Suchergebnisse

Работа посвящена развитию и современному состоянию израильско-турецких отношений в военно-политической сфере, дается краткий обзор эволюции военно-технического и внешнеполитического сотрудничества двух стран. Анализируется современный уровень стратегического партнерства Израиля и Турции, а также его влияние на проблемы региональной безопасности Ближнего и Среднего Востока. Делается заключение, что сотрудничество двух стран в сфере безопасности является важнейшим элементом в двусторонних отношениях между Израилем и Турцией. ; It is to be noted that the Jewish state was traditionally leaning to secure its strategy with regard to the two crucial presumptions. One was "determinism" assuming the support to Israel by a leading superpower (France, and later US), so as to obtain the up-to-date military technologies and political backing on a world-wide scale for the various preemptive and preventive strikes needed to maintain the policy of deterrence. Another crucial aspect is the mentioned "peripheral strategy" of security cooperation with the non-Arab regional powers. That process had been initiated by secret links of Israel with the Christian Ethiopia and the Shah-controlled Iran. Besides the political and military and technical cooperation or exchange of intelligence information between those states, part of the "peripheral strategy" was the Israeli support of the religious and national minorities within the Arab states, like the Christians in Lebanon or the rebels in the South of Sudan. However, the most ambitious example of this kind was cooperation with the Shah-controlled Iran in supporting the Kurdish opposition in North Iraq going on up to 1975 when the Shah decided to improve the relations with Iraq blocking the Israeli access to the Kurdishpopulated Iraqi areas. The profound changes in the Middle East in the late 50s of the last century resulting from an increased influence of the Soviet Union and an effective breakdown of the Baghdad Pact after the Iraqi withdrawal through Colonel Kassem's coup made Turkey join the Israeli efforts to create an anti-Arab alliance. This event has set off the close multifarious links between the two countries, primarily in the military and political domain. Despite ups and downs, those relations had acquired a more and more specific character of a complete strategic partnership by the mid 90s thus suggesting a tendency to forming a military-political alliance between Turkey and Israel, which has become a key factor of regional security to date. Rather than to analyze the causes and motivations of the emerging strategic alliance between the two states or the developing Israeli-Turkish militarypolitical cooperation, amply covered by relevant literature, in our paper we should restrict ourselves to considering the current status and the prospective strategic cooperation in the military and military hardware domains as well as their general effect upon the problems of regional security. Despite all complexities and problems, the Israeli-Turkish alliance is going to gain strength up by the simple reason that the crucial imperative for both countries is the policies in the sphere of security. In the meantime, while Israel and Turkey themselves, together with US, view this alliance as a nucleus of the future system of regional security, in the opinion of their opponents it will trigger a series of response activities of building alternative blocks and a new spiral of tension, which will eventually affect the prospective security in the Middle East as a whole.

Contents: Map of Egypt -- Introduction -- Preface to the Seventh Edition -- Excavations in 1901-02 -- Egyptian History and its sources -- Historical Summary -- Ancient Empire -- Middle Empire -- New Empire -- Persians -- Macedonians -- Ptolemies -- Romans -- The Byzantines -- Muḥammadans -- Dates assigned to the Egyptian Dynasties by Egyptologists -- Progress in Egypt under British Rule -- The Country of Egypt -- The Nomes of Egypt -- The Ancient Egyptians -- The Nile -- The Oases -- Ancient Egyptian Buildings, Sculpture, Painting, etc. -- Egyptian Writing -- A list of some Hieroglyphic Signs -- Arabic Alphabet -- Coptic Alphabet -- Egyptian Months -- The Religion and Gods of Egypt -- The Modern Egyptians -- Sketch of Coptic History -- The Arabs, Muḥammad, etc -- Alexandria -- The Pharos -- Pompey's Pillar -- Cleopatra's Needles -- Catacombs -- Damanhûr -- Kafr ez-Zaiyât -- Ṭanṭa -- Benha el-'Asal -- Rosetta Stone -- Suez and the Suez Canal -- Shibîn el-Ḳanâṭir -- Zaḳâzîḳ and Tell-Basṭa -- Abu Ḥammâd -- Tell el-Kebîr -- Maḥsamah -- Isma'îlîya -- Nefîsheh -- Tanis -- Cairo -- Coptic Churches -- Mosques -- Tombs of the Khalifs -- Tombs of the Mamelukes -- The Citadel -- Joseph's Well -- The Library -- Ezbekîyeh Garden -- The Nilometer at Rôḍa -- Heliopolis -- The Pyramids of Gîzeh -- -- The Great Pyramid -- The Second Pyramid -- The Third Pyramid -- The Sphinx -- The Temple of the Sphinx -- The Tomb of Numbers -- Campbell's Tomb -- The Pyramids of Abu-Roâsh -- The Pyramids of Abuṣir -- Bedrashên, Memphis, and Saḳḳârah -- The Statue of Rameses II. -- The Step Pyramid -- Pyramid of Unạs -- Pyramid of Tetạ -- Pyramid of Pepi I. -- The Serapeum -- The Tomb of Thi -- Mariette's House -- The Pyramids of Dahshûr -- The Quarries of Ma'ṣara and Ṭurra -- The Pyramid of Mêdûm -- Upper Egypt Railway -- Wasṭa and the Fayyûm -- Aṭfîḥ -- Beni Suwêf -- Maghâghah -- Cynopolis -- Convent of the Pulley -- Minyeh -- Beni Hasân -- Rôḍa -- Melâwî -- Haggi Ḳandîl -- Gebel Abu Faḍah -- Manfalûṭ -- Asyûṭ -- Abu Tîg -- Ṭahṭah -- Sûhâg -- The White and Red Monasteries -- Akhmîm, Menshiah, Girgeh -- Abydos -- Temple of Seti I. -- Temple of Rameses II. -- Farshûṭ -- Nag' Ḥamâdî -- Ḳaṣr eṣ-Ṣayyâd -- Ḳeneh -- The Temple of Denderah -- Ḳufṭ -- Ḳûs -- Naḳadah -- Luxor and Thebes -- The Temple of Luxor -- The Temple at Karnak -- The Temple at Ḳûrnah -- The Ramesseum -- The Colossi of Amenophis III. -- Medînet Habû -- The Temple of Rameses III. -- Dêr el-Baḥari -- Dêr el-Medînet -- The Discovery of Royal Mummies at Dêr el-Baḥari -- The Tombs of the Kings -- Tomb of Seti I. -- Tomb of Rameses III. -- Tomb of Rameses IV -- Tomb of Rameses VI. -- Tomb of Rameses IX. -- Tomb of Rameses I. -- xv Tomb of Thothmes III. -- Tomb of Amenophis II. -- Tomb of Rechmạ-Rā -- Tomb of Nekht -- Erment -- Gebelên -- Esneh -- El-Kâb -- Edfû -- Hagar Silsileh -- Kom Ombo -- Aswân -- Elephantine -- The First Cataract -- Philae -- The Nile between the First and Second Cataracts -- Dabôd -- Ḳartassi -- Wâdi Tâfah -- Kalâbshah -- Bêt el-Walî -- Dendûr -- Gerf-Hussên -- Dakkeh -- Kubân -- Kûrta -- Miḥarrakah -- Wâdi Sebûa -- Korosko -- Amada -- Dêrr -- Abû-Simbel -- Map of the Country south of Wâdî Ḥalfah -- Wâdî Ḥalfah -- Wâdî Ḥalfah to Kharṭûm -- -- Sûdân Military Railway -- Sarras, Semneh, Kummeh -- Mughrat Wells, Akasheh, Ferket, Kosheh, Sai, Amârah -- Sedênga, Suarda, Gebel Dûsh, Soleb, Sesebi, Dalgo, Tombos -- Al-Ḥafîr, New Donḳola or Ḳaṣr Donḳola -- Old Donḳola -- Abu Gûs, Al-Dabbah, Ḳûrṭa -- Kurru, Zuma, Tanḳassi -- Marawî and Gebel Barkal -- Nuri -- Fourth Cataract -- Abu Ḥamed -- Berber -- Atbara -- Meroë -- Shendi -- Nâga -- Ben Nâga -- Muṣawwarât aṣ-Ṣufra -- Omdurmân -- Kharṭûm and Tuti Island -- List of Hieroglyphic names of Kings -- Gîzeh Museum -- Rôda Gauge

For the Arab Gulf kingdoms, the Horn of Africa is a strategic perimeter. They want to minimize political threats — some are hostile to Islamists, all want to suppress democracy movements. Anticipating a post-carbon and food insecure world, the Gulf States want to possess rich farmlands. Each has its own vision of African client states that will do their bidding. This is a recipe for proxy wars, state fragmentation and autocracy in northeast Africa.For the Horn of Africa, today's crises are existential. War, dictatorship and famine are causing state collapse. The African Union is compromised, its peace and security system unravelling. The United Nations is retreating from peacemaking, increasingly reduced to a bare-bones humanitarian provider.The dangers were illuminated by the surprise New Year's Day deal between Abiy Ahmed, prime minister of Ethiopia, and Muse Bihi, president of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, a breakaway region of northwest Somalia. Ethiopia has been renowned for careful diplomacy, including championing the inviolability of existing boundaries. After fighting wars with Somalia in the 1960s and '70s, Ethiopia had learned to be circumspect and consultative in its dealings with Mogadishu.Last week, Ethiopia upended that tradition. It promised to recognize Somaliland as an independent sovereign state, in return for Somaliland leasing it a 12-mile stretch of land, including a seaport, that will allow Ethiopia to establish a naval base. This in turn unleashed strong words from Somalia — which had not been informed ahead of time. The AU called for Ethiopia to treat Somalia with respect. Fears of new conflicts were stirred. Unsaid in public is that the UAE is widely suspected to be the patron of the deal.For the United States, crises in the Horn of Africa are a sidebar to the ongoing Israel-Gaza war and the confrontation with Iran. Gunboat diplomacy in the Red Sea — the warships deployed under Operation Prosperity Guardian to protect shipping from attacks from the Houthis in Yemen — is the priority.The narrow strip of water carries 12 percent of world seaborne trade. For sailors, the Red Sea is "a sea on the way to somewhere else," its shores at best an inconvenience, at worst a security threat.There's a global consensus on keeping the shipping lanes open. If the Red Sea shuts down — as happened following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war— the knock-on effects on trade between Europe and Asia would be economically severe. The EU-run Operation Atalanta runs an anti-piracy flotilla involving warships from 13 European nations, (including the UK, which provided the flagship until Brexit), working with ships from Ukraine, India, Korea and Colombia.After a few years the flotilla commanders concluded that the solution to piracy lay onshore, in the form of diplomacy to resolve Somalia's conflicts and economic assistance to provide livelihoods to impoverished fishermen. That was a step in the right direction.Saudi Arabia chairs a Red Sea Forum that includes eight littoral states (all except Israel), to tackle piracy, smuggling and marine resources — not political issues.Six years ago, Thabo Mbeki, the former president of South Africa who chairs the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for the Horn of Africa, introduced the term "Red Sea Arena." The idea was to create a diplomatic forum that would include not just the littoral states, but all the other countries with vital interests in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden or with political and commercial links across the narrow strip of water.The former AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra explained: "The Red Sea has historically been a bridge rather than a divide, with the peoples on the two shores sharing culture, trade, and social relations." Egypt has millennia-old interests in the Nile Valley and both shores of the Red Sea. Ethiopia has a vital interest in access to the sea. The UAE, Qatar, Oman, and Turkey all have historic or current interests.Regional and global power struggles are played out in the Red Sea Arena. Seven nations including the U.S., China, Turkey and the UAE have naval bases there. Others, including Iran and Russia, have warships in the vicinity and are actively seeking bases. The port of Eilat in the Gulf of Aqaba is Israel's strategic back door, as the Houthi attacks on shipping have dramatically shown.The plan for a standing conference of Red Sea Arena states built on proposals contained in the World Peace Foundation report to the AU, "African Politics, African Peace" — for which Mbeki and veteran UN diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi co-authored the preface. The idea was that Middle Eastern states should sign on to the principles of the AU's peace and security architecture and establish joint mechanisms for cooperation.The AU failed to act on these proposals. Nor were they raised at the UN Security Council.Instead, Arabian Gulf states are increasingly assertive in the Horn, and they're bringing an aggressive form of transactional politics, including funding proxies to fight wars. The U.S. — whose security umbrella sheltered the Red Sea for decades — seems uninterested.Saudi Arabia has long seen the African shore of the Red Sea as part of its security perimeter. Qatar and Turkey sought influence in Sudan and Somalia, especially among the Islamists. Israel has discreetly sought a determining role in the region.But the key actor is the UAE. A small, rich state, it uses proxies to project power, and supports separatists in disregard of international norms. Abu Dhabi's clients include key players in Libya and Chad, and it is positioning itself as kingmaker in the Horn. The UAE supports and arms Ethiopia. It already controls many ports in the region — including, it is suspected, the proposed Ethiopian port and naval base in the land leased from Somaliland. But Abu Dhabi has yet to clarify its strategic goals for the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.The UAE has long had a free pass in Washington. Only recently has the U.S. begun to criticize Abu Dhabi's adventurism in Sudan, calling out its arming of the murderous Rapid Support Forces there.The last decade has been a rollercoaster of hope and horror for the peoples of the Red Sea Arena. Popular uprisings in Yemen, Ethiopia and Sudan all descended into lethal brews of autocracy, war, atrocity, and famine, with local conflicts escalating into proxy wars. Guided by the short-term imperative of staying in power — and by the ambitions of cash-rich foreign sponsors — today's leaders are too often short-sighted and transactional.Under UN and AU guidance, a raft of peace agreements was crafted to serve as the threshold for democracy. Today a peace pact, such as the threadbare "Permanent Cessation of Hostilities" that ended Ethiopia's war in Tigray, may be no more than a truce. The principle of the primacy of politics — that served Africa's peace agenda well — has come to mean short-term transactionalism rather than a commitment to democracy, good governance, and inclusivity.A key African norm was "sovereignty as responsibility," developed by the Sudanese/South Sudanese lawyer and diplomat Francis Deng. Today we have its antithesis, decried as "neo-sovereigntism" by the Cameroonian philosopher Achille Mbembe.Today's regression means that Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki is being rehabilitated. For 30 years, Isaias has ruled an iron fist, with no constitution let alone political parties or an open media, hoping that the tide of global liberalism would recede. He looks to be proven correct.Sudanese General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as "Hemedti," commander of the Rapid Support Forces, the insurgent paramilitaries notorious for their human rights abuses, is touring Africa in a Royal Jet airplane (an Emirati airline). He arrived in Addis Ababa last week where he met Prime Minister Abiy. Extending protocol to Emirati-backed disrupters is the new normal in the region.To the extent that it functions at all, the AU is becoming the face of illiberal multilateralism, veering away from its founding principles. The UN's practice of deferring to its regional partners leaves it eviscerated. The InterGovernmental Authority on Development — the eight-member northeast African bloc — is now deeply divided and approaching paralysis.With the Horn of Africa and Yemen slipping far down the priority list in Western foreign ministries, America and Europe are sending mid-ranking diplomats into the snake pit, woefully under-armed for the perils they encounter. Too easily intimidated by swaggering local despots, perhaps swayed by zombie "Pan Africanist" slogans that challenge their right to talk about human rights, they have left their countries irrelevant in the face of ruthless Gulf power-broking.Recent developments could not have been anticipated in detail. But American diplomats saw the broader challenge some years ago. In 2020, a bipartisan "senior study group" on the Red Sea convened by the United States Institute of Peace, prioritized a broad diplomatic strategy for the Red Sea Arena. The USIP report warned that conflicts in the region could threaten U.S. national security and proposed a high-level envoy with a broad mandate.The Biden administration quickly appointed a special envoy for the Horn of Africa, but the Africa Bureau at the State Department soon downgraded the position. The cost of this strategic neglect is becoming clear today.There's still a chance for a diplomatic forum that promotes collective security. Washington has lost its best opportunities to take a lead — any U.S. initiative today will arouse deep suspicions among others. Middle Eastern powers don't, as a rule, propose collective action, and the Gulf states are divided. The Europeans will follow, not lead.The onus of leadership then falls on Africa and on the United Nations. Acting together, they can create a consensus that brings on board America, Europe, China, and Russia in a forum framed by the agenda of a stable and cooperative Red Sea Arena.

An emergent canon, or putting bodies on the scholarly agenda -- Introduction -- Friedrich Engels on the part played by labor in the transition from ape to man / Robert Hertz -- The pre-eminence of the right hand / Marcel Granet --Right and left in China / Marcel Mauss -- Techniques of the body / Victor Turner --Symbols in Ndembu ritual / Terence Turner -- The social skin -- Philosophical studies, or learning how to think embodiment -- Introduction -- Karl Marx and opposition of the materialist and idealist outlook / Friedrich Engels -- Walter Benjamin on the mimetic faculty / Maurice Merleau-Ponty -- From the phenomenology of perception / Ian Hacking -- Making up people / Judith Butler -- From bodies that matter / Bruno Latour -- Do you believe in reality? -- Fundamental processes, or denaturalizing the given -- Introduction / E. E. Evans-Pritchard -- Time and space / Caroline WalK Bynum -- Women mystics and eucharistic devotion in the thirteenth century / Kristofer M. Schipper -- On breath / Henry Abelove -- Some speculations on the history of "sexual intercourse" during the "long eighteenth century" in England / Margaret Lock -- Human body parts as therapeutic tools : contradictory discourses and transformed subjectivities / Anna Lowenhaupt -- Tsing Meratus embryology -- Everyday life, or exploring the body's times and spaces -- Introduction to Part IV / Michel de Certeau -- Walking in the city / Michael Taussig -- Tactility and distraction / Peter Stallybrass and Allon White -- The city, the gaze, and the contaminating touch -- Judith Farquhar -- Medicinal meals / Nancy K. Miller -- Rereading as a woman : the body in practice -- Colonized bodies, or analyzing the materiality of domination -- Introduction ./ Janice Boddy --Remembering Amal : on birth and the British in Northern Sudan / Susan Pedersen -- National bodies, unspeakable acts : the sexual politics of colonial policy making / Stuart Cosgrove -- The zoot suit and style warfare -- John D. O'Neil -- Cooptation and control : the reconstruction of Inuit birth / Patricia Leyland Kaufert, Jean Langford -- Dosic bodies/docile bodies -- Desires and identities, or negotiating sex and gender -- Introduction / John Boswell -- Men, beasts, and "nature" / Gregory M. Pflugfelder -- Cartographies of desire : male-male sexuality in Japanese discourse / Emily Martin -- The egg and the sperm : how science has constructed a romance based on stereotypical male-female roles / Gilles Deleuze -- We always make love with worlds / Felix Guattari -- Bodies at the margin, or attending to distress and difference -- Introduction / Barbara Duden -- The woman beneath the skin : a doctor's patients in eighteenth-century Germany / Mariella Pandolfi-- Memory within the body : women's narrative and identity in a Southern Italian village / Nancy Scheper-Hughes -- Nervoso / Arthur Kleinman -- Somatization : the interconnections in Chinese / Joan Kl/nman -- Society among culture, depressive experiences and the meanings of pain -- Alice Domurat Dreger-- Jarring bodies : thoughts on the display of -- Unusual anatomies -- Capitalist production, or accounting the commodification of bodily life -- Introduction / E. P. Thompson --Time, work-discipline, and industrial capitalism / Aihwa Ong --The production of possession : spirits and the multinational corporation in Malaysia / Brad Weiss plastic teeth extraction : the iconography of Haya gastro-sexual affliction -- Matthew Schmidt and constructing a "good catch," picking a winner / Lisa Jean Moore -- The development of technosemen and the deconstruction of the monolithic male / Margaret Lock -- Alienation of body parts and the biopolitics of immortalized cell lines -- Knowing systems, or tracking the bodies of the biosciences -- Introduction / Shigehisa Kuriyama -- Pulse diagnosis in the Greek and Chinese traditions / Rayna Rapp -- Real-time fetus : the role of the sonogram in the age of monitored reproduction / Charis Thompson -- Quit sniveling, cryo-baby, we'll work out which one's your mama! / Jos van Dijck -- Bodyworlds : the art of plastinated cadavers / Keith Wailoo -- Inventing the heterozygote : molecular biology, racial identity, and the narratives of sickle-cell disease / Tay-Sachs, and cystic fibrosis

Почему в одних региональных конфликтах члены «Группы восьми» одобряют использование материальных санкций, а в других применение военной силы?3 Будучи неформальным институтом безопасности, состоящим из крупнейших демократических сил Северной Америки, Европы и Азии, «Группа восьми» часто делала выбор в пользу применения санкций, в частности, в отношении Ирана в 1980 г., Афганистана в 1980 г., Судана в 2004 г., Северной Кореи в 2006 г. и Сирии в 2011 г. Также в последнее время организация все чаще делала выбор в пользу применения военной силы так было в Ираке в 1990 г., в Косово в 1999 г., в Афганистане в 2001 г., в Ливии в 2011 г. и в Мали в 2013 г. При этом выбор «Группы восьми», основания, приверженность обязательствам и их исполнение, а также внедрение и эффективность как санкций, так и военных операций каждый раз были разными. Военная сила выбиралась и эффективно использовалась лишь после «холодной войны», прежде всего, когда страна-объект была близка к Южной Европе. Высокое сравнительное превосходство членов «Группы восьми» над странами-объектами оказывает сильное влияние на выбор «Группы восьми» в пользу применения военной силы, а высокая, прямая, смертельная угроза, исходящая от стран-объектов в отношении стран «Группы восьми», не оказывает такого влияния. Географическая приближенность и взаимосвязь, оставшаяся от бывших колониальных отношений между членами «Группы восьми» и страной-объектом, слабо обуславливают выбор силы «Группой восьми». Поддержка со стороны наиболее влиятельной региональной организации НАТО, а также поддержка со стороны ООН в форме принятия резолюции Советом безопасности ООН или Генеральной Ассамблеей ООН имеют сильное и позитивное влияние на выбор силы «Группой восьми». Сопутствующие механизмы подотчетности со стороны самой «Группы восьми» имеют неоднозначное влияние, поскольку проработка проблем лидерами на последующих саммитах не улучшает выполнение обязательств «Группы восьми» по связанным с применением силы вопросам, однако последующее обсуждение проблем министрами иностранных дел в значительной степени оказывает положительное воздействие. ; Why do the Group of Eight (G8) members approve its members' use of material sanctions in some regional conflicts but military force in others?2 As an informal security institution composed of major democratic powers from North America, Europe and Asia, the G8 has often chosen sanctions, notably on Iran in 1980, Afghanistan in 1980, Sudan in 2004, North Korea in 2006, and Syria in 2011. It has increasingly chosen military force, notably in Iraq in 1990, Kosovo in 1999, the USSR over Afghanistan in 2001, Libya in 2011, and Mali in 2013. Yet the G8's choice, initiation, commitment, compliance, implementation and effectiveness of both sanctions and force has varied. Force was chosen and used effectively only in the post cold war period, primarily where the target was close to southern Europe. A high relative-capability predominance of G8 members over the target country strongly produces the G8's choice of force, but a high, direct, deadly threat from the target state to G8 countries does not. Geographic proximity and the connectivity coming from the former colonial relationship between G8 members and the target country only weakly cause the G8 to choose force. Support from the most relevant regional organization – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – and support from the United Nations in the form of an authorizing UN Security Council or General Assembly resolution have a strong, positive effect on the G8's choice of force. Accompanying accountability mechanisms from the G8 itself have a variable impact, as leaders' iteration of the issue at subsequent summits does not increase compliance with G8 commitments on force-related cases, but their foreign ministers' follow up does to a substantial degree.

Book reviewed in this article:GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELANDEric Gordon, Eynsham Abbey, 1005‐1228M. W. Greenslade, ed., The Victoria history of the counties of England: a history of the county of Stafford, xiv: the city of LichfieldRichard Holt and Gervase Rosser, The English medieval town: a reader in English urban history, 1200‐1540Frank Musgrove, The north of EnglandRichard S. Smith, Early coal‐mining around Nottingham, 1500‐1650Barbara English, The great landowners of east Yorkshire, 1530‐1910David Levine and Keith Wrightson, The making of an industrial society: Whickham, 1560‐1765Phyllis Hembry, The English spa, 1560‐1815: a social historyTheodore Koditschek, Class formation and industrial society: Bradford, 1750‐1850Jane Fiske, ed., The Oakes diaries: business, politics and the family in Bury St Edmunds, 1778‐1827. I. Introduction: lames Oakes'diaries, 1778‐1800James E. Bradley, Religion, revolution and English radicalism: non‐conformity in eighteenth‐century politics and societyJohn Belchem, Industrialization and the working class: the English experience, 1750‐1900Jeffrey G. Williamson, Coping with city growth during the British industrial revolutionClark Nardinelli, Child labour and the industrial revolutionRoderick Floud, Kenneth Wachter, and Annabel Gregory, Height, health and history: nutritional status in the United Kingdom, 1750‐1980Alex Mercer, Disease, mortality and population in transition: epidemiological‐demographic change in England since the eighteenth century as part of a global phenomenonJohn E. Archer, By a flash and a scare: arson, animal maiming, and poaching in East Anglia. 1815‐1870Michael Hunter and Robert Thorne, eds., Change at King's CrossR. J. Morris, Class, sect and party: the making of the British middle class. Leeds, 1820‐1850Cynthia Brown, Northampton, 1835‐1985: shoe town, new townDieter Ziegler, trans. Eileen Martin, Central bank, peripheral industry: the Bank of England in the provinces, 1826‐1913David McCrone, Stephen Kendrick, and Pat Straw, ed., The making of Scotland: nation, culture and social changeEdgar Jones, A history of GKN, 2: the growth of the business, 1918‐1945G. H. Martin and Peter Spufford, eds., The records of the nation: the Public Record Office, 1838‐1988: the British Record Society, 1888‐1988Harvey J. Kaye and Keith McClelland, eds., E. P. Thompson: critical perspectivesGENERALRichard Duncan‐Jones, Structure and scale in the Roman economyMarc Boone, Geld en macht: de Gentse stadsfinancien en de Bourgondische staatsvorming, 1384‐1453Larry Neal, The rise of financial capitalism: international capital markets in the age of reasonLars T. Lih, Bread and authority in Russia, 1914‐1921Roger Pethybridge, One step backwards, two steps forward: Soviet society and politics under the new economic policyWilliam Moskoff, The bread of affliction: the food supply in the USSR during World War IIGeorges Sabagh, ed., The modern economic and social history of the Middle East in its world contextM. W. Daly, Imperial Sudan: the Anglo‐Egyptian condominium, 1934‐1956Zbigniew A. Konczacki, Jane L. Parpart, and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., Studies in the economic history of southern Africa, I: the Front‐Line StatesDavid J. Jeremy, Technology and power in the early American cotton industry: James Montgomery, the second edition of his'Cotton manufacture'(1840), and the Justitia'controversy about relative power costsTom Kemp, The climax of capitalism: the U.S. economy in the twentienth centuryFrank Griffith Dawson, The first Latin American debt crisis: The City of London and the 1822‐25 loan bubbleMauricio Font, Coffee, contention, and change in the making of modern BrazilDennis L. McNamara, The colonial origins of Korean enterprise, 1910‐1945Harold Blakemore, From the Pacific to La Paz: the AntofagastaLawrence I. Conrad, ed., The formation and perception of the modern Arab world: studies by Marwan R. BuheiryM. Mann, ed., The rise and decline of the nation stateGeoffrey Jones, ed., Banks as multinationalsBruna Ingrao & Giorgio Israel

The year 2008 witnessed a polio outbreak in Nigeria, with new international spread to bordering countries, persistent importations in south-central Africa and Sudan and the largest outbreak of polio in eight years in Pakistan. Elsewhere, western Uttar Pradesh in India - historically the world's most entrenched reservoir of polio but free of indigenous poliovirus type 1 for more than a year - was re-infected by a virus from a neighbouring state. By the end of the year, the number of children paralysed by polio in 2008 had returned to 1999 levels. And yet 2008 has proved to be a turning point in the fight against polio. To say 2008 was an arduous year in polio eradication is an understatement. To say it was a watershed for polio eradication is not. Against a sobering epidemiological backdrop, the progress made - in key political, technical, financial and operational areas - led the ACPE and SAGE1 to conclude in November 2008 that the intensified eradication effort had shown that the remaining challenges in the four polio-endemic countries could be overcome. First and foremost, all tiers of government in key polio- infected countries - from central to local levels - have realized the level of support and effort required to finish polio eradication and are engaging in the global effort as never before. In addition to financial and operational commitments, the remaining countries with indigenous polio - Nigeria, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan - now have special mechanisms to monitor the performance of eradication activities and hold local authorities accountable for their quality. Secondly, these efforts are being closely watched and frankly assessed. Following the re-infection of West Africa, for example, the international community has refocused its attention on key polio-affected countries, especially Nigeria, with a World Health Assembly Resolution (WHA) in May 2008 tasking each endemic country - by name - to act. Thirdly, the donor community has remained determined in the face of continued transmission of polio. Mindful that meeting established global health goals demands extraordinary perseverance, donors have redoubled efforts to finish the final lap. In January 2009, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation announced a further US$ 255 million grant for polio eradication to Rotary International, which the latter pledged to match with another US$ 100 million, bringing to US$ 200 million Rotary's matching funds in the past year alone. That same month, the United Kingdom announced a multi-year contribution of US$ 150 million, and Germany signalled its intention to provide US$ 130 million. By the end of the year, these global developments and country-specific strategies were showing an impact on wild poliovirus transmission. In India, monthly vaccination campaigns in the highest-risk areas, using monovalent vaccine, have reduced wild poliovirus type 1 - the more dangerous of the two remaining strains - to record lows. In Nigeria, stronger leadership at state level brought about new commitments to accountability for the quality of vaccination campaigns. By early 2009, the proportion of children with no polio vaccination in the highest-risk states of northern Nigeria fell to under 10% for the first time ever. In Afghanistan, teams exploited lulls in the conflict in the southern region to enter normally inaccessible areas and give children an additional dose of monovalent vaccine between large-scale campaigns. Pakistan started using finger-marking of vaccinated children to objectively measure coverage, thereby introducing real accountability of local authorities. With new multi-sectoral activities, the country laid the ground for the Prime Minister's Action Plan for Polio Eradication, launched in early 2009. Meanwhile, ongoing research in social attitudes, the development of new vaccines and behaviour of the poliovirus is expanding the current state of knowledge. In March 2008, Somalia became polio-free once again, demonstrating that full application of international outbreak response guidelines can stop the virus even in the most difficult conditions. This Annual Report of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) features progress made in 2008 towards the objectives defined in the GPEI Strategic Plan for 2004-08 and reports on intensified eradication activities. ; Eexecutive summary -- Key events 2008 -- 1. Strategic objective I: Interruption of wild poliovirus transmission -- 2. Strategic objective II: Surveillance and certification of global polio eradication -- 3. Strategic objective III: Management of long-term risks after wild poliovirus eradication -- 4. Strategic objective IV: Mainstreaming of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative -- 5. Financing: Financial commitments mark confidence in ending polio -- Appendix A. Performance against milestones in Strategic Plan 2004-2008 -- Appendix B. Performance against milestones in Intensified Eradication Effort 2007-2008 -- Acronyms and abbreviations ; "WHO/POLIO/09.03." ; On cover: logos for World Health Organization, Rotary International, CDC (U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), UNICEF. ; Available via the World Wide Web as an Acrobat .pdf file (7.3MB, 52 p.).

Volume 4: ⁰́₈Slaughter and "Scuttle"⁰́₉: Trouble at Home and Abroad (1870-1914)Acknowledgements Dedication List of AbbreviationsGeneral IntroductionIntroduction Volume 4: ⁰́₈Slaughter and "Scuttle"⁰́₉: Trouble at Home and Abroad (1870-1914)Part 1. Trouble At Home1. ⁰́₈Return of Number of Deaths From Starvation in Metropolitan Districts in the year 1877, upon which a coroners⁰́₉s jury have returned a verdict of death from starvation, or death accelerated by privation⁰́₉, Hansard, HC, Volume 71, Image 3.2. Anon., ⁰́₈Why be Transported?⁰́₉, Socialist Leaflets, no. 1, 1885.3. ⁰́₈One of the Middle-Class⁰́₉, (H. H. C), The Facts About the Unemployed: An Appeal and a Warning (1886)4. Select Committee of House of Lords on Poor Law Relief. Report. Proceedings, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, Index, Hansard, HL, Volume 15, Images 117, 123, 346-347 (23 April 1888). 5. Thomas Mackay, The English Poor, A Sketch of their Social and Economic History, London: J. Murray, 1889, pp.194-6, 256-7, 264, 284-9, 293-5, 297.6. Anon., ⁰́₈Starvation Once More⁰́₉. Reynold⁰́₉s Newspaper, December 1892, p. 47. J. Milson Rhodes, M. D., ⁰́₈The Objective Causes of Poverty⁰́₉, 10 January 1894, Transactions of the Manchester Statistical Society, pp. 43-5. 47, 50, 57, 62, 67-8. 8. Gertrude Lubbock, Some Poor Relief Questions, With the Arguments on Both Sides. A Manual for Workers, London: John Murray, 1895, pp., 193-202.9. [F. Whelan], ⁰́₈A Plea for Poor Law Reform⁰́₉, no. 44 (Revised March 1907), and [J. F. Oakeshott], ⁰́₈The Humanizing of the Poor Law⁰́₉ no. 54, Fabian Tracts Nos. 1, 5, 7, 9, 12 to 86, London: Fabian Society, 1884-1899. 10. ⁰́₈Down with the Socialists!⁰́₉, Socialist Leaflet no. 2, nd, Open-air meetings. [s.n.] [19--]. 11. M. Birley, et al., New Poor Law and No Poor Law: Being a Description of the Majority & Minority Reports of the Poor Law Commission, London: Dent, 1909, pp. 77-8.12. Elizabeth Leigh Hutchins, ⁰́₈Working Women and the Poor Law⁰́₉, London: Women⁰́₉s Industrial Council, 1909, pp. 1-3, 7-11.13. David Lloyd George, The People⁰́₉s Budget: Explained by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1909, pp. viii-x. 14. Anon., ⁰́₈Deaths from Starvation: A List of 94 Tragedies⁰́₉, Votes for Women, 30 January 1914, p. 273. Part 2. Trouble Abroad: Egypt, the Sudan, Africa, China, IndiaPart 2. Introduction2.1. Trouble Abroad: Egypt, the Sudan, and British Africa15. Anon., ⁰́₈Egypt⁰́₉, Saturday Review, 29 March 1879, pp. 382-3 16. Extract from the ⁰́₈El Kahirah⁰́₉, a native newspaper, Incl No. 141, Correspondence Respecting Affairs of Egypt 1887, C4941, Hansard, HC, Volume 88, Image 131. 17. A. B. Wylde, ⁰́₉83 to ⁰́₉87: The Soudan, Vol. 1, London: Remington & Co., 1888; New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969, pp. 126-7. 18. Vice-Consul Barnham, Letters to the Prime Minister, the Marquis of Salisbury, regarding the famine in Sudan, 5th, 19th , 31st March 1890, Correspondence Respecting Finances and Condition of Egypt 1890, Hansard, HC, Volume 83, Images 106-7, 125-6, 135. 19. Eva Hope, Stanley and Africa, New York: Walter Scott; A. Lovell & Co, 1890, pp. 87-8, 339, 351-2.20. A. B. Wylde ,⁰́₉The Starving Soudanese and Our Responsibilities: Extracts from letter received from Mr. A. B. Wylde, of Suakin⁰́₉, Anti-slavery Reporter 10 May 1890, p. 92.21. Hugh E. M. Stutfield, ⁰́₈The Position of Affairs in the Eastern Soudan⁰́₉, Fortnightly, 49 (1891), pp. 383-7, 392-3. 22. Thomas Heazle Parke, My Personal Experiences in Equatorial Africa as Medical Officer of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition, London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1891, pp. 112-19.23. Henry Russell, The Ruin of the Soudan, Cause, Effect, and Remedy; A Resume of Events, 1883-1891, London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1892, pp. 183-5, 222, 24. Anon., ⁰́₈The Ruin of the Soudan⁰́₉, Speaker: The Liberal Review, 6 (1892), p. 175.25. W. T. Marriott, ⁰́₈The Devastation of the Soudan⁰́₉, National Review, 20 (1892), pp. 482-3, 485, 492-4.26. Joseph Thomson, Through Masai Land: A Journey of Exploration Among the Snowclad Volcanic Mountains and Strange Tribes of Easter Equatorial Africa, London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1895, pp. 23, 339-40. 27. Henry Duff Traill, ⁰́₈The Burden of Egypt⁰́₉, Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review, 39 (1896), pp. 545-6, 548, 550-52, 555-6.28. Ethel Younghusband, Glimpses of East Africa and Zanzibar, London: J. Long, 1910, pp. 78-9,103.2.2. Trouble Abroad: China29. Anon., ⁰́₈China⁰́₉, Morning Post, 12 February 1877, p. 6. 30. Anon., ⁰́₈The Famine in China⁰́₉, York Herald, 2 May 1877, p. 3 31. Anon., ⁰́₈Terrible Famine in China: Thousands Dying of Starvation⁰́₉, Aberdeen Journal, 5 May 1877, p. 5.32. Joseph Edkins, ⁰́₈Letter from China⁰́₉, Academy, 21 July 1877, p. 68.33. Anon., ⁰́₈Another Asiastic Famine⁰́₉, York Herald, 2 August 1877, p. 6.34. Anon., ⁰́₈China⁰́₉, Ipswich Journal, and Suffolk, Norfolk, Essex, and Cambridgeshire Advertiser, 25 August 1877, p. 8.35. Anon., ⁰́₈The Famine in China⁰́₉, Saturday Review, 45, (1878), p. 271. 36. Anon., ⁰́₈Political and Social. Notes and Comments⁰́₉, Examiner, 23 February 1878, p. [2].37. ⁰́₈Anon., ⁰́₈The Famine in China⁰́₉, Daily News, 15 March 1878, p. [5].38. The Famine in China: Illustrations by a Native Artist, London: C. Kegan Paul, 1878, Plate III. 39. [Charles William Wason], The Great Famine: Report of the Committee of the China Famine Relief Fund, Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1879, pp. 3-9, 18-19. 40. H. E. Timothy Richard, ⁰́₈Despatches⁰́₉, in [Charles William Wason], The Great Famine: Report of the Committee of the China Famine Relief Fund, Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1879, pp. 34-7, 41-2, 46-50, 66.41. Walter Kirton, A Silent War or the Great Famine in Kiangpeh, Shanghai: North-China Daily News & Herald, 1907, pp. 37-8, 40-1.42. Hu Tien Tsing, ⁰́₈An Account of my Trip to the Famine Region⁰́₉, Nanking University Magazine, Volume 2, September 1911, pp. 20-2.43. Zuk-Vann Lee, ⁰́₈Educational Comments⁰́₉, World⁰́₉s Chinese Students⁰́₉ Journal, Volume 5, Shanghai: The World⁰́₉s Chinese Students⁰́₉ Federation, 1906-1917, Images 448-9.44. Anon., ⁰́₈The Famine in China⁰́₉, Far Eastern Review, 8 (1912), pp. 319-20. 2.3. Trouble Abroad: India, Again45. Anon., ⁰́₈Famines. India⁰́₉, Ipswich Journal, and Suffolk, Norfolk, Essex, and Cambridgeshire Advertiser, 25 August 1877, p. 8.46. W. G. Pedder, ⁰́₈Famine and Debt in India⁰́₉, Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review, 2 (1877), pp. 181, 184-7,194, 196-7. 47. H. M. Hyndman, Indian Famine and the Crisis in India, London: Edward Stanford, 1877, pp. 3-5, 24-5, 32, 34-6. 48. Sir William Digby, The Famine Campaign in Southern India, Madras, and Bombay Presidencies and Province of Mysore: 1876-1878, 2 vols, London: Longmans, Green, 1878, Volume 1, pp. viii, 45-55.49. Dadabhai Naoroji, ⁰́₈The Poverty of India⁰́₉ (1878), Extracts from Papers read before the Bombay Branch of the East India Association, April, and July 1876, Part I, London: Vincent Brooks, Day and Son, 1878, Images 17, 41, 43-4, 46-50, 59.50. Report of the Indian Famine Commission. pt.1.Famine Relief, London: George Edward Eyre and William Spottiswoode, 1880, HC, Volume 52, Images 10-12, 16-21, 26-32, 38, 42-3, 77, 80, 82. 51. Anon. ⁰́₈Some Facts about the Famine in India⁰́₉, Social-Democrat, no. 2, (1897), pp. 35-8.52. Pandita Ramabai, ⁰́₈Famine Experiences⁰́₉, in M. Koshambi (ed.) PanditaRamabai: Through Her Own Words. Selected Works, New Delhi; Oxford University Press, 2000 pp. 251-68. 53. Pandita Ramabai, ⁰́₈An Indescribably Sad Sight⁰́₉, in George Lambert, India, The Horror-stricken Empire: Containing a Full Account, Elkhart, Indiana: Mennonite Pub., 1898, pp. 101-7.54. Behramji M. Malabari, India in 1897, Bombay: A. J. Cambridge, 1898, Images 7-11. 55. J. J. Lohr. A Few Pictures from Chhattisgarh and the Central Provinces of India, Illustrating the Scenery, the Social Customs of the Sath©Łmis and the Late Famine, np 1899, Images 114, 115.56. J. A. Baines, ⁰́₈Famines in India⁰́₉, India Ceylon Straits Settlements British North Borneo Hong-Kong. Volume 1, London Kegan Paul, Trench, Tr©ơbner, 1899, Images 393-5.57. An Indian. ⁰́₈How to Mitigate Indian Famines⁰́₉, Review of Reviews (1900), pp. 191-2, on pp. 191-2.58. Vaughan Nash. The Great Famine and its Causes; With Eight Photographs by the Author and a Map of India Showing the Famine Area, London: Longmans, Green, 1900, Images 115-22.59. John M. Robertson, ⁰́₈The Duties of Empire⁰́₉, The British Empire Series, Volume V, New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1899-1902, Images 596-601, 603-4, 606-7.60. William Loftus Hare, Famine in India: Its Causes and Effects, with a foreword by William Digby, C.I.E., London: P. S. King & Son, 1902, Images 33, 35, 36, 42, 51. Index

Dans les années 1960, l'Afrique subsaharienne a connu une offensive diplomatique à grande échelle de la part d'Israël. Le Ghana de Kwame Nkrumah a été le premier pays à établir des relations diplomatiques et économiques. D'autres pays suivirent bientôt, si bien qu'au milieu des années 1960, une quarantaine de pays africains recevaient une aide agricole et militaire d'Israël et bénéficiaient de bourses pour leurs étudiants. L'implication d'Israël a été renforcée par les activités de la CIA en Afrique à l'époque, qui étaient conçues et financées par les États-Unis et d'autres puissances occidentales comme leur "troisième force" en Afrique. Depuis, la situation a évolué en raison de la solidarité croissante des Africains avec les Palestiniens et de leur rejet du système israélien de "l'apartheid", c'est-à-dire de la discrimination systématique à l'encontre des populations non-israéliennes. Israël a perdu le soutien de la plupart des pays d'ASS au début des années 1970 en raison de sa collaboration avec l'Afrique du Sud de l'apartheid. Comme l'a dit Nelson Mandela: "L'Afrique du Sud ne sera jamais libre tant que la Palestine ne sera pas libre". Lors de sa 12e session ordinaire à Kampala en 1975, l'OUA a pour la première fois identifié l'idéologie fondatrice d'Israël, le sionisme, comme une forme de racisme. Néanmoins, plusieurs pays africains ont continué à entretenir des contacts de faible niveau par l'intermédiaire de treize ambassades étrangères, par exemple en Éthiopie, en Tanzanie, en Ouganda et au Zaïre, tandis que les échanges éducatifs et commerciaux se sont poursuivis, bien qu'à des niveaux considérablement réduits et à l'abri des regards du public. Mais le fléau du terrorisme islamiste a nécessité une relance des relations. La coopération militaire et sécuritaire, y compris la cybersécurité, est particulièrement intense avec par exemple l'Éthiopie, le Zaïre, l'Ouganda, le Ghana, le Togo et l'Afrique du Sud. Elle a aussi souvent servi à soutenir des régimes africains despotiques. Aujourd'hui, l'Afrique subsaharienne constitue un marché lucratif pour l'industrie de défense israélienne. Le Cameroun, le Tchad, la Guinée-Équatoriale, le Lesotho, le Nigeria, le Rwanda, les Seychelles, l'Afrique du Sud et l'Ouganda ont reçu des armes d'Israël entre 2006 et 2010. En 2014, 40% des exportations d'armes d'Israël étaient destinées aux pays africains. Après la fin de la guerre froide et le début du processus de paix israélo-arabe, la plupart des États africains ont repris leurs relations avec Israël après que Netanyahu soit devenu Premier ministre en 2009 sous le slogan: "Israël revient à l'Afrique, l'Afrique revient à Israël". Israël entretient désormais des relations avec 40 États subsahariens, dont certains adoptent une position plus pro-israélienne qu'auparavant. La stabilisation de la Corne de l'Afrique était considérée comme cruciale car elle était directement liée aux pressions migratoires auxquelles Israël était confronté depuis le milieu de la dernière décennie. On estime que 40 000 réfugiés africains vivent sur le sol israélien, la plupart venant du Soudan et de l'Erythrée. La réputation internationale d'Israël a été affectée par sa politique décisive visant à limiter le nombre de migrants en construisant un mur à la frontière avec l'Egypte. Depuis 2013, le gouvernement a tenté d'expulser environ 4 000 migrants vers le Rwanda et l'Ouganda dans le cadre d'un programme de « départ volontaire » entre 2014 et 2017. Presque tout le monde a de nouveau fui le Rwanda et a entrepris le dangereux voyage vers l'Europe.