Suchergebnisse

The paper assesses the definition of indirect expropriation included in the recent EU proposal within the context of the TTIP negotiation. The paper argues that, while the EU proposal is likely to have narrowed the scope of the concept of indirect expropriation, in terms of providing 'greater clarity', we are not there yet. Like similar attempts before it, the EU proposal refers to a variety of different legal approaches without sufficiently clarifying their content and relationship. While this lack of clarity emphasizes the indecision among policy makers, including the EU, about where to draw the line between an indirect expropriation and a legitimate regulatory measure, it ultimately suggests that there are still doubts about the proper function of international investment law.

This paper examines concerns about the impact that TTIP could have on existing and future climate policies and laws from the inclusion of provisions on investment protection including investor-to-State dispute settlement (ISDS), the reduction of non-tariff barriers and the introduction of rules for trade in energy and raw materials. It argues that from an environmental perspective, ISDS should not necessarily be seen as a regime that goes against the defence of the environment or prevention of climate change. Although it might be used to challenge policies of an EU home State that increase levels of environmental protection, it can also be used to contest changes in an EU home State's environmental policies that would reduce the protection of the environment, if foreign investment is affected. To a large extent, this also holds true for other areas of TTIP negotiations. While the achievement of a balance between rules that promote trade and those that maintain policy space for governments to respond to environmental concerns has to be closely monitored, benefits for climate could be seized from harmonisation of carbon laws at the level of the strictest regulations of two parties, provisions that promote trade in low carbon technologies and renewable energy and bilateral cooperation on climate change.

To give the exchange of goods and services between the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) new momentum the two parties are currently negotiating the transatlantic free trade agreement Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The aim is to create the largest free trade area in the world. The agreement, once entered into force, will oblige EU countries and the U.S. to further liberalize their markets. The negotiations on TTIP include a chapter on Electronic Communications/ Telecommunications. The challenge therein will be securing commitments for market access to Electronic Communications services. At the same time, these commitments must reflect the legitimate need for consumer protection issues. The need to reduce Electronic Communications-related non-tariff barriers to trade between the Parties is due to the fact that these markets are heavily regulated. Without transnational rules as to regulations national governments can abuse these regulations to deter the market entry by new (foreign) suppliers. Thus the free trade agreement TTIP affects in many respects regulatory provisions on and access to Electronic Communications markets. The objective of this paper is therefore to examine to what extend the regulatory principles for Electronic Communications markets envisaged under TTIP will result in trade facilitation and regulatory convergence between the EU and the U.S. As to this question the result of the analysis is that the chapter on Electronic Communications will be an important step towards facilitating trade in Electronic Communications services. At the same time some regulatory convergence will take place, but this convergence will not lead to a (full) harmonization of regulations. Rather the norm, also after TTIP negotiations will have been concluded successfully, will be mutual recognition of different regulatory regimes. Different regulations being the optimal policy response in different market settings will continue to exist. Moreover, it is very unlikely that such regulatory principles for the Electronic Communications sector are a vehicle for a race to the bottom in levels of consumer protection.

The aim of this study is to analyze the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on Turkey's foreign trade. The aim of the TTIP is to remove all trade barriers in order to develop trade relationship between European Union (EU) and United States (US). TTIP will also have very important impacts of TTIP on third countries. These impacts are especially important for Turkey due to the Customs Union (CU) between Turkey and the EU. In this study, the effects of TTIP on exports and imports of Turkish manufacturing industry sectors are examined by using the SMART model of the World Bank. Our study points out that the effects of TTIP on Turkey depends on whether Turkey is included or not. Our results show that Turkey will benefit most if becomes a partner of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the US and the EU. However, if Turkey excluded from the FTA welfare will decrease mostly due to the trade deflection effect. ; Bu çalışmanın amacı, ABD ve AB arasındaki Transatlantik Ticaret ve Yatırım Ortaklığı (TTIP/TTYO) üzerine yapılmış çalışmalar göz önünde bulundurularak, Türkiye'nin dış ticareti üzerindeki etkilerini ölçmeyi amaçlamaktadır. TTYO'unun amacı, ticaret engellerini kaldırarak AB ve ABD arasındaki ticareti geliştirmektir. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Avrupa Birliği arasındaki TTYO inisiyatifinin, üçüncü ülkelere etkisi çok önemlidir. Özellikle AB ile Gümrük Birliği olan Türkiye için çok önemlidir. Bu çalışmada farklı senaryolar altında TTYO'nun Türkiye'nin imalat sanayi sektörleri ithalat ve ihracatı üzerindeki etkileri Dünya Bankası, SMART modeli kullanılarak tahmin edilmektedir. Çalışma sonuçlarına göre, anlaşma dışında olmanın ve anlaşmaya katılmanın Türkiye'ye farklı etkileri vardır. Çalışmanın sonuçları, Türkiye'nin AB ve ABD arasında kurulacak bir Serbest Ticaret Anlaşması'na taraf olduğu durumda en yüksek kazancı elde edeceği buna karşılık anlaşmadan dışlandığı durumda ticaret sapması etkisi nedeniyle refah kaybına uğrayacağı sonucuna oluşmaktadır.

Questions concerning consumer rights have thus far dominated discussions about the planned Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). This is surprising, because very much more is at stake. Firstly, TTIP and similar large-scale projects endanger the future of the multilateral trading order. Secondly, before the agreement can be signed, enormous and as yet entirely unexplored obstacles will need to be overcome; this includes the question of inter-state dispute settlement. The economic benefits of TTIP will also be smaller than claimed, whereas the long-term political damage, especially for Germany, could be considerable. (SWP Comments)

AbstractThe Republic of Turkey (RoT) is closely observing negotiations of the first three mega‐regional preferential trade agreements. Of greatest concern to the Republic is the US–EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), intended to establish the standards for preferential regimes beyond ambitious next generation free trade areas (FTAs). The Republic's primary concern is TTIP's potential impact on the Turkish economy given interaction with the RoT–EU Customs Union (CU). This interaction reflects the problem of outdated trade agreements' overlap with the spaghetti bowls of next generation and now mega‐regional agreements. Although immediate Turkish TTIP inclusion is unlikely, TTIP triggered a critical juncture for the Republic given the agreement's potential interaction with the CU's outdated features and hub‐and‐spoke structure. This juncture provides the Republic with strategic leverage to pursue the CU's review and possible revision. The RoT's strategic sequencing of its CU review with TTIP engagement may prove advantageous by altering its structural relationship with its hub and primary economic anchor of the EU as well as facilitating its entry into ambitious mega‐regional agreements and contributing to its EU accession process. It also highlights the way in which states may strategically consolidate their particular cases of overlapping preferential trade agreements (PTAs).

Since 2013 the European Union and the United States have been negotiating a Trans-atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Such a deal would create the world's largest free market and impact significantly on developing countries and the world trade system. Numerous authors discuss the expected effects, with strongly diverging assumptions leading to very different findings. Supporters of TTIP hope for significant prosperity gains, opponents fear grave disruptions in labour markets and the world economy. Overall, there is great concern about negative net effects on third countries not involved in the talks. (author's abstract)

This article examines the European Commission's information policy during the heavily politicised Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. Through the methodologically innovative use of Freedom of Information requests, it moves beyond official discourse to reveal how internal deliberation among Commission officials is preoccupied with monitoring and containing civil society mobilisation against the deal. Underpinned by elitist conceptions of democracy, public opinion emerges as a problem to be solved through strategic public relations, despite the Commission's discursive commitments to greater transparency and political dialogue with citizens. The findings challenge the widely-held notion that a 'communication deficit' between European Union institutions and their publics is at the root of the perennially elusive formation of a European public sphere. Instead, approaching TTIP as a key frontline in the struggle over post-democracy, I conclude that antipublic ideas encoded in the Commission's information policy are reflective of historically engrained institutional ambivalence towards public-political participation.

This article examines the European Commission's information policy during the heavily politicised Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. Through the methodologically innovative use of Freedom of Information requests, it moves beyond official discourse to reveal how internal deliberation among Commission officials is preoccupied with monitoring and containing civil society mobilisation against the deal. Underpinned by elitist conceptions of democracy, public opinion emerges as a problem to be solved through strategic public relations, despite the Commission's discursive commitments to greater transparency and political dialogue with citizens. The findings challenge the widely-held notion that a 'communication deficit' between European Union institutions and their publics is at the root of the perennially elusive formation of a European public sphere. Instead, approaching TTIP as a key frontline in the struggle over post-democracy, I conclude that antipublic ideas encoded in the Commission's information policy are reflective of historically engrained institutional ambivalence towards public-political participation.