, followed by a missile strike. The fact is that the authors of the draft resolution are motivated by completely different priorities. They have pinned their hopes on the assumption that the draft resolution will not be adopted. That is what they want, and it is something that they can bank along with the rest of their reasons justifying the use of force against Syria. For several days now, the Administration in Washington, D.C., has been keeping the international community in suspense while discussing the so-called important decisions being prepared. Only yesterday we heard how anxiously Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura spoke about the current escalation extending beyond Syria's borders (see S/PV.8225), and we know that the Secretary-General is also very concerned about that. It is clear that Russia will once again be the target of the propaganda cannons. My American colleague will painstakingly enumerate the Russian vetoes on Syria. It is not impossible that she has taken upon herself a capitalist commitment to using the reckless policies of the United States to achieve some sort of personal record in that regard. We are using the veto to protect international law, peace and security and to ensure that the United States does not to drag the Security Council into its misadventures. The United States representative says that we are covering up for someone. Russia is in Syria at the invitation of its lawful Government in order to combat international terrorism, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, while the United States is covering up for militias and terrorists. If the United States has decided to carry out an illegal military venture — and we still hope that it will think better of it — it must answer for that itself. It wants to dump this draft resolution, which has been sitting on the shelf for a long time, onto the Security Council in order to find a pretext. The United States representative 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 5/21 herself has said repeatedly that if the Council does not make a decision, the United States will make a decision on its own. Why is the suta purposely undermining the Council's authority by promoting a draft resolution that we know will not go through? And a lot of people said that yesterday during consultations. We urge the Americans to give sober consideration to the potential this presents for confrontation, to think better of it and to withdraw its draft resolution from a vote. Russia cannot support it. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall first put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/321, submitted by Canada, France, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America Against: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Russian Federation Abstaining: China The President (spoke in Spanish): The draft resolution received 12 votes in favour, 2 against and 1 abstention. The draft resolution has not been adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): This is a sad day for the Security Council; it is a sad day for the cause of universal norms and standards; and it is a sad day for the non-proliferation regime. But, above all, it is a very sad day for the people of Douma, who now are without the protection that the international system was set up to provide for them. This is the fourth time in six days that the Council has discussed chemical weapons. Yesterday 14 members of the Security Council called for an investigation. Several members called on the permanent five (P-5) to assume their responsibilities to uphold the universal prohibition on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As a P-5 member, the United Kingdom was ready to do that and was joined by France and the United States. Conversely, by vetoing, Russia has crossed a line in the international order, and worse, if possible, history is repeating itself one year on from Khan Shaykun. Russia helped to create the original independent investigation that attributed Khan Shaykun to the Syrian regime and concluded that sarin, which can be developed only by a State actor, had been used. But last autumn, Russia vetoed renewal of that mechanism on not one but three occasions. The reason is clear: it is because Russia would rather cross the WMD line than risk sanction of its ally Syria. Instead, we are asked to believe that the Russian version of this latest attack should be the one that the Security Council believes. Russia is not authorized by the Security Council to carry out an investigation in Syria. Russia says that there were no traces of a chemical attack. No traces were found by whom? I repeat: Russia is not authorized to carry out an investigation on behalf of the Security Council. We need an independent investigative mechanism for that purpose, and only that sort of mechanism can have the confidence of the Security Council, the confidence of the membership of the United Nations and the confidence of the people of Syria. Sadly, reports of chemical-weapon attacks in Syria have continued since the original Russian veto, in November. It has become very clear that Russia will do what it takes to protect Syria, whatever the compelling evidence of the crimes committed, and to shut down further investigation and discussion of those crimes. This has come at the cost of Russia's own obligations and credibility as a permanent member of the Council, as a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and as a declared and supposed supporter of peace in Syria. The Security Council has been unable to act solely because Russia has abused the power of veto to protect Syria from international scrutiny for the use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people. Even today open-source investigations have located a chlorine cylinder, the same kind that the Joint Investigative Mechanism has found that the Syrian regime used, atop a house in Douma full of people who had clearly died from respiratory problems. S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 6/21 18-10187 I frankly doubt that in 48 hours Russia has verified all similar reports and can conclude that they are all fake. They are not fake; they need to be looked at and investigated by a proper independent mechanism such as the Council was prepared today to pass. Russia's credibility as a member of the Council is now in question. We will not stand idly by and watch Russia continue to undermine the global norms that have ensured the security of all of us, including Russia, for decades. As a P-5 member, the United Kingdom will stand up for international peace and security; it is our moral duty. It is a matter of shame that Russia has once again blocked a draft resolution. The Russian Ambassador mentioned that it was not a question of counting the number of Russian vetoes. I beg to differ. To quote Lenin, quantity has a quality all of its own. Russia's actions today are a step against the rules and authority of the Security Council and the wider United Nations. They are a step against international peace and security and non-proliferation, and they are a step against humanity. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China is deeply concerned at reports that the use of chemical weapons has caused civilian deaths and casualties in Syria. We are firmly opposed to the use of chemical weapons by any country, organization or individual, under any circumstances. This has been China's clear and consistent position. China supports the carrying out of a comprehensive, objective and impartial investigation into the use of chemical weapons in Syria so as to achieve results that are based on substantial evidence and can pass the litmus test of history and truth, bringing the perpetrators and the parties responsible for the use of chemical weapons to justice. There should be no prejudgment of the outcome or arbitrary conclusions. The Security Council has a consensus on condemning the chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, establishing a new investigative mechanism and identifying the perpetrators of the chemical-weapon attack in Syria. All members of the Security Council should remain united and insist that the Council and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons be the main channel for dealing with the Syrian chemical-weapon issue, in an effort to seek an appropriate solution through consultations. The draft resolution that was just put to the vote in the Security Council (S/2018/321) had elements of consensus, including condemning the chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, establishing a new investigative mechanism and urging all parties to cooperate with the investigation. However, on some specific measures, it does not take full consideration of some of the major concerns of certain Security Council members on improving the mechanism's working methods and ensuring an objective and impartial investigation. Against that backdrop and in the light of our long-standing position on the question of chemical weapons in Syria, China abstained in the voting on the draft resolution. The issue of Syria is currently at a critical juncture. China remains firmly seized of the situation and is deeply concerned at the developments on the ground. China has always called for respecting the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria and insists on seeking a peaceful solution to the dispute. We oppose the use or threat of force in international relations and believe that any action taken should be in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The international community and all parties concerned should stand firm on the imperative need to seek a political solution to the question of Syria, step up their support for the United Nations main channel of mediation, and push for all Syrian parties to seek a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political solution to the question of Syria, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015). China is ready to work with all parties in an effort to push for a political solution to the issue of Syria. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution initiated by the United States (S/2018/321) for two main reasons. With regard to the first reason, Côte d'Ivoire believes that the draft resolution conforms to our firm belief that any and all use of chemical weapons in wartime as in peacetime must be condemned and requires investigation to determine those responsible for such acts to hold them accountable. In that regard, the draft resolution submitted by the United States clearly conveys the resolve of the international community to see perpetrators of chemical attacks identified and prosecuted so that they are accountable for their acts. Concerning the second reason, Côte d'Ivoire believes that the text of the draft resolution provides 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 7/21 guarantees with regard to the credibility of the outcome of investigations. The text insulates such investigations from any political influence and clears a path for the experts' professionalism and independence and the impartiality of the mechanism itself. By voting in favour of the draft resolution, the Ivorian delegation wanted to show its solidarity with Syrian victims who are suffering from the consequences of an endless war and to help meaningfully safeguard international peace and security. Sadly, my delegation notes that divisiveness within the Security Council prevented the adoption of the American draft resolution, which Côte d'Ivoire painfully regrets. It is time that efforts be made to unify the Council if we want truly to work to achieve international peace and security. Mr. Radomski (Poland): The use of chemical weapons is a serious atrocity, which may amount to a crime against humanity and a war crime. Accountability for such acts is a requirement under international law — and central to achieving sustainable peace in Syria. Draft resolution S/2018/321, presented by the United States, addressed the most pressing needs related to the use of chemical weapons in Syria, including the role of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission, securing humanitarian access and, last but not least, creating a new, truly independent and impartial accountability mechanism. We thank the American delegation for its ongoing leadership in the negotiations. We appreciate its flexibility and fully understand and share the rationale behind putting this text to the vote today. Because of the use of the veto by the Russian Federation, the Security Council failed once again today to establish an accountability mechanism. By that act, Russia undermined the ability of the Council to fulfil its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations: to maintain international peace and security. We are disappointed that, for some States, political alliances and calculations proved to be more important than the need to end the horrors confronting the civilian population and the unacceptable loss of human life in Syria. Poland supports the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, the Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, and other instruments that might facilitate bringing the perpetrators of chemical attacks to justice. We will join all genuine efforts to achieve that goal. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): Bolivia reiterates in the strongest terms its categorical condemnation of the use of chemical weapons and the weaponization of chemical agents as an unjustifiable and criminal act, wherever, whenever and by whomever they are committed, as such use constitutes a serious crime under international law and a threat to international peace and security. There is no justification for their use regardless of the circumstances and of who uses them. We therefore reaffirm the need to maintain the unity of the Security Council so as to ensure that those who have used chemical weapons are held accountable and brought to justice so that their actions do not go unpunished. In that regard, we reiterate our support for the work being carried out by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission so that, in line with their mandates, they can carry out the work entrusted to them in the most methodical, technical and trustworthy manner possible with the support of an independent, impartial, complete and conclusive investigation. We firmly reiterate that the work of an investigative mechanism is essential to ensuring accountability for such terrible acts. To that end, it must be independent, impartial and representative so that a transparent, impartial, complete, reliable and conclusive investigation can be carried out, and, for that to happen, we face the great challenge and the responsibility of not politicizing or instrumentalizing the Security Council. My delegation voted against the draft resolution (S/2018/321) presented by the United States of America, first of all, because we regret that once again a draft resolution was put to the vote with the knowledge that it would not be adopted by the Security Council, and, moreover, because there has already been a series of threats of the use of force accompanied by threats of unilateral action, which, of course, runs directly counter to the Charter of the United Nations. Bolivia once again makes clear its firm rejection of taking unilateral actions, because any unilateral military action that does not enjoy the approval of the Security Council is entirely illegal and contravenes the principles explicitly set forth in the Charter. In addition, any unilateral S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 8/21 18-10187 military action would violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Arab Republic of Syria, and would affect the stability of the political process and the agreements on which progress has been made under the auspices of the United Nations. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): In my statement yesterday (see S/PV.8225) I urged the Security Council not to stand idly by and watch as a spectator while chemical weapons were being used in Syria. In our opinion, the Council should act, condemn, protect, and hold to account those responsible. Those elements are all reflected in draft resolution (S/2018/321) put forward by the United States, and that is why the Kingdom of the Netherlands voted in favour of that draft resolution. We thank the United States delegation for drafting the text. We appreciate the earlier rounds of negotiations and the flexibility displayed at yesterday's late-night round. Together with others, we are extremely disappointed that an attempt to set up an effective mechanism of attribution on the use of chemical weapons has failed once again. Today we witnessed the twelfth overall Russian use of the veto concerning Syria, including six pertaining to chemical weapons. As I said yesterday, if the Russian representative claims that the chemical-weapons attack in Syria is a fabrication, he should not veto the draft resolution. By vetoing this draft resolution, the Russian Federation assumes a heavy responsibility for continued impunity and the horrible use of chemical weapons in Syria. Because of this permanent member, the Council is not even able to condemn the use of chemical-weapons attacks this past weekend in Douma, during which the White Helmets once again demonstrated their unwavering commitment to their life-saving work in the most difficult circumstances. With regard to the draft resolution proposed by the Russian Federation (S/2018/175), the Netherlands will vote against it. That draft resolution falls short in every possible way. It seems that the Russian Federation is unable to support an independent and impartial investigative mechanism. It seems that it can accept a mechanism only in which itself can decide when, where, how and by whom the investigation would be conducted, while leaving the mandate attributed to the Council subject to its veto. This cannot be the end of the issue. The Security Council cannot remain passive in the face of the atrocities being committed in Syria. We must continue to work for an effective attribution mechanism, inside and outside the Security Council. Impunity must not prevail. The President (spoke in Spanish): The Security Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/175, submitted by the Russian Federation. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Before I speak about the draft resolution before us (S/2018/175), I would like to say that I am very happy that my British colleague is familiar with the classic works of Marxism-Leninism, although that is hardly surprising, because Marx, Engels and Lenin were frequent visitors to London — indeed, Marx is buried there. But I would like to cite another quotation from Lenin, who wrote an article entitled "Better Fewer, but Better". After the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) on the use of chemical weapons in Syria ended, in November of last year, it was Russia that found itself in the forefront of the efforts to fill the resulting gap. We drafted a resolution on the issue that we submitted to our colleagues for their consideration on 23 January. The Western camp immediately gave the draft text a hostile reception, since it eliminated the loopholes that enabled investigations to be manipulated and handed over to the control of the opponents of Damascus, as occurred with the JIM and which was the reason for its premature demise. I want to emphasize that we have not invented anything new in our text, but have merely brought the principles for the work of the new mechanism in line with the standards of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We now have a real opportunity to create a genuinely independent and impartial working mechanism that would help the Security Council to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the context of the conflict in Syria. All that it needs is for Council members to vote in favour of our draft resolution, and we call on them to do that. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/175, submitted by the Russian Federation. A vote was taken by show of hands. 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 9/21 In favour: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation Against: France, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America Abstaining: Côte d'Ivoire, Kuwait The President (spoke in Spanish): The draft resolution received 6 votes in favour, 7 votes against and 2 abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): As I have taken the floor once today already, I will be brief. With regard to Karl Marx, I think he must be turning in his grave to see what the country that was founded on many of his precepts is doing in the name of supporting Syria by condoning the use of chemical weapons on Syrian territory. We voted against the Russian draft resolution (S/2018/175) for a number of reasons. The Russian text is a distraction. It has lain dormant around the Security Council for weeks. There was no attempt to meet other Council members' concerns in its drafting, unlike the United States text (S/2018/321), which had adapted its original preferences precisely to try to meet those of the Russian Federation and others. The Russian text does nothing to bring a political process any closer. Specifically, it moves the parameters on access and imparts a quasi-judicial standard — "beyond a reasonable doubt" — that is inappropriate for the type of investigation that the Council wishes to establish. If the Russians want a criminal investigation, they could always suggest that we refer the matter to the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, there is selective quoting of the Chemical Weapons Convention to undermine the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, and it takes a selective approach to the parameters of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. But, above all, the text is unacceptable because it seeks to assert that sovereign States are above international law and international norms. That is breathtaking both in its arrogance and its ignorance, and for that reason alone, if not the others, we could not support it. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): Yesterday I said that history will record this moment (see S/PV.8225) as one when we as the Security Council either lived up to our responsibilities or showed our complete failure to protect the Syrian people. Today we have our answer. The votes have been cast. The record will show that today some countries decided to stand up for truth, accountability and justice for the Syrian people. Most countries saw the horror that took place in Douma last weekend at the hands of the Al-Assad regime and realize that today was a time for action. Month after month, the Al-Assad regime, with the full support of Russia and Iran, has strung the Security Council along. They ignored our calls for a ceasefire, for political dialogue and for deliveries of humanitarian aid. They ignored our calls to stop using chemical weapons — weapons that are universally banned from war. And then, last weekend, the Al-Assad regime forced a moment of reckoning on all of us by gassing people in Douma. The United States and the countries that joined us today could not allow that attack to go unanswered. The record will not be kind to one permanent member of the Council. Unfortunately, Russia has again chosen the Al-Assad regime over the unity of the Security Council. We have said before that Russia will stop at nothing to shield the Al-Assad regime, and now we have our answer. Russia has trashed the credibility of the Council. It is not interested in unity or compromise. Whenever we propose anything meaningful to Russia, Russia vetoes it. It is a travesty. It has now officially vetoed draft resolutions that would hold Al-Assad accountable for these barbaric chemical attacks six times. Things did not have to turn out this way. For weeks, the United States has led transparent, good-faith negotiations with all Security Council members to establish an attribution mechanism for chemical weapons in Syria. We started from the simple premise that every Council member would want to know who was responsible for using those barbaric and illegal weapons. We did everything to accommodate Russia's views. Russia surprised us with a proposed draft resolution (S/2018/175), calling all of us into the S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 10/21 18-10187 Security Council Chamber and handing out the draft text on the spot. After hearing widespread concerns about its draft resolution, Russia moved ahead anyway, accommodating no one's views. We could have done the same, but instead we tried to take as much as we could from Russia's draft text, while maintaining an impartial and independent process. We negotiated in good faith. Many aspects of our draft resolutions were similar. Russia said that the investigators should have safe access to the places where chemical weapons were used. We agreed. Russia said that it wanted an impartial, independent and professional investigation. We agreed. Russia said that the investigators should be recruited on as wide a geographical basis as possible. We agreed. Russia said that it wanted reports on the activities of non-State actors involving chemical weapons. Although that sounded to us like an attempt to distract from the Al-Assad regime, we included Russia's request. We even gave our mechanism the name that Russia wanted — the United Nations independent mechanism of investigation. There were really only two key differences between our draft resolution and that of Russia, but those differences speak volumes. First, Russia wanted to give itself the opportunity to approve the investigators who were chosen for the task. Secondly, Russia wanted the Security Council to assess the findings of any investigation before any report was released. Does any of that sound independent or impartial? Russia's proposal was not about an independent and impartial investigation at all. It was all about protecting the Al-Assad regime. This is a sad day. The United States takes no pleasure in seeing Russia exercise its sixth veto on the issue of chemical weapons in Syria. Only last week, we had hoped that the one-year anniversary of the Khan Shaykun attack might be the start of a renewed partnership to combat chemical weapons. However, those deadly weapons have been used on Syrian families again. When the people of Douma, along with the rest of the international community, looked to the Council to act, one country stood in the way. History will record that. History will record that, on this day, Russia chose to protect a monster over the lives of the Syrian people. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China has stated its principled position on the chemical weapons attack in Syria. The draft resolution on the establishment of a new investigative mechanism submitted by the Russian Federation (S/2018/175) condemns the chemicals weapons attack in Syria and calls for the creation of a new investigative mechanism to establish the facts and the truth. We can all agree on those positive elements. In addition, it proposes improved working methods compared to previous investigative mechanism and set out concrete steps to carry out a robust on-site investigation on the ground and to ensure impartiality in the process of collecting evidence. As a result, the new investigative mechanism would be able to function with greater professionalism and to reach a truly credible conclusion. Those elements are in line with China's principled position. We support Russia's draft resolution. China regrets that the draft resolution was not adopted. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I am taking the floor following the voting on the two draft resolutions (S/2018/175 and S/2018/321) above all to express our frustration over the fact that the Security Council was not able to adopt either the first or the second draft, which sought to give the Council an independent and professional mechanism with a mandate to attribute responsibility for the use of chemical weapons, despite the fact that all Security Council members expressed their desire in that regard. That is precisely why we voted in favour of both draft resolutions in the hope of having a new monitoring mechanism to attribute responsibility so as to protect people from the terrible and harmful effects of such chemical weapons. Despite the negative outcome of the voting on both draft resolutions, the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, whose position on the use of chemical weapons we have clearly set out during the debates on the issue, wants the members of the Security Council to seek and to explore other alternative draft texts that could merit the joint agreement or the consensus of the Security Council so that we can establish that new mechanism as soon as possible. That is what the people who are suffering, or in the future may suffer, the terrible effects of chemical weapons hope and expect of the Security Council. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): It is indeed regrettable that the Council could not adopt a resolution to establish a new mechanism that would identify those responsible 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 11/21 for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Establishing such a tool would have sent a quick and unified message regarding the resolve of the Council not to tolerate impunity. That is how we view the defeat of both draft resolutions (S/2018/175 and S/2018/321). However, we were not at all surprised. We voted in favour of both draft resolutions, consistent with our position in reaffirming the importance of setting up an independent, impartial and professional investigative mechanism with a view to ensuring accountability. No doubt, such a mechanism would clearly have addressed the existing institutional gap in that regard, which continues to be a source of major weakness in the fight against impunity. Both draft resolutions sought the establishment of such a mechanism. Clearly, there are differences, among others, concerning some aspects of the accountability mechanism. We believe that we have come some distance in bridging those differences. It would have been a major achievement, both functionally and from the point of view of enhancing trust, which is so greatly needed in order to address the challenge not only of ensuring non-proliferation but also of advancing the cause of international peace and security. That was why we were hoping that we could achieve consensus on the matter and unity within the Council. Frankly speaking, we do not like what we see. At the risk of sounding self-righteous — and the challenge that we face makes taking the risk appropriate — we must say that we are deeply disappointed about the situation that we are in. Since we have no alternative, it remains important that we all persevere in continuing our dialogue and supporting the efforts to ensure unity, without which the Council will not be in a position to discharge its principal responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, in particular repairing the damage to the chemical weapons disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Yesterday, we expressed our concern about the difficult situation we are currently facing (see S/PV.8225). We do not wish to repeat what we said, but allow me to state in closing that we look forward to handling the issue of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma, eastern Damascus, with a greater sense of responsibility. That is how we intend to look at the draft resolution from Russia before us, a draft which, in our view, is relatively similar to the draft resolution informally made available by Sweden yesterday, whenever the Council is ready to handle it. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): I support the statement in explanation of vote on the American draft resolution (S/2018/321) made earlier in the meeting by the representative of the United Kingdom, who said that today is actually a sad day. It is a sad day for the non-proliferation regime, and a sad day for civilians — particularly women, children and the elderly — throughout Syria, and specifically Douma in eastern Ghouta. We ask their forgiveness because we have disappointed them once again. The Council has been unable to establish a mechanism that would hold accountable those who commit crimes by using chemical weapons in Syria. We ask their forgiveness because the Council has been unable to put an end to the serious and gross violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law and many Security Council resolutions condemning the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We ask their forgiveness because the Council has been unable to hold to account the perpetrators of crimes related to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Our position has always been clear. We have called for consensus in the Council on this sensitive issue, which touches on accountability and impunity. We voted in favour of the United States draft resolution because it contains the basic elements that we think are necessary to establish any new accountability mechanism in Syria in order to guarantee its independence, neutrality and professionalism. The mechanism would identify the perpetrators responsible for any chemical attack, and then the Security Council would shoulder its responsibility in terms of sanctions. We abstained in the voting on the draft resolution presented by the Russian Federation (S/2016/175) because it did not include the elements to which I have referred. It would undermine the credibility of the new mechanism by depriving it of its fundamental terms of reference, namely, to determine whoever is responsible in the event of attacks using chemical weapons. We are very concerned about the result of voting today because it will encourage parties to the conflict to continue using chemical weapons in the absence of accountability. Kuwait supported the code of conduct whereby the States members of the Security Council would commit to not opposing draft resolutions dealing with crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. We also S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 12/21 18-10187 supported the French-Mexican initiative on abstention in the use of the veto in cases of human rights violations. As a result of the voting today, and based on our commitment to abiding by the four Geneva Conventions and their two Additional Protocols, international humanitarian law and the final outcome of 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, we call again for crimes against humanity and war crimes, as well as humanitarian issues, to receive due attention. That would include allowing the safe and sustainable delivery of humanitarian assistance and medical evacuations, and preventing the siege of residential areas. These should be treated as procedural issues; they should not be subject to a veto so that such human tragedies and sufferings are never repeated. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): Like everyone else, we deeply regret that today the Council was prevented once again from establishing a responsibility-attribution mechanism for the purpose of impartially identifying the perpetrators and organizers of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. I am sure we all share a sense of very tragic déjà vu as we repeat the scenario the Council faced in November when the renewal of the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism was blocked. However — and I apologize to all of those who are tired of hearing me say this — we will not give up. Efforts to reach an agreement on a responsibility-attribution mechanism must continue, and we support all serious and genuine initiatives that aim to achieve this objective. We stand ready to help facilitatory efforts to find a way forward. Accountability for the use of chemical weapons is crucial. As we have stated before, the Syrian people suffering from more than seven years of conflict deserve no less from us. They want peace and justice, not further military escalation or impunity. A collective response to the most recent alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma therefore remains urgent and critical. The credibility of the Council is at stake. We must now come together to swiftly condemn the use of chemical weapons in Syria and express alarm at the alleged attack in Douma. We must support an immediate and further investigation through the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and we must demand full, free and safe access without any restrictions or impediments to the fact-finding mission in its immediate deployment to Syria. Establishing the facts of what has taken place in Douma remains an essential first step towards confirming the alleged use of chemical weapons and finding the truth, and we need independent, impartial attribution of guilt followed by full accountability. The Council must remain seized and live up to its responsibility. That is why we circulated yesterday a draft text aimed at finding common ground. We stand ready to work tirelessly to find agreement on a robust, swift and immediate response. We need to come back together again after the failure that we have just witnessed. Mr. Tumysh (Kazakhstan): Our position remains unchanged and consistent. Due to well-known historical reasons, Kazakhstan has always taken a firm and resolute stance of uncompromising condemnation of any use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. We do so as that is an extremely heinous action and an unacceptable war crime. We have also been in support of attaching paramount importance to the creation of a new investigative mechanism. That has been strongly reiterated, and we have pressed for its urgency. Impunity for chemical crimes is not acceptable. It sends the wrong signal to those who continue to use or intend to use such an extremely heinous weapon. However, in order to punish anyone, we must be able to prove guilt completely and irrefutably. In that regard, the creation of a full-fledged, impartial and independent investigative tool is of the utmost necessity for all. We have worked in earnest with the delegations of the United States and the Russian Federation. We must recognize that the use of chemical weapons in Syria continues, along with the persistent threat of chemical terrorism, to present a grave reality. In addition, many allegations of the use of chemical agents in Syria are still undisclosed. Based on the aforementioned circumstances and understanding the need to preserve this mechanism, we supported both draft resolutions intended to create new investigative mechanisms. We urge that we all work together for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): This meeting is an interesting one from a variety of perspectives. One is that Lenin and Marx, two anti-imperialists, have been invoked more than once. What we have seen today is related to that topic. It is a fact that all empires are under the illusion that they are morally superior to the rest of us, that they believe themselves to be exceptional and indispensable and that they are above the law. In this, as in other cases, they do not seek to advance democracy or 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 13/21 freedom, but rather ultimately to expand their power and domination worldwide. What we have seen today is a sad reflection of what is happening on the battlefield in Syria and of those interests. I would like to echo the words of the Swedish Ambassador in urging the Security Council not to rest until we are united and can reach consensus, if indeed we believe in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It is the Charter, and whether the members of the Council can fulfil it, that is ultimately at stake. One of our responsibilities under it is to refrain from taking unilateral action. We hope that principle will be honoured. The President (spoke in Spanish): The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/322, submitted by the Russian Federation. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We too are sorry that our draft resolution (S/2018/175) was not adopted today, but at the moment neither it nor the United States draft resolution (S/2018/321) would have had any influence on the investigation of the alleged incident in Douma. Right now, that is not what they are about. There is no need to mislead anybody by saying that, or that there were intensive consultations on the American draft resolution but not on ours, or that most of our amendments were supposedly taken into account. Our colleagues will now tell the press that we vetoed their resolution, while modestly remaining silent about the fact that just as with the draft resolutions on the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, they also vetoed ours. Yesterday, during the meeting on threats to international peace and security (see S/PV.8225), there was an emotional discussion of the event, or the alleged event, in Douma on 7 April. Based on the results of the inspection conducted by our specialists, we said that a chemical attack could not be confirmed. Nonetheless, we advocated for the speediest possible investigation of all of the circumstances by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and affirmed our willingness to facilitate its work on the ground. The Government of Syria has sent the OPCW an official request that such a mission be dispatched to Douma as soon as possible. Yesterday, the Swedish delegation put forward a fairly constructive text for a corresponding draft resolution. Unfortunately, their initiative was undeveloped and was trampled down thanks to the confrontational efforts of the United States and its closest allies, which had decided to shift the focus away from the issue of an investigation of what happened on 7 April. That is understandable, because they have already identified the guilty parties. As far as they are concerned, the so-called regime, along with Russia and Iran, is always to blame for everything. The investigation does not interest them. Well, sometimes it does, but only if it is based on so-called exclusive data from the opposition's social networks. For the hundredth time, I would like to ask the same question yet again. Can someone here explain clearly and plainly why Damascus needed this alleged chemical attack in Douma in principle, especially since practically all of the militias had evacuated Douma by then? And the militias who were still being evacuated on 8 April knew nothing about the alleged occurrence of this chemical attack. I will answer my own question. The provocation was desperately needed by the militias who received that very timely support from the United States and other Western countries. We decided to develop the Swedish initiative, and our draft resolution notes the Syrian Government's invitation to the OPCW Fact-finding Mission to visit the site of the alleged event without delay. It welcomes the decision of the Director-General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to send the Mission to Syria in order to conduct investigative work in line with Chemical Weapons Convention standards. It takes into account the guarantees of safe access provided by the Syrian authorities and Russian military forces. Fifteen days later, the Secretary-General would submit the first report to the Security Council. This is a strictly practical, non-confrontational and depoliticized initiative in support of the OPCW, which would help the specialists in this area determine what did, or rather did not, take place in Douma. And that is the priority now, not the draft resolution on a United Nations independent investigative mechanism, which was hastily submitted for a vote with the obvious aim of seeing both draft resolutions vetoed. We hope that Council members will give this initiative their unanimous support so that the process can begin as soon as possible. According to our information, two S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 14/21 18-10187 expert groups from the OPCW Fact-finding Mission should leave for Syria by the end of this week. Whatever the excuse that may be given, if the experts do not reach Douma because they have been prevented by those who continue to speculate about the chemical issue in order to smear Syria and Russia, that will be yet another piece of evidence showing that behind this thoroughly false story are dirty geopolitical games and, what is worse, aggressive military plans capable of reversing the positive trend in the resolution of Syria's conflict and inflicting a painful blow on a region already tormented by adventurist assaults. We are witnessing all of that literally in real time. We request that you put this draft resolution to a vote, Mr. President. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): We want swift and resolute action today, and we want the Security Council to shoulder its collective responsibility. But I am not sure that we have exhausted all the avenues that could get us there, nor am I sure that voting on this new Russian draft resolution (S/2018/322) will get us there either. We feel that we are at a very fragile stage of Council deliberations right now, and we need to reflect carefully on the way forward to ensure that we do not jump into further paralysis, with consequences that will be difficult to defend or repair. That is why I would like to ask you, Mr. President, to suspend the meeting right here and now so that we can all move into consultations and carefully and collectively reflect on the next step. The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the Russian Federation has asked to make a further statement. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We listened carefully to what the Permanent Representative of Sweden has just said. To be candid, we are somewhat puzzled by his statement, because the draft resolution that we submitted (S/2018/322) is, in essence, based on the same idea as the draft submitted yesterday by the Swedish delegation. I do not know what we are going to consult on in consultations. I believe we already consulted on this subject yesterday. However, out of respect for the Swedish delegation and those delegations who would like to hold consultations, we are not against that. But let me say right away that we intend to put this draft resolution to a vote today, after our consultations. We hope that the consultations will be constructive and will not drag on for long, because that is certainly not necessary at this point. We need to adopt this draft resolution in support of the mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in order to establish the facts on the ground as quickly as possible. The President (spoke in Spanish): If there is no objection, I will suspend the meeting. We will continue after our consultations. The meeting was suspended at 4.40 p.m. and resumed at 5.45 p.m. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/322, submitted by the Russian Federation. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation Against: France, Poland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America Abstaining: Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden The President (spoke in Spanish): The result of the voting is as follows: 5 votes in favour, 4 against and 6 abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I will be brief. In the Consultations Room just now, Mr. President, you and the representative of Sweden made valiant attempts at a compromise. We all appreciate what is at stake and thank you for your and Sweden's efforts. But, fundamentally, the United Kingdom could not vote for the Russian text (S/2018/322) because it does not establish an investigation into who was responsible for the attack. It only welcomes the Fact-finding Mission, which is already on its way. I repeat what I said in consultations: the Fact-finding Mission determines whether chemical weapons were used and, if they were, which chemical weapons were used. It does not, and cannot, establish who was responsible for 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 15/21 their use — and thus start on the first step on the path to attribution and accountability. For that reason, we are not able to support the text. It would be like watching a fire, identifying that there was a fire, and doing nothing to put it out. The Russians invited us to return to the issue of an investigative mechanism on a separate occasion. I am afraid that the answer to that is 17 November 2017, when Russia vetoed a joint investigative mechanism that it had itself decided to set up. For all those reasons, all it would have taken is a written decision for an investigation set up by the Security Council. Russia could not take that small step, and therefore we were not able to support the draft resolution. I very much regret that, but the answer was in Russia's hands. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): Recent reports concerning the use of chemical weapons in Douma and the consequent civilian casualties have given rise to serious concern on the part of the international community. China has noted that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has already asked its Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic to investigate the relevant reports. We support the OPCW in sending investigators to Syria so as to establish the truth. We call on all parties concerned to cooperate with the investigation. The draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation (S/2018/322) expresses deep concern about the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April, strongly condemns the chemical-weapons attacks that took place in Syria and elsewhere, urges the OPCW Fact-finding Mission to carry out an on-site investigation, and provides that the Syrian Government and other parties will ensure the security of and safe access to investigators. The draft resolution is in keeping with China's principled position. China supports and voted in favour of the Russian draft resolution. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): We deeply regret that we have ended up here following a long day of serious efforts to move forward by some of us — I believe. We abstained in the voting on the Russian draft resolution (S/2018/322) a few moments ago because the attribution and accountability track, which we believe is important, lacked clarity. We called for consultations earlier because we felt that, provided there was political will, an opportunity remained for us to come together and shoulder our responsibility today. We put forward a draft resolution (S/2018/321) to all members that we felt was credible and assertive, and was intended to support the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It was also very clear in its determination to establish an impartial, independent and professional investigative mechanism, and we had suggested that the Secretary-General help us recommend the best way forward in that area and give him 10 days to come back to the Council. I believe that would have been a much better way forward than where we are right now. I am therefore very disappointed that we have not been able to move forward on this. I thank all those members of the Security Council that were ready to engage, and I just hope that we do not consider this the end with regard to ensuring that the facts will be established and that there will be true accountability and no more impunity for the horrendous use of chemical weapons in Syria and elsewhere. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I once again express the frustration of our delegation over this afternoon's negative outcome. We abstained in the voting on the third draft resolution (S/2018/322), first of all because it was submitted only very late today and, secondly, because it is lacking compared to the two previous draft resolutions on which we voted in favour (S/2018/175 and S/2018/321). We believe that we should ask the representative of Sweden, Mr. Olof Skoog, not to withdraw his proposal so that following this meeting — perhaps tomorrow afternoon — as was suggested during consultations, we can continue considering and analysing it to see whether we can agree to vote on the draft resolution once we have introduced amendments and reached a consensus on the text that he has presented. Mr. Radomski (Poland): Poland voted against the draft resolution (S/2018/322) presented by Russia. We believe that the draft resolution submitted originally by Sweden was an honest attempt to enable the Security Council to respond promptly to the horrific act of violence that occurred in eastern Ghouta on Saturday. To that end, the Security Council needs to re-establish a professional, truly independent and impartial accountability mechanism. The draft resolution proposed by the Russian Federation is missing that important provision. That is why we had to vote against it. S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 16/21 18-10187 Mrs. Haley (United States): I thank you, Sir, and members of the Security Council for what has been another frustrating day. My parents always said that you should always see the good in everyone and in everything. I have therefore been trying to figure out what the good is in Russia. I believe that it is very good at being consistent, and I believe that it is very good at playing games. We saw that when we took up the issue of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. Russia loved the Joint Investigative Mechanism until we found one side guilty, and then it decided that it did not want it. We then adopted the ceasefire, and Russia loved the idea of the ceasefire until Al-Assad had a problem with it and subsequently violated it. Today Russia vetoed for the sixth time a draft resolution (S/2018/321) condemning Al-Assad for chemical-weapons attacks on his own people. No matter what we do, Russia will be consistent. Russia will continue to play games, and once again it is putting forward yet another surprise draft resolution (S/2018/322). The first time that any of us saw it was today at 11 a.m. The Russians held no negotiations. It took no input, and, when Sweden asked that the Council be allowed to discuss the draft resolution, Russia allowed that but did not want any changes to it. There is a reason for which Russia did not want to discuss its resolution, and that is because it does not accomplish anything. The draft resolution mainly asks for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to send its Fact-finding Mission to Douma, but the Fact-finding Mission is already travelling to Douma. It already has a mandate to investigate and collect samples. What makes it worse is that Russia includes several provisions in its draft resolution that are deeply problematic and once again seeks to compromise the credibility of the international investigation. The draft resolution puts Russia and the Al-Assad regime itself in the driver seat for making arrangements for the Fact-finding Mission investigators. We are just supposed to trust that the same Government that says that everything concerning the Douma attack was fake will work in good faith with the OPCW. This draft resolution also tries to micromanage how the Fact-finding Mission should carry out its investigation, while dictating where the investigators should go. As we have always said, for an investigation to be credible and independent, the investigators must choose where they believe they should go. Members of the Council — least of all Russia — should not be calling the shots. For those reasons, the United States voted against the draft resolution. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We voted in favour of the draft resolution (S/2018/322) because we saw value in its adoption as it offered, we thought, the possibility for the protection of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic. Frankly, we tried to find weaknesses in the text. We could not. It is a matter-of-fact and uncomplicated draft resolution. We could not find any reason not to support it. Undoubtedly, it would not have made achieving attribution possible, but finding out whether chemical weapon were in fact used would have been a great achievement. Of course, so far the Russian position has been that there was no use of chemical weapons in Douma. Establishing the facts surrounding that assertion or position would have been a great achievement. We are not in a position to take advantage of the guarantee offered or the Council's strong support in that regard. We felt that the Fact-finding Mission needed the support. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Frankly speaking, I think all of us have seen everything for ourselves. Unfortunately, the failure to adopt draft resolution S/2018/322 really is a litmus test says a great deal and leaves us extremely apprehensive. We proposed a very innocuous draft resolution, which is moreover virtually a complete repeat of Sweden's draft text from yesterday. I find it difficult to understand which might be the parts where Mrs. Haley read between the lines to discover our scheming and our trickery. Perhaps the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom answered that when she said that they could not adopt the Russian draft resolution — let us say it out loud — because it was a Russian draft resolution. Then everything was clear. The United States representative said that we are very good at playing games. I am not sure about that. What I am sure of is that she is very good at making threats, and the threats that the United States is making with regard to Syria should make us all extremely alarmed, because we may be standing on the threshold of some very sad and terrible events. I would once again like to ask the United States to refrain from executing the plans that it may be incubating for Syria. Unfortunately, the refusal of the United States to adopt the draft resolution speaks to the fact that our 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 17/21 American partners and colleagues do not need any real investigation, which is something that we discussed earlier. We regret the fact that the draft resolution was not adopted, although it is true that the Fact-finding Mission will, I hope, reach Syria soon and be able to get to work on its principal mandate, which is establishing the facts about what really happened in Douma. To repeat what I have said once again, in all innocence, the Russian military and the Syrian Government will provide support to the mission in terms of ensuring its security. I hope that does not raise questions for anyone, because it is simply what must be done. We hope that the Mission will be able to make the trip effectively and without delay. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): I would like to start by thanking Sweden for its efforts and attempts to achieve rapprochement and to smooth over the differences among the members of the Security Council. We are disappointed by the Council's inability to reach consensus on this important matter and by the fact that the divisions among Council members unfortunately continue. We abstained in the voting, despite the fact that the gist of draft resolution S/2018/322 calls for an investigation into what took place in Douma, which is what we called for. The investigation should be undertaken by an international, independent and impartial body, which in this case is the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, the OPCW Fact-finding Mission will go to Syria anyway, and the Council welcomed that fact yesterday. There is therefore no need for a draft resolution. What we are looking for is an international, independent, neutral and professional body or mechanism that would investigate the incident and identify the party that has used chemical weapons, if it indeed determines that chemical weapons have been used. That approach will enable the Council to hold the perpetrators accountable, in accordance with resolution 2118 (2013). Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): I thank everybody for today's very difficult and unfortunately unproductive day. We voted for the Russian Federation's draft resolution (S/2018/322) on sending a fact-finding mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as soon as possible because, as we said yesterday in raising this very simple question, we need to know what happened on the ground. Yesterday we were also very clear when we said that there were different and conflicting reports about the number of casualties and even about the very fact that the chemical attack had taken place. We requested and supported the important proposal that a fact-finding mission should go to Douma to establish the facts on the ground. We are not talking right now about who did it, but we are talking about the fact of the event itself. We needed to understand what was there and what had happened there. Sending a fact-finding mission was very important to us and to all the delegations that do not have a presence there to understand the objective reality of the place. Even if the only information obtained is about the kind of substance that was used, that would be very useful for us to understand who the perpetrators might be and at the very least establish the fact that a chemical attack took place. In this kind of understanding, we very much support sending OPCW experts to investigate on the ground in order to give us information on which we can base an objective opinion about the situation. We are not taking sides here, and we were very clear about that yesterday. We would like to receive full, objective, transparent and unbiased information about the facts that we are addressing here. We are therefore glad that the OPCW is sending a group to Douma, regardless of the results of today's voting on draft resolutions. We are hopeful that we can at least get this preliminary information about the situation in Douma. I would like to say once again that we in the Security Council should be objective and base our decisions on the simple facts that may be presented to us by the independent organizations that will determine whether there was a chemical attack or not. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): After having vetoed a draft resolution that sought to shed full light on acts of violence involving chemical weapons (S/2018/175), including those that took place last weekend, Russia persists in a dual strategy of obstruction and diversion on the matter. The only aim of the draft text on which we have just voted (S/2018/322) was clearly to confuse the issue. It is not a question of disputing the importance of an independent investigation by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) into what happened in Douma on 7 April. That is essential, and the investigation has already been launched. However, the Russian draft resolution, which we had to vote against, did not meet the challenges. S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 18/21 18-10187 Let us be clear: what we lack today, and what Russia continues to reject, is a truly independent and impartial mechanism that can attribute responsibility in order to prevent impunity. That was the raison d'être for the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. With the establishment of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, set up with the involvement of Russia, we put in place a tool for the essential deterrence of perpetrators of chemical attacks. That is clearly what we lack today. Let us be clear in saying that statements are not enough and that the Russian draft resolution is only a smokescreen that falls well short of the urgent response that the Council should provide. That is why France voted against the draft resolution and why the draft resolution was not adopted. Today I reiterate that France will spare no effort to ensure that the perpetrators of those chemical horrors are identified and held to account in an independent and impartial way. The stakes are extremely high, and we will not give up. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): We abstained in the voting on the draft resolution (S/2018/322) because we had serious hesitations about the text, as it differed in some crucial aspects from the Swedish text put forward yesterday. First of all, the text makes it insufficiently clear that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic already has the mandate for on-site visits, as States have to comply with it. They do not need the Council's authorization. Secondly, the text is unduly restrictive. Paragraph 3 is not a correct reflection of the decision of the Director-General or of his existing mandate. The necessity of on-site investigations is up to the team to decide. My third point is that the fact-finding mission should be able to perform its mandate in complete independence. Fourthly, we do not want the precedent that Security Council authorization is needed for a fact-finding mission to do its work. We are convinced that those were issues that we could have solved if the draft resolution had been put forward for proper consultations. We received it this morning. We regret that those concerns could not be taken into account. My last point is that one colleague said that the litmus test of this evening, and of today, was the voting on this draft resolution. I disagree. The litmus test of today's meeting was the veto by one permanent member on the establishment of an effective attribution mechanism. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): I shall be very brief. Bolivia voted in favour of the draft resolution (S/2018/322) for several reasons. One of those is that, although the nature of the events that have been condemned is unknown, the highest authorities of the Organization have pointed out that the United Nations is not is a position to verify the reports of such events. It is therefore essential to establish the truth by means of an independent and impartial investigation. Many of those reports come from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and we know who finances those NGOs. Therefore, we must allow doubts with regard to such sources. Analysing the draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation word by word, from the point of view of intellectual integrity, commitment to the Syrian people or international law, we found no reason to vote against the draft resolution. Nevertheless, what concerns us is what is being planned outside the structure of this edifice. While it was said today that Lenin and Marx would probably be turning in their graves, I do not know about that. But what is certain is that Churchill and Roosevelt, for example, are turning in their graves because, as founding fathers of the structure of this world order, they endowed the Security Council with the authority to use force to deal with threats to international peace and security. I am not sure that they would be very happy that the outcome of such events, without a full and conclusive investigation, is that some of its members undertake the unilateral use of force. In any case, we remain hopeful that the Security Council will shoulder its responsibility and that, through unity, it can help to identify the perpetrators of any attack against international peace and security, if that is the case. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Peru. We regret that we were not able to achieve consensus this afternoon on a draft resolution with regard to the delicate situation in Syria. We underscore that the investigation being carried out on the use of chemical weapons must be complemented by an independent, impartial and professional mechanism that attributes 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 19/21 responsibility. That is why we abstained in the voting on this occasion. We reiterate the need for the Security Council to regain its sense of unity on this very delicate subject so that it can fulfil its high responsibilities and thereby alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. That is why we will continue to explore options on this important matter. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I remind speakers of the content of presidential note S/2017/507 with regard to the length of statements. I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): I will give colleagues who are about to leave the Chamber some of my valuable time. They are afraid that I will beat them in the battle of arguments. They become terrified when they hear any opposing views. Those who just left the Chamber said in their statements that today was a sad day for the non-proliferation regime. I would like to refresh their memories and say that violation of the non-proliferation regime is the speciality of the following Western States. The United States of America used nuclear weapons in Japan. It used chemical and biological weapons in Viet Nam and enriched uranium in Iraq. France used Algerian human beings when it tested its first atomic bomb in the Algerian desert in 1960. In fact, it placed living Algerians in the desert tied to poles, and dropped on them the first French atomic bomb. Britain, of course, conducted all its nuclear tests in its colonies on islands in the oceans. The British Ambassador then says that day was a sad day for the people of Douma. English is not my mother tongue, but I know that there are no people of Douma. There are inhabitants in Douma. There are Syrian people. There are no people of Douma. However, beyond Marx, Engels and Lenin, I would like to quote from Shakespeare as saying: "Lies shame you. Speak the truth or remain silent". My British colleague said that Russia does not have the authority to go to Douma and establish whether or not chemicals were used there, stating that it is not within the jurisdiction of our Russian friends, who are on the ground, to go to Douma and investigate the scene. That is quite strange. Britain should have advised itself in the same manner when it sent intelligence officers to Khan Shaykhoun and conferred upon itself the authority to collect samples with the French. They took the samples to British and French laboratories, as they claimed, without coordinating with the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) or the Fact-finding Mission. That is quite the paradox: giving themselves the very right that they deprive others. Approximately two weeks ago, Britain signed an agreement with the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia for an arms deal worth $100 billion — much bigger than the Al-Yamamah deal — to continue killing people in Yemen, start new wars in the region with Iran and Syria and entrench never-ending wars throughout the entire region. That is what Britain is capable of doing. Mahatma Gandhi knew the British well, and he was right when he said, "If two fish broke out into a fight in the sea, everyone knows it was Britain that started it". The American colleague said that there is only one monster facing the entire world in defiance today. That monster has financed terrorists in Syria for seven years and provided them with arms. I would say that the monster is the United States, Britain and France. They sponsored terrorism in my country for seven years, and before that they did the same in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. They sponsored terrorist organizations starting with Taliban and Da'esh, down to the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaida, Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and the White Helmets, which British intelligence newly invented. The monster she spoke of unleashed lies in order to destroy, occupy and send troops thousands of miles throughout the world to destabilize international peace and security. The monster is the American who, thus far, refuses to destroy his chemical arsenal, as we know, yet lectures others on destroying chemical weapons. My French colleague said that he was horrified by the pictures he saw. But he was not horrified by the pictures of the hundreds of civilians who were killed in the 2016 French air strikes in Toukhar village in the rural area of Manbij. Two hundred civilians were killed, including entire families, by France's war planes. The French Ambassador must not have seen those pictures, and consequently they were not a source of horror for him. The concept of double standards is an understatement for those people. In response to the web of lies spread by some Western States against my country regarding the S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 20/21 18-10187 alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic sent today, 10 April, an official invitation to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to dispatch a fact-finding mission to Douma in order to investigate the allegations of the use of chemical weapons there and to determine the facts about those allegations. I informed members of the Council of that invitation yesterday in this very Chamber (see S/PV.8225). The Syrian Arab Republic welcomes the visit of the fact-finding mission and stands ready to fully cooperate, provide all forms of assistance to the mission in the discharge of its duties and guarantee the safety of its personnel. It will also facilitate interviewing and sampling in accordance with the terms of reference. Syria looks forward to the fact-finding mission carrying out its work in a full, transparent and professional manner and while relying on credible and tangible evidence. If it does deploy, it will find Douma liberated and it will be granted full access to any location it wishes to visit. The situation is quite clear. The co-sponsors of the American draft resolution (S/2018/321) do not seek the truth, because it will simply expose them and their terrorist proxies on the ground. Instead of waiting for the OPCW fact-finding mission to determine whether or not toxic chemicals were used in Douma, they present draft resolutions that do not enjoy consensus, nor do they seek truth, but rather establish non-objective mechanisms that pre-empt results in support of their political accusations and agendas. They are aware that a clone of the JIM would not be accepted by the States in the Council that are dedicated to the quest for truth regarding who is using toxic chemicals against Syrian civilians. In that regard, I underscore that the United States, Britain and France made the JIM fail by thwarting it through politicizing its work, putting pressure on members of its leadership and blackmailing them. Consequently, the JIM lacked credibility and professionalism, as it fabricated reports that accused the Syrian Government based on the so-called open sources, of course including the White Helmets, and false testimonies and fabricated evidence emanating mostly from terrorist groups, most important of which is the terrorist Al-Nusra Front and the White Helmets, which is the British misleading media arm of the Al-Nusra Front. The scenario that we witness today is exactly similar to what we witnessed a year ago when the United States of America launched a wanton aggression on the Al-Shayrat air base, which was founded on flimsy arguments and fabricated pretexts stating that the Syrian Arab Army used chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhoun. Those allegations were proven false when the United States and its allies prevented the experts of the JIM from visiting Khan Shaykhoun and collecting samples from the Al-Shayrat air base. Things are crystal clear. The aggression of the United States and its accomplices, throughout history, thrives on lies, deceit and hegemony, as well as on the rule of the powerful. It is a brutal approach that will never respect the rule of law and international legitimacy. For seven years, my country, Syria, has been a stark example of what the United States and Britain did when they unleashed lies, misleading information and fabricated stories in this very Chamber in order to destroy and occupy Iraq. Their actions were grounded on the pretext of a significant lie, that is, the existence of the so-called weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. I am compelled each and every time to remind the Council of the position of former Secretary of State Colin Powell when, in this very Chamber (see S/PV.4701) — and I was sitting where the Deputy Permanent Representative of China is seated today — he presented tapes, documents, maps and pictures that were later discovered to have been produced, faked and fabricated by the American intelligence services for the purpose of invading Iraq. The operation was prepared in advance. The same scenario occurred with Libya. The truth must be revealed. For centuries the world has witnessed various instances of occupation and hegemony, whose sole purpose was to loot the wealth of nations, occupy land or impose a geopolitical agenda. However, political immorality has reached a depth today to the extent that Libya has been destroyed and many of its people killed to cover up cases of bribery and financial corruption involving the President of a permanent member of the Council that talks about democracy and freedom. It is so low today to the extent that a permanent State regrettably forces Arab oil-exporting countries to foot the bill for its ongoing aggression and military intervention in my country, Syria. It is a business deal forged between the corrupt with the financial means and a mercenary who has weapons and power. Some permanent members of the Council commit acts of aggression against sovereign 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 21/21 countries simply to detract attention from domestic crises and ongoing controversy surrounding their political elite. Following seven years of a dirty terrorist war that was imposed upon us, we in Syria believe that clear options exist — but they pose a major challenge to the majority of Council members. The Council must refute the lies and reverse the political deterioration that the United States, Britain and France are trying to push the Council towards engaging in. It is up to the Council today, and in the future, to make its decision. World public opinion and the people of the free world will judge whether or not the Council has assumed its responsibility to uphold international legitimacy, maintain international peace and security and protect the world against the horrible terrorism that is used and exploited by those three permanent member countries to undermine the stability and self-determination of States. I call upon the members of the Council to uphold a global, ethical and multilateral political system that believes in international law and in the right of peoples to self-determination, and rejects military, political and economic hegemony. In conclusion, my country reiterates its condemnation in the strongest terms of any use of chemical weapons by any party, anywhere and under any circumstances. My country stands ready to cooperate with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to reveal the allegations and lies being promoted by some Western parties so as to justify their aggression and serve their own political agenda. Their fleets are now in the eastern Mediterranean, waiting for the veto in order to start their aggression. I would like to inform those Western parties — and they must pay close attention to what I say — that their threats of aggression, manoeuvres, lies and terrorism will never prevent us — as one of the founding States of the Organization — from exercising our duties and rights under the Charter of the United Nations and our national Constitution to protect our sovereignty and territorial integrity and to fend off aggression from any source. We will not allow anyone — big or small, permanent member or non-permanent member — to treat us the way Iraq and Libya were treated. The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.