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Last month, Human Rights Watch released a report documenting massacres of migrants and asylum seekers by U.S.-trained Saudi border guards. Far from holding the Saudi government accountable, the Biden administration announced last week the first proposed arms sale to Saudi Arabia in over a year, and the sale includes repairs and spare parts for some of the very same equipment to carry out what Human Rights Watch describes as possible crimes against humanity.The proposed sale comes just months after the Biden administration released its Conventional Arms Transfer policy — which, on paper, elevates human rights concerns in the administration's arms transfer policy. The sale demonstrates the need for more congressional attention to the human consequences of U.S. arms sales. Meanwhile, Congress is now poised to consider repealing the overly-vague authorizations underpinning the "war on terror" that expanded executive power over war-making after the Senate passed a repeal of the 2002 Iraq war authorization in March. However, despite interest from both members of Congress and the public, further legislative action to address long standing gaps in foreign policy accountability does not look promising this year. Over the summer, the House and Senate passed their respective versions of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the defense policy bill that serves as an annual vehicle to pass many foreign policy laws. Largely absent from either chamber's versions were measures to reassert congressional oversight for the use of military force and arms sales, two of the chief ways that the U.S. fuels armed conflict around the world. Although the House and Senate versions contain some reporting requirements on weapons and the use of military force, more ambitious reform proposals were left on the cutting room floor. Among the nearly 8,000 bills introduced since the start of the 118th Congress, several would explicitly address congressional oversight of foreign policy. These bills were excluded from the FY2024 NDAA and are not likely to become law on their own — Congress only enacts about 2 percent of proposed stand-alone legislation. However, these proposals provide an important foundation for ongoing conversations about the policy changes required to ensure effective oversight of U.S. defense and national security policy including through war powers reform, increased arms sales oversight, and improved human rights standards.War Powers ReformFollowing the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress passed far-reaching authorizations for the use of military force that both Democratic and Republican administrations have used to conduct lethal force operations throughout the world, including in places where the U.S. is not a party to the conflict, where the adversaries did not exist at the time of the September 11 attacks, and even in the absence of an ongoing armed conflict.
In an effort to counteract this over-extended executive authority, the Reclamation of War Powers Act (HR. 3370), introduced by Rep. Jim Himes (D-Conn.), would limit funding for any new military engagement without explicit approval from Congress — essentially preventing the president from authorizing any more activity via the two-decades-old AUMFs.
It would also create additional reporting requirements for the president when utilizing emergency executive authority. Additionally, Sen. Dick Durbin's (D-Ill.) Accountability for Endless Wars Act of 2023 (S.1151) would establish sunset provisions for both future and existing authorizations for the use of military force and declarations of war, requiring that any future authorizations terminate 10 years after enactment. The bill would repeal currently active authorizations after six months, forcing Congress to reauthorize the U.S. military's active engagement in Somalia, Yemen, Syria, and elsewhere.Flipping the Script on US Arms Transfers Oversight
The National Security Reforms and Accountability Act, or NSRAA, (HR. 4928) is a bipartisan bill recently reintroduced by Reps. Jim McGovern (D-Mass.) and Nancy Mace (R-S.C.) that seeks to reassert Congress's national security powers in three key areas: war powers, arms exports, and national emergencies.

The portion of NSRAA addressing weapons exports would "flip the script" on how Congress approves U.S. arms transfers. Current law requires Congress to muster supermajorities in both chambers to block a president's proposed arms sale in light of a near-inevitable veto. Given this high barrier, Congress has never been able to block presidents of either party from arming human rights abusers, even when the endless supply of weapons to foreign governments is unpopular in Congress and with the U.S. public.

The flip-the-script approach, first introduced by then-Senator Joe Biden in 1986, would require an affirmative congressional vote to approve a subset of the riskiest arms transfers. This process would require Congress to pass risky arms sales by voting for them, as it does other bills, rather than allowing concerning arms sales to proceed in the absence of a congressional vote of disapproval which, historically, has been impossible to achieve.
Human Rights and U.S. Security Assistance
In addition to an increasingly expansive global military presence, the United States is the world's largest arms dealer, responsible for selling roughly 40 percent of all weapons in the global market. Many of these weapons go on to fuel conflict, human rights violations, and civilian harm, and there are credible reports of the negative impact of the U.S. commercial arms trade in countries that import American-made weapons. Despite the known risks, human rights and civilian harm issues are often not adequately considered in arms transfer decisions — the term "human rights" does not even appear in the Arms Export Control Act, the main statute governing U.S. arms exports. What's more, current U.S. "end-use monitoring" processes don't actually monitor the use of U.S.-origin weapons in human rights violations or civilian harm.

The Stop Arming Human Rights Abusers Act (HR.1471), introduced by Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.), would explicitly prohibit the United States from selling weapons to any foreign country found to be in violation of international human rights law or international humanitarian law, which would likely include several prominent buyers of U.S. weapons. The bill would establish a new federal commission to monitor and enforce this mandate.

The Safeguarding Human Rights in Arms Exports Act of 2023 (SAFEGUARD) was reintroduced this year in both the House and Senate. Introduced by top foreign policy Democrats in the House and Senate, the SAFEGUARD Act would make significant changes to the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act, including by clarifying that the human rights restrictions in the Leahy Law apply to all U.S. arms sales. It would also increase notifications to Congress when arms sales are proposed to a country where gross human rights violations have occurred, ban arms exports to countries where the government has committed genocide or war crimes, and mandate that the U.S. government track whether U.S. weapons are used to violate human rights or international humanitarian law. Ironically, and notwithstanding the strength of the bill, the SAFEGUARD Act's sponsor Sen. Menendez was recently indicted on corruption charges involving, in part, helping funnel weapons to Egypt, whose regime has an abysmal human rights record.

Although Rep. Meeks introduced SAFEGUARD as an amendment to the House NDAA in its entirety and Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.) introduced an amendment that drew from SAFEGUARD's provisions on end-use monitoring of U.S. weapons for human rights violations, neither made it into the versions of the FY24 NDAA that are now being reconciled.

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Deliberations on the NDAA will continue this fall, with a reconciled bill expected to reach President Biden's desk by the end of the year. While the current NDAA drafts leave much to be desired, there are still opportunities to improve transparency and oversight of U.S. military engagement, security assistance, and arms transfers — no matter the recipient country or political party in control of Congress or the executive branch. Congress should take up and pass these bills, which are critical to protecting our constitutional balance of powers, providing accountability for U.S. taxpayer dollars, and maintaining U.S. legitimacy on the world stage.

This article was co-published with The New Arab.Close watchers of Israel's war in Gaza have faced a question in recent months: If the U.S. is rushing weapons to Israel, then why hasn't the public heard of any arms sales besides two relatively small transfers late last year?The Washington Post delivered an answer last week. Reporter John Hudson revealed that the Biden administration has approved over 100 smaller weapons packages for Israel since Oct. 7 that fell under the $25 million threshold for formally notifying Congress — and thus the public — about the transfers. In total, these mini sales could add up to more than $1 billion worth of U.S. military aid.The decision to deliver U.S. aid in smaller packages is far from unusual. The U.S. government has done so in the past for practical and nefarious purposes alike; only about 2% of weapons transfers occur above the threshold to notify Congress, according to former officials. But what is abnormal is the fact that many of those weapons were likely pre-positioned on Israeli territory before the war. Unlike other countries, Israel has a stockpile of American weapons on its soil to which it has privileged access. When a U.S.-made bomb slams into Gaza, there's a real chance that it started the day in an American facility, managed by American soldiers and governed by American law."It's clear that it's been a major source of arms for Israel," said Josh Paul, a former State Department official who resigned in protest of U.S. support for Israel's war. Unfortunately, Paul added, "it's an opaque process, so it's hard to say exactly what weapons they're getting" from the stockpile.This cache of arms is just a small piece of the puzzle. Taken as a whole, U.S. efforts to shield Israel from human rights restrictions and guarantee its access to continued military aid go further than for any other country, according to experts and former senior U.S. officials. These advantages include modified human rights vetting, special access to U.S. weapons, and a veto on American arms sales to Israel's neighbors. Up to this point, the State Department hasn't carried out a formal assessment of Israel's compliance with the law in its Gaza war.Experts claim these arms transfer cutouts have continued or, in some areas, been expanded since Israel launched its campaign in Gaza, which has left over 31,000 Palestinians dead and much of the strip's population in famine or famine-like conditions. Even last month, as war crime accusations mounted, the U.S. reportedly gave Israel at least 1,000 precision-guided munitions and artillery shells."The bottom line is that either you have human rights standards and legal standards or you don't," Paul said. When U.S. officials fail to hold Israel accountable for alleged abuses, "it not only creates an exception for Israel, but it also undermines your diplomacy with other countries," he told Responsible Statecraft/ The New Arab."I have serious concerns that the continued transfer of weapons to Israel is facilitating indiscriminate bombing that may violate international humanitarian law," Rep. Joaquin Castro told Responsible Statecraft/ The New Arab in a statement. "Congress needs to push the Biden administration to hold Benjamin Netanyahu accountable for any use of U.S. security assistance that violates international law."State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller told Responsible Statecraft/ The New Arab that all transfers to Israel since Oct. 7 have followed U.S. law and policy, including notifications to Congress. "We have followed the procedures Congress itself has specified to keep members well-informed and regularly brief members even when formal notification is not a legal requirement," Miller said in a statement, adding that claims that the U.S. has cut up weapons packages in order to avoid public scrutiny are "unequivocally false."The White House did not respond to a request for comment.Exceptions make the rulesWhen a Middle Eastern country asks the U.S. for weapons, American officials' minds go straight to Israel. Would Tel Aviv approve of the transfer? Could new fighter jets give Egypt an edge over Israel on the battlefield if their peace deal fell apart? Would Israeli officials come around if we offer them better weapons to sweeten the pot?This line of reasoning doesn't have anything to do with the personal opinions of U.S. officials. In fact, U.S. law explicitly states that the U.S. must give Israel a "qualitative military edge" over its neighbors to counter a threat from "any individual state or possible coalition of states or [...] non-state actors."U.S. partners are starkly aware of — and unhappy about — this reality, according to a former senior U.S. military official in Cairo who requested anonymity to speak freely about his experience. Egyptian officials would sometimes request high-tech weapons just to "watch us squirm and come up with some way to say 'no' without saying the Israelis won't approve it," the former official recalled."This is another place where it's very explicit that Israel has a special status that no other country enjoys," said John Ramming-Chappell of the Center for Civilians in Conflict.This qualitative advantage is enforced by the quantitative side. Since World War II, Israel is far and away the largest recipient of U.S. military aid. Washington's funding for the Israeli military, which now totals $3.8 billion per year, makes up about 16% of its total budget, according to the Congressional Research Service. Israel, which can spend part of its U.S. aid on Israeli weapons, gets this cash in an interest-bearing account in New York, making it one of only two states that get a multimillion-dollar tip on top of baseline U.S. support.When it comes to human rights, Israel also gets special protections. Take the Leahy law, a statute that prevents specific units of foreign militaries from receiving U.S. aid if American officials have evidence they've committed "gross violations of human rights." For most countries, Leahy vetting happens before aid is disbursed. Israel gets the equipment first, and the ensuing vetting process looks different than for other countries. Lower-level State Department officials have found multiple cases in which Israeli units should lose access to American weapons under U.S. law, but those cases are consistently blocked by higher-ups in government who usually don't weigh in on such cases for other countries, according to Paul.The result is that, unlike Egypt and other U.S. partners in the Middle East, no Israeli unit has ever been sanctioned under the Leahy law despite numerous credible allegations of human rights abuses, a fact that the statute's namesake has loudly railed against. The State Department has previously justified this disparity by pointing to Israel's judicial system, which U.S. officials believe is capable of handling human rights violations internally.In recent weeks, congressional attention has focused on whether Israel is violating a U.S. law that prevents countries from receiving American weapons if they block U.S. humanitarian aid in whole or in part. While the statute has rarely been enforced, the Biden administration promised to hold states accountable to the law in a recent memorandum.At this point, many experts and lawmakers believe Israel is in clear violation of this law given how little aid now enters Gaza. Yet the White House has still not offered a reason — or a formal waiver — to justify its failure to enforce its own commitment."I really haven't heard a good response to the question of why we should not apply existing U.S. law [...] to ensure that U.S. military assistance is used in accordance with our values," said Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md."Given the evidence that Israel is intentionally blocking the passage of humanitarian aid to Gaza, the Biden administration has an obligation to enforce Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act and move towards limitations on further offensive aid to Israel as long as the aid blockade continues," Rep. Castro said.'As supportive as possible'When the White House moved to expedite weapons transfers to Israel after Oct. 7, it faced an unusual problem. The president already had more than enough authority to make this happen, but officials wanted to signal that they were being "as supportive as possible." The solution was to further loosen laws around U.S. arms transfers, according to Paul, who still worked in government at the time.
"It's not that those were things that we'd been previously thinking about," Paul said. "The previous position within government had been [that] Israel already has more than you could possibly want in terms of authorities and funding."
Now, the Senate's supplemental spending package for Israel has provisions that would dramatically expand the secretive U.S. stockpile on Israeli soil while loosening public reporting requirements about transfers from it. A bill with similar changes passed the House as well, signaling broad support for the proposal in Congress.
Alongside already existing loopholes, these new restrictions weaken America's case that it is committed to protecting human rights on the world stage, according to Ramming-Chappell.
"The exceptional status that Israel enjoys in U.S. arms transfer policy and law, when taken in conjunction with the devastating effects of Israel's current campaign in Gaza, really undermines U.S. leadership and claims to moral authority in the international sphere," he said.

Parallel efforts in the House and Senate hoping to find a short-term funding solution have advanced at a snail's pace this week, and it continues to look likely that no agreement will be struck and the federal government will shutdown on October 1. Central to the major battles being fought right now between and within both chambers is the future of Ukraine aid. While majorities in both the House and Senate still support both humanitarian and weapons assistance to Kyiv, an increasing number of Republicans have expressed skepticism or flat-out oppose additional funding beyond the $113 billion allocated by Washington last year. A few have vowed to reject any government funding measures that include more aid or have pushed to attach more conditions to future support. In the latest in a series of flip-flops in recent weeks, House Republican leadership decided late on Wednesday night to remove $300 million in security assistance for Ukraine from the Defense Appropriations bill, and will vote on the aid separately, according to reporting from Juliegrace Brufke. The Senate, which has been more generally more supportive of President Joe Biden's $24 billion emergency supplemental request for Ukraine, has put forward a proposal for a continuing resolution containing $6 billion in funding for Ukraine (coming up short of Biden's ask). The trimming down of aid is likely an effort to placate skeptical Republicans. Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), for example, has pledged "to do everything in [his] power to block a bill that includes funding for Ukraine," and he will likely use procedural tools that can delay the resolution from arriving on the House floor until the weekend, all but ensuring a shutdown. Even if the stopgap measure does eventually make its way through the Senate, it is likely dead on arrival in the House. "I don't see the support in the House," Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) said on Wednesday. The Speaker reportedly told Sen. Mitch McConnell, the GOP leader in the Senate, that he would not bring a bill to the House floor that funded Ukraine while ignoring problems at the United States' southern border. McCarthy's apparent refusal to entertain the Senate proposal continues his back-and-forth stance on how to handle further aid for Kyiv. The Speaker is in a tricky political situation, balancing a desire to avoid a shutdown with the fear that he will face a "motion to vacate" — in which one member could force a vote on removing him from his job — if he ignores his right flank's demands. As a result, he has continued to be ambiguous on his own stance on aid to Ukraine. After turning down both the Biden administration's offer to hold a briefing with various high-level officials on the status of the war, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's request to address a joint session of Congress during his visit to Washington last week, McCarthy met with Zelensky in a smaller, private group. His brief comments following the meeting suggested that it was a productive one.But a few hours later, Jake Sherman of Punchbowl News posted on X that House Republicans were "considering removing any Ukraine-related funding from the Pentagon spending bill in order to attract GOP holdouts." On Saturday, the Speaker had again reversed course, saying that removing the funding was "too difficult" to do, and that it would therefore stay in, before changing his mind once more on Wednesday. The Ukraine-related funding in the DoD spending bill amounts to approximately $300 million, part of the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). An amendment to the bill that would have removed this money, introduced by Rep. Andy Biggs (R-Ariz.), was defeated 104-330, with all votes in favor coming from Republicans.It is now unclear if McCarthy, who controls a very narrow majority, can get spending bills that contain any money for Kyiv through the House. After two failed attempts, House Republicans finally managed to vote to approve the rule that will allow them to begin debate on their defense appropriations bill (along with three other single-subject spending bills). The only dissenting GOP vote on the defense appropriations rule was from Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, who argued that "voting yes means more money for Ukraine." Once the rule was approved, Greene posted on X that she was "the ONLY Republican to vote NO on the rule yesterday that contained appropriation bills with unlimited funds for Ukraine." Other Republicans who voted in favor of the rule may try to strip any Ukraine funding from the legislation (as Rep. Matt Gaetz has already attempted, through the amendment process) or eventually vote against the spending bill. Rep. Eli Crane (R-Ariz.) posted a video on X over the weekend, saying "people all over the country are tired of funding never-ending wars." Appearing on Washington Journal on Friday, Biggs said that he would continue to oppose more aid, since "there is no exit plan," out of this conflict.Greene told Cami Mondeaux of the Washington Examiner that the defense spending bill was "dead on arrival" when it gets a vote on the House floor, because there are enough Republican members opposed specifically to Ukraine funding. It appears she was correct, as GOP leadership's decision on Wednesday indicates that they knew that there were not enough votes for the spending bill to pass. Greene, Crane, and Biggs are three of the 29 Republican members of Congress (six Senators and 23 House representatives) who signed a letter last week arguing that "The American people deserve to know what their money has gone to. How is the counteroffensive going? Are the Ukrainians any closer to victory than they were 6 months ago? What is our strategy, and what is the president's exit plan? What does the administration define as victory in Ukraine?"Until those questions were answered, the signers pledged to oppose any future expenditures for the war. "It would be an absurd abdication of congressional responsibility to grant this request without knowing the answers to these questions," they wrote. Twenty-nine members represents a small total of the GOP caucus (though earlier measures making similar demands have garnered more support). As a recent story in Semafor points out, this dynamic puts a majority of Republicans in Congress at odds with their constituents. "Among the GOP base, skepticism of U.S. involvement in the conflict runs deep," reports Semafor. "Fifty-nine percent of Republicans say the U.S. is doing too much to help Kyiv, according to a Washington Post-ABC News poll released over the weekend, similar to earlier results from Gallup and CNN." Republicans in Congress are slowly shifting in that direction. Gaetz's first attempt to prohibit security assistance for Ukraine had 70 Republicans voting in favor. A similar amendment introduced by Gaetz on Wednesday received 93 votes. If congressional leadership can find a way to break the logjam on other parts of the government funding debate, it's possible that bipartisan and bicameral support for new Ukraine monies will stream forward in future legislation. But the tumultuous events of the last few weeks show that the political pressure in the Republican caucus is moving against future funding, that debates over Ukraine are becoming increasingly thorny, and that the issue will remain central to political disputes for the foreseeable future.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been described by one senior African diplomat at the United Nations as a 'state in the making; it is not yet a state.' Further, this 'state in the making' also is a state that, with few exceptions, has been in decline since the early 1970s. The colonial era, from 1885 until 1958, was a period of nearly uninterrupted state construction; the hegemony of the Belgian colonial apparatus steadily deepened. In its final two years, the colonial edifice progressively lost control over civil society to a tumultuous and fragmented nationalist movement, which was unable to capture intact the colonial infrastructure. The result was five years of turbulent state deflation, generally known as the 'Congo crisis.' The Mobutu coup of 1965 inaugurated a new cycle, with eight years in which a rising tide of state ascendancy seemed to dominate the political process. After 1974 currents of decline again began to flow strongly, progressively eroding the superstructure of hegemony. The actual purpose of the Zairian government under Mobutu was not to fulfill basic state functions; rather, the government existed as a structure for individual enrichment and patronage. Officials at the highest levels stole large amounts of money, usually from mineral or customs revenues, sometimes through extremely straightforward strategies, such as literally pocketing gem diamonds and having them sold for personal gain in Antwerp or elsewhere.

2017 saw more research programmes, new personnel, additional partners and outstanding visitors at RSIS. Almost every day, our School and scholars were featured in the media and public discourse, both at home and abroad. RSIS is the go-to place for academic and policy decision-makers. As our Dean reported, RSIS faculty and researchers are publishing more and our students are provided with an increasing array of learning and professional opportunities. We commenced the Science and Technology Studies Programme. We consolidated the National Security Studies Programme which was set up in 2016. We streamlined existing activities and created new avenues for more focussed coverage of non-traditional security and science and technology research. We appointed Dr Shashi Jayakumar as Executive Coordinator for Future Issues and Technology (FIT) to better manage cross-cutting issues and be future ready. (Shashi is concurrently the Head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security.) We reached out to other parts of NTU to explore and initiate more collaborative work. We convened the CSCAP Retreat, World Agricultural Forum, Regional Conference on International Humanitarian Law in Asia, US-ASEAN Conference on Legal Issues of Regional Importance, and several new workshops with various international bodies and think tanks from other countries. Our flagship programmes were reviewed and innovative ideas implemented. More importantly, the central services in RSIS were strengthened to cope with the increased mandate and staffing. The physical space constraint is being addressed creatively. We hope the refreshed RSIS website will inspire more connection and pride with the School's mission and vision going forward.

Die "Flüchtlingskrise" und ihre "Willkommenskultur" 2015 haben auch in Sachsen für viel Improvisation und Spontanität gesorgt. Migration und Integration als Lernfelder für Gesellschaft und Politik haben dabei eine Fülle an Engagementformen hervorgebracht. Aber was geschieht langfristig mit ihnen? Wo sind die Grenzen und Möglichkeitsräume von Engagement? Die Autorin beleuchtet in ihrer ethnografischen Studie zum Engagement in Leipzig den dynamischen Wandel in Zivilgesellschaft und Asylpolitik als Wechselwirkung. Sie hinterfragt gängige Beschreibungen politischer Handlungen und Felder und wirft einen detaillierten Blick auf die Beziehungen von Zivilgesellschaft und Staat.

"Zwischen 1999 und 2002 zahlten mehr als 2300 Unternehmen weltweit illegale Aufschläge und Gebühren in Höhe von 1,8 Milliarden US-Dollar an die durch den VN-Sicherheitsrat sanktionierte irakische Regierung. Der Artikel analysiert den Beitrag deutscher und französischer Unternehmen zur Korrumpierung des Hilfsprogramms, zeigt wie korrupte Strukturen entstehen und macht Vorschläge zur Korruptionsbekämpfung." (Autorenreferat)

International Cooperation for Development (CID) despite being considered an important instrument for peaceful coexistence and stability of the international system, has failed to achieve its main objective which is the economic and social development to reduce global poverty.To demonstrate the above, a distinction is made between cooperation and assistance, stating that the first occurs in symmetrical relationships in which the parties involved give and receive, while the second is called to respond to the interests of donors. Next, it examines the conflict between national interest and cooperation, to finally reveal how unproductive has been the CID in solving the problems of underdevelopment, because its actions have been ineffective and inadequate, which can be seen with the humanitarian crisis lived in the planet today, that require an analysis from the social and political sciences standpoint and from the interdisciplinary view that characterizes bioethics as the ethic of the XXI century. ; La Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (CID), a pesar de ser considerada como un instrumento importante para la convivencia pacífica y estabilidad del sistema internacional, no ha logrado alcanzar su objetivo principal, que es el desarrollo económico y social para reducir la pobreza mundial. Para demostrarlo, se hace una distinción entre cooperación y ayuda, en la que se afirma que la primera ocurre en relaciones simétricas en la que las partes involucradas dan y reciben, mientras que en la segunda se orienta a responder a los intereses de los donantes. Seguidamente, se examina la oposición entre interés nacional y cooperación, para finalmente develar lo poco efectivo que ha sido la CID en la solución de los problemas del subdesarrollo, porque las acciones han sido poco efectivas e inadecuadas. Esto último se puede constatar con la crisis humanitaria que se vive hoy en el planeta y que requiere del análisis desde los puntos de vista de las ciencias sociales, políticas y desde la interdisciplinariedad que caracteriza a la bioética como ética del siglo XXI. ; A Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (CID), mesmo sendo considerado como um instrumen­to importante para a convivência pacífica e a estabilidade do sistema internacional, não tem conseguido atingir seu principal objetivo, que é o desenvolvimento económico e social para reduzir a pobreza mundial. Para demonstrá-lo, é feita uma diferenciação entre cooperação e assistência, em que se afirma eu a primeira acon­tece em relações simétricas em que as partes envolvidas dão e recebem, enquanto que na segunda orienta-se para atender aos interesses dos doadores. Em seguida, examina-se a oposição entre o interesse nacional e a cooperação, para finalmente descobrir o pouco eficiente que tem sido o CID na resolução dos problemas do subdesenvolvimento, porque as ações têm sido ineficazes e inadequadas. Este último pode ser conferido com a crise humanitária que existe hoje no planeta e que exige a análise do ponto de vista das ciências sociais, políticas e desde a interdisciplinariedade que caracteriza à bioética como ética do século XXI.

У статті коротко розкрито історію створення та функціонування структур Civil-Millitary Cooperation (далі – CIMIC) в арміях провідних країн світу. Обґрунтовано концепції цивільно-військового співробітництва (далі – ЦВС) у нормативно-правових актах оборонної стратегії США та ряду країн Європи. Показано необхідність розуміння концепції СІМІС в умовах військової діяльності, що спрямована на реконструкцію та модернізацію збройних сил у напрямі тісного зв'язку із цивільною стороною. Висвітлено роль ЦВС як механізму, який дозволяє створити передумови для вирішення поставлених задач, надання відповідної допомоги цивільному населенню та успішного завершення збройного конфлікту. ; The article briefly describes the history of the creation and functioning of Civil – Millitary Cooperation structures in the armies of the leading countries of the world. The concepts of civil-military cooperation in legal acts of defense strategy are justified Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, USA, Norway, the Netherlands, Ukraine and also NATO. It is shown that it is necessary to understand the concept of SIMIS in the context of military activities aimed at the reconstruction and modernization of the armed forces in the direction of close ties with the civilian side. The role of the Center is shown as a mechanism that allows creating prerequisites for solving the tasks, providing appropriate assistance to the civilian population and the successful conclusion of an armed conflict.Statement of the problem and the state of its research. In recent years, approaches to conflict resolution have changed and the legal requirements for their participants have been substantially revised. The international community is increasing the requirements for taking into account economic, social, religious, political, cultural and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting international peacekeeping operations. As international experience shows, the involvement of a wide range of civil institutions in the process of resolving an existing conflict contributes to the achievement of the common goal of resolving this armed conflict.The relevance of the research center, primarily due to the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine. The CWS system in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is relatively new and is constantly being improved. Theoretical and practical interest is the very functioning of such structures in the armies of foreign states, their features and differences from the Ukrainian system of the Central Military Council.Domestic researchers have already paid some attention to the problems of military-civilian cooperation, exploring information support, the system of training civil-military cooperation specialists, and civilian-military relations in the NATO countries. It is worth noting the articles of Yu. Kalagin, I. Koropatnik, S. Garkushi, N. Vasyukov, E. Titko, P. Tkachuk, V. Opryshko, I. Kuropatkin, A. Nozdrachev, A. Leshchenko, and also a number of collective works. However, the activity of the system of civil-military cooperation of the leading countries of the world is not fully investigated.The purpose of the article is to analyze the regulation of the activities of the structure of civil-military cooperation of the leading countries of the world with an explanation of the basic principles and tasks, where special attention is paid to the element of communication with the civilian element.

У статті коротко розкрито історію створення та функціонування структур Civil-Millitary Cooperation (далі – CIMIC) в арміях провідних країн світу. Обґрунтовано концепції цивільно-військового співробітництва (далі – ЦВС) у нормативно-правових актах оборонної стратегії США та ряду країн Європи. Показано необхідність розуміння концепції СІМІС в умовах військової діяльності, що спрямована на реконструкцію та модернізацію збройних сил у напрямі тісного зв'язку із цивільною стороною. Висвітлено роль ЦВС як механізму, який дозволяє створити передумови для вирішення поставлених задач, надання відповідної допомоги цивільному населенню та успішного завершення збройного конфлікту. ; The article briefly describes the history of the creation and functioning of Civil – Millitary Cooperation structures in the armies of the leading countries of the world. The concepts of civil-military cooperation in legal acts of defense strategy are justified Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, USA, Norway, the Netherlands, Ukraine and also NATO. It is shown that it is necessary to understand the concept of SIMIS in the context of military activities aimed at the reconstruction and modernization of the armed forces in the direction of close ties with the civilian side. The role of the Center is shown as a mechanism that allows creating prerequisites for solving the tasks, providing appropriate assistance to the civilian population and the successful conclusion of an armed conflict.Statement of the problem and the state of its research. In recent years, approaches to conflict resolution have changed and the legal requirements for their participants have been substantially revised. The international community is increasing the requirements for taking into account economic, social, religious, political, cultural and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting international peacekeeping operations. As international experience shows, the involvement of a wide range of civil institutions in the process of resolving an existing conflict contributes to the achievement of the common goal of resolving this armed conflict.The relevance of the research center, primarily due to the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine. The CWS system in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is relatively new and is constantly being improved. Theoretical and practical interest is the very functioning of such structures in the armies of foreign states, their features and differences from the Ukrainian system of the Central Military Council.Domestic researchers have already paid some attention to the problems of military-civilian cooperation, exploring information support, the system of training civil-military cooperation specialists, and civilian-military relations in the NATO countries. It is worth noting the articles of Yu. Kalagin, I. Koropatnik, S. Garkushi, N. Vasyukov, E. Titko, P. Tkachuk, V. Opryshko, I. Kuropatkin, A. Nozdrachev, A. Leshchenko, and also a number of collective works. However, the activity of the system of civil-military cooperation of the leading countries of the world is not fully investigated.The purpose of the article is to analyze the regulation of the activities of the structure of civil-military cooperation of the leading countries of the world with an explanation of the basic principles and tasks, where special attention is paid to the element of communication with the civilian element.

Despite a growing body of evidence highlighting the strategic, economic and humanitarian benefits resulting from the provision of foreign aid, the recent Global Financial Crisis has seen a rise in 'home-first' sentiments in donor countries, resulting in a reduction in public support for foreign aid. At a time where the need for aid remains high, a question facing many governments is whether, with increasing pressure on all forms of expenditure, the current levels of aid can be sustained. As foreign aid has to compete with other policy areas for a share of the finite national budget, public support is an integral factor in influencing both the size and effectiveness of foreign aid flows. As a result, recognition of the factors that influence support is imperative, yet we lack understanding of why different people do or do not support foreign aid. Most literature on public opinion in donor countries is descriptive, and the range of factors that could affect support for foreign aid remains unspecified. In an attempt this gap, this study analyses the influence of domestic forces on support for foreign aid provided by Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) across Australian electorates. Through utilising data provided by the AEC (Australian Electoral Commission), the Australian 2011 Census, the ABC (Australian Broadcasting Channel) and ACFID (Australian Council for International Development), this study aims to assess the impact of political affiliation, demographic and socio-economic features of Australian electorates on support for aid provided by development NGOs (a proxy of support for Australian aid more broadly). Data was compiled on each of the 150 Australian electorates regarding their urbanisation, the voting preference of the electorate, religiosity, education, income, the proportion of the electorate who (as of the last Census) were under 35 years of age and donations to NGOs. The data I present suggests that Greens support, education, income, religiosity and electoral urbanisation affects support for aid provided by NGOs. Specifically, urban electorates in Australia, characterised by a higher proportion of tertiary educated individuals, who are supportive of the Greens Party, have higher levels of donations to Australian aid NGOs. Age and support for the centre-left more generally (taken as combined Labor and Green vote shares) were not found to be associated with levels of NGOs donations. Interestingly, once other factors such as education were controlled for, there appeared to be a negative association between both income and religiosity and donations, although this finding was not particularly robust. While this analysis has begun to investigate drivers of support for foreign aid, the results of this study are limited by data availability and time constraints, and thus further research into the relationship between Australian domestic forces and public support would complement these findings. For instance, if data on the exact volume of donations from individuals and religious groups to NGOs could be obtained, a more accurate relationship between income or religiosity and NGO aid support could be modelled. In addition, incorporating an electorate's support of Official Development Assistance (ODA) directly, rather than utilising political support as a proxy for ODA support, could improve the strength of these findings.

Рассматривается процесс возникновения и функционирования неполитических общественных объединений по защите жизни и здоровья населения на территории Рязанской губернии в конце XIX начале XX в. Среди них региональные отделения Российского Общества Красного Креста и Российского Общества спасания на водах, а также многочисленные пожарные общества. Отмечается, что данные организации пользовались поддержкой власти и находились под покровительством императорской семьи, т.е. имели привилегированный статус. На основе документов Рязанского государственного архива анализируются количественный состав региональных объединений указанной направленности, их материально-финансовая база и основные методы работы. ; The article deals with the activities of voluntary non-political associations for the protection of human life and health, which were widespread in the Russian Empire in the late 19th early 20th centuries. The investigation shows that central and regional governments often provided support in the establishment of such associations because of their usefulness and loyalty. In addition, most of these associations were under the patronage of the imperial family, and, as a result, they got a semi-governmental or semi-public status. In Ryazan Province among organizations of this orientation there were voluntary firefighting associations, as well as the regional departments of the Russian Red Cross Society and the Russian Water Rescue Society. The period of mass establishment of voluntary fire-fighting societies was the end of the 1890s, which was largely due to the publication of the standard ("normal") regulations. Principles of this large group of associations at the regional level are considered by the example of the Ryazan Voluntary Fire-fighting Society, which was a part of the Russian Imperial Firefighting Society. The study of the documents shows that the association consisted of several categories of members with different rights and obligations, and the leadership of the society included representatives of the local authorities and the police. The association successfully carried out firefighting activities and, in addition, it initiated the establishment of a special insurance company from the effects of fire for the city residents. Another public organization that made a significant contribution to the life safety of the population in Ryazan Province at the turn of the 20th century was the department of the Imperial Russian Water Rescue Society. The society set up rescue stations and posts in the most dangerous areas of reservoirs, it also led educational work with the population on the prevention of accidents on water. One of the most well-known humanitarian organizations of a nationwide scale, which had a department in Ryazan Province, was the Red Cross Society. Governor N.S. Bryanchaninov took an active part in the work of the Ryazan Committee of the society. The Ryazan Red Cross Society played an important role in the organization of assistance to victims of crop failures of the late 19th century. The documents of the State Archive of Ryazan Oblast provide insight into the structure, membership and finances of these organizations, as well as evidence of the active participation of high-ranking regional officials in their work. The article concludes that, despite the cautious attitude of the authorities to all "amateur" associations, the administration preferred to rely on the voluntary initiative, to exploit its potential and to promote its activities during emergencies.

Set against the backdrop of the Cold War and the declining British Empire, this thesis explores how the Hong Kong government handled the Vietnamese refugee crisis of the 1970s. The Vietnamese refugee influx started after the fall of Saigon in 1975 and temporarily stopped after the Geneva Conference on Indochinese refugees in 1979. Drawing extensively upon recently declassified files from the National Archives in London and the National Archives in Maryland, the thesis discusses several important themes, for example, international concerns about human rights during the Cold War era, interpretations of humanitarianism, and Hong Kong's autonomy in the age of decolonization. It argues that Britain exerted its international influence by forcing Hong Kong to be a first asylum for refugees. Hong Kong played an important role in demonstrating Britain's contribution to resolving the refugee crisis. The colony served as a place for Britain's proxy humanitarianism. This thesis shows that international expectations of human rights conflicted with local politics in Hong Kong. Unlike studies that stress Hong Kong's increasing autonomy, this thesis shows that the colonial authorities played a passive role in the refugee crisis, and the British government still had the final say on Hong Kong's refugee policy. This thesis comprises three chapters. The first chapter investigates the case of two freighters that rescued Vietnamese refugees in 1975 and 1976. The Danish-registered Clara Maersk arrived in Hong Kong on 30 April 1975, marking the beginning of the refugee crisis. As the British and Hong Kong governments were uncertain about the scale of the influx and had different expectations about Britain's contribution to ending the refugee problem, the Clara Maersk incident triggered heated debates. The incident demonstrates how Britain's domestic affairs led to the British government's reluctant assistance to Hong Kong. The Burmese-registered Ava that arrived in Hong Kong on 6 July 1976 with ninety-eight refugees reveals the unclear responsibility for shipwrecked refugees rescued by foreign vessels. The Ava incident shows how Hong Kong's refugee influx was treated as an American problem. The U.S. government saw Hong Kong's regional role of strengthening Southeast Asian countries' involvement in America's refugee program. The second chapter investigates the second wave of Vietnamese refugees. The deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1978 led to an exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam. The Vietnamese government officially permitted the ethnic Chinese to leave in return for payment. This chapter examines the pre-arranged vessels that transported refugees to other countries under collaboration with the Vietnamese authorities. The final chapter focuses on how the British government relieved Hong Kong's refugee burden as cheaply as possible. On the one hand, the British government wanted to show its contribution to resolving the refugee crisis by maintaining Hong Kong's humanitarian policy. On the other hand, it did not want to take the Vietnamese refugees because of Britain's own immigration problems. By initiating an international conference on Indochinese refugees, the British government internationalized the refugee problem and minimized its responsibility for the crisis. ; published_or_final_version ; History ; Master ; Master of Philosophy

International Cooperation for Development (CID) despite being considered an important instrument for peaceful coexistence and stability of the international system, has failed to achieve its main objective which is the economic and social development to reduce global poverty.To demonstrate the above, a distinction is made between cooperation and assistance, stating that the first occurs in symmetrical relationships in which the parties involved give and receive, while the second is called to respond to the interests of donors. Next, it examines the conflict between national interest and cooperation, to finally reveal how unproductive has been the CID in solving the problems of underdevelopment, because its actions have been ineffective and inadequate, which can be seen with the humanitarian crisis lived in the planet today, that require an analysis from the social and political sciences standpoint and from the interdisciplinary view that characterizes bioethics as the ethic of the XXI century. ; La Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (CID), a pesar de ser considerada como un instrumento importante para la convivencia pacífica y estabilidad del sistema internacional, no ha logrado alcanzar su objetivo principal, que es el desarrollo económico y social para reducir la pobreza mundial. Para demostrarlo, se hace una distinción entre cooperación y ayuda, en la que se afirma que la primera ocurre en relaciones simétricas en la que las partes involucradas dan y reciben, mientras que en la segunda se orienta a responder a los intereses de los donantes. Seguidamente, se examina la oposición entre interés nacional y cooperación, para finalmente develar lo poco efectivo que ha sido la CID en la solución de los problemas del subdesarrollo, porque las acciones han sido poco efectivas e inadecuadas. Esto último se puede constatar con la crisis humanitaria que se vive hoy en el planeta y que requiere del análisis desde los puntos de vista de las ciencias sociales, políticas y desde la interdisciplinariedad que caracteriza a la bioética como ética del siglo XXI. ; A Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (CID), mesmo sendo considerado como um instrumen­to importante para a convivência pacífica e a estabilidade do sistema internacional, não tem conseguido atingir seu principal objetivo, que é o desenvolvimento económico e social para reduzir a pobreza mundial. Para demonstrá-lo, é feita uma diferenciação entre cooperação e assistência, em que se afirma eu a primeira acon­tece em relações simétricas em que as partes envolvidas dão e recebem, enquanto que na segunda orienta-se para atender aos interesses dos doadores. Em seguida, examina-se a oposição entre o interesse nacional e a cooperação, para finalmente descobrir o pouco eficiente que tem sido o CID na resolução dos problemas do subdesenvolvimento, porque as ações têm sido ineficazes e inadequadas. Este último pode ser conferido com a crise humanitária que existe hoje no planeta e que exige a análise do ponto de vista das ciências sociais, políticas e desde a interdisciplinariedade que caracteriza à bioética como ética do século XXI.

The issue of non-return of rejected international protection applicants does not enjoy a high political profile on its own, but has been discussed as part of a global debate on asylum. Significant efforts are required when considering the wide spectrum of possible reasons of non-return, some reasons depending on the countries of destination, others on the returnee himself/herself. In this respect, reasons of non return range from the non-respect of deadlines, the issuance of travel documents, postponement of removal for external reasons to the returnee, for medical reasons, the resistance of the third-country national and the lack of diplomatic representation of Luxembourg, to name but a few. In regards to the procedure, in Luxembourg the rejection of the international protection application includes the return decision. The Minister in charge of Immigration, through the Directorate of Immigration, issues this decision. The return decision only becomes enforceable when all appeals are exhausted and the final negative decision of rejection of the competent judicial authority enters into force, as appeals have suspensive effects. This decision also sets out the timeframe during which the rejected international protection applicant has to leave the country. In case the applicant does not opt for a voluntary return, the decision will also include the country to which s/he will be sent. In general, the decision provides for a period of 30 days during which the applicant has the option to leave voluntarily and to benefit from financial support in case of assisted voluntary return through the International Organization for Migration (IOM). There are two exceptions to this rule: the applicant who is considered a threat to national security, public safety or homeland security and the applicant who has already been issued a return decision before. The declaration and documentation provided during the procedure of international protection can be used to facilitate return. Subsequent applications are possible, in particular if new evidence of facts appears resulting in an increased likelihood of the applicant to qualify for international protection. For rejected international protection applicants who did not opt for voluntary return and did not receive any postponement of removals, a certain (limited) support is available while waiting for the execution of the enforceable return decision. As such, they continue to stay in reception facilities and to receive certain social benefits unless they transgress any internal rules. If an urgent need exists, rejected applicants may be granted a humanitarian social aid. However, they are not entitled to access the labour market or to receive 'pocket money' or the free use of transport facilities. They benefit from an access to education and training, however this access cannot constitute a possible reason for non-return. These benefits are available to rejected applicants until the moment of their removal. In order to enforce the return decision and prevent absconding, the Minister may place the rejected international applicant in the detention centre, especially if s/he is deemed to be obstructing their own return. Other possible measures include house arrest, regular reporting surrendering her/his passport or depositing a financial guarantee of 5000€. Most of these alternatives to detention were introduced with the Law of 18 December 2015 which entered into force on 1st January 2016. As a consequence, detention remains the main measure used to enforce return decisions. A number of challenges to return and measures to curb them are detailed in this study. A part of these measures have been set up to minimize the resistance to return from the returnee. First and foremost is the advocacy of the AVRR programme and the dissemination of information relating to this programme but also the establishment of a specific return programme to West Balkan countries not subject to visa requirements. Other measures aim at facilitating the execution of forced returns, such as police escorts or the placement in the detention centre. Finally, significant efforts are directed towards increasing bilateral cooperation and a constant commitment to the conclusion of readmission agreements. No special measures were introduced after 2014 in response to the exceptional flows of international protection applicants arriving in the EU. While the Return service within the Directorate of Immigration has continued to expand its participation to European Networks and in various transnational projects in matters of return, this participation was already set into motion prior to the exceptional flows of 2014. As for effective measures curbing challenges to return, this study brings to light the AVRR programme but especially the separate return programme for returnees from West Balkan countries exempt of visa requirements. The dissemination of information on voluntary return is also considered an effective policy measure, the information being made available from the very start of the international protection application. Among the cases where return is not immediately possible, a considerable distinction has to be made in regards to the reasons for the non-return. Indeed, in cases where the delay is due to the medical condition of the returnee or to material and technical reasons that are external to the returnee, a postponement of removal will be granted. This postponement allows for the rejected applicant to remain on the territory on a temporary basis, without being authorized to reside and may be accompanied by a measure of house arrest or other. In cases of postponement for medical reasons and of subsequent renewals bringing the total length of postponement over two years, the rejected applicant may apply for a residence permit for private reasons based on humanitarian grounds of exceptional seriousness. Nevertheless, apart from this exception, no official status is granted to individuals who cannot immediately be returned. Several measures of support are available to beneficiaries of postponement to removal: they have access to accommodation in the reception centres they were housed in during their procedure, they may be attributed humanitarian aid, they continue to be affiliated at the National Health Fund, they continue to have access to education and professional training and they are allowed to work through a temporary work authorization. The temporary work authorization is only valid for a single profession and a single employer for the duration of the postponement to removal, although this is an extremely rare occurrence in practice. OLAI may allocate a humanitarian aid might be allocated if the individual was already assisted by OLAI during the procedure of her/his international protection application. All of these measures apply until the moment of return. The study also puts forth a number of best practices such as the Croix-Rouge's involvement in police trainings, their offer of punctual support to vulnerable people through international networking or the socio-psychological support given to vulnerable people placed in the detention centre among others. A special regard has to be given to AVRR programmes and their pre-departure information and counselling, the dissemination of information and the post-arrival support and reintegration assistance. Indeed, stakeholders singled the AVRR programme out as a best practice and the Luxembourgish government has made voluntary return a policy priority for a long time. However, this increased interest in voluntary returns has to be put into perspective as research shows that sustainable success of voluntary return and reintegration measures is only achieved for a very restricted number of beneficiaries (namely for young, autonomous and dynamic returnees with sizeable social networks and who were granted substantial social capital upon return). Hence, returning women remains a sensitive issue, especially if they were fleeing abusive relationships. Another factor contributing to hardship set forth by research is the difficult reintegration of returnees that have lived outside of their country of return for a prolonged period of time and are therefore unable to rely on social networks for support or for a sense of belonging. Based on these considerations, NGOs and academia cast doubts on the 'voluntary' nature of these return programmes, their criticism targeting the misleading labelling of these policy measures.