Suchergebnisse

In July 2020, Russian voters gave strong support to a package of constitutional reforms that reconfigured the Russian political system and enshrined social guarantees and conservative identity values, consolidating the regime that has been built over a 20-year period. This was achieved through an alteration that `zeroed' presidential terms that commenced before the constitutional change, potentially allowing President Vladimir Putin to overcome term limits and continue in office beyond 2024. The article explains how such a far-reaching and important change was successfully endorsed by the Russian electorate. The analysis shows that the main explanation rests with variations in voting patterns across the regions, a pattern that has been evident in previous Russian elections and resulted in strong pro-Putin support. The article also evaluates questions raised about the legitimacy of the result, and its long-term significance for the Russian political system.

Abstract
In July 2020, Russian voters gave strong support to a package of constitutional reforms that reconfigured the Russian political system and enshrined social guarantees and conservative identity values, consolidating the regime that has been built over a 20-year period. This was achieved through an alteration that 'zeroed' presidential terms that commenced before the constitutional change, potentially allowing President Vladimir Putin to overcome term limits and continue in office beyond 2024. The article explains how such a far-reaching and important change was successfully endorsed by the Russian electorate. The analysis shows that the main explanation rests with variations in voting patterns across the regions, a pattern that has been evident in previous Russian elections and resulted in strong pro-Putin support. The article also evaluates questions raised about the legitimacy of the result, and its long-term significance for the Russian political system.

"May 1, 1974." ; Cover title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The interactions of a group of non-identical voting units may be studied by applying the concept of the Shapley value from n-person co-operative game theory. In this theory one assumes that voting units, or players, may form coalitions of various kinds in order to achieve success in the game, and one may assign a "value" to each such coalition based on what it can accomplish against arbitrary coalitions of the remaining players. The relative value of an individual player is calculated by considering how much he brings to each coalition he might join, that is, by how much the value of that coalition increases because of his membership, and summing this figure over all coalitions of which he could be a part.

Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments re: Limiting Presidency to Single 6 year Term

The new federal government committed that 2015 would be the last election under the first past the post ("FPTP") system used since 1867. If the federal electoral system does change, it will be a break from the recent politics of reform. Over the last decade, numerous attempts to reform provincial electoral systems have failed. The additional potential hurdle facing the federal government, which was not relevant for the provinces, is the uncertainty relating to the rules on constitutional amendment, particularly in light of the Reference re Senate Reform. The central questions I address in this article are whether federal electoral reform requires recourse to the formal amendment rules in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 and, if so, whether provincial consent is required. Canada famously has one of the democratic world's most rigid regimes for constitutional amendment. If electoral reform requires provincial consent, then it is likely dead on arrival. While it is formally possible to amend the Constitution even where federal-provincial agreement is obligatory, it is likely to be constructively unamendable in the absence of a new round of mega-constitutional negotiations.

D. M. K. POWER By P. Spratt. Nachiketa, Bombay. 1970. 164p. Rs 25.

This research analyzes county-level support for the 2002 Constitutional Amendments for Voluntary Universal Prekindergarten Education (VPK) and Florida's Amendment to Reduce Class Size (CSA). Three regression models are constructed for each dependent variable (support for VPK and support for CSA): a bivariate model with political party, a full model with all theoretically identified variables, and a best model with just the independent variables that have the most explanatory power. A variety of socioeconomic, demographic and political independent variables are tested. Four independent variables had a statistically significant positive relationship with support for both VPK and CSA: Democratic registration, Hispanic population, higher education, and population density. ; 2017-05-01 ; B.A. ; College of Sciences, Political Science ; Bachelors ; This record was generated from author submitted information.