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The Pacific island countries (PICs) are some of the most exposed to frequent natural disasters and climate shocks, and their vulnerability is increasing due to mounting effects of climate change as well as demographic and economic forces. Natural disasters hit the poorest hardest and have long-term consequences for human development. Social protection programs and systems have an important role in helping poor and vulnerable populations cope with the impacts of shocks as well as build long-term resilience. This paper discusses the potential role of social protection for disaster and climate risk reduction and management in PICs. It presents evidence and lessons from other regions, providing examples of tools and entry points for the development of climate, and disaster, responsive social protection interventions and context-specific recommendations for PICs.

The Lebanon Economic Monitor provides an update on key economic developments and policies over the past six months. It also presents findings from recent World Bank work on Lebanon. The political standoff combined with an escalating Syrian conflict hampered growth in 2012, and is projected to continue doing so through the first half of 2013. Economic growth in 2012 is estimated to have decelerated to 1.4 percent due to a weak second half of 2012 following a downturn in the security situation. The major fiscal expansion that took place in 2012 is creating fiscal challenges for 2013, particularly in the context of a promised increase in public salaries. The fiscal expansion, measured by the change in the central government s primary fiscal balance, reached a staggering 4.6 percentage points of GDP in 2012. The overall fiscal deficit reached 9.4 percent of GDP in 2012. Inflationary pressures rose despite tepid economic activity. Headline inflation accelerated notably in the second half of 2012. Core inflation has also been on an upward trend, reaching 5.3 percent by end-2012. Domestically, inflationary pressures can primarily be attributed to (i) increases in disposable income in early 2012 due to the increase in the minimum wage and public sector salaries cost of living adjustment; and (ii) a cumulative output gap that remains positive following above-potential growth in 2007-2010. The conflict in Syria, a country that is closely linked, both through historical, social and economic ties to Lebanon has created a humanitarian crisis of enormous scale. While Lebanon is to be commended for its openness to Syrian refugees, the conflict is severely and negatively impacting the Lebanese economy. The largest impact arises through the insecurity and uncertainty spillovers and touches at the heart of Lebanon s societal fabric.

There's no question that war leaves behind its lingering destruction. This includes both harm to people and to the environment. As the world marks the second year of Vladimir Putin's illegal invasion of Ukraine, we must reflect on the impact of war on Ukraine, the resiliency of its people and global response to resolving the issues of bomb contamination.Roughly one-third of Ukraine's territory is contaminated. This is the size of an average country in Europe. Ukraine is currently experiencing the worst environmental disaster in terms of soil pollution per unit of time.Toxic elements such as lead, cadmium, arsenic, and mercury leach from ammunition and weapons into the soil. If potential areas of contamination are not identified and recorded in time, harmful substances can enter the food chain and become carcinogenic. This threatens global food security and export opportunities. Failure to act now could result in the deterioration of human health.Prior to the war, about 400 million people worldwide relied on Ukraine for their food supply making this a large-scale problem. Spent ammunition and chemical weapons can contaminate soil for decades or longer. Land is not a renewable resource. Soils and their fertile layer are formed over thousands of years. Just 1 cm of soil is formed in 200-400 years, and 20 cm in 5,000-6,000 years. Military operations that take place for 2 years like in the case of Ukraine can destroy what has been formed over thousands of years.Contaminations left behind from war are nothing new. We know this from wars in SE Asia, conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and the list goes on. It's no surprise then that at least 50 countries are impacted by landmines and other explosives. The good news is there are solutions to the long lasting impacts of conflicts like unexploded ordnance on humans, all living things and our planet.One example is a project called "Assessing farmland and ecosystems damage in north-eastern Ukraine from the Russian invasion" (UA-UK-CH) led by this article's co-author Dr. Olena Melnyk. This project is a joint initiative with researchers from Ukraine, England and Switzerland aimed at enhancing the capacity for mapping, environmental monitoring, and managing the effects of war-induced damage on Ukraine's agricultural land, utilizing existing networks of scientists and field-based analysis to safeguard food security. The first component of the project involves gathering ground truth data on the damage inflicted on Ukrainian farmland, which is then utilized to analyze the extent of soil pollution and calibrate remote sensing data.The second component focuses on developing an application for mapping farmland to document hazards and contamination and prioritize land for production and remediation.The third aspect involves building up "citizen science" by training non-combatant experts to inspect and analyze contaminated farmlands and contribute to land mapping efforts.The fourth component aims to facilitate the decontamination and remediation of Ukrainian lands to restore agricultural productivity while promoting post-war environmentally friendly agricultural practices to ensure sustainability and climate neutrality. This project will enable Ukrainian farmers to avoid dangerous areas and prioritize the land for targeted decontamination. The data collected from this research project will help inform government agencies, civil societies and other stakeholders.The United States is the largest funder of global humanitarian demining. Since 1993, the U.S. has provided at least $4.2 billion to over 100 countries from Laos to Ukraine. Funding is invested in activities such as bomb clearance, victims' assistance and explosive risk education.Environmental research like the UA-UK-CH in Ukraine has proven to be necessary and important to the future of soil rehabilitation post conflict. This should be a norm and donor countries, funders, academic institutions can leverage the future findings from Ukraine and leverage it as a model that can inspire research in other war impacted countries — especially 50-year-old legacy contaminations in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam—where no study has been done.

Modern science is increasingly focused on research that solves specific technological problems. In the world literature there are different, but generally similar, names for such studies. For example, German and Russian researchers use the term «problem-oriented research», the names «mission-oriented research», research as a response to «great challenges» and «frontier research», «science mode 2» are also used. In Ukraine, particularly in the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the name «targeted research programs» and «targeted scientific (scientific and technical) projects» are used. The article analyzes features of targeted research and the status of the obtained knowledge. It emphasizes their direct involvement in the social sphere — economic, political, social relations in general, because they are the basis of modern technology and their development is interested in the general public — producers and consumers of material goods. The knowledge obtained in these studies is knowledge «to order», which requires a solution to the relationship between basic and applied research, the principles of professional activity of scientists, «academic freedoms», changes in epistemological, socio-humanitarian principles of science as a social institution. In the professional activity of a scientist, the praxeologization of science requires an ori- entation on the humanity of the produced knowledge, which, in fact, is a combination of knowledge about nature with knowledge about human. In this case, the scientist must be an expert in related disciplines. The organizers of targeted research solve this situation through the collective implementation of research, or, as expressed by R. Florida, the use of «social intelligence». At the same time, the latter requires from the scientist, as a specialist, not only purely professional competencies but also individual psychological skills of work (creativity) in an interdisciplinary team (mutual assistance, tolerance, empathy, etc.) and interaction with the transdisciplinary community. Otherwise, the profession of a scientist becomes socially en- gaged in terms of competencies and activities, and the leader in the research team performs moderative rather than directive functions. Although targeted research programs are becoming widespread, leading in solving urgent practical problems, but in the scientific field, a balance must be maintained between research «to order» and research that will be the basis for future development of science and society. ; Сучасна наука дедалі більше орієнтується на дослідження, які розв'язують конкретні технологічні проблеми. У світовій літературі існують різні, але загалом аналогічні назви таких досліджень. Наприклад, німецькі та російські дослідники використовують назву «проблемно- орієнтовані дослідження», вживають також назви «дослідження, орієнтовані на місію», «дослідження як реакція на "великі виклики"», «дослідження переднього краю науки», «наука моду- су 2». Українські дослідники, зокрема в рамках Національної академії наук, використовують назви «цільові програми наукових досліджень» та «цільові наукові (науково-технічні) проєкти». У статті проаналізовано особливості цільових наукових досліджень та статус отриманого в такий спосіб знання. Автор підкреслює їхню безпосередню вмереженість у соціальну сферу — економічні, політичні та соціальні відносини загалом, бо вони є основою сучасних тех- нологій і в розвитку їх зацікавлена широка громадськість – виробники та споживачі матеріальних благ. Знання, здобуті в цих дослідженнях, це знання «на замовлення», яке вимагає розв'язання питання щодо співвідношення фундаментальних і прикладних досліджень, принципів реалізації професійної діяльності вчених, «академічних свобод», змін гносеологічних і соціально- гуманітарних принципів функціонування науки як соціального інституту. У професійній діяльності вченого праксеологізація науки вимагає орієнтації на людино- мірність продукованих знань, що передбачає поєднання знань про природу зі знаннями про людину. Отже, вчений має бути фахівцем із суміжних дисциплін. Організатори цільових досліджень розв'язують цю ситуацію через колективне виконання досліджень, або, за висловом Ричарда Флориди, використання «соціального інтелекту». Водночас останнє вимагає від вченого як фахівця не тільки суто фахових компетенцій, а й індивідуальних психологічних навичок праці (творчості) в міждисциплінарному колективі (взаємодопомоги, толерантності, емпатії тощо) і взаємодії з трансдисциплінарною спільнотою. Інакше, професія вченого стає, з погляду компетенцій і діяльності, соціально заанґажованою, а керівник в науковому колек- тиві виконує модераційні, а не директивні функції. Хоча цільові програми наукових досліджень набувають поширення і стають провідними у розв'язанні нагальних практичних проблем, у науковій сфері має зберігатися баланс між дослідженнями «на замовлення» і дослідженнями, що стануть основою майбутнього розвитку науки та суспільства.

The article considers the necessity to investigate an issue of development and establishment of the mechanism realization of the administrative-legal regime of the civil-military cooperation in Ukraine. It is noted that the issue of the administrative-legal regimes in one or another aspects has been investigated by the national as well as foreign authors, in particular: V.B. Averyanov, O.M. Bandurka, E.O. Barash, V.V. Belevtseva, Y.P. Bytyak, O.H. Bratel, A.S. Vasyliev, I.P. Holosnichenko, V.V. Zuy, S.V. Kivalov, T.O. Kolomoets, V.M. Komarnytskyi, A.T. Komzyuk, S.O. Kuznichenko, S.K. Mohyl, T.P. Minka, V.Y. Nastyuk, S.V. Petkov, V.M. Plishkin, M.M. Tishchenko et al. A number of the scientists, lawyer and militaries have also addressed the issue of civil-military cooperation, in particular: B.V. Bernadsky, P.I. Denysenko, P.O. Dodonov, V.V. Kovalenko, I.M. Koropatnik, V.O. Kushnir, O.O. Olifirov, S.V. Pietkov, I.P. Ruschenko, S.M. Salkutsan, O.F. Salnikova, V.M. Tarasov, V.M. Telelym, I.M. Shopina et al. The main regulatory legal acts are determined, being regulating the activity of the Civil and Military Cooperation Department in Ukraine. It is determined that after the introduction of the administrative - legal regime of civil and military cooperation in Ukraine in the liberated territories of Ukraine, the confidence of the local residents in the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the areas of deployment of the force grouping military bases and units has increased. The assistance is provided to the civilian population of the liberated territories, as well as interoperability with other military formations and law enforcement agencies, local authorities, Mass Media, various humanitarian organizations and the private sector in the areas of operation of the joint forces. It is stated that the process of the administrative and legal regime implementation of the civil-military cooperation is still insufficiently covered by domestic and foreign scientists. We can assume that the main reason for this phenomenon is that the emergence, formation and improvement of the cooperation system between the civilian population and the military organization, starting from the period of existence of the UNR and ZUNR in the history of Ukraine and ending with the present, is characterized by chronic political instability and constant reform of this sphere, especially in modern conditions. ; У статті розглядається необхідність дослідження проблем розвитку та становлення механізму реалізації адміністративно-правового режиму цивільно-військового співробітництва в Україні. Зазначено, що питання адміністративно-правових режимів у тому чи іншому аспекті досліджували як вітчизняні, так і закордонні автори, а саме: В.Б. Авер'янов, О.М. Бандурка, Є.О. Бараш, В.В. Бєлєвцева, Ю.П. Битяк, О.Г. Братель, А.С. Васильєв, І.П. Голосніченко, В.В. Зуй, С.В. Ківалов, Т.О. Коло-моєць, В.М. Комарницький, А.Т. Комзюк, С.О. Кузніченко, С.К. Могил, Т.П. Мінка, В.Я. Настюк, С.В. Пєтков, В.М. Плішкін, М.М. Тищенко й інші. А до питання цивільно-військового співробітництва звертались також низка науковців юристів та військовослужбовців, зокрема: Б.В. Бернадський, С.І. Денисенко, Р.О. Додонов, В.В. Коваленко, І.М. Коропатнік, В.О. Кушнір, О.О. Оліфіров, С.В. Пєтков, І.П. Рущенко, С.М. Салкуцан, О.Ф. Саль-нікова, В.М. Тарасов, В. М. Телелим, І.М. Шопіна й інші. Визначено основні нормативно-правові акти, які регулюють діяльність Управління цивільно-військового співробітництва в Україні. Визначено, що після запровадження в Україні адміністративно-правового режиму цивільно-військового співробітництва на визволених територіях України підвищилася довіра місцевих жителів до діяльності Збройних сил України у районах дислокації військових частин та підрозділів угруповань військ. Надається допомога цивільному населенню визволених територій, а також організовано взаємодію з іншими військовими формуваннями та правоохоронними органами, місцевими органами влади, засобами масової інформації, різноманітними гуманітарними організаціями та приватним сектором у районах проведення операції Об'єднаних сил. Констатовано, що процес реалізації адміністративно-правового режиму цивільно-військового співробітництва і дотепер недостатньо висвітлений вітчизняними та закордонними науковцями. Можна припустити, що основна причина такого явища полягає в тому, що виникнення, становлення й удосконалення системи співробітництва цивільного населення та військової організації, починаючи з періоду існування Української Народної Республіки та Західноукраїнської Народної Республікив історії України і закінчуючи сьогоденням, характеризується хронічною політичною нестабільністю та постійним реформуванням означеної сфери, особливо за сучасних умов.

Youth represent a critical demographic in Timor-Leste in terms of the country's economic development and stability. The slow pace of development has meant that there are very few opportunities for youth to improve their socio-economic well-being and this has had serious economic and security ramifications for Southeast Asia's poorest state. Investing in the development of Timorese youth represents an important strategy for enabling them to contribute to nation building and reducing their propensity to engage in destructive behaviour which threatens to undermine the stability of the fragile state. This is pertinent given that young people aged 15 to 29 will represent almost 40% of the population by 2010. Youth in Timor-Leste face many development challenges which stem from the context within which they live. Since gaining official independence in 2002 following 24 years of brutal Indonesian occupation Timor-Leste has had to rebuild its political, social, judicial and security institutions and infrastructure, a huge task which has been undermined by widespread poverty, a small and undiversified private sector, the poor provision of social services, inadequate security and judicial institutions, political instability and periodic civil conflict. While population growth has ballooned, the economy has remained stagnant and this has led to rising income poverty since 2002. There are multiple challenges for young people in Timor-Leste that have arisen from this development context. Poor quality teaching, high drop-out rates, a deficiency of post-primary and vocational education opportunities and poor linkages between learning outcomes and labour market demands mean that most youth lack the skills needed for gainful employment. Youth unemployment is a major concern, particularly in Dili where 40% of young people do not have a job. The country's weak economy is unable to provide enough employment for the thousands of job seekers entering the labour market every year and most Timorese youth make a living from subsistence agriculture. Up to 70% of young men are involved in some sort of martial arts group and while some groups participate in community development initiatives, many are engaged in crime and gang violence which contributes to insecurity in Timor-Leste. Female youth face their own development challenges including widespread gender-based violence and the burden of high fertility rates with the average women giving birth to 7 or more children. The lack of education and employment opportunities for young people has led to growing feelings of frustration and disenfranchisement among Timorese youth which increases their propensity to engage in crime and violence. This was most evident in 2006 when thousands of bored and disaffected young men joined violent riots sparked by tension within the military. The 2006 crisis highlighted the serious security implications of development challenges for youth because young men were responsible for most of the violence and destruction which forced 150,000 people to flee their homes, caused the economy to contract and destabilised the entire country. Since the 2006 crisis there has been a growing realisation among the development community that the socio-economic predicament of Timorese youth has significant implications for the country's economic development and stability. This is of particular concern to the Australian Government which has invested over AU$4 billion in stabilisation operations and aid to Timor-Leste since 1999. Australian assistance to Timor-Leste stems from its national interest in having a stable and prosperous neighbour, and a humanitarian responsibility to protect Timorese people from violence and help the impoverished country develop. In order to promote economic development and stability in Timor-Leste and prevent the outbreak of future civil conflicts such as the 2006 crisis, Australia should increase its investment in development initiatives for Timorese youth. It is recommended that the Australian Government: 1. Assist the Government of Timor-Leste to implement its National Youth Policy. 2. Invest in education to increase young people's access to quality education and training. 3. Invest in rural development to assist the majority of youth who make a living from subsistence agriculture. 4. Conduct further research into the effectiveness of youth development as a strategy for conflict prevention and promoting stability.

В статье анализируются проблемы взаимоотношений нового международного актора БРИКС со странами Африки. Автор ставила задачу определить политические и экономические интересы в Африке как БРИКС в целом, так и каждой страны-члена, рассмотреть различные аспекты сотрудничества БРИКС с Африкой и оценить их влияние на африканские экономики и африканское развитие.Внимание БРИКС к Африке обусловлено важной ролью африканского ресурсного потенциала, успехами африканских экономик и растущим политическим весом Африки в международных отношениях. На примере Африки БРИКС рассчитывает продемонстрировать преимущества сотрудничества в рамках Юг Юг. Африканская «повестка дня» БРИКС предусматривает содействие странам континента в решении таких проблем, как устойчивое развитие, энергетическая и продовольственная безопасность, взаимовыгодная торговля, развитие инфраструктуры, сельского хозяйства, технологии и инновации, здравоохранение, образование, ответы на кризисы и конфликты. Все эти проблемы жизненно важны для Африки. Торговля Африки с БРИКС растет быстрее, чем ее торговля с традиционными партнерами и чем торговля стран БРИКС друг с другом. Страны БРИКС являются значимыми донорами и инвесторами для стран континента. В фокусе их внимания африканская инфраструктура. В арсенале методов политики БРИКС важную роль играет «мягкая сила»: БРИКС активно участвует в сферах здравоохранения и образования стран Африки, в передаче им технологий, инноваций и опыта. Китай лидирует в вопросах финансовой помощи и инвестиций. Приоритетная сфера деятельности Индии новые технологии и услуги. Наращивает сотрудничество с Африкой и Бразилия, использующая в своей политике связи, существующие между португалоязычными странами. Сфера ее особого внимания сельское хозяйство. Россия уступает другим членам БРИКС по объему сотрудничества с Африкой, однако в последние годы положение меняется. РФ участвует в международных программах помощи Африке; на континенте действуют российские компании. Новый член БРИКС, Южная Африка, позиционирует себя как региональный лидер Африки, «ворота» на континент. Ее преимущества богатые ресурсы, сильный финансово-банковский сектор, практический опыт региональной экономической интеграции. Страны БРИКС сближает заинтересованность в создании справедливого демократического мирового порядка; они вносят заметный вклад в решение проблем африканской безопасности. Все страны БРИКС участвуют в миротворческих миссиях ООН на континенте. Внимание к нуждам Африки, растущая экономическая помощь, не обремененная политическими условиями, торговый и инвестиционный бум, защита интересов Африки в международных организациях сделали БРИКС привлекательной для африканцев альтернативой Западу. Хотя пока страны БРИКС выступают в Африке в роли конкурентов, они стремятся к налаживанию сотрудничества, а их растущий вклад в развитие африканской экономики находит положительный отклик на континенте. ; This article provides an analysis of the BRICS as a whole and an analysis of each member's policies in Africa. It explores the countries' political and economic interests in Africa, the various patterns and strategies of each country's cooperation with Africa, and estimates the impact of BRICS aid and investment on the African economy and Africa's development. The BRICS countries have emerged as the new effective actors in the world arena. Their global economic weight and political influence continue to grow. Not only is the group focusing its attention on strengthening the internal ties of its members, but it is also focusing on assistance to Africa, as a way to implement the emerging powers efforts to change the existing world order. The BRICS is deepening its engagement with African countries, which gained great success in their development in recent years. Its focus on Africa is determined by the important role of African resources and by the continent's growing influence in the world economy and contemporary international relations. BRICS countries are major trade partners of Africa, and Africa's trade with BRICS members is growing faster than its trade with the traditional partners. Africa has become the main destination for BRICS development aid and investment. The BRICS is also focusing on African infrastructure. BRICS countries use soft power widely, through developing humanitarian ties with Africa, particularly in health care and education. The BRICS is also an active participant in peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa. Members currently tend to compete in Africa, but they are taking steps toward collaboration. The BRICS contributes much to the African economy. Its presence has become important for the continent and receives a positive response there.

The impacts of climate change are felt worldwide and manifest differently in various parts of the globe. While extreme weather events such as monsoons, hurricanes, torrential rains, wildfires, droughts and heat waves with the resulting impacts on human lives and settlements are common, climate change also manifests in slow onset events such as sea level rise, increasing temperatures, ocean acidification, glacial retreat, salinization, land and forest degradation, loss of biodiversity, and desertification. It is found by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that the adverse effects of slow onset events are already affecting developing countries, resulting in loss of fertile land and the scarcity of water resources. In many parts of developing countries where farming constitutes the main livelihood and source of income, changes in the natural environment and in the distribution and availability of water resources may induce social disturbances that may range from migration to social instability and even violent conflicts. Lake Chad Basin and Northeast Nigeria in particular are seen as a climate hot spot partially due to the high variability of precipitations in the region. The Lake Chad that offers livelihood to millions of people in the region has been highly affected by climate change, losing up to 90% of its size between the early 1960s and today. Political issues have also emerged in the region with the birth of the islamist insurgent group Boko Haram in 2009. Since then, social structures have been highly disturbed, with millions of people leaving their homes in search of safety and the fulfilment of their basic needs, therefore becoming Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in their countries or crossing the border to become refugees in neighbouring countries. While the insurgency of the Boko Haram group and the response by various governments of the Lake Chad region including Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger may seem to be the main cause of migration in the region, understanding migration in the Lake Chad Basin is made complex for a few reasons: on the one hand, the link between conflict and migration is easily made by conflict experts; on the other hand, environmental scientists easily establish a correlation between environmental degradation and migration. Meanwhile, conflict and environmental degradation have not been treated simultaneously as causes of migration. To close this gap, this thesis divides into four studies, in which a multitude of research methods and empirical data are used. After the analysis of historical, socioeconomic and the environmental root causes of the crisis in northeast Nigeria in the first study, the second study introduces a comparative analysis of political factors (the conflict) and environmental factors (loss of fertile land and water scarcity) as causes of migration in northeast Nigeria. More explicitly, the role that environmental factors play on migration is dissociated from the role that conflict plays on migration in the study area. The next study examines how water scarcity contributes to migration in the region by studying the association between the local residents' intention to migrate and water related factors. Furthermore, since migration creates new social structures, the last study introduces a Social Network Analysis (SNA) of IDPs in Maiduguri. This approach allows to understand the networks in which IDPs are involved in Maiduguri, the main city in northeast Nigeria where most IDPs are found. It also allows to predict the potential of tensions between IDPs and host communities in the long term. To better address these issues, 204 IDPs in the Bakassi IDP camp located in Maiduguri, 100 members of the host community in the close proximity with the Bakassi IDP camp and experts in various governmental, non-governmental and international organizations based in Nigeria were interviewed. Findings reveal that conflict is the main push factor of migration in the region. However, the time of migration or the time that people spent in conflict before migrating varies from one community to another community. While in some communities people migrated very early after the community was affected by the conflict or even before conflict arrived, in other communities, people stayed several months or years with the conflict before migrating. Findings in this study also reveal that other factors including income, land ownership, occupation, and history of previous resource scarcity have a medium to large effect on the time of migration in some of the communities. Furthermore, the SNA in the Bakassi IDP camp and the host community reveal that the relationships between IDPs within the Bakassi IDP camp were usually friendly, while only few relationships between IDPs and host community members were reported. Host community members were connected to IDPs in other camps far away from their community rather than IDPs in the Bakassi IDP camp that was closer to them. This behaviour is seen in the fourth study in this thesis as a way of securing the few available resources and income generating opportunities that are available to the host community. Even though the network of friendly relationships between IDPs and host community members is denser than the network of conflicting relationships, suggesting a dominance of friendly relationships in the community, most experts believe that the friendly nature of the relationships between IDPs and their host communities may quickly turn conflicting or even violent as the pressure on resources grows and the IDPs population keeps rising. In conclusions, solving the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin and especially in northeast Nigeria is a complex task to the Lake Chad Basin governments, given the complexity of the crisis itself. Besides efforts by the international community to reduce greenhouse gases emissions in order to mitigate global warming and reduce the impact on vulnerable regions such as the Lake Chad Basin, local efforts are needed in the short and long term to address the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin. In the short term, improving humanitarian assistance to IDPs and extending it to poorer households in host communities will not only reduce pressure on the resources in the host communities, but also reduce the potential of tensions between IDPs and members of host communities. In the long term, creating additional income generating opportunities by industrializing the region will reduce the chronic poverty that pushes many young people to join armed groups. The protection of water resources through the construction of boreholes and the regulation of irrigation activities will ensure a sustainable use of water and increase food security in the region. ; Die Auswirkungen des Klimawandels sind weltweit spürbar und manifestieren sich unterschiedlich in verschiedenen Teilen der Erde. Während extreme Wetterereignisse wie Monsun, Wirbelstürme, sintflutartige Regenfälle, Waldbrände, Dürren und Hitzewellen mit den daraus resultierenden Auswirkungen auf Menschenleben und Siedlungen weit verbreitet sind, zeigt sich der Klimawandel auch in langsam einsetzenden Ereignissen wie dem Anstieg des Meeresspiegels, steigenden Temperaturen, Versauerung der Ozeane, Rückzug der Gletscher, Versalzung, Land- und Walddegradierung, Verlust der biologischen Vielfalt und Wüstenbildung. Die Klimarahmenkonvention der Vereinten Nationen (UNFCCC) stellt fest, dass die nachteiligen Auswirkungen langsam einsetzender Ereignisse die Entwicklungsländer bereits treffen und zum Verlust von fruchtbarem Land und zur Verknappung von Wasserressourcen führen. In vielen Teilen der Entwicklungsländer, in denen die Landwirtschaft die wichtigste Lebensgrundlage und Einkommensquelle darstellt, können Veränderungen in der natürlichen Umwelt sowie in der Verteilung und Verfügbarkeit von Wasserressourcen Auswirkungen auf das soziale Gefüge haben und zu Migration, sozialer Instabilität und gewaltsamen Konflikten führen. Insbesondere die Lake Tschad Region und der Nordosten Nigerias gelten als klimatische Brennpunkte. Dies ist teilweise auf die hohe Variabilität der Niederschläge in der Region zurückzuführen. Der Tschadsee, der Millionen von Menschen in der Region eine Lebensgrundlage bietet, wurde vom Klimawandel stark in Mitleidenschaft gezogen und verlor zwischen dem Anfang der 60er Jahre und heute bis zu 90% seiner Größe. Mit dem Erstarken der islamistischen Rebellengruppe Boko Haram im Jahr 2009 sind in der Region auch politische Fragen aufgeworfen worden. Seither sind die sozialen Strukturen in hohem Maße gestört, da Millionen von Menschen auf der Suche nach Sicherheit und der Befriedigung ihrer Grundbedürfnisse ihre Heimat verlassen und deshalb zu Binnenvertriebenen (engl. Internally Displaced Persons - IDPs) in ihren Ländern werden oder die Grenze überqueren, um als Geflüchtete in die Nachbarländer zu gelangen. Während der Aufstand der Boko-Haram-Gruppe und die Reaktion verschiedener Regierungen der Lake Tschad-Region, darunter Nigeria, Kamerun, Tschad und Niger, als Hauptursache für die Migration in der Region erscheinen mögen, wird das Verständnis der Migration in der Lake Tschad Region aus mehreren Gründen kompliziert: Einerseits wird eine klare Verbindung zwischen Konflikt und Migration von Konfliktexperten gesehen; andererseits stellen Umweltwissenschaftler einen Zusammenhang zwischen Umweltzerstörung und Migration her. Jedoch sind Konflikt und Umweltzerstörung bisher nicht zusammen als Ursachen von Migration behandelt worden. Um diese Lücke zu schließen, ist diese Arbeit in vier Studien unterteilt. Nach der Analyse der historischen, sozioökonomischen und umweltbedingten Ursachen der Krise im Nordosten Nigerias in der ersten Studie führt die zweite Studie eine vergleichende Analyse der politischen Faktoren (der Konflikt) und der Umweltfaktoren (Verlust von fruchtbarem Land und Wasserknappheit) als Ursachen der Migration im Nordosten Nigerias ein. Dabei wird die Rolle, die Umweltfaktoren bei der Migration spielen, expliziter von der Rolle abgegrenzt, die der Konflikt für die Migration im Untersuchungsgebiet spielt. In der nächsten Studie wird untersucht, wie Wasserknappheit zur Migration in der Region beiträgt, indem der Zusammenhang zwischen der Migrationsabsicht der Einheimischen und wasserbezogenen Faktoren untersucht wird. Da Migration zudem neue soziale Strukturen schafft, führt die letzte Studie eine soziale Netzwerkanalyse (SNA) der Binnenvertriebenen in Maiduguri ein. Dieser Ansatz ermöglicht es, die Netzwerke zu verstehen, in die die Binnenflüchtlinge in Maiduguri eingebunden sind und das Potenzial von Spannungen zwischen Binnenflüchtlingen und Aufnahmegemeinschaften langfristig vorherzusagen. Zu diesem Zweck befragte ich 204 Binnenvertriebene im Binnenvertriebenenlager Bakassi in Maiduguri, 100 Mitglieder der Gastgemeinde in unmittelbarer Nähe des Binnenvertriebenenlagers Bakassi sowie Experten verschiedener staatlicher, nichtstaatlicher und internationaler Organisationen mit Sitz in Abuja, der Hauptstadt Nigerias. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Konflikt der wichtigste Push-Faktor für Migration in der Region ist. Die Zeit der Migration oder die Zeit, die Menschen vor der Migration im Konflikt verbrachten, variiert jedoch von einer Gemeinschaft zur anderen Gemeinschaft. Während in einigen Gemeinschaften die Menschen schon sehr früh migrierten, nachdem die Gemeinschaft von dem Konflikt betroffen war oder sogar bevor der Konflikt eintraf, blieben die Menschen in anderen Gemeinschaften mehrere Monate oder Jahre innerhalb des Konfliktkontextes, bevor sie migrierten. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie zeigen auch, dass andere Faktoren wie Einkommen, Landbesitz, Besatzung und die Geschichte früherer Ressourcenknappheit in einigen der Gemeinschaften einen mittleren bis großen Einfluss auf den Zeitpunkt der Migration haben. Darüber hinaus zeigt die Analyse des sozialen Netzwerks im Binnenflüchtlingslager Bakassi und der Gastgemeinde, dass die Beziehungen zwischen den Binnenflüchtlingen innerhalb des Binnenflüchtlingslagers von Bakassi in der Regel freundschaftlich waren, während nur über wenige Beziehungen zwischen Binnenflüchtlingen und Mitgliedern der Gastgemeinde berichtet wurde. Die Mitglieder der Gastgemeinde standen eher mit Binnenvertriebenen in anderen Lagern in Verbindung, die weit von ihrer Gemeinde entfernt waren, als mit Binnenvertriebenen in dem ihnen näher gelegenen Binnenflüchtlingslager Bakassi. Dieses Verhalten wird in der vierten Studie dieser Arbeit als eine Möglichkeit gesehen, die wenigen verfügbaren Ressourcen und Einkommensmöglichkeiten, die der Gastgemeinde zur Verfügung stehen, zu sichern. Auch wenn das Netz der freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen Binnenvertriebenen und Mitgliedern der Gastgemeinde dichter ist als das Netz der konfliktreichen Beziehungen, was auf eine Dominanz freundschaftlicher Beziehungen in der Gemeinde hindeutet, glauben die meisten Experten, dass der freundschaftliche Charakter der Beziehungen zwischen Binnenvertriebenen und ihren Gastgemeinden mit zunehmendem Druck auf die Ressourcen und steigender Zahl der Binnenvertriebenen schnell in konfliktreiche oder sogar gewalttätige Beziehungen umschlagen könnte. Zusammenfassend ist die Lösung der Krise in der Lake Tschad Region und insbesondere im Nordosten Nigerias angesichts der Komplexität der Krise selbst eine komplexe Aufgabe für die Regierungen in der Lake Tschad Region. Neben den Bemühungen der internationalen Gemeinschaft, die Treibhausgasemissionen zu reduzieren, um die globale Erwärmung einzudämmen und die Auswirkungen auf gefährdete Regionen wie der Lake Tschad Region zu verringern, sind kurz- und langfristig lokale Anstrengungen erforderlich, um die Krise in der Lake Tschad Region zu bewältigen. Kurzfristig wird die Verbesserung der humanitären Hilfe für Binnenvertriebene und ihre Ausweitung auf ärmere Haushalte in den Gastgemeinden nicht nur den Druck auf die Ressourcen in den Gastgemeinden verringern, sondern auch das Potenzial von Spannungen zwischen Binnenvertriebenen und Mitgliedern der Gastgemeinden reduzieren. Langfristig wird die Schaffung zusätzlicher Einkommensmöglichkeiten durch die Industrialisierung der Region die chronische Armut verringern, die viele junge Menschen dazu treibt, sich bewaffneten Gruppen anzuschließen. Der Schutz der Wasserressourcen durch den Bau von Bohrlöchern und die Regulierung von Bewässerungsaktivitäten wird eine nachhaltige Wassernutzung sicherstellen und die Ernährungssicherheit in der Region erhöhen.

South Sudan is a fragile country beset by conflicts. The oil shutdown accompanied by a border closure in 2012 was resolved, but ongoing military clashes between factions of the ruling party have affected livelihoods since December 2013. Before the onset of these conflicts, large parts of the population were food insecure (2 out of 3 people) and lived in poverty (1 out of 2 people). This note estimates and juxtaposes the impact of the oil shutdown and the ongoing military conflict on livelihoods based on food price changes, predicted harvest losses and displacement. The resulting poverty estimates help to understand the structural implications of these conflicts. But to validate these numbers, test the underlying modeling assumptions and inform a policy response, new data needs to be collected urgently.

Background. Increasing the number of mass casual­ty incident such as traffic accidents or terrorist attacks which causes significant number of victim needs the medical assistance, so several chapters of health response plan to be revived. The term "event with mass casualty incident" (for healthcare institution) in the article presents the situation, because of which there is a mismatch between the simultaneous admission of a large number of victims and the possibility of provi­ding medical assistance without introducing changes in everyday forms and methods of work. Unlike the "emergency situation", the need to involve external resources by the health care institution is absent or minimal. The purpose of the study was the improving management system of medical assistance for the victims after the mass casualty incident. Materials and methods. The work is based on the own experience of the authors on the organization and the direct provision of medical assistance to victims after mass casualty incident in Ukraine and outside, participation in international projects and exercises, in parti­cular under the auspices of the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. The research uses bibliographic and semantic methods of cognition. The organizational aspects of medical support in 46 cases of mass casualty incident that occurred in the world during 1979–2015 are summarized, of which 33 (71.7 %) — as a result of terrorist attacks using explosive devices, 6 (13 %) — using firearms against an unprotected civilian population, fires in recreation facilities — 3 (6.5 %), strong poisonous substances — 2 (4.3 %) and due to transport accidents — 2 (4.3 %). Results. The organization of medical care for those who suffered because of mass casualty incident should be based on the principles of 4C crisis management in accordance with the level of the introduced regime of functioning. In the health care system of Ukraine, it is advi­sable to introduce the modes of operation of the system that are used in the European Union countries: 1) readiness for the possible admission of a large number of victims ("Green Level"), 2) partial mobilization of available resources of the health care institution ("Yellow Level"), 3) complete mobilization ("Red Level"). The primary medical triage of victims at the prehospital stage provides for dividing into two groups: "urgent" and "non-urgent". "Non-urgents" to be sent to hospitals that are geographically located near the scene of the incident, but not to the nearest, which should be ready to provide emergency medical care to "urgent" patients and applied independently — "self-reported", the number of which significantly exceed those who are delivered by ambulance team. The management group of health facilities includes responsible on — duty surgeon and anesthesiologist. The forms of information support of health care management system at the prehospital stage include: 1) the forces and facilities at the scene, 2) the triage of the victims at the scene, and 3) the need to strengthen the prehospital stage. At the hospital stage, the possibilities of conducting surgeries and the number of free hospital beds are determined: 1) the ope­rating unit, 2) hospital beds. Conclusions. In the health care system of Ukraine, it is advisable to introduce appropriate levels of functioning in mass casualty incident which applied in the European Union countries. Redistribution of available health care resources when providing medical care to the victims after mass casualty incident at prehospital and hospital stages is critically necessary to save the life and health of people. The medical response requires the adequate information support for the prehospital and hospital stages, and the introduction of sectoral and interagency cooperation. ; Актуальность. Увеличение количества чрезвычайных ситуациях с массовым поражением людей, в том числе вследствие аварий на транспорте или террористических актов, приводит к одновременному поступлению значительного количества пострадавших в учреждения здравоохранения и требует увеличения готовности системы здравоохранения к медицинскому реагированию через постоянный пересмотр и обновление Плана реагирования и взаимодействия при возникновении чрезвычайных ситуаций и ликвидации их последствий. Под понятием «события с массовым поражением людей» (для учреждения здравоохранения) в представленной статье понимают ситуацию, при которой возникает несоответствие между одновременным поступлением значительного количества пострадавших и возможностями оказания им медицинской помощи без внедрения изменений в повседневную форму и методы работы, в отличие от чрезвычайной ситуации, при которой потребность привлечения внешних ресурсов учреждением здравоохранения отсутствует или минимальна. Цель. Оптимизация информационного обеспечения системы управления медицинской помощью пострадавшим при событиях с массовым поражением людей. Материалы и методы. Работа основывается на собственном опыте авторов организации и непосредственного оказании медицинской помощи пострадавшим при событиях с массовым поражением людей и чрезвычайных ситуациях в Украине и за ее пределами, участия в международных проектах и учениях, в частности под эгидой Европейской комиссии гуманитарной помощи и защиты. При проведении исследования применены библиографический и семантический методы познания. Обобщены организационные аспекты медицинского обеспечения 46 случаев массового поражения людей, произошедших в мире на протяжении 1979–2015 гг., из них в результате террористических нападений с использованием взрывных устройств — 33 (71,7 %), огнестрельного оружия против незащищенного гражданского населения — 6 (13 %), пожаров в учреждениях отдыха — 3 (6,5 %), сильнодействующих ядовитых веществ — 2 (4,3 %) и в результате транспортных аварий — 2 (4,3 %). Результаты. Организация медицинской помощи пострадавшим в результате событий с массовым поражением должна основываться на принципах 4С кризисного менеджмента в соответствии с уровнем введенного режима функционирования. В системе здравоохранения Украины целесообразно внедрить режимы функционирования системы, которые используют в странах Европейского союза: 1) готовность к возможному поступлению значительного количества пострадавших («зеленый уровень»); 2) частичная мобилизация имеющихся ресурсов учреждения здравоохранения («желтый уровень»); 3) полная мобилизации («красный уровень»). Первичная медицинская сортировка пострадавших на догоспитальном этапе предусматривает деление на две группы: срочные и несрочные. Пострадавших, которые отнесены к группе несрочных, доставляют в больницы, которые географически расположены недалеко от места происшествия, но не в ближайшую, которая должна быть готова к оказанию экстренной медицинской помощи срочным больным и обратившимся самостоятельно (самообращение), количество которых может существенно превышать тех, кого доставляют бригады экстренной (скорой) медицинской помощи. В группу управления учреждения здравоохранения включают ответственных дежурных — врача-хирурга и врача-анестезиолога. К формам информационного обеспечения системы управления оказания медицинской помощи догоспитального этапа относятся: 1) силы и средства на месте происшествия; 2) распределение пострадавших соответственно на месте происшествия; 3) потребность усиления догоспитального этапа. На госпитальном этапе применяют: 1) операционный блок; 2) больничные койки. Выводы. В систему здравоохранения Украины целесообразно внедрить соответствующие уровни функционирования при событиях с массовым поражением людей, использующиеся в странах Европейского союза. Перераспределение имеющихся ресурсов здравоохранения при оказании медицинской помощи пострадавшим при событиях с массовым поражением людей на догоспитальном и госпитальном этапах критически необходимо для сохранения жизни и здоровья пострадавших. Управление оказанием медицинской помощи при массовом поражении людей требует соответствующего информационного обеспечения догоспитального и госпитального этапов, внедрения отраслевого и межведомственного взаимодействия. ; Актуальність. Збільшення кількості надзвичайних ситуацій із масовим ураженням людей, зокрема через аварії на транспорті або терористичні напади, призводить до одночасного надходження значної кількості постраждалих осіб до закладів охорони здоров'я та потребує збільшення готовності системи охорони здоров'я до медичного реагування через постійний перегляд і опрацювання Плану реагування та взаємодії під час виникнення надзвичайних ситуацій і ліквідації їх наслідків. Під поняттям «події з масовим ураженням людей» (для закладу охорони здоров'я) у поданій статті розуміють ситуацію, через яку виникає невідповідність між одночасним надходженням значної кількості постраждалих і можливостями надання їм медичної допомоги без впровадження змін у повсякденні форми та методи роботи, на відміну від надзвичайної ситуації потреба залучення зовнішніх ресурсів закладом охорони здоров'я відсутня або мінімальна. Мета. Оптимізація інформаційного забезпечення системи управління медичною допомогою постраждалим при подіях із масовим ураженням людей. Матеріали та методи. Робота ґрунтується на власному досвіді організації та безпосередньому наданні медичної допомоги постраждалим при подіях із масовим ураженням людей і надзвичайних ситуаціях в Україні та за її межами, участі у міжнародних проектах і навчаннях, зокрема під егідою Європейської комісії гуманітарної допомоги та цивільного захисту. Під час проведення дослідження застосовано бібліографічний і семантичний методи пізнання. Узагальнено організаційні аспекти медичного забезпечення 46 випадків масового ураження людей, які відбулись у світі впродовж 1979–2015 рр., із них унаслідок терористичних нападів з використанням вибухових пристроїв — 33 (71,7 %), вогнепальної зброї проти незахищеного цивільного населення — 6 (13 %), пожежі в закладах відпочинку — 3 (6,5 %), сильнодіючих отруйних речовин — 2 (4,3 %) і внаслідок транспортних аварій — 2 (4,3 %). Результати. Організація медичної допомоги постраждалим внаслідок подій із масовим ураженням має ґрунтуватись на принципах 4С кризового менеджменту відповідно до введеного режиму функціонування органів і закладів охорони здоров'я. В системі охорони здоров'я України доцільно впровадити режими, що існують в країнах Європейського Союзу: 1) готовність до можливого надходження значної кількості постраждалих («зелений рівень»); 2) часткова мобілізація («жовтий рівень»); 3) повна мобілізації («червоний рівень»). Первинне медичне сортування постраждалих на догоспітальному етапі передбачає розподіл на дві основні групи: термінові та нетермінові. Нетермінових постраждалих слід доставити до лікарень, які географічно розташовано недалеко від місця події, але не до найближчого закладу, який має бути готовим до надання екстреної медичної допомоги терміновим хворим і тим, хто звернувся самостійно (самозвернення), кількість яких може суттєво перевищувати тих, кого доставлено бригадами екстреної (швидкої) медичної допомоги. До групи управління закладу охорони здоров'я включають відповідальних чергових — лікаря-хірурга та лікаря-анестезіолога. До форм інформаційного забезпечення системи управління надання медичної допомоги на догоспітальному етапу належать: 1) сили та засоби на місці події; 2) розподіл постраждалих на місці події; 3) потреба підсилення догоспітального етапу. На госпітальному етапі визначають можливості проведення хірургічних операцій та кількість вільних лікарняних ліжок: 1) операційний блок; 2) лікарняні ліжка. Висновки. В систему охорони здоров'я України при подіях із масовим ураженням людей доцільно впровадити відповідні рівні функціонування, що використовують в країнах Європейського Союзу. Перерозподіл наявних ресурсів охорони здоров'я при наданні медичної допомоги постраждалим при подіях із масовим ураженням людей на догоспітальному та госпітальному етапах критично важливе для збереження життя та здоров'я постраждалих. Управління надання медичної допомоги при масовому ураженні людей потребує відповідного інформаційного забезпечення догоспітального та госпітального етапів, впровадження галузевої та міжвідомчої взаємодії.

While the nonviolent struggle of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi against the Burmese military government's continuing repression has captured the world's attention, the profound human rights and humanitarian crisis endured by Burma's ethnic minority communities has largely been ignored. ¶ Decades of armed conflict have devastated ethnic minority communities, which make up approximately 35 percent of Burma's population. The Burmese army, or Tatmadaw, has for many years carried out numerous and widespread summary executions, looting, torture, rape and other sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and torture, forced labor, recruitment of child soldiers, and the displacement and demolition of entire villages as part of military operations against ethnic minority armed opposition groups. Civilians bear the brunt of a state of almost perpetual conflict and militarization. ¶ Violations of international human rights and humanitarian law (the laws of war) by the Tatmadaw have been particularly acute in eastern Karen state, which runs along the northwestern border of Thailand. One woman described to Human Rights Watch more than twenty years of Tatmadaw brutality: . One result of the Tatmadaw's brutal behavior has been the creation of large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees among Burma's ethnic minority communities. Conflict and its consequences have been going on for so long that in many ethnic minority-populated areas, continuous forced relocations and displacement–– interspersed with occasional periods of relative stability––have become a fact of life for generations of poor villagers. ¶ The scale of the IDP problem in Burma is daunting. Estimates suggest that, as of late 2004, as many as 650,000 people were internally displaced in eastern Burma alone. According to a recent survey, 157,000 civilians have been displaced in eastern Burma since the end of 2002, and at least 240 villages destroyed, relocated, or abandoned. The majority of displaced people live in areas controlled by the government, now known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), or by various ethnic armed groups that have agreed to ceasefires with the government. But approximately eighty-four thousand displaced people live in zones of ongoing armed conflict, where the worst human rights abuses continue. Many IDPs live in hiding in war zones. Another two million Burmese live in Thailand, including 145,000 refugees living in camps. ¶ Karen State is the location of some of the largest numbers of IDPs in Burma. Since 2002, approximately 100,000 people have been displaced from Karen areas, which include parts of Pegu and Tenasserim Divisions. Though a provisional ceasefire was agreed in December 2003 between the SPDC and the Karen National Union (KNU), sporadic fighting continues. Tatmadaw military operations against the KNU's army, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), in the first months of 2005 caused numerous deaths and injuries to civilians in poor villages along the Thai border. They also forced many civilians to flee internally or to Thailand. For example, at least 9,000 civilians were displaced in Toungoo District, in the far north of Karen State bordering Karenni State, and in Nyaunglebin District in northwest Karen State, during major Tatmadaw offensives between November 2004 and February 2005. ¶ The majority of Karen IDPs have been forced out of their homes as a direct result of the Tatmadaw's "Four Cuts" counter-insurgency strategy, in which the Burmese army has attempted to defeat armed ethnic groups by denying them access to food, funds, recruits, and information from other insurgent groups. H.T., a twenty-eight year-old Karen from Dooplaya District, described his experience with the Tatmadaw in January 2005: . ¶ This report describes the situation in government-controlled areas, including relocation sites, which are generally not accessible from across the Thailand border. The report identifies two main causes of displacement: • Displacement due to armed conflict as a direct result of fighting, or because armed conflict has undermined human and food security and livelihood options; and • Displacement due to human rights violations, particularly land rights caused by Tatmadaw and militia confiscation of land and other violations of land rights, especially in the context of natural resource extraction, such as logging and mining. Other rights violations, such as forced labor, killings, torture, and rape, also cause displacement. ¶ The report describes patterns of abuse and forced relocation over a period of many years. It documents how serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses continue to occur in some parts of Karen State, such as Toungoo and Nyaunglebin Districts, while other areas are relatively quiet. It recommends a need to think of new and more realistic answers to the dilemmas faced by IDPs, many of whom may not be able––or may not want––to go home again. ¶ For this report, Human Rights Watch interviewed community leaders, representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), staff at community-based organizations (CBOs), U.N. officials, and many others. Most important, we interviewed forty-six Karen IDPs living in the Papun hills, in mid-late 2003, and along the Thai border, in early 2005. These forty-six individuals altogether were displaced more than one thousand times. Incredibly, five individuals had been forcibly displaced more than one hundred times. One of these five, an elderly woman, first fled to the jungle during World War II, when Japanese soldiers came to her village. ¶ All the interviewees for this report had been farmers and continue to derive most of their food from working their own or others' rice fields. These fields remain susceptible to destruction by Tatmadaw patrols. Displacement often means that new land must be cleared for farming, rather than farmers being able to return to former swidden fields in sustainable rotation after fallow swiddens have regained their fertility. Over time, the disruption of traditional agricultural practices has seriously undermined livelihoods and caused encroachment by swidden farmers into primary forest, rather than rotating their plots in secondary forest customarily used for swidden agriculture. ¶ Many IDPs have been displaced for some time, and live alongside others who are not–– or have not recently been––displaced. Their needs may therefore be similar to those of other vulnerable populations in peri-urban and rural Burma. ¶ The main problems identified by interviewees were lack of consistent access to food; insufficient income and livelihood problems; human rights abuses and poor physical security related to displacement and fighting; lack of access to education and health services; and, finally, the problem of landmines, which destroy both land and their victims' lives. Their primary need is to be able to farm properly, without disturbance, and thus improve income and food security, as well as better access to education and health services. All wanted to, as one interviewee put it, "live in peace and with justice." Most of these problems are linked to longer-term structural problems, and can only be addressed in the context of socio-economic––and above all political––solutions to Burma's protracted ethnic conflicts. ¶ The findings of this report caution against assuming that all IDPs necessarily want to return "home." Returning home can be a problematic concept for people who have been on the move for long periods of time. Many IDPs may wish to return home, if it still exists, but others may want to stay put or resettle elsewhere. Some who have returned home or have otherwise resettled still face major problems, while others have not. Some have not moved and built new lives in the place to which they were displaced, often in the jungle hills or in a relocation site. ¶ Thus, those providing assistance should avoid taking a one-size-fits all approach to meeting the needs of IDPs. Instead, the focus should be on individual choice and the needs of specific communities. Indeed, the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which summarize existing international law as it applies to IDPs, make choice the touchstone. Competent authorities have a duty to "establish conditions, as well as provide the means" to allow voluntary resettlement and integration in the place to which people are displaced, if that is their choice. ¶ An understanding of long-term patterns of forced displacement should inform the design of humanitarian, development, and socio-political interventions on behalf of the displaced. One aspect that deserves careful consideration is the effect of ceasefires on the human rights situation and on displacement. Over the past decade many armed ethnic groups have entered into ceasefires with the military government in Rangoon. In some parts of the country, ceasefires have meant a reduction in the most severe forms of human rights abuses, though this has not usually led to greater respect for other basic rights, such as freedom of expression or the right to due process of law. But in many cases, ceasefires have been quietly accompanied by the reemergence of local civil society actors. This has been one of the most important, yet under-studied, aspects of the ceasefires in Burma. ¶ The SPDC and KNU agreed to an informal ceasefire in December 2003. In some parts of Karen State, the situation began to stabilize. Across the whole of Tenasserim Division, and much of lower and western Karen State, there has been less fighting and fewer of the most severe type of human rights violations, such as extrajudicial executions and torture, than before. Some IDPs are beginning to return from hiding places in the jungle and from relocation sites to build more permanent houses and grow crops other than swidden rice. However, the Tatmadaw continues its aggressive use of forced labor, especially on road-building projects, land confiscation, and arbitrary taxation in many areas. It has recently stepped up attacks on a variety of armed ethnic groups. Under the right conditions, a ceasefire between the SPDC and the KNU could deliver a substantial improvement in the human rights situation, creating the space in which local and international organizations can begin to address the urgent needs of Karen IDPs. But the situation may yet return to guerilla warfare and full-scale counterinsurgency. ¶ Many of the ceasefires are now under threat. Since the purging of General Khin Nyunt last October, hard-liners in the SPDC have attempted to undermine ceasefires agreed between Rangoon and several armed ethnic groups since 1989. In mid-2005, the future of these ceasefires looks more and more uncertain. .

This report provides an overview of the World Bank Group's engagement in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, highlighting the new operating model of the World Bank Group. In particular, the report provides insight on the key challenges and strategic engagement of each sector (Global Practice) in MENA and details some of the key cross-cutting challenges that countries face. This report serves as a basis to convene international thought leaders, as well as internal and external stakeholders, in the context of developing a new strategy for the Middle East and North Africa region later this year. The region faces three challenges in particular: (a) long-standing distortions that have generated jobless growth and poor service delivery as well as low financial access and inclusion; (b) severe imbalances that threaten macroeconomic stability; and (c) deep political and social tensions, at times escalating into violent conflict. The World Bank Group's current engagement supports four key pillars: (a) strengthening governance; (b) ensuring economic and social inclusion; (c) creating jobs; and (d) accelerating sustainable growth. Progress on these pillars can be made through a two-pronged approach focused on addressing the immediate needs arising from humanitarian crises throughout the region while also giving sustained attention to the investments and reforms needed for medium- and long-term development. This two-pronged approach is necessary to help governments cope with immediate pressures on already fragile institutions and at the same time develop long-term strategies to address deep-seated issues that have hindered inclusive growth and prosperity for decades. This report details nine specific cross-cutting challenges: climate change; decentralization; disaster risk management; fragility, conflict and violence; fuel subsidies and social safety nets; gender; governance and service delivery in health and education; private sector development and job creation; and public-private partnerships. Looking ahead, responding to the changing realities on the ground, the World Bank Group is rethinking its regional strategy in order to maximize its impact in the Middle East and North Africa. This new strategy, which is currently under preparation, will aim to step up the Bank Group's engagement in the region in order to achieve shared growth and prosperity, as well as work with partners to convene change in the region.

FONDEN (Natural Disasters Fund), Mexico's fund for natural disasters, was established in the late 1990s as a mechanism to support the rapid rehabilitation of federal and state infrastructure affected by adverse natural events. FONDEN was first created as a budget line in the Federal expenditure budget of 1996, and became operational in 1999. Funds from FONDEN could be used for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of: 1) public infrastructure at the three levels of government (federal, state, and municipal); 2) low-income housing; and 3) certain components of the natural environment. FONDEN consists of two complementary budget accounts, the FONDEN program for reconstruction and FOPREDEN program for prevention, and their respective financial accounts. The FONDEN program for reconstruction is FONDEN's primary budget account. It channels resources from the federal expenditure budget to specific reconstruction programs. The FOPREDEN program for prevention supports disaster prevention by funding activities related to risk assessment, risk reduction, and capacity building on disaster prevention. The FONDEN system is continuously evolving to integrate lessons learned over the course of years of experience.

America's Global War on Terror has seen its share of stalemates, disasters, and outright defeats. During 20-plus years of armed interventions, the United States has watched its efforts implode in spectacular fashion, from Iraq in 2014 to Afghanistan in 2021. The greatest failure of its "Forever Wars," however, may not be in the Middle East, but in Africa."Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated," President George W. Bush told the American people in the immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks, noting specifically that such militants had designs on "vast regions" of Africa.To shore up that front, the U.S. began a decades-long effort to provide copious amounts of security assistance, train many thousands of African military officers, set up dozens of outposts, dispatch its own commandos on all manner of missions, create proxy forces, launch drone strikes, and even engage in direct ground combat with militants in Africa. Most Americans, including members of Congress, are unaware of the extent of these operations. As a result, few realize how dramatically America's shadow war there has failed.The raw numbers alone speak to the depths of the disaster. As the United States was beginning its Forever Wars in 2002 and 2003, the State Department counted a total of just nine terrorist attacks in Africa. This year, militant Islamist groups on that continent have, according to the Pentagon, already conducted 6,756 attacks. In other words, since the United States ramped up its counterterrorism operations in Africa, terrorism has spiked 75,000%.Let that sink in for a moment.75,000%.A Conflict that Will Live in InfamyThe U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq opened to military successes in 2001 and 2003 that quickly devolved into sputtering occupations. In both countries, Washington's plans hinged on its ability to create national armies that could assist and eventually take over the fight against enemy forces. Both U.S.-created militaries would, in the end, crumble. In Afghanistan, a two-decade-long war ended in 2021 with the rout of an American-built, -funded, -trained, and -armed military as the Taliban recaptured the country. In Iraq, the Islamic State nearly triumphed over a U.S.-created Iraqi army in 2014, forcing Washington to reenter the conflict. U.S. troops remain embattled in Iraq and neighboring Syria to this very day.In Africa, the U.S. launched a parallel campaign in the early 2000s, supporting and training African troops from Mali in the west to Somalia in the east and creating proxy forces that would fight alongside American commandos. To carry out its missions, the U.S. military set up a network of outposts across the northern tier of the continent, including significant drone bases – from Camp Lemonnier and its satellite outpost Chabelley Airfield in the sun-bleached nation of Djibouti to Air Base 201 in Agadez, Niger — and tiny facilities with small contingents of American special operations troops in nations ranging from Libya and Niger to the Central African Republic and South Sudan.For almost a decade, Washington's war in Africa stayed largely under wraps. Then came a decision that sent Libya and the vast Sahel region into a tailspin from which they have never recovered."We came, we saw, he died," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton joked after a U.S.-led NATO air campaign helped overthrow Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, the longtime Libyan dictator, in 2011. President Barack Obama hailed the intervention as a success, but Libya slipped into near-failed-state status. Obama would later admit that "failing to plan for the day after" Qaddafi's defeat was the "worst mistake" of his presidency.As the Libyan leader fell, Tuareg fighters in his service looted his regime's weapons caches, returned to their native Mali, and began to take over the northern part of that nation. Anger in Mali's armed forces over the government's ineffective response resulted in a 2012 military coup. It was led by Amadou Sanogo, an officer who learned English in Texas and underwent infantry-officer basic training in Georgia, military-intelligence instruction in Arizona, and was mentored by U.S. Marines in Virginia.Having overthrown Mali's democratic government, Sanogo and his junta proved hapless in battling terrorists. With the country in turmoil, those Tuareg fighters declared an independent state, only to be muscled aside by heavily armed Islamists who instituted a harsh brand of Shariah law, causing a humanitarian crisis. A joint Franco-American-African mission prevented Mali's complete collapse but pushed the militants into areas near the borders of both Burkina Faso and Niger.Since then, those nations of the West African Sahel have been plagued by terrorist groups that have evolved, splintered, and reconstituted themselves. Under the black banners of jihadist militancy, men on motorcycles — two to a bike, wearing sunglasses and turbans, and armed with Kalashnikovs — regularly roar into villages to impose zakat (an Islamic tax); steal animals; and terrorize, assault, and kill civilians. Such relentless attacks have destabilized Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger and are now affecting their southern neighbors along the Gulf of Guinea. Violence in Togo and Benin has, for example, jumped 633% and 718% over the last year, according to the Pentagon.U.S.-trained militaries in the region have been unable to stop the onslaught and civilians have suffered horrifically. During 2002 and 2003, terrorists caused just 23 casualties in Africa. This year, according to the Pentagon, terrorist attacks in the Sahel region alone have resulted in 9,818 deaths — a 42,500% increase.At the same time, during their counterterrorism campaigns, America's military partners in the region have committed gross atrocities of their own, including extrajudicial killings. In 2020, for example, a top political leader in Burkina Faso admitted that his country's security forces were carrying out targeted executions. "We're doing this, but we're not shouting it from the rooftops," he told me, noting that such murders were good for military morale.American-mentored military personnel in that region have had only one type of demonstrable "success": overthrowing governments the United States trained them to protect. At least 15 officers who benefited from such assistance have been involved in 12 coups in West Africa and the greater Sahel during the war on terror. The list includes officers from Burkina Faso (2014, 2015, and twice in 2022); Chad (2021); Gambia (2014); Guinea (2021); Mali (2012, 2020, and 2021); Mauritania (2008); and Niger (2023). At least five leaders of a July coup in Niger, for example, received American assistance, according to a U.S. official. They, in turn, appointed five U.S.-trained members of the Nigerien security forces to serve as that country's governors.Military coups of that sort have even super-charged atrocities while undermining American aims, yet the United States continues to provide such regimes with counterterrorism support. Take Colonel Assimi Goïta, who worked with U.S. Special Operations forces, participated in U.S. training exercises, and attended the Joint Special Operations University in Florida before overthrowing Mali's government in 2020. Goïta then took the job of vice president in a transitional government officially charged with returning the country to civilian rule, only to seize power again in 2021.That same year, his junta reportedly authorized the deployment of the Russia-linked Wagner mercenary forces to fight Islamist militants after close to two decades of failed Western-backed counterterrorism efforts. Since then, Wagner — a paramilitary group founded by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former hot-dog vendor turned warlord — has been implicated in hundreds of human rights abuses alongside the longtime U.S.-backed Malian military, including a 2022 massacre that killed 500 civilians.Despite all of this, American military aid for Mali has never ended. While Goïta's 2020 and 2021 coups triggered prohibitions on some forms of U.S. security assistance, American tax dollars have continued to fund his forces. According to the State Department, the U.S. provided more than $16 million in security aid to Mali in 2020 and almost $5 million in 2021. As of July, the department's Bureau of Counterterrorism was waiting on congressional approval to transfer an additional $2 million to Mali. (The State Department did not reply to TomDispatch's request for an update on the status of that funding.)The Two-Decade StalemateOn the opposite side of the continent, in Somalia, stagnation and stalemate have been the watchwords for U.S. military efforts."Terrorists associated with Al Qaeda and indigenous terrorist groups have been and continue to be a presence in this region," a senior Pentagon official claimed in 2002. "These terrorists will, of course, threaten U.S. personnel and facilities." But when pressed about an actual spreading threat, the official admitted that even the most extreme Islamists "really have not engaged in acts of terrorism outside Somalia." Despite that, U.S. Special Operations forces were dispatched there in 2002, followed by military aid, advisers, trainers, and private contractors.More than 20 years later, U.S. troops are still conducting counterterrorism operations in Somalia, primarily against the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab. To this end, Washington has provided billions of dollars in counterterrorism assistance, according to a recent report by the Costs of War Project. Americans have also conducted more than 280 air strikes and commando raids there, while the CIA and special operators built up local proxy forces to conduct low-profile military operations.Since President Joe Biden took office in January 2021, the U.S. has launched 31 declared airstrikes in Somalia, six times the number carried out during President Obama's first term, though far fewer than the record high set by President Trump, whose administration launched 208 attacks from 2017 to 2021.America's long-running, undeclared war in Somalia has become a key driver of violence in that country, according to the Costs of War Project. "The U.S. is not simply contributing to conflict in Somalia, but has, rather, become integral to the inevitable continuation of conflict in Somalia," reported Ẹniọlá Ànúolúwapọ Ṣóyẹmí, a lecturer in political philosophy and public policy at the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University. "U.S. counterterrorism policies are," she wrote, "ensuring that the conflict continues in perpetuity."The Epicenter of International Terrorism"Supporting the development of professional and capable militaries contributes to increasing security and stability in Africa," said General William Ward, the first chief of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) — the umbrella organization overseeing U.S. military efforts on the continent — in 2010, before he was demoted for profligate travel and spending. His predictions of "increasing security and stability" have, of course, never come to pass.While the 75,000% increase in terror attacks and 42,500% increase in fatalities over the last two decades are nothing less than astounding, the most recent increases are no less devastating. "A 50-percent spike in fatalities tied to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel and Somalia over the past year has eclipsed the previous high in 2015," according to a July report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a Defense Department research institution. "Africa has experienced a nearly four-fold increase in reported violent events linked to militant Islamist groups over the past decade… Almost half of that growth happened in the last 3 years."Twenty-two years ago, George W. Bush announced the beginning of a Global War on Terror. "The Taliban must act, and act immediately," he insisted. "They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate." Today, of course, the Taliban reigns supreme in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda was never "stopped and defeated," and other terror groups have spread across Africa (and elsewhere). The only way "to defeat terrorism," Bush asserted, was to "eliminate it and destroy it where it grows." Yet it has grown, and spread, and a plethora of new militant groups have emerged.Bush warned that terrorists had designs on "vast regions" of Africa but was "confident of the victories to come," assuring Americans that "we will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail." In country after country on that continent, the U.S. has, indeed, faltered and its failures have been paid for by ordinary Africans killed, wounded, and displaced by the terror groups that Bush pledged to "defeat." Earlier this year, General Michael Langley, the current AFRICOM commander, offered what may be the ultimate verdict on America's Forever Wars on that continent. "Africa," he declared, "is now the epicenter of international terrorism."This article has been republished with permission from TomDispatch.