Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- List of Figures -- Chapter 1: Introduction: Children's Suffrage Studies -- The Intellectual Context -- The Conversation Today -- The Present Volume -- References -- Part I: Theoretical Frameworks -- Chapter 2: Silence Is Poison: Explaining and Curing Adult "Apathy" -- The Germ -- Metastasis -- Training for Incompetence -- Institutional Adultism -- The Cure -- The Small Picture: Empowered Individuals -- The Medium Picture: Effective Group Activism -- The Big Picture: Robust Democracy with a Strong Civil Society -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: How Low Can You Go? The Capacity to Vote Among Young Citizens -- Introduction -- Step 1: Lowering the Voting Age -- Austria -- Why Not Abandon Age Limits? -- The Question of Incapacity -- The Question of Capacity -- Abandoning the Voting Age -- The Benefits of Universal Enfranchisement -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 4: The Case for Children's Voting -- Learning from History -- Deconstructing Voting Competence -- Reconstructing Democratic Societies -- Reimagining Democratic Theory -- Conclusion -- References -- Part II: Historical Contexts -- Chapter 5: The Enfranchisement of Women Versus the Enfranchisement of Children -- Introduction -- They Are Not Competent -- They Don't Want It -- They Don't Need It -- They Are Better Off Without It -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 6: De-Colonizing Children's Suffrage: Engagements with Dr B R Ambedkar's Ideas on Democracy -- Brief Sketch About Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar -- What Is a Democracy? -- Who Is a Minority? Who Should be Allowed to Vote? -- Applying Ambedkar's Ideas to Children -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 7: The Reform that Never Happened: A History of Children's Suffrage Restrictions -- Introduction -- Background -- Historicising Suffrage Reforms.

AbstractWhile some candidates use music in some of their campaign ads to shape individuals' perceptions of their competence or compassion, for example, it is unclear whether the relationship between music and trait perceptions is empirically valid. Considering the importance of knowing where trait perceptions—which represent important determinants of the vote—come from and the extent to which it is possible to manipulate trait perceptions by means of music, this study investigates the effect of music on trait perceptions using data from an online survey experiment conducted between October 30 and November 12, 2020. In this experiment, 362 individuals were exposed to a random sequence of five campaign ads, either with their original music or with no music. Following each campaign ad, individuals were asked to evaluate the candidate's competency, honesty, leadership, and compassion. The analyses reveal that music marginally affects perceptions of competency, honesty, and leadership. Moreover, music exerts no significant effect on perceptions of compassion.

This article considers the selection of Keir Starmer as the new Leader of the Labour Party within the context of the Stark model for explaining leadership election outcomes. The article seeks to achieve three objectives. First, to provide an overview of the nomination stages and the candidates who contested the Labour Party leadership election. Second, to provide an analysis of the underlying academic assumptions of the Stark model on leadership selection and to assess its value as an explanatory model. Third, to use opinion-polling evidence to consider the selection of Starmer in relation to the criteria of the Stark model—i.e. that party leadership (s)electorates are influenced by the following hierarchy of strategic goals: acceptability or select the candidate most likely to unify the party; electability or select the candidate most likely to expand the vote base of the party; and competence or select the candidate most likely to be able to implement their policy objectives.

AbstractThis article considers the selection of Keir Starmer as the new Leader of the Labour Party within the context of the Stark model for explaining leadership election outcomes. The article seeks to achieve three objectives. First, to provide an overview of the nomination stages and the candidates who contested the Labour Party leadership election. Second, to provide an analysis of the underlying academic assumptions of the Stark model on leadership selection and to assess its value as an explanatory model. Third, to use opinion-polling evidence to consider the selection of Starmer in relation to the criteria of the Stark model—i.e. that party leadership (s)electorates are influenced by the following hierarchy of strategic goals: acceptability or select the candidate most likely to unify the party; electability or select the candidate most likely to expand the vote base of the party; and competence or select the candidate most likely to be able to implement their policy objectives.

International tribunals — European Court of Human Rights — Competence — Whether excluding certain types of rules or measures by a State — Whether examination of provisions of a State's Constitution by European Court of Human Rights permitted — Whether European Court of Human Rights reviewing provisions of national legislation in abstracto — Whether European Court of Human Rights examining particular effect of provisions on applicant's rights in concretoInternational tribunals — European Court of Human Rights — Admissibility criteria — Article 35 of European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 — Exhaustion of domestic remedies — Whether referral to President of Russia and State Duma constituting adequate and effective remedy — Six months' time limit — Whether starting from cessation of a continuing situationHuman rights — Right to vote and stand for election — Article 3 of Protocol No 1 to European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 — Whether Article applicable to elections of Head of State — Limitations of right — Margin of appreciation — Whether disenfranchisement of all convicted prisoners falling outside any permissible margin of appreciation — Article 32(3) of Russian Constitution

A widespread view in the 'political budget cycles' literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters' perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive and perceive the signal in that way. To empirically assess the relevance of the signalling channel at the municipal level, we conducted a survey among 2,000 representative German citizens in 2018. Only a small fraction of voters feel well-informed about the fiscal budget signal and use the information it contains to decide whether to vote for the incumbent politician. Persons paying more attention to the signal sent by local politicians live in smaller municipalities, are more satisfied with their economic situation, are more educated, and do not feel that they are being electorally targeted. Our analysis suggests that the municipal voting decision, at least in Germany, is a more complex process than is commonly assumed in political budget cycle models.

The near-death of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) painfully illustrated that the conclusion mixed agreements, i.e. agreements that list the EU, its Member States and a third party as contractors, may be derailed by a negative vote of (sub-)national decision-makers. Such a non-ratification entails a problematic conundrum: Despite the requirement for national ratification under international law, a Member State violates the EU's legal principles of conferral and loyal cooperation when vetoing a mixed treaty in its entirety. The present article argues that the Member States are not competent to reject the EU exclusive parts of a mixed treaty in their own right. It suggests that the EU's and the Member States' legal authority to ratify mixed agreements is contingent on who owns and who exercises treaty-making power for substantive components and outlines several practical ways to align national (non-)ratification with the EU's law on competences and procedure.

The aim of this contribution is to make some points on the distinction between 'perfect' (or equal) and 'imperfect' (or unequal) bicameralism and its relevance to contemporary discussions about second chambers and their constitutional position. The analysis starts with an assumption that this distinction is somehow under-theorised. The distinction between perfect and imperfect bicameralism, finally resulting in a clear prevalence of the latter, mainly focuses on two aspects: the exercise of legislative function and, in parliamentary regimes, the confidence vote. In spite of the unquestionable relevance of these two components to the activity of parliaments, these analyses are incomplete. The functions and competences of a given second chamber depend on the way it represents pluralism: the weight that each legal system attaches to the representative role of its own second chamber decisively shapes the perimeter of their functions. Important evidence for validating this claim comes from the procedures for passing constitutional amendments, in which second chambers, even in a number of 'unequal' bicameral systems, are put on equal footing with first chambers.

While the study of political attitudes has incorporated implicit processes in its theoretical models, the predominant approach to candidate‐trait perception focuses exclusively on explicit processes. Our novel, dual‐process approach to candidate perception sees voters as holding both conscious, explicit impressions of candidate traits and automatic, implicit candidate‐trait associations that cannot be measured using traditional self‐report techniques. We examine implicit candidate‐trait associations for the first time using data from a three‐wave online panel conducted in the last month of the 2012 U.S. presidential election. First, we demonstrate that implicit candidate‐trait associations exist. Second, we show that implicit associations of warmth and competence with the candidates predict explicit candidate evaluations, economic evaluations, and vote choice, above and beyond conventional political science controls and explicit trait perceptions. Finally, we find that these effects are strongest among nonpartisans and partisans with conflicted feelings about their party's nominee. We suggest future directions for implicit political cognition research, including trait perception.

No-confidence motions (NCMs) are attempts by opposition parties to publicise the government's failings in a salient policy arena, and previous research has shown that they often negatively affect citizens' evaluations of governing parties' competence and damage their electoral prospects. Yet currently there is a lack of understanding of how opposition parties respond ideologically to these NCMs. It is argued in this article that opposition parties should distance themselves from the government challenged by NCMs to show that they are different from the incompetent government and to compete for the votes that the government is likely to lose. Using a sample of 19 advanced democracies from 1970-2007, empirical evidence is presented that NCMs encourage political parties to move their positions away from the government's position, especially in the presence of reinforcing negative signals about government performance. These results have important implications for our understanding of opposition party policy change, for the economic voting literature, and for the spatial and valence models of party competition. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractNo‐confidence motions (NCMs) are attempts by opposition parties to publicise the government's failings in a salient policy arena, and previous research has shown that they often negatively affect citizens' evaluations of governing parties' competence and damage their electoral prospects. Yet currently there is a lack of understanding of how opposition parties respond ideologically to theseNCMs. It is argued in this article that opposition parties should distance themselves from the government challenged byNCMsto show that they are different from the incompetent government and to compete for the votes that the government is likely to lose. Using a sample of 19 advanced democracies from 1970–2007, empirical evidence is presented thatNCMsencourage political parties to move their positions away from the government's position, especially in the presence of reinforcing negative signals about government performance. These results have important implications for our understanding of opposition party policy change, for the economic voting literature, and for the spatial and valence models of party competition.

Do events such as scandals, intra-party squabbling, and acts of perceived incompetence affect political parties' valence images, and thus, their electoral fortunes? If so, how great is their effect? Building upon a growing body of literature that explores the concept of valence, we develop a valid measure of valence based upon content analysis of Keesing's Record of World Events that scores parties along three valence dimensions - competence, integrity, and unity/division. The results of regression analyses designed to test this relationship for parties in nine Western European democracies are reported, and suggest that the answer to the first question posed above is yes. Specifically, evidence is found that events such as political scandals and party divisions cause parties to lose vote share, and that these effects are both statistically and substantively significant. These findings have important implications for understanding the dynamics of electoral competition, for parties' election strategies, and for political representation. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Do events such as scandals, intra-party squabbling, and acts of perceived incompetence affect political parties' valence images, and thus, their electoral fortunes? If so, how great is their effect? Building upon a growing body of literature that explores the concept of valence, we develop a valid measure of valence based upon content analysis of Keesing's Record of World Events that scores parties along three valence dimensions - competence, integrity, and unity/division. The results of regression analyses designed to test this relationship for parties in nine Western European democracies are reported, and suggest that the answer to the first question posed above is yes. Specifically, evidence is found that events such as political scandals and party divisions cause parties to lose vote share, and that these effects are both statistically and substantively significant. These findings have important implications for understanding the dynamics of electoral competition, for parties' election strategies, and for political representation. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

If voters use information about the economy to assess the competence of incumbents, a connection between economic conditions and incumbent success should only be discernible in settings where public policy might plausibly affect the economy, and where the assignment of government responsibility is relatively straightforward. Applying this logic to gubernatorial elections in the United States, we test the following hypothesis: the connection between economic conditions and incumbents' vote shares is mediated by the structure of the state economy. This hypothesis is premised on the idea that voters understand that raw macroeconomic aggregates – when driven by factors like weather, commodity prices and federal policy – are poor signals of incumbent performance. Using data from gubernatorial elections held between 1950 and 1998, we show that the connection between macroeconomic indicators and incumbent success is weak in states dominated by natural resources and farming but quite strong elsewhere. This finding helps explain why earlier studies found no connection between state-level economic conditions and gubernatorial elections.