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This article argues that the global AIDS pandemic is no longer solely a health issue, but also has emerging human, national, & international security dimensions that must be acknowledged by scholars & international policy-makers. In order to substantiate this argument, this article specifically analyses these three dimensions in greater detail, & outlines the broad policy implications that follow from such an analysis. It is important to recognize these security dimensions of the AIDS pandemic, the article concludes, (i) in order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the nature & extent of the contemporary pandemic; (ii) in order for the level of the international response to become commensurate with the extent of the global challenge posed by the AIDS pandemic; & (iii) because the security sector, as a high-risk group & vector of the virus, can make a responsible contribution to international efforts to reduce the transmission of HIV/AIDS. Adapted from the source document.

The use of pathogens as biological weapons was considered since their early discovery. Attacks using "natural" virulent germs, such as the bacillus of plague or anthrax, were perpetrated during the 20th century by States or terrorists. Recent scientific progress dramatically changes the threat of biological weapons, by improving the virulence or the resistance of pathogens (bacteria or virus), by genetic manipulations. At the edge of the 21st century, it is now possible to synthesize in vitro small viruses, thus it is conceivable to design very dangerous viruses, such as Ebola or smallpox viruses. Recent technological breakthroughs permit the creation of novel germs, extremely dangerous since never encountered before by highly susceptible humans. Prevention of bioterrorist attacks requires a careful scientific surveillance of potentially dangerous biotechnological innovations, & eventually retention of scientific information of the most unsafe data. Overcoming the crisis induced by bioterrorist attacks remains a major problem of information management. Adapted from the source document.

At the close of 2004, the European Commission deployed numerous efforts to aid victims of the tsunami in Southern Asia. This development presented the occasion to test the structural & operational efficiency of this mechanism. It has been subsequently observed that there was insufficient coordination on the ground by the European Commission & EU member states to effectively come to the assistance of the tsunami victims to the extent that was initially hoped for. This situation reveals, as described here, the demand to rethink & reorganize the means that Europe has at is disposal for the management of crisis relief & other security-related situations. Key among the proposed plans of improvement for this mechanism is the refinement of a means of rapid reaction in the case of a disaster situation. This entails, among other things, an improved level of integration between civil & military assets. C Brunski