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For approximately 25 years, the United States was the world's sole superpower. With the emergence of China as a peer competitor on both the economic and military fronts, that era has come to an end. The prospect for near-future, industrial-scale, non-nuclear warfare can no longer be dismissed. Should that occur, it would be irresponsible to assume that a military decision would quickly ensue, therefore industrial (and societal) mobilization would be necessary. When considering this type of future, it is natural to look to the most recent historical example for guidance, and that would be World War II, in which America's supremely effective industrial mobilization created the well-known "arsenal of democracy" that the enemy was not able to counter. In this paper, we propose that while the World War II story is instructive, the run-up to World War I in which America's industrial mobilization was far less effective, should not be ignored. This paper takes an introductory look at the failure of U.S. industrial mobilization in World War I, focusing on the case of shipbuilding. We review similarities and contrasts to today's situation and suggest courses of action to reduce the likelihood of a similar outcome in the future. ; Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Program

In the presence of threatening stimuli, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can manifest as hypervigilance for threat and disrupted attentional control. PTSD patients have shown exaggerated interference effects on tasks using trauma-related or threat stimuli. In studies of PTSD, faces with negative expressions are often used as threat stimuli, yet angry and fearful facial expressions may elicit different responses. The modified Eriksen flanker task, or the emotional face flanker, has been used to examine response interference. We compared 23 PTSD patients and 23 military controls on an emotional face flanker task using angry, fearful and neutral expressions. Participants identified the emotion of a central target face flanked by faces with either congruent or incongruent emotions. As expected, both groups showed slower reaction times (RTs) and decreased accuracy on emotional target faces, relative to neutral. Unexpectedly, both groups showed nearly identical interference effects on fearful and neutral target trials. However, post hoc testing suggested that PTSD patients showed faster RTs than controls on congruent angry faces (target and flanker faces both angry) relative to incongruent, although this finding should be interpreted with caution. This possible RT facilitation effect with angry, but not fearful faces, also correlated positively with self-report measures of PTSD symptoms. These results suggest that PTSD patients may be more vigilant for, or primed to respond to, the appearance of angry faces, relative to fearful, but further study is needed.

The US Presidential elections of 2016 were marked by the breaches into the Democratic National Committee's computer network. This report describes the details and techniques of the hack, their victims and the actors involved, including Russian actors. The research does not focus only on the DNC hack, but also on older and related hacks that were attributed to Russia. The report analyzes the effects of these hacks on US society, US internal politics, economy and the international relations. Finally the paper suggests recommendations for states to prevent the occurrence of such events in their own elections.