Arviointi, mikäli sen kaikkia mahdollisuuksia hyödynnettäisiin, olisi tärkeä työkalu avustamaan julkista sekä yksityissektoria ja kansalaisyhteiskuntaa inhimillisen hyvinvoinnin lisäämiseksi. Valitettavasti, vaikka tehtyjen arviointien määrä on maailmanlaajuisesti lisääntymässä, näiden arviointien alhainen hyödyntämisaste on samoin kasvamassa. Tästä esimerkkinä on kehitystyö, jossa lukemattomat tuotetut ja oppimislähteenä käytettäväksi oletetut arviointiraportit kuitenkin todellisuudessa makaavat koskemattomina. Tämä toteutumaton "käyttö" on todellista ajan ja rajallisten julkisten varojen tuhlausta. Arviointien hyödyllisyyden määrittäminen tiukasti näiden julkaistujen arviointiraporttien käyttöön perustuvaksi, mikä useimmiten on tilanne, laiminlyö ja vähentää muiden käytettävissä olevien arviointielementtien, kuten arviointitoimeksiannon tai arviointiprosessin hyödyntämistä ja käyttöä, mikä yhä enemmän supistaa arvioinnin kokonaisvaikuttavuutta. Tämän tansanialaisessa ammattikoulussa, Mwanza Home Craft Centressä (MHCC), toteutetun arviointikokeilun tarkoitus oli hyödyntää arviointia, etenkin sen arviointiprosessia, arviointivaikutusten osoittamiseksi. Kokeiluni, joka toteutettiin suomalaisin kehitystyövaroin käynnistetyssä kansalaisjärjestöhankkeessa, tehtiin kehityshankkeesta rinnan hankkeen edetessä, oli vastakohta kehnosti hyödynnetyille ulkopuolisten arvioitsijoiden vallitsevaa tilivelvollisuus- ja kontrollitarkoitusta varten tekemille, menneeseen fokusoituneille ja kovia tutkimusmenetelmiä käyttäville kehitysarvioinneille, jotka sulkevat paikalliset ulkopuolelle ja ovat heille vieraita, ja siksi saavat vähäistä paikallista arviointivaikuttavuutta aikaan. Noissa arvioinneissa on suosittu hallitsevaa länsimaista ja Eurooppa-keskeistä positivistista tulokulmaa, rahoittajakeskeistä arviointiparadigmaa ja hegemonista kieltä, joka saa alkunsa uudesta julkishallinnon johtamisliikkeestä. Sen sijaan, kokeiluni oli mikrokuvaus ja reflektio hankkeen rahoittajan sponsoroimasta, paikallis- ja asianomaiskeskeisestä, oppimis- ja tulevaisuussuuntautuneesta, paikallisesti hyödynnetystä ja vaikuttaneesta kehitysarvioinnista. Arviointikokeilu koostui kahdesta komponentista. Arviointiosuudessa tutkittiin ammatillisen koulutuksen sosio-ekonomisia vaikutuksia. Arviointitutkimusosiossa fokusoitiin arvioinnin prosessikäyttöön ja arvioinnin vaikuttavuuteen. Ammattikouluhankkeessa kaikkien asianomaisten arviointioppimista pyrittiin tukemaan arvioinnin aikana arviointiprosessia hyödyntäen. Yksilöllisiä, interpersoonallisia ja kollektiivisia arviointivaikutuksia tavoiteltiin henkilökohtaisen ja organisaation osallistumisen, saadun arviointikokemuksen ja valmennuksen sekä dialogin kautta. Mandaattini oli integroida, "arviointimassoja", tarkoittaen avun vastaanottajia, paikallisten arviointivaikutusten aikaansaamiseksi, ja tarkastella arvioinnissa suhdetta valtaan heidän näkökulmastaan. Yleisesti ottaen heillä on vähemmän valtaa ja ääntä nykyisessä kehitysarvioinnissa kuin vahvemmilla, "eliitillä", avun rahoittajilla. Asetin hypoteesikseni, että jokainen tutkimus ja arviointitutkimus on tulokulmasidonnaista, mikä vaikuttaa arvioinnin käytettävyyteen, ja siten myös arvioinnin vaikutuksiin, vaikutustyyppeihin, -tasoon, -ryhmiin, ja vaikuttavuuden kestoon. Tässä tutkimuksessa painotettiin sellaisia arvioinninkäytössä ja arvioinnin vaikuttavuudessa keskeisessä roolissa olevia elementtejä, kuten arviointiparadigmaa, arviointimallia ja metodologiaa, arvioijan asemaa ja näkökulmaa, arvioinnin käyttäjien asemaa, arviointitarkoitusta, arvioinnin aikakehikkoa, ja arviointietiikkaa. Tässä tutkimuksessa käytettiin toimintatutkimuksellisesti suuntautunutta strategiaa. Tutkimusaineisto koottiin kahden Tansanian kenttämatkan aikana useita aineistonkeruumenetelmiä hyödyntäen. Arvioinnin vaikutuksia ja arvioinnin prosessikäyttöä tutkittiin aineistosta, joka saatiin ammattikoulutustapauksen kahdesta MHCC:n henkilöstölle ja komiteanjäsenille organisoidusta seminaarista ja työpajasta, samoin kuin henkilöstön jäsenten teemahaastatteluista ja komitean, henkilöstön antamasta kirjallisesta arviointipalautteesta ja yhdestä 11 hengen ryhmähaastattelusta. Lisäksi, ammatillisen koulutuksen sosio-ekonomisia vaikutuksia kerättiin 115 opiskelijan kirjallisen kertomuksen ja taustalomakkeen sekä 11 opiskelijan ja 20 muun arvioijan teemahaastattelun avulla. Kirjallinen aineisto koodattiin käyttäen teoriavetoista (tai -suuntautunutta) laadullista sisällönanalyysiä, johon pohjautuen johtopäätökset tehtiin. MHCC:n arviointikokeilu osoitti, että valittu arvioinnin tulokulma ja paradigma erilaisten arviointifaktorissa olevien elementtien hyödyntämisen kautta vaikutti arvioinnin käyttöön ja arvioinnin vaikutuksiin. Kokeilu sai aikaan vaikuttavuutta; arviointia automaattisesti hyödynnettiin jo arvioitaessa sen prosessikäytön vuoksi. Arviointiprosessiin osallistuneiden henkilöiden ja heidän instituutioidensa omakohtaisia arviointikokemuksia ei voinut vain "jättää hyllylle". Heidän yksilöllinen, henkilöiden välinen ja kollektiivinen arviointioppiminen arvioidessa kiistatta myötävaikutti, ei vain välittömiin vaan myös pidempiaikaisiin kognitiivisiin, affektiivisiin, sosiaalisiin, toiminnallisiin, jopa taloudellisiin ja kulttuurillisiin muutoksiin kehitysintervention eri tasoilla, jopa ammattioppilaitoksen ulkopuolella. Tämän tutkimusten löydösten perusteella, päättelin, että prosessuaalinen arvioinnin käyttö oli vahva työkalu ja MHCC:n muutosprosessien kiihdyttäjä, etenkin niille arvioinnin asianomaisille, jotka omaksuivat arvioivaa mieltä. Tämä ajattelutavan muutos, valistuminen ("mwanga"), mahdollisti siirtymisen jälki- ja menneisyysorientoituneesta historiaa tarkastelleesta ajattelusta tulevaisuussuuntautuneeseen omaehtoiseen kehittämistoimintaan. Tämä tutkimusaineisto antanee ymmärtää, että arviointiprosessilla ja -tuloksilla samanaikaisesti hyödynnettynä arvioivan oppimisen lähteinä oli pitkäaikaisia vaikutuksia – ehkä pidempiaikaisia kuin vain arviointituloksia yksin hyödynnettäessä voitaisiin aikaansaada. Nämä vaikutukset saattoivat muodostua MHCC:n reflektion, nopeamman ympäristöön reagoinnin ja jatkuvan sopeuttamisen elinehdoiksi. Tämä selitti, kuinka ammattikoulutusinstituutio MHCC on ollut kykenevä jatkuvasti uudistumaan ja muuttamaan toimintojaan tarvittaessa, huomioiden taloutensa ja ympäröivän yhteiskunnan vaatimukset sekä olemaan taloudellisesti itsensä kannattava yli 20 vuotta (mikä on ainutlaatuista koulutussektorilla maailmalaajuisestikin, puhumattakaan kehitysmaista, kuten Tansaniasta). Lisäksi, kokeilun ansiosta saatiin uutta tietoa arviointikohteesta, MHCC:stä opiskelijoineen, sen arviointikäytänteistä ja oppilaitosta ympäröivästä todellisuudesta. Ammattikoulun nimi muutettiin, uusia osastoja, kuten ajoneuvo, sähkö, sekä hotellinjohto ja turismi, lanseerattiin, ja uusia iltakursseja käynnistettiin, metallityön lisäkoulutusta, sekä tietokone- ja englannin kielen kursseja aloitettiin. Tämän tutkimuksen yleisenä yhteenvetona totean, että kansalaisjärjestöjen rooli on edelleen tärkeä ammatillisen koulutuksen järjestäjänä Tansanian kehityshankkeissa neljästä syystä. Ensiksi, koska maan koulutuksen yleistaso on dramaattisesti huonontunut. Toiseksi, koska riittävät ammattikoulutusmahdollisuudet puuttuvat. Kolmanneksi, koska ammattikoulutus on yleisesti ottaen hyödyllistä: se näytti vaikuttaneen ei vain yksilön köyhyyden vähentämiseen vaan laajemminkin yhteiskuntaan. Kuitenkin, tutkimustulokset esittivät yllättävän todisteen, mikä on vastakkaista länsimaalaiselle suoraviivaiselle ajattelulle ja oletukselle ammattitaidon ja ammatillisen koulutuksen valtavasta taloudellisesta voimasta ja hyödystä saajalleen; ei edes kokoaikatyö köyhyyden vähentämis- ja automaattisesti elintasoa nostavana keinona toiminut. Kaikesta huolimatta, minkä ammattiin opiskelleiden elämää koskeva aineisto todistaa, niiden, jotka kokivat positiivisia, merkittäviä, kestäviä taloudellisia, sosiaalisia ja henkilökohtaisia koulutusvaikutuksia MHCC:n koulutushankkeen vuoksi, nämä ammatillisen koulutuksen sosio-ekonomiset materiaaliset ja immateriaaliset positiiviset, tuotteliaat vaikutusketjut näyttivät ulottuneen myös laajennettuun perheeseen, ikätovereihin, yhteisöjen jäseniin ja tansanialaiseen yhteiskuntaan merkittävin seurannaisvaikutuksin. Esimerkkinä mainittakoon valmistuneiden opiskelijoiden sukulaisilleen, ikätovereilleen ja yhteisöjensä jäsenilleen tarjoama "epävirallinen, yksityinen oppisopimuskoulutusjärjestelmä"; jonka kautta yksi MHCC:stä valmistunut on epävirallisesti kouluttanut yli 50 henkilöä. Tosin, näitä sosio-ekonomisia koulutusvaikutuksia olisi voitu tehostaa resursoimalla ja tekemällä säännöllisesti arviointeja sekä syöttämällä niiden tuloksia edelleen ammattioppilaitoksen palvelujen parantamiseksi (esim. työvälineet tai yrittäjyyskurssit ammattiin valmistuneille). Neljänneksi, tutkimus osoitti, että kehitysmaissa työpaikat olivat tarjolla pääasiassa informaalilla sektorilla ja itsenäisenä ammatinharjoittajana työskenteleminen oli useimmille valmistuneille ainoa työllistymisvaihtoehto. Näin ollen, kansalaisjärjestöjen toteuttama ammattikoulutus oppilaitoksen kannattavuudelle välttämättömine tulonhankkimisprojekteineen (jotka yleensä puuttuvat valtion omistamista ammattioppilaitoksista) voi toimia erinomaisena yrittäjyyshenkeä vahvistavana oppimisympäristönä. Tutkimuslöytöjä voitaneen soveltaa seuraavasti. Ensiksi, huolestuttava arviointien käyttämättömyys ja/tai tehoton käyttö tulee tiedostaa. Toiseksi, arvioinnin teettäjien, käynnistäjien, rahoittajien ja avunantajien tulee saada lisätietoa merkittävistä arvioinnin positiiviseen käyttöön ja vaikuttavuuteen tai sitä estävistä kontekstuaalisista, arviointi- ja inhimillisistä faktoreista elementteineen. Esimerkiksi, sellaisia kontekstuaalisia tekijöitä, jotka liittyvät taloudellisiin ja poliittisiin rajoitteisiin ja arviointisysteemeihin ja jotka negatiivisesti vaikuttavat arviointien hyödyntämiseen ja vaikutuksiin, tulee paljastaa. Kolmanneksi, arviointien puutteellista hyödyntämistä vastaan tulee hyökätä muun muassa arviointiprosessia käyttämällä. Neljänneksi, jokaisessa arviointipolitiikassa ja -suunnitelmassa jo arvioinnin toimeksiantovaiheessa tulee edellyttää konkreettisia toimia arviointien hyödyntämiseksi. Jokaiselta julkisin varoin tuotetulta arvioinnilta tulee vaatia arvioinninkäyttösuunnitelma tavoiteltavine arviointivaikutuksineen ennen arvioinnin toimeenpano vaihetta. Viidenneksi, arviointikäyttö tulee uudelleen käsitteellistää arviointipolitiikkojen ja -suunnitelmien sanastossa. Kaikki tarjolla olevat arvioinnin käytön keskeiset elementit — arvioinnin toimeksianto, arviointiprosessi (eikä ainoastaan arviointilöydökset) — tulee maksimaalisesti valjastaa kaikilla arvioinnin tasoilla, myös kansalaisjärjestöissä, rajallisten evaluointiresurssien vuoksi, tuodakseen maksimaalisen arvon arviointikohteelle, sen asianomaisille ja arvioinnin käyttäjille. Kuudenneksi, arviointien hyödyntämistä tulee ohjeistaa, kannustaa ja rahoittaa. Arvioinnin käynnistäjien ja rahoittajien tulisi palkita arvioinnin asianomaisia ja heidän organisaatiotaan, mikäli arviointia hyödynnetään ja se saa aikaan vaikuttavuutta. Seitsemänneksi, arvioinnin vaikuttavuus/vaikutus -termit tarvitsevat selkeyttämistä, ei ainoastaan viitaten vain arvioinnin positiivisiin seurauksiin, vaan myös sen negatiivisiin, tahattomiin vaikutuksiin, joihin täytyy myös puuttua. ; Evaluation, if utilised to its full potential, would be an important tool for helping governments, the private sector and civil society to increase human well-being. Unfortunately, though the number of evaluations conducted is increasing worldwide, a low rate of utilisation of these evaluations is increasing as well. An example of this is the development field, where countless evaluation reports are produced and assumed to be used as sources of learning, when in reality they lie untouched. This non-actualised "use" is a real waste of time and of limited public funds. The usefulness of evaluations, when strictly determined based on the use of the published evaluation reports (as is the case most of the time), neglects the usefulness and reduces the utilisation of other evaluation elements available, such as evaluation commissioning or evaluation process, which further reduce the overall impact of the evaluation. This evaluation experiment, conducted in the Tanzanian vocational education and training (VET) centre, Mwanza Home Craft Centre (MHCC), was designed to utilise the evaluation, especially its process, to show evaluation impacts. My experiment, conducted upon the development intervention of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) established by Finnish funds, was performed concurrently alongside and from within the development intervention, in contrast to the poorly utilised development evaluations conducted for dominating accountability and control purposes by external evaluators using a past-focussed orientation combined with hard evaluation methods, all of which were exclusive and unfamiliar to the locals and thus, had minor local evaluation impact. In those evaluations the donorcentred standpoint, overarching evaluation paradigm and hegemonic language, having their origin in the New Public Management movement were favoured. Instead, I devised a micro explanation of, and provided reflections about, the donorsponsored, local- and stakeholder-centred, learning- and future-oriented, and locally utilised development evaluation with impacts. The evaluation experiment consisted of two components. In the evaluation section, the socio-economic impacts of VET were studied. In the research on evaluation section the focus was put on the process use of evaluation and evaluation impacts. In the VET project, all the stakeholders' evaluative learning was targeted to be supported with the assistance of the process use of evaluation while evaluating. It was aimed at individual, interpersonal and collective evaluation impacts through personal and organisational involvement, evaluative experience and training received, as well as dialogue. My mandate was to integrate into the evaluation process, evaluation "masses," that is, the aid recipients, to generate stronger local evaluation impacts, and to look at the relation to power in evaluation from their standpoint. Generally speaking, they have less power and voice in the current development evaluations than do "the elite," the financial donors. I hypothesised that every research and evaluation research is standpoint-bound, which has influence on evaluation usability, and then, on evaluation impacts, their types, levels, user groups, and duration. In this research, emphasis was placed on those elements playing key roles in evaluation use and evaluation impact, such as the evaluation paradigm, evaluation design and methodology; the evaluator's location and standpoint; the position of the evaluation users; the evaluation purpose; the evaluation time-frame; and evaluation ethics. In this research, the action research-oriented strategy was used. The research data was generated during two Tanzanian field trips by utilising various data generation methods. Evaluation impacts and process use of evaluation were studied through the data received from the VET case, its two seminars and workshops organised for the MHCC staff and committee members, as well as from thematic interviews of some staff persons and written evaluative feedback given by the committee, staff members and an 11-participant group interview. Again, socio-economic VET impacts were collected through the data of 115 former students' written stories and background questionnaires, as well as of 11 former students' and 20 other evaluees' thematic interviews. The written data of the evaluation experiment was coded by using the theory-driven (or theory-directed) qualitative content analysis, on which the conclusions were based and drawn. The evaluation experiment at MHCC indicated that the chosen evaluation standpoint and paradigm, through the utilisation of various elements existing in the evaluation factor, affected evaluation use and evaluation impacts. The experiment contributed to impact; the evaluation was automatically brought into utilisation while evaluating due to its process use. The first-hand evaluative experience of the participants and of their institutions involved in the evaluation process could not "just be left on the shelf." Their individual, interpersonal and collective evaluative learning, while evaluating, inevitably contributed not only to immediate but also to long-term cognitive, affective, social, behavioural, even economic, and cultural changes at various levels of the development intervention, even outside the VET centre. Based on findings of this research, I suggested that the processual use of evaluation was a powerful tool and an accelerator of MHCC's change processes, even for those stakeholders whose evaluative minds were made up. This change in the pattern of thought, enlightenment ("mwanga"), enabled a shift in focus from the post- and past-oriented, history observing thinking, to the future-directed independent line of development action. This research data might imply that evaluation process, with its findings utilised simultaneously as evaluative learning sources, had long-term effects — maybe longer than the findings use alone can generate. These impacts could become the lifeblood at MHCC for reflection, quicker reactivity to the environment and on-going adaptation. This presented an explanation for how the VET institution MHCC could have been capable of being renewed continuously and transforming its activities, as needed, regarding its economy and the demands of surrounding society, as well as being self-supporting for over 20 years (which is unique in the educational sector worldwide, let alone in the developing countries, like Tanzania). In addition, with the experiment, the new knowledge was received about the evaluand, MHCC and its students, its evaluation practices, and MHCC's surrounding reality. Again, the VET centre's name was changed, new departments such as motor vehicle, electricity, as well as hotel management and tourism were launched, and new evening courses, further education and training in welding and fabrication, as well as computer and English language courses, were started. As the general conclusion of this research I state that NGOs still have an important role as VET providers of Tanzanian development interventions, for four reasons. First, because the country's general education level has dramatically deteriorated. Second, because of a lack of sufficient VET opportunities. Third, because in general VET was beneficial: it seemed to have had impacts not only on an individual's poverty reduction, but even more widely on the society. However, this data also provided surprising evidence that, in direct contradiction to Western linear thinking and assumptions about the enormous economic power and benefit of vocational skills for its acquirer gained in VET, even full-time employment did not function as a tool for alleviating poverty and automatically raising the person's living standards. Nevertheless, as was evidenced by the lives of these VET trainees, who experienced positive, significant, sustainable economic, social, and personal education impacts due to the development project MHCC, these material and immaterial socio-economic impact chains were positive and productive and seemed to have had very far-reaching and significant ramifications for the lives of extended families, peers, community members, and the Tanzanian society. A case in point was the informal "private apprenticeship training system" offered by the former students to their relatives, peers and community members; through which one MHCC graduate has unofficially "trained" over 50 persons. Indeed, these socio-economic impacts of education could have been intensified by resourcing and carrying out evaluations frequently as well as by feeding their results forward for the VET institution's service improvements (e.g., equipment or entrepreneurial courses for VET graduates). Fourth, the research indicated that jobs in the developing countries were offered in the informal sector and self-employment was, for the majority of graduates, the sole option to be employed. Hence, NGO-implemented VET, with their essential income-generating projects for the institution's sustainability (generally lacking from government-owned VET centres), could operate as an excellent learning environment, strengthening the entrepreneurial spirit. The research findings might have the following applications. First, the worrying trend towards evaluation non-use and/or deficient use is worth acknowledging. Second, evaluation commissioners, initiators, funders, and donors need to gain further knowledge about significant positive or prohibitive contextual, evaluation and human factors (with their related elements) that lie behind evaluation utilisation and impact. For instance, those contextual factors which are related to financial and political constraints and evaluation systems and which negatively affect evaluation utilisation and impacts must be revealed. Third, an attack against the inadequate use of evaluations could be launched among others with processual evaluation use. Fourth, in every evaluation policy and plan in an evaluation commissioning phase, concrete actions need to be made necessary for evaluation utilisation. A written plan on evaluation use with evaluation impacts intended should be demanded to be produced from every evaluation conducted with public funds before the evaluation commissioning phase. Fifth, evaluation use in the vocabulary of evaluation policies and plans should be reconceptualised. All the available key elements of the evaluation use — the evaluation commissioning, evaluation process (not solely evaluation findings) — should be maximally harnessed at all the evaluation levels, also in NGOs, due to the scarcity of funding opportunities available for evaluations, to bring maximal value to a target of the evaluation, its stakeholders and evaluation users. Sixth, evaluation utilisation should be instructed, encouraged and funded. Evaluation stakeholders and their organisations should be rewarded by evaluation commissioners and funders, if the evaluation is used and it contributes to impacts. Seventh, terms such as evaluation impact/impacts need to be clarified, to refer not only to positive evaluation consequences but also to negative, unintended impacts, which must also be tackled.
Marx has a threefold objective in "On the Jewish Question": to respond to Bruno Bauer's views on the same issue; to give us his own standing on the matter of the political emancipation of Jewish populations in Germany and the rest of Europe, while at the same time defining what political emancipation means for each citizen, no matter the religion, in a modern State; and lastly, to show us how political emancipation is not enough and how actual freedom (political plus social) is accessible to all once a new, final and imperative kind of emancipation is obtained: human emancipation. This paper will be divided into two parts: the first one will try to briefly review and explain Marx's text. Particular attention will be given to the differentiation between political and human emancipation and its implications. In this section, Marx's views on Judaism will be clarified by analyzing them on their proper socio-historical context. In the second one, an interesting and, hopefully, appropriate exercise will be put into consideration: taking into account Marx's concerns regarding the possibility of inclusion of a religious minority into the public spheres of a secular State, the Jewish question of 19th century's Europe will be altered into the Muslim question of 21st century's Europe. According to Yoav Peled the main difference between how Bauer and Marx confront the issue of Jewish emancipation is that the former one considers the problem as a theological one, while the latter does it as a sociological one (1). Bauer affirms that not only the Jews are longing for political emancipation, meaning being recognized by the State as equal citizens; but also the rest of the Gentile population is awaiting such recognition. The State cannot emancipate Jews if it still has not emancipated the rest. The Jewry cannot obtain full citizenship if there are no citizens. In order to attain political emancipation the State has to become a secular one, not to recognize any religion as its official one and to extend freedom of religion to all of its citizens. Religious freedom would require religion's removal from the public sphere and its "ostracism" into a private creed. This privatization of religion would eventually abolish it. Nevertheless, Bauer does not consider the Jews capable of becoming free because he does not consider Judaism able to become a private creed. Bauer characterizes Judaism as a religion of law not as, like Christianity, areligion of faith. Being a religion based on actions and not on beliefs would completely be opposed to freedom of religion, to its own removal from the public sphere. Judaism could not become free because there is a chance that its laws would contradict the laws of the State. Marx, instead, affirms that Jews (and Christians), in order to be really emancipated do not have to abandon Judaism in a theological way, but have to do it in a sociological manner. Political emancipation as stated by Bauer is not the final possible form of emancipation, but it is the last possible form of emancipation within the framework of the prevailing social order. For example, according to Marx the citizens of the United States of America, which at the time was the best case of a modern secular State, still practiced, and needed to practice, their religious beliefs as private creeds. Then, Bauer was wrong; religion survived the test and did not disappear after political emancipation. As reported by Marx this happened because when religion is expulsed from the sphere of public law to that of private law, religion becomes the spirit of civil society and the essence of differentiation which leads to, and presupposes, inequality. Political emancipation divides the human being into two antagonistic spheres: the individual, who is egoistic by nature and based in inequality and corresponds to civil society; and the citizen, who is based in common solidarity and equality and complements with the State. This separation can only be overcome by human emancipation. Human emancipation is the final and real kind of reachable and desired emancipation by all human beings. Human emancipation would erase all deficiencies that are found in civil society: private property, insecurity and religion. Human emancipation would, then, end social inequality. Only then, humans would achieve real and total freedom. Only when the individual and the citizen would synthesize their antagonisms in the species-being would humanity be free from all its social and political constraints and a truly democratic State would appear. (2)Marx's views on Judaism have been defined as anti-Semitic by several critics; but it is not the case (3). First of all, Marx was a strong advocate for political emancipation to the Jewish communities in Europe, especially in Germany, and he believed, in opposition to Bauer, that the Jewry was fully capable of becoming citizens in a secular State by privatizing their creed. Although, it has to be said that Marx, like Bauer, considered Judaism to be a religion based on laws; he did not directly consider the case if Judaism could withstand the transformation to a private form. Orthodox Jews, for example, would not become suitable for citizenship in the modern secular State. Because Marx could not resolve this argument in a direct form he chose to solve it by taking Judaism in its socio-historical context instead than in a purely theological way. To Marx Jews have embodied the mercantile spirit in a natural economy dominated Europe (4). Jews did not choose to be merchants or entrepreneurs: feudal society limited them to those kinds of activities. They could not legally own land or be members of any corporate guild. Jews could only deal with money or goods exchange(5). Then, Jews could only be considered as bourgeois, as capitalists, as financiers. Even if, like Marx says, the Jewish mercantile particularity had already generalized through the Christian world and there was no economic basis for distinguishing between Jews and Gentiles, which allowed the Jews to practically self-emancipate by the "Judaization" of society; the general public was still perceiving Judaism as a synonymous of "merchants"(6). It is rather interesting to note that in 1850 half of all entrepreneurs in Berlin were Jews and that in 1861 58% of the Prussian Jewry was engaged in commerce and credit, while only 2% of Christians was similarly employed (7). When Marx calls for the abolition of Judaism, he is calling for the abolition of the economic activity that was a reflection of the Jews social-historical role in society; he is calling for the end of the mercantile/capitalist elements that produce social inequality. The abolition of Judaism means the abolition of all religions through the correction of the secular defect of civil society(8). Finally, Marx's views on the political emancipation of a religious minority and of social emancipation as the only way to end all inequalities and distinctions could be helpful in order to understand the current Muslim Question that is concerning much of Europe. The Muslim question is significantly different from 19th century's Jewish question. Jews were asking for the State's recognition of the same basic constitutional rights that Christians already, or were about to, benefited from. Additionally, liberal-secularists, like Bauer, were concerned about Judaism's capability to remove their religious practices from the public sphere and privatize them. According to them, it was essential for the survival of the modern secular State that its citizens should exclude their religious distinctiveness from all of their public interactions with the State or with other fellow citizens. Today, Muslims in Europe enjoy all of the individual and social rights that are recognized in each of the European Constitutions; meaning political emancipation is not an issue. It is Islam's interactions with the secular, and almost irreligious, European public spheres that has become on of the most fervent debates in the last few years. Such debate extremely overcomes the purpose of this article, but a few points should be taken into account regarding the Muslim question and the relevance of Marx's work on the matter. Marx, just like with the political emancipation of the Jews, would not have been able to directly confront the possibility of a real privatization of Islamic beliefs, because he would have faced the same issue that arose in the Jewish question: Islam, like Judaism, is a religious of laws. As it has been said, a religion of laws will almost certainly contradict the laws of a secular State and would not be able to refrain from interrelate with the public sphere. For example, teachers wearing a Muslim veil or turban in public schools; Muslim women wearing burqas in public facilities; the introduction of Sharia law in order to legalize social relationships within Muslim communities and in their relations with non-Muslim communities; etc., are challenges to the secular State. Several European countries are juggling between the right of freedom of religion and absolute secularism(9): France chooses to ban burqas in public spaces; the Netherlands to expel teachers from public schools that insisted in wearing veils or turbans in class; Italy to reform family law in order to stop "honor killings" among Muslim families; etc. But like with Judaism, Marx would overcome Islam's inability to privatize its creed by arguing that such incapability is a symptom of the antagonism between civil society (the individual egoistic man) and the State (the solidary citizen) and that will never be surpassed until human emancipation is obtained. Interestingly enough, while during the 19th century Jews were an equivalent to bourgeois and entrepreneurs, Muslims of the 21st century, on the other hand, are identified with other kinds of socio-economic characterization. Muslims are identified either as proletarians or as lumpenproletarians. Remarkably, the occupational standing of 84% of Muslims living in Germany is either blue or white collar; compared to just 40% of non-Muslims Germans (10); 20% of young non-Muslim French are unemployed compared to 50% of young French Muslims(11); 9% of non-Muslim Dutch are unemployed, while 30% of Dutch Muslims are jobless(12); 10% of non-Muslim Belgians live below the poverty line, while 60% of Muslim Belgians are poor(13); 15% of non-Muslim British households are in poverty, but that percentage ascends to 55% when Muslim British households are considered(14). In Europe 80% of Muslim men are employed in low-skill/low-wage jobs and in routine manual and service occupations, only 45% of non-Muslim men are employed in the same kind of jobs(15). Finally, when the Human Development Index is taken into account and it is divided among the Muslim and non-Muslim population in the European countries it is evidenced that the standard of living of Muslim communities is significantly lower than that of the rest (16). This brief and expedited socio-economic context of Muslims in Europe would be employed by Marx in order to circumvent Islam's inability to privatize its creed: Muslims, although they live in modern secular States and enjoy political emancipation, persist in carrying on with their religious practices in public spaces, and sometimes in opposition to public laws, because they are suffering social inequality; they are suffering from not attaining human emancipation. Of course, all human beings lack of human emancipation, not only Muslims in Europe, but it is Muslims' special socio-economic situation in Europe that creates a secular deficiency from political emancipation and prevents their religion's transformation into a private creed. Jews did not have political emancipation and were, in their majority, entrepreneurs, which gave them a better socio-economic standing and allowed them to privatize their religion once political emancipation was conquered. Most of European Muslims, in contrast, are proletarians and, in worst cases, lumpenproletarians (17)and even if they enjoy political emancipation they find themselves in a position characterized by an extreme social inequality, that does not allow many of them to privatize their creed (18). Only through human emancipation and social equality they would be able to negate their religious differentiation; because in a true democratic State, a communist State according to Marx, communism itself would act as a religious belief and manner of living. That is, perhaps, how Marx intended to accomplish the abolition of all religions: by the emergence of a new politically and socially equal "religion for all human beings", that of communism.(1) Peled Yoad; "From Theology to Sociology: Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx on the Question of Jewish Emancipation";History of Political Thought; Vol. XIII, No. 3, Autumn, 1992. (2) Marx borrows the concept of species-being from Feuerbach. It seems to be implied in the text, although it is more possible to be influenced by later Marx's texts, that revolution is the mean to obtain human emancipation; the mean that those who suffer from social inequality will use in order to end that suffering. Once human emancipation is reached then the democratic/communist State is at hand. Again, this is not actually said in On the Jewish Question. (3) See Flannery Edward, Antisemitism: Myth and Hate from Antiquity to the Present, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005, pp.154-157; and Lewis Bernard, Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1999, pp. 112.(4) Peled Yoad; "From Theology to Sociology: Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx on the Question of Jewish Emancipation"; History of Political Thought; Vol. XIII, No. 3, Autumn, 1992, pp. 475. (5) It was this image of the "financial Jew", embodied in the Rothschild dynasty, which begot the western anti-Semitic wave of the 19th and 20th century. See Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Benediction Books, New York, 2009; Ferguson Niall, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World, Penguin, New York, 2009; Ferguson Niall, The House of Rothschild, Penguin, New York, 2000; Landes David,Dynasties: Fortunes and Misfortunes of the World's Great Family Businesses, Penguin, New York, 2007.(6) Actually, the word "Judentum" came to be a synonymous with commerce.(7) Sorkin David, The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780-1840, Wayne State University Press, New York, 1999, pp. 108-9.(8) Peled Yoad; "From Theology to Sociology: Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx on the Question of Jewish Emancipation"; History of Political Thought; Vol. XIII, No. 3, Autumn, 1992, pp. 481.(9) For more about the interaction of Muslim minorities and political liberalism in a Rawlsian version see Benhenda, Mostapha, "For Muslim Minorities, it is Possible to Endorse Political Liberalism, but this is not Enough", Journal Of Islamic Law and Culture, Vol. 11, No. 2, May 2009, pp. 71-87. The article concludes that almost all Muslim minorities could and will endorse political liberalism, but many will not be able to do it because of a religious normative prohibition to reform their doctrine.(10) "Muslim Life in Germany", Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, German Government, http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Migration/Publikationen/Forschung/Forschungsberichte/fb6-muslimisches-leben,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/fb6-muslimisches-leben.pdf(11) "Muslims in Europe", Open Society Institute; http://www.soros.org/initiatives/home/articles_publications/publications/muslims-europe-20091215/a-muslims-europe-20100302.pdf(12) Ibid.(13) Ibid.(14) Ibid.(15) Ibid.(16) For example, the HDI of Spain, Italy, Great Britain, France, Germany and Sweden are: 0,955; 0,951; 0,947; 0,961; 0.947 and 0,963 respectively; while the HDI of their respective Muslim communities are: 0,841; 0, 848; 0, 830; 0, 850; 0, 860; 0,912. Available at the European Social Survey http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ (17) Loïc Wacquant would call them "urban outcasts" or marginal. See Wacquant Loïc, Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality, Polity, Cambridge, 2007; Wacquant Loïc, Prisons of Poverty, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2009; Wacquant Loïc, Los Condenados de la ciudad. Gueto, peripherias, Estado, Siglo XII Editores, Buenos Aires, 2007.(18) Certainly they are more religious than Christian and Jewish Europeans because they are perceived as a marginalized minority and in fierce competition with non-Muslim proletarians. It is civil society that enforces religious differentiation on them.*Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.
The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) learned with immense shock and sadness of the passing on of Professor Samir Amin on Sunday, 12th August 2018. Subsequently, Prof. Samir Amin's body was interned at Père Lachaise in Paris on 1st September 2018 at a site provided by the French Communist Party. The Council was represented at the burial by Prof. Fatow Sow and Dr. Cherif Sy; two members of the CODESRIA community who have worked with Samir Amin for a while. For CODESRIA, this marks nothing less than the end of an era in the history of African social research given the many pioneering roles the late Professor Amin played as a scholar, teacher, mentor, friend, and revolutionary. Samir was many things to us as a Council; for the younger members of the community, it meant much more to be in his company at the numerous CODESRIA meeting he attended. A model for three generations of African and, indeed, radical scholars globally, Samir was that giant Baobab tree whose grandeur of intellect and spirit made him a worthy role model. While serving as Director of the United Nations African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP), he hosted the initial scaffolding of the CODESRIA at IDEP, brought together and nurtured new talent that laid the foundations which launched Council on a path of growth and resilience to what it is to-date. As the final note on his reflections contained in this Bulletin illustrates, while serving as CODESRIA's founding Executive Secretary, Samir worked very closely with Abdalla Bujra and later Thandika Mkandawire, to shape the initial years of CODESRIA's intellectual identity and trajectory. After CODESRIA relocated from the premises of IDEP to a new home in the Fann Residence part of Dakar, Samir Amin remained engaged with Council and its community of scholars, participating actively and effectively in all its activities. This 15th General Assembly of CODESRIA is perhaps the first Assembly without Samir Amin presence. In all previous General Assemblies, Samir has been a notable presence even giving the Cheikh Anta Diop Lecture at the 10 Assembly in Kampala, Uganda. It is at the General Assembly that many young academics interacted with Samir, often for the first time and indeed experiencing the awe of his presence. Though Samir is absent at the current Assembly, there is no doubt that his intellectual and revolutionary spirit is definitely present just as the thoughts and ideas that he shared so generously and to the very end will continue to inspire reflection and debate. Samir Amin's intellectual journey was a long and illustrious one. It was a journey marked by commitments that distinguished him as a scholar of unparalleled convictions. He died still an unapologetic socialist academic or, as the title of his memoir reads, 'an independent Marxist' whose work was driven by an unshakeable conviction to confront and oppose totalizing economic orthodoxies. He treated this confrontation and opposition as a prelude to social transformation. He was steadfast in his belief that the world must shift away from capitalism and strive to build new 'post-capitalist' societies. He described capitalism as a small bracket in the long history of human civilization. His works identify and record the multiple crises of capitalism, a system he described as senile and obsolete. In its place, Samir Amin formulated a political alternative that he envisioned would proceed by i) socializing the ownership of monopolies, ii). definancializing the management of the economy and iii) deglobalising international relations [cited in Campbell, 2015: 286]. For him, these three directions provided the basis of an active politics of dismantling capitalism; a politics he committed his skill and energy mobilizing for. Even as he grew older, he mustered fresh bursts of energy to continue the struggle and to the very last days when he was in Dakar, he was apart of the team of scholar/ activists gathered together by International ENDA Third World Network to draft the Alternative Report on Africa (Dakar, 2018). CODESRIA was apart of this process and the Report will by shared at this General Assembly. Many of Samir Amin's writings make the point repeatedly on the urgent necessity to dismantle the 'obsolete system' known as capitalism. However, none was as emphatic in rethinking the underlying cultural underpinning of the 'obsolete system' like Eurocentricism. In that engaging publication, he provided a rggesounding critique of world history as is centered around Eurocentric modernity and invites us to understand modernity as an incomplete process that, to survive its current crises, will need 'economic, social and political reconstruction of all societies in the world.' Embedded in this argument is a long held position about the importance of the Bandung moment (1955) as a moment of an alternative globalization based on Afro-Asian solidarity. It is from this perspective that one understands why Samir Amin emphasized the importance of China [see tribute by Sit Tsui and Yan Xiaohui in this bulletin]. Afro-Asian solidarity was the basis upon which Samir Amin located his alternative politics which also defined his towering global outlook and presence. There is no doubt that Samir Amin's intellectual presence was defined by depth of knowledge, complexity of thought and fidelity to Marxist organising principles. There is no way of summarizing the corpus of work he produced, the revolutionary engagements he undertook and the transformative potential that led him to remain steadfast even when many others were only too happy to find a good reason to backtrack and conform. His work is enormous in volume but also in the depth of its knowledge and relevance to society. He provoked and joined debates across the globe but more importantly with comrades in Latin America and Asia, those of the dependency and underdevelopment school but also later from a South-South perspective. In CODESRIA's flagship journal Africa Development alone, Samir Amin published twenty articles. A biodata document he shared with the Council has 24 books in English and 41 in French. He is published in English, French, Arabic, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish to name but these few languages. In all these publications and in the various languages, Samir Amin articulated his belief in alternatives, and as indicated above, this belief remained strong even to the last month of his life on earth. Born to an Egyptian father and French mother on 3rd September 1931 in Cairo, Egypt, Samir Amin's convictions owe much to the context of his childhood all the way from Port Said in northern Egypt to Cairo where he schooled. He spent his early life in Egypt where he attended his formative schooling before proceeding to France to pursue higher education at Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris ("Sciences Po"). Here, he earned a diploma in 1952 and later a PhD in 1957 at the Sorbonne. Samir later earned another diploma in mathematical statistics from L'institut national de la statistique et des etudes economiques. He had always been interested in radical thought and action from early on, noting in an interview that he already considered himself a communist in Secondary School. Even though he and his cohort did not know what communism really meant in their early childhood, they assumed it meant "equality between human beings and between nations, and it meant that this has been done by the Russian revolution." It is not surprising that with this pedigree, Samir Amin focused in his graduate research on "The origins of underdevelopment – capitalist accumulation on a world scale" and emphasized in his work that underdevelopment in the periphery was, in large measure, due to the working of the capitalist system. He consequently underscored the need to search for socialist alternatives to liberal globalisation. Samir Amin returned to Cairo in 1957, worked briefly in Gamal Abdel Nasser's Institute for Economic Management (1957–1960) before heading to work as an adviser in the Ministry of Planning in Mali (1960- 1963). Subsequently, Samir Amin's intellectual life became largely internationalist in orientation, and anchored principally on the question of accumulation as key to understanding underdevelopment. He maintained the sojourn between France where he took up a Professorship in 1966 and Dakar, Senegal his adopted home where he worked for ten years, from 1970 to 1980 at IDEP. Later in 1980, he founded the Third World Forum, originally hosted at the CODESRIA Secretariat, and lent his considerable weight to the institutionalisation of ENDA and the World Forum for Alternatives. His support for revolutionary politics is marked not just in the books and papers he published but also in the lecture circuit where he spoke to audiences about the undeniable relevance of radical politics. Samir Amin's thinking was in large measure defined by the solidarity built around the Bandung Confer- ence of 1955. This remained a critical touchstone in his work in which non-western civilisations and his- tories played an important role. Bandung, for him, inaugurated a different pattern of globalisation, the one he called 'negotiated globalisation.' Though not asufficientbasisforcomplete"de-linking"from'ob- solescent capitalism', Samir Amin saw in Afro-Asian solidarity possibilities and pathways to that delinking; the process, as he explained, by which you submit "ex- ternal relations to the needs of internal progressive so- cial changes and targets." The notion of 'delinking' oc- cupied a major place in Samir Amin's thinking and is positioned in contrast to 'adjustment' that was the pre- ferred approach of the Bretton Woods Institutions. As Mamdani shows elsewhere in this Bulletin, there are major problematic elements of this notion that Samir Amin continued to grapple with. But ultimately, Samir Amin noted that delinking is in fact a process that, de- pending on the societies implementing it, can be used to install graduated level of autonomous development instead of countries in the periphery remaining locked into and merely adjusting to the trends set by a funda- mentally unequal capitalist system. In Samir Amin, we found the true meaning of praxis; a thinker who insisted that his work has immediate relevance to society. His departure deprives us of the practical energy he brought to our meetings and debates; and denies radical thinkers a model around whom they found the compass that enabled them to navigate the treacherous, indeed murderous, waters of capitalism. We however are lucky to have lived in his company, to have learned from his fountain of knowledge and to have shared in the passion of his convictions. The Council plans to invigorate the value of his legacy by celebrating him during this 15th General Assembly but also beyond the confines of the Assembly. Thus, this edition of the Bulletin contains two intertwined sets of essays; all organised around Samir Amin. In the one instance, we have a selection of messages in his memory. One the other, we have a selection of essays he authored. Separately, we will re-publish all the essays he published in Africa Development in a special issue of the journal to provide them in one collection for posterity. But whichever way, and as his own reflection in the essay published in this volume and his memoirs show, CODESRIA is an inheritance that Samir Amin bequeathed the African social science community. As such, it is fitting that the Bulletin designed for the 15th CODESRIA General Assembly is also a Bulletin that publishes essays in his honour. The choice of theme for the General Assembly predates the passing on of Samir Amin. But the theme itself is one that was dear to Samir Amin. It is our pleasure therefore to present the essays contained here as essays that shed light on a life lived fully but also that open up a space to explore the unfulfilled promises of globalisation. We hope that at the end of it, this will be a fitting study in honour of our departed icon but also a commentary on the key issues the 15th General Assembly explored.
Natürliche Ressourcen bilden die Lebensgrundlage vieler ländlicher Haushalte in Entwicklungsländern. Die Auswirkungen unklarer Eigentumsrechte, extremer Armut, nicht funktionierender Märkte und Institutionen trägt dazu bei, dass natürliche Ressourcen, mit samt den Gemeinschaften, die von ihnen abhängen, dem Risiko der Gemeingüter-Tragik ausgesetzt sind. Gemeinschaftliches Management natürlicher Ressourcen (CBNRM) ist ein Ansatz, der es Gemeinschaften ermöglicht, ihre natürlichen Ressourcen nachhaltig zu nutzen, und damit ökonomische Entwicklung und soziale Gleichheit verbessert. CBNRM erfreut sich immer größerer Beliebtheit in Afrika südlich der Sahara, und sowohl Regierungs- als auch Nichtregierungsorganisationen fördern die Vorteile des Programms. Die wenigen empirischen Studien, die sich mit den ökonomischen und ökologischen Auswirkungen CBNRMs beschäftigen, kommen allerdings zu unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen hinsichtlich positiver oder negativer Programmauswirkungen. Diese Arbeit verfolgt daher einen ganzheitlichen Ansatz. Mit Hilfe einer detaillierten Fallstudie in einem CBNRM Gebiet (das Sikunga Naturschutzgebiet) in der nordöstlichen Sambesi Region Namibias werden drei spezifische Forschungsziele verfolgt. Es geht konkret darum, (1) unterschiedliche Existenzstrategien innerhalb der Gemeinschaft zu identifizieren, die jeweiligen Unterschiede in der Ressourcennutzung zu erkennen, und zu analysieren, wie diese Unterschiede die ökonomische Gleichheit in der Gemeinschaft bedingen, (2) die ökonomischen Verbindungen zwischen den verschiedenen ökologischen und nicht-ökologischen Aktivitäten innerhalb der CBNRM-Wirtschaft zu untersuchen; und (3) zu analysieren, wie individuelle und ökologische Faktoren Kooperation zum Schutz der natürlichen Ressourcen schwächen. Die ersten beiden Zielstellungen wurden anhand einer Befragung von 200 Haushalten aus dem Sikunga Naturschutzgebiet untersucht, die im September und Oktober 2012 durchgeführt wurde. Der Datensatz umfasst detaillierte Informationen über Einkommensquellen, Zeitallokation, Konsum und Ausgaben, Nutzung natürlicher Ressourcen, Viehwirtschaft und Pflanzenproduktion. Außerdem wurden Informationen zu sozio-demographischen Haushaltseigenschaften und Sozialkapital gesammelt. Für die Analyse des Datensatzes wurden zwei aufeinander aufbauende empirische Strategien genutzt. Entsprechend der ersten Zielstellung, wurde eine zweistufige Clusteranalyse durchgeführt, die die Haushalte anhand ihrer jeweiligen Existenzstrategie in unikale Gruppen (Cluster) kategorisiert. Diese Haushaltscluster wurden dann benutzt, um eine ökologisch-erweiterte Social Accounting Matrix (ESAM) zu entwickeln. Diese ESAM diente als Grundlage zur Durchführung unbeschränkter und beschränkter Multiplikatoranalysen, um, entsprechend der zweiten Zielstellung, die Verbindungen zwischen ökologischen und nicht-ökologischen Aktivitäten innerhalb der Gemeinschaft zu identifizieren. Zur Bearbeitung der dritten Zielstellung wurde eine Serie von Lab-in-the-Field-Experimenten zur Eruierung des Kollektivgut-Verhaltens der Gemeinschaftsmitglieder im Sikunga Naturschutzgebiet im September und Oktober 2014 durchgeführt, wobei die Haushalte nur teilweise mit denen aus der vorangegangen Welle übereinstimmen. Die experimentellen Daten sind in Paneldatenform und erlauben daher die Anwendung von Generalized Least Squares Random Effects und Poisson Random Effects Modellen. Methodisch trägt diese Arbeit zum gegenwärtigen Forschungsstand in der Verhaltensökonomie in der Literatur zu öffentlichen Gütern auf verschiedene Weise bei. Erstens beinhaltet das Kollektivgut-Experiment tatsächliche Anstrengungen seitens der Teilnehmer, welche sowohl im Feld als auch im Labor durchgeführt werden können. Während tatsächliche Anstrengungen im Labor im Laufe der Zeit zum Standard geworden sind, steht die Umsetzung im Feld vor allerlei Herausforderungen. Zum Beispiel hängen diese Aufgaben von Fähigkeiten zu rechnen und zu lesen, oder von einfachen physischen Eigenschaften wie der Sehstärke, ab. Besonders in ländlichen Gebieten Afrikas südlich der Sahara sind diese Fähigkeiten unter dem Niveau der westlichen Welt. In dieser Arbeit wird eine tatsächliche Anstrengung so modelliert, dass diese Fallstricke überwunden werden können. Zweitens, ist dies die erste empirische Studie, die konsistent die Auswirkungen von Risiko in einem Kollektivgutexperiment untersucht, indem Risiko simultan auf das private und das öffentliche Gut angewandt wird. Durch den Vergleich des Teilnehmerverhaltens in einem risiko-neutralen und in einem risiko-behafteten Kontext in zwei aufeinanderfolgenden Experimenten, ist es möglich, den Effekt von Risikoaversion und Wahrscheinlichkeitsgewichtung zu kontrollieren und letztlich den Einfluss von Risiko auf Kooperationsverhalten zu identifizieren. Auf diese Weise trägt diese Arbeit eine neue Dimension zum, von Ostrom entwickelten, Teufelskreis der Kooperation bei. Drittens ermöglicht das Experiment die Quantifizierung des Risikoeffekts auf das Anstrengungslevel in einer kontrollierten Umgebung. Während viele Studien quasi-experimentelle Methoden anwendeten, erfolgt in dieser Arbeit die Quantifizierung des Risikoeffekts zum ersten Mal in einer kontrollierten Umgebung. Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit liefern neue Erkenntnisse in der Verhaltensökonomie zu Kollektivgütern und können zu einer Verbesserung der Programmgestaltung von CBNRMs beitragen. Erstens ist die Wirtschaftsstruktur in der Studienregion zugunsten der wohlhabenderen Haushalte ausgerichtet und zu denen, die näher an den Hauptinfrastrukturen leben, wie Straßen und Elektrizität. Mit Hilfe des Programms konnten Eigentumsrechte auf die Gemeinschaft übertragen werden, aber ohne Entwicklungsstrategien, die speziell die verletzlichen Haushalte in der Gemeinschaft unterstützen, konnte die Elite durch kommerziellen Abbau und Handel größere Renditen aus den natürlichen Ressourcen ziehen. Ärmere Haushalte sind dagegen weiterhin auf die natürlichen Ressourcen zur Deckung ihres Eigenbedarfs angewiesen. Zweitens, unter Berücksichtigung der biologischen Grenzen des Naturschutzgebietes, gibt es nur wenig ökonomische Integration zwischen den ökologischen und nicht-ökologischen Aktivitäten innerhalb der Dorfgemeinschaft. Im Gegensatz dazu, gibt es starke Verbindungen zwischen verschiedenen ökonomischen Aktivitäten mit erhöhter Nachfrage für eine bestimmte Ressource. Dies führt zu erhöhter Nachfrage für die meisten anderen Rohstoffe, anstatt zur Stimulation anderer Sektoren außerhalb des Rohstoffabbaus in der Dorfgemeinschaft. Daher dürfte es für die Gemeinschaft schwer sein, ihr Einkommen aus dem CBNRM-Programm zur Diversifizierung ihrer wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten zu nutzen und langfristig aus der Ressourcennutzung herauszukommen. Drittens identifiziert diese Arbeit potentielle verhaltensökonomische Faktoren, die die positiven Auswirkungen des CBNRMs beschränken könnten. Die Ergebnisse des Lab-in-the-Field-Experiments zeigen, dass Risiko Aufwands- und Kooperationsbereitschaft negativ beeinflusst. In einem risiko-neutralen Kontext waren Haushalte eher bereit, in öffentliche Güter zu investieren als in einem risiko-behafteten Kontext. Weiterhin wurde belegt, dass gemeinsame Strategien zur Verbesserung der Kooperation und Kommunikation in Gegenwart von Risiko nicht effektiv sind. Dies hebt eine potentielle Schwachstelle des CBNRM Programmdesigns hervor, wobei die Risiken des gemeinschaftlichen Vermögens und Unternehmen weder abgemildert noch versichert sind. Diese nicht versicherten Risiken könnten für Haushalte Anreiz sein, sich von der Gemeinschaft abzusetzen und in ihr eigenes Unternehmen zu investieren, zum Beispiel in die Umwandlung von gemeinschaftseigenen Lebensraum für Wildtiere in privates landwirtschaftliches Eigentum. Insgesamt zeigen die Ergebnisse dieser Fallstudie, dass das CBNRM Programm wahrscheinlich nur begrenzt Vorteile für die Forschungsregion haben wird. In Hinsicht auf die Literatur deuten die Ergebnisse an, warum die ökonomischen Effekte von CBNRM bisher nicht eindeutig sind. Es wird empfohlen, verschiedene Methoden und empirische Strategien, die sowohl individuelle Haushalte als auch ihre Überlebensstrategien ins Zentrum stellen, in der Analyse zu berücksichtigen. Letztlich suggerieren die Ergebnisse des Experiments, dass die Gegenwart ungemilderter Risiken eine Bedrohung für Gemeinschaftsprojekte, die auf Kooperation bauen, darstellt. Akteure aus der Entwicklungspraxis könnten daher in Betracht ziehen, wie Gemeinschaften gegenüber Risiken, wie Niederschlagsveränderungen oder Konflikte zwischen Wildtieren und Menschen, versichert werden können. ; In remote areas of developing countries, the livelihoods of many rural households are highly dependent on natural resources. However, the impact of poorly defined property rights, extreme levels of poverty, dysfunctional markets and government institutions place the natural resources, and the communities that depend on them, at risk of becoming another tale of the "tragedy of the commons". Community based natural resource management (CBNRM) was promoted as an approach that would enable communities to sustainably manage their natural resources which would also enhance economic development and economic and social equality. CBRNM has become increasingly popular in sub-Saharan Africa, and governments and NGOs alike continue to promote the perceived benefits of CBNRM programmes. The few extant empirical studies, however, that investigate economic and environmental impacts of CBNRM derive inconsistent conclusions whether CBNRM impacts are positive or negative. The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the role of social, natural, physical, human and financial capital in influencing the impact of CBNRMs. This thesis therefore takes a holistic approach by means of a detailed case study on a single CBNRM area (the Sikunga Conservancy) in the north-eastern Zambezi region of Namibia, this thesis focuses on three specific research objectives: (1) to identify the different livelihood strategies within the community, to investigate the extent to which different strategies utilize natural resources, and to analyse how this improves economic equality within the community; (2) to examine the economic linkages between the different environmental and non-environmental activities within the CBNRM-economy; and (3) to investigate how individual and environmental factors may degrade cooperation to protect natural resources. The first two objectives are met using household survey data from 200 households in the Sikunga Conservancy collected in September and October 2012. The data set contains detailed information on income sources, time-use, consumption and expenditure data, harvesting of natural resources, livestock and crop management. Information on each household's socio-demographics and social capital was also collected. The survey data is utilized in two different empirical strategies that build upon each other. To meet the first research objective, a two-step cluster analysis is conducted, identifying the unique groups of households within the study area which adopt similar livelihood strategies. The household clusters were 9 then used to develop an environmentally extended village social accounting matrix (ESAM). According to the second objective, the ESAM serves as a basis to conduct a series of unconstrained and constrained multiplier analyses to identify the linkages between environmental and non-environment based activities, and the different household groups and other institutions within the community. The third objective is addressed via a series of artefactual lab-in-the-field experiments to elicit community members' behaviour towards public goods that were conducted in the same community, with a partial overlap between households, in September and October 2014. The lab-in-the-field experiment data follows the form of panel data. As such, a series of Generalized Least Squares Random Effects and Poisson Random Effects models are applied. Methodologically, the thesis makes several contributions to the current research of behavioural economics in public good literature. First, it provides a real-effort based public good game which can be implemented in the field as well as in laboratories. Whilst laboratory real-effort tasks are common place and have been relatively standardized over time, the conduct in the field has several challenges. For example, these tasks are heavily biased towards basic levels of numeracy, literacy or even simple physical characteristics such as level of sight. Especially in rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa where numeracy and literacy levels may be well below the western world, and simple things such as sight or hearing deprivation remain untreated. This thesis details a real-effort task which overcomes these constraints by utilising a simple physical sorting task. Second, it is the first empirical study of its kind to consistently examine the impact of risk in a public good game; by simultaneously applying risk to the private and public goods. By comparing participants' behaviours in a risk neutral and risky setting in two sequential public good games the experiment is able to limit the impact of risk aversion and probability weighting and finally, identify the impacts of risk on cooperative behaviour. In this way, it adds a new dimension to the virtuous circle of cooperation developed by Ostrom. Furthermore, by utilising a real-effort based experiment, it also quantifies the impact of risk on exertion levels in a controlled environment. Whilst many studies have used quasi-experimental methods and econometrics to quantify the impact of risk on effort levels, this is the first time that it has been quantified in a controlled environment. Empirically, the results obtained in this thesis contribute to existing knowledge and help improve CBNRM programme designs. Firstly, in the study area, the structure of the economy is heavily biased towards the wealthier households, and those located near the main infrastructure such as roads and electricity. CBNRM has transferred property rights for natural resources to the community, but without development policies that specifically target vulnerable households within the community the elite and wealthy households have been able to extract greater rents from the natural resources via more commercial harvesting and trading. Poorer households largely continue to rely on natural resources for subsistence. Secondly, when the biological limits of the conservancy are taken into consideration, there is little economic integration between the environmental and non-environmental activities within the village economy. Conversely, there are strong interlinkages within different environmental activities, with increased demand for natural resources, leading to increased demand for most other environmental resources, rather than stimulating other off-farm sectors within the village economy. Therefore, communities may struggle to use income derived from CBNRM to diversify their economy and shift away from natural resource consumption. Thirdly, as well as highlighting the importance of the local underlying economic structures when designing CBNRM programmes, this study also identifies potential behavioural factors which may limit the positive impact of CBNRM. The results of the lab-in-the-field experiment show that risk negatively impacts on effort and cooperation levels. Faced with pay-off equivalent situations, households were more likely to invest in public goods in risk neutral contexts than in risky contexts. Furthermore, common strategies to enhance cooperation such as communication and observation proved to be ineffective in the presence of risk. This highlights a potential flaw in the design of many CBNRM programmes where the risk to community owned assets and enterprises are unmitigated and uninsured. The uninsured risks in community assets may create the incentive for households to reduce their contributions to public goods and invest in their own private assets and enterprises, to the detriment of community-owned ones such as the conversion of community-owned wildlife grazing lands to private land for agriculture. Overall the results of the case study show that the CBNRM programme in the study area is likely to have limited benefits. With respect to the literature they may help to explain why the literature to date onthe economic impacts of CBNRM has been inconclusive. It is recommended to consider multiple methods and empirical strategies that consider individual households and livelihood strategies at the centre of analysis. Finally, the experiment results suggest that the presence of unmitigated risk poses a threat to community projects that are dependent on cooperation. Development practitioners may need to consider ways of insuring community projects against risks such as weather and wild-life conflicts.
El Departamento Archipiélago de San Andrés, Providencia y Santa Catalina es una región que cuenta con una dotación de recursos naturales, una comunidad étnica rica en cultura e identidad, y una localización estratégica, que le permite estar bien posicionada para competir en el Siglo XXI. Después de algunos años de iniciado el proceso de apertura, y de cambios sistemáticos de su modelo económico, aún padece de problemas fundamentales en el medio ambiente competitivo colombiano que deben ser resueltos de manera decidida y oportuna. Siendo el único departamento Insular necesita explorar y diversificar su base exportadora. Desarrollar el recurso humano avanzado, superar sus deficiencias de infraestructura y mejorar sus condiciones internas para atraer inversión extranjera directa y desarrollar capacidades estratégicas que le permita ser un territorio competitivo. Sin embargo lo más importante y significativo, será el desarrollo de una actitud más agresiva hacia el aprendizaje, el desarrollo de capacidades y la modernización institucional para enfrentar los retos de desarrollo sostenible que le demanda su condición de Reserva de Biosfera. La dependencia de las islas a su modelo tradicional de comercio y turismo, está cambiando, no obstante mientras las exportaciones son casi inexistentes, su naturaleza no refleja un significativo conocimiento nuevo por reorientar su modelo económico, exponiéndose a riesgos asociados al deterioro de su capital natural y una dependencia absoluta a la importación. El estudio presentado a continuación ha mostrado que mientras el volumen absoluto del comercio nacional se ha incrementado, la composición de las exportaciones desaparece, desaprovechando una serie de oportunidades posibles en el territorio. En otras palabras, el archipiélago no ha aprendido a incursionar en mercados sofisticados con productos sofisticados que protejan su capital natural y patrimonio étnico, como elemento diferenciador en el país. Las razones del estancamiento y la inexistencia de la exportación, es la confianza o dependencia que se tiene en las fuentes tradicionales de su modelo económico, no permitiéndole desarrollar ventaja competitiva. Cada vez es más difícil competir si no se cuenta con capacidades estratégicas, ventajas competitivas y un sistema de apoyo de categoría mundial al interno del territorio. En efecto, las capacidades del tejido empresarial de las islas, para desarrollar y mantener estrategias agresivas, se ven limitadas por las restricciones y falencias que encuentran en su medio ambiente competitivo. El tejido empresarial insular continúa adoptando tácticas basadas en las ventajas comparativas que están siendo lesionadas por otras regiones competidoras, que cuentan con iguales ventajas naturales y estrategias similares. Para motivar a las empresas a desarrollar estrategias más sofisticadas, el sector privado y el sector público deben trabajar unidos para mejorar el medio ambiente competitivo y facilitar la creación de ventajas competitivas sustentables o sostenibles, que se basen en el conocimiento y en el continuo mejoramiento. Es imperativo desarrollar objetivos nacionales en torno a los acuerdos de integración comercial sin contemplar las competencias y capacidades locales de aquellos territorios que por su ubicación tienen proximidad con los territorios pactados; esto debería ser una prioridad de aprovechamiento del estado colombiano de utilizar las ventajas comparativas que le da la condición de contar con territorios fronterizos que faciliten procesos de articulación. Por otro lado, las políticas de estado cambian en periodos cortos y no permiten lograr una alineación a largo plazo, omitiendo que fenómenos como la apertura económica demandará competencia internas de adaptación, y las empresas no contaran con la capacidad de elegir opciones estratégicas y desarrollar las capacidades necesaria para defender y expandir su mercados, un ejercicio visible en la balanza comercial de las islas las cuales analizamos en el presente estudio donde se exploraron sus capacidades estratégicas para sostener o realizar una articulación con el Caribe Occidental como zona fronteriza del territorio colombiano, en el marco de los acuerdos existentes. El análisis permitió no solo identificar su capacidad, sino las condiciones de comercio exterior que se están obviando desde el gobierno central en este tipo de estrategias económicas. Para el departamento Insular, como para el país es urgente tomar decisiones que le permitan al sector productivo de las islas competir sosteniblemente, y visibilizar los riesgos a los que podría estar expuesta el modelo económico actual del archipiélago y el poco aprovechamiento que se tiene de las vocaciones locales para generar capacidades que le permita esa sostenibilidad. Es aquí donde lo más importante y necesario es estructurar un proceso en el cual el gobierno y el sector privado trabajen unidos con el objetivo de desarrollar y definir las prioridades locales y al mismo tiempo, garantizar que el sector privado se comprometa a alinear un proceso de desarrollo común y focalizado a las condiciones y capacidades del territorio. Como territorio fronterizo, llego de particularidades por su condición insular, requiere de un mayor entendimiento de las fortalezas competitivas que posee, y de sus debilidades, para hacer clara la selección de una política de comercio y articulación local asertiva. Estas condiciones facilitarán en el largo plazo no solo definir las estrategias que le permitan al sector privado invertir en ventajas sostenibles y fortalecer su capacidad para atender a los consumidores más sofisticados del mundo, sino para responder a las condiciones que la insularidad le establece. El estudio que se presenta, examina en detalle sectores específicos de la economía en las islas y los sitúa en un contexto más amplio de competitividad y capacidades estrategias existentes o posibles de desarrollo, para el aprovechamiento de los acuerdos con países y territorios vecinos. El territorio insular hoy se enfrenta a grandes retos que requieren de grandes decisiones que lo empoderen de un modelo económico decidido y no impuesto, donde es importante tener presente que la competitividad no es algo estático, es un proceso continuo de mejoramiento y de innovación que requiere objetivos precisos, amplios insumos (recursos naturales, recursos humanos, capital, infraestructura), claras estrategias y un medio ambiente que permita adoptar con rapidez aquellas innovaciones que estén basadas en el conocimiento y que se determinen para un proceso de ajuste ; Abstract: The Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina is a region that has natural resources, an ethnic community rich in culture and identity, and a strategic location that allows it to be well positioned to compete in the 21st Century. After a few years of initiating the process of opening up and systematic changes in its economic model, it still suffers from fundamental problems in the competitive Colombian environment that must be resolved in a decisive and timely manner. Being the only insular department, it needs to explore and diversify its export base. Develop the advanced human resource, overcome its infrastructure deficiencies and improve its internal conditions to attract foreign direct investment and develop strategic capabilities that allow it to be a competitive territory. However, the most important and significant will be the development of a more aggressive attitude towards learning, capacity building and institutional modernization to face the challenges of sustainable development that demands its status as a Biosphere Reserve. The dependence of the islands on their traditional model of trade and tourism is changing, yet while exports are almost non-existent, their nature does not reflect significant new knowledge by reorienting their economic model, exposing themselves to risks associated with the deterioration of their natural capital And an absolute dependency on imports. The study presented below has shown that while the absolute volume of domestic trade has increased, the composition of exports disappears, missing a number of possible opportunities in the territory. In other words, the archipelago has not learned to venture into sophisticated markets with sophisticated products that protect its natural capital and ethnic heritage as a differentiating element in the country. The reasons for the stagnation and the non-existence of the export are the confidence or dependence that one has in the traditional sources of his economic model, not allowing him to develop competitive advantage. It is becoming increasingly difficult to compete without strategic capabilities, competitive advant ages and a world-class support system within the territory. In fact, the capacity of the islands' business fabric to develop and maintain aggressive strategies is limited by the restrictions and shortcomings they encounter in their competitive environment. The insular business fabric continues to adopt tactics based on the comparative advantages being hurt by other competing regions, which have the same natural advantages and similar strategies. To motivate companies to develop more sophisticated strategies, the private sector and the public sector must work together to improve the competitive environment and facilitate the creation of sustainable or sustainable competitive advantages based on knowledge and continuous improvement. It is imperative to develop national objectives around trade integration agreements without considering the local competencies and capacities of those territories that, because of their location, are close to the agreed territories; This should be a priority for the Colombian state to use the comparative advantages provided by the condition of having border territories that facilitate articulation processes. On the other hand, state policies change over short periods and do not allow for long-term alignment, omitting that phenomena such as economic openness will require internal adaptive competition, and companies will not have the ability to choose strategic options and develop The necessary capacities to defend and expand their markets, a visible exercise in the trade balance of the islands, which we analyzed in the present study where their strategic capacities were explored to support or articulate with the Western Caribbean as a border area of the Colombian territory, Framework of existing agreements. The analysis allowed not only to identify its capacity, but the foreign trade conditions that are being ignored from the central government in this type of economic strategies. For the Insular Department, as for the country, it is urgent to make decisions that allow the productive sector of the islands to compete sustainably, and to make visible the risks to which the current economic model of the archipelago could be exposed and the little use made of the Local vocations to generate capacities that allow this sustainability. This is where the most important and necessary thing is to structure a process in which the government and the private sector work together with the objective of developing and defining local priorities and, at the same time, ensuring that the private sector is committed to aligning a process of Common development and focused on the conditions and capabilities of the territory. As a frontier territory, it comes from particularities because of its island condition, it requires a greater understanding of the competitive strengths it possesses, and of its weaknesses, to make clear the selection of an assertive local trade and articulation policy. These conditions will facilitate in the long term not only to define the strategies that allow the private sector to invest in sustainable advantages and strengthen their capacity to serve the most sophisticated consumers in the world, but to respond to the conditions that insularity establishes. This study examines in detail specific sectors of the economy in the islands and places them in a broader context of competitiveness and existing or potential development strategies for the exploitation of the agreements with neighboring countries and territories. The island territory today faces major challenges that require major decisions that will empower it with a decided and untaxed economic model, where it is important to keep in mind that competitiveness is not static, it is an ongoing process of improvement and innovation that requires (Natural resources, human resources, capital, infrastructure), clear strategies and an environment that allows rapid adoption of those innovations that are based on knowledge and that is determined for a process of adjustment ; Maestría
Letter From The Representatives Of France, Kuwait, The Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, The United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland And The United States Of America To The United Nations Addressed To The President Of The Security Council ; United Nations S/PV.8217 Security Council Seventy-third year 8217th meeting Tuesday, 27 March 2018, 11.10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Blok . (Netherlands) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Dah Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Orrenius Skau United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/243) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-08569 (E) *1808569* S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 2/21 18-08569 The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/243) The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, to participate in this meeting. Mr. Lowcock is joining today's meeting via video-teleconference from Geneva. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/2018/243, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017). Recalling the latest note by the President of the Security Council on its working methods (S/2017/507), I want to encourage all participants, both members and non-members of the Council, to deliver their statements in five minutes or less. Note 507 also encourages briefers to be succinct and focus on key issues. Briefers are further encouraged to limit initial remarks to 15 minutes or less. I now give the floor to Mr. Lowcock. Mr. Lowcock: As all members of the Council know, the Syrian conflict has now entered its eighth year. When weapons speak, civilians pay the price — a relentless price with horrific violence, bloodshed and unspeakable suffering. The past few months have been some of the worst yet for many civilians in Syria. Today I want to start with the situation in eastern Ghouta. Since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) on 24 February, military operations in eastern Ghouta, in particular air strikes, have reportedly killed more than 1,700 people. Thousands more have been injured. Attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, such as medical facilities, continue to be reported. There have been at least 28 reported attacks on health facilities since mid-February and more than 70 verified incidents since the beginning of the year. The World Health Organization has reported that attacks on health facilities, health workers and health infrastructure were recorded during the first two months of the year at three times the rate that we saw during 2017. In recent weeks in Damascus city, at least 78 people were reportedly killed and another 230 injured by shells fired from eastern Ghouta. That includes reports of at least 35 people killed and scores wounded on 20 March, when Kashkul market in Jaramana, a suburb in the south-eastern part of the city, was struck by a rocket. Tens of thousands of civilians have been displaced from Douma, Harasta, Sagba and Kafr Batna in recent days and weeks. So far, reports indicate that some 80,000 civilians have been taken to places in Damascus city and rural Damascus. Nearly 20,000 combatants and civilians have been transported to locations in north-western Syria. Nearly 52,000 civilians from eastern Ghouta are currently being hosted in eight collective shelters in rural Damascus. That displaced population has endured months of limited access to food, medical care and other essential items. In the words of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, Ali Al-Za'tari, who met and spoke to some of them, those people are "tired, hungry, traumatized and afraid". Most of the collective shelters do not have the capacity or infrastructure to accommodate such large numbers of people. They are extremely overcrowded and severely lacking in basic water, sanitation and hygiene facilities. There are a number of serious protection concerns related to risks of gender-based violence, unaccompanied and separated children and restrictions on movement. The United Nations is not in charge of the management of those shelters. However, since 13 March, together with humanitarian partners, we have mobilized a rapid response to provide evacuees with basic support in close coordination with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and other local partners. So far, more than 130,000 non-food items have been distributed, 130 emergency 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 3/21 toilets have been installed, and water trucking services have been provided to most shelters. In addition, supplies to feed more than 50,000 people and a total of 38 mobile health teams and 18 mobile medical teams are currently providing support to those in need inside the shelters. Humanitarian organizations also need access to the people still trapped within eastern Ghouta, in particular in Douma, where fighting and siege continue. The United Nations and its partners are ready to proceed to Douma with food for up to 16,500 people, as well as health, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene supplies, but facilitation letters need to be signed by the Government of Syria. I reiterate the Secretary-General's call on all parties to fully respect international humanitarian law and human rights law in order to ensure immediate humanitarian access and guarantee the protection of civilians, including in relation to displacements and evacuations. The United Nations and its partners require unimpeded access to all those affected by the situation in eastern Ghouta. That means access to the areas where civilians remain, through which they transit and to which they exit, such as collective shelters, in order to ensure that effective protection mechanisms are in place so that we can deter any possible violations and provide remedial protection support. Eastern Ghouta is not the only place in which humanitarian needs continue to increase. In north-western Syria, in recent weeks, an estimated 183,500 people have been displaced by hostilities in Afrin district in Aleppo governorate. The majority — some 140,000 people — have fled to Tell Rifaat and the remainder have gone to Nubl, Al-Zahraa, Manbij, Hasakah and surrounding areas. That massive influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is putting a strain on host communities, which are already overwhelmed. Two days ago, on 25 March, an inter-agency convoy to Tell Rifaat delivered assistance for some 50,000 people. However, overall, humanitarian partners are still struggling to gain sustainable access to the area. Moreover, access to Aleppo city for IDPs from Afrin district is currently restricted. Of particular concern are medical evacuations that are urgently required for severely sick people to receive care in specialized hospitals in Aleppo city. Four deaths due to the lack of proper health care have already been reported. Between 50,000 and 70,000 people are estimated still to be in Afrin city. Humanitarian access to the city and its outer perimeters is possible through cross-border operations mandated by the Council. Today, the Government of Turkey told us that it is positively disposed towards such access, and we plan to run convoys in the very near future. We know that needs are very substantial. In Idlib governorate, the situation remains catastrophic, with almost 400,000 people displaced since mid-December. Local capacity to assist is overstretched. Thousands more people are now arriving there from eastern Ghouta, with no sites or shelters available for the vast majority of them. We have received reports of an increase in violence in Idlib in recent days. According to local sources, on 20 March air strikes hit an IDP shelter on the outskirts of Haas village in southern rural Idlib governorate, reportedly killing at least 10 displaced people and injuring another 15. On 21 March, air strikes on Kafr Battikh village, also in southern rural Idlib governorate, reportedly killed scores more. The next day, the central market in Harim town was hit by an air strike, reportedly killing 35 people, including many women and children. On 12 March, air strikes also resumed in southern Syria, with attacks being reported in and around Dar'a city. There have been no air strikes in those areas since an agreement was reached last year on the establishment of a de-escalation zone for parts of the south of the country. That therefore appears to be a major unwelcome development. Let me turn to Raqqa. On 19 March, we received approval from the Syrian authorities for an assessment mission to Raqqa city by the United Nations Mine Action Service, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Health Organization. As Council members know, we have been seeking agreement to that for some time. That was on 19 March. Three days later, on 22 March, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security deployed a team to conduct a security assessment. They report that while the city is considered calm and stable, considerable risk remains. Raqqa city is still highly contaminated with landmines, unexploded ordnances, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices. We hope that access to Raqqa city will be possible for humanitarian aid deliveries via Qamishli, Manbij, Aleppo, Hamah S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 4/21 18-08569 and Homs, depending on operational and logistical arrangements. The United Nations and our partners are now preparing a humanitarian assessment mission, which is likely to take place next week. Next I shall address Rukban, on the Syria-Jordan border. United Nations partners received permission from the Syrian authorities on 8 March to organize a humanitarian convoy from Damascus to reach people in need along the Syria-Jordan border. Last week, on 19 March, the United Nations itself received permission to join that humanitarian mission. Preparations are ongoing, and a first humanitarian convoy is expected to deploy soon. As the Council knows, we have been seeking approval for that for many months. As we sit here today, almost at the end of the month, we have reached some 137,000 people in need through inter-agency convoys — that is, cross-line convoys sent to hard-to-reach and besieged areas — to Tell Rifaat, Al-Dar al-Kabirah and Douma. That is limited, incremental progress, compared to the first part of the year, thanks to the extraordinary efforts of the team on the ground and some of those around this table. But we are essentially just given crumbs — an occasional convoy here and there, often, coincidentally, shortly before our monthly briefings to the Council. A total of 5.6 million Syrians in acute need cannot live on crumbs, and with a quarter of the year gone, our level of access is currently far worse than it was this time last year. We need the support of all Council members and members of the International Syria Support Group humanitarian task force to do their part to exert their individual and collective influence over the parties. A few days ago, the Government of Syria and others asked for more United Nations help with humanitarian aid in eastern Ghouta. In response, we have, first, proposed that a team of United Nations emergency response experts be deployed to strengthen efforts on the ground. Visa requests for the team have been submitted. Secondly, we have confirmed a new allocation of $20 million from the Syria Humanitarian Fund, which is managed by my Office, for eastern Ghouta and those displaced from Afrin to provide shelter materials, improve sanitation for displaced people, ensure that safe water is available, provide life-saving medicines and medical services and put in place measures to enhance protection in relocation sites. The United Nations and its partners, on average, reach 7.5 million people every month with life-saving humanitarian assistance across the whole of Syria. Clearly, without that assistance, the situation would be even more catastrophic than it is now and the loss of life even greater. The United Nations has no money of its own to do those things. We can do them only because we receive voluntary contributions from our donors. I want to take this opportunity to thank everyone who has supported our appeal over the last year, including our top donors: the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Norway, Canada, Japan, Denmark, Sweden, Qatar, Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted just over a month ago. I ask all in the Council to make the resolution a reality. Whatever the difficulty, the United Nations and its partners remain determined to follow through, for the sake of the Syrian people. The President: I thank Mr. Lowcock for his briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Recently, a Dutch photographer working with Save the Children published a photo album featuring 48 Syrian children, all seven years old. Those photos were school portraits, like we all had taken when we were young. The children were born in Syria, but they had to flee. They are as old as the Syrian war, so they have never seen their country at peace. Their memories of their homeland are fading. Sometimes they cannot remember their country at all, nor their family members left behind. But by giving those young children a public face, the photographer has tried to restore some of the dignity sacrificed to a war in which all humanity seems lost. I have here a photo of Nour. Those children were relatively lucky; they were able to escape. At the same time, inside Syria, during seven years of war, thousands of children have been killed. I myself am a father, and I am certainly not the only parent in this Chamber. Images of children affected by war should leave no one unmoved. Despite any differences between us, we should at least have one thing in common: the belief that protecting children should come first. Yet, such protection is lacking. The Syrian crisis is, above all, a protection crisis — a grave violation of the long-established norm to protect civilians and their belongings in the time of war. 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 5/21 Together, we — the international community — have expressed our determination to prevent conflict and save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. And where conflict cannot be prevented, we have agreed to regulate the conduct of warfare. One of the very first steps to that end was taken in Russia, almost 150 years ago. In Saint Petersburg, it was decided to forbid weapons that cause unnecessary suffering. Since those first steps, the body of international humanitarian law has grown considerably, including through the adoption of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The imperative of those laws has always been to protect civilians in conflict, to spare them from disaster, save them from harm and respect their dignity. Sadly, what we see in Syria today is the exact opposite. Every day, many are showing total disregard for civilians. In eastern Ghouta, the Syrian regime and its allies, including Russia, have trapped hundreds of thousands of civilians and are relentlessly continuing their offensive. The United Nations has reported air strikes on densely populated areas, blatant attacks targeting hospitals and medical personnel, the use of starvation as a weapon of war and the use of chemical weapons. Many innocent children, women and men are suffering. They should be protected. Yet instead, families are seeing their homes destroyed, their loved ones killed and their dignity shattered. In Afrin, the effects of the Turkey-led offensive are clear for all to see: a worsening of the already precarious humanitarian situation, with more than 160,000 displaced people and a further obstacle to efforts to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS). I ask Turkey not to extend its military activities to other border regions in Syria or Iraq. Four weeks ago, the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018). It is telling that in 2018, the Council should need to spell out that warring parties should immediately lift all sieges in Syria and grant unimpeded humanitarian access to those in acute need. Those are by no means exceptional demands. They are basic obligations under international humanitarian law, developed over decades to instil minimum standards of human decency in warfare. Not even the presence of terrorists is an excuse for disregarding those standards. It is humiliating that the Council is unable to enforce those minimum standards. If the Council is not willing or able to do it, who is? With all that in mind, we should not forget that the responsibility, and indeed the obligation, to execute the Council's decisions lies with individual Member States. So what should be done? First, we should reaffirm these norms and enforce the relevant resolutions. We call on all parties to the Syrian conflict — including the Syrian regime, Russia, Iran, Turkey and armed opposition groups — to respect and implement the Council's decisions. Secondly, we must strengthen resolution 2401 (2018), with United Nations monitoring of the implementation of the ceasefire and with full access for fact-finding missions to sites and collective shelters housing internally displaced persons. These missions are ready to go; we need their impartial information. Thirdly, with regard to accountability, if there is to be any credible, stable and lasting peace in Syria, the current culture of impunity must end. All those guilty of crimes must be brought to justice. The perpetrators of crimes, including ISIS and Al-Qaida, must know that they are being watched, followed and identified. They must know that files are being compiled with a view to prosecuting them for crimes that may include genocide. They must know that one day they will be held accountable. We urge all States to increase their support for the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, which aims to ensure that information about serious crimes is collected, analysed and preserved for future prosecutions. The Netherlands again calls on all Council members to support referring the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. What will become of the children in the photographs I mentioned? Will they one day be able to return to Syria? Like all children, they long for a normal life, for stability, for safety. The Syrian regime believes in a military solution. But there is none. There are no winners in this war. But it is clear who is losing — the ordinary people of Syria. In these most extreme circumstances we commend the incredible courage and perseverance of the humanitarian aid workers. It is up to us to restore credibility to the Council. It is up to us to ensure a negotiated political process, in which all Syrians and other relevant actors are represented. And it is up to us to end the agony and restore dignity and humanity to the people of Syria. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 6/21 18-08569 I give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): We welcome you, Sir, in presiding over this important meeting. I am delivering this statement on behalf of Kuwait and Sweden. At the outset, I would like to thank the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mr. Mark Lowcock, for his briefing. Today I will address three main areas: first, the status of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018); secondly, measures needed to improve the humanitarian situation; and thirdly, the responsibility of the parties to implement the resolution. First, on the status of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), we are meeting today one month after its unanimous adoption by the Security Council, calling on all parties to cease hostilities without delay for 30 days following the adoption of the resolution. We deplore the fact that it has not yet been implemented. However, we must continue to do everything in our power to ensure the resolution's full implementation throughout Syria. The increased number of humanitarian convoys entering the besieged areas during the month of March shows that partial delivery was achieved by comparison to the complete deadlock in access in previous months. That indicates that progress can be made in implementing the resolution, and we must build on that progress. We affirm that the provisions of the resolution will remain valid beyond the first 30 days after its adoption. We look forward to continued reports from the Secretariat on the status of implementation through monthly briefings, as stipulated in the resolution. In that regard, we support the proposal for providing the Council with further regular updates. We appreciate the continued efforts of the United Nations to facilitate talks among all parties in eastern Ghouta with the goal of securing a ceasefire. We are particularly concerned about the continued military offensive by the Syrian authorities in eastern Ghouta, as well as air strikes on Dar'a and Idlib. The shelling of Damascus from eastern Ghouta is also a matter of concern. All of those acts of violence have claimed the lives of hundreds of innocent civilians. Secondly, on measures needed to improve the humanitarian situation, we must take the necessary measures to protect civilians fleeing eastern Ghouta and to improve the humanitarian situation in collective shelters. As we have said before, implementing the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018) is the only way to improve the humanitarian situation and to achieve tangible progress in that regard. Those provisions stipulate that there must be a cessation of hostilities and that access for humanitarian aid to reach the civilian population must be enabled. Regarding the humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta, we have five points to convey to the relevant parties, which represent our special concerns about the protection of civilians. First, all evacuations must be voluntary. People must have the right to return and to choose safe places to go to. Secondly, any negotiations on the evacuation of civilians should include civilian representatives, such as local councils. Thirdly, humanitarian aid convoys should continue to enter eastern Ghouta for the benefit of those who decided to stay there. Those convoys should occur on a weekly basis, as stipulated in resolution 2401 (2018), according to the United Nations assessment of needs, including medical supplies, and with full access for United Nations staff. Fourthly, human rights violations, including detentions, disappearances and forced conscriptions, must end. Those are serious protection concerns for civilians staying in eastern Ghouta and for those leaving it. We therefore encourage the United Nations to register the names of those evacuated and their destinations and to reinforce its presence in the collective shelters for internally displaced persons, including through the use of monitors to protect them and prevent sexual violence. We call on the Syrian authorities to grant immediate permission for that. Fifthly, the deteriorating situation in the collective shelters for the internally displaced persons should be improved as quickly as possible as the number of new arrivals continues to rise. We are deeply concerned that the United Nations partners are bearing the brunt of a burden beyond their capacity. It will therefore be essential to make the maximum use of the United Nations, its staff and its resources in order to assist in managing the increasingly crowded collective shelters. We welcome the United Nations plans to increase staff on the ground to that end, and we encourage the United Nations to do the same for eastern Ghouta as soon as the security situation allows. We call on the Syrian authorities to grant visas for additional United Nations staff immediately. 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 7/21 Thirdly, on the responsibility of the parties to implement the resolution, we have a collective responsibility, as members of the Council and, specifically, as parties with influence, to work with the Syrian authorities and urge them to implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018) according to international humanitarian law. We expect the guarantors of the Astana agreement, Russia, Iran and Turkey, to achieve progress towards the fulfilment of the commitments undertaken in the statement they issued on 16 March in advance of their summit meeting, to be held in Istanbul on 4 April. Those commitments include, first, ensuring rapid, safe and unhindered access for humanitarian aid to areas affected by the conflict; secondly, increasing their efforts, as guarantors of the ceasefire agreement, to ensure observance of the respective agreements; and thirdly, pursuing their efforts to implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018). In conclusion, we affirm our full commitment to continuing to follow up closely on the status of the implementation of the resolution in the monthly reports to the Council. We will spare no effort to make progress in its implementation. This month marks the beginning of the eighth year of the conflict in Syria. Sadly, there is still a need for an end to the violence, sustained humanitarian and medical aid through weekly convoys across conflict lines, evacuation operations, the protection of civilians and hospitals, and the lifting of the siege. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I thank you, Foreign Minister Blok, for presiding over this meeting, and I thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock for once again laying out the facts about what is happening in Syria. I also want to personally welcome Karen Pierce to the Council as the new Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom. I know all of us in the Chamber look forward to working with her. Today we have a very difficult subject to address: siege, starvation and surrender. That is the awful, unceasing rhythm of the Syrian war. As we meet today, the third step, surrender, is taking place in eastern Ghouta. After years of enduring siege and starvation, residents are surrendering eastern Ghouta. The terrible irony of this moment must be stated and acknowledged. In the 30 days since the Security Council demanded a ceasefire, the bombardment of the people of eastern Ghouta has only increased and now, at the end of the so-called ceasefire, eastern Ghouta has nearly fallen. History will not be kind when it judges the effectiveness of the Council in relieving the suffering of the Syrian people. Seventeen hundred Syrian civilians have been killed in the past month alone. Hospitals and ambulances are being deliberately targeted with bombs and artillery. Schools are being hit, like the one in eastern Ghouta that was bombed just last week, killing 15 children. Siege, starvation and surrender. I would like to ask my Security Council colleagues to consider whether we are wrong when we point to the Russian and Iranian forces working alongside Al-Assad as being responsible for the slaughter. Russia voted for the so-called ceasefire in Syria last month (see S/PV.8188). More than that, Russia took its time painstakingly negotiating resolution 2401 (2018), which demanded the ceasefire. If we watched closely during the negotiations, we could see our Russian friends constantly leaving the room to confer with their Syrian counterparts. The possibilities for what was going on are only two. Either Russia was informing its Syrian colleagues about the content of the negotiations, or Russia was taking directions from its Syrian colleagues about the content of the negotiations. Either way, Russia cynically negotiated a ceasefire that it instantly defied. Russia even had the audacity to claim that it is the only Council member implementing resolution 2401 (2018). How can that possibly be true when in the first four days after the so-called ceasefire, Russian military aircraft conducted at least 20 daily bombing missions on Damascus and eastern Ghouta, while the people of Syria remained under siege? The so-called ceasefire was intended to allow humanitarian access to sick and starving civilians. Russia even doubled down on its cynicism by proposing five-hour pauses in the fighting. It said that they were necessary to allow humanitarian convoys to get through, but Russian and Syrian bombs continue to prevent the delivery of humanitarian aid. Only after territory falls into the hands of the Al-Assad Government and its allies do they allow food and medicine to be delivered. Russia and Syria's rationalization is that they have to continue to bomb in eastern Ghouta in order to combat what they call terrorists. That is a transparent excuse for the Russians and Al-Assad to maintain their assault. Meanwhile, from the very beginning, the opposition groups in eastern Ghouta expressed their readiness to implement the ceasefire. They told the Council that they welcomed the resolution. Russia's response was to call those groups terrorists and keep pummelling S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 8/21 18-08569 civilians into submission, while the people of Syria continue to starve. Last week, after Syrian civilians had spent years barely surviving, an agreement was reached to allow them to leave eastern Ghouta. Who brokered it? Russia. So we see the cycle being completed. The people of eastern Ghouta are surrendering. That is the ugly reality on the ground in Syria today. Cynical accusations of bad faith from Russia will not stop us from speaking out, and their blatantly false narratives will not keep us from telling the world about Russia's central role in bombing the Syrian people into submission. Fifteen days ago, when it was apparent that the Russian, Syrian and Iranian regimes were utterly ignoring the ceasefire, the United States developed a plan for a tougher and more targeted ceasefire focused on Damascus city and eastern Ghouta. Despite overwhelming evidence that the ceasefire was being ignored, some of our colleagues urged us to give resolution 2401 (2018) a chance to work. Reluctantly, we agreed and put off introducing the resolution. Now, more than 80 per cent of eastern Ghouta is controlled by Al-Assad and his allies. Their deception, hypocrisy and brutality have overtaken the chance of a ceasefire in eastern Ghouta, and for that we should all be ashamed. If we were upholding our responsibility as a Security Council, we would adopt a resolution today recognizing the reality of what happened in eastern Ghouta. A responsible Security Council would condemn the Syrian authorities, along with Russia and Iran, for launching a military offensive to seize eastern Ghouta the same day that we called for a ceasefire. A responsible Security Council would condemn the Al-Assad regime for deliberately blocking convoys of humanitarian aid during its military campaign and removing medical items from convoys that attempted to reach eastern Ghouta. A responsible Security Council would recognize that the provision of humanitarian aid was never safe, unimpeded or sustained, and that there was no lifting of sieges. A responsible Security Council would express its outrage that at least 1,700 civilians were killed during a military campaign that it demanded to come to a halt — 1,700 civilians who should have been spared in the ceasefire we demanded, but who died on our watch. But we cannot. We cannot take those actions because Russia will stop at nothing to use its permanent seat on the Council to shield its ally Bashar Al-Assad from even the faintest criticism. And we cannot take those actions because instead of calling out the ways in which Al-Assad, Russia and Iran made a mockery of our calls for a ceasefire, too many members of the Council wanted to wait. That is a travesty. This should be a day of shame for every member of the Council and it should be a lesson about what happens when we focus on fleeting displays of unity instead of on what is right. For those who think otherwise, the people of eastern Ghouta deserve an explanation. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): At the outset, I would like to thank Mark Lowcock for his briefing and to commend him on his tireless efforts and those of his team in their response to the urgent and severe humanitarian situation in Syria. To address that urgency and severity, a month ago almost to the day the Security Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018). We thus collectively and unanimously demanded that all the parties to the conflict cease hostilities throughout the country to allow for sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access to civilians in need and for medical evacuations. A month later, what is the situation? Not only has resolution 2401 (2018) not been implemented, but the humanitarian situation in Syria has worsened. The civilian population is living in despair, trapped between bargaining and fighting, particularly in eastern Ghouta. Over the past few weeks, not only has the fighting has not subsided; it has doubled in intensity, with a land offensive launched by the regime, supported by its allies Russia and Iran. The carefully planned offensive was unremitting, using the double strategy of terror and parallel negotiations that was used in Aleppo to obtain the surrender of combatants and the displacement of civilians. For a month there has not been a single day when eastern Ghouta, which has been besieged and starved for years, has not suffered indiscriminate shelling by the regime and its supporters. They have systematically bombed schools and hospitals and killed more than 1,700 civilians, including more than 300 children. Those deaths are the result of a deliberate strategy of the Syrian regime to forcibly bend an entire population, annihilate any form of opposition and remain in power. Nothing should justify breaches of international humanitarian law. Not one humanitarian convoy has been authorized to enter eastern Ghouta since 15 March, and almost no humanitarian assistance has 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 9/21 been delivered in recent weeks. Meanwhile, there are immense needs among those still in eastern Ghouta, the majority of whom are women and children. For several days we have been witnessing forced evacuations of populations from eastern Ghouta, which could constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes. We have demanded humanitarian access to eastern Ghouta in order to provide assistance to people in their own homes, where they wish to stay as long as the ceasefire allows. That was the reason for the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). Instead, we have witnessed just the opposite — an escalation of violence to force a massive displacement of civilians. Bombing has forced civilians, approximately 80,000 people, to flee. The displacement of people from eastern Ghouta is an integral part of the military strategy of the Syrian regime to force the opposition to capitulate. Once again, civilians are the primary victims. As I said, those forced displacements could constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes. Evidence of such crimes will be collected, preserved and used. We were clear on that point during the Arria-formula Council meeting with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights a few days ago. Some 55,000 civilians are now in eight collective camps managed by the Syrian regime around eastern Ghouta, without water or electricity and in disastrous sanitary conditions. Their lot has not improved; their hell has simply moved a few kilometres away. We are extremely concerned about the fate of those civilians who now live in overcrowded conditions, with no assurances of protection or security, with no guarantee that they will return home. How do we protect civilians in the situation I have just described? It is absolutely urgent to protect those who can still be protected. Although the 30-day cessation of hostilities demanded by resolution 2401 (2018) has still not been implemented, that demand remains, more urgent and relevant than ever. The resolution is still the framework for our collective action. In that regard, and in line with the briefing just given by Mark Lowcock, I would like to underscore three vital demands. First, it is indispensable and urgent that humanitarian convoys be allowed to enter eastern Ghouta daily and with adequate security. Although humanitarian needs are great, the regime continues to deliberately block aid. United Nations convoys must be able to enter and make deliveries. Fighting must cease long enough to allow for delivery, unloading and distribution of supplies, including of medical assistance. The second demand concerns civilians who remain in Ghouta, who have the right to emergency humanitarian assistance and to protection. Aid must reach them where they are. To that end, the United Nations and its international and local humanitarian partners must be able to work safely on site to assess the needs of those populations. It is an obligation under international humanitarian law, but it is the minimum required to provide tangible assistance to those concerned. The protection that is due them under international humanitarian law must be unconditionally guaranteed. In that regard I call again on the responsibility of all actors with influence on the Syrian regime. The third demand, which has taken on new importance in recent days, is for assistance to be provided to the displaced civilians in camps outside Ghouta. Very concretely, that means that those populations, who have been forced to leave everything behind in order to survive, must be assured of their safety, access to basic necessities and a chance to return home when they so desire. Care must be taken that they are not threatened with retaliation, threats or persecution of any kind. In order to ensure that they are protected, the United Nations and its partners must be able to escort civilians who have been evacuated from their point of departure to their destination in the collective shelters. The United Nations and its partners must be granted continuous access to civilians living in those camps. We hope that the United Nations can strengthen its support to displaced persons who have fled eastern Ghouta. That would call for an increase in the number of international staff on site. We hope that approval will be granted to that end as soon as possible. It would also call for security guarantees for humanitarian workers. The situation in Afrin is also extremely worrisome. A great many civilians are in a critical situation. More that 180,000 people have been displaced. A single convoy was authorized, yesterday, which is insufficient given the tremendous needs of the population. Ongoing fighting in Afrin has forced the Syrian Democratic Forces to halt operations against Da'esh, whose threat, as we all know, has not dissappeared. Our position on the issue is the same. The legitimate concerns of Turkey with regard to the security of its borders cannot in any way justify a lasting military presence deep inside Syria. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 10/21 18-08569 More than ever, we need the fighting to end. We call on all parties on the ground to conclude the negotiations under way and respect a cessation of hostilities. We support the efforts of the Special Envoy for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, and his commitment to resuming the Geneva process and to reaching a lasting political solution in line with resolution 2254 (2015) that starts with the establishment of an inclusive constitutional committee, under the auspices of Mr. De Mistura. It is the only way to end the Syrian crisis. It is absolutely essential to work on both the humanitarian and political fronts. I appeal on behalf of France, first, to those who can make a difference on the ground, starting with Russia. It is never to late to save lives. Let us be well aware that without urgent, decisive action, the worst is undoubtedly yet to come in the form of a worsening and enlargement of the conflict. The time has come for us to learn seriously the lessons of the Syrian tragedy. This tragedy is the illustration of a new global disorder where the rappelling ropes have disappeared due to a lack of strong international governance, a lack of a power of last resort and a lack of convergence among key actors — to which we add the well-known attitude of Russia. In other words, if we want to avoid other tragedies of this type in future, it is essential to structure the multipolar world in which we now find ourselves around a robust multilateralism embodied by a reformed United Nations. It is the only alternative to the fragmentation of the world and the return to the zones of influence — and our history teaches us all the dangers of that — and it is with the settlement of the Syrian crisis, which is our priority today and which is the emergency before us, one of the other challenges of our generation. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I thank you, Mr. President, both for being here today to underscore the vital importance of this topic and, in particular, for your very powerful statement. The United Kingdom supports your call for a referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. I also wish to express our thanks to the Under- Secretary-General for his continued efforts to keep the Security Council informed of the toll that hostilities are having on civilians in Syria. We also thank him for the heroic efforts of all his teams on the ground. Their efforts are much supported by most of us on the Council. The Under-Secretary-General's briefing eloquently underscores why it is essential that the Council comes together to agree on concrete steps to allow the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to fulfil its mandate to ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for everybody who needs it. Ambassador Haley has laid the situation bare, Ambassador Delattre has set out the regime's intentions, and Ambassador Alotaibi has focused on the need for protection and registration. I support their calls. I will not rehearse a catalogue of suffering that we have heard expressed so eloquently today, but that omission should not be taken as any indication that the United Kingdom is not as horrified as others by what is happening on the ground. Specifically, it is diabolical that access is actually worse in the face of such suffering. Diabolical is a strong word, but there are no others to describe what is happening. The worst destruction and suffering has continued in eastern Ghouta. Those who support Al-Assad have not taken steps to help stop the violence. Instead, Al-Assad and his supporters have violated the strong words of the Security Council in resolution 2401 (2018), making mockery of the Council's authority, as Ambassador Delattre stated. Since 11 March, an estimated 100,000 people have left eastern Ghouta and are in makeshift reception sites in rural Damascus. Thousands more have been bused to Idlib. Because there is no independent monitoring nor provisions for civilian safety, those fleeing and those staying remain vulnerable and at risk of mistreatment and abuse by the regime, including being detained, disappeared or separated from their families. Humanitarians, health workers and first responders on the ground report that the regime is deliberately targeting them. That is illegal, and those who help the Al-Assad regime are complicit in that illegality. The situation continues even for those who are left behind. An estimated 150,000 civilians remain in eastern Ghouta. They suffer from acute food shortages and lack of medical supplies. They are afraid, and above all they remember how the regime punished the civilians who fled from eastern Aleppo in December 2016. That is why Ambassador Alotaibi's call for protection and registration is so urgent. We welcome United Nations plans to scale up support to deal with the dire situations in the internally displaced persons camps and collective shelters. We call on Russia to use its influence with the regime to 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 11/21 ensure that the United Nations and its partners can also provide assistance and protection for those who remain in eastern Ghouta. Whether civilians choose to stay or leave, it is essential that they be protected against attack and have access to the essentials to survive. This is not just a plea on the grounds of humanity; it is a requirement under international humanitarian law. It is the job of the Council and all members of the Council to uphold international humanitarian law. Those who side with the regime in its actions are themselves guilty of violating that law. In concluding, I would like to highlight two further areas. The suffering of the Syrian people continues in Idlib, where civilians have been under attack by regime forces for many years. More than a million internally displaced Syrians live there, including those who have fled eastern Ghouta. In Afrin, we recognize Turkey's legitimate interest in the security of its borders, but at the same time we remain concerned about the impact of operations on the humanitarian situation, and my Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have raised the need for protection of civilians and access with President Erdoğan and his Ministers. It was good to hear from the Under-Secretary-General that there may at last be signs of progress in Afrin. After seven years of conflict, over 13 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria. The Al-Assad regime has created the situation and is now preventing humanitarian actors from relieving some of the horror it has inflicted. We call on Russia to use its influence to ensure that at a minimum the United Nations can fulfil its mandate to ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for Syrians on the basis of need, regardless of any other considerations. I was at Geneva in 2012. I think we all feel that that was a huge missed opportunity, in the light of events. The situation has escalated every year since that time, and, as the Under-Secretary-General said, the level of access is worse. The Council has a small opportunity to put measures in place to reduce the risk of reprisals. As you said, Mr. President, if the Security Council cannot do it, who can? Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): I join others in thanking Under-Secretary-General Lowcock for his comprehensive briefing. I also wish to welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, His Excellency Mr. Stephanus Abraham Blok, who is presiding over today's meeting. Kazakhstan remains committed to all Security Council resolutions aimed at solving humanitarian issues in Syria. We believe that it is most important to preserve all possible humanitarian-access modalities, including cross-border assistance, which are indispensable in bringing humanitarian aid to millions of people in Syria. Implementing resolution 2401 (2018) is a collective responsibility, with each Council member and State Member of the United Nations playing a significant role. We must all continue to do everything we can to ensure full implementation across Syria. We look forward to continued reporting on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) to the Council through the regular Syria briefings and reports of the Secretary- General, as stipulated in the resolution. Urgent attention must be focused on long-term humanitarian assistance, with the assurance of safe humanitarian access by the United Nations and other aid agencies, and evacuation of the wounded. We commend the sterling contribution of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent for their provision of increased medical supplies and life-saving services, including surgical procedures. In that regard, we welcome the increase in humanitarian convoys gaining access to besieged areas in Syria in March, compared to previous months. It is necessary to take note of the worrisome humanitarian situation in Syria, as fighting in different parts of the country are causing massive displacement. We endorse the appeal of the United Nations to help stem the catastrophic situation for tens of thousands of people, from both eastern Ghouta and Afrin. We look forward to the next round of talks, to be held in mid-May in our capital, Astana, where the stepping up of efforts to ensure observance of the relevant agreements will be addressed. We also believe that the dialogue between Under- Secretary-General Mark Lowcock and the Government of Syria should be ongoing. We reiterate that all obligations under international humanitarian law must be respected by all parties. A further United Nations needs-assessment mission to these troubled areas, similar to that which Under-Secretary-General Lowcock led recently, may be required very soon. The Syrian authorities must cooperate fully with the United Nations and relevant humanitarian organizations in S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 12/21 18-08569 facilitating the unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance and thereby mitigating the suffering. Lastly, we are of the view that the crisis in Syria can be resolved only through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process, based on the Geneva communiqué of 30 June 2012 (S/2012/522, annex), subsequent Security Council resolutions and relevant statements of the International Syria Support Group. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We appreciate the convening of this meeting and the briefing by Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs, on the humanitarian situation in Syria. We also welcome your presence here today, Sir, in presiding over our meeting. Peru deeply regrets that violence and human suffering continue to characterize the situation in Syria, 30 days after the humanitarian ceasefire demanded by the Council. Resolution 2401 (2018) remains in full force, and we consider that the Syrian Government and other actors with the capacity to influence developments on the ground are obliged to ensure its full implementation. The ceasefire should be immediate and enable unrestricted access to humanitarian assistance throughout Syrian territory. While there has been some limited progress in that regard, the delivery of humanitarian assistance must be continuous and unrestricted. In view of the Council's responsibilities in line with international law and international humanitarian law, Peru will continue to advocate for the protection of civilians in all conflicts and humanitarian crises. An indeterminate number of Syrian citizens, including thousands of women and children, have been driven out of eastern Ghouta by the violence. We note with concern that the shelters in the vicinity of Damascus cannot cope and that they lack food, clean water and medical supplies. We must remember that international humanitarian law has mandatory provisions for the evacuation of civilians. It is also compulsory to take measures to safeguard private property from looting and destruction. Syrian citizens must be able to return to their homes and businesses when security conditions improve. We must also protect the majority of the remaining population in eastern Ghouta, who are particularly vulnerable to reprisals, forced recruitment and sexual violence. We are also concerned about the humanitarian situation in Afrin, Idlib and Raqqa, among other areas of Syria. The responsibility to protect civilians cannot be conditional or subordinated to political or strategic interests. We highlight the efforts of the United Nations and other humanitarian agencies, such as the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, to assist people in such a difficult situation. They have our full support. Given the intensification of violence in recent weeks and its devastating consequences for the population, we must once again reiterate how urgent it is to make progress towards achieving a political settlement on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). In that regard, we hope that progress will soon be made in the establishment and composition of the constitutional committee agreed on in Sochi. All the Syrian parties, and especially the Government, must engage constructively in this. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We thank Under-Secretary- General Lowcock for his comprehensive briefing. We want to express our appreciation to the United Nations and humanitarian partners for their continued selfless and courageous service in providing assistance to all Syrians in difficult circumstances. We remain concerned about the humanitarian crisis in all the areas of Syria where it is prevalent. As the Under-Secretary-General said, the Syrian war has entered its eighth year, bringing unspeakable suffering to the people of the country. The escalation of violence that we witnessed last month in eastern Ghouta and other parts of the country has been a source of extremely grave concern. According to the statement issued on 21 March by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, shelter, protection, water and sanitation remain the key priority humanitarian needs of the internally displaced. In that regard, we thank the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for providing much-needed assistance. Alleviating the suffering of Syrians requires urgent and coordinated action on the part of all actors, while respecting the relevant resolutions of the Council, particularly resolution 2401 (2018). It was encouraging that the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria for at least 30 days so as to ensure the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and medical evacuations. In that regard, while much remains to be done to fully implement the resolution, compared to the previous month there has been positive 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 13/21 action, including aid delivery to some of the areas that are especially badly affected and difficult to reach. The conflict has also diminished in intensity in some areas, according to the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/243). However, this does not mean that the action taken has been sufficient. We therefore stress that it is vital to redouble our efforts to do everything possible to fully and comprehensively implement the resolution with a sense of urgency and enhanced political will. We believe that what the people of Syria need is a cessation of hostilities, along with protection and access to basic goods and services. All of those demands are contained and affirmed in resolution 2401 (2018). All Syrian parties should therefore respect and fully implement resolution 2401 (2018), and all States that have influence over the parties should try to bring the maximum pressure to bear on them, with the ultimate objective of helping to fully operationalize the resolution, which was adopted unanimously by the Council. In that regard, we hope that the Astana guarantors, Russia, Turkey and Iran, will play their role in implementing resolution 2401 (2018), strengthening the ceasefire arrangements and improving humanitarian conditions, as stated in their final statement of 16 March. In addition, while we acknowledge that the United Nations and its humanitarian partners have been able to reach millions of Syrians using all modes of aid delivery, the fact remains that humanitarian access, particularly inter-agency convoys, remains a critical challenge. In that connection, it is absolutely vital to ensure safe, sustained and need-based humanitarian access so that life-saving aid can reach all Syrians in need. Let me conclude by reaffirming that only a comprehensive political dialogue, under the auspices of the United Nations, can ultimately end the humanitarian tragedy in Syria. We reiterate our position that the only solution to the Syrian crisis is a political solution based on resolution 2254 (2015). We support the continued efforts of the Special Envoy and encourage all Syrian parties to engage with him constructively and meaningfully in order to revitalize the Geneva intra-Syrian talks and support the establishment of a constitutional committee, in line with the outcome of the Sochi congress. We fully concur with the Secretary- General, who states, in his report of 20 March, "Political efforts to bring the war to an end must be accorded priority and redoubled by all parties to the conflict." (S/2018/243, para. 48) While the primary responsibility for resolving the conflict lies with the Syrians themselves — a principle that is firmly embedded in resolution 2254 (2015) — the Council also has an important role to play in supporting the efforts in a spirit of unity, which we believe can have a positive impact on the ground in alleviating the suffering of all Syrians. That may be a tall order, in the light of the fragmentation that Ambassador Delattre mentioned earlier. However, the effort must be made. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We welcome your presence, Sir, and the fact that you are presiding over the work of the Security Council today. We would also like to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, for his briefing. We support him in the difficult work with which he is entrusted. We must once again express our regret that this conflict has continued for eight years and that we are still witnessing the ongoing sieges and violence being endured by the Syrian people, particularly women and children. In addition to living with the psychological consequences of the situation, they urgently need humanitarian assistance. We unequivocally condemn the ongoing bombardment of civilian infrastructure such as hospitals and schools, and the military activities in residential areas in the cities of Damascus, Afrin and Idlib, as well as in eastern Ghouta. They have only led to more civilians being killed, wounded and displaced. According to the most recent report of the Secretary General (S/2018/243), between December and February alone, there were 385,000 internally displaced persons and 2.3 million people living in besieged and hard-to-reach areas. We regret that so far there are still obstacles preventing the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). We call on all parties involved to make every effort to ensure the effective implementation of the resolution throughout Syria in order to facilitate the safe, sustained and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid and services, as well as to enable the medical evacuation of those who are seriously ill or injured. In addition, according to the same report, since October 2017, 86,000 civilians have returned to the city of Raqqa, of whom 20,000 arrived in February alone. Regrettably, 130 civilians have died and 658 have been seriously injured by explosive remnants of war and anti-personnel mines. In that regard, we would like to highlight the visit by the United Nations mission to Raqqa last week. We reiterate that the work of clearing S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 14/21 18-08569 anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war is crucial to facilitating the safe return of the displaced. While it does not reflect what has gone on throughout Syrian territory, it is important to highlight the recent delivery of humanitarian aid through convoys, of which the first, on 5 March, was to Douma in eastern Ghouta, bringing food for more than 27,000 people. We also believe that cross-border assistance is an important part of the response to the situation, and we highlight the food assistance to 2 million people and the dispatch by the United Nations to areas of northern and southern Syria of 449 trucks carrying aid for 1 million people. We welcome the efforts of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, all the humanitarian agencies concerned and the Russian Federation that have enabled humanitarian assistance to be delivered to various populations, in particular in eastern Ghouta, which three convoys recently entered. We call for that assistance to continue as safely as possible. In that regard, we believe it is important to strengthen the dialogue and coordination among the humanitarian agencies, the United Nations and the Syrian Government in order to facilitate the entry of convoys and humanitarian aid workers, as well as the safe and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons. We emphasize the dangerous work of the personnel of the various agencies and humanitarian assistance bodies, whose staff risk their own lives in carrying out their dangerous work on the ground. We therefore reiterate the importance of full respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law. We want to take this opportunity to reiterate how important it is to build on the political momentum following the commitments made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi. That should be the channel for reinforcing the Geneva process, led by the United Nations in the context of resolution 2254 (2016). We hope for the speedy implementation of the Sochi outcome and, as a result, the establishment of a constitutional committee that can facilitate a viable political transition. In that regard, we support the results of the latest Astana meeting, which enabled the agreements establishing de-escalation zones to be strengthened. We hope they will be reflected on the ground so as to reduce the violence and meet the urgent humanitarian needs. We condemn any attempt to foment fragmentation or sectarianism in Syria and believe that it is the Syrian people who must freely decide their future and their political leadership in the context of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Finally, we reiterate that the only way to resolve the conflict is through an inclusive, negotiated and agreed political process, led by and for the Syrian people, and aimed at achieving sustainable peace on their territory without foreign pressure of any kind. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to welcome you as you preside over the Council today, Sir. We also welcome Ms. Karen Pierce, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, who is now here with us. We thank Mr. Lowcock for his briefing. The difficult humanitarian situation continues in a number of areas in Syria. The Russian Federation has been taking active steps to normalize things, including within the framework of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). While some here may not like it, it is a fact that we are the only ones who have been making concrete efforts to implement resolution 2401 (2018). Since we first established humanitarian pauses, with the assistance of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic, and the participation and oversight of the United Nations and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, nearly 121,000 people have been evacuated, on a strictly voluntarily basis — let me stress that — from eastern Ghouta. Many of them have talked about how difficult it has been for them to live under the repressive regime established by the armed group militants. Civilians continue to flee eastern Ghouta through the Muhayam-Al-Wafedin humanitarian corridor. There is real-time video of this running on the Russian Defence Ministry's official website. In just the past few days more than 520 civilians have left Douma. Russian agencies have organized the distribution to them of hot food, food kits and individual food rations, as well as bottled drinking water. Yesterday alone, Russian military doctors treated 111 civilians, including 42 children. At the same time, the Russian Centre for Reconciliation continues to organize the return of residents of Saqba and Kafr Batna. On 24 March, as a result of an agreement reached by the Centre with leaders of illegal armed groups, another checkpoint was opened for fighters and their family members to leave from Harasta, Arbin, Zamalka, Ain Terma and Jobar. In the past few days, militias from the Ahrar Al-Sham 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 15/21 and Faylak Al-Rahman groups and their relatives have been evacuated along the corridor and bused to Idlib governorate. In three days, more than 13,000 people were evacuated from Arbin alone. However, many have decided to remain, taking advantage of the presidential amnesty. Incidentally, there have been active efforts to plant stories about detentions and torture and possibly even executions. They are lies. The Syrian police are ensuring that these operations are safe, under the oversight of specialists from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation and representatives of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent. Yesterday 26 Syrian soldiers and civilians who had been taken prisoner by Faylak Al-Rahman were freed. In our view, those facts clearly attest to the difficulty and extent of the work being done by the Russian specialists on the ground, in communication with the Syrian authorities and the leaders of the armed groups. There are some members of the Security Council who prefer wasting their time on inflammatory speeches and letters making groundless claims about our country, probably to conceal their own unwillingness to do anything constructive to implement resolution 2401 (2018) in cooperation with the groups they sponsor. At the same time, yesterday the fighters from Jaysh Al-Islam who remain in Douma detonated four mines yesterday in several districts in Damascus. Six civilians died and another six were wounded. Al-Mazraa, a residential neighbourhood in the capital was shelled earlier. As a result of mine explosions around the Al-Fayhaa sports complex, a 12-year-old boy died and seven children were injured. Hundreds of people have died from mine explosions in Damascus overall. This is apparently the message that the militants are sending every day about the willingness to implement the ceasefire that they loudly proclaimed in their famous letter to the Secretary-General. I want to again point out the importance of clarifying the data used in the Secretary-General's report (S/2018/138), including on possible attacks on civilian infrastructure and the victims of such attacks. Where does that information come from? The February report has a footnote that mentions various United Nations agencies and departments of the Secretariat. The main source cited is the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, which does not have a staff presence on the ground. The big question, and what we are trying to get to the bottom of, is who is providing the United Nations staff with this kind of information? Is it the anti-Government groups and terrorist accomplices like the White Helmets? But they are interested parties. So why is there only a sprinkling of the information provided by the Syrian authorities? We call on the United Nations, humanitarian organizations and States to deliver urgent assistance to help the people who are evacuating eastern Ghouta. It is also essential to strengthen the United Nations presence around the humanitarian corridors. The Syrians need immediate assistance with the infrastructure reconstruction that the Syrian Government has begun in the liberated residential areas of eastern Ghouta. We would like to ask Mr. Lowcock to oversee that issue personally. We also hope that as soon as possible the coalition will create the conditions and provide the necessary security guarantees enabling a United Nations assessment mission to be sent to Raqqa and humanitarian convoys to the Rukban camp. The Syrian authorities gave their official consent to this some time ago, as Mark Lowcock confirmed today. We should note that we were shocked by the recent reports that more than 2,000 civilians may have died during the coalition forces' assault on Raqqa. Let me ask it once again — where were the weeping and wailing and calls for humanitarian aid then? We have noted the statistics in the Secretary-General's report on the numbers of people who have returned to Raqqa, but we would like to see similar information on other parts of Syria and the country as a whole. How many people are returning to their permanent homes? We would like to propose to the United Nations representatives that they designate the areas where those indicators are the highest as a priority for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and monitor how effectively it is being implemented. We also think it would be appropriate to include information on reconstruction assistance in the reports. Resolution 2401 (2018) stipulates that Syrian districts, including those that have been liberated from terrorists, need support in restoring normal functioning and stability. One of the key areas in that regard is mine clearance. We get the feeling that external donors are losing interest in delivering assistance to residents in areas under Syrian Government control. We are seeing signals from some capitals that only opposition-held enclaves should be helped. Such double standards go completely against the core principles of neutrality and impartial humanitarian assistance. We hope that we are wrong about this and that Mr. Lowcock will refute the S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 16/21 18-08569 possibility of such a trend. But if our suspicions are borne out, how does the United Nations intend to deal with the issue? Just the other day a meeting of senior officials was held in Oslo under the auspices of the United Nations and the European Union to address the humanitarian situation in Syria. No representatives of the Syrian authorities were invited. How does Mr. Lowcock view the prospect of another assessment of the humanitarian situation in Syria without the participation of its official representatives? Does he consider that a productive format? That is a very urgent question considering that the forthcoming second donor conference is scheduled for the end of April in Brussels. I would also like to ask Mr. Lowcock what is known at the United Nations about the facts of sexual services being provided in exchange for humanitarian assistance in the context of cross-border operations. There is information about that in the November report of the United Nations Population Fund, and the BBC did a journalistic investigation of the issue. If this issue is known about, why is it avoided in the Secretary- General's reports? And if it is not known about, it should be investigated. We hope that in close cooperation with the Syrian authorities and consideration of their views, the United Nations will agree on an emergency humanitarian response plan for this year as soon as possible, with an emphasis on the delivery of assistance to liberated areas. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I would like to welcome you here today, Sir, and to commend the presidency's leadership. I would also like to thank Under-Secretary- General Mark Lowcock for his comprehensive but once again alarming update. Like many around this table, we share a sense of urgency on this issue, especially following the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which we adopted unanimously a month ago. Unfortunately, we have to recognize that it has not been implemented in the first 30 days since its adoption. We are meeting again when there has been no substantial change on the ground and the fighting is far from over. The military offensive in Syria continues and the human suffering is growing as a result. Any action, even against terrorists, cannot justify attacks on innocent civilians and civilian infrastructure, including health facilities. That must stop, and the parties to the conflict must strictly comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law. Accountability for serious violations is a requirement under international law and central to achieving sustainable peace in Syria. As indicated in the last report of the United Nations-mandated Commission of Inquiry, there is a need for the international community to take a broader view of accountability and to take urgent steps to ensure that the needs of Syrian conflict victims for justice and accountability are met both immediately and in the long term. We call upon all parties to alleviate the suffering of the civilians, including children, by granting them free and safe access to humanitarian assistance, including voluntary medical evacuation, which should be strictly overseen by the United Nations and the implementing partners in order to ensure the voluntary character of the process. While discussing evacuations, let me underline that people must have the right to return and to a safe location for settlement. Any evacuation negotiations should also include civilians. Humanitarian aid convoys to eastern Ghouta must continue for those who choose to stay. We would like to stress that all actors should use their full influence to immediately improve conditions on the ground. We urgently call for the cessation of hostilities in the whole of Syria. Attacks against civilians, civilian property and medical facilities must stop in order to alleviate the humanitarian suffering of the Syrian people. Some small positive steps have taken place, such as a larger number of humanitarian convoys reaching the besieged areas in March, especially when compared to previous months, when humanitarian access was almost completely blocked. That improvement shows that it is possible to make progress, although much more is needed. In that context, we call on Russia, Iran and Turkey — as the European Union did, and as the High Representatives did through their respective ministers after the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union in February — to fulfil their obligations and responsibilities as Astana guarantors. It is also important to note that the cessation of hostilities may also provide a chance for the peace talks under the auspices of the United Nations in Geneva to gain momentum so that a political solution may finally be reached. Once again, let me underline that we should seek to reach an intra-Syrian framework political agreement, in line with Council resolution 2254 (2015). In that connection, we strongly believe that the conclusions of the Congress of Syrian 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 17/21 National Dialogue in Sochi could and should be used to advance the Geneva process, especially with regard to the creation of a constitutional committee by United Nations Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura. In conclusion, let me stress the necessity of maintaining the unity of the Council on the question of the full implementation of the humanitarian resolution across Syria. The civilian population of Syria has already suffered too much. The adoption of the resolution was just the beginning of the process. We call on all with influence on the ground to take the necessary steps to ensure that the fighting stops, the Syrian people are protected and, finally, our joint humanitarian access and necessary medical evacuations continue. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): We welcome Mr. Stef Blok, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, to New York. We take this opportunity to congratulate him for the commendable presidency of the Netherlands during the month of March. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea is grateful for the holding of this informative meeting, which enables us to once again assess humanitarian resolution 2401 (2018), which we approved one month ago. We thank Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock, who, as he always does, has just given us a very informative and detailed briefing on the developments on the ground in Syria. The 30-day ceasefire throughout Syria, established under resolution 2401 (2018) in order to carry out humanitarian operations, has expired. Despite the diplomatic efforts of the United Nations team in Syria, violence has increased in eastern Ghouta, in Damascus, in Idlib and in Afrin, where there is an ongoing Turkish military offensive. Daily air strikes and bombardments have increased, including in residential areas, among Government forces, opposition forces and non-State armed groups, making it difficult to ensure the protection of all civilians and the immediate, secure and sustained provision of humanitarian aid. That excessive resurgence of violence, orchestrated by the various parties, only serves to exacerbate and aggravate the already grim humanitarian situation in those conflict zones. As we have reiterated, the solution to the humanitarian crisis in Syria is tightly linked with a ceasefire. The prolongation of the conflict can only further aggravate the tragic humanitarian situation, which in turn creates greater instability and negatively affects neighbouring countries that take in the millions of refugees fleeing the war. As the Secretary-General underlines in his 20 March report: "Our common objective" — and one of high priority — "should be to alleviate and end the suffering of the Syrian people. What the Syrian people need immediately has been made abundantly clear and affirmed in resolution 2401 (2018). Civilians need a cessation of hostilities, protection, access to basic goods and services" — and access to humanitarian and sanitary assistance — "and an end to sieges." (S/2018/243, para. 48) All parties involved in the Syrian crisis must accept that none of them can achieve a military victory. Government forces, opposition forces and armed groups must accept that no matter how much death and destruction they cause in their country, there will be no victor but rather one single loser — the Syrian people. Similarly, national parties and international partners that have significant political and geostrategic interests and that have the capacity to exercise their influence on their respective allies must redouble their efforts and political commitments in order to bring sustainable peace and stability to the country. Any party that insists on political red lines that block the necessary commitments must also consider the setback caused by the loss of innocent human lives. It is evident that the Council has not entirely reached its goal by unanimously adopting resolution 2401 (2018). The Republic of Equatorial Guinea will support any humanitarian initiative that seeks to definitively put an end to the suffering of the Syrian people. In conclusion, I renew the tribute of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to Mr. Lowcock and to the entire humanitarian team of the United Nations for their noble and tireless work in Syria to provide relief to the Syrian people living through a humanitarian catastrophe. Mr. Dah (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Like others, my delegation would like to welcome Mr. Stef Blok to New York and to congratulate him on the holding of the current meeting in the Security Council. My delegation also wishes to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, for his informative briefing on the humanitarian situation in Syria. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 18/21 18-08569 As we are all aware, the war in Syria has unleashed one of the most serious humanitarian crises in recent history and continues to have a devastating impact on the Syrian people. My country remains particularly concerned about the attacks and bombings, including those against hospitals and civilian infrastructure, that continue to punctuate the daily lives of people subjected to forced displacement in the areas of Afrin, Idlib and eastern Ghouta. Côte d'Ivoire condemns those actions and calls on the parties to take the steps necessary to protect people, civilian infrastructure and humanitarian personnel. More than a month after its unanimous adoption by members of the Security Council, resolution 2401 (2018), on which so much hope was pinned, has fallen woefully short of our expectations, much to our regret. The fact is that the demand for an immediate cessation of hostilities to allow safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid and related services, as well as medical evacuation of the seriously ill and wounded, in accordance with relevant international humanitarian law, has still not been adhered to, despite our joint efforts. The ongoing fighting has forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee to camps and makeshift shelters where living conditions are extremely difficult. Côte d'Ivoire calls once again for the effective implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) with a view to resuming the delivery of humanitarian aid, including medical evacuations from besieged areas and camps for internally displaced persons, in order to ease the suffering of people in distress. We urge the Council to overcome its differences and to demonstrate unity in order to ensure the effective implementation of the resolution, which is more relevant than ever. My delegation reiterates its belief that the humanitarian situation will not improve unless significant progress is made at the political level, as the two issues are closely linked. We therefore encourage the parties to prioritize political dialogue and resume peace talks in the framework of the Geneva process, in accordance with the road map established by resolution 2254 (2015). Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): I thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock for his briefing. China commends the active efforts of the relevant United Nations agencies to alleviate the humanitarian situation in some areas of Syria. The conflict in Syria is in its eighth year and has caused terrible suffering for the people of Syria. The humanitarian situation in parts of the country has recently deteriorated. China calls on all parties in Syria to put its country's future and destiny, as well as its people's safety, security and well-being first, cease hostilities and violence without delay, resolve their differences through dialogue and consultation and ease the humanitarian situation in Syria as soon as possible. United Nations humanitarian convoys have now gained access to eastern Ghouta in order to deliver aid supplies to the people there. China welcomes Russia's establishment of temporary truces in eastern Ghouta, opening up a humanitarian corridor for Syrian civilians. As a result of the efforts of the parties concerned, some ceasefire agreements have been reached and a large number of civilians evacuated through the corridor. In the circumstances, it is important to continue to promote the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) so as to alleviate the humanitarian situation in areas such as eastern Ghouta. China welcomes the meeting between Foreign Ministers held by Russia, Turkey and Iran in Astana, and commends Kazakhstan for hosting the meeting. We hope that the upcoming meeting of the Heads of State of the three countries and the next round of the Astana dialogue will contribute positively to restoring the ceasefire momentum in Syria and supporting the Geneva talks. The international community should continue to support the role of the United Nations as the main mediator, and back Special Envoy de Mistura's diplomatic efforts to relaunch the Syrian political process. Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity must be respected, and all Syrian parties must be encouraged to reach a political solution to the Syrian issue, based on the principle of the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned peace process, and in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015), with a view to fundamentally easing the humanitarian situation in Syria and continuing to advance the counter-terrorism agenda, as mandated by the Council's resolutions. The Council should remain united on the Syrian issue and speak with one voice. China stands ready to work with the international community and to contribute actively and constructively to a political settlement of the Syrian issue. 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 19/21 Mr. Orrenius Skau (Sweden): As the representative of Kuwait has already delivered a joint statement on our behalf, I will make my remarks very brief. One month ago, the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018) by consensus, in response to the deafening calls for action to address the horrific humanitarian situation in Syria. Today we have heard around this table a continued commitment to moving forward with the implementation of that important resolution. I wanted to speak last in order to identify some points of convergence. From the discussion today, I believe that there are a number of critical areas where there is broad agreement within the Council. First, we all share a deep disappointment and sense of dissatisfaction and frustration with the lack of implementation. While a limited increase in access for humanitarian convoys shows that progress is possible, much more is needed. The resolution remains in force and all parties remain obliged to comply. Secondly, we have heard a common concern about the continuing hostilities throughout the country, particularly the ongoing military offensive in eastern Ghouta. Those who leave the area should do so voluntarily, with the right to return and a choice of safe places to go to. At the same time, humanitarian aid convoys must continue to support those who choose to remain. Thirdly, we agree that efforts to strengthen the protection of civilians must be stepped up by the United Nations and its partners, both inside eastern Ghouta and for those leaving and in the collective shelters. I want to emphasize that preventing sexual and gender-based violence should be an integral part of those efforts. We condemn the attacks in February that affected health facilities. Many colleagues also reiterated today that resolution 2401 (2018) applies across the whole of the country. I just wanted to mention our concern about the Turkish operation in Afrin and the statements that Turkey has made about expanding its military operations in the north, beyond Afrin. We are also concerned about the protection of civilians fleeing Afrin, as well as the difficult conditions for those remaining. We call on all relevant parties, especially Turkey, to ensure the protection of civilians and facilitate cross-border and cross-line humanitarian aid deliveries, as well as freedom of movement, for internally displaced persons. The need for the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) remains as urgent today as when it was adopted. As Ambassador Alotaibi has said, we will spare no effort in making progress on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). We will continue to work actively and tirelessly to that end, be creative in considering possible further steps, and remain ready to reconvene the Council at any time should the situation warrant its renewed action. We are convinced that the unity of the Council, as difficult as it may be, is the only way to effectively make a real difference on the ground and alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. For our part, even when terribly frustrated, we will never give up trying to achieve that change. The President: I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I would like to convey the condolences of the Government and people of my country to my colleague on the Russian Federation delegation in the wake of the tragic incident that claimed children's lives in the commercial centre in Kemerovo. A few minutes ago, I was checking the list of the States members of the Security Council and I realized that two — only two — of its 15 members have embassies in Damascus. That is why the statements made by the representatives of those two countries offered the most accurate description of the humanitarian situation in my country. They were able to provide an objective and fair assessment of the situation there. In late 2016, right here in the Chamber (see S/PV.7834), we announced the good news to our people in Syria that the Syrian Government would liberate eastern Aleppo from armed terrorist groups, and as a Government, an army and a responsible State we have done just that. Today we announce to our people the good news that the time has come to liberate all of eastern Ghouta from these armed terrorist groups. We declare that we will liberate the Golan, Afrin, Raqqa, Idlib and the rest of our occupied territory because, as a State, we reject the presence on our territory of any illegal armed group or occupying Power, regardless of the excuses, just like all other States represented in the Council. Such victories would not have been possible if we had no just cause. They would not have been possible without the sacrifices made by the Syrian Arab Army, the support of our people and the support of our allies and friends. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 20/21 18-08569 Facts that have come to light recently with the liberation of eastern Ghouta from armed terrorist groups again prove what we have always told the Council since the first day of the global terrorist war waged by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel, Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom and France against my country. We said that the suffering of Syrians is the result of the practices of armed terrorist groups against civilians. The testimonies of the tens of thousands of our people leaving eastern Ghouta underscore that those groups have continued to deprive them of their freedom, destroy their livelihoods, disperse their families and prevent them from leaving to areas under State control in order to continue using them as human shields. They have seized control of humanitarian assistance in order to distribute it to their supporters or sell it to civilians at exorbitant prices. They have also targeted the safe corridors allocated by the Government with explosive bullets and mortar shelling, which has led to the death of dozens of people, including some Palestinian brethren. We have borne witness to a state of hysteria in recent days and weeks in the Council as the Syrian Government has sought to exercise its sovereign right, combat terrorist groups and eliminate terrorists in Syria in order to restore security and stability to all Syrians and implement Council resolutions against terrorism. That state of hysteria proves that the States supporting those terrorist groups have never sought to end the suffering of Syrians. They have sought only to perpetuate and prolong their suffering in order to blackmail the Syrian Government, at the political and humanitarian levels, and save terrorists from their certain deaths. I would like to assure the supporters of terrorism, some of whom are present in this Chamber, that the plan that they have promoted for the past seven years has failed. Their plan was to deny that the Islamist takfiri groups were terrorists and instead present them as moderate Syrian opposition. That plan has failed. Eastern Ghouta has not fallen, as my colleague the representative of the United States stated. It was liberated in the same way we liberated eastern Aleppo. It is terrorism that has fallen in eastern Ghouta, not civilians. As the representative of the United States said, today should be a day of shame for the supporters and sponsors of terrorism and terrorist groups. They have supported those terrorist groups for years in order to topple the Syrian Government by force in favour of Islamist takfiri groups. Such actions have led to considerable suffering among the Syrian people, and I have proof of it. Two days ago, at the Senate Armed Forces Committee, led by Senator Lindsey Graham, the Chief of Central Command, General Joseph Votel, stated that "the change of the Government in Syria by force in favour a number of Islamist opposition groups has failed". The Security Council has to date held 49 formal meetings to discuss the so-called humanitarian situation in Syria and a number of informal emergency and Arria Formula meetings. The Council has read reports and heard briefings that were replete with falsehoods that senior officials of the United Nations sought to present in order to serve the policies of some influential Western countries that are members of the Council and to pressure the Syrian Government. Such reports and briefings were completely devoid of professionalism and objectivity. They have failed to take note of the attacks on the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, including the attacks by the international coalition, led by the United States, and those by the Turkish regime and the Israeli occupying force. Those same parties have also sought to provide all kinds of support to terrorist groups associated with Da'esh, the Al-Nusra Front and other militias fabricated in those countries. After 49 reports and hundreds of meetings, briefings and thousands of working hours, some countries continue to refuse to recognize that the humanitarian crisis in Syria is the result of an external investment in terrorism and unilateral coercive measures. Forty-nine reports have been issued, and I say today that my words are falling on deaf ears. People from the Netherlands say that beautiful flowers have thorns. The Netherlands is famous for its flowers. Perhaps that saying reflects the situation on the ground. Mr. Lowcock stated that the Kashkul was targeted by a missile but he did not specify its origin. He said there are eight shelters for those leaving eastern Ghouta. He did not mention the efforts of the Syrian Government to host the 150,000 civilians leaving eastern Ghouta. He does not know who manages those shelters. Perhaps aliens are taking care of the 150,000 civilians. Mr. Lowcock stated that the United Nations, its partners and the Syrian Red Crescent are helping people from Ghouta. He did not mention the Government at all. If the Government has no role to play, why ask it to help the Council? Why does the Council request its approval for the entry of humanitarian convoys? Mr. Lowcock stated that 153,000 people left Afrin and went to Tell 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 21/21 Rifaat because of military operations. Who forced 153,000 people to leave Afrin? Was it not Turkey that forced them to leave? Was it not the Turkish aggression against Afrin that forced these people to leave? Mr. Lowcock mentioned the Syrian Government only once, saying that it approved the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Rukban camp. He did not say that the United States was behind the obstacles preventing the deployment of the humanitarian convoy in question. The United States occupies the Rukban camp and the Tanf area. I will not go into detail now for the sake of time. I will not even go into the details of the forty-ninth report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/243). I will give only one example to prove that the report lacks objectivity and impartiality. The report devotes nine paragraphs to the suffering of civilians in eastern Ghouta and the damage to the infrastructure there as a result of Government military operations, as the report claims — nine paragraphs. As for the situation of the 8 million civilians in Damascus, the targeting by terrorist groups of the capital with more than 2,500 missiles, the killing and injury of thousands, and the destruction of homes, hospitals and clinics, the report dedicates only one sentence to Damascus. The report says, "Attacks on residential neighbourhoods of Damascus also continued from eastern Ghouta, resulting in deaths, injuries and damage to civilian infrastructure." (S/2018/243, para. 8) We hope that the United Nations will not adopt in eastern Ghouta the same approach that it has taken in previous situations by not providing support to the areas liberated or achieving reconciliation. We hope that the United Nations will adopt a new approach in line with the Charter and international law, based on full coordination and cooperation with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, which is the only party concerned with the protection and support of Syrians. We hope that the United Nations will not succumb to the dictates of certain influential Western countries in the Council that run counter to humanitarian action, the Charter and international law. During the past week alone, the Syrian Ministry of Commerce has distributed 4,000 tons of food to civilians leaving eastern Ghouta. I am not sure about the sources mentioned by the representative of France, because France does not have an embassy in Damascus. So its sources of information cannot be credible. In conclusion, the States sponsoring terrorism have instructed armed terrorist groups to use chemical weapons once again in Syria. I ask the Council to pay attention to this information. They asked them to fabricate evidence, as they have in the past, in order to accuse the Syrian Government. We sent this information to the President of the Security Council yesterday. According to that information, this theatrical act will be produced by the intelligence agencies of these countries, and the starring roles will be the White Helmets. The production will be directed by foreign media. This theatrical act will take place this time in the areas close to the separation line in the Syrian occupied Golan. Terrorist groups will use poison gas against civilians in Al-Harra. Afterwards, the injured will be moved to the hospitals of the Israeli enemy for treatment there. Council members can already imagine the testimony that will be offered by doctors of the Israeli occupation forces. The information we submitted also refers to another theatrical act in the villages of Habit and Qalb Lawza in the suburbs of Idlib, where a number of satellite transmitters and foreign experts have been spotted. This time, the cast will include women and children from an internally displaced persons camp on the Syrian-Turkish border. Once again, I provide the Council with this serious information. The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.
Security Council 8236th Meeting (Pm) ; 5/24/2018 Humanitarian Response in Syria Must Be Urgently Boosted, Emergency Relief Coordinator Tells Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press Relea… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13302.doc.htm 1/5 SC/13302 17 APRIL 2018 MEETINGS COVERAGE SECURITY COUNCIL > 8236TH MEETING (PM) Humanitarian Response in Syria Must Be Urgently Boosted, Emergency Relief Coordinator Tells Security Council Casting a spotlight on the pressing needs of civilians in Raqqa and Rukban, the Security Council met this afternoon to hear a brieng on recent developments and discuss ways forward. While people in those cities comprised 1 per cent of those requiring help, their needs were no less important than the remaining 99 per cent, said Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Aairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. In Raqqa, where 100,000 people had returned since October when Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) had been forced out, conditions were not conducive for returns because of high levels of unexploded ordinances and improvised explosive device contamination. In addition, there were scant basic services, a lack of electricity and mobile communications and food insecurity. Describing other concerns, he said in Rukban some 50,000 people were in need of sustained humanitarian assistance. Those remaining in the town of Douma and other areas of eastern Ghouta required urgent assistance after years of deprivation, he said, adding that the humanitarian community had not yet been able to provide help. On 25 March, the United Nations had requested permission from the Government of Syria to deploy an interagency surge team to scale up the United Nations operational capacity, he said, adding that he could not overstate the importance of sustaining and scaling up the international response. Council members underscored the need for sustained aid deliveries, with some calling on all Member States to make substantial commitments at the upcoming Brussels pledging conference and to swiftly disburse pledges. Some delegates said mine clearing should be a priority to ensure safe returns of displaced persons, while many members urged parties to return to negotiations to nd a political solution to end the conict. Echoing a common call, China's representative appealed to all parties in Syria to comply with Security Council resolution 2401 (2018) by ceasing hostilities and coordinating with United Nations humanitarian eorts. Any unilateral action would violate the basic norms of international law while complicating a settlement of the Syrian issue, he said, urging all sides to refrain from moves that would further escalate the situation. The representative of the Russian Federation, noting that Raqqa's destruction had been due to a United States-led coalition ght against ISIL, criticized coalition members for their lack of reconstruction in that area. Civilians were regularly killed by landmines and no assessment of humanitarian needs had occurred until the Russian Federation had insisted on it. In addition, no practical steps had been taken to provide humanitarian assistance to the population of Rukban, which was located near an American airbase. Urging the Council and the humanitarian community to address the situation of those two cities, he said coalition members should outline how they themselves were implementing resolution 2401 (2018). Meanwhile, the United States delegate said that while the 75 members of the Global Coalition against Da'esh had targeted ISIL and liberated civilians, the Syrian Government had bombarded its own people. United Nations humanitarian convoys were welcome at any time in Raqqa and Rukhban, with any delays being the result of the Syrian Government and its failure to allow deliveries. Condemning the Russian Federation for its "cynical, thinly disguised diversions", she said it was clear that it had requested the Council meeting as a distraction from the atrocities committed by the Bashar Al-Assad regime. Providing another perspective, Syria's representative said three Council members continued to search for microscopic dust while ignoring the enormous "elephant in the room", which was the aggression they had launched against his country. Raqqa was a martyr city that had been destroyed by those very States, he said, adding that the coalition had never sought to combat terrorism. Indeed, the point had been to block the Syrian Government and its allies as they attempted to combat ISIL. Turning to the situation in the Rukban camps, he said coalition forces had prevented the Government from delivering aid. Moreover, he asserted that the situation in Syria did not require draft resolutions or semi-daily meetings. Instead, the Council must stand against the occupation of Syria by the United States, Israel and Turkey and aggressions carried out by the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Drawing attention to the eects of the crisis on the Syrian people, Equatorial Guinea's representative said the situation in Raqqa required the international community's urgent attention. Calling for sustained humanitarian access and the intensication of eorts to reach a political solution, he reminded Council members that "the Syrian people have suered enough." 5/24/2018 Humanitarian Response in Syria Must Be Urgently Boosted, Emergency Relief Coordinator Tells Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press Relea… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13302.doc.htm 2/5 Also speaking were the representatives of Kuwait, Sweden, France, United Kingdom, Kazakhstan, Poland, Côte d'Ivoire, Netherlands, Bolivia, Ethiopia and Peru. The meeting began at 4:48 p.m. and ended at 6:38 p.m. Brieng MARK LOWCOCK, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Aairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefed the Council on the situation in Syria, including in Raqqa and Rukban. While people in those cities totalled 1 per cent of those requiring help, their needs were no less important than the remaining 99 per cent. After a United Nations assessment mission on 1 April in Raqqa, where 100,000 people had returned since October when Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) had been forced out, reports showed that conditions were not conducive for returns because of high levels of unexploded ordinances and improvised explosive device contamination. Every week, 50 casualties had been reported due to the remnants of war. Also, an estimated 70 to 80 per cent of all buildings had been destroyed or damaged. While public services were slowly resuming, the city lacked electricity and mobile communications while water was being pumped at a very limited capacity to the outskirts. Meanwhile, up to 95 per cent of households that had returned to Raqqa were food insecure and health services were lacking. Some schools had reopened, but lacked supplies. United Nations agencies were planning deliveries of humanitarian assistance and programmatic interventions to support the work of humanitarian agencies already active in those areas. In Rukban, some 50,000 people were in need of sustained humanitarian assistance, he continued, noting that there was a pressing need for better service provision and medical help. Humanitarian agencies were working closely with the United States, Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent to facilitate deliveries. At the same time, those remaining in the town of Douma and other areas of eastern Ghouta, under control of the Government of Syria, required urgent assistance after years of deprivation. The humanitarian community had not yet been able to provide that, he said, adding that access to reach the people of eastern Ghouta was critical. Of the 155,000 who had been displaced, he said, approximately 63,000 had moved north to Idlib and Aleppo, resulting in a 25 per cent increase in Idlib's displaced population. That situation placed incredible pressure on host communities and humanitarian actors working to provide assistance and services. Those remaining in Afrin were also in dire need of aid. Despite some positive developments, humanitarian partners were still struggling to gain sustained access to Afrin and freedom of movement for internally displaced persons remained severely limited. On 25 March, the United Nations requested permission from the Government of Syria to deploy an interagency surge team to scale up the United Nations operational capacity. Overall, he could not overstate the importance of sustaining and scaling up the international response. Statements VASSILY A. NEBENZIA (Russian Federation), noting that some delegations were constantly calling on his country to provide updates on its implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), said signicant eorts had been undertaken to improve the situation in eastern Ghouta, where armed groups had long held populations hostage. "A bloodbath was prevented," he said, adding that some 60,000 people had also been helped to return to their homes. Joint work was ongoing between the Russian military police and Syrian law enforcement ocials, including debris clearance, re-establishment of services and food deliveries. However, the international community's attention was also required, he said, calling for additional support from other Member States. In contrast, he said, Raqqa — which had been destroyed by United States-led coalition air strikes — had seen no reconstruction eorts. Civilians were regularly killed by landmines, and no assessment of humanitarian needs had taken place until the Russian Federation had insisted on it. Buildings were in ruins, thousands of corpses remained buried and no school, hospital or basic services remained operational. No practical steps had been taken to provide humanitarian assistance to the population of the similarly damaged city of Rukban, located near an American airbase whose very existence constituted a blatant violation of Syria's sovereignty. Urging the Council and the humanitarian community not to ignore the situation of those two cities, he said members of the coalition should be courageous enough to outline how they themselves were implementing resolution 2401 (2018) in those cases. Events over recent days had revealed the hypocrisy of the "troika" — namely, the United States, United Kingdom and France, he said. By their acts of aggression, those countries and their supporters had taken sides in the Syrian conict. The Russian Federation was instead working with all sides, committing to implementing Council resolutions and supporting the parties in making progress in the Geneva talks, which must resume without preconditions and especially without demands for a regime change. Given current developments, it was hard to imagine that the Government of Syria would want to talk about the situation in its country with any members of the troika, who sought to declare its President a war criminal. Indeed, before any progress could be made, "you rst need to undo the damage that you yourself have created", he said, noting that the opposition must step back from its destructive position while embracing Council resolutions, and their patrons must end their militant rhetoric against the legitimately elected President of Syria. Meanwhile, he said, the establishment of a mechanism to attribute responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in Syria made no sense, as Washington, D.C., and its allies were already acting like self-appointed executioners on that matter. Attempts to push the Russian Federation to change its position using air strikes and the threat of sanctions had never 5/24/2018 Humanitarian Response in Syria Must Be Urgently Boosted, Emergency Relief Coordinator Tells Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press Relea… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13302.doc.htm 3/5 worked in the past nor would they work in the future. The United States and its allies must end its threats to use force against Syria, as such actions outed international law and only drove peace farther away. Warning against attempts to maintain foreign occupation in parts of Syria, loot its resources and stoke divisions between its people, he said military groups must also separate themselves from terrorists and Western parties should stop manipulating the humanitarian situation for political purposes. BADER ABDULLAH N. M. ALMUNAYEKH (Kuwait) said resolution 2401 (2018) had addressed the humanitarian situation across Syria, demanding a pause in hostilities for 30 days to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance and allow for the evacuation of the sick and wounded. Voicing frustration that it had not yet been implemented, he reiterated the call on parties to the conict to allow the entry of weekly convoys and for an immediate end to all attacks against civilians, civilian infrastructure and medical facilities. Urging the Astana guarantors, in particular, to continue to support talks. Welcoming the Oce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aairs preparations of plans for providing humanitarian assistance in Raqqa, he underscored the need to maintain sustained aid delivery to internally displaced persons camps in Rukban. OLOF ORRENIUS SKOOG (Sweden) said a greater eort must be made to ensure full and immediate implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) throughout Syria, with the Astana guarantors living up to their commitments. He called on the Syrian authorities to immediately grant facilitation letters for humanitarian convoys to Douma and to facilitate sustained United Nations access to camps housing internally displaced persons. Referring also the situations in Raqqa, Rukban, Idlib and Afrin, he said the humanitarian community was undertaking a Herculean task. However, the acute lack of funding for United Nations humanitarian operations in in Syria was deeply troubling, he said, calling on all Member States to make substantial commitments at the upcoming Brussels conference and to swiftly disburse pledges. KELLEY A. ECKELS-CURRIE (United States) said the 75 members of the Global Coalition against Da'esh that had fought the terrorist group in Iraq had continued its eradication campaign in Syria. While the coalition had targeted ISIL and liberated civilians, the Syrian Government had bombarded its own people. Noting that United Nations humanitarian convoys were welcome at any time in Raqqa and Rukban, the United States stood ready to support deliveries. Any delays stemmed from the Bashar al-Assad regime and its failure to allow convoys to move. The United States had already provided assistance, clearing 3,000 remnants of war and contributing 300,000 pounds of food. Pointing out that the Russian Federation had called the Council meeting as part of a messaging campaign to distract the international community from the atrocities committed by the Assad regime, she reiterated that in addition to a ceasere, the Council had called for unhindered access for humanitarian assistance. Yet, the regime had only allowed six convoys. Such calls by the Council needed to be implemented on the ground, but that required the Syrian Government's cooperation, she said, condemning the Russian Federation for its "cynical, thinly disguised diversions". FRANÇOIS DELATTRE (France) said the humanitarian situation in Syria screamed for attention, including those eeing safe areas, the bureaucracy preventing access to camps and conditions in Raqqa, where 90,000 people had returned. Humanitarian actors needed access to provide much-needed basic services and eorts must continue to remove landmines. For its part, France was helping with landmine clearance and had contributed €10 million for projects easing civilian returns to Raqqa. Concerning Rukban, he reiterated an urgent appeal to guarantee unimpeded humanitarian access. In that context, he supported the draft resolution that his country, United Kingdom and the United States had tabled on 14 April with a view to making progress on the humanitarian front, put a denite end to the Syrian chemical programme and begin conclusive political negotiations. That draft had sought areas of convergence to create conditions of real diplomatic progress in Syria and open the way for true negotiations. KAREN PIERCE (United Kingdom), regretting to note that some members had used the humanitarian situation to score political points, recalled that the United Kingdom had contributed a total of $3.5 billion to date for humanitarian assistance. Her Government continued to provide humanitarian support to Raqqa and surrounding areas and had aided with landmine clearance. Raising several concerns, she drew attention to the plight of displaced persons in Rukban and urged the regime to facilitate access to the United Nations and its partners to deliver aid to Douma and eastern Ghouta. She called on the Council to use recent events to get the political process back on track and was looking forward to the upcoming retreat in Sweden, which the Secretary-General would also attend. KANAT TUMYSH (Kazakhstan), welcoming the Oce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aairs assessment mission to Raqqa in April, raised concerns that an estimated 100,000 people had returned to their homes in that city despite the wide presence of unexploded ordnances. Highlighting the signicant destruction of Raqqa and the precarious fate of the Rukban and Hadalat refugee camps, he warned the Council of a dangerous tendency for those camps to become havens for foreign mercenaries. Kazakhstan supported the Russian Federation's proposal to establish humanitarian corridors for withdrawing refugees from El Tanf and the Rukban camp, based on the example provided by Russian and Syrian military troops during the assault on Aleppo. Calling on all parties immediately suspend hostilities, implement resolution 2401 (2018) and report periodically on those eorts, he said the questions of boundaries and territories following Syria's prolonged war should be addressed in line with that country's Constitution in order to prevent the re‑emergence of extremist groups. PAWEL RADOMSKI (Poland), raising concerns about new internally displaced persons reaching Idlib, said the military conict in north-west Syria had further complicated the situation on the ground. He called on all parties, especially the Russian Federation and Iran, to take action towards a cessation of hostility and to comply with all their obligations under 5/24/2018 Humanitarian Response in Syria Must Be Urgently Boosted, Emergency Relief Coordinator Tells Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press Relea… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13302.doc.htm 4/5 international law. He also urged the Russian Federation, Iran and Turkey to full their responsibility as guarantors of the Astana process. There could be no military solution to the conict, in Syria, he said, underlining that a political agreement remained the only sustainable solution. ANATOLIO NDONG MBA (Equatorial Guinea) said Council members had recognized the very high number of people eeing Syria when they had adopted resolution 2393 (2017). In the former ISIL stronghold of Raqqa, military oensives had led to signicant destruction. Commending World Health Organization (WHO) eorts, he said Raqqa's residents continued to be deprived of aid because there were no nearby oces of humanitarian agencies and local authorities were incapable of providing assistance. The situation required the international community and the Council's urgent attention, he said, calling for the provision of sustained access allowing humanitarian convoys to reach Raqqa. "The Syrian people have suered enough," he said, calling for the intensication of eorts to reach a political solution centred on the needs of the Syrian people and in full respect for Syria's territorial integrity. THÉODORE DAH (Côte d'Ivoire), echoing expressions of regret that resolution 2401 (2018) remained unimplemented, called on all parties to ensure its full implementation across Syria including in Raqqa and Rukban. In the former, signicant destruction, a dearth of basic services and the presence of unexploded ordnance posed serious obstacles for safe returns of civilians. Calling on the international community to address those situations, he said a needs assessment was urgently required to better understand the extremely precarious living conditions in Rukban's internally displaced persons camps. Such work must be part of a global eort to reach a negotiated political solution based on inclusive dialogue and in line with resolution 2254 (2015). LISE GREGOIRE VAN HAAREN (Netherlands) emphasized the urgent need for access to Douma for humanitarian convoys and for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) fact-nding mission. Calling for a humanitarian surge to address the urgent needs of internally displaced persons, she emphasized the situation of more than 180,000 people displaced by hostilities in Afrin, adding to the strain felt by host communities. Clearing improvised explosive devices was a priority in Raqqa, while in Rukban, both food and medical aid must reach the remaining displaced persons via the fastest and easiest route. Resolution 2401 (2018) must be implemented across Syria and eorts must succeed in ensuring humanitarian access and the protection of civilians, in line with international humanitarian law. MA ZHAOXU (China) appealed to all parties in Syria to comply with resolution 2401 (2018), cease hostilities and coordinate with United Nations humanitarian eorts. Equal attention must be paid to the humanitarian situation and to helping displaced persons to return to their homes. Emphasizing China's adherence to the peaceful settlement of disputes and its rejection of the use of force in international regulations, he said any action taken must comply with the United Nations Charter. Any unilateral action would violate the basic norms of international law while complicating a settlement of the Syrian issue, he said, urging all sides to refrain from moves that would further escalate the situation. PEDRO LUIS INCHAUSTE JORDÁN (Bolivia) underscored the pressing need to pursue mine clearing and to remove improvised explosive devices and remnants of war. Such work was vital for reconstruction and the return of basic services. Expressing regret that violence had continued unfettered in major cities, he said it was even more repugnant that schools, hospitals and residential areas were being targeted. Bolivia called on all stakeholders to spare no eort to implement resolution 2401 (2018) and for all parties to allow for unconditional humanitarian access. He went on to reiterate that the Syrian people should decide their political future through an inclusive process, free from external meddling. DAWIT YIRGA WOLDEGERIMA (Ethiopia) said the destruction of infrastructure and limited public services remained major challenges in Syrian cities. Demining eorts should be strengthened and aid must be delivered to all parts of Syria via safe and unhindered humanitarian access. Underscoring the importance of fully implementing resolution 2401 (2018), he said the Council should restore its unity through genuine and productive dialogue. GUSTAVO MEZA-CUADRA (Peru), Council President for April, speaking in his national capacity, welcomed eorts to clear "deadly booby-traps" laid by Da'esh in Raqqa and other areas. Recommendations from the Oce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aairs mission to Raqqa would contribute to the safe return of displaced persons. While acknowledging the legitimate right of States to protect their borders, he said there should be unfettered access to Rukban, given the humanitarian situation there. It was vital that needs in Syria be met on a consistent basis, regardless of location, he said, adding that politicizing humanitarian assistance was unacceptable and a contravention of resolution 2401 (2018), which must be applied holistically throughout Syria. BASHAR JA'AFARI (Syria) said three Council members continued to search for microscopic dust while ignoring the enormous "elephant in the room", which was the aggression they had launched against Syria. His counterpart from the United States had declared that her country's forces had rid Raqqa of 3,000 landmines. Yet, the United States had also assisted 4,000 terrorists to safely leave the city without holding them accountable for planting them. While Sweden's representative had called out the Syrian Government many times, he had failed to call for an end to the United States, Turkish and Israeli occupation of Syria and to mention State-sponsored terrorism. Addressing France's delegate, he said Médecins Sans Frontières, like ISIL, had entered Syria without the Syrian Government's approval, behaving instead like "terrorists without borders". 5/24/2018 Humanitarian Response in Syria Must Be Urgently Boosted, Emergency Relief Coordinator Tells Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press Relea… https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13302.doc.htm 5/5 Providing an update on the OPCW fact-nding mission in Douma, he said the Syrian Government had facilitated the arrival today of a United Nations security team, which had entered the city around 3 p.m. local time. If the team found the situation to be secure, the OPCW fact-nding team would begin its work 18 April. Claims that the mission had been blocked had only intended to distract the international community from reality, he said, expressing regret that countries launched cowardly attacks against Syria still failed to understand the Syrian people's desire to determine their own destiny. "The days of hegemony are gone," he said, adding that no threat of force or support for terrorists would change the fact that the world's people were tired of seeing big Powers continue to disregard international law with impunity. He said Raqqa was a martyr city that had been destroyed by those very States, with the Oce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aairs declaring the destruction to be "100 per cent complete". Hundreds of thousands of people had ed Raqqa and no basic services or operating hospitals remained, except for Médecins Sans Frontières facilities. The coalition had never sought to combat terrorism, he said, recalling its bloody massacres of civilians in various towns and villages across Syria. Indeed, the point had been to block the Syrian Government and its allies as they attempted to combat ISIL. On 8 February, United States forces had killed dozens of members of a popular force that had been ghting ISIL along the Euphrates River. Meanwhile, terrorists had been spared and even armed so they could wreak further havoc. Turning to the situation in the Rukban camps, he said coalition forces had prevented the Government from delivering aid. The United States was using the area as a place to train terrorist forces, who would then be used to ght other battles in the region. The situation in Syria did not require draft resolutions or semi-daily meetings. Instead, what was needed was for the Council to stand against the occupation of Syria by the United States, Israel and Turkey, aggressions carried out by the United States, France and the United Kingdom and the imposition of coercive measures against the Syrian people. For information media. Not an ocial record.
Access to a lawyer at the pre-trial stage of proceedings is an essential component of the right to defense in criminal proceedings and the right to a fair trial. Access to a lawyer enables the accused to make a good decision for his her defence. At present, there is no doubt that prompt access to a lawyer constitutes an important counterweight to the vulnerability of suspects in police custody, ensures equality of arms and provides a fundamental safeguard against coercion. This study analyses a suspect's right to access to a lawyer at the initial stage of criminal proceedings in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The first part of the article provides an analysis of the understanding of the right to a lawyer at the pre-trial stage as applied by the ECtHR prior to the Salduz case. This period in the ECtHR's case law was characterized by a lack of precision as to the temporal limits of the right laid down in Article 6 § 3 (c) of the ECHR. The next part shows the changes brought about by the judgment in the Salduz case regarding the protection of suspects and ensuring their right to counsel. It is argued that the Salduzdoctrine not only covered the suspect's access to a lawyer at the initial stage of the pre-trial proceedings, but also stressed the obligation to inform the suspect of his or her rights, including the right to remain silent. An important element of the Salduz doctrine was the possibility to eliminate evidence obtained during an interrogation conducted at an early stage of the pre-trial proceedings in the absence of a defense counsel. Further, the paper argues that the standard set out in the judgment in the Salduz v. Turkey case was confirmed in a number of rulings. The fourth part of the paper draws attention to the erosion of the Salduz standard that occurred with the judgment in the Ibrahim and Others v. the UK case. The article also brings into focus recent judgments of the ECtHR which have reinforced the view expressed in the Ibrahim and Others v. the UK case concerning a test of fairness of a trial as whole. It is underlined in the conclusions that recent ECtHR's case law does not provide any cause for optimism regarding legal assistance at an early stage of criminal proceedings. ; O acesso a um advogado na fase anterior ao julgamento é um componente essencial do direito de defesa no processo penal e do direito a um julgamento justo. O acesso a um advogado permite que o imputado tome uma boa decisão em relação à sua defesa. Atualmente, não há dúvida de que o acesso imediato à defesa técnica constitui um contrapeso importante à vulnerabilidade dos suspeitos sob custódia policial, garante a igualdade de armas e fornece uma salvaguarda fundamental contra a coerção. Este estudo analisa o direito do imputado a um advogado na fase inicial da persecução penal na jurisprudência do Tribunal Europeu de Direitos Humanos. A primeira parte do artigo apresenta uma análise da compreensão sobre o direito a um advogado na fase anterior ao julgamento, conforme aplicado pelo TEDH antes do caso Salduz. Esse período foi caracterizado por uma falta de precisão quanto aos limites temporais do direito previsto no artigo 6.º, n.º 3, alínea c, da CEDH. O item subsequente apresenta as mudanças trazidas pelo julgamento do caso Salduz no que diz respeito à proteção dos suspeitos e à garantia de seu direito à defesa técnica. Argumenta-se que a doutrina Salduz não apenas abrangia o acesso do suspeito a um advogado na fase inicial do procedimento prévio ao julgamento, mas também enfatizava a obrigação de informar o suspeito sobre os seus direitos, incluindo o direito de permanecer em silêncio. Um elemento importante da doutrina Salduz era a possibilidade de excluir as provas obtidas durante um interrogatório em investigação preliminar conduzido na ausência de um advogado de defesa. Além disso, argumenta-se que o standard estabelecido no julgamento no caso Salduz v. Turquia foi confirmado em uma série de decisões posteriores. A quarta parte do artigo chama a atenção para a erosão do padrão Salduz que ocorreu com o julgamento no caso Ibrahim e outros vs. Reino Unido. O artigo também destaca os recentes acórdãos do TEDH, que reforçaram a opinião expressa no caso Ibrahim e outros c. Reino Unido a respeito de uma verificação de legitimidade do julgamento como um todo. 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The aim of this report is to describe and analyze the embodiment of acceptance and recognition in discourses and practices which address cultural diversity in the Swedish educational system. In order to fulfil this general aim, we study how different categories of practitioners in the Swedish school system, such as teachers, headmasters and union representatives, and other stakeholders, such as civil servants, and representatives of political parties and the civil society, discuss and relate to the claims of recognition put forth by Muslim practitioners and/or policy measures designed to reach the fulfilment of those claims. Two cases are studied: the establishment of Muslim independent schools and the claims to dress veiled in public schools, out forth by Muslim youth. The cases are selected with consideration to a number of circumstances. First, the faith and belief practices of Muslim migrants have been debated on a large scale in Swedish media during the last decade, as in many other West European and North American countries. It is quite common that these practices has been put under scrutiny, and subjected to extensive critique. The attention paid to Muslim belief practices and institutions has also reached Muslim denominational schools and the practice of Burqa and Niqab. The establishment of denominational schools during the last two decades, whether Islamic or not, has also received a lot of attention, in mainstream media as well as in debates on education policy. For instance, a number of political parties have voiced demands to keep down the number of Islamic denominational schools. Second, Muslim migrants has, according to a number of studies, been subjected to direct and indirect discrimination. Whether this discrimination primarily is religious to its nature, or ethnic, and hence targeting their ethnic identity, is not always concluded, but the extensive negative attention mentioned above suggests that the scope of religiously motivated discrimination is either predominant or on the rise. The enactment of Muslim belief practices is not infrequently obstructed. For example, the construction of Mosques does seldom take place in silence; frequent and high-pitched voices of rejection and disapproval are common, and when the buildings once are completed, the congregations receive numerous threats and insults. The opposition is evident, and two mosques have been burned down. Moreover, women wearing burqa or niqab report being harassed in public. Apart from the lack of recognition and acceptance in religious matters, the prevalence of discriminatory mechanisms might also obstruct the access to welfare services and the entry to the labour market. This report consists of two cases studies, which relies solely on qualitative data. The main part of the empirical material consists of interviews with 13 persons – three teachers, three headmasters, two union representatives, two civil servants, one jurist, one imam and one representative of a political party. The interviews are used as a source for both cases. As additions to interviews, we have collected newspaper articles, memos from public authorities, bills introduced to the parliament, debates on commentary fields in web-edition of newspapers, et cetera. Being a minor study, it is necessary to make some reservations concerning the reliability of our material. Thus, it is difficult to determine whether or not it is possible to make generalizations from our material, thus asserting that the viewpoints found in our material are overlapping with or similar to the attitudes of other teachers, headmasters et cetera. In sum, a number of disadvantages with the establishment of Islamic denominational schools are expressed. They are allegedly divisive, both culturally and socially, and the quality of their instructions is supposed to be inadequate, in relation to the standards explicated in the national curriculum and syllabi. If the attitudes found in this study is spread all over Sweden, it could reasonable be said that Muslim schools are met by suspicion. Still, few calls for shutting down of these schools are voiced. It seems that the Muslim denominational schools are tolerated in a literal sense: it is accepted, sometimes pragmatically, but not liked. On the other hand, it could be said that the provision of a juridical and institutional space for religious minorities to establish denominational schools is part of politics of recognition; i.e. an educational policy which, under auspicious circumstances might provide the means for religious minorities to receive respect as equal and gain admission as normal. It must also be noted that the some of the objections to the existence of denominational schools implicitly and explicitly related to some central notions in Swedish educational policy. The notion of equivalence is a keyword in this context, and signifies on the one hand a demand for abidance by the national curriculum and syllabi, and on the other a priority of equalizing measures over freedom of choice. The equalizing and integrative objectives of the compulsory school project seem to be vital, but the quest for recognition of minority beliefs systems is circumscribed. Thus, the reproduction of "demos" is given priority over the recognition of "ethnos". As such, the notion of "equivalence" [likvärdighet] has been a keyword in Swedish educational policy since the 1980's, denoting equalizing ambitions as well as educational uniformity and compliance to steering documents. A number of objections to the practice of wearing Burqa or Niqab are put forth by our interviewees. In contrast to the media debate, the argument of gender equality was relatively downgraded. Rather, the interviewees focused on assumed problems with identification and communication. It was said that the abovementioned veiling practices obstructed the possibility of identifying the students at school, and also rendered the communication – and hence the instructions – at school more difficult. In comparison with the question of Islamic denominational schools, the non-tolerant stance was more manifest, although few explicit calls for a prohibition were made. Moreover, a specific discursive framing of the veiling practices could be discerned. The wearing of Burqa or Niqab was associated with phenomena such as mischief and the hidden, thus casting suspicion over the practice in question. As an instance of the everyday life, rather than an institutional arrangement, veiling practices could arguably be considered to be of less concern for educational policy than the establishment and maintenance of Islamic denominational schools. Still, the question of prohibition has gained a lot media attention during the last years, and brought the regulating dimension to the fore. And though our material contains few explicit calls for prohibition, several interviewees claimed that a teacher must see the face of the student in order to instruct and educate. And although the goal of equivalence was less relevant in this matter, the practice of veiling was questioned with reference to universal human rights, as the rights of the child. The right of the parent to exert influence in religious matter was questioned, since it could be regarded as a limitation of the freedom to choose direction to the walk of life. Thus, it seems like that the right to wear Burqa and Niqab in public schools are among the non-tolerable, although few explicit calls for prohibition can be discerned. So far, the material in our report, consisting of relatively limited set of qualitative data resonates with the broader tendency discerned by Orlando Mella, Irving Palm and Kristin Bromark (2011): the resistance in Sweden against the Burqa and the Niqab is compact; almost nine Swedes out of ten find it (totally or partly) unacceptable to wear Burqa and Niqab, respectively, at school or at work (Mella et al 2011:30), whereas seven out of ten find it (totally or partly) unacceptable to wear Burqa and Niqab at other public places. As noted above, the stress on equivalence consists of two distinct although related arguments. On the one hand, there is a demand for abidance by the law (here: steering documents such as national curriculum and syllabi), which among other things are paid attention to because Islamic schools are suspected not to follow these steering documents accordingly. This interpretation of "equivalence" is related to an understanding of the term which has become more and more frequent since the introduction of freedom of choice and independent schools in Swedish educational policy, and the decentralized system of governance of education in Sweden (Lindensjö & Lundgren 2002). In this context, where regulation is obtained through management by objective and evaluation, and responsibilities are spread between numerous responsible organizations, the goal of equivalence is equivalent (!) to abiding by the law. On the other hand, there is wish to maintain socially integrated educational environments, in which students from different ethnicities, classes and gender meets and interacts. Thus, it seems like the equalizing and integrative objectives which were central to the compulsory school project implemented during the heyday of the Scandinavian welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1990) seem to be "alive and kicking". But the quest for recognition of minority beliefs systems, central to the policy of multiculturalism, is circumscribed. In so far, the arguments employed here gives priority to the reproduction of "demos" over the reproduction of "ethnos". It must also be noted that the freedom of choice, an important feature in the neoliberal turn of educational policy, does not seems to be so important for the interviewees in this particular matter. If we focus on the most elaborated objections in the report, we find arguments which 1) was presented as a response to the presumably universalist claims of freedom of religion, thus setting the professional considerations which are presented above in a more general, ethical context, and 2) focused on an ethical value of overriding importance, viz. the rights of the child. Emphasis is laid on the right of the child to "choose his own path", a wording which is used by several interviewees, which most of all seems to refer to the first paragraph in article 14 in the United Nations convention on the Rights of the Child, which aims at protecting "the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion". In the arguments of the teachers, the headmasters and the union representatives, this ethical principle makes it to possible to assert that children possess the freedom from the religion (as well as from other loyalties, or sets of ideas and beliefs) of their parents. Although not explicitly questioning the parents rights' to raise and guide their own children, they distinctly emphasize the autonomy of the child, and it's potential to choose something else than that which is given within the family. The emphasis on the rights of the child is regularly explicated in a specific discursive context. The right to "choose one's own path" is contrasted to the restrictions inherent in the religiosity of the parents. Religion is regularly depicted as the repressive force, and the secular mind-set as the entity in need of protection. The possibility of secular parents putting down religious inclinations among their children is never represented. Evidently, a discursive coupling of religion with repression and secularism with liberation may be discerned in the claims for freedom from religion. It may also be noted, that the impact from parental (Islamic) faith is the only aspect of upbringing which is questioned in this context. The arguments against tolerance or recognition of Islamic belief practices in this report are not primarily based on islamophobic or orientalistic discourses, but with reference to notions of equality. The interviewees stress the professional aspect of their opposition against veiling practices. They dissociate themselves from standpoints put forth in media, above all those who solely focus on the gender aspect of complete veiling practices. Instead, their emphasis on the professional educator dimension entails a focus on communication and identification. These acts of discursive positioning might be seen as an effort to "maximize the intertextual gap" between their own argument and the discourse in media, which to a fair-sized extent was articulated by radical right-wing populists. This dilemma is solved by the rhetoric of equivalence, which offers a way to reject claims of recognition in tandem with the defence of values as diverse and important as social justice, the rule of law and the freedom of the individual (child). Thus, the non-tolerance of religiously motivated veiling practices could be motivated with values which is central to diverse but culturally dominant ideological universes, such as socialism and (neo-)liberalism. ; Accept Pluralism
The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8228 Security Council Seventy-third year 8228th meeting Tuesday, 10 April 2018, 3 p.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Tumysh/Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Poland. . Mr. Radomski Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-10187 (E) *1810187* S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 2/21 18-10187 The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Canada, the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them document S/2018/175, S/2018/321 and S/2018/322, which contain the texts of three draft resolutions, respectively. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/321, submitted by Canada, France, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. I now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): For years, as part of its responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security, the Security Council has been mobilized on the issue of chemical weapons. After the chemical attacks in Ghouta in 2013, the Security Council adopted resolution 2118 (2013), which provided for the complete dismantling of the chemical arsenal of the Syrian regime. Russia, as co-sponsor of that resolution, had guaranteed its implementation. Despite that guarantee, the Damascus regime has never complied with its obligations under resolution 2118 (2013) and has never renounced — as we saw again on 7 April — the use of chemical weapons against its civilian population. Five years after the Council's adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), we note that the general subject of chemical weapons remains tragically topical. The upcoming voting marks our fourth meeting in less than a week on this issue. Yesterday we met in an emergency meeting (see S/PV.8225) following a new chemical-weapons massacre in Douma, Syria, whose appalling images left us shocked. Last month we met to discuss the unacceptable attack in Salisbury (see S/PV.8203). Last year we met day after day after the terrible attack of Khan Shaykhun. That shows the deterioration of the situation and how serious the stakes are today for our security. The use of chemical weapons is so abominable that it has been banned for almost 100 years, and the international community began years ago to eliminate them. As such, the chemical non-proliferation regime, which we have patiently developed and strengthened, is one of the pillars of our collective security architecture, at the heart of our security system. Yet today it is under serious threat. We face the cynical, barbaric and all-out use of chemical weapons against civilian populations. The Douma attacks once again illustrated the abject brutality of the Syrian regime's resolute military strategy. Such acts constitute war crimes or even crimes against humanity. They increase the risk of dangerous normalization — tolerating the return of these agents of fear and death is nothing more than a blank cheque to all those who would like to use them. To allow the normalization of the use of chemical weapons without responding is to let the genie of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — which pose an existential threat to us all — out of the bottle. It would mark a serious and reprehensible setback to the international order that we have all patiently helped to develop. The consequences would be terrible, and we would all pay the price. That is why we cannot accept it. France will do all it can to prevent impunity for the use of chemical weapons. It is in that spirit that we launched an international partnership last January. The demise of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in November, due to the Russian veto to protect Al-Assad's regime, sent a dangerous signal of impunity. It deprived us of an essential deterrent tool. It left a vacuum that the Syrian regime has rushed to exploit, and which yesterday's atrocities have tragically reminded us of. The American initiative to re-establish an independent mechanism, based on a balanced approach and taking into account the concerns expressed by every member of the Council, enables us to fill that glaring void. Such a mechanism would support the inquiry that has already been launched by the OPCW. It would also respect the essential criteria of independence, 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 3/21 without any interference, and impartiality to which each member of the Council has committed. Such a mechanism would have a mandate to attribute responsibility for the attacks. Only the combination of those two criteria — independence and a mandate to attribute responsibility — will make that mechanism effective, and therefore dissuasive. Let me be clear: in view of the gravity of the 7 April attack, France will not accept any third-rate or sham mechanism whose independence and impartiality would not be genuinely ensured. That is what the Security Council owes today to the Syrian victims of chemical attacks and to the entire international community, whose security is threatened by the chemicals in the hands of the regime of Bashar Al-Assad. Since the threat is of an existential nature for us all, combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must, more than ever, be among the top priorities of the Security Council. If there is one area in which the Council has a moral and political responsibility to convene and act, it is this one. If there is one domain for which the credibility of the Council is at stake, where tactical games have no place, it is this one. This is one of those moments when we have no choice but to act because what is at stake is essential. We cannot allow the chemical non-proliferation regime, and with it our entire security architecture — along with the principles and values that underpin our action — to crack and disintegrate before our very eyes. Today's vote is one of those key moments, one of those moments of truth. On behalf of France, I therefore call on each member of the Council to properly gauge and assume its responsibilities now and to vote in favour of the American draft resolution (S/2018/321). Mrs. Haley (United States of America): We have reached a decisive moment as the Security Council. On Saturday the first haunting images appeared from Douma, in Syria. We gathered around this table yesterday (see S/PV.8225) to express our collective outrage. We then collectively agreed that the Council needed to take steps to determine exactly what happened in Douma and to put an end to these barbaric attacks. The United States has put forward a draft resolution (S/2018/321) that accomplishes those shared goals. For weeks we have been working with every single delegation on the Council to develop a new attribution mechanism for chemical-weapons attacks in Syria. We held open and transparent negotiations so that every delegation could provide its input. And we went the extra mile for one Council member. We adopted paragraph after paragraph of Russia's proposed draft resolution (S/2018/175). We tried to take every Russian proposal that did not compromise the impartiality, independence or professionalism of a new attribution mechanism. After the Douma attack, we updated our draft resolution with common sense changes. Our proposal condemns the attack. It demands unhindered humanitarian access for the people in Douma. It calls on the parties to give maximum cooperation to the investigation. And it creates the attribution mechanism that we worked so hard with each member to develop. The draft resolution is the bare minimum that the Council can do to respond to the attack. The United States did everything possible to work towards Council unity on this text. Again, we accepted every recommendation that did not compromise the impartiality and independence of the proposed attribution mechanism. I want to say a brief word about Russia's draft resolution, which is also before us for a vote. Our draft resolutions are similar, but there are important differences. The key point is that our draft resolution guarantees that any investigations will truly be independent. Russia's draft resolution gives Russia itself the chance to choose the investigators and then to assess the outcome. There is nothing independent about that. The United States is not asking to choose the investigators, and neither should Russia. The United States is not asking to review the findings of any investigation before they are final, and neither should Russia. All of us say that we want an independent investigation. Our draft resolution achieves that goal. Russia's does not. This is not an issue that more time or more consultations could have resolved. At a certain point, you are either for an independent and impartial investigation or you are not. And now that the Douma attack has happened, this is not a decision that we can delay any longer. The United States calls on all Security Council members to vote in favour of our draft resolution and to abstain or vote against the Russian draft resolution. The Syrian people are counting on us. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Today the delegation of the United States is once again trying to mislead the international S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 4/21 18-10187 community and is taking yet another step towards confrontation by putting to a vote a draft resolution (S/2018/321) that does not enjoy the unanimous support of the members of the Security Council. It is not true that it meets almost all our requirements. The text is nothing more than an attempt to resurrect, unchanged, the former Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), established to investigate cases of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Russia has always emphasized that it will not support that approach. The JIM became a puppet in the hands of anti-Damascus forces, and it covered itself with shame when it issued a guilty verdict for a sovereign State without credible evidence. The American draft resolution represents an identical reproduction of all of the former Mechanism's flawed working methods. The new mechanism would conduct investigations as it sees fit, with no reference to the standards of the Chemical Weapons Convention. That has nothing to do with independence, which the draft resolution's sponsors and its closest allies only pretend to care about. We know the worth of such independence. It is true anarchy and manipulation. At every stage of our work on the American initiative we have insisted that the Secretary-General should select the staff for the investigative mechanism on the basis of the broadest possible geographic representation, with subsequent approval by the Security Council. Visits to the sites of the incidents and strict adherence to the principle of sequential actions while ensuring the preservation of the material evidence should be not optional but mandatory working principles. In a collective decision, the Security Council would determine who was responsible in any given case of the use of chemical weapons, based on reliable evidence that would leave no room for doubt about the correctness of the conclusions. There is nothing about this in the American draft resolution. The authors know that it goes against the Russian position and will not be adopted. But they are obstinately sticking to their line. It is clear that today's provocative step has nothing to do with a desire to investigate what happened in Douma, Syria, on 7 April. An attributive mechanism is not necessary in order to initially establish the facts. Even if we could conceive of the improbable scenario in which the draft resolution creating the mechanism was adopted today, it would take several months to put the mechanism together and fine-tune its operations. Establishing who is to blame is the final link in a very long chain of actions. Here, in front of everyone, I would once again like to ask the sponsors why they need the mechanism when they have already identified the guilty parties before the investigation. They do not need it. They do not want to hear anything. They do not want to hear that no traces of a chemical attack were found in Douma. They have simply been looking for an excuse the whole time, and the provocateurs among the White Helmets have very kindly provided it. This is all reminiscent of a kind of spring fever. Exactly a year ago, in April 2017, a similar scenario unrolled with the chemical provocation in Khan Shaykhun, followed by a missile strike. The fact is that the authors of the draft resolution are motivated by completely different priorities. They have pinned their hopes on the assumption that the draft resolution will not be adopted. That is what they want, and it is something that they can bank along with the rest of their reasons justifying the use of force against Syria. For several days now, the Administration in Washington, D.C., has been keeping the international community in suspense while discussing the so-called important decisions being prepared. Only yesterday we heard how anxiously Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura spoke about the current escalation extending beyond Syria's borders (see S/PV.8225), and we know that the Secretary-General is also very concerned about that. It is clear that Russia will once again be the target of the propaganda cannons. My American colleague will painstakingly enumerate the Russian vetoes on Syria. It is not impossible that she has taken upon herself a capitalist commitment to using the reckless policies of the United States to achieve some sort of personal record in that regard. We are using the veto to protect international law, peace and security and to ensure that the United States does not to drag the Security Council into its misadventures. The United States representative says that we are covering up for someone. Russia is in Syria at the invitation of its lawful Government in order to combat international terrorism, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, while the United States is covering up for militias and terrorists. If the United States has decided to carry out an illegal military venture — and we still hope that it will think better of it — it must answer for that itself. It wants to dump this draft resolution, which has been sitting on the shelf for a long time, onto the Security Council in order to find a pretext. The United States representative 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 5/21 herself has said repeatedly that if the Council does not make a decision, the United States will make a decision on its own. Why is the suta purposely undermining the Council's authority by promoting a draft resolution that we know will not go through? And a lot of people said that yesterday during consultations. We urge the Americans to give sober consideration to the potential this presents for confrontation, to think better of it and to withdraw its draft resolution from a vote. Russia cannot support it. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall first put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/321, submitted by Canada, France, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America Against: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Russian Federation Abstaining: China The President (spoke in Spanish): The draft resolution received 12 votes in favour, 2 against and 1 abstention. The draft resolution has not been adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): This is a sad day for the Security Council; it is a sad day for the cause of universal norms and standards; and it is a sad day for the non-proliferation regime. But, above all, it is a very sad day for the people of Douma, who now are without the protection that the international system was set up to provide for them. This is the fourth time in six days that the Council has discussed chemical weapons. Yesterday 14 members of the Security Council called for an investigation. Several members called on the permanent five (P-5) to assume their responsibilities to uphold the universal prohibition on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As a P-5 member, the United Kingdom was ready to do that and was joined by France and the United States. Conversely, by vetoing, Russia has crossed a line in the international order, and worse, if possible, history is repeating itself one year on from Khan Shaykun. Russia helped to create the original independent investigation that attributed Khan Shaykun to the Syrian regime and concluded that sarin, which can be developed only by a State actor, had been used. But last autumn, Russia vetoed renewal of that mechanism on not one but three occasions. The reason is clear: it is because Russia would rather cross the WMD line than risk sanction of its ally Syria. Instead, we are asked to believe that the Russian version of this latest attack should be the one that the Security Council believes. Russia is not authorized by the Security Council to carry out an investigation in Syria. Russia says that there were no traces of a chemical attack. No traces were found by whom? I repeat: Russia is not authorized to carry out an investigation on behalf of the Security Council. We need an independent investigative mechanism for that purpose, and only that sort of mechanism can have the confidence of the Security Council, the confidence of the membership of the United Nations and the confidence of the people of Syria. Sadly, reports of chemical-weapon attacks in Syria have continued since the original Russian veto, in November. It has become very clear that Russia will do what it takes to protect Syria, whatever the compelling evidence of the crimes committed, and to shut down further investigation and discussion of those crimes. This has come at the cost of Russia's own obligations and credibility as a permanent member of the Council, as a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and as a declared and supposed supporter of peace in Syria. The Security Council has been unable to act solely because Russia has abused the power of veto to protect Syria from international scrutiny for the use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people. Even today open-source investigations have located a chlorine cylinder, the same kind that the Joint Investigative Mechanism has found that the Syrian regime used, atop a house in Douma full of people who had clearly died from respiratory problems. S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 6/21 18-10187 I frankly doubt that in 48 hours Russia has verified all similar reports and can conclude that they are all fake. They are not fake; they need to be looked at and investigated by a proper independent mechanism such as the Council was prepared today to pass. Russia's credibility as a member of the Council is now in question. We will not stand idly by and watch Russia continue to undermine the global norms that have ensured the security of all of us, including Russia, for decades. As a P-5 member, the United Kingdom will stand up for international peace and security; it is our moral duty. It is a matter of shame that Russia has once again blocked a draft resolution. The Russian Ambassador mentioned that it was not a question of counting the number of Russian vetoes. I beg to differ. To quote Lenin, quantity has a quality all of its own. Russia's actions today are a step against the rules and authority of the Security Council and the wider United Nations. They are a step against international peace and security and non-proliferation, and they are a step against humanity. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China is deeply concerned at reports that the use of chemical weapons has caused civilian deaths and casualties in Syria. We are firmly opposed to the use of chemical weapons by any country, organization or individual, under any circumstances. This has been China's clear and consistent position. China supports the carrying out of a comprehensive, objective and impartial investigation into the use of chemical weapons in Syria so as to achieve results that are based on substantial evidence and can pass the litmus test of history and truth, bringing the perpetrators and the parties responsible for the use of chemical weapons to justice. There should be no prejudgment of the outcome or arbitrary conclusions. The Security Council has a consensus on condemning the chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, establishing a new investigative mechanism and identifying the perpetrators of the chemical-weapon attack in Syria. All members of the Security Council should remain united and insist that the Council and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons be the main channel for dealing with the Syrian chemical-weapon issue, in an effort to seek an appropriate solution through consultations. The draft resolution that was just put to the vote in the Security Council (S/2018/321) had elements of consensus, including condemning the chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, establishing a new investigative mechanism and urging all parties to cooperate with the investigation. However, on some specific measures, it does not take full consideration of some of the major concerns of certain Security Council members on improving the mechanism's working methods and ensuring an objective and impartial investigation. Against that backdrop and in the light of our long-standing position on the question of chemical weapons in Syria, China abstained in the voting on the draft resolution. The issue of Syria is currently at a critical juncture. China remains firmly seized of the situation and is deeply concerned at the developments on the ground. China has always called for respecting the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria and insists on seeking a peaceful solution to the dispute. We oppose the use or threat of force in international relations and believe that any action taken should be in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The international community and all parties concerned should stand firm on the imperative need to seek a political solution to the question of Syria, step up their support for the United Nations main channel of mediation, and push for all Syrian parties to seek a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political solution to the question of Syria, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015). China is ready to work with all parties in an effort to push for a political solution to the issue of Syria. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution initiated by the United States (S/2018/321) for two main reasons. With regard to the first reason, Côte d'Ivoire believes that the draft resolution conforms to our firm belief that any and all use of chemical weapons in wartime as in peacetime must be condemned and requires investigation to determine those responsible for such acts to hold them accountable. In that regard, the draft resolution submitted by the United States clearly conveys the resolve of the international community to see perpetrators of chemical attacks identified and prosecuted so that they are accountable for their acts. Concerning the second reason, Côte d'Ivoire believes that the text of the draft resolution provides 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 7/21 guarantees with regard to the credibility of the outcome of investigations. The text insulates such investigations from any political influence and clears a path for the experts' professionalism and independence and the impartiality of the mechanism itself. By voting in favour of the draft resolution, the Ivorian delegation wanted to show its solidarity with Syrian victims who are suffering from the consequences of an endless war and to help meaningfully safeguard international peace and security. Sadly, my delegation notes that divisiveness within the Security Council prevented the adoption of the American draft resolution, which Côte d'Ivoire painfully regrets. It is time that efforts be made to unify the Council if we want truly to work to achieve international peace and security. Mr. Radomski (Poland): The use of chemical weapons is a serious atrocity, which may amount to a crime against humanity and a war crime. Accountability for such acts is a requirement under international law — and central to achieving sustainable peace in Syria. Draft resolution S/2018/321, presented by the United States, addressed the most pressing needs related to the use of chemical weapons in Syria, including the role of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission, securing humanitarian access and, last but not least, creating a new, truly independent and impartial accountability mechanism. We thank the American delegation for its ongoing leadership in the negotiations. We appreciate its flexibility and fully understand and share the rationale behind putting this text to the vote today. Because of the use of the veto by the Russian Federation, the Security Council failed once again today to establish an accountability mechanism. By that act, Russia undermined the ability of the Council to fulfil its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations: to maintain international peace and security. We are disappointed that, for some States, political alliances and calculations proved to be more important than the need to end the horrors confronting the civilian population and the unacceptable loss of human life in Syria. Poland supports the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, the Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, and other instruments that might facilitate bringing the perpetrators of chemical attacks to justice. We will join all genuine efforts to achieve that goal. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): Bolivia reiterates in the strongest terms its categorical condemnation of the use of chemical weapons and the weaponization of chemical agents as an unjustifiable and criminal act, wherever, whenever and by whomever they are committed, as such use constitutes a serious crime under international law and a threat to international peace and security. There is no justification for their use regardless of the circumstances and of who uses them. We therefore reaffirm the need to maintain the unity of the Security Council so as to ensure that those who have used chemical weapons are held accountable and brought to justice so that their actions do not go unpunished. In that regard, we reiterate our support for the work being carried out by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission so that, in line with their mandates, they can carry out the work entrusted to them in the most methodical, technical and trustworthy manner possible with the support of an independent, impartial, complete and conclusive investigation. We firmly reiterate that the work of an investigative mechanism is essential to ensuring accountability for such terrible acts. To that end, it must be independent, impartial and representative so that a transparent, impartial, complete, reliable and conclusive investigation can be carried out, and, for that to happen, we face the great challenge and the responsibility of not politicizing or instrumentalizing the Security Council. My delegation voted against the draft resolution (S/2018/321) presented by the United States of America, first of all, because we regret that once again a draft resolution was put to the vote with the knowledge that it would not be adopted by the Security Council, and, moreover, because there has already been a series of threats of the use of force accompanied by threats of unilateral action, which, of course, runs directly counter to the Charter of the United Nations. Bolivia once again makes clear its firm rejection of taking unilateral actions, because any unilateral military action that does not enjoy the approval of the Security Council is entirely illegal and contravenes the principles explicitly set forth in the Charter. In addition, any unilateral S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 8/21 18-10187 military action would violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Arab Republic of Syria, and would affect the stability of the political process and the agreements on which progress has been made under the auspices of the United Nations. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): In my statement yesterday (see S/PV.8225) I urged the Security Council not to stand idly by and watch as a spectator while chemical weapons were being used in Syria. In our opinion, the Council should act, condemn, protect, and hold to account those responsible. Those elements are all reflected in draft resolution (S/2018/321) put forward by the United States, and that is why the Kingdom of the Netherlands voted in favour of that draft resolution. We thank the United States delegation for drafting the text. We appreciate the earlier rounds of negotiations and the flexibility displayed at yesterday's late-night round. Together with others, we are extremely disappointed that an attempt to set up an effective mechanism of attribution on the use of chemical weapons has failed once again. Today we witnessed the twelfth overall Russian use of the veto concerning Syria, including six pertaining to chemical weapons. As I said yesterday, if the Russian representative claims that the chemical-weapons attack in Syria is a fabrication, he should not veto the draft resolution. By vetoing this draft resolution, the Russian Federation assumes a heavy responsibility for continued impunity and the horrible use of chemical weapons in Syria. Because of this permanent member, the Council is not even able to condemn the use of chemical-weapons attacks this past weekend in Douma, during which the White Helmets once again demonstrated their unwavering commitment to their life-saving work in the most difficult circumstances. With regard to the draft resolution proposed by the Russian Federation (S/2018/175), the Netherlands will vote against it. That draft resolution falls short in every possible way. It seems that the Russian Federation is unable to support an independent and impartial investigative mechanism. It seems that it can accept a mechanism only in which itself can decide when, where, how and by whom the investigation would be conducted, while leaving the mandate attributed to the Council subject to its veto. This cannot be the end of the issue. The Security Council cannot remain passive in the face of the atrocities being committed in Syria. We must continue to work for an effective attribution mechanism, inside and outside the Security Council. Impunity must not prevail. The President (spoke in Spanish): The Security Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/175, submitted by the Russian Federation. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Before I speak about the draft resolution before us (S/2018/175), I would like to say that I am very happy that my British colleague is familiar with the classic works of Marxism-Leninism, although that is hardly surprising, because Marx, Engels and Lenin were frequent visitors to London — indeed, Marx is buried there. But I would like to cite another quotation from Lenin, who wrote an article entitled "Better Fewer, but Better". After the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) on the use of chemical weapons in Syria ended, in November of last year, it was Russia that found itself in the forefront of the efforts to fill the resulting gap. We drafted a resolution on the issue that we submitted to our colleagues for their consideration on 23 January. The Western camp immediately gave the draft text a hostile reception, since it eliminated the loopholes that enabled investigations to be manipulated and handed over to the control of the opponents of Damascus, as occurred with the JIM and which was the reason for its premature demise. I want to emphasize that we have not invented anything new in our text, but have merely brought the principles for the work of the new mechanism in line with the standards of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We now have a real opportunity to create a genuinely independent and impartial working mechanism that would help the Security Council to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the context of the conflict in Syria. All that it needs is for Council members to vote in favour of our draft resolution, and we call on them to do that. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/175, submitted by the Russian Federation. A vote was taken by show of hands. 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 9/21 In favour: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation Against: France, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America Abstaining: Côte d'Ivoire, Kuwait The President (spoke in Spanish): The draft resolution received 6 votes in favour, 7 votes against and 2 abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): As I have taken the floor once today already, I will be brief. With regard to Karl Marx, I think he must be turning in his grave to see what the country that was founded on many of his precepts is doing in the name of supporting Syria by condoning the use of chemical weapons on Syrian territory. We voted against the Russian draft resolution (S/2018/175) for a number of reasons. The Russian text is a distraction. It has lain dormant around the Security Council for weeks. There was no attempt to meet other Council members' concerns in its drafting, unlike the United States text (S/2018/321), which had adapted its original preferences precisely to try to meet those of the Russian Federation and others. The Russian text does nothing to bring a political process any closer. Specifically, it moves the parameters on access and imparts a quasi-judicial standard — "beyond a reasonable doubt" — that is inappropriate for the type of investigation that the Council wishes to establish. If the Russians want a criminal investigation, they could always suggest that we refer the matter to the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, there is selective quoting of the Chemical Weapons Convention to undermine the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, and it takes a selective approach to the parameters of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. But, above all, the text is unacceptable because it seeks to assert that sovereign States are above international law and international norms. That is breathtaking both in its arrogance and its ignorance, and for that reason alone, if not the others, we could not support it. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): Yesterday I said that history will record this moment (see S/PV.8225) as one when we as the Security Council either lived up to our responsibilities or showed our complete failure to protect the Syrian people. Today we have our answer. The votes have been cast. The record will show that today some countries decided to stand up for truth, accountability and justice for the Syrian people. Most countries saw the horror that took place in Douma last weekend at the hands of the Al-Assad regime and realize that today was a time for action. Month after month, the Al-Assad regime, with the full support of Russia and Iran, has strung the Security Council along. They ignored our calls for a ceasefire, for political dialogue and for deliveries of humanitarian aid. They ignored our calls to stop using chemical weapons — weapons that are universally banned from war. And then, last weekend, the Al-Assad regime forced a moment of reckoning on all of us by gassing people in Douma. The United States and the countries that joined us today could not allow that attack to go unanswered. The record will not be kind to one permanent member of the Council. Unfortunately, Russia has again chosen the Al-Assad regime over the unity of the Security Council. We have said before that Russia will stop at nothing to shield the Al-Assad regime, and now we have our answer. Russia has trashed the credibility of the Council. It is not interested in unity or compromise. Whenever we propose anything meaningful to Russia, Russia vetoes it. It is a travesty. It has now officially vetoed draft resolutions that would hold Al-Assad accountable for these barbaric chemical attacks six times. Things did not have to turn out this way. For weeks, the United States has led transparent, good-faith negotiations with all Security Council members to establish an attribution mechanism for chemical weapons in Syria. We started from the simple premise that every Council member would want to know who was responsible for using those barbaric and illegal weapons. We did everything to accommodate Russia's views. Russia surprised us with a proposed draft resolution (S/2018/175), calling all of us into the S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 10/21 18-10187 Security Council Chamber and handing out the draft text on the spot. After hearing widespread concerns about its draft resolution, Russia moved ahead anyway, accommodating no one's views. We could have done the same, but instead we tried to take as much as we could from Russia's draft text, while maintaining an impartial and independent process. We negotiated in good faith. Many aspects of our draft resolutions were similar. Russia said that the investigators should have safe access to the places where chemical weapons were used. We agreed. Russia said that it wanted an impartial, independent and professional investigation. We agreed. Russia said that the investigators should be recruited on as wide a geographical basis as possible. We agreed. Russia said that it wanted reports on the activities of non-State actors involving chemical weapons. Although that sounded to us like an attempt to distract from the Al-Assad regime, we included Russia's request. We even gave our mechanism the name that Russia wanted — the United Nations independent mechanism of investigation. There were really only two key differences between our draft resolution and that of Russia, but those differences speak volumes. First, Russia wanted to give itself the opportunity to approve the investigators who were chosen for the task. Secondly, Russia wanted the Security Council to assess the findings of any investigation before any report was released. Does any of that sound independent or impartial? Russia's proposal was not about an independent and impartial investigation at all. It was all about protecting the Al-Assad regime. This is a sad day. The United States takes no pleasure in seeing Russia exercise its sixth veto on the issue of chemical weapons in Syria. Only last week, we had hoped that the one-year anniversary of the Khan Shaykun attack might be the start of a renewed partnership to combat chemical weapons. However, those deadly weapons have been used on Syrian families again. When the people of Douma, along with the rest of the international community, looked to the Council to act, one country stood in the way. History will record that. History will record that, on this day, Russia chose to protect a monster over the lives of the Syrian people. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China has stated its principled position on the chemical weapons attack in Syria. The draft resolution on the establishment of a new investigative mechanism submitted by the Russian Federation (S/2018/175) condemns the chemicals weapons attack in Syria and calls for the creation of a new investigative mechanism to establish the facts and the truth. We can all agree on those positive elements. In addition, it proposes improved working methods compared to previous investigative mechanism and set out concrete steps to carry out a robust on-site investigation on the ground and to ensure impartiality in the process of collecting evidence. As a result, the new investigative mechanism would be able to function with greater professionalism and to reach a truly credible conclusion. Those elements are in line with China's principled position. We support Russia's draft resolution. China regrets that the draft resolution was not adopted. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I am taking the floor following the voting on the two draft resolutions (S/2018/175 and S/2018/321) above all to express our frustration over the fact that the Security Council was not able to adopt either the first or the second draft, which sought to give the Council an independent and professional mechanism with a mandate to attribute responsibility for the use of chemical weapons, despite the fact that all Security Council members expressed their desire in that regard. That is precisely why we voted in favour of both draft resolutions in the hope of having a new monitoring mechanism to attribute responsibility so as to protect people from the terrible and harmful effects of such chemical weapons. Despite the negative outcome of the voting on both draft resolutions, the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, whose position on the use of chemical weapons we have clearly set out during the debates on the issue, wants the members of the Security Council to seek and to explore other alternative draft texts that could merit the joint agreement or the consensus of the Security Council so that we can establish that new mechanism as soon as possible. That is what the people who are suffering, or in the future may suffer, the terrible effects of chemical weapons hope and expect of the Security Council. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): It is indeed regrettable that the Council could not adopt a resolution to establish a new mechanism that would identify those responsible 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 11/21 for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Establishing such a tool would have sent a quick and unified message regarding the resolve of the Council not to tolerate impunity. That is how we view the defeat of both draft resolutions (S/2018/175 and S/2018/321). However, we were not at all surprised. We voted in favour of both draft resolutions, consistent with our position in reaffirming the importance of setting up an independent, impartial and professional investigative mechanism with a view to ensuring accountability. No doubt, such a mechanism would clearly have addressed the existing institutional gap in that regard, which continues to be a source of major weakness in the fight against impunity. Both draft resolutions sought the establishment of such a mechanism. Clearly, there are differences, among others, concerning some aspects of the accountability mechanism. We believe that we have come some distance in bridging those differences. It would have been a major achievement, both functionally and from the point of view of enhancing trust, which is so greatly needed in order to address the challenge not only of ensuring non-proliferation but also of advancing the cause of international peace and security. That was why we were hoping that we could achieve consensus on the matter and unity within the Council. Frankly speaking, we do not like what we see. At the risk of sounding self-righteous — and the challenge that we face makes taking the risk appropriate — we must say that we are deeply disappointed about the situation that we are in. Since we have no alternative, it remains important that we all persevere in continuing our dialogue and supporting the efforts to ensure unity, without which the Council will not be in a position to discharge its principal responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, in particular repairing the damage to the chemical weapons disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Yesterday, we expressed our concern about the difficult situation we are currently facing (see S/PV.8225). We do not wish to repeat what we said, but allow me to state in closing that we look forward to handling the issue of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma, eastern Damascus, with a greater sense of responsibility. That is how we intend to look at the draft resolution from Russia before us, a draft which, in our view, is relatively similar to the draft resolution informally made available by Sweden yesterday, whenever the Council is ready to handle it. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): I support the statement in explanation of vote on the American draft resolution (S/2018/321) made earlier in the meeting by the representative of the United Kingdom, who said that today is actually a sad day. It is a sad day for the non-proliferation regime, and a sad day for civilians — particularly women, children and the elderly — throughout Syria, and specifically Douma in eastern Ghouta. We ask their forgiveness because we have disappointed them once again. The Council has been unable to establish a mechanism that would hold accountable those who commit crimes by using chemical weapons in Syria. We ask their forgiveness because the Council has been unable to put an end to the serious and gross violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law and many Security Council resolutions condemning the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We ask their forgiveness because the Council has been unable to hold to account the perpetrators of crimes related to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Our position has always been clear. We have called for consensus in the Council on this sensitive issue, which touches on accountability and impunity. We voted in favour of the United States draft resolution because it contains the basic elements that we think are necessary to establish any new accountability mechanism in Syria in order to guarantee its independence, neutrality and professionalism. The mechanism would identify the perpetrators responsible for any chemical attack, and then the Security Council would shoulder its responsibility in terms of sanctions. We abstained in the voting on the draft resolution presented by the Russian Federation (S/2016/175) because it did not include the elements to which I have referred. It would undermine the credibility of the new mechanism by depriving it of its fundamental terms of reference, namely, to determine whoever is responsible in the event of attacks using chemical weapons. We are very concerned about the result of voting today because it will encourage parties to the conflict to continue using chemical weapons in the absence of accountability. Kuwait supported the code of conduct whereby the States members of the Security Council would commit to not opposing draft resolutions dealing with crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. We also S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 12/21 18-10187 supported the French-Mexican initiative on abstention in the use of the veto in cases of human rights violations. As a result of the voting today, and based on our commitment to abiding by the four Geneva Conventions and their two Additional Protocols, international humanitarian law and the final outcome of 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, we call again for crimes against humanity and war crimes, as well as humanitarian issues, to receive due attention. That would include allowing the safe and sustainable delivery of humanitarian assistance and medical evacuations, and preventing the siege of residential areas. These should be treated as procedural issues; they should not be subject to a veto so that such human tragedies and sufferings are never repeated. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): Like everyone else, we deeply regret that today the Council was prevented once again from establishing a responsibility-attribution mechanism for the purpose of impartially identifying the perpetrators and organizers of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. I am sure we all share a sense of very tragic déjà vu as we repeat the scenario the Council faced in November when the renewal of the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism was blocked. However — and I apologize to all of those who are tired of hearing me say this — we will not give up. Efforts to reach an agreement on a responsibility-attribution mechanism must continue, and we support all serious and genuine initiatives that aim to achieve this objective. We stand ready to help facilitatory efforts to find a way forward. Accountability for the use of chemical weapons is crucial. As we have stated before, the Syrian people suffering from more than seven years of conflict deserve no less from us. They want peace and justice, not further military escalation or impunity. A collective response to the most recent alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma therefore remains urgent and critical. The credibility of the Council is at stake. We must now come together to swiftly condemn the use of chemical weapons in Syria and express alarm at the alleged attack in Douma. We must support an immediate and further investigation through the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and we must demand full, free and safe access without any restrictions or impediments to the fact-finding mission in its immediate deployment to Syria. Establishing the facts of what has taken place in Douma remains an essential first step towards confirming the alleged use of chemical weapons and finding the truth, and we need independent, impartial attribution of guilt followed by full accountability. The Council must remain seized and live up to its responsibility. That is why we circulated yesterday a draft text aimed at finding common ground. We stand ready to work tirelessly to find agreement on a robust, swift and immediate response. We need to come back together again after the failure that we have just witnessed. Mr. Tumysh (Kazakhstan): Our position remains unchanged and consistent. Due to well-known historical reasons, Kazakhstan has always taken a firm and resolute stance of uncompromising condemnation of any use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. We do so as that is an extremely heinous action and an unacceptable war crime. We have also been in support of attaching paramount importance to the creation of a new investigative mechanism. That has been strongly reiterated, and we have pressed for its urgency. Impunity for chemical crimes is not acceptable. It sends the wrong signal to those who continue to use or intend to use such an extremely heinous weapon. However, in order to punish anyone, we must be able to prove guilt completely and irrefutably. In that regard, the creation of a full-fledged, impartial and independent investigative tool is of the utmost necessity for all. We have worked in earnest with the delegations of the United States and the Russian Federation. We must recognize that the use of chemical weapons in Syria continues, along with the persistent threat of chemical terrorism, to present a grave reality. In addition, many allegations of the use of chemical agents in Syria are still undisclosed. Based on the aforementioned circumstances and understanding the need to preserve this mechanism, we supported both draft resolutions intended to create new investigative mechanisms. We urge that we all work together for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): This meeting is an interesting one from a variety of perspectives. One is that Lenin and Marx, two anti-imperialists, have been invoked more than once. What we have seen today is related to that topic. It is a fact that all empires are under the illusion that they are morally superior to the rest of us, that they believe themselves to be exceptional and indispensable and that they are above the law. In this, as in other cases, they do not seek to advance democracy or 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 13/21 freedom, but rather ultimately to expand their power and domination worldwide. What we have seen today is a sad reflection of what is happening on the battlefield in Syria and of those interests. I would like to echo the words of the Swedish Ambassador in urging the Security Council not to rest until we are united and can reach consensus, if indeed we believe in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It is the Charter, and whether the members of the Council can fulfil it, that is ultimately at stake. One of our responsibilities under it is to refrain from taking unilateral action. We hope that principle will be honoured. The President (spoke in Spanish): The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/322, submitted by the Russian Federation. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We too are sorry that our draft resolution (S/2018/175) was not adopted today, but at the moment neither it nor the United States draft resolution (S/2018/321) would have had any influence on the investigation of the alleged incident in Douma. Right now, that is not what they are about. There is no need to mislead anybody by saying that, or that there were intensive consultations on the American draft resolution but not on ours, or that most of our amendments were supposedly taken into account. Our colleagues will now tell the press that we vetoed their resolution, while modestly remaining silent about the fact that just as with the draft resolutions on the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, they also vetoed ours. Yesterday, during the meeting on threats to international peace and security (see S/PV.8225), there was an emotional discussion of the event, or the alleged event, in Douma on 7 April. Based on the results of the inspection conducted by our specialists, we said that a chemical attack could not be confirmed. Nonetheless, we advocated for the speediest possible investigation of all of the circumstances by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and affirmed our willingness to facilitate its work on the ground. The Government of Syria has sent the OPCW an official request that such a mission be dispatched to Douma as soon as possible. Yesterday, the Swedish delegation put forward a fairly constructive text for a corresponding draft resolution. Unfortunately, their initiative was undeveloped and was trampled down thanks to the confrontational efforts of the United States and its closest allies, which had decided to shift the focus away from the issue of an investigation of what happened on 7 April. That is understandable, because they have already identified the guilty parties. As far as they are concerned, the so-called regime, along with Russia and Iran, is always to blame for everything. The investigation does not interest them. Well, sometimes it does, but only if it is based on so-called exclusive data from the opposition's social networks. For the hundredth time, I would like to ask the same question yet again. Can someone here explain clearly and plainly why Damascus needed this alleged chemical attack in Douma in principle, especially since practically all of the militias had evacuated Douma by then? And the militias who were still being evacuated on 8 April knew nothing about the alleged occurrence of this chemical attack. I will answer my own question. The provocation was desperately needed by the militias who received that very timely support from the United States and other Western countries. We decided to develop the Swedish initiative, and our draft resolution notes the Syrian Government's invitation to the OPCW Fact-finding Mission to visit the site of the alleged event without delay. It welcomes the decision of the Director-General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to send the Mission to Syria in order to conduct investigative work in line with Chemical Weapons Convention standards. It takes into account the guarantees of safe access provided by the Syrian authorities and Russian military forces. Fifteen days later, the Secretary-General would submit the first report to the Security Council. This is a strictly practical, non-confrontational and depoliticized initiative in support of the OPCW, which would help the specialists in this area determine what did, or rather did not, take place in Douma. And that is the priority now, not the draft resolution on a United Nations independent investigative mechanism, which was hastily submitted for a vote with the obvious aim of seeing both draft resolutions vetoed. We hope that Council members will give this initiative their unanimous support so that the process can begin as soon as possible. According to our information, two S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 14/21 18-10187 expert groups from the OPCW Fact-finding Mission should leave for Syria by the end of this week. Whatever the excuse that may be given, if the experts do not reach Douma because they have been prevented by those who continue to speculate about the chemical issue in order to smear Syria and Russia, that will be yet another piece of evidence showing that behind this thoroughly false story are dirty geopolitical games and, what is worse, aggressive military plans capable of reversing the positive trend in the resolution of Syria's conflict and inflicting a painful blow on a region already tormented by adventurist assaults. We are witnessing all of that literally in real time. We request that you put this draft resolution to a vote, Mr. President. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): We want swift and resolute action today, and we want the Security Council to shoulder its collective responsibility. But I am not sure that we have exhausted all the avenues that could get us there, nor am I sure that voting on this new Russian draft resolution (S/2018/322) will get us there either. We feel that we are at a very fragile stage of Council deliberations right now, and we need to reflect carefully on the way forward to ensure that we do not jump into further paralysis, with consequences that will be difficult to defend or repair. That is why I would like to ask you, Mr. President, to suspend the meeting right here and now so that we can all move into consultations and carefully and collectively reflect on the next step. The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the Russian Federation has asked to make a further statement. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We listened carefully to what the Permanent Representative of Sweden has just said. To be candid, we are somewhat puzzled by his statement, because the draft resolution that we submitted (S/2018/322) is, in essence, based on the same idea as the draft submitted yesterday by the Swedish delegation. I do not know what we are going to consult on in consultations. I believe we already consulted on this subject yesterday. However, out of respect for the Swedish delegation and those delegations who would like to hold consultations, we are not against that. But let me say right away that we intend to put this draft resolution to a vote today, after our consultations. We hope that the consultations will be constructive and will not drag on for long, because that is certainly not necessary at this point. We need to adopt this draft resolution in support of the mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in order to establish the facts on the ground as quickly as possible. The President (spoke in Spanish): If there is no objection, I will suspend the meeting. We will continue after our consultations. The meeting was suspended at 4.40 p.m. and resumed at 5.45 p.m. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/322, submitted by the Russian Federation. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation Against: France, Poland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America Abstaining: Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden The President (spoke in Spanish): The result of the voting is as follows: 5 votes in favour, 4 against and 6 abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I will be brief. In the Consultations Room just now, Mr. President, you and the representative of Sweden made valiant attempts at a compromise. We all appreciate what is at stake and thank you for your and Sweden's efforts. But, fundamentally, the United Kingdom could not vote for the Russian text (S/2018/322) because it does not establish an investigation into who was responsible for the attack. It only welcomes the Fact-finding Mission, which is already on its way. I repeat what I said in consultations: the Fact-finding Mission determines whether chemical weapons were used and, if they were, which chemical weapons were used. It does not, and cannot, establish who was responsible for 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 15/21 their use — and thus start on the first step on the path to attribution and accountability. For that reason, we are not able to support the text. It would be like watching a fire, identifying that there was a fire, and doing nothing to put it out. The Russians invited us to return to the issue of an investigative mechanism on a separate occasion. I am afraid that the answer to that is 17 November 2017, when Russia vetoed a joint investigative mechanism that it had itself decided to set up. For all those reasons, all it would have taken is a written decision for an investigation set up by the Security Council. Russia could not take that small step, and therefore we were not able to support the draft resolution. I very much regret that, but the answer was in Russia's hands. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): Recent reports concerning the use of chemical weapons in Douma and the consequent civilian casualties have given rise to serious concern on the part of the international community. China has noted that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has already asked its Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic to investigate the relevant reports. We support the OPCW in sending investigators to Syria so as to establish the truth. We call on all parties concerned to cooperate with the investigation. The draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation (S/2018/322) expresses deep concern about the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April, strongly condemns the chemical-weapons attacks that took place in Syria and elsewhere, urges the OPCW Fact-finding Mission to carry out an on-site investigation, and provides that the Syrian Government and other parties will ensure the security of and safe access to investigators. The draft resolution is in keeping with China's principled position. China supports and voted in favour of the Russian draft resolution. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): We deeply regret that we have ended up here following a long day of serious efforts to move forward by some of us — I believe. We abstained in the voting on the Russian draft resolution (S/2018/322) a few moments ago because the attribution and accountability track, which we believe is important, lacked clarity. We called for consultations earlier because we felt that, provided there was political will, an opportunity remained for us to come together and shoulder our responsibility today. We put forward a draft resolution (S/2018/321) to all members that we felt was credible and assertive, and was intended to support the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It was also very clear in its determination to establish an impartial, independent and professional investigative mechanism, and we had suggested that the Secretary-General help us recommend the best way forward in that area and give him 10 days to come back to the Council. I believe that would have been a much better way forward than where we are right now. I am therefore very disappointed that we have not been able to move forward on this. I thank all those members of the Security Council that were ready to engage, and I just hope that we do not consider this the end with regard to ensuring that the facts will be established and that there will be true accountability and no more impunity for the horrendous use of chemical weapons in Syria and elsewhere. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I once again express the frustration of our delegation over this afternoon's negative outcome. We abstained in the voting on the third draft resolution (S/2018/322), first of all because it was submitted only very late today and, secondly, because it is lacking compared to the two previous draft resolutions on which we voted in favour (S/2018/175 and S/2018/321). We believe that we should ask the representative of Sweden, Mr. Olof Skoog, not to withdraw his proposal so that following this meeting — perhaps tomorrow afternoon — as was suggested during consultations, we can continue considering and analysing it to see whether we can agree to vote on the draft resolution once we have introduced amendments and reached a consensus on the text that he has presented. Mr. Radomski (Poland): Poland voted against the draft resolution (S/2018/322) presented by Russia. We believe that the draft resolution submitted originally by Sweden was an honest attempt to enable the Security Council to respond promptly to the horrific act of violence that occurred in eastern Ghouta on Saturday. To that end, the Security Council needs to re-establish a professional, truly independent and impartial accountability mechanism. The draft resolution proposed by the Russian Federation is missing that important provision. That is why we had to vote against it. S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 16/21 18-10187 Mrs. Haley (United States): I thank you, Sir, and members of the Security Council for what has been another frustrating day. My parents always said that you should always see the good in everyone and in everything. I have therefore been trying to figure out what the good is in Russia. I believe that it is very good at being consistent, and I believe that it is very good at playing games. We saw that when we took up the issue of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. Russia loved the Joint Investigative Mechanism until we found one side guilty, and then it decided that it did not want it. We then adopted the ceasefire, and Russia loved the idea of the ceasefire until Al-Assad had a problem with it and subsequently violated it. Today Russia vetoed for the sixth time a draft resolution (S/2018/321) condemning Al-Assad for chemical-weapons attacks on his own people. No matter what we do, Russia will be consistent. Russia will continue to play games, and once again it is putting forward yet another surprise draft resolution (S/2018/322). The first time that any of us saw it was today at 11 a.m. The Russians held no negotiations. It took no input, and, when Sweden asked that the Council be allowed to discuss the draft resolution, Russia allowed that but did not want any changes to it. There is a reason for which Russia did not want to discuss its resolution, and that is because it does not accomplish anything. The draft resolution mainly asks for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to send its Fact-finding Mission to Douma, but the Fact-finding Mission is already travelling to Douma. It already has a mandate to investigate and collect samples. What makes it worse is that Russia includes several provisions in its draft resolution that are deeply problematic and once again seeks to compromise the credibility of the international investigation. The draft resolution puts Russia and the Al-Assad regime itself in the driver seat for making arrangements for the Fact-finding Mission investigators. We are just supposed to trust that the same Government that says that everything concerning the Douma attack was fake will work in good faith with the OPCW. This draft resolution also tries to micromanage how the Fact-finding Mission should carry out its investigation, while dictating where the investigators should go. As we have always said, for an investigation to be credible and independent, the investigators must choose where they believe they should go. Members of the Council — least of all Russia — should not be calling the shots. For those reasons, the United States voted against the draft resolution. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We voted in favour of the draft resolution (S/2018/322) because we saw value in its adoption as it offered, we thought, the possibility for the protection of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic. Frankly, we tried to find weaknesses in the text. We could not. It is a matter-of-fact and uncomplicated draft resolution. We could not find any reason not to support it. Undoubtedly, it would not have made achieving attribution possible, but finding out whether chemical weapon were in fact used would have been a great achievement. Of course, so far the Russian position has been that there was no use of chemical weapons in Douma. Establishing the facts surrounding that assertion or position would have been a great achievement. We are not in a position to take advantage of the guarantee offered or the Council's strong support in that regard. We felt that the Fact-finding Mission needed the support. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Frankly speaking, I think all of us have seen everything for ourselves. Unfortunately, the failure to adopt draft resolution S/2018/322 really is a litmus test says a great deal and leaves us extremely apprehensive. We proposed a very innocuous draft resolution, which is moreover virtually a complete repeat of Sweden's draft text from yesterday. I find it difficult to understand which might be the parts where Mrs. Haley read between the lines to discover our scheming and our trickery. Perhaps the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom answered that when she said that they could not adopt the Russian draft resolution — let us say it out loud — because it was a Russian draft resolution. Then everything was clear. The United States representative said that we are very good at playing games. I am not sure about that. What I am sure of is that she is very good at making threats, and the threats that the United States is making with regard to Syria should make us all extremely alarmed, because we may be standing on the threshold of some very sad and terrible events. I would once again like to ask the United States to refrain from executing the plans that it may be incubating for Syria. Unfortunately, the refusal of the United States to adopt the draft resolution speaks to the fact that our 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 17/21 American partners and colleagues do not need any real investigation, which is something that we discussed earlier. We regret the fact that the draft resolution was not adopted, although it is true that the Fact-finding Mission will, I hope, reach Syria soon and be able to get to work on its principal mandate, which is establishing the facts about what really happened in Douma. To repeat what I have said once again, in all innocence, the Russian military and the Syrian Government will provide support to the mission in terms of ensuring its security. I hope that does not raise questions for anyone, because it is simply what must be done. We hope that the Mission will be able to make the trip effectively and without delay. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): I would like to start by thanking Sweden for its efforts and attempts to achieve rapprochement and to smooth over the differences among the members of the Security Council. We are disappointed by the Council's inability to reach consensus on this important matter and by the fact that the divisions among Council members unfortunately continue. We abstained in the voting, despite the fact that the gist of draft resolution S/2018/322 calls for an investigation into what took place in Douma, which is what we called for. The investigation should be undertaken by an international, independent and impartial body, which in this case is the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, the OPCW Fact-finding Mission will go to Syria anyway, and the Council welcomed that fact yesterday. There is therefore no need for a draft resolution. What we are looking for is an international, independent, neutral and professional body or mechanism that would investigate the incident and identify the party that has used chemical weapons, if it indeed determines that chemical weapons have been used. That approach will enable the Council to hold the perpetrators accountable, in accordance with resolution 2118 (2013). Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): I thank everybody for today's very difficult and unfortunately unproductive day. We voted for the Russian Federation's draft resolution (S/2018/322) on sending a fact-finding mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as soon as possible because, as we said yesterday in raising this very simple question, we need to know what happened on the ground. Yesterday we were also very clear when we said that there were different and conflicting reports about the number of casualties and even about the very fact that the chemical attack had taken place. We requested and supported the important proposal that a fact-finding mission should go to Douma to establish the facts on the ground. We are not talking right now about who did it, but we are talking about the fact of the event itself. We needed to understand what was there and what had happened there. Sending a fact-finding mission was very important to us and to all the delegations that do not have a presence there to understand the objective reality of the place. Even if the only information obtained is about the kind of substance that was used, that would be very useful for us to understand who the perpetrators might be and at the very least establish the fact that a chemical attack took place. In this kind of understanding, we very much support sending OPCW experts to investigate on the ground in order to give us information on which we can base an objective opinion about the situation. We are not taking sides here, and we were very clear about that yesterday. We would like to receive full, objective, transparent and unbiased information about the facts that we are addressing here. We are therefore glad that the OPCW is sending a group to Douma, regardless of the results of today's voting on draft resolutions. We are hopeful that we can at least get this preliminary information about the situation in Douma. I would like to say once again that we in the Security Council should be objective and base our decisions on the simple facts that may be presented to us by the independent organizations that will determine whether there was a chemical attack or not. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): After having vetoed a draft resolution that sought to shed full light on acts of violence involving chemical weapons (S/2018/175), including those that took place last weekend, Russia persists in a dual strategy of obstruction and diversion on the matter. The only aim of the draft text on which we have just voted (S/2018/322) was clearly to confuse the issue. It is not a question of disputing the importance of an independent investigation by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) into what happened in Douma on 7 April. That is essential, and the investigation has already been launched. However, the Russian draft resolution, which we had to vote against, did not meet the challenges. S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 18/21 18-10187 Let us be clear: what we lack today, and what Russia continues to reject, is a truly independent and impartial mechanism that can attribute responsibility in order to prevent impunity. That was the raison d'être for the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. With the establishment of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, set up with the involvement of Russia, we put in place a tool for the essential deterrence of perpetrators of chemical attacks. That is clearly what we lack today. Let us be clear in saying that statements are not enough and that the Russian draft resolution is only a smokescreen that falls well short of the urgent response that the Council should provide. That is why France voted against the draft resolution and why the draft resolution was not adopted. Today I reiterate that France will spare no effort to ensure that the perpetrators of those chemical horrors are identified and held to account in an independent and impartial way. The stakes are extremely high, and we will not give up. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): We abstained in the voting on the draft resolution (S/2018/322) because we had serious hesitations about the text, as it differed in some crucial aspects from the Swedish text put forward yesterday. First of all, the text makes it insufficiently clear that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic already has the mandate for on-site visits, as States have to comply with it. They do not need the Council's authorization. Secondly, the text is unduly restrictive. Paragraph 3 is not a correct reflection of the decision of the Director-General or of his existing mandate. The necessity of on-site investigations is up to the team to decide. My third point is that the fact-finding mission should be able to perform its mandate in complete independence. Fourthly, we do not want the precedent that Security Council authorization is needed for a fact-finding mission to do its work. We are convinced that those were issues that we could have solved if the draft resolution had been put forward for proper consultations. We received it this morning. We regret that those concerns could not be taken into account. My last point is that one colleague said that the litmus test of this evening, and of today, was the voting on this draft resolution. I disagree. The litmus test of today's meeting was the veto by one permanent member on the establishment of an effective attribution mechanism. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): I shall be very brief. Bolivia voted in favour of the draft resolution (S/2018/322) for several reasons. One of those is that, although the nature of the events that have been condemned is unknown, the highest authorities of the Organization have pointed out that the United Nations is not is a position to verify the reports of such events. It is therefore essential to establish the truth by means of an independent and impartial investigation. Many of those reports come from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and we know who finances those NGOs. Therefore, we must allow doubts with regard to such sources. Analysing the draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation word by word, from the point of view of intellectual integrity, commitment to the Syrian people or international law, we found no reason to vote against the draft resolution. Nevertheless, what concerns us is what is being planned outside the structure of this edifice. While it was said today that Lenin and Marx would probably be turning in their graves, I do not know about that. But what is certain is that Churchill and Roosevelt, for example, are turning in their graves because, as founding fathers of the structure of this world order, they endowed the Security Council with the authority to use force to deal with threats to international peace and security. I am not sure that they would be very happy that the outcome of such events, without a full and conclusive investigation, is that some of its members undertake the unilateral use of force. In any case, we remain hopeful that the Security Council will shoulder its responsibility and that, through unity, it can help to identify the perpetrators of any attack against international peace and security, if that is the case. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Peru. We regret that we were not able to achieve consensus this afternoon on a draft resolution with regard to the delicate situation in Syria. We underscore that the investigation being carried out on the use of chemical weapons must be complemented by an independent, impartial and professional mechanism that attributes 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 19/21 responsibility. That is why we abstained in the voting on this occasion. We reiterate the need for the Security Council to regain its sense of unity on this very delicate subject so that it can fulfil its high responsibilities and thereby alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. That is why we will continue to explore options on this important matter. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I remind speakers of the content of presidential note S/2017/507 with regard to the length of statements. I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): I will give colleagues who are about to leave the Chamber some of my valuable time. They are afraid that I will beat them in the battle of arguments. They become terrified when they hear any opposing views. Those who just left the Chamber said in their statements that today was a sad day for the non-proliferation regime. I would like to refresh their memories and say that violation of the non-proliferation regime is the speciality of the following Western States. The United States of America used nuclear weapons in Japan. It used chemical and biological weapons in Viet Nam and enriched uranium in Iraq. France used Algerian human beings when it tested its first atomic bomb in the Algerian desert in 1960. In fact, it placed living Algerians in the desert tied to poles, and dropped on them the first French atomic bomb. Britain, of course, conducted all its nuclear tests in its colonies on islands in the oceans. The British Ambassador then says that day was a sad day for the people of Douma. English is not my mother tongue, but I know that there are no people of Douma. There are inhabitants in Douma. There are Syrian people. There are no people of Douma. However, beyond Marx, Engels and Lenin, I would like to quote from Shakespeare as saying: "Lies shame you. Speak the truth or remain silent". My British colleague said that Russia does not have the authority to go to Douma and establish whether or not chemicals were used there, stating that it is not within the jurisdiction of our Russian friends, who are on the ground, to go to Douma and investigate the scene. That is quite strange. Britain should have advised itself in the same manner when it sent intelligence officers to Khan Shaykhoun and conferred upon itself the authority to collect samples with the French. They took the samples to British and French laboratories, as they claimed, without coordinating with the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) or the Fact-finding Mission. That is quite the paradox: giving themselves the very right that they deprive others. Approximately two weeks ago, Britain signed an agreement with the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia for an arms deal worth $100 billion — much bigger than the Al-Yamamah deal — to continue killing people in Yemen, start new wars in the region with Iran and Syria and entrench never-ending wars throughout the entire region. That is what Britain is capable of doing. Mahatma Gandhi knew the British well, and he was right when he said, "If two fish broke out into a fight in the sea, everyone knows it was Britain that started it". The American colleague said that there is only one monster facing the entire world in defiance today. That monster has financed terrorists in Syria for seven years and provided them with arms. I would say that the monster is the United States, Britain and France. They sponsored terrorism in my country for seven years, and before that they did the same in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. They sponsored terrorist organizations starting with Taliban and Da'esh, down to the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaida, Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and the White Helmets, which British intelligence newly invented. The monster she spoke of unleashed lies in order to destroy, occupy and send troops thousands of miles throughout the world to destabilize international peace and security. The monster is the American who, thus far, refuses to destroy his chemical arsenal, as we know, yet lectures others on destroying chemical weapons. My French colleague said that he was horrified by the pictures he saw. But he was not horrified by the pictures of the hundreds of civilians who were killed in the 2016 French air strikes in Toukhar village in the rural area of Manbij. Two hundred civilians were killed, including entire families, by France's war planes. The French Ambassador must not have seen those pictures, and consequently they were not a source of horror for him. The concept of double standards is an understatement for those people. In response to the web of lies spread by some Western States against my country regarding the S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 20/21 18-10187 alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic sent today, 10 April, an official invitation to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to dispatch a fact-finding mission to Douma in order to investigate the allegations of the use of chemical weapons there and to determine the facts about those allegations. I informed members of the Council of that invitation yesterday in this very Chamber (see S/PV.8225). The Syrian Arab Republic welcomes the visit of the fact-finding mission and stands ready to fully cooperate, provide all forms of assistance to the mission in the discharge of its duties and guarantee the safety of its personnel. It will also facilitate interviewing and sampling in accordance with the terms of reference. Syria looks forward to the fact-finding mission carrying out its work in a full, transparent and professional manner and while relying on credible and tangible evidence. If it does deploy, it will find Douma liberated and it will be granted full access to any location it wishes to visit. The situation is quite clear. The co-sponsors of the American draft resolution (S/2018/321) do not seek the truth, because it will simply expose them and their terrorist proxies on the ground. Instead of waiting for the OPCW fact-finding mission to determine whether or not toxic chemicals were used in Douma, they present draft resolutions that do not enjoy consensus, nor do they seek truth, but rather establish non-objective mechanisms that pre-empt results in support of their political accusations and agendas. They are aware that a clone of the JIM would not be accepted by the States in the Council that are dedicated to the quest for truth regarding who is using toxic chemicals against Syrian civilians. In that regard, I underscore that the United States, Britain and France made the JIM fail by thwarting it through politicizing its work, putting pressure on members of its leadership and blackmailing them. Consequently, the JIM lacked credibility and professionalism, as it fabricated reports that accused the Syrian Government based on the so-called open sources, of course including the White Helmets, and false testimonies and fabricated evidence emanating mostly from terrorist groups, most important of which is the terrorist Al-Nusra Front and the White Helmets, which is the British misleading media arm of the Al-Nusra Front. The scenario that we witness today is exactly similar to what we witnessed a year ago when the United States of America launched a wanton aggression on the Al-Shayrat air base, which was founded on flimsy arguments and fabricated pretexts stating that the Syrian Arab Army used chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhoun. Those allegations were proven false when the United States and its allies prevented the experts of the JIM from visiting Khan Shaykhoun and collecting samples from the Al-Shayrat air base. Things are crystal clear. The aggression of the United States and its accomplices, throughout history, thrives on lies, deceit and hegemony, as well as on the rule of the powerful. It is a brutal approach that will never respect the rule of law and international legitimacy. For seven years, my country, Syria, has been a stark example of what the United States and Britain did when they unleashed lies, misleading information and fabricated stories in this very Chamber in order to destroy and occupy Iraq. Their actions were grounded on the pretext of a significant lie, that is, the existence of the so-called weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. I am compelled each and every time to remind the Council of the position of former Secretary of State Colin Powell when, in this very Chamber (see S/PV.4701) — and I was sitting where the Deputy Permanent Representative of China is seated today — he presented tapes, documents, maps and pictures that were later discovered to have been produced, faked and fabricated by the American intelligence services for the purpose of invading Iraq. The operation was prepared in advance. The same scenario occurred with Libya. The truth must be revealed. For centuries the world has witnessed various instances of occupation and hegemony, whose sole purpose was to loot the wealth of nations, occupy land or impose a geopolitical agenda. However, political immorality has reached a depth today to the extent that Libya has been destroyed and many of its people killed to cover up cases of bribery and financial corruption involving the President of a permanent member of the Council that talks about democracy and freedom. It is so low today to the extent that a permanent State regrettably forces Arab oil-exporting countries to foot the bill for its ongoing aggression and military intervention in my country, Syria. It is a business deal forged between the corrupt with the financial means and a mercenary who has weapons and power. Some permanent members of the Council commit acts of aggression against sovereign 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 21/21 countries simply to detract attention from domestic crises and ongoing controversy surrounding their political elite. Following seven years of a dirty terrorist war that was imposed upon us, we in Syria believe that clear options exist — but they pose a major challenge to the majority of Council members. The Council must refute the lies and reverse the political deterioration that the United States, Britain and France are trying to push the Council towards engaging in. It is up to the Council today, and in the future, to make its decision. World public opinion and the people of the free world will judge whether or not the Council has assumed its responsibility to uphold international legitimacy, maintain international peace and security and protect the world against the horrible terrorism that is used and exploited by those three permanent member countries to undermine the stability and self-determination of States. I call upon the members of the Council to uphold a global, ethical and multilateral political system that believes in international law and in the right of peoples to self-determination, and rejects military, political and economic hegemony. In conclusion, my country reiterates its condemnation in the strongest terms of any use of chemical weapons by any party, anywhere and under any circumstances. My country stands ready to cooperate with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to reveal the allegations and lies being promoted by some Western parties so as to justify their aggression and serve their own political agenda. Their fleets are now in the eastern Mediterranean, waiting for the veto in order to start their aggression. I would like to inform those Western parties — and they must pay close attention to what I say — that their threats of aggression, manoeuvres, lies and terrorism will never prevent us — as one of the founding States of the Organization — from exercising our duties and rights under the Charter of the United Nations and our national Constitution to protect our sovereignty and territorial integrity and to fend off aggression from any source. We will not allow anyone — big or small, permanent member or non-permanent member — to treat us the way Iraq and Libya were treated. The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.
Andehrs Behring Breivik no encaja en ninguna categoría existente de actuación violenta o política. Como lo revela su manifiesto, que dará que hablar durante años, Breivik es un terrorista sui generis.Brevemente, Breivik es un joven noruego que el pasado viernes cometió dos ataques terroristas. En el primero detonó una bomba en el distrito gubernamental de Oslo. En el segundo apareció disfrazado de policía en una pequeña isla donde se celebraba una reunión anual de las juventudes del Partido Laborista del país, y atacó a la multitud con armas y municiones de guerra.El manifiesto que el agresor envió a algunos miles de contactos horas antes de cometer el ataque es una obra sin precedentes en la historia de la acción criminal e ideológica. En primer lugar, el texto suma más de mil quinientas páginas, de las cuales Breivik es el autor de más de la mitad. En segundo lugar, la obra está escrita en perfecto inglés, con el objetivo expreso de difundir la ideología ahí presentada a la mayor cantidad de personas posible. En tercer lugar, los contenidos del trabajo son muy variados y llegan a un nivel de detalle inaudito. Este último aspecto es lo que hace de Breivik y su manifiesto algo extraordinario. Entre otras cosas, el lector encontrará:Una exposición detallada de la ideología política del autor (a la cual llama "Cultural conservatism or a nationalist/conservative direction"), con discusiones sobre Antonio Gramsci, György Lukács, Karl Marx, la historia del comunismo, tablas estadísticas sobre la demografía europea y otros elementos.Una descripción de los orígenes de la organización que pretende tener detrás, la Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici o PCCTS. El nombre es el término en latín para la orden medieval monástica y militar más conocida como los Templarios.Una guía meticulosa sobre cómo comprar los ingredientes para la elaboración de explosivos, así como su preparación, su detonación en ensayos, e incluso dónde y cómo esconderlos.Una guía similar para la obtención de armas, con discusiones de diversas fuentes como la mafia albanesa o la rusa. También explica cómo preparar una armadura de combate, así como los principios del combate urbano con armas de fuego.Una bitácora de su "trabajo" desde 2002 en adelante, que incluye su dieta con detalles sobre su ingestión de proteínas y su rutina diaria.Un presupuesto de toda su "obra" desde ese año en adelante. Breivik afirma haber invertido €317.000 a lo largo de una década en su "proyecto".Instrucciones para la construcción de su epitafio.Instrucciones para la implementación de un sistema de medallas, uniformes y ritos para la orden neo-templaria, con diagramas, nombres y criterios para la aplicación de cada una.Pasos básicos de contra-inteligencia para evitar ser detectado.Un currículum vitae completo.No hay cuestiones de menor importancia para Breivik: el ensayo también incluye discusiones detalladas sobre el estado actual de la educación terciaria en Estados Unidos y Europa, extensas explicaciones sobre la teología y la historia islámica, críticas hacia las letras del hip-hop misógino estadounidense, listas de canciones inspiradoras, etc. Una enorme proporción de los textos, como el propio Breivik admite, son de autores con argumentos válidos y que están muy lejanos de promover o aceptar actos de violencia como el suyo.El cuadro que ofrece la lectura de este ensayo es de una persona de una enorme inteligencia, capacidad de organización y, sobre todo, disciplina. Breivik es un individuo altamente preparado física y mentalmente para la grotesca tarea que se propuso. Tal como indica su ensayo, ya tiene preparados los discursos que realizará en su juicio, que pretende que sea altamente público. Antes de lanzar su ataque ya tenía decidido qué criterios aplicaría con el abogado que le asignara el estado, lo que le contestará al juez y demás quienes le digan que es un criminal psicótico, y cómo planea que termine el juicio.Esto último hace que sea poco probable que aparezcan otros Breiviks – aunque sigue siendo posible. Resulta simplemente increíble que pueda haber otro individuo que comparta la misma ideología hasta el mismo nivel de compromiso, y que sobre todo elija seguir el mismo camino.Breivik se ve a sí mismo como una persona fuertemente politizada, por lo cual es necesario discutirlo en esos términos. De los primeros que surgen apuradamente en los medios –seguramente por no haber leído el manuscrito-, no se aplica casi ninguno. Breivik no es nacionalsocialista o "neo-nazi"; tampoco es asimilable al Unabomber (por más que haya coincidencias en sus textos), ni al Ku Klux Klan o a los partidos nacionalistas europeos.De hecho, quizá la forma más correcta de definir a Breivik es resucitando el significado verdadero de un término muy abusado: "de derecha". Breivik ha elegido responder a la amenaza que percibe en Europa, que es sin dudas el Islam, con un remedio neo-medieval. En su ensayo, Breivik postula que la forma óptima de organización política en Europa debe estar basada en la monarquía, y no en repúblicas:"The king or queen of a country is more democratic than a president ever could be because he or she represents all citizens." (el original no es de Breivik).El noruego está a favor de la fusión de todas las iglesias bajo el Papa nuevamente, aún siendo él mismo luterano (no practicante, a diferencia de lo que sugieren los medios). La nueva mega-Iglesia tendría un monopolio público de la religión, así como acceso privilegiado a los contenidos de la educación y los medios. Su visión de una sociedad conservadora es esta: "Ladies should be wives and homemakers, not cops or soldiers (…) Children should not be born out of wedlock. Glorification of homosexuality should be shunned."Aunque Breivik dedica literalmente cientos de páginas a textos sobre la historia de la violencia islámica contra Europa (y también sobre el caso opuesto), en ningún momento menciona los más de mil años de calamidades, miseria y sufrimiento humano que fueron consecuencia directa del sistema medieval-monárquico-eclesiástico.El principal objetivo de Breivik y sus "templarios" es la erradicación de la presencia del Islam en Europa a través de tres modalidades. La primera es la conversión al cristianismo (incluyendo como variable su creación intelectual más débil, los cristianismos "agnóstico" y "ateo"). Esta vía tiene clarísimos componentes anti-liberales y anti-democráticos, ya que los musulmanes conversos deberían renunciar a sus nombres, idiomas, vínculos con sus países de origen (incluso por vía electrónica) y otras cuestiones básicas. Para Breivik, incluso será necesario que "All traces of Islamic culture in Europe will be eradicated, even locations considered historical" – algo por definición poco "conservador".Además, Breivik no tiene ilusiones sobre el "liberalismo islámico": "to take the violence out of Islam would require it to jettison two things: the Quran as the word of Allah and Muhammad as Allah's prophet. In other words, to pacify Islam would require its transformation into something that it is not."La segunda modalidad de erradicación del Islam es la limpieza cultural, que consistiría de deportaciones o expulsiones (Breivik menciona muchos modelos, incluyendo las gigantescas ordenadas por Stalin). La última es la exterminación.Es en referencia a esto último que Breivik dedica un pasaje a discutir a Adolf Hitler y el nacionalsocialismo. El autor se aleja de estos claramente, aunque por razones muy diferentes de las del ciudadano común. Su explicación es que la "causa" nacionalsocialista y el liderazgo de Hitler destruyeron a los nacionalismos europeos por más de un siglo (es decir, hasta bien entrado el siglo XXI), porque optaron directamente por el camino de la exterminación. El resultado fue una guerra que terminó en derrota, y la entrega del continente al bolchevismo y uno de sus herederos, la socialdemocracia multicultural.Esto explica una de las principales diferencias entre Breivik y el movimiento neo-nacionalsocialista es su posición respecto a Israel y los judíos. El terrorista noruego interpreta al estado israelí como un modelo a seguir de "reunión nacional" étnica, y simpatiza enormemente con su lucha anti-jihad. Ergo, para Breivik se trata de un aliado ante un enemigo en común. El mismo principio aplica Breivik, quien se define como anti-racista, a las alianzas que propone con asiáticos orientales, hindúes y otros con tal de luchar contra el Islam.A quien sí defiende Breivik abiertamente es a Slobodan Milosevic. De hecho, el noruego argumenta que fueron los ataques de la OTAN a la Serbia de ese dictador genocida lo que primero despertó su instinto conservador. Esa podría ser una pista significativa para entender el rompecabezas ideológico del agresor, ya que las dos intervenciones internacionales en Yugoslavia ocurrieron antes del Once de septiembre, que es el gran disparador de la actual preocupación por la jihad entre muchos occidentales.En la visión de Breivik, quizá el sistema de organización social ideal sería elapartheid, pero a diferencia del caso de Sudáfrica, no dentro de un país. Para él, los judíos deberían haber sido expulsados de Europa en los 1930s; ahora deberían ser expulsados los musulmanes. El autor incluso menciona los casos de países de Asia Oriental del presente, como Corea del Sur y Japón, como ejemplos de naciones étnicamente homogéneas y prósperas. Evidentemente, Breivik es una persona que piensa en términos profundamente colectivistas. No hay derechos individuales para las personas que no forman parte de su grupo. Esta forma de concebir el mundo, sumada a la forma en que Breivik se presenta como líder de un movimiento ideológico violento, lo hacen similar a figuras como Lenin, Hitler, Mao, el Che Guevara u Osama bin Laden.De hecho, como todo pretendiente a líder carismático, Breivik incluye en su manifiesto instrucciones para tener preparadas fotografías en las que el atacante se "vea bien", pensando en el momento en el cual su rostro sea visto por el mundo – tal como está ocurriendo ahora. Así se lo propuso Breivik: "As a Justiciar Knight you will go into history as one of the most influential individuals of your time. So you need to look your absolute best and ensure that you produce quality marketing material prior to operation." El texto incluso recomienda utilizar una cama solar y aplicarse maquillaje antes de tomarse las fotografías.El aspecto más sorprendente del planteo de Breivik es el blanco que escogió para su ataque. Al leer el inmenso manifiesto y contrastarlo con los hechos de los días pasados, es inevitable quedarse con la sensación de que fue todo una excusa para perpetrar un acto de extrema violencia contra jóvenes inocentes (y desarmados, por supuesto). El manifiesto incluso lo admite con una subsección entera: "The cruel nature of our operations". Breivik explica que aunque el enemigo objetivo es el Islam en Europa, el objetivo inmediato son los europeos que han trabajado durante cerca de medio siglo para que exista esa presencia islámica en la región.Estos son, para el noruego, los multiculturalistas, marxistas y demás miembros de una suerte de élite europea. De hecho, su objetivo explícito es que para el año 2020 ocurran golpes de estado en diversos países de Europa occidental (junto con la abolición de la Unión Europea), de modo de instalar regímenes conservadores que trabajen para la eliminación simultánea del marxismo multicultural y del Islam.Estas élites y su "political correctness" son las responsables, para Breivik, de que no se puedan discutir abiertamente cuestiones que preocupan a un nacionalista conservador como él. La principal de ellas es la presencia de musulmanes en Europa. La sección tres del manifiesto es fundamental, porque tras más de 750 páginas de "diagnóstico" sobre el estado actual de Europa, el autor quiebra con todos los demás que citó y anuncia su alejamiento de la vía pacífica. Por ejemplo, en la página 791 aparece, como un subtítulo más, un anuncio importante: "Why armed resistance against the cultural Marxist/multiculturalist regimes of Western Europe is the only rational approach".De hecho, en esa sección hay varias páginas dedicadas a enunciar los cargos legales que se le imputan a multiplicidad de líderes europeos. Como parte de su gigantesca acusación contra el sistema político-social europeo de posguerra, Breivik incluso ofrece cálculos específicos de las cantidades de europeos cuyos derechos han sido violados de diversas maneras por los efectos de esas políticos, que van desde la violación y el asesinato hasta los despidos de personas. Todos se imputan, en conjunto y criminalmente, a estas "élites" cuya muerte se anuncia poco a poco.En lugar de estas personas aparecerá, en palabras de Breivik, un "cultural conservative tribunal" en cada país que implemente un nuevo régimen político. Como parte de esta iniciativa, aparecen mencionadas casualmente algunas medidas atroces: "All Muslims are to be immediately deported to their country of origin. Each family (family head) will receive 25 000 Euro providing they accept the deportation terms. Anyone who violently resists deportation will be executed". Breivik también prevé compensaciones financieras para los sujetos que fueron "víctimas intelectuales" del sistema previo, así como específicamente para los ciudadanos de Serbia por el bombardeo de OTAN. También incluye los parámetros de su propia "ley de medios", por utilizar un desafortunado término rioplatense, que implica la imposición de cuotas de periodistas e intelectuales "conservadores" y nacionalistas en diversas organizaciones mediáticas.El método que ha elegido Breivik, conscientemente sin duda, es similar al viejo anarquismo de la propaganda por el hecho, que consiste de atacantes solitarios que cometen actos espectaculares de demostración e inspiración ideológica. El noruego llama a su campaña de violencia "A Declaration of pre-emptive War" contra sus dos enemigos. Breivik indica claramente que aquellos que existan como él actualmente en Europa son pocos pero que están en aumento; su ataque está pensado para encender la chispa de la conmoción en la región, lo cual incluiría también la aparición de más adeptos. Tácticamente, el ataque del pasado viernes 22 de julio en Noruega es definido por su autor como "military shock attacks by clandestine cell systems".Hay más pasajes que directamente preanuncian el ataque que Breivik escogió lanzar: "consider making use of a remote detonation, (…) to attract attention to one location. Ensure that the enemy forces are heading for this location. By then, you will be on the opposite side of town and in the middle of the process of finishing your primary goal." El blanco se vuelve cada vez más específico: el primero de la lista que hay en el manifiesto es "political parties - cultural Marxist/multiculturalist political parties."En el apartado correspondiente a este tipo de organización, el primer país detallado es Noruega, y el primer partido que aparece ahí es el "Norwegian Labour Party". Más adelante, nuevamente en primer lugar entre una lista de blancos, dice que un blanco primario es: "the annual party meeting of the socialist/social democrat party in your country."Curiosamente, aunque Breivik propone algunas formas de organización colectiva (como la neo-templaria), sus instrucciones para los actos de terrorismo son estrictas respecto a que las células deben ser individuales. Es por eso que Breivik el terrorista pasó desapercibido, a juzgar por la información disponible, incluso en los círculos nacionalistas no violentos.De los nueve miembros que supuestamente asistieron en 2002 a la reunión fundacional en Londres de la organización neo-templaria (todos anónimos), cuatro son descritos como "cristiano ateo" o "cristiano agnóstico". El propio Breivik está muy indeciso respecto a su religión: "I'm not going to pretend I'm a very religious person as that would be a lie (…) I consider myself to be 100% Christian (…) I'm not an excessively religious man". Sería interesante saber qué opinaría Hugues de Payens, fundador de la orden original, respecto a esta falta de disciplina teológica (que en realidad es una ausencia total). Son sin ninguna duda los nombres de estos nueve miembros iniciales, y de otros, lo que más están buscando los servicios de inteligencia de varios estados europeos.La visión del mundo de Breivik está claramente influenciada por el pensamiento colectivista, y su propia obra parece aproximarse a un sistema de pensamiento que podría llamarse ideológico. Es por eso que es posible concluir que no se trata de un lunático desequilibrado que pertenece a un manicomio. Es peor que eso: una persona que en todo momento supo lo que hacía, que se preparó durante años para hacerlo, y que desplegó un alto nivel de meticulosidad para lograrlo. Hasta el efecto de su ataque está pensado desde hace años: "The art of asymmetrical warfare is less about inflicting immediate damage but all about the indirect long term psychological and ideological damage. Our shock attacks are theatre and theatre is always performed for an audience".Las descripciones más personales de Breivik son reveladoras del grado de control que tenía sobre sí mismo: "I have managed to stay focused and highly motivated for a duration of more than 9 years now (…) I have never been happier than I am today (…) I do a mental check almost every day through meditation and philosophizing (…) I simulate various future scenarios relating to resistance efforts, confrontations with police, future interrogation scenarios, future court appearances, future media interviews etc".El objetivo de Breivik es la fundación de una nueva cadena de nacionalismos post-nazis en Europa, y es importante que ese proyecto fracase. El autor concibió un "100 year plan to contribute to seize political power in Western European countries currently controlled by anti-nationalists" (de ahí el título de su manifiesto: 2083). En sus planes más delirantes hacia el futuro, Breivik menciona todo tipo de planes, desde el robo y la detonación de armas nucleares en las capitales europeas hasta la colaboración con Al-Qaeda, el gobierno de Irán, y otros terroristas islámicos.Como se dijo anteriormente, el manifiesto es increíblemente largo y contiene todo tipo de cosas. Hay discusiones muy detalladas sobre la niñez ("My best friend for many years, a Muslim"), adolescencia (incluyendo encuentros con pandillas pakistaníes y un pasado como "graffiti artist") y juventud del autor, con descripciones (con nombres) de sus amigos y hasta las vidas sexuales de sus familiares más cercanos. Hay planes para la importación de inmigrantes en la era "post-islámica" de Europa, con detalles sobre los horarios, la compensación, las localidades y más. Breivik tiene hasta pensado cuál será el nuevo himno de Europa. También explica que él no fue el fundador de la organización neo-templaria, sino el octavo miembro (algo que recuerda a la historia de Adolf Hitler y su ingreso al NSDAP), y que a través de ella conoció a un criminal de guerra serbio en Liberia. Su mentor fue un inglés, fundador de la organización y sin duda un importantísimo blanco para la inteligencia doméstica británica en este mismo momento.Actualmente el "caso Breivik" se encuentra en una etapa que el propio terrorista ya tiene planeada desde hace años: "Your arrest will mark the initiation of the propaganda phase. Your trial offers you a stage to the world (…) A Justiciar Knight is not only a valorous resistance fighter, a one man army; he is a one man marketing agency as well". El terrorista está muy consciente de la opinión que el mundo se ha formado sobre él, y ya ha recorrido mentalmente el camino para superar el ostracismo de su causa: "It might sound completely ridiculous and funny to most people today. But by presenting the following accusations and demands in all seriousness we are indirectly conditioning everyone listening for the conflicts and scenarios ahead. They will laugh today, but in the back of their minds, they have an ounce of fear, respect and admiration for our cause and the alternative and authority we represent".Breivik no es un criminal o incluso un terrorista común. Es una figura nefasta con una ideología totalmente nueva. Es muy importante conocer los términos ideológicos y metodológicos en los que operó, porque existe una preocupante posibilidad de que haya otros como él en el futuro.*Licenciado en Estudios Internacionales - Universidad ORT Uruguay Candidato al Master of Arts in Security Studies - Georgetown University
In Italy, Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR) manages the second reception of forced migrants. This organization was founded by the Bossi-Fini law n. 189/2002 and is composed by the network of local governments, which uses the available resources of National Fund for Asylum Policies and Services provided by Government finance law and managed by the Ministry of Interior. Its principal goal is to realize integrated reception projects for refugees, asylum seekers, subsidiary and humanitarian protection holders in order to ensure their socio-economic inclusion within local contexts in cooperation with voluntary and third sector organizations. On 10th July 2014, local governments were signed an agreement between national and regional executive to create a national reception system to face the growing number of people who have arrived on the Italian coasts. The main goal of this system is to overcome only a material reception (food and lodging), in order to offer a "widespread reception" within urban areas. The strategy is to create an individual project and an accompaniment to ensure the integration of each person in the local community. The services provided consist in inclusion of migrants in the national health and scholastic system, orientation and access to other local services, professional training, job placement, legal assistance and social and housing integration . Indeed, it is crucial to emphasize that the Italian reception system is characterized by extreme fragmentation. Only SPRAR provides these services with the goal of enabling social and economic inclusion of hosted people in local context, which is why we talk about second reception centres. In Italy, there are, however, many different types of first and extraordinary reception centres for migrants . They are managed by the prefectures and differ in terms of goals, structural characteristics, services and receptive capacity. Only 18.7% of migrants are hosted in the SPRAR structures, while the remainder incurs the possibility of carrying out the entire procedure of the asylum application in the centres of first and extraordinary reception (IDOS, 2017). In recent years, the Italian reception structures have undergone a reorganization and redenomination phase, in which the SPRAR should have become a reference standard. In fact, this system has positively distinguished itself for its objectives, the structuring of his interventions and many best practices. This did not prevent bad reception occurrences even within SPRAR structures, as well as a large number of violent and verbal conflicts, some of which carried out by Italian citizens to the detriment of asylum seekers and owners of a status of international protection. These episodes, exacerbated by a political and media discourse that represents migrants as a threat (Battistelli et al., 2016), are the consequence and symbol of the fragmentary and contradictory reception policies adopted at a European level, in the individual countries and at a local level (IDOS, 2016). Instability and political, economic and social uncertainty, rulers in this historical period, are manifested in an emergency approach that is characterized by insufficient planning and a lack of coordination between the reception agencies. This orientation, supported by many and incongruent legislative changes, deprives the system of a strong structure and facilitates the overturning of the same principles of "widespread reception" of migrants in local communities. Moreover, this facilitates the affirmation of nationalist, xenophobic and localist drifts, as well as reception situations in which human rights are violated and which do not provide real opportunities for inclusion in the territories in a safe and dignified manner. Therefore, the conceptual distinction of the terms danger, risk and threat, used as the interpretative line of this work, appears fundamental to understand why subjective responses, in terms of perception and actions, differ according to the situations, as well as to manage the effects that derive in a consistent manner (Battistelli e Galantino, 2018). In order to realize the analysis, I decided to use an ethnographic approach that is traced back to the constructivist philosophical paradigm, where the vision of facts is investigated locally. Ethnographers, indeed, study subjects, artefacts and actions in their interactions, from an interpretative-dialectical point of view, without the claim of absolute objectivity of the results (Piccardo and Benozzo, 1996). Then, I have chosen to use focused narrative interviews because they turn to individuals, they aim for their "understanding", and this is part of the renewed interest in the subject's centrality and in the "deliberately intentional" social action (Weber, 1922). It is also an approach that allows investigating deeply the phenomena. It is very interactive, flexible and able to empathize in the perspective of the subject being studied. This makes it easier to interview marginal subjects neglected by "official knowledge" and to rediscover the social function of research, which is "giving voice to those who do not have it" (Crespi, 1985, pp. 351) In addition, observation and fieldwork are supported by a strong theoretical basis that offers its help to the researcher for the understanding of the social world, providing an order that supports they in their critical analysis of the facts. So, empirical work and theory support each other (Silverman, 2002). Then, narrative approach is highly adaptable to the study of organizations and to analyse the collected data. In fact, this approach is characterized for attention given to concrete situations and not to general theorizations (Czarniawska, 2000). Hence, the empirical research carried out in 2016-2018 can be summarized in the following phases: 1- Analysis of secondary data and documents produced by European and national statistical institutes, private associations, protection bodies and by SPRAR itself. 2- Participant observation in: - a political protest demonstration against the opening of a SPRAR centre in XIII Town Hall, on the north-western suburb of Rome; - nine meetings of social operators working in SPRAR network of Rome and in the national CARA and CAS reception centres; - a SPRAR centre (20 reception places increased to 40 in the south-eastern suburbs of Rome, VII Town Hall). One year of observation and shadowing of operators: 16th January 2017 – 22th January 2018; - a SPRAR apartment (14 reception places for families in the residential area of Monte Sacro neighbourhood, Town Hall III). Five days of observation and shadowing of operators in January 2018; - a seminar of reflection organized by SPRAR and ANCI on the reception system in Lazio, focused on the role of the Regions and Municipalities. 3- Forty-one narrative focused interviews: - Twenty-four SPRAR operators working in SPRAR centres of Rome; - Seventeen asylum seekers and refugees from SPRAR centre observed in Town Hall VII of Rome. The intent behind this ethnographic research started in a restructuring phase aimed to make the SPRAR a reference standard of reception for all asylum seekers who came to our country. But it was characterized, as still today, by speculative situations, the high presence on the territory of large collective reception centres and managing bodies without the necessary experience (Olivieri, 2011; Lunaria 2016). Therefore, the analysis of the risk management and the operators perception of the SPRAR of Rome has the objective to unveil and analyse the contradictions and weaknesses that may arise within this model due to a reckless management that produces specific factors of risk. The hypothesis underlying the case study is that, although the SPRAR has been recognized as an ordinary model, it can also be reproduced in a distorted manner, not respecting the reference guidelines. The alteration between SPRAR in books, the theoretical expression of a principle, and SPRAR in action, its implementation (Pound, 1910), is caused by specific factors that can cause significant effects from several points of view. To bring to light these aspects, closely related to the risk management and the perception that its operators have, I achieve a classification of the risks that I applied to three different types of SPRAR structures (large, medium and single apartment). Then, I identified a series of outcomes involving the people hosted, the operators, the local community and the SPRAR organization itself. The decision to draw the case study at the SPRAR of the city of Rome is driven by the complexity that distinguishes this territory on a social, cultural and political level. In fact, I believe it can bring out the contradictions of the model as new forms of confinement compared to territories with reduced complexity. However, allowing a glimpse of a reception of asylum seekers and holders of a protection status also possible within urban and metropolitan areas. The empirical survey shows that an increase in the distortion compared to the assumptions of an integrated and widespread reception in the territories corresponds to a greater possibility that specific risk factors are produced. Which in their turn, crystallizing into unhealthy forms, can involve the people hosted, the operators, the local community and the SPRAR organization itself. The case study and the application of the risk classification, which I achieved based on the evidence revealed from the field, reveal how the identified risk areas (socio-spatial context, production of the service, recipients) and the corresponding categories, do not produce in itself a negative result. However, this can occur if a short-sighted management acts on these aspects and does not align with the proposed guidelines. Therefore, this classification appears to be a useful tool to identify problems and to develop preventive measures, aimed to improve the management of SPRAR centres in metropolitan cities such as Rome (and other contexts), by intervening on the identified risk categories and reducing the factors that eventually emerge. The analysis, focused on three different types of SPRAR structure (large, medium, single apartment) of the Capital, shows how this alteration occurs in a disruptive way in the large collective centres, the most represented in Rome. Meanwhile, greater adherence to the model is shown, with a modality proportional to the size, in the medium-sized structure and in the apartment. The distortion detected in the large SPRAR collective centres of Rome and partly also in the medium-sized centre, reflects the ambivalence of the general reception system. It promotes on the one hand the principles of a good reception that respects human rights and the autonomy of people and by another implements foreclosure practices and new forms of borders (Vacchiano, 2011; Van Haken, 2008). The field research shows that this happens on different levels due to specific material factors (location and capacity of the centres, management of internal spaces, activation of the services provided, etc.) and through the daily practices of the operators who, in a more or less assenting, controlling and disciplining the people hosted, shape their conduct. Therefore, in the daily life of the structures in which the situations described are involved, the principles of freedom, inclusion and autonomy supported by the rhetoric of reception system are governed by a neoliberal logic of citizenship that suggests the criteria to distinguish, in the same integration paths, who is more worthy than other beneficiaries (Van Haken, 2008). Although the case study highlights strong contradictions and weaknesses that come to life in the implementation of the SPRAR model, it also shows the realization of a good reception. That which, despite being included in an extremely complex context such as Rome, attempts to oppose the "logic of large numbers and profits" of large cooperatives and which implements functional inclusion paths to achieve the objectives. Alignment and consistency with the guidelines and the SPRAR operating manual, in fact, allow the construction of a real project of individualized socio-economic integration for the person hosted. Only by acting in a widespread manner on the territory, in apartments or small centres, the genesis of new forms of borders beyond those already present is avoided. In fact, through this management most of the risks identified are eliminated or at least reduced, precisely because the "trajectory of opportunities" of risk (Reason, 1997) towards unfavourable outcomes generally develops within large collective centres. References Battistelli Fabrizio, Farruggia Francesca, Galantino Maria Grazia and Ricotta Giuseppe. 2016. "Affrontarsi o Confrontarsi? Il "Rischio" Immigrati sulla Stampa Italiana e nella Periferia di Tor Sapienza a Roma". Sicurezza e Scienze Sociali 1:86-112. Battistelli Fabrizio e Galantino Maria Grazia. 2018. "Dangers, Risks and Threats: An Alternative Conceptualization to the Catch-All Concept of Risk". Current Sociology 1-15. Czarniawska Barbara. 2000. Narrare l'organizzazione. La costruzione dell'identità istituzionale. Tr.it. Torino: Edizioni di Comunità. 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