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In past decades, scholars have observed that the transnational and local competition in higher education, as well as the expansion of higher education, have led to unprecedented transformation of universities and have affected its core processes and core staff - academics - in manifold ways (Bleiklie, Enders, Lepori & Musselin, 2011). Since the 1980s, new public management-inspired reforms in the European systems (both Western and Central Eastern Europe) have fostered a more business-like management at universities (de Boer, Enders & Schimank, 2007). Performance measurement in teaching and research, increased competition for resources, and increased accountability to the funding agencies have become important characteristics of higher education systems. These changed conditions at universities have had serious repercussions about what constitutes academic work and where, how and under what conditions academics can pursue knowledge creation and dissemination activities. In many cases, teaching and learning, which were the core activities in European universities, have become 'secondary' activities because they do not really 'count' for research performance evaluations and overall individualistic performance reviews under a managerialist regime. At the same time, the accountability following the quasi-market logics has increased the oversight over all academic activities, including teaching and learning. The tensions abound for academic work in this context. This chapter aims to unravel some of these tensions, with specific emphasis on the tensions between the profession and the organization, and tensions between the logics of the quasi-market and collegiality. This paper addresses the tensions between the academic profession and the university as an organization. It poses two questions. How are protected academic spaces created under different logics in different governance regimes? How do academics respond to threats to these protected academic spaces? It is suggested that the institutional norms of governing academic work at universities are changing whereby the academic logic guiding academic self-regulation, which encompasses professional and institutional autonomy, is being challenged by a different type of quasi-market logic which may lead to a very different environment for academic work, thus encompassing mixed logics (Greenwood et al. 2010, Thornton 2012). To understand the shift of logics in governing higher education in a comparative systematic way across different systems, five governance mechanisms in higher education can be used (see De Boer, Enders & Schimank, 2007). Specifically, five dimensions of governance that are distinguished in this article are: academic self-governance, competition for resources, managerial self-governance, (state) regulation, and stakeholder guidance. We propose that a certain dominant logic shapes the creation of a particular configuration of governance of higher education in a given system at a particular point of time. The academic logic provides the grounds for strong academic self-governance as one can see in the Humboldtian model of university. Competition for resources following this logic is low, while managerial self-governance and state regulation can be low to medium (Leisyte, 2014). On the contrary according to the quasi-market logic in higher education, one can see strong competition for resources, strong managerial self-governance and strong stakeholder guidance. At the same time, this logic would facilitate low state regulation and low academic self-governance. Literature on professional autonomy has pointed out that academics typically respond to the pressures of quasi-market logics are resistance to change and creation of 'protected spaces' (Leisyte, 2015). It has also been argued in the literature, that such spaces can be created also in the managerial type of universities which are stronger guided by quasi-market logic, although then they are the co-creation of academics and managers with mixes of old processes and structures preserving collegiality and new structures which albeit based on quasi-market logic- it still preserves academic freedom. We argue that academics respond to the institutional reform processes which threaten their professional autonomy in various ways depending on how much room for discretion they have and in which organizational unit they are embedded. Here discretion is understood as the power academics possess to assert authority over the content and methods of their work as well as the prestige they hold within the academic community (Chreim et al., 2007; Leisyte, 2007). Discretion may also be influenced by the prestige of their discipline in the discipline pecking order – in which physics would claim the first place (Rip, 2012), thus even though a professor can have high prestige in her/his community, it is not necessarily the case that this person has high discretion organizationally- as the power of other disciplines may be higher in negotiating the autonomy and resources organizationally where academics from different disciplines meet. Given the temporal dimension of protected spaces and the variability in agency among academics one could imagine switching taking place in time on both dimensions - in terms of changing the amount of protected spaces at the sub-organizational level and the level of discretion. Further, maintaining and creating protected spaces at different levels which may result in their nestedness. To conclude, the quasi-market logic results in a specific set of governance mechanisms which may potentially invade academic protected spaces through managerial interventions. At the same time academics depending on their level of discretion may act as institutional entrepreneurs and respond to various reform initiatives as open and deviant resistors, strategic gamers, new professionals, elite manager s and professional managers. Blurring boundaries of protected spaces over time seems to elicit different responses depending on the level of discretion academics have and the type of organizational settings they inhabit.

On Wednesday the 11th of of May, I met with Deputy Prime Minister John Anderson to discuss the conclusions of this report. During our meeting, his senior policy adviser explained to me the role that Mr Anderson had played in the negotiations surrounding the National Water Initiative, and how, without the zeal of the Deputy Prime Minister, the agreement may not have come to fruition. At the outset, his adviser explained to me, senior Commonwealth public servants were of the opinion that a Deputy Prime Minister who wanted to talk water reform was simply a Deputy Prime Minister looking for more money for the bush. They were proven wrong, she claims, when Mr Anderson explained to the assembled group of experts just how such a scheme was to be achieved, what it would achieve, and how, despite their earlier opinion, this scheme was to benefit farmers and the rest of the nation simultaneously. Out of this desire, and that of the States to look at ways to secure a water future, the National Water Initiative was borne. Its achievements are significant, the most important of which is assigning property rights to a water title, thus ensuring farmers have a legal entitlement to water. The valuation of water that this achieves will doubtlessly lead to better efficiency throughout the system, and force users, whether they be farmers or domestic, to utilise a finite, valuable resource more wisely. The National Water Initiative was not a pyrrhic victory for the Commonwealth like the constitutional conventions had been for the States 103 years previous. It was the States who caused many of the water-related problems faced in Australia today, mainly by their refusal, quite obstinate in the case of New South Wales, to the premise of federal control for Australia's waterways. The most important river system in this country, the Murray-Darling, has tributaries which cross three State boundaries and one Territory. Other than the Border Rivers region of north-east New South Wales and Queensland and the Snowy River in south-eastern Australia, it is the only system in the country that undergoes regulation by more than one government; in the case of the Basin, four governments manage its affairs. This situation exists because the States were so short sighted and vote-hungry when it came to apportioning water licenses that they did not see the need to give the new Commonwealth Government the legislative control of rivers. Because of this, the States failed to establish a pure federal system, rather opting for populism over common sense. To this end, the States have every right to manage the rivers that flow within their State that do not have any impact upon other systems or States; it would be silly, for example, for the Commonwealth Government to regulate the Clarence River in northern New South Wales, or the Barwon River in Victoria. These two rivers do not flow into, or have any impact upon, any other State. However, given the size of the Murray-Darling Basin, and the number of jurisdictions which it covers, it is simply ludicrous that the management of such a system is not vested in one central authority. Currently, because of State-based management, the Murray-Darling Basin is stressed beyond simple repair. For example, the over-allocation of water licenses to suit political purposes in Australia's early federal history has resulted in allocation and pricing inequities. To overcome such inequities, there needs to be on over-arching body, capable of policy formulation, implementation and regulation. The Commonwealth Government is the only body able to do this, yet still be capable, should it so desire, to devolve power to more local authorities for "localised" management within a "national" framework with "national" standards. How can a resolution of this situation be achieved? The only possible way to wrest the power of water system management back from the States is to change the Constitution. This is not easy - in fact it would probably fail - but it is the only method by which federalism can be maintained as a tenet of Australian politics. The States have shown their willingness to work with the Commonwealth to achieve national standards and service improvements for water. They must now accept that the Commonwealth is the best manager of water systems across the Murray Darling Basin, and must be willing to cede such power to the Commonwealth. This is an important first step in improving the management structure of Australian waterways where a common interest is required. There is no more pressing issue in Australia than resolving one of the longest running disputes in Australian federal history. The time is now right for this sore-point of Australia's constitution to be reformed, and the true custodian of the power given it.

With the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the EU will define not only the financial but also the political priorities until 2030. Which political objectives the EU intends to pursue in the future will therefore be a key issue during the MFF negotiations. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Develop¬ment Goals (SDGs), which the EU played a key role in shaping, should guide this debate. In terms of EU domestic policy, the 2030 Agenda should help the European budget be more strongly tuned towards socially disadvantaged groups, reduce the EU's environ¬mental footprint and promote sustainable economic growth. This, in turn, would enable the MFF to bolster public support for Europe. In terms of EU foreign relations, the 2030 Agenda requires the EU to not only focus on short-term security and migration policy interests but to allocate resources in the budget for supporting long-term sustainable development. This would allow the EU to position itself as a frontrunner for sustainable development – internationally as well as towards industrialised, emerging and developing countries. Two questions are central to the role of the 2030 Agenda in the next MFF: Where does the EU have the biggest deficits with respect to implementing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs? And in which areas can the MFF make important contributions? We make five proposals on how to include the 2030 Agenda into the next MFF. These proposals complement one another and should be followed in parallel: (1) Embed the principles of the 2030 Agenda in the MFF: Individual principles of the 2030 Agenda, such as Leave no one behind, universality and policy coherence for sustainable devel¬op¬ment, call on the EU to take the SDGs into con¬sidera¬tion not only in its foreign but also domestic policies, for example in agricultural or structural funds. Moreover, these principles require the EU to reduce the negative impact of EU policies on third countries and to promote positive synergies. (2) Assign the SDGs to individual headings: The MFF should assign the global SDGs to individual headings and set minimum criteria for those SDGs and targets that each heading should contribute to. All headings should promote the three dimensions of sustainability – social, environ¬mental and economic. (3) Mainstream sustainability principle: The principle of sustainability should be mainstreamed across all headings, e.g. the current climate mainstreaming, should be supple¬mented by objectives for social and economic sustainability. (4) In heading IV (foreign relations), the EU should align its strategies for bilateral cooperation with the partners' SDG strategies. In addition, three to four thematic flagship programmes should be created for cooperation with countries of all income groups, such as in the areas of urbanisation, inequality or climate change. (5) Cross-cutting issues: The successor to the Horizon 2020 programme should invest more in research on sustainability. EU Impact Assessments should take greater account of the social and environmental dimensions of sustainability. The next MFF should set clear guidelines for sustainable procurement.

With the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the EU will define not only the financial but also the political priorities until 2030. Which political objectives the EU intends to pursue in the future will therefore be a key issue during the MFF negotiations. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Develop¬ment Goals (SDGs), which the EU played a key role in shaping, should guide this debate.In terms of EU domestic policy, the 2030 Agenda should help the European budget be more strongly tuned towards socially disadvantaged groups, reduce the EU's environ¬mental footprint and promote sustainable economic growth. This, in turn, would enable the MFF to bolster public support for Europe. In terms of EU foreign relations, the 2030 Agenda requires the EU to not only focus on short-term security and migration policy interests but to allocate resources in the budget for supporting long-term sustainable development. This would allow the EU to position itself as a frontrunner for sustainable development – internationally as well as towards industrialised, emerging and developing countries.Two questions are central to the role of the 2030 Agenda in the next MFF: Where does the EU have the biggest deficits with respect to implementing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs? And in which areas can the MFF make important contributions? We make five proposals on how to include the 2030 Agenda into the next MFF. These proposals complement one another and should be followed in parallel:(1) Embed the principles of the 2030 Agenda in the MFF: Individual principles of the 2030 Agenda, such as Leave no one behind, universality and policy coherence for sustainable devel¬op¬ment, call on the EU to take the SDGs into con¬sidera¬tion not only in its foreign but also domestic policies, for example in agricultural or structural funds. Moreover, these principles require the EU to reduce the negative impact of EU policies on third countries and to promote positive synergies.(2) Assign the SDGs to individual headings: The MFF should assign the global SDGs to individual headings and set minimum criteria for those SDGs and targets that each heading should contribute to. All headings should promote the three dimensions of sustainability – social, environ¬mental and economic.(3) Mainstream sustainability principle: The principle of sustainability should be mainstreamed across all headings, e.g. the current climate mainstreaming, should be supple¬mented by objectives for social and economic sustainability.(4) In heading IV (foreign relations), the EU should align its strategies for bilateral cooperation with the partners' SDG strategies. In addition, three to four thematic flagship programmes should be created for cooperation with countries of all income groups, such as in the areas of urbanisation, inequality or climate change.(5) Cross-cutting issues: The successor to the Horizon 2020 programme should invest more in research on sustainability. EU Impact Assessments should take greater account of the social and environmental dimensions of sustainability. The next MFF should set clear guidelines for sustainable procurement.

В 2013 г. в издательстве «Граница» вышла монография В.И. Боярского «Правильная «неправильная» война» документальное повествование, в котором впервые идет речь о ключевой роли офицеров пограничных войск в организации и развертывании партизанского движения, деятельности республиканских партизанских штабов, руководстве партизанскими отрядами и соединениями в годы Великой Отечественной войны. Настоящая статья представляет соавторскую переработку фрагментов монографии. Боевой опыт прославленных партизанских командиров, бывших пограничников, представлен с акцентом на его актуальность в специальных действиях для обеспечения безопасности страны в современных условиях. ; After the end of the WWII, NATO began setting up clandestine formations that went under the code name 'Stay-Behind' (stay behind the front lines of the advancing enemy) almost all over Western Europe: in Italy, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Switzerland, Greece, Luxemburg and Germany. The organizational structure of these West European guerilla formations was in many ways similar to that of their Soviet prototypes. These formations had existed until 1990. However, even today some countries include guerilla type warfare into their defense doctrine complete with all the consequences such a consideration entails. For that reason, although there are thousands of books and articles about the role of the Soviet partisan movement in the struggle against the Nazi invaders, it is appropriate to revisit the history of guerrilla warfare during World War II. Least-studied theme is the role of border guards' officers in organization of partisan movement, in activities of republican guerrilla headquarters, as well as in leadership in guerrilla groups. This issue is the subject of my article, and for investigating this problem, I use the method of historical reconstruction using the data from state and departmental archives, as well as documents from my personal archive. In my article, I show during the WWII, organized guerrilla movement in the temporarily occupied territory of the USSR was in many respects the result of purposeful activities of the NKVD Special Department. In the same vein, the Soviet leaderships create NKVD Independent Motorized Infantry Brigade of Special Purpose, the Soviet military force that were included with of the NKVD Fourth (partisan) Department. This combat unit was actually raiding force. My conclusions are: (i) troops and state security agencies, internal affairs, military intelligence agencies played primary role in the organization of guerrilla warfare and creating of partisan forces until the creation of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement. Due their nature, troops and security bodies were the only who was capable to integrate organized nature and professionalism with guerrilla activities and centralize border forces. (ii) the most successful in the army command's interests acted only those guerrilla forces, headed by a core or whom were members of the armed forces, officers of bodies and troops of the State Security and Internal Affairs, who worked 'under the flag' of the guerrillas. Effectiveness was higher where special guerrilla army units had the support of the local population. Credo of guerrilla struggle consisted in (a) close connection with the guerrilla army and the people, and (b) in the optimum combination of professionals and volunteers in the partisan formations.

Статья посвящена рассмотрению современных взглядов на происхождение и карьеру готского историка VI в. Иордана и на особенности созданной им хроники «О происхождении и деяниях гетов», являющейся основным письменным историческим источником для реконструкции ранней истории готских племен. Некритичное отношение к данным Иордана, зачастую уникальным, представляется на современном этапе развития исторической науки неприемлемым. Будучи человеком своей эпохи, в большей степени компилятором, нежели самостоятельным автором, Иордан и его «Гетика» требуют более пристального анализа и верификации. Сделан вывод о том, что на современном этапе изучения этой проблемы «Гетика» Иордана представляется конъюнктурным метатекстом, в большей степени характеризующим особенности эпохи своего написания, нежели собственно историю готов. ; The article is devoted to the modern views on the origin and career of the Gothic historian Jordanes and to the features of his chronicle, "The Origin and Deeds of the Goths," which is the main written source for historical reconstruction of the early history of the Gothic tribes. Barbarian Goths are one of the most studied in the historic literature, the community, traditionally regarded as a bi-unity of the Ostroand the Visigoths. Researchers' attention to the Goths is explained not only due to a significant role in the recent historical context of the early Middle Ages, but also to a relatively presentable body of sources on the history of the Gothic tribes. Central among these sources is Jordanes' "De Origine Aqtibusque Getarum". This chronicle is the only work that has survived to our time, which is devoted directly to the history of the formation of a barbarian tribe from its origins to the formation of kingdoms in the declining empire. Some of its evidence is unique, or at least considerably more detailed than in other sources. The specific qualities and advantages of this chronicle is the fact that its author, Jordanes, considers himself a Goth, which automatically makes it a more authentic evidence. Other written sources pertaining to this period, have Greek or Latin origin, and broadcast the appropriate attitudes and identity. At the present state of research of Jordanes' Getica it should be stated that most scholars are inclined to accept one as a metatext chronicle of at least the third order originally quite artificial, but repeatedly corrected in accordance with the political situation. In this sense, Getica must be characterized as a reflection of the historical period of its creation. It seems that the most productive questions will be addressed to Getica not precisely to what it says, but how and why. Getica does not tell the history of the Goths, but one is itself part of the history and so is its creator. It is the result of the crisis of both the Roman and the barbarian identities, an attempt of cultural assimilation of the barbarians; an attempt that helped to shape the Gothic self-identity and self-determination, and therefore positively echoed among the Romans, among barbarians and among those who could not confidently be attributed to either category. Getica is a good example of the phase and hard formation of post-Roman Europe in all its diversity and syncretism.

Seit 60 Jahren wird im Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) Europa gedacht – dies ist die Bilanz internationaler Forschung und Kommunikation für Politik und Zivilgesellschaft, mit Beiträgen aus allen Epochen und Arbeitsbereichen, von 23 Autoren und Autorinnen, die das IEP mitgestaltet und begleitet haben. Hervorgegangen aus den euro-föderalistischen Bewegungen der Nachkriegszeit hat sich das IEP als Thinktank in Deutschland durch interdisziplinäre Wissenschaft und Forschung, durch Publikationen und Veranstaltungen, durch Schulungs- und Lehrprogramme in der deutschen Europapolitik einen Namen gemacht als Vordenker, Ratgeber und Agenda-Setter.Die in diesem Band präsentierten Entwicklungen und Forschungsfelder reichen von den Optionen, die sich zu Zeiten der Römischen Verträge boten, bis zur Zentralasienpolitik der Europäischen Union heute, über die Einbindung Mitteleuropas in die europäische Integration nach der Wende von 1989 bis zu Fragen der Demokratisierung des EU-Systems.Mit Beiträgen vonDr. Katrin Böttger, Dr. Gianni Bonvicini, Dr. Wolf-Ruthart Born, Elmar Brok, Dr. Vladimír Handl, Dr. Gunilla Herolf, Dr. Werner Hoyer, Prof. Dr. Rudolf Hrbek, Prof. Dr. Mathias Jopp, Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Beate Kohler, Prof. Dr. Michael Kreile, Dr. Barbara Lippert, Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Wilfried Loth, Prof. Dr. Hartmut Marhold, Prof. Dr. Jürgen Mittag, Prof. Dr. Dr. iur. habil. Dr. h.c. mult. Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, Ph.D. h.c., MAE, Dr. Elfriede Regelsberger, Axel Schäfer, Dr. Otto Schmuck, Dr. Franz Schoser, Dr. Funda Tekin, Dr. Jürgen Trumpf, Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Wessels

Im sozialistischen Teil Europas konnte man bis 1990 kaum an grenzenlose Freizügigkeit denken. 25 Jahre später verlaufen die Grenzen in Europa anders: Grenzen verschwanden und Grenzen entstanden. Die deutsche Einheit ist eng mit der europäischen Integration verbunden. Mit den Erweiterungsrunden sind viele postsozialistische Regionen in den EU-Binnenmarkt eingebunden worden – mit Auswirkungen auf die sozioökonomischen Entwicklungen in diesen Regionen. Die europäische Integrationspolitik war mit der Hoffnung verbunden, dass die Disparitäten zwischen Ost und West schnell aufgehoben würden. Wie Analysen des Europäischen Raumbeobachtungsnetzwerks ESPON jedoch zeigen, sind die Unterschiede nicht verschwunden. Während einige postsozialistische Regionen im europäischen Vergleich gut dastehen, drohen woanders neue Polarisierungen. So zeichnet sich in den neuen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten das Risiko einer inneren Polarisierung zwischen den Hauptstadt- und den übrigen Regionen ab.