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First of all, I would like to thank Holger Knudsen, a good old friend, for this invitation. It is very important for us Brazilians to get an opportunity to talk about our new Civil Code, since it has been harshly criticized for its bad sides and warmly praised for its good ones. I also would like to thank the Law Librarians' Discussion Group, which has organized this event, and you for your presence and interest in this subject.

Abstract:Skepticism prevails among a substantial number of economists over a possible connection between civil liberties and the level of economic activity. Until now, empirical research on economic growth has found mixed evidence on the influence of civil liberties. Disaggregation of the Freedom House Civil Liberties Index allows a fresh empirical look at the effect of human rights on long-term growth or economic development. Our results show that one of the four subcategories of the index outperforms all available indicators of property rights institutions in explaining long-term economic growth. This subcategory, Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights, captures the level of second generation human rights that affect the mobility of individuals with respect to housing, employment and university education, as well as the level of protection of property rights. This result is robust with respect to reverse causation, important omitted variables such as geography and human capital, as well as to a variety of sensitivity tests. We also discuss in our conceptual framework how civil liberties work as an indicator of the prevalence of the rule of law and how the latter affects growth or development as an essential public input.

Cover -- Title Page -- Foreword -- KINGDOM, STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN AFRICA -- POLITICAL COLLISIONS -- Groups advocating restoration -- Lobbying led to kingship -- Defensive advocacy following the coronation -- CONCEPTUAL COLLISIONS -- Is the BKG a government? -- Is the BKG a civil society organization? -- CONCLUSION -- ENDNOTES -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- REFERENCES -- Back Cover.

"Long Island has been in the corridors of almost all major turning points of American history, but Long Island has been overlooked as a battleground of the civil rights movement. Since early colonization by the English settlers in the 17th century, the shadow of slavery has bequeathed a racial caste system that has directly or indirectly been enforced. During World War II, every member of society was asked to participate in ending tyranny within European and Asian borders. Homeward-bound black soldiers expected a societal change in race relations; instead they found the same racial barriers they experienced prior to the war. They were refused homes in developments such as Levittown, denied mortgages, and had their children face limited educational opportunities. Collective efforts from organizations such as Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) employed civil disobedience as a tactic to fracture racial barriers."--Amazon.com

This article identifies a mechanism through which multiparty mediation – mediation with multiple active third parties – has positive effects on civil war resolution. Balanced mediation efforts – those providing third parties biased toward both sides of the dispute – have unique advantages in generating peaceful outcomes. In particular, balanced efforts alleviate the commitment concerns faced by both the rebel group and the government, improving the prospects for peace. In this article, I develop a measure, Mediation balance, which aggregates the mediators' biases when multiple third parties are present. I also consider, both theoretically and empirically, how the number of mediators interacts with mediation balance to shape outcomes. I test my theory on civil war mediation attempts between 1989 and 2005, finding that balanced mediation efforts improve the probability of reaching an agreement. Furthermore, the strength of this effect is influenced by the number of mediators involved. Mediation balance also influences the probability the agreement halts the violence, albeit in unexpected ways.

"Die Terroranschläge des 11. Septembers katapultierten den Afghanistankonflikt in das Zentrum des Weltgeschehens. Mit dem Zusammenbruch des Taliban-Regimes im Herbst 2001 setzte eine von der internationalen Gemeinschaft initiierte Phase des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbaus des Landes nach einem über 20 Jahre andauernden zerstörerischen Krieg ein. Jedoch mussten die Architekten des Wiederaufbaus bald erkennen, dass die Hindernisse für die Etablierung eines funktionierenden, modernen Staatswesens und einer emanzipierten Zivilgesellschaft weitaus komplexer und diffiziler waren als angenommen: Der hartnäckige und gewaltsame Widerstand der Macht habenden Eliten gegen die Wiedererrichtung eines staatlichen Gewaltmonopol gewann unter dem Schlagwort 'Warlordism' Popularität. Die Problematik des Drogenanbaus, der mit dem Kollaps der Taliban sprunghaft wieder an Bedeutung gewann, führte zudem vor Augen, dass das weitgehende Fehlen einer staatlichen Ordnung Afghanistan in ein Paradies von Bürgerkriegsökonomien, die einer Befriedung des Landes entgegenstehen, verwandelte. Das Anliegen dieses Beitrags ist es, die Komplexität von Warlordism und Bürgerkriegsökonomien in Afghanistan darzulegen. Beim Kriegsfürstentum und den Bürgerkriegsökonomien handelt es sich um ein eng miteinander verzahntes und sich gegenseitig stützendes System, das sich nicht auseinanderdividieren lässt. Es ist wichtig, auf der einen Seite auf die Verwicklung der Warlords in die Bürgerkriegsökonomien hinzuweisen, aber auch deutlich zu machen, dass das Gros der Kriegsfürsten nicht außerhalb der afghanischen Gesellschaft steht, sondern der Warlordism ein strukturelles Problem in Afghanistan darstellt. Auf Grund des Hybridcharakters von Macht- und Wirtschaftsstrukturen in Afghanistan entziehen sich die dortigen politischen, gesellschaftlichen und ökonomischen Strukturen unseren westlichen Kategorisierungsmustern, die häufig über eine bipolare Anordnung nicht hinauskommen." (Autorenreferat)

In this article the norms of Books 1–3 of the Civil Code of Ukraine are examined in order to determine civil sanctions and their system. The au- thor stipulates that in the Civil Code of Ukraine there is no definition for the specific term "sanction" and its types, except for Article 354, which states only one type of the sanction, that is, confiscation. These gaps lead to the problems in determining the grounds for the application of certain measures of coercive nature and impede the effective protection of subjective civil law rights which are violated.

A critical analysis of existing classifications of civil sanctions is carried out, and an author's classification of the General Part of the Civil Code's sanctions is proposed, depending on the types of legal relationships governed by it. For the purposes of such classification, the author considers the subjective composition of the legal relationship, the focus on the restoration of the subjective civil law right, which is violated, or on the compensation of the harm caused, and the consequences of civil sanctions application.

A thorough analysis of the norms of Books 1-4 of the Civil Code is carried out in order to identify the norms containing civil sanctions. Thus, in the first three chapters of the Civil Code there is a lack of the norms containing civil sanctions. At the same time, Chapter 4 of the Civil Code is distinguished by the variety of civil sanctions that are proposed to be considered as civil sanctions that limit or impede the personal civil status of an individual in the circumstances specified in Articles 36, 37, 39, 41, 43, 46, 47, 481. Other provisions of the same chapter contain sanctions that restore the civil status of an individual, which causes him or her to have positive legal effects (Articles 38, 42) related to the restoration of the civil capacity of an individual whose civil capacity has been is limited or recognized as incompetent.

On the basis of the conducted research of the norms of the Civil Code, it is concluded that the diversity of civil legal sanctions in different chapters of the Civil Code, which have different directions and consequences of their application, despite the absence of their direct name "sanctions".

The Chinese Party-state's repression of politically sensitive social organizations is well-known. Less known, however, is how the central state has governed a broader range of social organizations that have violated laws or regulations and are hence considered "untrustworthy" in the context of the social credit system. Analyzing over 22,000 entries of social organizations on the Ministry of Civil Affairs' National Social Organization Credit Information Public Notification Platform, this study examines which social organizations are publicly designated as untrustworthy—and why—as well as punishments and possibilities for redemption. The study finds that, on the one hand, the Xi Jinping administration has increased governance transparency by selectively publicizing untrustworthy organizations through the social credit system and standardizing their punishments. On the other hand, the administration continues to be opaque about its treatment of more politically sensitive organizations, such as those advocating for civil rights or representing marginalized communities. By maintaining an incomplete public list of banned organizations, the Party-state preserves maximum discretionary power over the most politically threatening sector. This governance approach breaks from the past in rendering civil society more legible while continuing the Party-state's tradition of flexible control. (China J/GIGA)

La desobediencia civil proviene de la transmutación de convicciones personales a intereses grupales, es acción pública y pacífica que transgrede algunas normas jurídicas. Es esencial- mente política porque, aunque no pretenda el cambio estructural de un régimen político y jurídico, busca la enmienda de ciertas leyes o medidas de gobierno. Los desobedientes civiles pertenecen al tejido social cívico y expresan visiones éticas que han sido deficientemente inter- pretadas en el orden jurídico; si la relación del campo civil con el área estatal dista de ser comunicativa, porque la esfera estatal no recepta la dinámica de la sociedad civil, la suerte de la desobediencia civil es su destierro de la vida social; de manera distinta, si la organización estatal está al servicio de la sociedad civil, la acción de los desobedientes civiles constituye una alarma moral que advierte y propugna cambios en la vida social y en la legislación que la sustenta. ; Civil disobedience comes from the transmutation of personal convictions to group interests; it is a public and peaceful action that violates some legal norms. It is essentially political because, although it does not intend the structural change of a political and legal system, it seeks the amendment of certain laws or government measures. Civil disobedient individuals belong to the civic social fabric and express ethical visions that have been poorly interpreted in the legal order. If the relationship between the state and the civil field is far from being communicative because the state sphere does not grasp the dynamics of civil society, the fate of civil disobedience is its banishment from society. On the other hand, if state organization is at the civil society's service, the action of the civil disobedient constitutes a moral alarm that warns and advocates changes in social life and the legislation that supports it.

The number of radical Islamist groups fighting in civil wars in Muslim countries has steadily grown over the last twenty years, with such groups outlasting and outperforming more moderate groups. By 2016, Salafi jihadist groups accounted for most of the militant groups in Syria and half of such groups in Somalia. In Iraq, a third of all militant groups were composed of Salafi jihadists. Many analysts argue that the rise of these groups reflects an increase in radical beliefs in Muslim societies. Under certain conditions, however, rebel leaders have strong incentives to embrace an extreme ideology even if they do not believe the ideas that underlie it. When competition is high, information is poor, and institutional constraints are weak, an extremist ideology can help rebel leaders overcome difficult collective-action, principal-agent, and commitment problems. All three of these conditions have been present in the post-2003 civil wars in the Middle East and Africa, and all help explain the emergence and growth of radical groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qaida.

This article interprets David Hume's social and political thought as a 'theory of civil society', arguing that as such it constituted an important challenge to the civic humanism of much early 18th-century British political argument. Since republican theorists invoke the historical traditions of civic thought in current debates, Hume's theory of civil society therefore is of especial interest in relation to the foundations of contemporary neo-republicanism. The first part argues that, in A Treatise of Human Nature, by analysing various different kinds of relation between human beings, Hume articulated a fundamental distinction between society and the state. The second examines Hume's Essays and Political Discourses, focusing in particular on the relationship between the respective interests of society and government, the effects of commercial refinement on virtues and sociability, and on forms of mediation between society and the state. The concluding section reviews the historical and theoretical significance of Hume's theory, focusing particularly on concepts of liberty.