Suchergebnisse

It is a non sequitur to attempt to combat political and bureaucratic corruption while leaving intact the existing regulatory structure and practices-the single-most important source of incentives to engage in corrupt activities for bothe private and public actors. Anti-corruption efforts will be self-defeating if they are made without keeping this fact clearly in mind. Unfortunately, however, this obvious fact is not well recognized. The lack of recognition can be found in the sidespread erroneous belief that all the government regulations exist to protect and enhance the public interest. This is emphatically not so. As abundant literature on rent-seeking or economic theory of regulation amply attests, a large chunkk of regulations has come into being as a result of self-interested attempts to appropriate economic rents, which must be created in the exercise of government's power over allocation of resources. Nevertheless, the efforts to put existing regulations under scrutiny from this perspective have been conspicuously lacking in the anti-corruption movement. Most importantly, we have to examine them whether they are of s uch a nature as to come into existence to promote particular actors' interest in disguise of public and general interest. In addition, we have to see whether they are simply mal-designed to encourage corruption at the stage of implementation. In this paper I will try to give pertinent examples of each with a particular reference to Korea, and strongly contend that anti-corruption should go hand in hand with regulatory reform, the emphasis of which should be placed on making regulations more market-conforming, transparent, and self-enforcing.

This paper takes a critical look at what the Trump administration has actually accomplished in terms of repealing and modifying greenhouse gas emission standards and otherwise advancing its pro-fossil fuel agenda. As detailed herein and summarized in Figures 1 and 2, the scope of the efforts taken pursuant to this agenda is extremely broad – there are dozens of different deregulatory actions underway at various agencies, most notably the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). But in most cases, the pace of these efforts has been quite slow. This is particularly true for efforts to repeal or revise major regulations like the Clean Power Plan and the motor vehicle greenhouse gas emission and fuel economy standards, as the administration must adhere to notice-and-comment procedures and must also justify any changes to these rules in light of the statutory provisions it is implementing.

This second edition expands upon what has become a widely cited work on the recast EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings. It incorporates important developments in the case law since the Regulation was recast in 2015, as well as other significant updates. As with the first edition, it provides a detailed article-by-article commentary on the Regulation, written by a group of expert scholars and practitioners from a range of European jurisdictions. Drawing on a rich body of CJEU and national case law, as well as scholarly developments, analysis of the Regulation is accompanied by a chapter explaining the background to the Regulation's enactment and recasting, identifying its key features, and examining the relationship between the Regulation and new European Restructuring Directive.

In the current political climate, it seems likely that a "New Regulatory Federalism" will push for deregulation at the federal level, with more regulatory responsibilities for the states. During the 1930s, economic regulatory responsibilities were assumed by the federal government. Protective regulation moved to the federal level in the 1960s. Dissatisfaction with centralized regulation has led to attempts at regulatory reform and decentralization. It is expected that these reforms will lead to greater flexibility, and responsiveness to regional differences.

China: Internal Market Development and Regulation by Anjali Kumar et al.

Electronic companies are considered one of the prerequisites of the technical revolution in the field of communications and informatics, through which companies aim to provide their services electronically. Traditional companies have taken to convert to electronic companies or create exclusive electronic companies; this is because this form of company has the advantage of saving effort and time. Hence, the importance of this study is to identify the legal regulation of electronic companies in Palestine, which takes place in an intangible environment, and to demonstrate the adequacy of the relevant legal rules for their regulation under the Electronic Transactions Law and the relevant laws, by indicating the meaning of the electronic company, its distinctive characteristics and the procedures for its establishment.

This paper examines the dilemma of regulating the complex and highly differentiated stock market. I argue that regulations, with legitimacy needs for status neutrality, serve mostly to protect investors with limited capacity for managing risk on their own. In competitive markets, players with greater capacity for risk management (e.g., access to market intelligence, sizeable reserves to cushion losses and enhanced technologies for risk assessment) seek out new arrangements for managing risk. These new privatized forms of risk management interact with the markets and market regulation in ways that undermine the regulatory program for those who depend on it most. I illustrate this form of regulatory bias by examining events surrounding Black Monday, the stock market crash of October 1987.

We live in an era of widening geographic inequality. Around the country, the spread between economically and culturally thriving places and those that are struggling has been increasing. "Superstar" cities like New York, San Francisco, Boston, and Atlanta continue to attract talent and grow, while the economies of other cities and rural areas are left behind. Troublingly, escalating geographic inequality in the United States has arrived hand in hand with serious economic, social, and political problems. Areas that are left behind have not only failed to keep up with their thriving peers; in many ways, they have stagnated and seen opportunities evaporate. At the same time, superstar cities are running up against extreme housing affordability problems, rendering middle- class life all but unsustainable. To make matters worse, the widening gulf between dynamic and stagnant places increasingly feeds into a democratic crisis of unrepresentative government at the federal level. The dominant explanations for widening geographic inequality focus largely on inexorable economic trends. Forces like "agglomeration effects" and globalization have reshaped the economy, benefitting some areas and harming others. We think these explanations leave out a crucial factor: the effects of specific regulatory choices on economic geography. The Progressive Era and New Deal regulatory order in the United States promoted geographic dispersion of economic activity. The unraveling of this regulatory order around 1980 coincided with the reversal in geographic convergence and the beginning of an era of growing divergence. More specifically, regulatory policies in the areas of transportation, communications, trade, and antitrust helped construct an era of geographic convergence in the mid-twentieth century, and deregulation in those same areas contributed to the rise of geographic inequality over the last generation. Though the COVID-19 pandemic has produced unprecedented awareness of and interest in remote work- raising the possibility of ...

The FCC's reinstatement of net-neutrality could undermine the benefit of smart networks for American consumers.
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