Suchergebnisse

Ziele und Befunde der Arbeit Das durchgeführte Forschungsvorhaben zeigt durch einen holistischen, gleichzeitig politikwissenschaftlichen wie auch historischen Ansatz Folgendes: Nämlich, warum und wie das liberale, regelbasierte Weltordnungssystem im Untersuchungsraum der US-Präsidentschaften von Clinton bis Obama kontinuierlich durch ein System der realistischen, kurzfristig wirkenden Durchsetzung vitaler Interessen mittels militärischer Instrumentenpräferenz unter fortlaufender militärischer Optimierung ergänzt bzw. ersetzt wird. Dies erklärt auch, warum die "transaktionale Führung Trumps"(1), die nach dem Untersuchungsraum von 1993 bis 2017 mit Außenwirkung die Reduktion idealistischer "Grand Strategy"-Elemente bzw. wohlwollender Ordnungsmacht unter Kostenabwälzung und Vorteilsverringerung europäischer Nato-Verbündeter vornimmt, in Kontinuität zur ausgeübten Führungsmacht der Amtsvorgänger steht. Ergebnisse dieser Dissertation wie die sich ab 1993 immer nachdrücklicher abzeichnende Auflösung der multilateralen Grundordnung legen damit nahe, Trumps bisherige Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik als deutlich spürbares Krisensymptom und nicht als Ursache dieses Abbaus der nach 1945 eingerichteten Weltordnung einzustufen. Diese Auflösung ist mit einer Erosion des letztlich transatlantisch angestoßenen bipolaren "amerikanischen Systems" gleichzusetzen. Die Implementierung dieses Systems erfolgte als "Lernstunde zweier Weltkriege" auf Basis der mit der Aufklärung und den amerikanischen Gründungskennziffern eingeleiteten neuzeitlichen Ordnungskonzeptionen: Daher ist diese Auflösung auch ein Indikator für das Scheitern neuzeitlicher Ordnungskennziffern, die sich im "American way of life" entfalten konnten. Als ursächlich für die geschilderte Entwicklung wird eine von Clinton bis Obama konstant ansteigende Gesamtbedrohung nachgewiesen, mit der die konsequente Schwächung amerikanischer Vormacht verknüpft ist. Diese fußt u.a. auf der Basis von seit 1979 postulierten Klimawandeleffekten als Bedrohungsverstärker bei erreichter amerikanischer Förderspitze in fossilen Rohstoffen und ansteigendem Ressourcenbedarf im Kontext schrumpfender Rohstoffvorkommen. Weiter sind für den Untersuchungsraum die zunehmende Einwirkung der in den 1980er Jahren begonnenen "US-Konservativen Revolution" auf die Ausübung der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik unter Einflusszugewinn von Konzernen und Lobbygruppen auf beispielsweise policy-Implementierung sowie die neuen Rahmenbedingungen zu addieren. Darunter fallen die sich ausformende Digitalisierung, die hohen Ressourcenverbrauch mit sich bringt, und die ansteigende Weltbevölkerung unter spezifischen demographischen Vorzeichen. Darüber hinaus sind beispielsweise die Beibehaltung des bipolar angewachsenen Rüstungssektors als ökonomische Basis militärischer Vormacht und das langsame Abbröckeln der Dollar-Hegemonie seit etwa 1973 zu berücksichtigen. Durch komplexes Zusammenspiel von "Grand Strategy"-Umsetzung gemäß der Prämisse amerikanischen Führungsmachtausbaus unter neokonservativem bzw. christlich-rechtem Einfluss mit asymmetrischen sowie reaktivierten konventionellen Bedrohungsgegenständen, Bedrohungsverstärkern und neuen Rahmenbedingungen wird der lineare Verlauf der Gesamtbedrohung im Zeitraum von 1993 bis 2017 verständlich: Im Kontext der "Grand Strategy"-Ausführungen erklären insbesondere das Bedrohungsabwehr-, Bedrohungsverstärker- und Marktwirtschaftsverständnis der US-Far Right in komplexer Wechselwirkung mit erstarkenden transnationalen Konzernen, Lobbygruppen, Individuen(2), informellen Netzwerken und staatlichen Akteuren in Bezug auf Bedrohungsgegenstände sowie Bedrohungsverstärker(3) im Zusammenhang mit der post-bipolaren, globalen Verankerung amerikanischer Wirtschafts- und Konsummuster das Folgende: Nämlich die Anpassung der amerikanischen Bedrohungsabwehr - unter Aufbau der "imperial presidency"(4) bzw. Einhegung des Systems von "checks and balances" - samt deren Implikationen auf das bipolare liberale Ordnungssystem. Sodann wird die notwendige Weiterführung in der Nato durch amerikanisch aufgeworfenen Nato-Umbau zur entsprechenden Umsetzung transformierter amerikanischer Bedrohungsabwehr bzw. Legitimierung der systemischen Anpassung begreifbar. Genauso wird nachvollziehbar, dass die so eingerichtete Bedrohungsabwehr nur kurzfristig abwehrt: Stattdessen verstärkt sie asymmetrische und konventionelle Bedrohung wie auch Bedrohungsverstärker - unter Einleitung von Rüstungsspiralen bzw. Demontierung der Rüstungskontrolle - und damit die Gesamtbedrohung. Dies lässt einen Konfliktausbruch jenseits des bisher Vorstellbaren konstant näher rücken. Gleichzeitig ist der dringende Bedarf an Mobilisierung der transatlantischen Zusammenarbeit im Hinblick auf Förderung der globalen Kooperation staatlicher, aber auch nichtstaatlicher Akteure hinsichtlich der Bedrohungswurzeln samt der sich verschlechternden Voraussetzungen illustriert: Denn mit jedem Anstieg der Gesamtbedrohung ist durch die eingeleitete amerikanische sicherheitspolitische Anpassung und deren Weiterführung in der Nato ein Abbau der regelbasierten Basiskennziffern im Untersuchungsraum verknüpft. Dies reduziert in fortlaufender Konsequenz die Grundlage für oben genannte, konstant zentraler werdende Zusammenarbeit, um eine sukzessive Erosion des bipolaren "amerikanischen Systems" unter künftigen Dystopien zu verhindern bzw. zumindest zu begrenzen. Durch die Forschungsergebnisse wird der bisherige Forschungsstand auf den Kopf gestellt, da so beispielsweise gezeigt werden kann, dass mittels der Transformation der Nato keine gleichberechtigte transatlantische Lastenteilung oder eine Weiterentwicklung der Nato gemäß der Nato-Gründungskennziffern erzeugt wird. Dies gilt auch für den europäischen Widerstand gegenüber der tatsächlichen Verankerung der Natotransformationspositionen(5), der auf die Erosion des bipolaren liberalen Ordnungssystems bzw. der US-Vorteilsgewährung sowie so begünstigter Partikularinteressensicherung abhebt. Außerdem wird deutlich, dass eine Kontinuitätslinie in der Bedrohungsabwehr von Clinton bis Obama unter unterschiedlicher Außenwirkung und dem Grundmuster "Battleship America" vorliegt - und eben nicht eine multilateral ausgerichtete Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik unter Clinton, die als Folge von 9/11 in einen unilateralen Pendelausschlag unter G. W. Bush 43 mündet, der durch die Obama-Administration wieder zurückgenommen wird. Die Arbeit basiert auf einer umfassenden Fülle an Literatur, die das aufwendige Literaturverzeichnis widerspiegelt: Darunter fallen vielfältige amerikanische und europäische Publikationen, Monographien und entsprechende Sekundärliteratur, wie Biographien, Veröffentlichungen unterschiedlichster Natur wichtiger Vertreter der transatlantischen Forschungselite, Akteure der entsprechenden Politikplanung und -ausführung und wissenschaftliche Artikel aus Fachzeitschriften zu allen Forschungsbereichen bzw. politikwissenschaftlicher Methodik und Theorie. Weiter wurden u.a. Veröffentlichungen bzw. relevante Dokumente von Regierungen, Außenministerien, Verteidigungsministerien, Regierungsorganen, Denkfabriken, universitären Forschungszentren sowie der Nato verwendet. Struktur der Arbeit Konkret ist die vorliegende Dissertation in zwei Bände sowie einen Anhangsband unterteilt: Band 1 umfasst Schwerpunkt 1, eine Prozessanalyse unter offensiver neorealistischer Verortung, Band 2 den darauf aufbauenden Schwerpunkt 2, einen Vergleich ("structured focussed comparison") unter defensiver neorealistischer Verortung. Im Anhangsband finden sich ergänzende Ausführungen zu Kapitel 1, Band 1 in Bezug auf den Forschungsstand, Literatur und Quellenlage, theoretische Verortung sowie Wahl des Untersuchungsraumes bzw. ausgewählter europäischer Nato-Partner. Weiter sind ein historisches Kapitel als Voraussetzung zum "process-tracing" in Kapitel 2, Band 1 und ein Abbildungs- und Abkürzungsverzeichnis wie auch ein Literaturverzeichnis enthalten. Insgesamt ermitteln die beiden aufeinander aufbauenden Schwerpunkte mittels qualitativer Methoden das Folgende: Nämlich die übergeordnete amerikanische sicherheitspolitische Reaktion auf eine neue Gesamtbedrohung sowie deren Weiterführung und Legitimierungschance in der Nato im Untersuchungsraum von Clinton bis Obama. Auf Basis des ersten Teils der Hypothese wird in Schwerpunkt 1, Band 1 ein Zusammenhang zwischen der Beibehaltung des bipolaren "US-Grand Strategy"-Ziels amerikanischer Führungs- und Ordnungsmacht sowie bipolarer außenpolitischer "Grand Strategy"-Kennziffern bzw. einer sich komplex entwickelnden neuen Gesamtbedrohung, amerikanischer sicherheitspolitischer Anpassung und der notwendigen Weiterführung in der Nato durch Natotransformation mittels amerikanisch aufgeworfener Natotransformationspositionen hergestellt. In Schwerpunkt 2, Band 2 wird auf Basis des zweiten Teils der Hypothese der transatlantische Aushandlungsprozess zur Etablierung der amerikanisch vorgeschlagenen Natotransformationspositionen in Augenschein genommen: Vor diesem Hintergrund wird überprüft, ob diese tatsächliche Verankerung bzw. Konkretisierung des Ausbaus amerikanischen Vormacht am Widerstand der ausgewählten europäischen Nato-Bündnispartner Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien scheitert. Im Gesamtergebnis zeigt sich, dass aufgrund einer sich entwickelnden komplexen, linear ansteigenden Gesamtbedrohung die Chance zum Ausbau amerikanischer Führungsmacht konstant abnimmt. Dies muss mittels amerikanischer sicherheitspolitischer Anpassung kompensiert werden. Die daher erfolgende amerikanische sicherheitspolitische Neuausrichtung auf Basis der eingeleiteten "Revolution im Militärwesen" modifiziert wiederum die Kennziffern bipolarer kollektiver Sicherheitsgewährleistung. Alles wird mittels tatsächlicher Verankerung der amerikanischen Natotransformationspositionen ermöglicht bzw. legitimiert. Das tatsächliche Erreichen der - die sicherheitspolitische amerikanische Anpassung konsequent weiterführenden - Transformation der Nato ermöglicht eine missionsorientierte, reaktionsbeschleunigende, flexible und globale Sicherheitsprojektion. Außerdem ist die Voraussetzung für "alliances of choice" innerhalb der Nato geschaffen. Weiter zementiert die Modifikation der "bipolaren Nato" die mittels sicherheitspolitischer amerikanischer Anpassung eingeleitete Erosion zentraler zivilisatorischer Errungenschaften bzw. Aufgaben bipolarer kollektiver Sicherheitsgewährleistung unter Vorteilsverringerung europäischer Nato-Bündnispartner. Die tatsächliche Verankerung der Natotransformationspositionen erfolgt mittels der Reaktivierung konventioneller Bedrohung im Kontext der Ukraine-Krise von 2014 und der Erweiterung der Nato-Partnerschaftsringe auf globaler Ebene, ohne diesen den Status eines Nato-Mitgliedsstaates zu gewähren. Damit wird der Bündnisfall nicht globalisiert. Der ausgeübte deutsch-französische Widerstand wird besonders intensiv durch den Einbezug der europäischen Gründungsstaaten befördert, dagegen unterbleibt die Ausbildung einer europäischen Führungstroika durch Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien. Darüber hinaus zeigt insbesondere die entsprechende Ursachenermittlung, dass trotz konstanter, aufeinander aufbauender amerikanischer sicherheitspolitischer Reaktion unter unterschiedlicher Außenwirkung sowie tatsächlicher Weiterführung in der Nato die Gesamtbedrohung nicht langfristig abgebremst wird: Dies führt zu einem konstanten Anstieg der Gesamtbedrohung unter fortlaufendem Einflussverlust staatlicher Akteure bzw. Machtdiffusion und -konzentration samt einer sukzessiven Chancenerhöhung reaktivierter konventioneller, nuklearer, Cyber- und ökologischer Zerstörungsszenarien. Auf dieser Basis entsteht die Konsequenz einer immer umfassenderen und die Reaktion beschleunigende Präzisionsabwehr unter ansteigender Versicherheitlichung, um die kontinuierliche Einengung amerikanischer Vormacht auszugleichen. Dies erzeugt im Fortlauf einen konstanten Abbau der Strahlungs- und Schlagkraft des liberalen, regelbasierten, bipolaren "amerikanischen Systems" sowie der Etablierung "idealistischer, liberaler" "Grand Strategy"-Elemente. Weiter ist damit - auf der Grundlage der aufeinander aufbauenden Natotransformationspositionen sowie Obamas "smart power"(6) im Untersuchungsraum - eine zunehmende Vorteilsverringerung der europäischen Nato-Verbündeten bzw. ein ansteigender Bedarf an US-Kostendämpfung verquickt. Zudem entwickelt sich eine immer geringer werdende Chance zur Entfaltung des postbipolar als "nicht verhandelbar" postulierten und global ausgebreiteten amerikanischen Lebensentwurfes in individueller, innerstaatlicher Ausprägung: Deren Artikulation erfolgt beispielsweise mittels zunehmendem Rechtspopulismus, Wahl von Außenseiterkandidaten, Zerfall traditioneller Parteiensysteme, isolationistischen Tendenzen unter ethnischer, regionaler Erstarkung, und Ablehnung von Supranationalität oder religiösem Fundamentalismus. Gleichzeitig ist die fortlaufende Erosion der globalen öffentlichen Güter identifizierbar. Damit ebnet all das oben Genannte den Boden für die Begrenzung amerikanischer wohlwollender Ordnungsmacht bzw. der Handlungsspielräume staatlicher Akteure - und für die Rückkehr zu klassischer Machtpolitik im Kontext entstandener Machtdiffusion bzw. -konzentration. Dies erschwert angesichts der Dringlichkeit einer langfristigen Eindämmung asymmetrischer bzw. konventioneller Sicherheitsbedrohungsgegenstände, -verstärker, -cluster und globalen Rahmenbedingungen folgende Chance: Nämlich die zu transatlantischer Zusammenarbeit in der Nato unter Wiederbelebung der politischen Organisation derselben sowie Erweiterung auf zusätzliche Ebenen und Akteure im Sinne von Vorbeugung bzw. vernetzter Sicherheit zur Erreichung entsprechender globaler Kooperation in Bezug auf Einhegen der Bedrohungswurzeln. Insgesamt wird durch diese Forschungsarbeit transparent, wie und warum die für den Untersuchungsraum von 1993 bis 2017 antizipierte "Friedensdividende" und das durch Präsident Clinton postulierte "age of hope" kaum spürbar wurden. Fußnoten (1) Vgl. Braml, Josef (2018), Trumps transaktionaler Transatlantizismus, in: Jäger, Thomas (Hrsg.), Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Oktober 2018, Volume 11, Ausgabe 4, S. 439-448, Wiesbaden. (2) Vgl. National Intelligence Council (Hrsg.) (2012), Global Trends 2013: Alternative Worlds (NIC 2012-001), https://publicintelligence.net/global-trends-2030/, letzter Zugriff: 12.04.19. Vgl. dazu auch das "international financial leadership, self-selected at Davos" bei McCoy, Alfred W. (2017), In the Shadows of the American Century. The Rise and Decline of US Global Power, Chicago. (3) Vgl. zu Bedrohungsverstärkern beispielsweise Mazo, Jeffrey (2010), Climate Conflict. How global warming threatens security and what to do about it, London, Abingdon. 1990 wurde bereits in Bezug auf den Bedrohungsverstärker Klimawandel für die entstehenden asymmetrischen bzw. konventionellen Bedrohungsgegenstände komplexe Cluster konstatiert: "Over the next half century, the global average temperature may increase by approximately 4 degrees C. (…) All nations will be affected. (…) How much time will there be to confirm the amount of change and then to act? (…) However, many believe that we will have waited too lang to avoid major dislocation, hardship and conflict - on a scale not as yet seen by man". Vgl. Kelley, Terry P. (1990), Global Climate Change. Implications For The United States Navy (The United States Naval War College, Newport, RI), http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/weather/climatechange/globalclimatechange-navy.pdf, letzter Zugriff: 30.03.19. Dies lässt Hinweise auf die sich entwickelnde, konstant ansteigende Gesamtbedrohung im Untersuchungsraum von 1993-2017 zu. (4) Vgl. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. (1973), The Imperial Presidency, Boston. (5) Die amerikanisch vorgeschlagenen Positionen zur Anpassung der Nato, die Nato Response Force sowie die Global Partnership Initiative, werden als "Natotransformationspositionen" bezeichnet: Mit deren tatsächlicher Etablierung war eine Transformation der Nato in konsequenter Weiterführung amerikanisch erfolgter sicherheitspolitischer Anpassung verknüpft. (6) Smart power geht auf Suzanne Nossel, Mitarbeiterin des UN-Botschafters Holbrooke während der Clinton-Administration, zurück: Vgl. Nossel, Suzanne (2004), Smart Power. Reclaiming Liberal Internationalism, http://www.democracyarsenal.org/SmartPowerFA.pdf, letzter Zugriff: 26.08.17. Weiter wird er Joseph Nye im Jahre 2003 als Reaktion auf die unilaterale Konzentration auf das militärische Instrument der G.W. Bush–Ära zugeschrieben. Vgl. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011), The Future of Power, New York bzw. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011), Macht im 21sten Jahrhundert. Politische Strategien für ein neues Zeitalter, München. Vgl. Rodham Clinton, Hillary (2010), Leading Through Civilan Power. Redefining American Diplomacy and Development, in: Foreign Affairs, November/December 2010, Vol. 89, No.6, S. 13-24. ; Aims and findings of the dissertation The completed research uses holistic, politological and historical approaches to present how, during the studied period of the administrations of Clinton to Obama, the liberal, rule-based world order system is gradually supplemented and replaced by a system of realist imposition of vital interests that have short-term effects, preferring military means combined with continuous military optimisation. This also explains a continuity between the leading-power policy of administrations in this study (1993-2017) and the subsequent period of the "transactional leadership of Trump"(1), with its recognizable, far-reaching effects of aiming to reduce idealistic Grand Strategy elements and measures of a benevolent order by passing on costs to and reducing the benefits of European NATO allies. The results of this dissertation, such as the increasingly evident dissolution of a multilateral fundamental order, therefore indicate that Trump's foreign and security policy to date should be regarded as a clearly noticeable crisis symptom, rather than the cause of a decline in the world order established after 1945. This decline is synonymous with the erosion of the transatlantically initiated bipolar "American system". Its implementation was the result of the "lesson of two world wars", based on modern concepts of order introduced by the Enlightenment and the founding criteria of the United States: thus its dissolution is also an indicator of the failure of contemporary criteria of order that thrive in the "American way of life". The cause of the described development is shown to be a constantly exacerbating overall threat, from Clinton to Obama, which is connected to the consistent erosion of US supremacy. Among other aspects, this is based on climate change effects postulated in 1979, which multiply the threat while coinciding with American peak production of fossil fuels and increased demand on resources in the context of dwindling raw material resources. Furthermore, during the period of this study, the "US conservative revolution", which began in the 1980s, increasingly affected foreign and security policy, combining with a consolidation in the influence of corporations and lobby groups in fields such as policy implementation and new underlying conditions. They include the onset of digitisation, entailing a high consumption of resources, and a growing world population faced with specific demographic indicators. Additionally, the maintenance of the armaments sector, originally a result of bipolar development, as the economic basis of military supremacy and the slow decline of the Dollar hegemony since around 1973, should also be taken into account. Complex interaction between Grand Strategy implementation according to the premise of expanding US-American dominance under neoconservative and Christian Right-wing influences, as well as asymmetrical and reactivated conventional security threats and threat multipliers clearly indicate the linear development of the overall threat in the period between 1993 and 2017: in the context of Grand Strategy statements, above all the understanding of defence against this threat, of the latter's multiplying factors and the market economy explains the following with respect to the US far-right in a complex interaction with the growth of transnational corporations, lobby groups, individuals(2), informal networks and state actors with respect to objects of threat and threat multipliers(3) in connection with the post-bipolar, global anchoring of US economic and consumer patterns: US adaptation of its reaction to this threat – while consolidating imperial presidency(4) and weakening the system of checks and balances – including its implications of a bipolar liberal order. In this way, the necessary continued leadership within NATO through the US-proposed NATO reform can be seen as an appropriate implementation of transformed threat-reaction measures and the legitimisation of systemic adaptation. It equally becomes clear that the established threat reaction measures only provide a short-term defence: instead, they enhance the asymmetric and conventional threat, as well as threat multipliers – by introducing arms races and breaking down arms control – thereby heightening the overall threat. The consequence is the consistently growing likelihood of a conflict of hitherto unimaginable proportions. At the same time, the urgent need to mobilise transatlantic cooperation with respect to supporting global cooperation between state and non-government actors is illustrated with respect to the roots of the threat and its deteriorating underlying conditions: each increase in the overall threat, the adapted US security policy and its continuation in NATO is connected to an erosion of rule-based underlying criteria during the studied period. This continuously and consistently undermines the basis of the above-stated, ever-increasingly important cooperation, to prevent or at least limit the successive erosion of the bipolar "American system" under future dystopias. The research results completely overturn the state of research to date, since for instance it is possible to show that, by means of NATO transformation findings, no transatlantic sharing of burdens on an equal footing and no NATO reform in accordance with its founding principles can be achieved. The same also applies to European opposition to the actual anchoring of NATO transformation positions(5), which is based on the erosion of the bipolar liberal order system and the maintenance of US advantages as well as the consolidation of particular interests they facilitate. Furthermore, it is apparent that a line of continuity in the threat-reaction measures from Clinton to Obama exists with varying external effects, along with an underlying pattern of "Battleship America" – as opposed to a multilaterally orientated foreign and security policy under Clinton, which merged into a unilateral, radical swing under G. W. Bush 43 following 9/11, but was reverted by the Obama administration. A comprehensive wealth of literature was used of the doctoral thesis, as reflected by the extensive bibliography: they firstly include diverse American and European publications, monographs and relevant secondary literature, including biographies, publications of various kinds of important political planning and implementation, as well as collected volumes and research articles from specialist journals on all fields of research and politological methodology and theory. The same applies to publications by leading European and American institutions, research centres and think tanks. Furthermore, this author used publications and documents by governments, foreign ministries, defence ministries, other government bodies and Nato. Dissertation structure This dissertation is divided into two volumes and one Appendix: Volume 1 discusses Focus 1, namely a process-tracing in the context of offensive neorealist positioning. Volume 2 presents Focus 2, which is based on the preceding focus in making a structured, focussed comparison in the context of defensive neorealist positioning. The Appendix volume contains further discussion of Chapter 1, Volume 1 with respect to the state of research, literature and sources, theoretical positioning and the choice of the region of study and selected European NATO partners. Furthermore, a historical chapter provides underlying information for process-tracing in Chapter 2, Volume 1, an index of images and abbreviations, and a bibliography. The entire dissertation uses qualitative methods to focus on these two mutually supporting, building on each other, themes to investigate the following from a US-perspective: firstly the overriding US security-policy reaction to a new overall threat and secondly, its continuation combined with the opportunity of for enabling and legitimising it within and through NATO during the studied period from Clinton to Obama. Based on the first part of this hypothesis, Focus 1 (Volume 1) establishes a connection between, on the one hand, maintaining the bipolar Grand Strategy target of consolidating the USA as a leading, regulating power, bipolar foreign-policy Grand Strategy indicators and a new overall threat that is developing in a complex way, and, on the other, the necessity of its continued leadership within NATO and the required NATO transformation according to US-proposed NATO transformation positions. Focus 2 (Volume 2) is based on the second part of the hypothesis, investigating the transatlantic negotiation process to establish these US-proposed NATO transformation positions: in this context, Volume 2 investigates whether the attempt to actually secure and consolidate such US supremacy was unsuccessful in the face of resistance from selected European NATO partners, namely France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The overall result shows that due to a complex, developing, linear increase in the overall threat, the chance for the USA to consolidate its status as a leading power is steadily diminishing. This must be compensated by adapting US security policy. The resulting American security-policy realignment based on the initiated "revolution in military affairs" in turn modifies the indicators of bipolar collective security guarantees. Everything is enabled and legitimised by means of actually securing US NATO-transformation positions. The actual implementation of such NATO transformation – representing the consistent adaptation of US security policy – enables a mission-orientated, rapid response, flexible, global security projection. It also creates conditions for "alliances of choice" within NATO. Furthermore, the modification of a "bipolar NATO" exacerbates the erosion of key achievements of civilisation as a result of adapted US security policy, as well as undermining the tasks of bipolar collective security guarantees through diminished benefits to European NATO partners. The actual anchoring of NATO transformation positions is achieved by reactivating the conventional threat in the context of the Ukraine crisis of 2014 and the extension of NATO partnership rings on a global level, without providing them with NATO membership status, thus avoiding globalisation in a mutual defence case. The German and French resistance is particularly intensive through the involvement of European founder states, while the formation of a European leadership triumvirate consisting of France, Germany and the United Kingdom does not take place. Moreover, a relevant investigation of causes particularly shows that despite constant mutually supporting US security reaction measures with varying international effects and actual continued leadership within NATO, the overall threat is not receding: this leads to a constant increase in the overall threat, a loss of influence of state actors, the diffusion and concentration of power and the increased probability of reactive conventional, nuclear, cyber and ecological destruction scenarios. On this basis, the consequence is an increasingly comprehensive and rapidly responding precision defence combined with growing securitization to compensate for the ongoing containment of US supremacy. This developing process steadily diminishes the reach and power of a liberal, rule-based, bipolar "American system" and the establishment of "idealistic, liberal" elements of US-Grand Strategy. This entails a further reduction in benefits for European NATO allies and increasing US cost-cutting demands – based on the successive NATO transformation positions that build on each other and Obama's "smart power"(6) during the period studied in this dissertation. Thus the chance is receding of developing the post-bipolar, globally adopted American way of life with individual national character, which is regarded as "non-negotiable": for instance its articulation is expressed through increasing right-wing populism, the election of outsider-candidates, the dissolution of traditional party systems, isolationist tendencies combined with burgeoning ethnic, regional movements, the rejection of supranationalism, and religious fundamentalism. At the same time, the ongoing erosion of global public goods is apparent. This all paves the way to limiting the benevolent American regulating power and state actors' leverage – and therefore to a return to classic power politics in the context of a resulting diffusion and concentration of power. In view of the urgency of a long-term containment of asymmetrical or conventional threats to security, or aspects that exacerbate such threats or clusters thereof, as well as underlying global conditions, this undermines the ability to achieve the following: to achieve transatlantic cooperation by broadening the range of levels and actors in the spirit of proactive and expanded, networked security to achieve according global cooperation with respect to containing the root causes of threats. Overall, this research work reveals how and why the anticipated "peace dividend" and the notion of an "age of hope", as postulated by President Clinton, were hardly perceptible during the period of study between 1993 and 2017. Notes (1) Cf. Braml, Josef (2018), Trumps transaktionaler Transatlantizismus, in: Jäger, Thomas (Hrsg.), Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Oktober 2018, Volume 11, Ausgabe 4, S. 439-448, Wiesbaden. (2) Cf. National Intelligence Council (Ed.) (2012), Global Trends 2013: Alternative Worlds (NIC 2012-001), https://publicintelligence.net/global-trends-2030/, last accessed: 12.04.19. See also the "international financial leadership, self-selected at Davos" cit. McCoy, Alfred W. (2017), In the Shadows of the American Century. The Rise and Decline of US Global Power, Chicago. (3) In 1990, the threat-enhancing nature of climate change was already postulated with respect to asymmetric objects of threat as well as conventional and complex clusters: "Over the next half century, the global average temperature may increase by approximately 4 degrees C. (…) All nations will be affected. (…) How much time will there be to confirm the amount of change and then to act? (…) However, many believe that we will have waited too long to avoid major dislocation, hardship and conflict – on a scale not as yet seen by man". Cf. Kelley, Terry P. (1990), Global Climate Change. Implications For The United States Navy (The United States Naval War College, Newport, RI), http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/weather/climatechange/globalclimatechange-navy.pdf, last accessed: 30.03.19. Cf. Mazo, Jeffrey (2010), Climate Conflict. How global warming threatens security and what to do about it, London, Abingdon. This supports the thesis of a developing, constant overall threat during the period between 1993 and 2017. (4) Cf. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. (1973), The Imperial Presidency, Boston. (5) In this dissertation, the proposed US positions on NATO adaptation, the NATO Response Force and the Global Partnership Initiative are described as "NATO transformation positions": Their actual establishment was connected to a NATO transformation with the consistent continuation of adapted US security policy. (6) Cf. Nossel, Suzanne (2004), Smart Power. Reclaiming Liberal Internationalism, http://www.democracyarsenal.org/SmartPowerFA.pdf, last accessed: 26.08.17, Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011), The Future of Power, New York, Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011), Macht im 21sten Jahrhundert. Politische Strategien für ein neues Zeitalter, München, Rodham Clinton, Hillary (2010), Leading Through Civilan Power. Redefining American Diplomacy and Development, in: Foreign Affairs, November/December 2010, Vol. 89, No.6, S. 13-24.

In this dissertation I explore the co-emergence of multinational corporations and the consolidation of the discourse on human rights at the level of the United Nations throughout the second half of the twentieth century and analyse the resulting conceptual gap that created tensions in the international legal order. Despite attempts by developing countries to alleviate this imbalance through the New International Economic Order (NIEO), a multitude of soft law initiatives and the reluctance to address human rights issues in MNCs at the level of the United Nations failed to make MNCs incorporate human rights standards in their operations. The merging of the two concepts became increasingly more challenging throughout the 70s and 80s when the world was faced with the oil crisis and the rise of neoliberalism. This shift in the global legal architecture forced the Third World to take a new approach to tackle the conceptual gap, this resulted in the emergence of the Third generation of human rights and ultimately, the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). CSR is a concept of international private business self-regulation that aims at merging human, socio-economic, and political rights into the world of the corporation. As a response to the concerns for human rights violations by corporate actors, CSR slowly came to the forefront of the global business scene to enable the continuation of the operation of multinational enterprises. CSR presented a platform for global soft law initiatives to minimise the conceptual gap they had created over throughout the preceding decades. This allowed people such as John Ruggie to develop the Guiding Principles, the most successful initiative to date. This dissertation will provide its readers with a fruitful understanding of the crucial role that international law played in this development and further, what implications this had on the political and economic level. - Introduction In the words of Sundhya Pahuja and Anna Saunders, the second half of the twentieth century staged a 'series of encounters between rival practices of world making, each of which travelled with rival accounts of international law'.[1] Anti-colonial disputes, the Cold War, the rise of developmental issues and the increasing popularity of neoliberalism are only some of the events that generated these competing views of the international legal order. These events brought different coalitions across the Global North and Global South, and different 'alliances of interest between 'public' and 'private' actors'.[2] At the heart of the system that emerged lie two fundamental elements: the modern multinational corporation and human rights. How to conceptualize multinational corporations (MNCs) and how to define their relation to the law and the State was part of these rival stories. In this paper I explore the co-emergence of multinational corporations and the consolidation of the discourse on human rights at the level of the United Nations throughout the second half of the twentieth century and analyze the resulting conceptual gap that created tensions in the international legal order. In particular, I examine how this encounter, which became evident as calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) were being advanced within the UN, came to produce the idea of 'Corporate Social Responsibility' (CSR). I show that CSR emerged from the failure of the NIEO, particularly in relation to the roles and responsibilities of private actors in the global economy and how this can be traced to the limits of initiatives addressing the tensions between human rights claims and the interests of multinational corporations. In so doing I provide an understanding of the crucial role that international law played in this development and the implications this had at the political and economic level. The first section of this essay examines the lack of direct use of human rights language in the UN literature focusing on MNCs and their role in world development from the 1960s to the 1970s. This includes an analysis of the report entitled 'Multinational Corporations in World Development'.[3] I demonstrate the emphasis and enthusiasm for multinational corporations displayed at the level of the United Nations and how the concepts of the corporation and human rights were kept separate due to their respective supporters during the Cold War. I then focus on the attempts by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the 'Group of 77' (G77) to bridge this conceptual gap through the imposition of policies and initiatives, though without major success. The second section analyzes the influence of the oil crisis and the rise of neoliberalism on the shift of the global legal architecture, ultimately promoting the birth of the new developmental state. Here concern is with the new legal structures' attempt to merge the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights through a third generation of human rights, [4] and I engage in theoretical approaches by legal scholars such as Samuel Moyn and Antonia Darder. In the third section investigates the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and analyzes its application and limitations. CSR is a concept of international private business self-regulation that aims at merging human, socio-economic, and political rights into the world of the corporation. As a response to the concerns for human rights violations by corporate actors, CSR slowly came to the forefront of the global business scene to enable the continuation of the operation of multinational enterprises. I demonstrate how CSR aspired to close a gap between human rights and corporate action in a way that would harmonize them through a multitude of soft law initiatives. This leads to the question of whether direct regulations can apply to MNCs under international law and a discussion of the UN Global Compact, at the time the world's largest and most far-reaching CSR initiative.[5] Finally, this paper closes with the most recent developments in the global legal order designed to tackle the conceptual gap between MNCs and human rights, namely through the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises[6] and the development of the Guiding Principles. Dawn of co-existence The United Nations lies at the heart of the international regime with its normative, institutional and procedural human rights activities.[7] By adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the UN created a milestone document in the history of human rights. The Declaration has had an enormous influence on the world both in terms of 'spreading the philosophy of human rights, and in terms of inspiring legal texts and decisions'.[8] New states have used the Declaration as a basis for their constitutions, while domestic and international courts have invoked the Declaration in their judgments.[9] As human rights law developed, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, followed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, were both drafted under the auspices of the United Nations, adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. Together, these three instruments make up the 'International Bill of Human Rights'.[10] Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the world became a stage for global changes that altered the legal order. The end of colonialism dawned in the Global South, and during the height of the Cold War the West faced the Soviet Bloc and its mission of 'exporting revolution'.[11] Leaders of nationalist resistance movements received military as well as financial aid from the Soviet Bloc which intensified anti-colonial mobilization for self-determination.[12] Simultaneously, globalization was increasing rapidly, with multinational corporations emerging onto the global scene with heightened awareness of their existence as an entity with legal personality. As outlined by Sornarajah, their distinct bases of power allowed them to assert their interests through the law. With economic resources often exceeding those of their host state, MNCs had the ability to sculpt and manipulate legal outcomes through arbitration processes concerning foreign investment protection. This was done by exerting lobbying pressure on a host state which might be reluctant or even unable to object to the activities of MNCs.[13] The 'Multinational Corporations in World Development', report drafted by the UN Secretariat's Department on Economic and Social Affairs in 1973, considers 'the role of multinational corporations and their impact on the process of development, especially that of developing countries [.] [and] international relations'.[14] From the outset, the Report identifies the emerging phenomenon of the MNC in international economic affairs, how its size and spread has increased, and identifies the wide array of its activities and its use of natural resources which 'rival traditional economic exchanges between nations'.[15] It is surprising therefore, that a Report from the Department on Economic and Social Affairs, does not contain the term 'human rights' throughout the entire document. In the Report's introduction the UN makes a clear distinction between the differing views of impacts MNCs have on host countries. While 'depicted in some quarters as key instruments to maximizing world welfare, [they] are seen in others as dangerous agents of imperialism'.[16] The fact the United Nations recognized the potential neo-colonial nature of multinational corporations further highlights the need for guidance on human rights violations by MNCs. Yet the Report's reluctance to engage in the area of human rights provides a first glimpse into the divergence of the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights. An explanation for this can be identified by analyzing the Conventions, on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, with the UN's reluctance to avoid tensions between the supporters of both Conventions, respectively the United States and the Soviet Union. The US pushed for the development of civil and political rights, reflecting the protection of the freedom and liberties of individuals. Stemming from a Western philosophy, John Locke identified that in a 'state of nature' humans had 'natural rights' including the right to life, liberty and property. Similarly, French legal philosophers such as Rosseau, Montesquieu and Voltaire argued that such rights emerge from the inherent nature and virtue of man.[17] As Joseph and Castan argue, 'natural rights theories were highly influential [.] particularly in the revolutionary fervor of the United States'.[18] The advancement of civil and political rights reflects the capitalist ideology of the United States, conforming to the libertarian nature of Western capitalist societies.[19] In contrast, the Soviet Union pushed for the advancement of economic, social and cultural rights. These included the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to physical health. Contrary to the civil and political rights, these rights were based on the idea of equality, one deeply rooted in the political ideology of socialism. As the US would not commit to a proposition that there is a right to social goods, the US has never ratified this Convention.[20] The Soviet Bloc promoted the right of self-determination by providing military and financial aid to indigenous political activists in their fight for independence; an idea enshrined in Article 1 of the Covenant which states that: 'All peoples have the right to self-determination'.[21] For the Soviets 'national self-determination was an adjunct to revolutionary communism'.[22] They envisioned self-determination as the tool for the transition from dismantling a colonial empire to establishing a socialist state.[23] However, while the United Nations was reluctant to adhere to human rights in the framework of multinational corporations, other international institutions were motivated to develop this area. The OECD attempted to impose human rights on MNCs by adopting the Guidelines for MNCs (hereinafter 'OECD Guidelines') in 1976.[24] These were 'voluntary recommendations for business practices relating to human rights, disclosure of information, anti-corruption, labour relations, taxation, the environment and consumer protection'.[25] The Guidelines were intended to strengthen the international investment climate by improving the relationship and confidence between MNCs and host countries. National Contact Points (NCPs) were created that bore the responsibilities of enforcing and promoting the Guidelines, and any natural person could make a claim related to the violation of the Guidelines.[26] This aspect of the Guidelines provided an enforcing mechanism accessible to the public. But although the Guidelines were formally adopted by member states as a corporate responsibility instrument, they were subject to widespread criticism in the international legal order. As explained by Cernic, the Guidelines are ambiguous while the NCPs are limited in their influence on host states. Even though they outlined the need to respect human rights, the obligations were not framed in mandatory terms.[27]. Since the Guidelines lacked legal basis, the OECD was unable to assert sanctions on non-compliant corporations, and critics labeled them weak and ineffective. However, it was the intention of the OECD to guide rather than to legislate, because they saw voluntary versus legally binding standards as less of a dichotomy and more a continuum.[28] Although voluntary, corporations would be under scrutiny and potentially harm their reputation if they violated the Guidelines.[29] Yet, the Guidelines were hardly successful in the international legal order. A year later, in 1977, the ILO attempted to bridge this gap by adopting the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning MNCs and Social Policy. These also attempted to 'encourage the positive contribution the MNEs can make to economic and social progress'.[30]. Article 8 emphasizes the respect for the Universal Declaration and the International Covenants. However, its voluntary and non-binding nature, as well as its weak monitoring process made this instrument as frail as the OECD Guidelines.[31] The lack of responsibility and perseverance stemming from international organizations and their disappointing attempt at bridging the gap between multinational corporations and human rights forced national and regional change. On the one hand, developing nations began taking matters into their own hands. To portray unity and solidarity throughout the 'Third World' the G77 coalition, formed in 1964 by developing member countries with the primary intention of promoting its members' economic and humanitarian interests through cooperation at the level of the United Nations, took a strong initiative. In the late 1970s the Group expressed its concern at the 'imbalance of negotiating power between TNCs [transnational corporations] and their host countries and inability on the part of the latter to control the activities of the TNCs within their territories'.[32] Simultaneously, home countries wanted to ensure their investments abroad would be protected, 'specifically from expropriation without a commitment to compensation based on international law'.[33] In accordance with the principles and concerns of the freshly adopted NIEO, developing countries raised the issue of the dominance of MNCs over natural resources and strongly urged the UN for a reaffirmation of their sovereignty over their resources. The NIEO was an attempt by Third World developing states, in the wake of decolonization, to deploy international law to achieve economic justice and improvements in the areas of development and socio-economic rights.[34] Pushed by the G77, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) member states devised a set of NIEO proposals in 1974 including (1) that developing states are entitled to control and regulate all activities of MNCs within their territory; and (2) that international trade must be based on equitable, stable and remunerative prices for raw materials.[35] Despite its impressive aims and careful compilation, the NIEO was unsuccessful. It failed 'to displace the power and advantage held by influential states', it failed to alter international law which favoured the economic interests of capital-exporting states and, most importantly, it demonstrated the Third World's acceptance of the economic ideology of the capitalist mindset, inflating the value of foreign capital including the exploitation of local labour in developing countries.[36] Consequently, the UN set up the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations which drafted a code of conduct for TNCs, one of the first formalized instruments drafted by the UN that set an obligation upon MNCs to respect human rights in host countries.[37] However while developing countries insisted on the idea of adopting an international instrument that was binding on MNCs, developed countries were not prepared to go beyond the voluntary sets of guidelines already in place.[38] On the other hand, due to the ineffectiveness of the international institutions, some MNCs that sought to abide by human rights law attempted to create some provisions themselves. An example is the Sullivan principles designed by Leon Sullivan, former member of the General Motors' Board of Directors. These principles included the elimination of discrimination based on race, and the concept of equality in the workplace. The objective was that by engaging in human rights concepts like dignity and respect, MNCs could be a lever for the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. However, like the previously established soft law on obligations on multinational corporations, these principles were voluntary and unlike the OECD Guidelines which had the NCPs, there was no enforcement mechanism. The great majority of MNCs that adopted his principles did so with the sole motive of being able to continue to prosper in South Africa.[39] In summary, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, there were attempts at a variety of levels to bring together the concepts of human rights and multinational corporations. Though it was largely absent on the level of the United Nations until the late 1970s there were many first steps by international institutions to bridge this gap. The NIEO was the first set of concrete economic principles that were prescribed in international law 'articulating a form of justice based not on domination of one people over another'.[40] It was an 'effort to assert the sovereign autonomy of the non-western world',[41] exemplifying the importance of linking human rights and development, and the fundamental values of duties of international cooperation. However, there was still much to be done as the new decade of the 1980s saw a drastic restructuring of the global trade and investment system - ultimately ending in massive international debt and a dramatic increase in foreign direct investment. A Change in the Global Legal Architecture An accumulation of capital obtained by the main oil producing states in the Middle East led to the establishment of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Cartel in 1972. With the intention of creating a monopoly and obtaining major profits, OPEC raised the price of oil by approximately 400%, with its members keeping revenue in US or European banks, from which developing countries regularly borrowed in the form of aid and loans.[42] However, banks were now lending at higher interest rates to these countries as they were deemed less creditworthy. As a result of sovereign debt and the surplus problem in the international banking system, developing states were forced to rely on foreign direct investment (FDI), as opposed to private borrowing. The very principle that developing states wanted to control with the establishment of the NIEO was now negated by Western states selling MNCs to the developing world as necessary for their survival.[43] Simultaneously to the effects of the oil crisis, the political ideology of neoliberalism emerged on the global scene. Conservative governments gained power in western countries, communism collapsed in Eastern Europe with a move towards market economics, and Latin America implemented stabilization policies to boost their economies.[44] This process saw neoliberalism became an enemy for structural equality, political inclusion, economic access and human rights.[45] Prior to the implementation of neoliberal policies, the relationship between multinational corporations and their host state was formed through the conflict between the host country's national developmental interests as opposed to the corporation's global investment interests. The state being the more powerful actor, attempted 'to channel its private investments to serve its own developmental objectives'.[46] However, as Michael Peters argues, neoliberalism provides 'a universalist foundation for an extreme form of economic rationalism'[47], which according to Paul Haslam, was a re-forming of the modern state rather than the perceived notion of the state 'unambiguously withering away'.[48] As a result, power shifted from host countries towards multinational corporations as the era was characterized by liberalization of foreign investment rules.[49] As the United Nations World Investment Report of 2000 showed, out of the 1035 changes made in national legislation regarding Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 1991 to 1999, only 5.9% were directed at restricting FDI.[50] Now more than ever before, the existence and nature of human rights were jeopardized in the sphere of multinational corporations led by neoliberal politics. Yet when analyzing human rights and neoliberalism, the two concepts have a plethora of similarities that run counter to this assertion. Samuel Moyn states that human rights and neoliberalism share (1) a predecessor and (2) a target, namely the welfarist West and the post-colonial nation state seeking economic autarky respectively.[51] Both concepts emerged and were formalized in the West. As a target, developing countries need both economic (neoliberalism) and social (human rights) elements to establish economic control. Furthermore, the two concepts share key foundational building blocks. Firstly, the principle of prioritizing the individual 'whose freedoms matter more than the collectivist endeavours' and secondly, their shared antipathy toward the state due to their rejection of its moral credentials.[52] As described by Darder, neoliberalism is characterized by a rampant greed that subsumes any notions of equality and public responsibility.[53] At the heart of this lies the ultimate subversion of human rights. When faced with the powers of global capitalism, human rights struggle to maintain themselves in the Third World. A prime example countering this thesis is the idea that human rights are a handmaiden to neoliberal policies. The argument follows that human rights are so tightly related to the role of a freely functioning market that there could be no socio-economic rights without extreme capitalism.[54] Unfortunately under this notion, human rights fall victim to being seen as dependent upon the capitalist order, creating the illusion that multinational corporations enhanced and promoted human rights in the developing World. What Wolfgang Streeck termed as 'non-market notions of social justice' became impossible to secure. Any attempt to place social commitments over economic ones were expelled, leaving market pressures to form human obligations and be governed by the dictatorship of neoliberalism.[55] The World Bank and the IMF, backed by the United States and other western states, became key in the project for liberalization, privatization, and market-friendly policies, known as the Washington Consensus. MNCs were given the protection they needed to flourish, be it proprietary or intellectual property rights. The interests of human rights on the other hand were not regarded. Though excelling and growing more than ever before, human rights had done so 'on a discrete track spearheaded internationally through the UN'.[56] Directed by developing states, human rights were intentionally dealt with by the United Nations while international economic law was being dealt with by the international institutions where they hold the balance of power.[57] Simultaneously, the developing world saw the third generation of human rights emerge as a result of anti-colonialist movements in the post-Second World War era. Newly born independent nations voiced their concerns over repeating their colonial past and demanded a new set of rights. These included the right to self-determination, the right to a healthy environment and the right to participation in cultural heritage. These are reflected in Declarations and Conventions such as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960, the Proclamation of Teheran of 1968 and the Stockholm Declaration of 1972.[58] What makes this generation of human rights exceptional however is that while they reflect neither the traditional individualistic approach of the first generation, nor the socialist tradition of the second generation, they simultaneously demand certain recognitions from the state while being able to be invoked against the state. Most importantly though, as articulated by Vasak, the third generation of human rights 'can be realized only through the concerted efforts of all the actors in the social scene: the individual, the State, public and private bodies and the international community'.[59] In other words, these rights belong to the community as a collective, rather than to an individual.[60] Drafted in 1986 by the UNGA, the Declaration on the Right to Development [61] (DRD) calls for effective international cooperation towards development objectives through the enhancement of human rights and the distribution of benefits.[62] The DRD gained inspiration from the NIEO as it relied on providing equal national opportunity through measures of fair distribution of natural resources and income. Alongside neoliberal policies, the two contradicting concepts were forced to work in tandem. Foreign investment in the developing world could proceed under the neoliberal ideology as long as it did not infringe the DRD. Interestingly, the right to development was coined by the former UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development, Arjun Sengupta, as 'growth with equity'. Growth should not only focus on the economic aspect, but also emphasize human rights and the principles of justice. This focus on equity, would require a 'a change in the structure of production and distribution in the economy to ensure growth was equitable', including the required international cooperation and not having to rely on the market.[63] Though the United Nations are promoting and enhancing the development of human rights, they are disregarding the fact that their work should be focused more on the human rights aspects entailed in the market, rather than solving human rights issues outside of the market framework. The development of human rights and the regulatory frameworks supporting multinational corporations attended very different interests. The new global legal architecture born of the oil crisis and rise of neoliberalism reorganized the relations between the Global South and Global North. At this point human rights and the regulation of corporations, with their distinctive genealogies, were forced to come together, but the failure of this exercise could not be challenged until the late 1980s when the third generation of human rights provided another opportunity for the merging of the two concepts. The outcomes of these new sets of discussions produced a more clearly defined relationship between human rights and multinational corporations which, although more sophisticated, was still unable to produce a satisfactory result. Nevertheless, the right to development began to take root in the corporate world. For the sake of their reputations, corporations were forced to appreciate the power held by vulnerable individuals that could act together as a strong collective.[64] As Claire Dickerson argues, multinationals became more aware of their relationship with human rights not only in regards to the individual, but rather to the society as a collective.[65] These were the first formalized steps to the recognition of what came to be known as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The Heterodox Approach What became apparent in the sphere of business and human rights were two situations, (1) that states were either unable or unwilling to implement human rights; and (2) that multinational corporations acting in such states were unprepared to deal with the risks of harming human rights through their activities. This was seen especially in the private extracting sector, such as oil, gas and coal, using aggressive means to exploit remote areas and leaving large physical and social 'footprints'. Local communities began resisting the activities by the multinationals and the language of human rights became increasingly popular in challenging corporate norms.[66] Some of the world's largest MNCs had become culprits of violating human rights standards, including Nike, Shell or Yahoo. Nike was guilty of using child labour, while Shell misused public funds to practice corruption and theft at all levels.[67] The effects were reflected in local communities that resorted to violence and criminal behaviour, significantly affecting the living conditions of these areas. In the early 1990s, some corporations began adopting measures to comply with responsible business conduct. CSR was a voluntary form of business self-regulation that attended the current societal goals. It involved the creation of monitoring schemes that regulated the workplace standards and policies of the global supply chains. However, what caused CSR to emerge, was not only pressure exerted by nations that felt their human rights had been impinged, but also a wider global political ethos. With its emphasis on privatization and deregulation, neoliberalism promoted CSR initiatives in order for corporations to gain self-control and rely less on direct government initiatives. Due to its voluntary nature, CSR was not conceived as a regulatory instrument but as a learning forum to promote strategies that enhanced socially responsible policies. This included the enhancement of human rights, environmental protection and anti-corruption efforts. [68] CSR had now progressed to the forefront of the global business scene by morphing out of corporate philanthropy.[69] Corporations began adopting voluntary schemes that not only adhered to social policy, but at times even went beyond the standard set by local requirements, which occasionally created conflict between the two.[70] Unilateral corporations produced company codes, with companies such as Gap and Nike adopting theirs in 1992. This involved internal audit teams and ethics officers to be established, verifying that contractors were complying with their company's codes of conduct. Gradually, social audit teams emerged onto the global scene. As one of the most prominent, the Fair Labour Association (FLA) monitored the working conditions for some of the top athletic brands such as Nike, Puma and Patagonia. In the food industry, the label of Fair Trade emerged, ensuring for local farmers the social, economic and environmental standards they deserved. Corporations adopted CSR measures mainly to improve their reputation. However, perhaps a greater incentive for corporations to adopt CSR measures lies in the financial risks posed by community pushback as a result of human rights violations. These pushbacks cause delays in design, operation, construction, siting, granting of permits etc. Further, they can create problems and relations with local labour markets, higher costs for financing, insurance and reduced output.[71] In a study of a large multinational company that wished to remain anonymous, Goldman Sachs found that it had accrued $6.5 billion in such costs over a two year period.[72] A great percentage of these costs could be related back to the staff time in managing conflicts that arise in communities as a result of human rights violations. In some instances between 50% and 80% of an assets manager's time can be devoted to these issues. Thus, it is clear that in this lose-lose situation, where MNCs violate human rights and thus incur losses, it makes sound corporate sense to adopt some sort of CSR measures.[73] Despite the improvements and the clear step forward the business world took in addressing human rights, CSR involved limitations and fragmentations that challenged its success. It was built on the assumption that it is an effective mechanism for a corporation to positively reconnecting with the community it is based in. Thus, in practice, CSR operates under the presumption that society has granted authority to corporations with naturally applying legal responsibilities.[74] In 2000 John Ruggie conducted research in the Fortune Global 500 and a wider range of corporations to assess the extent and success of voluntary initiatives promoting human rights. Staff monitoring schemes had evolved, demands by socially responsible investors had grown, and large public sector funds all aided in this development. However, the research also found 'company-based initiatives fell short as a stand-alone approach'.[75] Most companies still did not have the capabilities of managing human rights risks and instead were acting on a reactive based notion. Moreover, it was within the company's discretion to decide which human rights the company would address and furthermore how to define its measures. Thus, their voluntary nature could often be used as a camouflage to delay real reform.[76] A logical response to such a broad limitation would be to impose direct obligations under international law upon MNCs. Though only states and international organizations have legal standing in international law, the general view on this contention is that it would be possible to impose obligations upon MNCs due to their major economic and political influence as explained earlier, and their capabilities of influencing the enjoyment of human rights.[77] However, as explained by Zerk, the challenge lies in 'developing jurisprudence which refines and makes precise the vague aspirational statements [.] in the CSR debate'.[78] However, as the law stands, the most promising and efficient method for applying obligations on multinational corporations remains to be the national courts. Yet the fact that claims must be raised as a tort-based litigation proving a violation of domestic tort principles rather than claiming a violation under international human rights casts doubt over this method. An interesting exception to this is the US Alien Tort Statute of 1789. The tort states that district courts 'have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violations of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States'.[79] The original intention of the statute was to establish a civil remedy for violation of international law norms such as piracy, mistreatment of ambassadors and the violation of safe conducts.[80] This piece of legislation lay dormant until the 1980s when human rights lawyers discovered its potential for foreign plaintiffs to raise a claim for certain human rights abuses against an individual of any nationality, or a corporation as long as they had a presence in the United States. The question whether the Act could be enforced against a corporation was considered in 2012 in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Kiobel.[81] The court held that there was a presumption against extraterritoriality applying to claims under the Statute. There is therefore no application of the statute abroad unless it is explicitly stated in the international law which is the subject of the claim.[82] As stated by John Ruggie in his advice to the Human Rights Council in 2007 'no single silver bullet can resolve the business and human rights challenge. A broad array of measures is required, by all relevant actors.'[83] Ultimately, as a measure to seek guidance on the matter, this led to the UN Global Compact in 2000, the largest global CSR initiative.[84] The UN Global Compact was a strategic policy initiative posed by the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that aimed at improving corporate conditions in areas such as human rights, environmental protection and labour rights.[85] It was a prospective and hopeful initiative that was designed as a learning forum to develop, implement and disclose sustainability principles among corporate actors.[86] At its time, the Global Compact was the most far-reaching, non-governmental set of policies aimed at catalyzing the voluntary nature in the corporate citizenship movement.[87] Legal scholars such as Meyer and Stefanova felt the Global Compact could shape the relationship between MNCs and human rights through 'rewarding responsible TNCs [MNCs], while shaming at least some of the irresponsible TNCs [MNCs] into better promoting human rights'.[88] Their only concern about the extent of the success of the Global Compact lay, in the Global Compact's voluntary nature. Comparing it to the OECD Guidelines implemented 25 years earlier, an initiative like the Global Compact will only be successful if there is commitment to the initiative at all levels of the international system. Thus, the main task is to put a human face on globalization through the values and principles shared by the people, the corporation and the state.[89] However, Aravalo and Fallon dispute this. Published in 2008, their Report uses the Compact Quarterly and UNGC Annual Review to critique the Global Compact's activities and practices throughout its eight years of existence. Published by local networks and the UN respectively, they evaluate new businesses adhering to the Global Compact, as well as Global Compact practices and responses. Aravalo and Fallon found that after evaluating the various progress reports, the Global Compact falls short of being a successful initiative. According to the UNGC Annual Review, there are a multitude of gaps existing in the Global Compact framework. Research instruments for instance, under the principles of human rights and labour protection, have been deemed as inadequate as participants have failed to voice their concern over the protection of such rights within their corporation. The Global Compact has solely used online surveys to administer data, which smaller businesses are often unwilling or unable to provide. The methodology applied by the Global Compact was ambiguous and did not show the extent of the success of CSR initiatives.[90] Alavaro and Fallon argue that it would be highly beneficial for the Global Compact to re-think its methodology process of evaluating its success by introducing a chronological component into its future research models. [91] It would allow for a clearer comparison not only for participants of the Global Compact, but also for the comparison with non-Compact companies in the area of corporate responsibility.[92] As a result of this poor research methodology, the Global Compact has difficulty assessing its direct influence on the broad and voluntary concept of CSR. There are key principles of CSR that fail to receive the attention they deserve in the scope of the Global Compact. However, this is not to say that the Global Compact has been an outright failure. The Annual Review, though lacking quantifiable data, has provided a wide array of case studies providing evidence for the practical influence of the Global Compact on participants. These include programs in education and working relationships the Global Compact has encouraged and facilitated. It can be said therefore, that the Global Compact is making a difference, even if only in these cases. Until shortly after the turn of the millennium, neither company codes nor multilateral initiatives such as Global Compact, successfully achieved the necessary, concrete obligations in regard to human rights and environmental protection demands. This was set to change with the arrival of the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Norms). Drafted in 2003, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights attempted to merge the concepts of MNCs and human rights and transform these newly developed principles into hard law. The intention was to impose human rights obligations upon companies through the domestic legal systems of their host countries. The Norms clearly express that 'states retain primary, overarching responsibility for human rights protection' and that corporations are identified as 'Duty-bearers' based on that expectation of following human rights principles.[93] The expectations expressed by the Norms are supported by enforcement mechanisms for their implementation which address the requirements that MNCs must adopt in terms of their internal practice. Furthermore, there are a multitude of rights that go beyond what is traditionally accepted as international human rights law. Examples include rights associated with consumer protection, the environment or corruption which are covered by different areas of the law.[94] However, the Norms failed to achieve promising results. Described as a 'train wreck' by John Ruggie, the Norms fell under heavy criticisms for a plethora of reasons. Firstly, the Norms fall under heavy scrutiny for attempting to impose obligations upon corporations, while simultaneously imposing parallel obligations on the state. The intention was to address the fact that MNCs operate in a legal vacuum due to their status of acting as a multinational. To alleviate this issue, it was thought that binding MNCs to hard international law would be the best option. On the one hand, minimalists argue that binding multinational corporations to international law is not an appropriate method as this would go beyond the concept of soft law initiatives such as Global Compact. This argument is developed by stating that binding corporations to international law would 'privatise human rights'. The Norms would be placing obligations on an entity that was never democratically elected, nor eligible to make reasonable decisions in regard to human rights at the level of international law.[95] On the other hand, maximalists lobby for a judicial body solely focused on the practice of multinational corporations and argue that corporations should be bound by international law.[96] Secondly, there was severe backlash against the Norms from states, corporations and businesses who argued that there was a lack of consultation from the Sub-Commission when drafting the Norms. However, this argument has since been disputed by institutions such as the Corporate Europe Conservatory or the scholars Weissbrodt and Kruger.[97] In regard to the discontent presented by states, many argued that there was a lack of involvement on their behalf in the Norms' development. As stated by Kinely, Nolan and Zerial, it is of vital importance that in issues revolving around CSR and their wide variety of stakeholders, everyone's voice must be heard when protecting human rights.[98] Thirdly, issues were raised regarding the language used by the Norms. Terms like 'sphere of influence'[99] and 'complicity' were deemed as vague and unclear.[100] It is agreed upon, even by supporters of the Norms, that such terms must be defined more definitively and where possible, draw definitions from more grounded areas of the law like criminal law, tort or contract law. This attitude towards the Norms from corporations shows the extent of their distrust and the scare factor used to attempt to dismantle the Norms.[101] However, even though the Norms failed as a concept, as Kinley, Nolan and Zerial maintain, 'the Norms have been a beneficial and fruitful initiative, reinvigorating debate on business and human rights'.[102] Previous to the imposition of the Norms, CSR had found itself in a position that was stagnant, focusing solely on codes of conduct that should be implemented by corporations using a bottom-up approach. The Norms altered the position of CSR to now provide a top-down approach and provided human rights activists with hope that human rights protection in regard to multinational corporations was now in the hands of the United Nations. However, the reactions to the Norms from the CSR community varied. CSR had been a newly emerging concept which was still unclear when fitted into the international legal order. It was still in its early years of development with highly broad-reaching initiatives in the fields of both soft and hard law. The playing field for CSR was simply too big for such an underdeveloped concept to handle. Further, it was attempted to implement CSR through domestic laws and quasi-legal initiatives raised to the level of international law. It is therefore often perceived that the implementation of the Norms were an attempt to remedy CSR by uniting these various aspects into one document at the level of the United Nations. The Norms conjoined national and international levels of CSR while maintaining that states continued to hold the primary responsibility of ensuring that businesses protect human rights. The world was a 'deeply divided arena of discourse and contestation lacking shared knowledge, clear standards and boundaries; fragmentary and often weak governance systems concerning business and human rights in states and companies alike'.[103] A range of governments still expressed their demand for further attention to be given to the relationship between human rights and the practices of multinational corporations. Thus, the United Nations appointed a team led by John Ruggie to establish the Guiding Principles. Rather than establishing a new international framework as was previously attempted with the Norms, Ruggie was 'urged [.] to focus on identifying and promoting good practices and providing companies with tools to enable them to deal voluntarily with the complex cluster of business and human rights challenges'.[104] Ruggie moved away from the traditional 'mandatory approach' which involved the compliance of national laws in correspondence to a corporation's voluntary measures and practices, to a heterodox approach. This heterodox approach was devised to create an environment of mixed reinforcing policy measures that provided cumulative change and large-scale success. The Guiding Principles lay on three foundations: (1) the state duty to protect against human rights abuses; (2) the responsibility by corporations to respect human rights and the implied obligation of acting in due diligence; and (3) the need for greater access to remedies for victims. However, there are two things that the Guiding Principles fail to accomplish. Firstly, to create binding international law and instead rely on normative contributions which further elaborate the implications of existing standards. Secondly, the Guiding Principles 'fail to ensure the right to an effective remedy and the need for States' measures to prevent abuses committed by their companies overseas'.[105] Amnesty International goes further by reiterating that aside from lacking accountability measures, the Guiding Principles should mandate a due diligence approach rather than only recommending it, as this would solve internal as well as extraterritorial accountability issues. Alongside Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch criticized the Guiding Principles for not adopting a global standard in corporate responsibility, and instead resort to a 'sliding scale' based on a corporation's size and geographic location.[106] However, when compared to other governance regimes in the past and present, the Guiding Principles seem to be a robust framework. Although various human rights organizations and NGOs identify neglect of human rights in the framework of MNCs, the Guiding Principles reiterate business as an instrument to contribute to societal welfare.[107] Thus, it acts as a basis for the empowerment of society and a benchmark to judge practices and conduct of corporations and governments.[108] Conclusion The discourse of the co-emergence of multinational corporations and human rights took the world by storm. The ongoing globalization of multinational corporations and the evolution of the concept of human rights were born attending different aims in the global legal order. Their greatest challenge however was not necessarily their harmonization and co-existence, but more importantly co-existing under the intentional gap created through the world's largest and most influential actor, the United Nations. This was clearly visible in the 1960s and 1970s. Throughout the various Reports and Declarations that were passed through the international institution, the two concepts were kept separate. While the United Nations was enthusiastic for the growth of both MNCs and human rights, it intentionally avoided discussing the harmonization of both concepts. Due to the underlying pressures imposed on the United Nations by the tensions from the Cold War, the UN was left in a legal vacuum unable to merge the two distinctive genealogies. The global international legal order was unaware of the extent of the importance of such a gap being eradicated before adopting a resolution as complex as the NIEO. Thus, from this point onwards, the NIEO was therefore already bound to be unsuccessful. Not only had international law not developed enough to impose such obligations upon MNCs, the corporations themselves were not aware of the ramifications and necessity for abiding human rights obligations as I showed in the third section of this dissertation. Enthusiasm for further initiatives such as the push by the G77 or the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations was only short lived. The events of the 1980s greatly disrupted the already turbulent environment of the global international legal order creating a greater gap between the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights. The 1980s became a stage which saw a great change in the global legal structure. The NIEO was an already broken concept from the outset as the conceptual gap had already created a disparity in the relationship between MNCs and human rights. This meant that although they were not aware of it at the time, the Global South could not rely on the imposition of the NIEO. Fostering the Western neoliberal policies, the conceptual gap between MNCs and human rights was now well established. For human rights to become a globally instructed concept, MNCs are a useful tool to spread, promote and enhance human rights across the globe. This of course is under the condition that the MNC does not violate human rights. From the other perspective MNCs rely on human rights in terms of their societal and financial risks. It becomes clear that when this is not realized by the proponents of both concepts, it can lead to major discrepancies and disparities as was proven in the Global South during this period. If there had not been this conceptual gap, and instead there had been a clear and devised relationship between MNCs and human rights, the effects of the oil crisis and neoliberalism would not have left the detrimental mark in developing countries that they did, potentially allowing the NIEO to prevail. However, the ongoing persistence of developing countries and their call for the third generation of human rights to gain prominence forced MNCs to catch up with their relationship to human rights. What emerged, were essentially the first initiatives and practices of CSR. CSR was heavily affected by the fact that it relied on the voluntary nature of businesses to adhere to as well as practice CSR. Even though corporations had an incentive to adopt CSR measures, weak monitoring systems allowed violations to still occur on a grand scale. The issue was that the multinational corporation as a concept was still unclear and lacked definition and that tying MNCs down with hard international law was not possible due to the diversity of MNCs. CSR allowed for too large a divergence from the issue at hand and required to approach human rights at a different angle. This was the key reason for the partial success of the Guiding Principles. Ruggie's unconventional, heterodox approach provided clarity and distinct concepts that individuals, business and states could adhere to. Although the conceptual gap has still not vanished, the UN has after an array of various attempts, managed to narrow the gap that it had created almost sixty years ago by continuously forcing society to rethink and redefine the relationship. What exactly lies in the future is uncertain and impossible to foresee. It can be said with great certainty however, that if initiatives such as Global Compact or the Guiding Principles are enhanced and given more attention, the world will be faced with a much clearer and concise relationship between multinational corporations and human rights. Focusing on monitoring mechanisms, methodological research and greater transparency and accountability among all actors involved will undoubtedly seal the conceptual gap that has caused the international legal order to experience such unsettling times. [1] Pahuja, Sundhya. Saunders, Anna. Rival Worlds and the place of the Corporation in International Law in Dann and Von Bernstorff (eds). Decolonisation and the Battle for International Law (OUP, 2018) p.1 [2] Ibid. [3] UN, Multinational Corporations in World Development ST-ECA/190 [4] Linarelli, John. Salomon, Margot. Sornarajah M. The Misery of International Law. (OUP, 2018) p.245 [5] Ruggie, John. Just Business. (W.W. Norton & Company, 2013) p.70 [6] United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 [7] Alston, Philip. Mégret, Frédéric. (eds) The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Second Edition, OUP, 2020) p.1 [8] Clapham, Andrew. Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction (OUP, 2007) p.42 [9] (n.8) p.108. [10] ibid . p.109 [11] Allina, Eric. Imperialism and the Colonial Experience in Paul A. Haslam, Jessica Schafer and Pierre Beaudet, Introduction to International Development (3rd Edition, OUP, 2017), pp. 24-42. p.39 [12] Ibid. p. 40 [13] Sornarajah M. International Law on Foreign Investment (CUP, 2010) p.5 [14] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Multinational Corporations in World Development, 1973 ST-ECA/190 p.VI [15] ibid. p.1 [16] ibid. [17] Joseph, Sarah. Castan, Melissa. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials. (3rd Edition, OUP, 2013) p.4 [18] ibid. p.5 [19] ibid. [20] Alston, Philip. U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy. The American Journal of International Law Vol.84, No.2 (CUP,1990) pp.365-393, p.4 [21] UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, Article 1 [22] Simpson, Gerry. The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age (Ashgate Publishing, 2000) p.266 [23] Ibid. [24] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 1976 [25] Carasco, Emily. Singh, Jang. Towards Holding Transnational Corporations Responsible for Human Rights. European Business Review Vol.22, No.4, (Emerald Publishing Group, 2010). p.4 [26] Cernic, Jernei. Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Hanse Law Review, Vol.4, No.1, (2008). p.16 [27] Ibid. p. 12 [28] Sanchez, Juan Carlos Ochoa. "The Roles and Powers of the OECD National Contact Points Regarding Complaints on an Alleged Breach of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by a Transnational Corporation." Nordic Journal of International Law (2015) Vol.84, No.1, pp: 89-126 p. 18 [29] Bolt, Cassidy. "Leveraging Reputation in Implicit Regulation of MNEs: An Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises' Capacity to Influence Corporate Behavior." Corporations and International Law, 20 Jan. 2018, Available at: sites.duke.edu/corporations/2018/01/20/leveraging-reputation-in-implicit-regulation-of-mnes-an-analysis-of-the-oec

Over the first weekend of August 2023, Saudi Arabia convened an international summit on the war in Ukraine. Held in Jeddah and attended by representatives from 40 countries As was widely expected, the meeting did not produce any breakthroughs. Still, it provided a golden opportunity for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MBS) to position himself as a leader of what might be called a second "Non-Aligned Movement." This movement's growing influence owes much to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. For while Moscow's assault had the unintended effect of revitalizing—and expanding—NATO, it also created an opening for many countries to leverage a multipolar international system in ways that have limited Washington's global power, not to mention its regional clout in the Middle East.


But these "balancing" efforts come with a high cost, as rising grain prices have threatened the stability of many of the very states that have thus far refused to condemn Russia's invasion, much less support Ukraine. For these states, the status quo is increasingly precarious, hence the wider logic of inviting China and the United States to sit a few short whispers away from their Saudi hosts at a meeting to which Russia was not invited.


China's Multi-Faceted Foreign Policy


From the outset, China has tried to advance a position of "neutrality" while echoing Russian President Vladimir Putin's justification for his unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. Beyond rhetoric, Beijing has provided economic support via its purchase of price-discounted Russian oil and, some experts argue, limited military assistance as well (a claim Beijing denies).


China's efforts to maintain these two tracks reflect structural tensions at the heart of China's global engagement. On the one hand, China is closely tied to a global economic order that is dominated by Western states and multilateral institutions. On the other hand, President Xi Jinping is seeking to counter U.S. military, economic, and even cultural power, and has done so in multiple ways, thus inviting conflict with the United States even as Beijing needs to cooperate with Washington and its Western allies. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which reportedly took Chinese leaders by surprise, created opportunities for China to flex its "counter-hegemonic" muscles, but also opened the door to economic and strategic threats that were likely to intensify absent a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine conflict.


The tension between China's ideological and global economic interests extends well beyond the China-West arena. Many middle-sized regional powers such as India, Brazil, and South Africa share Beijing's desire to counter U.S. global dominance. But their policies are also rooted in the principle of state sovereignty and the rejection of the use of force to solve international conflicts. Beijing has long advocated these very norms and has given them pride of place in the charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, not to mention China's 12-point Ukraine peace proposal.


Thus its support for Russia has raised legitimate questions from many leaders about the rising humanitarian and economic costs of the war and Beijing's readiness to take credible steps to show that its Ukraine plan is not a mere diplomatic feint. The most important of these steps would be for Beijing to reduce its diplomatic support for Moscow.


Beijing's Jeddah Dance


From the outset of the Jeddah meeting China's delegate avoided suggesting that Beijing would endorse any particular proposal other than its own. Indeed, Special Representative Li Hui seemed to emphasize the limited goals of the meeting—and the conflicts animating its leading participants—when he declared, "We have many disagreements and we have heard different positions, but it is important that our principles be shared."


Putting a more positive spin, a spokesperson for the Chinese government noted that, "China is willing to work with the international community to continue to play a constructive role in promoting a political solution to the crisis in Ukraine."


But what kind of solution? The outcome that China has outlined in its own 12-point proposal calls for respecting "the independence and territorial integrity of all countries" but also for a negotiated "political settlement" that could fudge or violate these principles. Thus, China is not ready to accept Ukraine's 10-point peace plan, which would require Russia's total withdrawal from all Ukrainian lands, including Crimea.


That Moscow has totally rejected this idea is not surprising; any hint by Putin that he might accept Ukraine's terms could undermine his rule. Moreover, as one expert has noted, "Ukraine's best-case scenario for the end of this war is also China's worst-case scenario," because Beijing wants Putin to remain in power while sustaining Russia's occupation until it is Ukraine that makes the key compromises.


It is inconceivable that China's envoy came to the Jeddah meeting believing that these various circles could be squared. Still, with the Ukraine conflict settling into what could be a prolonged war of attrition, and with Russia's suspension of its grain deal and its attacks on shipping in the Black Sea, China had to demonstrate concern for those states suffering from Moscow's policy of global blackmail.


Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy exploited China's unease when he noted that, "On issues such as food security, the fate of millions of people in Africa, Asia and other parts of the world directly depends on how fast the world moves to implement the peace formula." He was, of course, talking about Ukraine's own proposal, which China certainly did not back. Still, China's active presence in Jeddah presumably showed that it was ready to assume its responsibilities as a major global power that, in the words of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, had helped "to consolidate international consensus" on Ukraine.


Whatever the veracity of this claim, it is worth noting that on the second day of the Jeddah conference, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov insisted that the meeting was "a reflection of the West's attempt to continue futile, doomed efforts," but added that China could nevertheless "convey common sense to the Western patrons of Kyiv."


China did its best to avoid taking on the role of Moscow's messenger. Still, days after the Jeddah summit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a phone call with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, reassured him that Beijing was committed to being an "objective and rational voice." That the week before the summit China had joined Russia in a naval exercise off the coast of Alaska that prompted the deployment of four U.S. Navy destroyers underscored the risky juggling act that is at the heart of Beijing's foreign policy.


A Win for MBS and Zelenskyy


The key participants in the Jeddah conference made good use of the multiple balls that Beijing has thus far kept in the air. Ukrainian officials declared that the meeting "completely destroys the narrative of Russia" that Ukraine was only backed by "countries of the collective West." Such hyperbole was as necessary as they were predictable. Indeed, while in the lead up to the meeting Ukrainian officials insisted that "our goal in Saudi Arabia is to develop a unified vision" ahead of a future global peace summit, the fact that no such vision emerged in Jeddah was almost irrelevant. What counted most was that the summit was held and that it ended, as the Ukrainian ambassador to Saudi Arabia pitched it, with "constructive" talks and "a broad vision." Jeddah was thus a win for Zelenskyy.


The same, of course, can be said for MBS. He may have not fully agreed when the Ukrainian ambassador thanked Saudi Arabia "for being so committed and hospitable to Ukraine in moving forward our peace formula plan." But the meeting signaled that the crown prince is on his way to rehabilitating his international reputation.


More broadly, as one leading Saudi journalist noted, the conference underscored Saudi Arabia's growing clout as a "neutral" mediator in a diverse group of states that constitute a kind of second Non-Aligned Movement whose members are leveraging the US-Russia-China triangle of conflict to advance their interests while maintaining good relations with all three countries.


For Riyadh, a key element in this juggling act is its unhappiness with being replaced by Russia as China's chief supplier of crude oil. This represents a real economic and political cost for MBS, who to the frustration of the Biden White House, has sustained the oil production cuts he initiated in Spring 2023.


In short, the Jeddah meeting gave Riyadh a practically risk-free opportunity to direct multiple signals in multiple directions. Thus, while the conference ended without any final declaration, Saudi officials held that the meeting contributed to "building common grounds that pave the way for peace." As for China, it has signaled its readiness to attend a follow-up meeting.


The Biden Administration (and China) Navigate Choppy Waters


While U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan went to the Jeddah conference, the administration's best bet was to let other participants, most importantly Ukraine's president, make their case and test China's intentions. That in the words of one unnamed U.S. official, the administration was "glad" that China attended and participated in the meeting "in a constructive way"— highlights the challenges that the administration faces as it navigates choppy diplomatic waters.


Those waters got a little rougher as the BRICS countries — Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — held a summit on summit on August 22 during which Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia were invited to join. If the decision shows that Russia and China are advancing their efforts to create an alternative to the International Monetary Fund and other Western dominated multi-lateral financial powerhouses, the expanded BRICS club includes not a few members who have concerns about the agenda of Moscow and China on a host of issues, including the Ukraine war.


That Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov stated that Moscow looked forward to "an exchange of views" with the BRICS countries that attended the Jeddah meeting could suggest some unease in the Kremlin. For however determined to foster a multi-polar global system, major regional players such as Brazil and South Africa have no interest letting Moscow or China become the new arbiters of a counter hegemonic agenda. Speaking to the point, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has warned, "We have resisted pressure to align ourselves with any one of the global powers or with influential blocs of nations."


Vladimir Putin might ignore such sentiments, but Beijing's leaders cannot. Afterall, precisely because China is a real world economic and military power in ways that Russia will never be, it needs to find a path to engaging across the global spectrum. This balancing act has become harder with a struggling domestic economy, not to mention the efforts of the Biden White House to foster greater security cooperation in Asia — amply demonstrated by the recent US/South Korea/Japan Camp David summit.


Biden wisely insisted that the meeting was not "anti-China." Still, it is far from clear that this statement shows that the White House has forged a policy that fully takes into account the tensions that are at the heart of China's foreign relations — and that brought Beijing's emissary to Jeddah in the first place.


A version of this piece was published by Arab Center Washington DC. The views expressed in this publication are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.

En esta cuarta sección del evento Economía de la Informalidad Conferencia 2020, se presento la Ponencia de la profesora Pascaline Dupas, profesora de la Universidad de Stanford, La ponencia de la profesora Pascaline Dupas, titulada Informality in the time of Covid-19 (Informalidad en tiempos de Covid-19) hace un recorrido sobre las relaciones económicas que se desarrollan en un contexto de informalidad y analiza cómo la pandemia ha afectado de manera diferencial a poblaciones formales e informales a través de tres fuentes de datos diferentes. Dupas divide su presentación en tres partes. La primera muestra una perspectiva amplia de la informalidad y la correlación entre este fenómeno y el desarrollo económico de los países. La segunda es sobre las razones por las cuales la pandemia de Covid-19 podría imponer retos en relación con la informalidad. La tercera es sobre los impactos que se han observado en el corto plazo como consecuencia del Covid-19. En la primera parte de su ponencia, Dupas hace énfasis en que la informalidad no es únicamente laboral (por ejemplo, firmas que se ocultan de la regulación del gobierno, o trabajadores que no cuentan con contratos laborales formales), sino que trasciende a los ámbitos de vivienda, transporte, comercio, pagos, seguros, consumo, gravámenes e instituciones. De hecho, resalta que estos aspectos suelen sobreponerse y ocurrir simultáneamente, o uno como consecuencia de algún otro. Más aún, la informalidad en cada una de estas áreas está relacionada con condiciones de vida más difíciles y menos oportunidades. Por ejemplo, Dupas presenta amplia evidencia de la correlación entre las dimensiones de la informalidad usando datos para la capital marfileña Abiyán, mostrando que las personas que viven en asentamientos informales adolecen de derechos de propiedad, son más propensas a tener que hacer pagos informales a autoridades locales para evitar desalojos, suelen depender de instituciones informales y suelen tener menor cobertura de tarjetas gubernamentales de identificación. Los empleados informales, por su lado, tienen ingresos irregulares que les dificulta aceptar compromisos con entidades formales. Por esta razón, cuando requieren una red de seguridad frente a riesgos, suelen acudir a seguros informales, así como a créditos informales. Asimismo, pagos informales a las autoridades (corrupción) permiten que se mantenga la informalidad en asentamientos, contratos y comercio. Esto lleva a la pregunta sobre si la informalidad es una elección. Frente a esto, Dupas argumenta que, por el lado de los trabajadores, la mayoría preferirían tener contratos formales reconocidos frente a la ley y con seguridad social. Por su lado, las firmas informales preferirían mantenerse en esa condición por cuestiones de viabilidad (no serían rentables en escenarios formales). A su vez, Dupas dice que las personas que viven en asentamientos informales no encuentran otras opciones de vivienda asequible que estén a una distancia razonable de las oportunidades laborales. En la segunda parte de su ponencia, Dupas argumenta que el Covid-19 ha levantado preocupaciones por sus efectos sobre la población informal. En primer lugar, los asentamientos informales son más propensos para la transmisión masiva del virus, pues son muy densos en términos de población, tienen muchas personas por hogar, tienen fuentes acuíferas comunales, acceso limitado a redes de saneamiento y a instalaciones de higiene. De la misma forma, se desplazan usando medios de transporte congestionados y compran en lugares muy concurridos. Lo anterior se traduce en el hecho de que hay una seroprevalencia de Covid-19 del 54% en los asentamientos informales de Mumbai (India) y del 53% en los de Buenos Aires (Argentina). Por otro lado, la informalidad está relacionada con menor resiliencia a las cuarentenas o bloqueos relacionados con el Covid-19. Lo anterior se debe a que estas medidas eliminan los ingresos de los trabajadores, obligan a los individuos a acceder a mercados más costosos, imponen restricciones al transporte público informal y dificultades de movilidad. A esto se suma que, dado que tienen menor acceso a cuentas financieras formales, se hace más difíciles de alcanzar con ayudas gubernamentales. Asimismo, suelen experimentar una caída en los ingresos de remesas. En la tercera parte, Dupas documenta una serie de impactos económicos del Covid-19. Hace referencia a casos de estudio en Colombia, México, Costa de Marfil y Ghana. En el caso de Colombia y México, analizan la encuesta IPA RECOVR realizada por IPA, que incluye tanto a Bogotá como al Distrito Federal. En estas ciudades, se evidenciaron pérdidas de trabajos, que fueron más pronunciadas sobre la informalidad. Las personas formales en estas ciudades reportaron pérdidas de empleo de un 40%, mientras que esa cifra alcanzó el 80% entre los informales. Los trabajadores informales reportaron que, post-Covid, trabajaron menos horas que antes y ganaron menos que antes. En el caso de Ghana, Dupas hizo referencia a los efectos causales de la educación sobre la resiliencia ante choques como el de la pandemia de Covid-19. Frente a esto, mostró resultados que indican que las beneficiarias de programas educativos tuvieron mayor resiliencia laboral en términos de permanencia e ingresos. Finalmente, Dupas concluyó con cuatro puntos. Primero, que la informalidad tiene muchos dominios interconectados entre sí. Segundo, que la informalidad estuvo relacionada con vulnerabilidad aumentada frente a las crisis. Tercero, que los impactos del Covid-19 tienen una gran probabilidad de extenderse en el largo plazo. Lo anterior, sobre todo, porque las inversiones en nutrición de la primera infancia y en educación han caído debido a la pandemia. Y estas inversiones son muy importantes para el desarrollo de mediano y largo plazo de los niños, niñas y adolescentes. Por último, resaltó que la recuperación de esta situación va a ser intrincada. Esto, debido a la destrucción de negocios, activos y trabajos que significó la pandemia y las cuarentenas consecuentes para los individuos. Todo esto, con un enfoque diferencial frente a la informalidad que indica que va a ser mucho más difícil recuperarse para los que antes de la pandemia ya eran informales. ; In this fourth section of the Economics of Informality Conference 2020 event, the Presentation by Professor Pascaline Dupas, a professor at Stanford University, The presentation by Professor Pascaline Dupas, entitled Informality in the time of Covid-19 (Informality in times of Covid-19) takes a tour of the economic relations that develop in a context of informality and analyzes how the The pandemic has differentially affected formal and informal populations through three different data sources. Dupas divides his presentation into three parts. The first shows a broad perspective of informality and the correlation between this phenomenon and the economic development of the countries. The second is about the reasons why the Covid-19 pandemic could pose challenges in relation to informality. The third is about the impacts that have been observed in the short term as a consequence of Covid-19. In the first part of his presentation, Dupas emphasizes that informality is not only labor (for example, firms that hide from government regulation, or workers who do not have formal labor contracts), but that it transcends of housing, transport, commerce, payments, insurance, consumption, taxes and institutions. In fact, it highlights that these aspects tend to overlap and occur simultaneously, or one as a consequence of some other. Furthermore, informality in each of these areas is related to more difficult living conditions and fewer opportunities. For example, Dupas presents ample evidence of the correlation between dimensions of informality using data for the Ivorian capital Abidjan, showing that people who live in informal settlements lack property rights, are more likely to have to make informal payments to authorities. To avoid evictions, they tend to rely on informal institutions and tend to have less coverage from government identification cards. Informal employees, on the other hand, have irregular income that makes it difficult for them to accept commitments with formal entities. For this reason, when they require a safety net against risks, they tend to turn to informal insurance, as well as informal loans. Likewise, informal payments to the authorities (corruption) allow informality to be maintained in settlements, contracts and commerce. This leads to the question of whether informality is a choice. Faced with this, Dupas argues that, on the workers' side, the majority would prefer to have formal contracts recognized by the law and with social security. For their part, informal firms would prefer to remain in that condition for viability reasons (they would not be profitable in formal settings). In turn, Dupas says that people living in informal settlements do not find other affordable housing options that are within a reasonable distance of job opportunities. In the second part of his presentation, Dupas argues that Covid-19 has raised concerns about its effects on the informal population. First, informal settlements are more prone to massive transmission of the virus, as they are very dense in terms of population, have many people per household, have communal water sources, limited access to sanitation networks and hygiene facilities. In the same way, they travel using congested means of transport and shop in crowded places. This translates into the fact that there is a Covid-19 seroprevalence of 54% in the informal settlements of Mumbai (India) and 53% in those of Buenos Aires (Argentina). On the other hand, informality is related to less resilience to quarantines or blockades related to Covid-19. This is because these measures eliminate workers' income, force individuals to access more expensive markets, impose restrictions on informal public transport and mobility difficulties. Added to this is that, given that they have less access to formal financial accounts, it is more difficult to achieve with government aid. They also tend to experience a drop in remittance income. In the third part, Dupas documents a series of economic impacts of Covid-19. It refers to case studies in Colombia, Mexico, Ivory Coast and Ghana. In the case of Colombia and Mexico, they analyze the IPA RECOVR survey conducted by IPA, which includes both Bogotá and the Federal District. In these cities, job losses were evidenced, which were more pronounced on informality. Formal people in these cities reported job losses of 40%, while that figure reached 80% among informal ones. Informal workers reported that, post-Covid, they worked fewer hours than before and earned less than before. In the case of Ghana, Dupas referred to the causal effects of education on resilience to shocks such as the Covid-19 pandemic. Faced with this, it showed results that indicate that the beneficiaries of educational programs had greater work resilience in terms of permanence and income. Finally, Dupas concluded with four points. First, that informality has many interconnected domains. Second, that informality was related to increased vulnerability to crises. Third, that the impacts of Covid-19 have a high probability of spreading in the long term. The above, above all, because investments in early childhood nutrition and education have fallen due to the pandemic. And these investments are very important for the medium and long-term development of children and adolescents. Finally, he stressed that the recovery from this situation will be intricate. This, due to the destruction of businesses, assets and jobs that the pandemic meant and the consequent quarantines for individuals. All this, with a differential approach to informality that indicates that it will be much more difficult to recover for those who were already informal before the pandemic.

The main focus of the social protection and labor portfolio is on strengthening client's institutional capacity in the design and implementation of programs, but projects are not well equipped to track progress in this area. Correspondingly, there is a need to strengthen approaches to measuring and monitoring a 'missing middle' of service delivery, precisely those areas for which counterpart institutions are responsible during the course of a project. In particular, better measures of the primary functions of social protection and labor agencies are needed, such as identifying and enrolling beneficiaries, targeting, payment systems, fraud and error control, performance monitoring of service delivery providers, responsiveness to citizens, transparency, efficiency, management information systems and monitoring and evaluation systems. New World Bank initiatives particularly standard core indicators by sector and the introduction of results based investment lending call for substantial improvements in the use of monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Impact evaluations are included in about half of projects and should continue to be used selectively and strategically, particularly when the program is innovative, replicable and/ or scalable to reach a broader set of beneficiaries, addresses a knowledge gap and is likely to have a substantial policy impact. Structuring evaluations around core themes with common outcome measures is fundamental to building a global knowledge base on development effectiveness.

Der Beitrag untersucht die Auswirkungen der Justizreform des Jahres 2001 und der Politik der "womenomics" der Regierung Abe. Aus dieser Perspektive wur­de die Ernennung dreier Richterinnen an den Obersten Gerichtshof als ein neuer Schritt auf dem Wege zur Gleichstellung in der Justiz angesehen, die traditionell eine Männerdomäne war. Der erste Teil des Beitrages setzt sich mit dem Umfeld der politischen Initiativen des Premierministers auseinander, Frauen in führende Positionen innerhalb der japanischen Gesellschaft zu bringen, und beleuchtet die verschiedenen Maßnahmen, welche der Obersten Gerichtshof, das Justizministerium und die Anwaltsvereinigungen in Japan ergriffen haben, um diese Initiativen umzusetzen und die zahlreichen kulturellen, psychologischen und finanziellen Hemmnisse abzubauen, die bis heute den Aufstieg von Frauen im Justizsystem behindern. Die anschließenden beiden Teile befassen sich mit den demografischen Daten zur Entwicklung der Justiz in den formativen Jahren zwischen 2005 und 2017, einer Periode der Erneuerung der Juristenausbildung in Japan auf der Grundlage der Reform der Aufnahmeprüfung für die nationale Referendariatsausbildung und der Einrichtung von Law Schools. Die allgemeinen Daten zeigen eine erhebliche Zunahme der im Bereich der Justiz tätigen Personen – Richter, Staats- und Rechtsanwälte –, wobei die männliche Dominanz in diesen Berufen zwar etwas zurückgegangen ist, aber nach wie vor ein wesentliches Charakteristikum ist . Aber eine genauere Analyse der jüngeren Zahlen der Abgänger von der zentralen juristischen Ausbildungsinstitution (LTRI) lassen als Trend erkennen, dass die Rekrutierung von Richterinnen und Staatsanwältinnen insgesamt bereits das von der Regierung vorgegebene Ziel eines 20-prozentigen Frauenanteils erreicht hat. Gleichwohl ist der Anteil von Frauen in Spitzenpositionen mit nur 12 Richterinnen am Obersten Gerichtshof und als in Führungspositionen an den Instanzgerichten nach wie vor gering, was an unterschiedlichen Karrierewegen und einer weniger "erfolgsorientieren" Einstellung liegen dürfte. Der vierte Teil des Berichts diskutiert einige allgemeine Gender-Fragen. Dabei geht es zum einen um den Kampf gegen sexuelle Belästigung am Arbeitsplatz, die in einigen Fällen durch die Berichterstattung in den Medien ins Licht der Öffentlichkeit kamen, und zum anderen um die Vereinbarkeit von Beruf und Familie. Bezüglich letzterer werden einschlägige Initiativen aus den drei Zweigen der Justiz vorgestellt, wobei es insbesondere um die Elternzeit geht, die bislang von Männern zu wenig genutzt wird. Der letzte Teil wendet sich der neu aufgekommenen Problematik zu, wie die Justiz im Lichte jüngster Schwierigkeiten auf dem juristischen Arbeitsmarkt und auf der Ebene der Re­feren­dariatsausbildung und der Law Schools ausreichend attraktiv für die jüngere Generation gestaltet werden kann. Es werden verschiedene Initiativen der Rechtsanwaltskammern, des Justizministeriums und des Kabinetts vorgestellt, vermittels welcher das Bild einer vermeintlich von Stereotypen geprägten Justiz zurechtgerückt und junge Menschen, insbesondere Frauen für einen Eintritt in die Justiz gewonnen werden können. Der Beitrag schließt mit der Empfehlung, sich nicht lediglich quantitativ, sondern darüber hinaus auch qualitativ um die Einbindung von Frauen in die Justiz zu bemühen. Das Thema könne nicht von der Beseitigung der generellen Benachteiligung von Frauen im Recht, dem Engagement von Rechtsan­wäl­tinnen in neuen Rechtsgebieten, die noch immer von Rechtsanwälten dominiert würden, und einer neuen Rollenverteilung zwischen Männern und Frauen in der japanischen Gesellschaft getrennt werden. (Die Redaktion) Resumé Le but de cet article est d'examiner l'impact de la réforme de la justice mise en place à partir de 2001 en relation avec la politique dite de«womenomics» promue par les Cabinets Abe. La présence de trois femmes juges à la Cour suprême avait été considérée, à cet égard comme une nouvelle étape sur la voie de la féminisation de la justice, bastion traditionnel de la masculinité. La première partie de cette contribution traite du contexte général des politiques avancées par le Premier ministre pour stimuler l'emploi féminin à des postes de responsabilité au Japon, ainsi que des mesures et recommandations diverses adoptées par les principaux acteurs de la justice – la Cour suprême, le ministère des Affaires Juridiques et la Fédération japonaise des associations du barreau, prises à cet effet, dans le but de lever les nombreux obstacles culturels, psychologiques et financiers qui continuent à entraver la promotion des femmes dans l'appareil judiciaire. La seconde partie est centrée sur des données démographiques décrivant l'évolution de la composition des milieux de la justice entre 2005 et 2017, période qui coïncide avec la restructuration du système de formation des professions judiciaires, notamment du régime de leur recrutement national et l'introduction des écoles de droit. Ces données générales font apparaître une augmentation sensible de la population judiciaire, qui, bien qu'inégalement répartie entre ses différentes branches – juges, procureurs et avocats – confirme que la domination masculine, même si elle est entamée, demeure une caractéristique fondamentale de l'organisation de la justice au Japon. Mais une analyse plus détaillée des dernières cohortes de diplômés du Centre national d'études judiciaires (CNEJ) fait apparaître une nouvelle tendance : la proportion de femmes recrutées comme juges et procureurs atteint voire dépasse les 20%, seuil fixé par le gouvernement. Néanmoins, la promotion de femmes à des postes à responsabilité demeure encore faible: seules douze femmes sont présidentes de tribunaux ou juges à la Cour suprême, une situation qui tient sans doute au fait que les femmes ont des parcours différents au sein de la magistrature et qu'elles sont moins «performantes» que leurs homologues masculins. La quatrième partie s'attache à quelques problématiques de genre dans la carrière des femmes, axées autour de deux points: d'une part, la lutte contre le harcèlement sexuel au sein de la magistrature, dont certains cas ont été dénoncés dans les médias, d'autre part la conciliation entre vie de famille et vie professionnelle. L'article décrit ainsi les dispositifs posés par les trois branches du hōsō pour faire en sorte que les contraintes professionnelles soient compatibles avec la vie privée et les liens familiaux avec, en point d'orgue, la question du congé parental, sous utilisé par les hommes. La cinquième partie parle d'une nouvelle problématique qui s'est récemment imposée: comment faire pour que les carrières judiciaires soient attractives pour la jeunesse, dans un environnement marqué à la fois par la réduction du «marché judiciaire» et la crise de recrutement qui affecte à la fois les écoles de droit et le CNEJ. L'article fait ainsi le point sur les divers dispositifs institués par le ministère des Affaires Juridiques, le barreau japonais et l'Office du Cabinet en vue de déconstruire les stéréotypes de la justice et d'inciter les jeunes, en particulier les jeunes filles, à embrasser une carrière judiciaire. En conclusion, il est souligné que la promotion des femmes dans la justice n'est pas simplement qu'une affaire quantitative mais qualitative. Elle est indissociable de la levée des biais sexistes dans le droit positif, de la capacité des femmes à investir des champs juridiques nouveaux qui étaient jusque-là l'apanage des hommes et d'une meilleure répartition des rôles entre hommes et femmes dans la société japonaise. ; The purpose of this article is to examine the impact of the reform of the judicial system in Japan implemented in 2001, in accordance with the "womenomics" policy promoted by the Abe Cabinets. In this respect, the presence of three female judges at the Supreme Court was considered as a new step on the path of the feminization of the judiciary which was traditionally a bastion of masculinity. This first part of this contribution deals with the general context of the policies advocated by the Prime minister in order to foster female employment at leading positions in Japan's society, and the various measures and recommendations taken by the main actors of the judiciary – the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations – in order to cope with the situation created by the enactment and the implementation of these policies and to lift the numerous cultural, psychological and financial obstacles which still impede the promotion of women in the judiciary. The second part is centred on demographical data depicting the evolution of the judiciary between 2005 and 2017, a period which coincides with the restructuring of the legal education system hinged on the reform of the national bar examination and the creation of law schools. The general data show a huge increase in the population of the judiciary, but unequally distributed between the three components of the judiciary − judges, public prosecutors and lawyers − which confirm that male dominancy, even slightly affected, remains a fundamental characteristic of the judiciary in Japan. But a more detailed analysis of the last cohorts of graduates from the Legal Training and Research Institute (LTRI) reveals a new trend: the proportion of women recruited as judges and public prosecutors has already reached the objective of 20% fixed by the government. Hence, the proportion of women in management and direction posts is still low with, for example, only twelve women as Supreme Court judges and presidents of tribunals, mainly because women have different paths of career and are less "performant" than male judges. The fourth part addresses some main gender issues in the judicial careers from a twofold perspective: the first is the fight against sexual harassment within the judiciary, some cases of which have been highlighted by the media. The second relates to the problem of conciliation of professional and family life. The article describes the initiatives launched by the three branches of the hōsō for the accommodation of professional constrains with the protection of privacy and family links, with a focus on child care leave which is currently under-utilized by men. The last part evokes an issue which recently emerged: how to make the judiciary more attractive for young people in an environment plagued by the constriction of the legal market and the crisis of recruitment both at the LTRI and the law school level. The article discusses the various proposals made by the bar associations, the Ministry of Justice and the Cabinet Office at the local level, aiming at deconstructing an image of the judiciary somewhat stuffed with stereotypes, with the objective of impelling young people, especially women, to join the judiciary. The article concludes that the promotion of women in the judiciary should be studied not only through a quantitative, but a qualitative approach as well: a topic which cannot be dissociated from the eradication of the gender bias in Japanese positive law, the commitment of female lawyers in new fields of law still dominated by their male counterparts, and a new distribution of roles between males and females in Japanese society. Resumé Le but de cet article est d'examiner l'impact de la réforme de la justice mise en place à partir de 2001 en relation avec la politique dite de«womenomics» promue par les Cabinets Abe. La présence de trois femmes juges à la Cour suprême avait été considérée, à cet égard comme une nouvelle étape sur la voie de la féminisation de la justice, bastion traditionnel de la masculinité. La première partie de cette contribution traite du contexte général des politiques avancées par le Premier ministre pour stimuler l'emploi féminin à des postes de responsabilité au Japon, ainsi que des mesures et recommandations diverses adoptées par les principaux acteurs de la justice – la Cour suprême, le ministère des Affaires Juridiques et la Fédération japonaise des associations du barreau, prises à cet effet, dans le but de lever les nombreux obstacles culturels, psychologiques et financiers qui continuent à entraver la promotion des femmes dans l'appareil judiciaire. La seconde partie est centrée sur des données démographiques décrivant l'évolution de la composition des milieux de la justice entre 2005 et 2017, période qui coïncide avec la restructuration du système de formation des professions judiciaires, notamment du régime de leur recrutement national et l'introduction des écoles de droit. Ces données générales font apparaître une augmentation sensible de la population judiciaire, qui, bien qu'inégalement répartie entre ses différentes branches – juges, procureurs et avocats – confirme que la domination masculine, même si elle est entamée, demeure une caractéristique fondamentale de l'organisation de la justice au Japon. Mais une analyse plus détaillée des dernières cohortes de diplômés du Centre national d'études judiciaires (CNEJ) fait apparaître une nouvelle tendance : la proportion de femmes recrutées comme juges et procureurs atteint voire dépasse les 20%, seuil fixé par le gouvernement. Néanmoins, la promotion de femmes à des postes à responsabilité demeure encore faible: seules douze femmes sont présidentes de tribunaux ou juges à la Cour suprême, une situation qui tient sans doute au fait que les femmes ont des parcours différents au sein de la magistrature et qu'elles sont moins «performantes» que leurs homologues masculins. La quatrième partie s'attache à quelques problématiques de genre dans la carrière des femmes, axées autour de deux points: d'une part, la lutte contre le harcèlement sexuel au sein de la magistrature, dont certains cas ont été dénoncés dans les médias, d'autre part la conciliation entre vie de famille et vie professionnelle. L'article décrit ainsi les dispositifs posés par les trois branches du hōsō pour faire en sorte que les contraintes professionnelles soient compatibles avec la vie privée et les liens familiaux avec, en point d'orgue, la question du congé parental, sous utilisé par les hommes. La cinquième partie parle d'une nouvelle problématique qui s'est récemment imposée: comment faire pour que les carrières judiciaires soient attractives pour la jeunesse, dans un environnement marqué à la fois par la réduction du «marché judiciaire» et la crise de recrutement qui affecte à la fois les écoles de droit et le CNEJ. L'article fait ainsi le point sur les divers dispositifs institués par le ministère des Affaires Juridiques, le barreau japonais et l'Office du Cabinet en vue de déconstruire les stéréotypes de la justice et d'inciter les jeunes, en particulier les jeunes filles, à embrasser une carrière judiciaire. En conclusion, il est souligné que la promotion des femmes dans la justice n'est pas simplement qu'une affaire quantitative mais qualitative. Elle est indissociable de la levée des biais sexistes dans le droit positif, de la capacité des femmes à investir des champs juridiques nouveaux qui étaient jusque-là l'apanage des hommes et d'une meilleure répartition des rôles entre hommes et femmes dans la société japonaise.

Podemos recurrir a un simple modelo para hacer más visible el proceso. Por ejemplo, el modelo de De la Fuente descansa en 3 variables para pensar la convergencia y divergencia. Hay una variable X que refleja las condiciones iniciales de una economía, como por ejemplo el clima, la extensión territorial y la existencia de una riqueza minera o petrolera. El petróleo en Arabia Saudita sería un ejemplo representativo. En segundo lugar, De la Fuente menciona la existencia de una variable Beta. Esta variable representa condiciones de una economía en relación a otra. Por ejemplo, el deterioro o mejora en los términos de intercambio a partir de la aparición de una economía emergente (como China en la última década) genera modificaciones relativas. Por su parte, hay una variable aleatoria.Así, El modelo básico de De la Fuente es el siguiente:/\Yi,t = Xi –β Yi,t +€itDonde β refleja la correlación entre la tasa de crecimiento y el nivel de renta. La relación puede ser positiva o negativa y proporciona una medida de la velocidad (según la pendiente). €it es una perturbación aleatoria y X resume las características fundamentales del país I, que podrían influir sobre su ritmo de crecimiento. Es constante en el tiempo y la medida es 0. Es decir, hay quienes de acuerdo a X tienen más potencial y otros menos que la media.En esta segunda parte apelaremos a tres teorías para explicar las dos cortas convergencias y la larga divergencia de Argentina y Chile desde 1880 hasta la actualidad. En primer lugar, recurriremos al modelo neoclásico de Solow. En segundo lugar, apelaremos a la teoría de la dependencia y en tercer lugar a una explicación institucional.1) Enfoque neoclásicoLa primera convergencia argentina descansa en las ventajas relativas para insertarse en el comercio mundial. Esta Beta puede describirse a partir del modelo de Solow ya que la relación complementaria que desarrolló Argentina con Inglaterra supuso no sólo un creciente intercambio de bienes sino un creciente flujo de capitales. Tanto en la experiencia argentina como chilena de finales del siglo XIX y principios del siglo XX, es posible ver como el ahorro de los países ricos (particularmente inglés) buscaba mercados alternativos dado que tenía un rendimiento marginal decreciente en sus respectivas economías. Principalmente Argentina y, en menor medida Chile, se posicionaron como dos economías atractivas para recibir el excedente de ahorro que tenía el país más rico del mundo.Argentina y Chile: Primera Convergencia (1880-1929)En la siguiente tabla podemos ver el sorprendente peso relativo de Argentina y, en menor medida, Chile en la inversión Británica en la región.Fuente: RipleyEn segundo lugar, ¿Cómo explicar la larga divergencia que sufrieron Argentina y Chile entre 1930 y el final del siglo XX a partir de la teoría neoclásica? Podemos pensar que en cierta forma es la contracara del período anterior: si durante la primera convergencia se consolidó una economía globalizada donde los aranceles formales y reales (como el mencionado costo de transporte) caían y eso hacía que el capital buscara sin restricciones los ámbitos donde podía maximizar el retorno, luego, a partir de la "Gran Depresión", se sucedieron políticas proteccionistas que desincentivaron la llegada de inversión extranjera. Para la teoría neoclásica solowiana, la primera convergencia fue causada por la β que significaba la existencia de incentivos para la llegada de capitales y la posterior divergencia se explica por la β que expresaba la desaparición de esos incentivos, es decir, por la llegada de políticas proteccionistas que dificultaron o imposibilitaron la inversión extranjera.Argentina: Larga Divergencia (1930-2003)Chile: Larga Divergencia (1930-1990)Si bien Argentina y Chile vivieron un proceso de convergencia similar y un proceso de divergencia largo y traumático, podemos ahora marcar una "divergencia" en las características que la segunda y actual convergencia ha tomado en uno y otro país. Mientras en Chile la última convergencia comienza en 1990 y descansa en la creciente inversión extranjera y apertura al mundo, en Argentina el modelo neoclásico explicaría el crecimiento argentino desde 2003 en adelante como consecuencia de las ventajas comparativas que una economía colapsada encontró en un mercado mundial que demandaba sus productos. Es decir, desde la visión neoclásica, la nueva convergencia descansaría en una economía altamente competitiva como consecuencia de una moneda colapsada que generó bienes exportables muy baratos en dólares.2) Teoría de la dependenciaDesde la construcción teórica que nos ofrece la escuela de la CEPAL y la teoría de la dependencia, podemos recurrir al deterioro y mejora de los términos de intercambio para explicar la primera convergencia desde 1880 hasta la "Gran Depresión", la larga divergencia que siguió a 1929 y se consolidó en la posguerra y a la convergencia actual. Tanto en Argentina como en Chile sucedió un proceso de mejora en los términos de intercambio al menos hasta la primera guerra mundial. Esta variable es una β ya que no depende de las condiciones iniciales de la economía sino de la relación entre el precio de los bienes que una economía exporta con el precio de los bienes que esa economía importa.Argentina y Chile: Convergencia (1830-1929)Argentina y Chile: Divergencia (1930-finales del siglo XX)Argentina y Chile: Convergencia (Finales del siglo XX en adelante)Sostienen Brambilla, Galiani y Porto que "Argentine trade policies swang from episodes of open trade, especially at the end of the 1800s and during the early 1900s, to episodes of a strong anti-export bias and import substitution, especially after 1930 and until the 1990s. Our analysis tells a story of bad trade policies, rooted in distributional conflict and shaped by changes in constraints, that favored industry over agriculture in a country with a fundamental comparative advantage in agriculture. While the anti-export bias impeded productivity growth in agriculture, the import substitution strategy was not successful in promoting industrialization. In the end, Argentine growth never took-off" (LAMES/2009/1141/AE_Brambilla_Galiani_Porto.pdf).Tomamos un gráfico de la CEPALFuente: http://prebisch.cepal.org/es/sigloXXI/terminos-intercambioEn segundo lugar, es posible recurrir en la escuela cepaliana para explicar la larga divergencia. Gráfico 3: Términos de intercambio de Argentina (1945-1973)Fuente: econserialcronica.orgEn tercer lugar, la nueva convergencia ha descansado en parte en una mejoría en los términos de intercambio. El siguiente gráfico refleja la experiencia argentina entre 1986 y 2012. Es posible ver que sucede una notable mejora a partir de 2003, justamente cuando el país comienza a salir de su crisis política.Gráfico 4Fuente: http://www.infocadena.com/columnistas/columnistas.html3) Enfoque Neo-institucionalistaDe las tres teorías elegidas, el neo-institucionalismo representa más cabalmente a una explicación que descansa en una X, es decir, variables no relacionales que reflejan escenarios donde es difícil o incluso imposible modificar determinadas situaciones. Argentina y Chile: Primera Convergencia (1880-1929)Sin embargo, definir las instituciones como X es problemático: si bien es muy difícil modificar las instituciones estructuralmente de un período a otro, sí es posible modificar sucesivas instituciones en el mediano y largo plazo. En Argentina hay una amplia literatura que explica la larga decadencia (o divergencia) a partir del creciente incumplimiento de los preceptos de la Constitución liberal de 1853-60. ¿Qué significa un "creciente incumplimiento" de una determinada norma o un conjunto de normas? Si bien es difícil medirlo, es posible mencionar una creciente debilidad de los derechos de propiedad. Para una economía insertada en el mundo a partir de las ventajas comparativas del modelo agro-exportador, la delimitación de los derechos de propiedad es una condición más relevante de lo que lo es para, ceteris paribus, una economía cerrada.Paso seguido, la experiencia argentina tiene distintos hitos institucionales relevantes que contribuyen a pensar que, en un determinado momento, "las instituciones" contribuyeron para la convergencia y en otro momento contribuyeron para la divergencia. Pero si eso es así, ello podría significar que o una misma institución explica A y no-A o que las instituciones fueron paulatinamente modificadas y suena anti-tuitivo.Si bien sería necesaria una argumentación más elaborada, el papel de las instituciones en el modelo de De La Fuente podría representar tanto una X como un β. Sin embargo, en ese escenario nos enfrentaríamos a un problema adicional ya que sería necesario definir instituciones en forma más precisa y rigurosa. Es decir, sería sencillo refutar esta definición (las instituciones como X y β) sosteniendo que en realidad no es que "las instituciones sean X y β" sino que no es posible hablar como si las reglas de juego fueran uniformes. Así, sería necesario desagregar aquello que, por falta de rigurosidad, habríamos agregado en nuestra definición inicial. Siguiendo este simple y válido razonamiento: no es que "las instituciones" puedan ser X y B dependiendo las circunstancias sino que hay reglas de juego que son X y hay otras reglas de juego que son B y eventualmente sucede que algunas reglas de juego devienen en instituciones formales.Paso seguido, en Argentina el neo-institucionalismo sería un X que explicaría el primer período de convergencia entre 1880 y 1929 a partir de la existencia de un aparato estatal y una dinámica sociedad civil que acogieron e interpretaron el espíritu liberal de la Constitución de 1853. Esta Constitución estaba inspirada en parte en la Constitución de los Estados Unidos y en los escritos de Juan Bautista Alberdi (principalmente, "Bases y puntos de partida para la organización nacional" y "Sistema económico y rentístico"). Es importante remarcar que dentro de estas "condiciones iniciales" mencionamos tanto el espíritu de la letra constitucional (que, según esta tradición de pensamiento, fue respetada por el aparato estatal) como también mencionamos el espíritu de la sociedad civil. ¿Puede ser tomada una sociedad civil como parte de determinadas "condiciones iniciales"? Ello podría haber sucedido dada la particular experiencia inmigratoria argentina de finales del siglo XIX. Es decir, Argentina era una nueva nación en el momento que recibió una gran oleada inmigratoria europea y ello habría contribuido a un papel fundacional o, en términos de De La fuente, a constituirse (la inmigración) en un X en lugar de un β. En cambio, podemos pensar que una similar oleada inmigratoria en la actualidad no podría constituirse como actor fundacional y devendría un β. Así, podemos ver que un mismo actor o variable es un X en un contexto y un β en otro contexto.La declinación argentina ha fascinado a investigadores de distinto tipo. Por ejemplo, el austaliano Alan Taylor comienza un artículo en "The Journal of Economic History" de la siguiente manera: "Once one of the richest countries in the world, Argentina has been in relative economic decline for most of the twentieth century. The quantitative records of income growth and accumulation date the onset of the retardation to around the time of the Great War, and patterns of aggregate saving and foreign borrowing show that scarcity of investable resources significantly frustrated interwar development. A demographic model of national saving demonstrates that the burdens of rapid population growth and substantial immigration depressed Argentine saving, contributing significantly to the demise of the Belle Epoque following the wartime collapse of international financial markets" ("External Dependence, Demographic Burdens, and Argentine Economic Decline After the Belle Epoque" que, Vol 52, Nro 4, 1992).Por su parte, otro reconocido historiador como el cubano Carlos Díaz-Alejandro es citado por Taylor en el mismo artículo con la siguiente frase: "It is common nowadays to lump the Argentine economy in the same category with the economies of other Latin American nations. Some opinion even puts it among such less developed nations as India and Nigeria. Yet, most economists writing during the first three decades of this century would have placed Argentina among the most advanced countries-with Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia. To have called Argentina "underdeveloped" in the sense that word has today would have been considered laughable. Not only was per capita income high, but its growth was one of the highest in the world.'"Siguiendo el pensamiento de Taylor y Díaz-Alejandro, es posible pensar que la historia va camino a repetirse y que esta última convergencia podría estar llegando a su fin. Consiguientemente, será necesario en otro momento estudiar la divergencia Argentina con respecto a Chile. Pedro Isern es profesor del Depto. Estudios Internacionales, FACS - Universidad ORT Uruguay.Master en Filosofía Política, London School of Economics and Political Science@Pedropisern.

The question of how to balance environmental protection with economic growth is at the forefront of policy agendas around the world. For Peru, environmental issues have opened new perspectives on how to manage natural resources while combating poverty and pursuing economic growth. A way of responding to the political and economic crisis of the eighties was the process of stabilisation, structural reform, and reform of the state that took place in Peru starting from 1991. The implementation of reforms, at the national level, implied the adoption of a new institutional and regulatory framework. Those reforms included market liberalisation, privatisation of state-owned enterprises and trade liberalisation. Environmental institutions and regulations have found a place in that framework. The reform process in the Peruvian case refers to a paradigm change from an attempt to emulate the economic and political systems of European welfare states (prevalent in the sixties and seventies) to a liberal political and economic system following the path inspired by the Chicago School of Economics in the eighties. In Peru, the failure in the implementation of successful economic policies targeting the poor ended undermining the system that sustained the political parties, aiding to its atomisation and eventual demise. Thus, in the political realm, Peru is a democracy in transition that still needs to strength the pillars of the democratic institutions that embody the political system. In Peru, the introduction of sustainable development issues took place first at the level of institutions and regulations. One of the sectors that had to adapt the most to the introduction of environmental issues was mining. Peru possess 16 percent of the world reserves of silver, 15 percent of reserves of copper, 7 percent of the world reserves of zinc, and important volumes of reserves on other strategic minerals. Mining is a capital-intensive activity and usually has had an important toll in the regions in which has been carried on. The reforms prompted during the nineties had as aim to open mining resources to foreign and national private investors that, in exchange of favourable tax and revenue conditions, would invest the amounts necessary to develop a sector which was languishing after ten years of internal war. The copper and gold mining sectors have been the busiest during the last decade and represented the most important part of Peruvian mining exports as well. In terms of gold mining production, Peru is consistently the largest producer in Latin America and the eight largest worldwide. Environmental policies in the mining sector were regarded with distrust by the economic actors. The main argument was that environmental conditions would be an additional obstacle to investment, putting the country in disadvantage in relation to others when attracting foreign capital. The approach favoured was to have as few regulations as possible. Mining operators were not motivated to undertake costly industrial renewal and re-engineering techniques. At the same time, environmental NGOs and CBOs were actively advocating for a sound environmental policy framework for the mining sector. Meanwhile, the government was mainly interested in achieving economic growth, with environmental liabilities as a second priority. The approach taken was to facilitate large project investment on natural resources extraction in Peru, particularly in the mining, gas and oil sectors. The subject matter of this research is to study environmental policies in the context of political transition in the mining sector in Peru. This research is set up in the fields of political sciences and public policy. The research focuses on the institutions and actors interacting in the context of public policies for the environment in the mining sector in Peru, taking as case study the conflicts emerged through gold exploration in Northern Peru (Yanacocha, Cajamarca) during the period 1999-2004. Significantly, the research has as background the political struggles emerged during the same period, due to the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic government in the country. The overall objective is to contribute to a better understanding of the role of institutions and actors in the design and implementation of environmental policies through an analysis of the institutional and regulatory framework underlying such policies. The aim of this research is to contribute filling the gap in the academic research on how the implementation of environmental policy at the national level takes place, in the context of political change. This research will provide insight on in how far environmental problems are rooted in the overall development problems the country faces. The research shall contribute to the discussion on environmental policy in unstable political settings, adding inputs into the debate on the process of reform of the state, as proposed in Peru in the last years. The final aim is to contribute to an improved policy making process in the environmental field, taking into account the case of countries like Peru, subject to political instability and dependant on natural resources extraction for economic growth. The case study of this research is gold mining extraction in the Peruvian Northern Andes (Cajamarca) carried out by Minera Yanacocha S.R.L., a joint venture of Newmont Mining Co. (U.S.A.), Compañía de Minas Buenaventura S.A. (Peru), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of The World Bank Group. Yanacocha is the second biggest goldmine in the world. The Yanacocha case brings together issues of interaction between government agencies at the national and at the regional and local levels, public participation and grievances, interaction of power and lobby groups, environmental damages with international repercussions, environmental issues as trigger for political claims, foreign investment involvement added to international financial institutions backing, among the most important. MYSRL is now the largest Latin American gold producer, while Cajamarca from being the fourth poorest department in Peru has gone to become the second poorest. The Peruvian case is worth studying, as environmental institutions and regulations have been set up in the context of a state under reform and political instability. Mining in Peru is an economic sector in strong conflict with environmental interests. To study the case of the Peruvian gold mining can give us important lessons to draw on for the design and implementation of environmental policy and law in the context of political change processes. For that reason, it is an ideal ground for exploring in how far successful environmental policies are possible to achieve under reform and transition conditions. Because of the economic importance of mining in the Peruvian context and the different interests at stake, a case study for the analysis of the institutional and regulatory framework for the environment in Peru is relevant as it helps analyse the links between political and economic issues and environmental problems. Furthermore, the mining sector reflects almost accurately the balance of interests, power and decision making processes (relating to public policy and environment) in Peru. Chapter 2 presents an analysis of the theoretical building blocks that inform the concept of "environmental policy." In Chapter 3, a historical perspective is taken to analyse the introduction of environmental issues in the Latin American context. In Chapter 4, after an introduction to the political system of Peru, the political and economic background of the country is discussed, in the light of the process of reform of the state that took place during the nineties, parallel to the introduction of environmental policies in Peru. In Chapter 5, the Peruvian institutional and regulatory framework for the environment is analysed. Further, Chapter 5 analyses the environmental policies introduced in the country as part of the process of reform of the state during the nineties. Chapter 6 presents the mining sector and the environment in Peru. In Chapter 7, the case of gold exploration in the Northern Peruvian Andes by Minera Yanacocha Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada is analysed. This is an example of the problems stemming from large-scale mining projects. In the light of the conflicts of Cajamarca, environmental, mining and public policies need to be reassessed to attain a logical framework that can effectively serve to promote private investment, while, at the same time, strengthening human rights. The inclusion of participation, empowerment, good governance, and accountability in the Peruvian political system is a duty to allow democracy to take root in the context of a society that still has very much to overcome and achieve to deliver effectively the promise of development to its citizens. ; Umweltpolitik im politischen Übergangsprozess - Der peruanische Bergbausektor und der Yanacocha Goldbergbau Die Frage, wie Umweltschutz mit wirtschaftlichem Wachstum in ein Gleichgewicht gebracht werden kann, ist Gegenstand politischer Programme auf der ganzen Welt. Für Länder wie Peru haben Umweltfragestellungen neue Perspektiven eröffnet, insbesondere wie natürliche Ressourcen gemanagt werden können, während zugleich die Armut bekämpft und wirtschaftliches Wachstum erreicht wird. Wege, um den politischen und wirtschaftlichen Krisen in den achtziger Jahren zu begegnen, waren ein Prozess der wirtschaftliche Stabilisierung, strukturelle Reformen und die Reform des Staates, welche in Peru seit 1991 unternommen werden. Die Implementierung der Reformen auf der nationalen Ebene implizierte die Annahme eines neuen institutionellen und rechtlichen Rahmens. Diese Reformen umfassten die Liberalisierung des Marktes, die Privatisierung von staatseigenen Unternehmen und die Liberalisierung des Handels. Umwelt Institutionen Umweltrecht haben einen Platz in diesem Rahmen gefunden. Der Transformationsprozess beruht auf einem Paradigmenwechsel ausgehend von dem Versuch, den wirtschaftlichen und politischen Systemen der europäischen Wohlfahrtsstaaten nachzueifern (weit verbreitet in den sechziger und siebziger Jahren) hin zu einem liberalen politischen und wirtschaftlichen System, das den von der Chicago School of Economics in den achtziger Jahren empfohlenen Weg verfolgte. Im Falle Perus bewirkte das Scheitern des Versuchs einer erfolgreichen, auf die Bekämpfung der Armut abzielenden Wirtschaftspolitik, eine Schwächung jenes Systems, das die politischen Parteien aufrecht hielt und führte zu seiner Atomisierung und endgültigen Auflösung. Auf der anderen Seite ist Peru im politischen Bereich eine Demokratie in Übergang, die Säulen des politischen Systems und die demokratischen Institutionen, die es verkörpern, weiter stärken muss. In Peru wurden Fragestellungen einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung zuerst auf der Ebene der Institutionen und der gesetzlichen Bestimmungen behandelt. Einer der Sektoren, der sich am meisten auf die Einführung von Umweltregelungen anpassen musste, war der Bergbau. Peru besitzt 16 Prozent der Weltreserven an Silber, 15 Prozent der Reserven an Kupfer und 7 Prozent der Weltreserven an Zink, sowie wichtige Anteile an den Reserven anderer strategischer Mineralien. Bergbau ist ein kapitalintensives Betätigungsfeld und für gewöhnlich hat er in den Regionen, in denen er sich entwickelte, bedeutende Auswirkungen entfaltet. Die in den neunziger Jahren veranlassten Reformen hatten zum Ziel, die Ressourcen innerhalb des Bergbaus ausländischen und nationalen privaten Investoren zu öffnen, die im Austausch mit günstigen Steuerbedingungen und Gewinnmöglichkeiten die notwendigen immensen Beträge investieren würden, um einen Sektor zu entwickeln, der nach zehn Jahren Bürgerkrieg stagnierte. Der Kupferbergbau und der Goldbergbau waren in der vergangenen Dekade am größten und stellten zugleich den wichtigsten Teil der peruanischen Exporte aus dem Bergbausektor. Im Hinblick auf die Produktion von Gold im Bergbau ist Peru der größte Produzent in Lateinamerika und der achtgrößte weltweit. Umweltpolitik im Bergbausektor wurde mit Zweifel betrachtet. Das Hauptargument lag darin, dass Umweltkonditionen zusätzliche Hindernisse darstellen, die das Land gegenüber anderen im Hinblick auf die Gewinnung von ausländischen Investitionen benachteiligt. Der bevorzugte Ansatz war, so wenig gesetzliche Bestimmungen wie möglich zu haben. Im Bergbau aktive Konzerne besaßen keine Motivation, kostspielige industrielle Erneuerungen auf sich zu nehmen und neue Techniken einzuführen. Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs) im Bereich der Umwelt und in den Gemeindeverwurzelte Organisationen (CBOs) traten aktiv für einen soliden (rechtlichen) Rahmen zur Umweltpolitik im Bergbausektor ein. Das Interesse der Regierung galt indessen nur dem wirtschaftlichen Wachstum, sogar auf Kosten von Belastungen für die Umwelt. Ihr Ansatz war, jedes größere Investitionsprojekt bezüglich des Abbaus von natürlichen Ressourcen in Peru zu fördern, im Besonderen im Bergbau und in den Sektoren Gas und Öl. Das Thema dieser Arbeit ist die Untersuchung der Umweltpolitik im Bergbausektor im Kontext des politischen Übergangs in Peru. Diese Forschungsarbeit ist den Bereichen der Politikwissenschaft und der öffentlichen Politik zuzuordnen. Sie legt einen Fokus auf die Institutionen und Akteure, welche im Kontext der Umweltpolitik im Bergbausektor in Peru interagieren. Als Fallbeispiele werden die Konflikte gewählt, welche aufgrund des Goldabbaus im Norden Perus (Yanacocha, Cajamarca) im Zeitraum 1999-2004 aufkamen. Bedeutungsvoll ist, dass die politischen Auseinandersetzungen, die im gleichen Zeitraum angesichts des Übergangs von einer autoritären zu einer demokratischen Regierungsform im Land stattfanden, den Hintergrund der Untersuchung bilden. Die allgemeine Zielsetzung besteht darin, einen Beitrag zu einem besseren Verständnis der Rolle von Institutionen und Akteuren hinsichtlich der Gestaltung und Implementierung von Umweltpolitik, durch eine Analyse des dieser zugrunde liegenden institutionellen und rechtlichen Rahmens, zu leisten. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, dazu beizutragen, die Lücke in der wissenschaftlichen Forschung hinsichtlich der Frage zu schließen, wie sich die Implementierung von Umweltpolitik auf der nationalen Ebene im Kontext eines politischen Wandels vollzieht. Diese Arbeit wird in ein Thema Einblick gewähren: Inwieweit sind Umweltprobleme in den allgemeinen Entwicklungsproblemen verwurzelt, mit denen das Land konfrontiert wird? Die Untersuchung soll einen Beitrag zur Diskussion über Umweltpolitik in einer unsicheren politischen Umgebung leisten und der Debatte über einen Reformprozess eines Staates – wie der Reformprozess, der in Peru in den letzten Jahren stattfand – Impulse gab. Letztendlich ist das Ziel, zu einem verbesserten Prozess der Politikgestaltung im Umweltbereich für Länder wie Peru beizutragen, die politische Instabilität unterworfen sind und für wirtschaftliches Wachstum vom Abbau natürlicher Ressourcen abhängig sind. Das Fallbeispiel dieser Dissertation ist der Abbau von Gold in den nördlichen peruanischen Anden (Cajamarca), die von "Minera Yanacocha S.R.L." vorgenommen wird, einem Gemeinschaftsunternehmen der "Newmont Mining Co." (Colorado, U.S.A.), der "Compañía de Minas Buenaventura S.A." (Lima, Peru) und der "International Finance Corporation" (IFC) der Weltbankgruppe. Yanacocha ist die zweitgrößte Goldmine der Welt. Der Fall Yanacocha vereint unter anderem Fragen des Zusammenspiels zwischen Behörden auf der nationalen sowie der regionalen und lokalen Ebene, öffentliche Partizipation und Beschwerden, das Zusammenspiel von Macht und Lobbygruppen, Umweltschäden mit internationalen Auswirkungen, Umweltfragestellungen als Auslöser für politische Ansprüche, die Beteiligung ausländischer Investoren, die von internationalen Finanzinstitutionen unterstützt werden. MSRL ist mittlerweile der größte Goldproduzent Lateinamerikas, während Cajamarca vom viert ärmsten Department in Peru zum zweit ärmsten geworden ist. Eine Untersuchung von Peru lohnt sich, da die Institutionen und gesetzlichen Bestimmungen bezüglich der Umwelt im Kontext eines reformierenden Staates und politischer Instabilität festgelegt wurden. Peru hat mit dem Bergbausektor einen wirtschaftlichen Bereich, der Umweltinteressen konfliktreich gegenüber steht. Im Rahmen der Untersuchung des peruanischen Goldabbaus können wichtige Schlussfolgerungen in Bezug auf die Ausgestaltung und Implementierung vom Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht im Kontext von politischen Veränderungsprozessen gezogen werden. Aus diesem Grunde ist das Fallbeispiel ideal, um zu ergründen, inwieweit die Realisierung einer erfolgreichen Umweltpolitik unter Reform- und Transformationsprozessen möglich ist. Aufgrund der wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung des Bergbaus in Peru und wegen der verschiedenen und oft konträren Interessen, die auf dem Spiel stehen, ist eine Fallstudie für die Analyse der institutionellen und rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen für die Umwelt in Peru relevant, da sie die Verbindungen zwischen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Fragestellungen sowie Umweltproblemen veranschaulicht und wichtigen Schlussfolgerungen für die Zukunft ermöglicht. Der Bergbausektor zeigt zudem unterschiedliche Interessen sowie die Macht- und Entscheidungsprozesse (bezüglich Politik und Umwelt), auf da für gewöhnlich die Entscheidungen hinsichtlich des Bergbausektors aufgrund der bereits erwähnten wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung auf der höchsten Ebene getroffen werden. Kapitel 2 bietet eine Analyse der Bausteine des theoretischen Gerüstes, das das Konzept der "Umweltpolitik" behandelt. In Kapitel 3 wird eine historische Perspektive vorgenommen, um die Einbringung von Umweltfragestellungen im lateinamerikanischen Kontext zu analysieren. In Kapitel 4 wird nach einer Einführung in das politische System Perus der politische und wirtschaftliche Hintergrund Perus im Lichte des Reformprozesses des Staates diskutiert, der in den neunziger Jahren parallel zur Einführung einer an der Umwelt orientierten Politik eingeleitet wurde. In Kapitel 5 wird der institutionelle und rechtliche Rahmen bezüglich der Umwelt des Landes analysiert. Weiter, Kapitel 5 analysiert weiter die Umweltpolitik, die als Teil des Reformprozesses des Staates in den neunziger Jahren im Land eingeführt wurde. Kapitel 6 stellt den Bergbausektor und die Umwelt in Peru vor. In Kapitel 7 wird das Fallbeispiel des Goldabbaus durch die Minera Yanacocha Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada (MYSRL) in den peruanischen nördlichen Anden analysiert. Im Lichte der Konflikte in Cajamarca müssen die Umweltpolitik, die Politik hinsichtlich des Bergbaus und die öffentliche Politik überdacht werden, um schlüssige Rahmenbedingungen zu schaffen, mit denen wirksam für private Investitionen geworben werden kann, und die zugleich nicht die Bürger gegenüber den privaten Investoren ungeschützt lassen. Die Einbeziehung von Partizipation, empowerment, good governance und Verantwortlichkeit in das politische System Perus ist eine Pflicht, damit die Demokratie in einer Gesellschaft Wurzeln schlagen kann, die noch immer viel überwinden und erreichen muss, um wirkungsvoll das seinen Bürgern gegebene Versprechen auf Entwicklung einzulösen.

Issue 46.5 of the Review for Religious, September/October 1987. ; REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS (ISSN 0034-639X), published every two months, is edited in collaboration with the faculty members of the Deparlment of Theological Studies of St. Louis University. The editorial offices are located at Room 428; 3601 Lindell Blvd.; St. Louis, MO. 63108-3393. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS is owned by the Missouri Province Educational Institute of the Society of Jesus, St. Louis, MO. ©1987 by REWEW FOR RELtG~OtJS. Single copies $2.50. Subscriptions: U.S.A. $11.00 a year; $20.00 for two years. Other countries: add $4.00 per year (surface mail); airmail (Book Rate): $18.00 per year. For subscription orders or change of address, write: REVIEW FOR RELI(;IOUS: P.O. Box 6070; D~luth, MN 55806. Daniel F.X. Meenan, S.J. Dolores Greeley, R.S.M. Iris Ann Ledden, S.S.N.D. Richard A. Hill, S.J. Jean Read M. Anne Maskey, O.S.F. Editor Associate Editor Review Editor Contributing Editor Assistant Editors September/October, 1987 Volume 46 Number 5 Manuscripts, books for review and correspondence with the editor should be sent to Rt:wEw voR Rt:Lmu)us; Room 428; 3601 Lindell Blvd.; St. Louis, MO 63108-3393. Correspondence about the department "Canonical Counsel" should be addressed to Richard A. Hill, S.J.; J.S.T.B.; 1735 LeRoy Ave., Berkeley, CA 94709. Back issues and reprints should be ordered from REVIEW t'OR REI.I(:IOUS; Room 428; 3601 Lindell Blvd.; St. Louis, MO 63108-3393. "Out of print" issues and articles not published as reprints are available from University Microfilms International; 300 N. Zeeb Rd.; Ann Arbor, M1 48106. A major portion of each issue is also available on cassette recordings as a service for the visu-ally impaired. Write to the Xavier Society for the Blind; 154 East 23rd Street; New York, NY 10010. What Do the Laity Expect of Religious Life Guzm6n Carriquiry This article was prepared for the USIG (International Union of Superiors General) and originally appeared in the USIG Bulletin (no. 73, 1987). It is reprinted here with permission. Dr. Carriquiry, a native of Uruguay, is married and father of four. He is head of the Pontifical Council for the Laity and a professor at the Pontifical University Urbaniana. Two Remarks and a Propitious Occasion '~(ou have proposed and requested a very difficult task. Probably I accepted it with a considerable lack of awareness. Preparing for this meeting, I was able to realize the predicament in which I had placed myself. I am not a theologian by profession and even less an expert on the theology of religious life. I have had to read and reflect a good deal on the theme, but even so, I feel very inadequate in facing such a delicate question. I will limit myself, therefore, t.o giving some impressions, reflections and challenges, without any pretense at having a profound penetration into the "mystery" of the religious life. I would like to make a second remark., through a concern for hon-esty. "What do the laity expect. ?" is the question. When we speak of "laity," however, we are referring to many different people. It is good to suspect, or at times to smile at, those who with an excessive fa-cility and pretension claim to be "representatives" of the laity (or of youth, or of the poor, or of women . . .). We are tempted to dress our-selves in plumed clothing in order to hide our nakedness and to give our-selves a better or stronger "image." I am going to answer the question-- What do the laity expect. ? knowing that there will be much that is 641 1542 / fleview for Religious, September-October, 1987 personal to this individual layman, to this poor Christian, as a result of his own journey, experience and convictions. The fact of working in the Pontifical Council for the Laity for many years, however, has placed me in a privileged situation because if one wishes to serve the participation of the laity in the life and mission of the Church effectively--which is the competency of this Dicastery--then it is necessary to listen to and follow with special attention the sensitivities, demands, needs and ex-periences which are part of this multifaceted lay world. I hope to be able to transmit some of this rich experience to you. If, however, there are two evident limitations to this contribution, there is no doubt that it comes at an opportune and propitious moment in the life of the Church. We are in the time between the recent past extraordinary Synod--a commemoration, verification and actualization of Vatican Council II twenty years after its conclusion--and the next ordinary Synod of 1987, which will have as its theme "The vocation and mission of the laity in the Church and in society." The relations between laity and religious are adequately clarified by the knowledge the Church has at present of its mystery of communion and of the demands of i(s mission. And all, bish-ops, priests, deacons, religious and laity--as is stated in the final mes-sage of the extraordinary Synod--are invited to participate in the work of preparation for the next Synod, which "should constitute a decisive step so that all Catholics might receive the grace of Vatican II." From an Ecclesiology of Communion We can begin from an obvious daily experience. Many walls of sepa-ration- material, cultural, ecclesiastical--have been torn down, and to-day a close, simple, fraternal experience of collaboration between the la-ity and religious is lived and shared. This occurs within the most diverse Christian communities, in the most varied works of the Church, in asso-ciations and movements, in structures of "communion and participa-tion" of the combined pastoral team of the local Churches . It is like an immediate, accessible, verified evidence of fraternal collaboration and of common participation. No one can deny it. It can be stated that this is like a reflection and a fruit, a sign and a realization of the "ecclesiology of communion" of Vatican Council II. This I give here as something taken for granted. I find it interesting to point out a double movement, indivisible, in the carrying out of this con-ciliar ecclesioiogy. On one hand, we have gradually gone beyond a cor-porate or governmental division between clergy, religious and laity, com-partmentalized and sometimes in tension or in struggle for the division Expectations of Religious Life / 643 of "power" in the Church. What is anterior and interior to any dis-tinction has been affirmed and accented in this developing movement; that is, what is more essential, common to all, more original and radical in all Christian life. We are members of the great family of the "Chris-tian faithful," incorporated into Christ by baptism, participants in his priesthood, called to holiness, with equal dignity in the eyes of God, all co-responsible for the communion and the mission of the Church. But all "in their own way" because, at the same time, we experience that we are distinct, that this unity of all does not reduce us to uniformity and impoverish us by it, but that it develops fruitfully in the diversity of vo-cations, ministries and charisms which express and enrich the commun-ion and mission of the Church. It is with this ecclesiological basis and in intense ecclesial experience that we pose the question of what the laity expect of religious life . The Laity Expect "Something More" In the first place, I believe that many lay people would be surprised and somewhat disconcerted with the question, unable to respond in a con-scious and well-planned way. However, I think that, instinctively, in-tuitively, their response would be that of expecting "something more" of religious. Yes, they expect something more! Something more radical, more total, more definitive, more profound, more demanding and chal-lenging, in the relationship with God. They expect something more of holiness. In giving this spontaneous response, I pictured the alert, concerned, astonished reaction of the sister who says: "but, Dr . are not the laity also called to sanctity? . . ." And she says something obviously true if considered in the light of present ecclesial self-knowledge, but not so obvious in the understanding of all Christians. That conventional and arbitrary prejudice which seems to reserve holiness to the religious state, judging it in some way the monopoly of the following of Christ or of the evangelical counsels--has been gradually abandoned, and yet, at the same time, the lay condition was often considered a second-class Chris-tian life, a concession to human weaknesses. Ai times, the ideal of holi-ness was seen as a heroic and somewhat "aristocratic" option of per-fection, attained through the initiative of superior men and women. But, be at peace; good sister, because in ever greater numbers, the laity are becoming conscious of this universal vocation to holiness to which Chapter 15 of Lumen Gentium refers in a clear and distinct man-ner. 644 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 This being accepted, perhaps you still remain disturbed that the laity continue expecting from religious a greater radicality of commitment and donation to God (the three vows are like dimensions of a unique vow--I read this some days ago--of the vow of one's whole self, the gift of the entire person, offering oneself to God with all one's energies.); they expect a greater, more immediate and more total liberty and availability in order to follow-imitate-serve Christ; they expect a more direct and tan-gible referenceto the presence of the mystery of God in human life. They are very sure of what they expect even though they cannot always ex-press it well. For this reason, the ordinary lay person is much more exi-gent in observing and in judging the witness given by religious than that given by lay people. In general, this is so. It is surprising that this ex-pectation- which rises up from the "sensum fidei," from this "super-natural instinct" of simple Christians--corresponds perfectly to what the Church considers the radical originality of the religious life: to give wit-ness to and "impulse" in the area of the growth of life, of sanctity. Con-sciously or intuitively, the laity expect that religious will keep as a high priority the primacy, the radicality of the witness to sanctity, not as .a,pat-rimony or goal exclusively their own, but as a call and warning, a chal-lenge and attraction for all the members of the people of God toward this vocation and program of life. It is right that religious should be a bit disturbed when they feel them-selves burdened with such expectations because they feel that it is not. a question of a privilege but of a grave responsibility. In other words, there is a preferential love of God for each one of you--it was he who chose you first and who put his "aspiration" in you, and not you your-selves who decided to be more holy--which burdens you with responsi-bility in the response to God in the Church, I would say before the most "insignificant" of the baptized . . . and even before the most "care-less" of human beings. And it is not sufficient to p~ut on the habit~t~) say, "Lord, Lord." This vocation must be carried out effectively as the will of the Father. Saints or Reformers? In the long history of the Church one can find strong confirmation of what the laity today expect of the religious life. They expect what the Church has always expected, an assurance that they will never be de-prived of this "special gift" which is the religious life. Almost two mil-lennia of life teach that the crucial periods or phases of renewal of the Church--in its communion and in its mission--were brought about and' carried out through the great and liberated energies of holiness, and that Expectations of Religious Life / 645 in the "vanguard" of these holy and reforming energies the numerous and diverse charisms of the religious life proved powerful and fruitful. Let us have a bird's eye view of all this. - When the Church lived under the tension of the seducing powers of "worldliness" on the one hand and of vigorous heretical movements on the other, during the Roman-Christian Empire, the tradition of con-secrated life, of which the first witnesses are already met within the New Testament writings, flowered in the monastic experience, raising up a new spiritual "oxygenation," a passion for unity and a lively responsi-bility for the truth. - Shortly,afterwards, when Ambrose saw "the end of the world" in the total destruction of the Roman Empire of the West and before the invasion of the "barbarians," there came the charism of a Benedict-- as well as of Cyril and Methodius--whose cloistered disciples and fol-lowers would be nothing less than the evangelizers of the new peoples and the principal protagonists of the construction of a new civilization, medieval Christianity. - When the liberty of the Church was being strangled in the suffo-cating and corrupting embrace of feudal chains, currents of sanctity ra-diating from Cluny and Cister made possible the Gregorian reform and a sort of "second evangelization" of medieval Christianity. - And before the upheaval of the urban-mercantile-university revo-lution of the later medieval period--when the sectarian phenomena were swarming like so many devious responses to new sensitivities and cul-tural demands which went beyond the limits of the feudal "order"-- God enriched the communion and mission of the Church with the men-dicant orders for the most incisive and suitable evangelization of the new world and the new culture in process of being born. - And how is it possible to speak of the "Catholic reform" at the moment of the Council of Trent in face of the drama and challenge of the "Protestant reform" and the new missionary needs created by the European expansion at the dawn of modem times without considering the holy charisms of Ignatius, Teresa of Avila, Philip Neri, Angela Merici, Francis de Sales, Vincent de Paul. ? - In the second half of the nineteenth century, the intellectual, spiri-tual and missionary revival of the Church, harassed by the impetus of the secularizing and anti-clerical modernism, had its strong point in the multiplication of religious orders, masculine and feminine, which it would take too long to mention . 646 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 This is a mere schematic outline, certainly, but substantially true in what I wish to demonstrate. Speaking to Superiors General, after hav-ing mentioned the names of great and holy founders, John Paul II con-cluded: All these names testify that the paths of holiness, to which the members of the people of God are called, passed and continue to pass in great part through religious life. And there is no need to marvel at that, given the fact that religious life was founded on the most precise "prescription" for holiness, constituted by love lived according to the evangelical coun-sels. Also, mentioning two essential criteria for the renewal of religious life, the Pope said during his trip to Brazil: The first criterion is that religious life (and concretely every religious community) is not seriously renewed if the objective of the renewal is, in fact, the seeking of the greatest ease and convenience, but only if this objective is the seeking of what is most authentic in religious life and most harmonious with it. The second criterion is that religious life is re-newed by being ever more a road of sanctity. This is nothing else than what is stated by the conciliar decree Per-fectae Caritatis in Number 21. All this brings to mind a marvelous reminder of John Paul II to the laity, when he celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the conciliar de-cree Apostolicam Actuositatem in November, 1985: The Church needs great currents, movements and testimonies of holi-ness among the Christian faithful because it is from holiness that all authentic renewal of the Church is born, all enrichment of the intelli-gence of faith and of the following of Christ, a vital and fruitful re-actualization of Christianity in meeting with human needs, renewed forms of presence in the heart of human existence and in the culture of the nations. More than "reformers," the Church needs saints--frequently re-peats the Pope because saints are the best reformers. And this is the same point stressed by all the participants in the recent extraordinary Synod. Twenty years after the end of Vatican Council II the "univer-sal vocation to sanctity" must have the primacy. Between Crises and Hopes Well. twenty years after the end of Vatican Council II, that great gift of God to the Church of our times, in this crucial phase of renewal of the Church. how does it appear to you? Are religious in the van- Expectations of Religious Life / 647 guard, as first and primary witnesses of those energies and currents of sanctity which effectively renew the Church and the world? A lay per-son responds with fear and trembling: it does not seem to me to be so. Certainly there are not lacking admirable personal and communitarian tes-timonies in religious life--we have them present here--which have an impact far beyond the visible limits of the Church. Thanks be to God! But, in general, there are also the weighty results of the convulsive cri-sis which occurred during the first phase of the "post-conciliar times." The great yon Balthasar says that the strong crisis felt by the Church in the immediate post-conciliar time, and which was partially a crisis of secularization and partially a crisis of comprehension of authority in the Church, affected the priesthood and the religious state in the very depths of its theology and in a manner in-comparably stronger than for the laity who had no great reason to re-flect on its identity and to question itself. What a painful distance there was between the great conciliar hopes of an "adequate renewal of religious life" and the heavy price of un-certainty and instability, of disquiet and disoriented nervousness, of secu-larization and crisis which followed it: so heavy a price that some are still suffering from the results of it and many were ruined by it. A heavy price which indicates, on the one hand, how fossilized and anachronis-tic were some forms inherited from the past--already hatching a crisis under a rather sclerotic shell--and which signals, on the other hand, de-vious and unilateral interpretations and actions in the realization of the renewal desired by Council;, in which there tended to predominate worldly criteria rather than an authentic and rigorous discernment "of the spirit." And this is not the result of expert examinations. The ordinary laity witnessed this crisis when, for example, sending their children to Catho-lic schools, they realized that many religious were leaving their commu-nities, that there were very few novices, that those who remained were usually the oldest . But where do vocations come from? From the grace of God which is never lacking, and from the response of lay men and women who wish to live their baptism more radically. These have not been lacking in these twenty post-conciliar years either. So? We tend to take refuge in a detailed and often rather intellectual enumeration of all the obstacles which are found on the road of total commitment: secu-larism, consumerism, pansexualism, and so forth. Who can deny this? But the "worldly" difficultie~ ought to make even more evident the chal-lenging vigor in the sign, the witness, thecalling. Perhaps the most se- Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 rious,reply with regard to the "crisis" is that, in these last decades, re-ligious life has failed to be radical enough in its following of Christ, suf-ficiently rooted in the full certainties of life, passionate enough as an ex-pression of the mystery of communion, challenging enough for con-version, vigorous enough in its apostolate, transparent enough in its wit-ness to awaken amazement, fascination, admiration, imitation among the many laity made aware of the requirements of baptism and of their Chris-tian responsibility. Today the "uneasy time" has passed. Serenity has been regained. There are promising signs of an increase of vocations. From the at-tempted experimentations there have come more criteria to consolidate the positive and reject the negative. There is a different atmosphere. Re-ligious life is beginning to reflect the new ecclesiai climate. But the Church expects much more from it. It should be strengthened in the Lord. A crisis is fully overcome when the reasons which caused it are discerned in depth: crisis of spiritual discipline, crisis of authority, obe-dience, crisis of communion . It is necessary to "refound" relig-ious life, said Don Egidio Viganb a few years ago. And the great con-necting threads for this new phase of the carrying out of the Council, which gave direction to this refoundation, seem clear: radicality on the road of holiness, passion for the truth, solidity and fidelity to com-munion, missionary impetus of a new evangelization. New Forms of Consecrated Life If there has been a crisis of religious institutes--also states Balthasar--it cannot be said that there has been a crisis of consecrated life because, in addition to the traditional forms of religious life, there have been developing lately new forms of consecration, new forms of "monastic" experiences in the world. In the vigorous "ecclesial move-ments" at the present time--such as the Focolarini, Communion and Lib-eration, Charismatic Renewal in the Spirit--and also in very many other communitarian experiences on local levels, there have been maturing per-sons and groups of persons who have decided, privately, to assume as a radical commitment the practice of the evangelical counsels in life com-munities. These types of vocations have abounded and a great number of new vocations, especially to the contemplative religious life, come from these movements. To be sure, history teaches that different impulses of renewal of re-ligious life are generated from strong charismatic and communitarian ex-periments which do not fit easily into existing forms and which were gen-erating--- or were heading toward--new roads of sanctity. But those more Expectations of Religious Life / 649 and more numerous lay vocations to live the evangelical counsels in a radical form, in forms that are different from the traditional forms of "consecration," should constitute a questioning and challenging sign for religious institutes. Why do they not have a similar attraction? On the other hand, the institutes have a precious patrimony of traditions and of spiritual wisdom which, revitalized and clarified, could be of primary im-portance in facing and directing the new forms which are arising. In the Return of the Sacred Not a few attentive observers at the present time note the emerging signs of a complete process of cultural transition, as if we were in mo-ments of maximum realization and, at the same time, of exhaustion 'from the process of secularization stirred up by the secularist and materialis-tic ideologies: a nihilistic phase, the indifferent absence of great motives and ideals of life, spiritual emptiness and lethargy, the predominance of the miserable idols of money, pleasure, power. At the same time there are emerging everywhere, at times with surprising or ambiguous mani-festations, new sensitive, new "significant" dem~inds, new "religious" expectations. Do we, perhal~s, 'see this under such varied signs as the re-vitalization of the cultural-religious substratum of some nations-- Poland, the Philippines, Haiti;--the resistance to secularizing modern-ism: the renewal of Islam; the accelerated and dangerous expansion of sects and of "mysterious" and "esoteric" cults; the sensitive "relig-ious" antennae of the new generations of youth; the increase of priestly and religious vocations; the great number of places in which individuals and whole peoples claim at the present time to have enjoyed apparitions of the Virgin; the enormous popular repercussions of the apostolic trips of the Holy Father; the growing flood of pilgrims going to the sanctuar-ies of their country? And in so many other and varied ways . "In s.pite of secular-ism," says the final message of the extraordinary Synod, "there exist also signs of a return to the sacred . . , of a new hunger and thirst for the transcendent and the divine . We should open the way to the di-mension of the 'divine' or of the 'mystery.' " This resurgence of the sacred--states a synodal father--will be more vigorous yet in the perspective of the end of the second millennium, but care must be taken so that the response and satisfaction of this new sen-sitivity and need is not given through devious channels and forms, frus-trating in the end because it will appear that the Catholic Church does not itself refer sufficiently to the sacred. 650 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 The whole Church is challenged, but I ask if there is not a special warning call to religious life. Instead of pursuing a retarded and submis-sive adaptation to a secularist culture in process of disintegration, the signs of an emerging culture can be fed on and deciphered only by the signs of the Absolute of God, by the radical testimony of the Mystery of God in human life. In the Agitation of the Secular Life Now let us be more specific. Let us look more carefully at the con-crete and daily experience of lay people. It is their specific work to or-der the world according to the designs of God, to live their Christian vo-cation in the ordinary conditions of family, work, and social life, in the logic and even dullness of created things. This is the road-~diversified in an enormous multiplicity of ways---of their sanctification. Yes, in-deed! I believe that there are many silent, hidden, daily witnesses to sanc-tity among lay people. At times, however, it is truly wearying to have to endure a certain "idealism" or a great deal of ecclesiastical rhetoric when reference is made to the lay state, to the "adult lay person". One gets the im-pression that often it is an abstraction of the real rhythm and weight of the normal day of an ordinary lay person. It is necessary to sanctify and to sanctify oneself in the family, professional and social life. But, how avoid being "pulled about," absorbed by a permanent agitation of the rhythm of life in order to obtain those material and spiritual times nec-essary to give "breath," "feeling" and an orientation to one's own life? Generally, in order to find these moments, as, for example, to as-sist at Mass, to pray in the family, to speak of God with one's children, to grow spiritually as a couple, to be silent., it is necessary to strug-gle and even more, to acquire a "discipline" and to respect it and to put it into practice. Most often one is pulled along by the bustle of the activities, preoccupations, responsibilities and the immediate anxieties of daily life to such a point that life becomes opaque, gray, is impover-ished of spiritual content, goes on marginalizing "the religious" to de-termined ritual moments which become ever more infrequent. And yet more . The laity are asked to assume ecclesiai and secu-lar responsibilities which are on a large scale and require time and la-bor. They are asked to be "militant." And that i~ fine. But what does it mean concretely? That the hours dedicated as catechist in the parish or in teams of service, or to meetings of movements or apostolic groups to which they belong, or absorbed by union responsibilities or participa-tion in the political party--and in this type of commitment the demands Expectations of Religious Life / 651 always seem to multiply if one wishes things to go along better continu-ally-. those hours of "militancy" have to be taken or "stolen" from the domestic and family life at the end of a day's work. For this reason, lay militants are always unstable minorities, threat-ened with discontinuity, doubly sacrificed, in abnegation and dedication. This is not to be regretted; it is their normal habitual condition. Great institutions are not built nor great works done with "extra" hours. Two remarks seem important for service of religious life in face of these situations of the laity. The first is to realize the need that the lay people have--today more than ever---of time, signs and specific spaces of prayer, of being filled with the perspective of the kingdom, savoring the things of God, becoming impregnated with the spirit of the beatitudes which can provide specific nourishment for their family, professional or political life. Many lay people look at and are seeking the contemplative life of religious communities so as to enter into contact with their spiri-tual radiation. You know how difficult it is to be contemplatives in the secular life, since many of your communities are dedicated to works of the apostolate. You can imagine how much more difficult it is for the laity . The second remark refers to the availability of religious for the serv-ice of the Gospel when compared to the obligations of lay people. When I end my day's work, I return home, not in order to rest but to help my wife who is carrying out her duties for the children, to bathe the little ones, to attend to a thousand little domestic needs . I would like to read so many things that could help me grow--and my wife also, natu-rally- but I do not have the time. I would like to visit friends in diffi-culty, to participate in ecclesial or cultural meetings which seem impor-tant to me, to get to know important persons or experiences. But I can-not sacrifice more than a minimum of family time. It is in my marriage and in my family that I see my first and most important responsibilities as a Christian. I am a happy man, but at times I admire and envy the "full time" workers for the Gospel, the "professional revolutionaries" of the Church, those who consecrate themselves exclusively and totally to the Lord. They should show a liberty and availability of tremendous energies for the most varied services for the Christian people. Does it perhaps happen that where there is more time to dispose of, there is more time to waste? On Political Participation If the chief witness of the laity is the Christian presence in the con-duct of the economy of creation, this does not mean that this is a field 659 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 exclusively reserved to them. The witness of lay people challenges re-ligious to go beyond caricatures of flight from the world and to consider their own consecration to God a radical commitment in the service of hu-man beings and of society. The great contributions of the religious life in social construction and progress can be found throughout history; but it is a fact that since the Council they have been going beyond the nar-row horizons, the so-called exclusivity or spiritual incompetence in the name of which religious life degenerated into forms of insensitivity in the face of situations and conditions of injustice and oppressiori suffered by persons, social groups, entire peoples. If the struggle for justice is a constitutive dimension of evangeliza-tion; if the defense and promotion of the dignity, rights and liberties of all human beings are a necessary part of the mission of the Church; if the kingdom of God--kingdom of peace and of justice, of truth and of love--is growing mysteriously in human, history--no religious can con-sider extraneous to her own peculiar vocation these commitments and tasks. It also falls to the religious "to evangelize the political' '--as says the Puebla document--in the sense of values of the Gospel and in con-formity with them. Up to this point, everything is clear. But there are cases in which, in the face of flagrant situations of injustice, misery and violence, when a vigorous and incisive commitment on the part of lay people is lacking, religious feel called to a more direct, surer, more incisive social and po-litical action. No one can be "neutral" in face of such situations. Even in these cases, however, it is necessary, on the one hand, to control the "immediate reaction" which ends up by absorbing and weakening the original vocation of the religious, and on th~ other, to prevent their ac-tions ending up in a well-determined political praxis, in a militant, dis-ciplined commitment, organized in a political party or strategy, with a basic reference to power. In taking this road, the premises for "secularization" are created. In addition, there is the "clerical" temptation of using prestige, social weight and the cultural representativity of ecclesiastics--above all, in Christian environments--as a basis to affirm definite political options worthwhile and free in themselves, and left then to the prudence of each Christian. In cases in which this "political praxis" of religious exists, many of the laity are conscious of a great lack of preparation of an "idealis-tic" voluntarism which substitute forms of "moral indignation" for the complex calculation of political .analysis. Expectations of Religious Life The categorical imperative "it is necessary to become committed" is identified, by some religious, in a mech'anical or simplistic manner with a "plunging into" the agitation of political matters without discern-ment. And this "plunging," with their lack of technical and political preparation, with their "ecclesiastical" condition of life far from the re-alistic stability of family and professional life and responsibility, with their lack of respect for the "weightiness" of the daily life of ordinary mortals, and with their counting on the particular protection of the Church--all this ends up by creating a particular type of untrustworthy political person and confused religious. The ease and simplicity with which some religious pass from traditional forms of life to political radi-calizations and moralistic ideologies is incredible. They are easily ma-nipulated and absorbed into a horizon which gradually becomes a prior-ity and then into a respect which becomes a substitute for ecclesial communion. Truly the Pope is right in insisting that it is not the proper role for religious to be converted into political or union leaders, and even less into state functionaries! Various Methods of Service to Humanity In these experiences of specific political participation, there is, on the part of religious, even if not consciously, a certain devaluation of their particular vocation and, consequently, an inferiority complex which makes one want to excel in the typically lay manner of service to human-ity. This service seems identified with social and political militancy if it is to be truly efficacious. Anything else seems like alienation, indif-ference and even the complicity of religious with injustice and oppres-sion. With this attitude as a basis, there comes a loss of confidence in the specificity of the religious consecration as a fundamental manner of serv-ice to humanity. The council was already warning about this when it said: Let no one think that, by their consecration, religious have become strang-ers to their feliowmen or useless citizens of this earthly city. But, even though in some instances they do not directly mingle with their contem-poraries, yet in a more profound sense, these religious are united with them in the heart of Christ and cooperate with them spiritually. In this way the work of building up the earthly city can always have its foun-dation in the Lord and can tend toward him. Otherwise, those who build this city will perhaps have labored in vain (LG n. 46). Does not the witness of St. Th6r~se of Lisieux teach us the incom- 654 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 parable value of prayer for all human service? Those who take on as a priority the construction of the world through matrimony, the administra-tion of goods and power--such are the laity--greatly need those who ac-company them with prayer as a priority, who remind them that we are in the world but not of the world and that we cannot conform ourselves to the present time; that we must safeguard and strengthen our Christian liberty in face of the seductions of the idols of money, power and pleas-ure; that the "logic" of the beatitudes is authentically revolutionary; that Christ is the cornerstone of all social construction which is to be truly human; that it is worth the trouble to struggle and sacrifice in order to continue creating conditions and experiences of greater justice, solidar-ity and peace so that nothing will be forgotten and all will be redeemed when God grants us "new heavens and a new earth". The best and most radical service to humanity is the testimony of a life which manifests the total supremacy of the love of God. For this rea-son, the special road of service to humanity for religious life consists, today more than ever, in being centered in one's "consecration," in a special care and cultivation of its religious dimension, of its discipline of life and spiritual growth. Living and Manifesting a Specific Charism This life according to the Spirit is diversified and deepened in the fol-lowing of the "charism of the founders." The apostolic exhortation Evangelica Testificatio and the decree Mutuae Relationes emphasized this in a special way. For the majority of lay people, however, I believe that this statement would not be well understood because there is the dan-ger of considering religious life generically, with little variations, with more or less uniform ways, barely differentiated into families with dif-ferent names and habits. It is necessary to ask if the various religious com-munities witness effectively to the gift they have received, to their own original spiritual richness, their particular contribution to the Christian enrichment of all the people of God. If fidelity to one's own charism is a form of obedience to the grace of Christ, if it characterizes the origi-nality of an evangelical project for the following of Christ and encour-ages the discovery of new lights and new dimensions of the totality of Christian life, if it is a specific way of sanctification, the greatest contri-bution of a religious community to the life of the Church and of each Christian is to keep'very much alive the fidelity to this charism, to live it with the same radicality as the founder lived it, to regenerate and radi-ate its relevancy before the needs of the Church and the people, I believe that thus the whole of the people of God would feel more "encouraged" Expectations of Religious Life / 655 and "worked upon" by the powerful ferment of renewal of Christian life. The laity who have contact with religious communities, directly or through schools, clinics, and so forth, would be much more "struck" by these radical charisms. All of that is contained in the generic term-- the Sisters. In this sense, we find much to the point the words of John Paul II in Brazil when, after having emphasized the great pastoral and apostolic service accomplished by religious, he stated: It is not because it is useful to the pastoral work that religious life occu-pies a very definite place in the Church and has an indispensable value. The contrary is true: religious life lends an efficacious service to the pas-toral work because it is and keeps itself firmly faithful to the position it occupies in the Church and to the charisms which characterize this po-sition. In addition, I ask myself if religious communities should not put more emphasis on the witness of the sanctity of their founders or spiri-tual teachers. Many times witness is of more value than words and Chris-tians need "models," fathers and teachers on the road of faith. Life Communities in the Church Permanent life communities which fully involve the person are found in the life of the Church only in religious communities and in Christian families. The differences between these two are obvious. The famil~ is a "natural" community, whose matrimonial nucleusbin the loving and fruitful union of the man and woman--is "sacramentalized" by the Church. The religious community does not have a "natural" base and those who participate in it freely sacrifice precious goods--such as the whole field of conjugal love, the free disposal of material goods, indi-vidual autonomy for the great decisions of life--for a Good, for a Love which is much greater. ~But in both cases we see, in different forms, the mystery of commun-ion which there is in the human origin and destiny and which becomes a daily miracle. In societies which are ever more disunited and frag-mented, where the powerful and uniforming tides of massification break up social bonds in the social fabric--much has been written about th'is-- these very forms of community life acquire even more importance and a great "impact." There is an intense desire for personal recognition, friendship, solidarity, authentic reconciliation, deeper and fuller human encounters and relationships so that people are very sensitive to the hu-man witness and acceptance of these life communities. 656 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 There are beautiful analogies which could be made between religious communities and. family communities. Do not the various aspects of hu-man love which are found ,in family life and which reflect the insepara-ble dimensions of divine love exist in their own manner and even more fully in the religious community as signs, glimpses, first-fruits of the king-dom? Both communities are based on the indestructible and fruitful foun-dation of a spousal love. While in the person-to-person encounter of the man and his wife, their passionate experience of love truly reflects the covenant of Christ with his Church, the religious lets herself be grasped directly and tota~lly by the limitless love of Christ, in the immediilcy of the covenant between Spouse and spouse, with the totality and sublima-tion of a commitment to which all human love is called. Cohsecrated vir-ginity- lived in its serene and mysterious fullness~is the sign of p~ssi-bility and of example to order and encourage the "chastity" of married life in this vital, delicate and fragile complex between the spi,ritual sway and instinctive impulses. There is a complete education to lib~rty, to do-minion over selfl which 'is a ~:ondition of authentic love--so important and urgent today on the level of tlae' new generations, determined and marked by a hedonist mentality and an atmosphere of flagrant eroticism-- which shines through a healthy religious life. ~ ~ The family, although implicitly, also requires a "rule" for i!s com-munity life, and authority is the prinqiple and guarantee of communion. In the rule of rules--that of St. Benedict--the "superior".of the com-mu~ nity is called "father"--abbot. It is good that the superior is recog-nized as "mother" and all are "sisters." Without paternity (maternity) we would remain orphans, community would disintegrate because it would be without a source and point of reference. This is the value of "authority" as derived from "augere," that which helps to increase, to grow in life, which permits the human to grow in persons. It i~ always a reflection on the paternity (maternity) of God, who giyes us life, makes. it grow in faith, brings it to plentitude. There is a spiritual fruitfulness which~.engenders abundant fruits of Christian life. Lay people often observe with special attention the life of r~eligious communities so as to see if they discover, if they perceive that "some-thin~ more" which they expect. For this reason, excessive formalism, minor quarrels, divisions, absence of human warmth, and more dull the communitarian witness. It is as if community were more an obligatory formality than a radiation of liberty and life. The laity must be able to see in the life of religious communities the carrying out in a small way of this reconciliation in depth, of this fraternity and solidarity,, of this Expectations of Religious Life / 657 peace and happiness in communion for which all human beings yearn in their heart, a strong sign of "reconciled humanity" in the interior of the mystery of communion of the Church, a model of "the new society" in which can be found united liberty and solidarity, where authority is exercised as paternity (maternity), where there is a different attitude to-wards riches, in which human relations are brought to their fullness by liberty and do not degenerate into domination, and which brings all its members to an ordered participation;'and "above all," as says a beauti-ful text bf the Puebia document: where it is unequivocally manifested that, without a radical communion with, God in Jesus Christ, any form of purely human communion re-mains in the long run incapable of being sustained and ends totally in tu'rning against the human person. In other words, nothing less than a corner of heaven! Some Priority Areas Lay people are very sensitive to the way religious life witnesses to poverty, and they are also very demanding, at times too demanding, with religious and little, indeed, with themselves. It is good, howev.er, to be challenged by this exigency. More than an "area" of work or of commitment, poverty is a radi-cal dimension of "cbnsecration" insofar as it is detachment from mate-rial goods and affirmation of the liberty which recognizes God as its only good. These are admirable witnesses. On too many occasions, however, the laity do not succeed in seeing how this vow of poverty is manifested concretely as detachment and liberty. Even more, many times, with no malice, they notice that religious liv~e rather conveniently~---even comfort- ~ably--x~ith all material problems settled in the present and in the future, and that in environments which show nothing of "poverty." It'is not a question of their asking for "romantic" gestures nor of exaggerat)ng criticism. But, at least a greater austerity and severity of life is required, a more generous availability in the sharing of material and spiritual goods, the elimination of all that is superfluous . This exigency is even more challenging since it is within a Church which is ever more conscious of and determined concerning the so-called "preferential option for the poor." "This preferential option for the poor," says Don Egidio Viganb in a very expressive synthesis which we cannot examine in detail now, questions religious very concretely, especially the institutes of active life. It demands a review of the specific mission in light of those receiv- Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 ing it. It requires a study and replanning of the presence of the religious. It deepens the sacramental meaning of the vow of poverty, places in dia-logue the great values of evangelical poverty with the pressing obliga-tions of social misery, proclaims with ever greater clarity that the pov-erty of the beatitudes is a challenge to materialism and opens doors to solutions which are alternatives to those of the consumer society. Religious should also take to heart the criteria mentioned by the magis-terium of the Church as to the evangelical authenticity of this "option": it is not exclusive nor excluding because the message of salvation is di-rected to all; it is animated by an intention which is primarily religious and not political; it does not let itself be entrapped by nor reduced to a class dialectic; it takes into consideration the existence of various forms of poverty in situations of 'hunger and misery, of unemployment and marginalization, of deprivation of liberty, of physical or mental health or other material and/or moral privations. In this preferential love for the poor as derived from the love of Christ for all is found in great measure the witness of religious life today. A special attention to the young also seems to be a basic and urgent requirement for religious communities of our times. There is a long and impressive religious tradition of the education of youth which shou!d not be abandoned but should be renewed and deepened. The point is clear; an individual becomes social and is educated, from the most tender age, fundamentally through the family and the school. These are the two ba-sic "channels" to lead youth to reality. But could it be that the States, political parties, ideological strategists would take a strong interest in the school in order to "penetrate" into the world of youth and direct it ac-cording to their various criteria and interests, while the Church-- especially religious communities--would underestimate its educational tradition and its educational institutions and responsibilities? In times of crisis of credibility and of search for "ideologies," when the most no-ble energies and concerns remain dissatisfied with the suffocating mate-rialism of the consumer society, it is more important than ever to offer to the young great and vigorous proposals, ideal certainties of life as signs and guides for their own education. Christian lay people, parents of families, need to count on the help of the Catholic school because the first responsibility for education falls on the parents, and the family is the basic place for growth in the faith of its members. Nevertheless, there is a considerable amount of catecheti-cal instruction, of Christian attitudes, of fruitful joining of faith with cul-ture which is acquired in. the environment and activity of the school. The Expectations of Religious Life I 659 most fruitful means is that of an active and co-responsible educational collaboration between the family and the Catholic school. I am sure that it is not without concern to the laity that educational religious communi-ties are abandoning the field of the school. On the contrary, they should intensify their commitment involving the collaboration of the laity, es-pecially of the parents, and should go beyond the "administrative" and routine activities in the running of the school, transforming it ever more into a vigorous, radiant, highly educational environment and seek means to make their services always more accessible and fruitful. Here there is much to rethink, to plan and to carry out along the line of a scholastic pastoral which meets all these demands. I think also of other milieux and human activities which have been converted into new frontiers of the ecclesial mission, in which the pres-ence of the Church cannot be limited to some free-lance laity. There surely is no lack of religious charisms for the apostolic work among in-tellectuals, artists, professionals of social communication, factory work-ers . According to the Measure of the Gift of Christ One last remark. The Council says that while profession of the evangelical counsels involves the renunciation of goods which undoubtedly deserve to be highly valued, it does not con-stitute an obstacle to the true development of the human person, but by its nature is supremely beneficial to that development (LG 46). Thus the renunciation should not diminish the human but rather help to develop the human stature according to the measure of the gift of Christ. This "something more," this "much more," of holiness, which the laity expect of religious finds its response in the witness of new men, of new women, penetrated with the Absolute of God, radically incorpo-rated into Christ, totally dedicated to the service of others. If Christ re-veals to human persons the 'fullness of their being and their destiny, all radical following of Christ can be only a path of integral fulfillment for humanity. It is necessary to show that what one abandons in order to fol-low Christ will be recovered even now, multiplied, as more human riches more full of humanity. Lay people hope to meet in religious well-balanced Christian person-alities because they are centered in God and, therefore, persons having an effective equilibrium and emotional serenity (how many "argu-ments" reveal psychological immaturity !) of ever more solid intellectual formation (why in the past did one so rarely meet religious on this 660 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 level?), with 'a great liberty because a great obedience radiates a richness of life from their "interior castle." They expect them to be attentive and generous in dedication and service, spreading a happiness and a joy which come from within, persons of whom one can speak and think of as models for women of hidden but full life, in the image of Mary, first and greatest disciple of Christ. Words, Words, Words How glibly do we toss them off, precious self-wrought jewels, precious beyond diamond, sapphire or pearl: Mined from quickened breath, warmed by channeled blood, carried live on currents of air they glow to foul or fair. Let us then nourish them ~with care, knowing their fire can rage uncontrolled to devastating No or curved to simple Yes, can make a world of bleak distress spin in giddy joy, and bring a God to birth while angels sing! Marcella M. Holloway, C.S.J. 6321 Clemens Avenue, Saint Louis, Missouri 63130 The Public and Witness Religious Life Dimension of David F. O'Connor, S.T. Father O'_Connor, past president of the Canon Law Society of America, is chairman of the Department of Church Law at the Washington Theological Union. He resides at the Holy Trinity Mission Seminary; 9001 New Hampshire Avenue; Silver Spring, Maryland 20903. Religious life has a public dimension to it which is intended by the Church. Religious, both in their personal and their corporate lifestyles, are meant to be identifiable as Church-people and to witness Gospel val-ues. They engage in' forms of the apostolate and in ministry always in the name of the Church and under the authority of their respective relig-ious SUl~eriors and local bishops. All of this manifests their distinctive character, their place in the Church and their canonical status. An awareness of this--and it is not always viewed by everyone as an unambigtious biessing~--helps us better understand some of the events occurring on the contemporary scene; for example, the reaction of the hierarchy to religious who are seeking public office or those who sign published statements which a.ppear to be contrary to Church positions. The following article is iritended to elaborate somewhat on this pub-lic dimension of the religious life and some of its implications for relig-ious. The Institutionalizing of a Charismatic Fbrm Since Vatican II, we have a renewed awareness of the religious life as a charismatic vocation, a gift of the Spirit to the Church.2 This has helped deepen our understanding and appreciation of its place and role in the Church. For the Holy Spirit is not only the source of the inspira- 661 662 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 tion of the founders, but also of those who have followed after them down through the succeeding generations. These charisms have contrib-uted in a significant and special way to the very holiness of the Church and to its ability to fulfill its mission in this world.3 A religious commu-nity is obliged to hand on an awareness of its charism to new members so that these gifts of the Spirit may be lived, safeguarded, deepened and constantly developed.4 Charisms are given within the Church for the building up of the Church community. Whenever a claim is made by a group of the faith-ful that it is living a radical form of the Gospel life, such a claim cannot be ignored by the wider Church, especially by the bishops who are the pastors and guardians of the faith.5 The assertion that one is being led by the Spirit, now as in the past, needs to be examined and authenticated by the wider Church community before it can be given credence and ac-ceptance. Historically, ecclesial recognition was given informally and im-plicitly for the first few centuries. But, beginning in the fourth century, bishops of the local churches, aware of certain abuses and of the disrup-tiveness of some wandering monks, required monastic groups to have of-ficial and explicit approval before establishing a foundation. Indeed, the canons of the Council of Chalcedon (45 I) established the norms Which regulated the relationship of bishops and monasteries up until the Mid-dle Ages. Then, because of the development of large and centralized re-ligious orders in the thirteenth century, official recognition was fre-quently reserved to Rome. It is a fact, then, that ecclesial recognition and authentication of charis-matic groups existed in some form from the beginning of the devel-opment of religious life. It was necessary in order to determine whether or not a particular group or rule truly was presenting a viable form of Gospel life. Ecclesial or canonical approbation had the added benefit of helping to preserve the original charism of the founder and the first mem-bers by institutionalizing it within the visible community of faith. Ca-nonical authentication of a particular style of Gospel life has helped it to be passed on to succeeding generations of men and women, and this has redounded to the benefit of the wider Church. The religious life, as we know it today, is canonically established only through the official recognition of the Church's pastors, the hierar-chy. This has helped safeguard the faithful from. being led astray by ab-errant forms of Christianity which, in the past, frequently ended up in fanaticism, schism or heresy. The Church possesses within itself the charism of discerning spirits, and this is exercised by the bishops as part Witness of Religious Life / 663 of their pastoral office. As Karl Rahner has stated: " . . . the official Church is also the guardian and guide of the charismatic element--she herself possesses the gift of the discernment of spirits."6 Canonical Approval of a Religious Institute The Church, through the pastoral office of its bishops, is forced at various times and places to state what it considers to be compatible or incompatible with the Gospel because the Church does sponsor groups, institutions and agencies which publicly and officially represent it. These public institutions have to be supervised lest they present a distorted pic-ture of the gospel values which the Church incarnates. Religious insti-tutes are one such form. Both the institutes as such and its members rep-resent the Church. Once canonical or ecclesiastical recognition is granted to a religious community, that community no longer exists as a private and independ-ent group of the faithful, nor does the institute exist in isolation from par-ties external to it, even though it does enjoy some canonical autonomy.7 For, once having sought and been granted official recognition and ap-proval, the religious institute takes upon itself an added identity--it be-comes an ecclesial institute and is linked to the hierarchy in a special man-ner. 8 Official Church recognition identifies the institute as a Church in-stitution, and it identifies its members, women or men religious, as Church-people, involved in a life of public dedication and service in the name of the Catholic Church.9 Membership in a canonically approved form of consecrated life, which requires the profession of public vows, involves an ecclesial form of commitment that distinguishes religious from other members of the faithful, even those who may be in secular institutes. The latter do not represent the Church in its public life, but live somewhat anonymously, maintain their secular vocation, and qui-etly work to Christianize their milieu. ~0 A Personal Witness That Is Public Religious, as publicly consecrated members of the faithful, are ex-pected, as is every Christian, to witness a personal commitment to Christ. But because they are called by their vocation to an ecclesiai form of public consecration, they are expected tO bear a visible witness to a deep, personal experience of Christ and to share the faith, hope and love which it inspires. ~ For religious, above all, are consecrated to the Lord. Their development in holiness of life is more important than the good works they perform. As John Paul II has remarked: "What counts most 664/Review for Religious~ September-October, 1987 is not what religious do, but what they are as persons consecrated to the Lord." ~2 The canons of the Code of Canon Law reassert some of these essen-tial personal obligations. Canon 662 states that religious are to have as their highest rule of life the ['ollowing of Christ as it is proposed in the Gospel and in their constitutions. The constitutions of each institute help specify and make the Gospel particular for their religious, how it is to be lived in service to others in the name of Christ and of his Church. Re, ligious are to bemen and women of prayer. Their first and foremost duty is the contemplation of divine things, and assiduous union with God in prayer. ~3 They are expected to use the traditional forms ,of, worship and devotion: daily participation in the eucharistic sacrifice, the prayerful read-ing of Sacred Scripture, mental prayer, devotion to Our Lady, and the Liturgy of the Hours. ~'~ .Religious, as individuals,.are ,to engage, in the asceticism required for personal conversion of heart through a daily ex-amination o~ conscience and by frequently receiving the sacrament of pen-ance. 15 These devotional obligations are assumed personally by every relig-ious who takes his or her spiritual life seriously. The cultivation of the interior life is an absolute necessity if the public consecration of a relig-ious is not to become a charade. Without a deep, personal spiritual life, perseverance in a public form of consecrated life becomes tenuous and the fulfillment of the vows turns int~) a heavy burden. " Th~ faithful have a right to expect that those who have publicly ded-icated their lives to Christ by religious profession will be living exam-ples of a GoSpel life. The Church presents religious to the world as pub-lic witnesses of evangelibal values. Holiness of life and a generous, un-selfish service of the People of God are a'rightful expect, ation from each religious. A Corporate Witness That Is Public Religious life is characterized by a communitarian lifestyle. All reli-gious are expected to live in some form of common life which is proper to the specific institute to which they belong. 16 Because of the centrality of the enclosure for monastic religious and some form of active service for apostolic religious, the styles of their common life will be radically different. Indeed, monastic institutes which are totally ordered to the con-templative life are prohibited from engaging in any form of pastoral min-istry outside the monastery,. ~7 However, all religious are expected to live in a house of their own institute with their.brothers or sisters. ~8 Their life together is intended to be a microcosm of the Church, idealized in the Witness of Religious Life / 665 Jerusalem community described in the Acts of the Apostles (2:44): "The faithful all lived together and owned everything in common; they sold their goods and possessions and shared among themselves according to what each one needed." Religious community life is to be filled with pray-erfuines~ and with Christian service and love. Religious life is actually lived on the local level, in a pa.rticular house with specific women or men. The locai community takes on certain char-acteristics, principally because of the individual religious who live to-gether, and secondarily because of the apostolates in which they are en-gaged. The image or witness which they project will depend upon many factors, especially the expectations and experience of the people with whom the religious interact. If the religious are perceived as prayerful, charitable, joyful and generous in their community life together, their cor-porate or collective witness will evidence the Gospel ideal and they will be what the Church intends--living witnesses of Christian love. It may be well to recall the fact that a group is frequently able to wit-ness better than individual persons. An individual can be--all too easily-- simply dismissed as just an eccentric. However, a community of Chris-tian men or women, living a similarly dedicated lifestyle, cannot be so perfunctorily ignored or written-off. Moreover, the members of a relig-ious community can offer support to one another by their companionship and prayerfulness, especially when the Gospel values they embody are countercultural. Living witnesses are a powerful sign. Reflective people will be forced to examine the faith dimension and Gospel values which are the foundation of their own religious lifestyle. Those who do not share our Christian values may be led to a greater appreciation of them by the wit-ness of a vibrant, faith-filled religious community. In fact, it was just such an experience which led the famous~ agnostic, British commenta-tor, Malcolm Muggeridge, to become a Christian-- and later a Catholic-- after his experience in Calcutta with Mother Teresa and her Missionar-ies of Charity. Few people can remain totally indifferent to a corporate Christian wit-ness. Either they will reject it or accept it. That is why the Church pre-sents religious as living witnesses of Christ, as Lumen Gentium, 46, states: Let religious see well to it that the Church truly show forth Christ through them with ever increasing clarity to believers and unbelievers alike --- Christ in contemplation on the mountain, or proclaiming the king-dom of God to the multitudes, or healing the sick and maimed and con- 666 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 verting sinners to a good life, or blessing children and doing good to all people, always in obedience to the will of the Father who sent him. The Witness of Public Vows Religious profess the evangelical counsels as public vows in the con-text of their community lifestyle. Their vows cannot be properly under-stood or appreciated apart from the context of their common life. The Witness of Consecrated Poverty The public vow of poverty, as professed in religious institutes, would be better appreciated and offer a better public witness if it were presented as a vow of common life and goods. Too often the term "poverty" is judged by socio-economic criteria and religious are misjudged as lack-ing because they are not "poor" in that ordinary meaning of the term. Those of us who are educated or who live in comfortable houses, drive automobiles, eat three meals a day, and so forth, (and that is the vast majority of American religious) are sometimes even thought to be vio-lating our commitment. We are judged as hypocritical for professing a "vow of poverty," when it is obvious that we are not "poor." There certainly is a socio-economic dimension to how we are to live our religious life. Our lifestyle must be adapted to the particular cultural and economic situation in which we live, so that we do not give the appearance of being wealthy. Also, there are ascetical demands made upon us, personally and corporately, to live simply and avoid the dele-terious influences of the larger consumer society. Nevertheless, we are not, in fact, invited by our vow to embrace a debilitating, crushing, in-humane form of economic poverty as the ideal of our commitment. That is not religious poverty. That is not the purpose of our vow. Religious poverty can only be valued and offer edification if it is recognized as an essential aspect of community life and, where applica-ble, a dimension of an apostolate. Thus everything a religious acquires as a member of the institute is acquired for the institute. 19 The religious community, in turn, provides for the needs of its members so that they can fulfill the purpose of their vocation in that specific religious family.2° Ascetically, religious are urged to forego standards of comfort and conven-ience which may be legitimate for others and to exercise a certain re-straint in the forms of relaxation and entertainment they choose.2~ All of this is intended to promote the spiritual life of the religious and to help free us from the desire to accumulate things and, positively, to liberate our hearts for the things of God. Witness of Religious Life / 667 When religious undertake apostolates among the socio-economically and culturally deprived, they are required to adapt their style of living to the demands of their apostolate. This will often involve a style of life approximating that of the people among whom they live and work. Life on the missions is not like life at home. Life among the poor in the rural areas of Appalachia or in the inner-city of our large urban centers will bring with it many restrictions and the call for a special asceticism. Those religious can well be viewed as living "poorly" in the more ordinary sense of the word. Generally, if religious are seen as lix;ing a rather simple lifestyle, per-sonally and communally, this will be a source of great edification, espe-cially if they are serving others generously and unselfishly. The Gospel ideal of poverty and simplicity can be beautifully manifested by such a public witness. The faithful are reminded that superfluous goods are not necessary for happiness and contentment. The unencumbered life of reli-gious can help people to look beyond the present world. It can support the credibility of the Gospel° message which religious are to preach by their lifestyle. Religious poverty can be a reminder to every member of the faithful that we are all called to rely upon the Lord, and to manifest a loving concern for our neighbor, especially the needy and the .deprived, whoever they may be. The Witness of Consecrated Chastity If there is anything that is truly countercultural in our modern soci-ety, it is the value of Christian chastity and marital fidelity. A life of dedi-cated chastity and celibacy runs directly contrary to the pleasure princi-ple which is so dominant in our post-Christian western world. Our contem-poraries cannot ignore the witness of thousands of men and women who profess to live chastely and celibately out of love for God and in the serv-ice of others. Those who share our common faith and values, especially those who are themselves without spouses because of circumstances be-yond their control, find great support and consolation in the awareness that many of their sisters and brothers in the Lord live happy and fulfill-ing lives as celibate religious. The community lifestyle of religious provides them with their princi-ple support group.22 Their life shared in common with their religious brothers or sisters is a Christian and humane lifestyle that offers an ideal context for their vowed life. Apostolic religious especially benefit from a communal dimension to their dedication to mission. While their pri-mary orientation may be to serving others, their religious community set-ting on the local level should be the base to which they return for spiri- 668 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 tual ,and fraternal/sisterly refreshment. Again, the fact that a group can offer a better witness than individuals is an important consideration when it involves a chaste and celibate Christian lifestyle. Individuals find their commitment under assault or too heavy a burden if they live alone and apart. Living celibately in a communal setting can witness that religious do not live lonely and eccentric single lives, but live in a Christian faith community and in hope of complete fulfillment in the eschaton. The Witness of Consecrated Obedience Religious have willingly accepte~d,a pattern of life that is largely laid down for them.23 They follow a,rule or constitution and live in residence under the authority of those who have been elected or appointed as reli-gious superiors.24 Their vow of obedience has limited their freedom and their options so that they might pursue the cor~mon good and the corpo-rate mission of their particular religious institute. Ultimately, they seek, as women and men of faith, to discern the will of God in the commands they are given in holy obedience. This enalSles their institute to under-take corporate commitments and helps galvanize the personal investmeni of time and talent into a commhnity endeavor. ' The life of religious obedience requires a great sense of faith. The generosity that this clemands can help foster the spiritual maturity of re-ligious as they strive humbly to imitate the obedience and love of Jesus who sought only.to do the will of his Father. Certainly, jn a society and culture that exaggerates the importance of individual freedom, Christian obedience is truly countercultural. The obedience of religious is fre-quently denigrated as a "blind obedience" by those who do not share our faith values. However, our brothers and sisters in the faith often find it a rather Christ-like response and are disedified when they perceive the opposite in the lives of religious. All Christians are obliged to seek the will of the Lord. Thus the hum-ble example of obedient religious can only help to build up the Body of Christ. Canonical Consequences of the Public Dimension Appropriate Attire Since religious life has a public dimension to it, it seems reasonable, all things considered, that a distinctive style of garb might have some advantages, especially in many apostolates, and in our commitment to a simple lifestyle. It is quite common to find that people in "service" roles, even professional ones, are recognizable .by their uniform or pro- Witness of Religious Life / 669 fessional'attire. We tend to expect that these people will be readily iden-tifiable when we need their services. 'Indeed, the sign or witness dimension is referred to in the canon which concerns the garb of religious.25 While a religious "habit," in the strict sense of the term, is more appropriately a monastic garment, custom and tradition among many apostolic institutes has provided them with a style of dress which identified them as pertaining to a particular religious family. Often enough it was a form of dress suitable to another age or culture. Frequently, too, apostolic groups adopted the contempo-rary clerical dress, if they were men religious. While not adopting a habit, as such, they did choose a style of dress that gradually became a traditional garb that went unchanged and unadapted to times and circum-stances. It was for the most part a post-Vatican II phenomenon that, in-stead of guitably adapting the dress, as was expected, it was often dis-carded entirely in part because of the difficulty of deciding on something acceptable to all the members. Another purpose for wearing a religious garb is that it is intended to be a sign of simplicity of lifestyle and religious poverty. It is appropri-ate that a public witness to the Gospel should evidence a certain degree of Christian detachment and modesty. Experience has shown that it is difficult to,dress attractively and appropriately for every occasion with-out having to invest in a.rather extensive wardrobe. A simple garb which is modest, becoming and dignified solves this problem. However, the rules and regulations of each institute, the expectations of the local Church, the demands of the apostolate and the requirements of the particular culture and clime all have to be considered when it comes to deciding in concrete situations how one ought to be dressed. There is no requirement in Canon Law that the habit or religious garb be worn on every occasion, nor at all times, nor in all places. Indeed, the Apostolic~ See itself has stated that a secular style of dress, without any recognizable sign or symbol, can be permitted when a habit would be an impediment to the everyday exercise of activities which should be undertaken by the relig'ious.26 Mission in the Name,.of the Church All forms of apostolic activity are to be undertaken by men and women religious only in the name of the Church and in communion with it.27 The exercise of the apostolate by religious is never entirely a pri-vate and personal ministry. It is always, in some sense, a public and cor-porate one.28 The Vatican Council stated that one of the essential ele-ments of the Christian apostolate is that it be conducted in union with 670 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 those whom the Holy Spirit has assigned pastorally to govern the Church.29 It is the duty of the local bishop to coordinate all forms of the apostolate among his portion of the People of God.3° Religious are' al-ways to be subject to their own superiors and to the local bishop in the exercise of all forms of the external apostolate.3~ Unbecoming Activities Church law has always recognized that the public nature of the cleri-cal ministry and the religious life places certain restrictions on the ac-tivities in which clerics or religious may engage. However, what may be inappropriate at one time and place may not be so in another. Times change and so do the circumstances. As a result, the 1983 Code of Canon Law is both different and simi-lar to the 1917 Code. It is different insofar as some of the activi, ties which were considered unbecoming for clerics and religious, such as the prac-tice of medicine, especially surgery, are no longer prohibited by the re-vised code. It is the same in that a number of activities which were proscribed by the old code appear again in the new one-~especially the general prohibition that forbids religious and clerics to engage in any ac-tivity which is foreign to their way of life.32 No specific unbecoming are enumerated here. Such determination is be left to the good judgment and prudence of mature women and men religious as they con-sider the demands of the apostolate in their .particular culture, time and place. Of course, specific directives can be given by the proper religious superiors and by the local bishops. These would have to be observed. Public or Political Office The new code continues the prohibition of the old one that religious are not to assume a public office to which is attached the exercise of civil authority, such as the office of mayor, attorney general, governor, or sim-ilar offices.33 The reason seems self-evident--persons holding such of-rices confuse Church ministry with a civil role, and inhibit a Gospel and prophetic stance. Religious are meant to be°at the service of people as heralds of the Gospel in the name of the Church. Similarly, they are not to take an active role in partisan political par-ties nor in the management of labor unions, unless they have the permis-sion of their ecclesiastical superiors.34 Again, the reason for this general proscription is that the public image and identity of a religious is that of a representative of the Church community. When publicly dedicated Church-people become too closely identified with a specific ideology, any Gospel witness is blunted, and the situation often distracts people Witness of Religious Life / 671 from the various social justice and public stands which the Church may want to make through its pastors.35 Finally, religious are supposed to be agents of reconciliation, not division. They should foster peace and jus-tice as servants of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God.36 Secular Financial Responsibilities , Another general area which religious are wisely urged to avoid, un-less good reasons indicate otherwise--in which cases permission can be granted--is the acceptance of secular financial responsibilities or involve-ment in business and trade activities. The canons prohibit religious, gen-erally, from undertaking the management of property owned by the la-ity and from assuming any secular office which require financial accountability.37 However, today it is easy to envision situations in which a religious might be expected to do so. For example, the demands of a certain apostolate may require that, at least for the time being, a re-ligious administer the finances of an organization, especially when no one else is in a position to do so. Likewise, a religious may find himself or herself having to take care of the financial affairs of an incapacitated relative or friend. Charity and common sense may simply demand this. However, the general prohibition is a wise one and should force a relig-ious to consider alternatives. And having to explain a request to do so to the religious superior can help prevent an imprudent decision. The same type of consideration should be given to the matter of a religious becoming involved in business or trade, personally or on be-half of others.38 The present code is more lenient than the 1917 one and expressly indicates that permission to do so can be granted, presumably for good reasons. Again, it is not difficult to imagine situations where this may be necessary or beneficial, at least for a reasonable period of time. If, for example, a religious is an only child and inherits a small family business with which he or she had been most familiar before en-tering religion, the most prudent decision could be for the religious tem-porarily to oversee the business until other provisions can be made. The above prohibitions are, in general, completely consonant with the nature of the religious life. Yet it is eminently reasonable that excep-tions be permitted. The dangers present for religious, in becoming too hastily and imprudently involved in financial matters that have nothing to do with their community, are all too evident. It is especially fitting that religious not be burdened with financial involvements when they have responded to a vocation which requires them to develop an asceti- 679 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 cism of detachment and a life of simplicity. Military Service and Civil Exemptions Finally, since religious are followers of the Prince of Peace, it is par-ticularly incongruous that they volunteer to bear arms in times of con-flict, unless they are legally bound to do so. Therefore, the canons state that religious are not to volunteer for military service and they should take advantage of civil exemptions, if they exist, to avoid this and any other public or civic duty which is foreign to religious life.39 Certainly this prohibition does not apply to service as military chaplains or any simi-lar type of ministry. The prohibition would seem to apply to accepting jury duty in criminal cases also, especially if they are capital offenses, when an exemption is possible. It seems most inappropriate that a relig-ious be in a position of determining the guilt of citizens and playing part in their incarceration or execution. Again, canon law recognizes that there can be exceptional cases in which the proper religious superior and ecclesiastical authority can grant permission to a religious to act contrary to the general canonical norm that the above activities are to be avoided. Conclusion Ecclesial authentication of charismatic forms of the Gospel life ex-isted from the beginning. At first, ,such approbation was given unoffi-cially and implicitly. Later, it became an official and explicit necessity. The religious life is a charismatic and an ecclesial form of public conse-cration. Religious institutes are public agencies of the Church which pre-sents the members as public witnesses of Gospel values. The personal and corporate lifestyles of religious, as well as their apostolic activities, are at the service of the Church and are supervised by their superiors and the bishops. Since religious are iri apublic form of consecrated life, they are expected, all things considered, to be recognizable, and to avoid those activities which muddle or confuse their ecclesiai image. Above all, religious are expected to be living examples of evangelical values: chastity for the sake of the kingdom; Gospel simplicity in lifestyle; hum-ble~ and Christ-like obedience; and complete dedication to a loving serv-ice of people in the name of the Church. The counterculturai witness of religious is meant to speak eloquently of a deep faith conviction that Je-sus is the way, and the truth and the life. NOTES See Carolyn Osiek in Vatican H and Its Documents: An American Reappraisal, ed., Witness of Religious Life / 6"/3 Timothy E. O'Connell0(Michael Glazier, Inc., Wilmington, Delware, 1986), pp. 86- 87. 2 Perfectae caritatis, 1; canon 575. 3 Lumen Gentium, 39. '~ Mutual Relations, II (Henceforth MR). 5 See Raymond Hostie, The Life and Death of Refigious Orders (CARA, Washing-ton, D.C., 1983), p. 21. 6 See The Dynamic Element in The Church (Herder, New "fork, 1964) p. 62; Lumen Gentium, 43; canon 573, §1 and §2. 7 Canon 586, §1. 8 Canons 573, §2, 575-579. 9 Canon 675, 93. l0 Canons 710-730. I~ Essential Elements, 33. (Henceforth EE). ~z Papal Message to the Plenary Assembly of CRIS, March 1980; EE, 33. ~3 Canon 663, 91. ~4 Canon 663, §2, §4. ~5 Canon 664. 16 Canons 607, 92 and 665. ~7 Canon 674. 18 Canon 665, 91. ~9 Canon 668, §3. 20Canon 679; see David F. O'Connor, "Two Forms of Consecrated Life; Religious and Secular Institutes," REvmw voR Rv.~.m~ous, 46, n. 2 (1986) pp. 205-219. z~ Christus Dominus, 33-35. ~ Canons 599, 602 and 607, §2. 23EE, 34. 24Canons 601,608 and 665. 25Canon 669. 26See Canon Law Digest, 7 (1975) pp. 534-535. 27Canon 675, §3. 28EE, I 0. 29Apostolicam actuositatem, 23; MR, 9 (a). 30Canons 394, 91 and 680; MR, Chapt. II. 3~ Canon 678. 32Canons 285 and 672. 33Canons 285, §3 and 672. 34 Canons 287 and 672. 35 See George Aschenbrenner, "Currents in Spirituality," Rv.w~w voR R~L~o~ous, 42, n. 2 (I 983), pp. 183-186. 36 CRIS, "Religi6us and Human Promotion," Canon Law Digest, 9 (1983), pp. 379-410; David F. O'Connor, "Religious in Politics," R~wEw ~oa R~L~6~ous, 41, n. 6 (1982), pp. 834-848. 37 Canons 285, §4 and 672. 38 Canons 286 and 672. 39 Canons 289 and 672. The Religious as "Sentry": A Reflection on the Prophet Ezekiel James Fitz, S.M. Father Fitz is a member of the Provincial Administration of his congregation's Cin-cinnati Province. An earlier article, "Religious Life as Acted Prophecy," appeared in the issue of November/December, 1982. Father Fitz may be addressed at the Mari-anist Provincialate; 4435 East Patterson Road; Dayton, Ohio 45430-1095. [~uring my twenty-one years as a religious, I have attended many vow cer-emonies in support of brothers and sisters saying "yes" to their call from the Lord. At these liturgies the first reading has often come from the Old Testament prophets--the call of Isaiah or Jeremiah, for exam-pie-- to indicate that those making profession identify with the call Of these prophets. But, I have yet to attend a ceremony where the call of Ezekiel is the Old Testament reading. In fact, it is not even one of the optional readings in the Lectionary for the Mass of Religious Profession. Yet, I believe the call of Ezekiel as sentry is an apt model and image for religious life today. The Value of an Image In recent years, theologians and spiritual writers have used images and models to describe the mysteries of our Christian faith. In so doing they have imitated Jesus himself, ~who often used images to evoke understanding: "The kingdom of heaven may be compared to a man who sowed good seed in his field.; the kingdom of heaven is like the yeast a woman took and mixed in with three measures of flour.; the kingdom of heaven is like a mustard seed.; the kingdom of heaven is like treasure hidden in a field.; the kingdom of heaven is like a drag- 674 The Religious as Sentry / 675 net. " These images helped Jesus' hearers enter into the mystery of faith. The Second Vatican Council used images when it described the mys-tery of the Church in its Dogmatic Constitution, Lumen Gentium. Im-ages like "the People of God," "a sheepfold," "the edifice of God," "our Mother," "the body of Christ," "a pilgrim in a foreign land," "a kind of sacrament" help elucidate the mystery of the Church. Avery Dulles' book, Models of the Church,~ uses images and mod-els in a similar way. Images and models, then, can be helpful ways to penetrate the richness of a mystery of our faith, to evoke an understand-ing of some complex reality of our tradition. Images and models have been helpful also in the understanding of religious life. The authors of Shaping the Coming Age of Religious Life,2 for example, have imagined religious in the different eras of religious life as ascetics, monks, mendicants, soldiers and apostolic servants. These images help elucidate the predominant understanding of religious life during the various eras of Church history. This article will explore the image of the prophet Ezekiel as sentry in the belief that it helps elucidate our contemporary understanding of religious life. The Call of Ezekiel In the third chapter of Ezekiel, we hear: "Child of the earth, I have appointed you as a sentry to the House of Israel. When you hear a word from my mouth, you shall warn them for me" (3:16). The third chapter continues to expand on this call. If God says to wicked people, "You shall surely die" (3:18), and Ezekiel does not warn them or speak out to dissuade them from their wicked conduct, the wicked people will die for their sins but God will hold Ezekiel responsible for their death. If Ezekiel speaks out and the people do not change, then Ezekiel is not held responsible. Not only is Ezekiel to challenge the wicked but he is also to be a prophet to the virtuous. If virtuous people turn away from virtue and Ezekiel does not warn them, then God will hold him responsible for their death. However, if Ezekiel does warn them, then the virtuous will surely live and Ezekiel will also save his life (3:16-21). This same de-scription of the prophet's role is repeated in Chapter 33:1-9. In explor-ing the image of prophet as sentry as appropriate for the role of the re-ligious in the world today, this article will first examine the role of the sentry, and then how this role might illuminate the role of religious in 676 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 the Church today. The Role of the Sentry The role of the sentry has four characteristics which I believe help explicate the mystery of the call to religious life. Call to See. The sentry's first responsibility is to see, to be watch-ful. This seeing is twofold: to announce the signs of good news and to warn of coming danger. The sentry is to be watchful for the signs of good news. For exam-ple, the sentry on a ship watches for the sign of land; the sentry at the gate of a medieval city watches for the signs of the coming of a beloved monarch in order to prepare the people for this great event; or the sentry watches for the runner returning from battle to share the news of victory. The sentry also needs to be watchful of signs of danger. The sentry on the ship needs to be conscious of the signs of bad weather so that the crew can be prepared to respond; the sentry at the gate needs to be con-scious of the signs of an approaching enemy. Call to Discern. A second responsibility of a sentry is to discern signs. Is the approaching rider friend or foe? Is the moving wind the sign of an approaching storm or the advent of good weather? Is it land that is seen or a mirage, a trick of the imagination? This discernment is an important responsibility. If a sentry is fearful or shallow, then he or she will proclaim good news that does not come to pass, or give false warn-ings of events that fail to materialize. People will no longer take seri-ously any message of the sentry. Responsibility to Proclaim. Once the se~lt.r.y has discerned the signs, the next responsibility is to announce the good news or the approach of danger to the people. When he or she has completed this proclamation, the responsibility for action is no longer just the sentry's but the respon-sibility of the entire community--as we have seen in the call of Ezekiel. In fact, the role of the sentry may now become secondary to the role of others who move the community to ,action. One Role Among Many. A sentry is often on the margins of society, outof synchronization with the rest of society, even while interdepend-ent with them.~As the sentry is watching, others are busy about other activ-ities.~ To have a sense of security, the people have need of the sentry. However, the sentry cannot survive without the people who are doing other activities (e.g., producing food, clothing and the other necessities of life), The sentry is, then, one role among many---different, but nei- The Religious as Sentry / 67'7 ther more nor less important than the other roles in society. The Religious as Sentry How does the role of the sentry, and more specifically, the call of Ezekiel, help us to understand religious life in the Church today? I be-lieve that the four characteristics just described can help illuminate the mystery of religious life. Call to See. Religious are called to be attentive, to be watchful. They do this first and foremost as people of prayer. Prayer, of course, is not ¯ the occupation of religious alone--all Christians are called to pray. How-ever, one cannot be a good religious without prayer, without attentive-ness to the religious dimension of life. Contemplation (to see clearly) has traditionally been part of religious life, whether one speaks of the con-templative life as manifested in the monastic movement or contemplation-in- action as manifested in service-oriented religious orders. I believe this responsibility of being attentive and watchful is very important to relig-ious today. Clearly we need people to read the signs of the times. Prayer-ful religious can contribute this gift to the Church. Call to Discern. For the religious to see clearly, there needs to be discernment. The first step in this discernment is honesty with oneself in order not to project danger where there is none or to characterize as hopeful movements that are contrary to the Gospel. A sentry who is fear-ful or shallow will give false warnings and proclamations. Eventually peo-ple will cease to take his or her word seriously. The practice of self-knowledge (achieved through prayer, examen, spiritual direction, and similar helps) will be essential to the religious who hopes to see clearly and proclaim what is seen in a way that will truly build up the commu-nity of the Church and the world. Discernment is not an easy task. What is heralded as good news by some is seen as danger by others. We witness this, for example, in the various responses to the development of new technology. Some see in this advancement the liberation of humankind; others feel we are being enslaved and controlled by these same technological advances. Discern-ment is an important task in the Church today, a task in which religious clearly have a role. Responsibility to Proclaim. Once the signs have been seen and dis-cerned, the religious has the responsibility of proclaiming the message, that is, the word of the Lord. If religious are good sentries, they will be able to proclaim the good news (the signs of the reign of God) and warn of danger (signs of the counterspirit). Ezekiel is a good model for relig-ious in this proclamation. Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 First of all, Ezekiel, like all the prophets, denounces and announces; he afflicts the comfortable and comforts the afflicted. His book not only contains oracles that are warnings of danger to the Chosen People (4- 24), the nations (25-32), and the shepherds of Israel (34), but powerful statements of hope such as the vision of dry bones (37) and the raising of a good shepherd for Israel (34). Secondly, Ezekiel is a good model for religious because he proclaims the word of God in both words and symbolic action. His signs are par-ables in action. For example, Ezekiel performs acts symbolic of siege and exile (4-5); prepares his baggage and digs a hole in the wall of the city as an act symbolic of exile (12); groans bitterly to symbolize the city's coming fall(12); neglects the normal mourning customs at the death of his wife as symbolic of the fact that Israel will not be able to mourn when the city of Jerusalem is besieged (24); and, finally, joins two sticks as a symbolic prophecy of the new covenant people (37). These actions raise questions among the people which allow the prophet to proclaim the word of the Lord: "Will you not tell us what all these things that you are doing mean for us?" (24:19; 39:18). This proclamation of God's word by prophetic action is a valuable way of viewing our living of the vowed life. The vows are symbolic ac-tions that often open to religious the possibility of proclaiming a word of the Lord. Religious life is acted prophecy.3 The lived vows can warn of danger and proclaim good news. For example, the vow of poverty can warn of the dangers of consumerism and can challenge the prevailing be-lief that more is better. It can also proclaim good news. The sharing of common goods lived by religious, for example, can proclaim that shar-ing is a life-giving alternative to greed and exclusive possess!on. The sym-bolic action of living the vows will hopefully lead others to ask questions: "Why do you do this? . What does this mean?" Thus re-ligious will have an opportunity to further proclaim the word of the Lord. As I mentioned earlier, once the sentry has proclaimed what has b~en seen, it is no longer solely his or her responsibility to act. This is clear in the call of Ezekiel. The role of Ezekiel is to be the sentry, the watcher and proclaimer. The responsibility to act is the responsibility of the en-tire people. The important thing for the religious is to proclaim clearly the message of the Lord in our world today, even though religious can-not ¯ control the response to the proclamation. As Ezekiel is told: "And whether they heed or resist--for they are a rebellious house--they shall know that a prophet has been among them" (2:5). The call to religious, then, is to stand for certain values and to speak those values in word, The Religious as Sentry / 679 and especially in deed, so that people will know that a word of the Lord has been spoken in their midst. Would it not have a tremendous impact on our modern world if people would know that a prophet has been among them? One Role Among Many. Another characteristic of the sentry is to have a uniquely different role, a role that can be out of synchronization with the rest of society. The vowed life of religious often places them out of synchronization with others. In the past this uniqueness has been explained as a form of life superior to other Christian lifestyles. The im-age of the sentry helps us image the complementarity of different life-styles. To say that religious have a unique role in the Church and society is not to say that it is better or more important than the roles of others. By their gifts, religious contribute to the world, but they are at the same time dependent on the gifts and lifestyles of others. All contribute to the common good. In the past, to be a sentry often meant to live on the margins of soci-ety. Religious, too, have often moved to the margins of society. Relig-ious houses were set up on the fringes of the city or separated from the city in the desert or countryside. There is a need for this type of sentry today. But signs of good news and omens of danger are also in the midst of society. In our day, when we read about terrorist attacks almost daily, we know that the greatest danger may come from within the city gates themselves. Those who can harm us live in our midst. Therefore, there will be need for religious immersed in society to read the signs of God's reign, that is, the movement of the Spirit in the midst of the world. At the same time, they will need to read the signs of peril and danger, that is, of the counterspirit in the midst of the world. Conclusion I believe that reflection upon Ezekiel and his call as sentry can en-rich the vision of the prophetic role of religious in our day, can be for religious a new way of imagining their role. Many religious will ask whether they are worthy or capable of such a call. Most honest religious will feel unworthy, as did Ezekiel, who fell upon his face when he was called (I :28). To take up the challenge can only be in response to God's call. "Child of the earth. Stand up! I wish to speak to you" (2: I). The call of the religious will be a response to the Spirit moving within. This will be the source of the authentic voca-tion to be a sentry for God's people and for the world. Finally, since the call to be a sentry will be a call from the Lord, he will be with the relig-ious on the journey. "Fear them not," (3:10) the Lord tells Ezekiel. The 680 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 Lord tells religious today the same: He will be with the sentry today, as he was with Ezekiel, Jeremiah, Isaiah and the other prophets. "I am with you always, yes, even to the end of time" (Mt 28:20). NOTES ~Avery Dulles, S.J., Mddels of the Church (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1974). 2Lawrence Cada, S.M. et al., Shaping the Coming Age of Religious Life (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979), pp. I 1-50~ 3See my article "Religious Life as Acted Prophecy" REvmw ~OR REt.mIOUS 41, n. 6, November/December, 1982, pp. 923-927. ,From Tablet to Heart: Internalizing New Constitutions I and II by Patricia Spillane, M.S.C. Address: Price: $1.25 per copy, plus postage. Review for Religious Rm 428 3601 Lindell Blvd. St. Louis, Missouri 63108 The Fathers in the Office of Readings: St. Cyprian of Carthage Anthony Daly, S.J. Father Anthony Duly has been a member of the faculty of the Languages Depart-ment of Saint Louis University. He has published several of these descriptive and brief biographies of Fathers of the Church who have been used in the Office of Read-ings of the Liturgy of the Hours. His last contribution appeared in the issue of Sep-tember/ October 1983. He may be addressed at Jesuit Hall; 3601 Lindell Blvd.; St. Louis, Missouri 63108. The third-century writings of St. Cyprian, bishop and martyr, are impor-tant today because they furnish otherwise unknown details of the life of both the Christians and pagans of his day and because they provide an illustration, hard to interpret though it is, of third-century African epis-copal attitudes toward the Roman papacy, a topic, however, which is not treated here. More directly, the writings reveal the character of St. Cyprian him-self, an interesting man with qualities people of any era can admire and imitate and who has many things to say which will never go out of date. What follows is first a brief overall sketch of St. Cyprian's life and then a more detailed account of certain matters which seemed likely to be of interest to readers of the Liturgy of the Hours. Well educated in the secular tradition of his times, Cyprian was a man who actively and thoroughly integrated his knowledge and experi-ence within a completely Christian ideology. He appears as an effective rhetorician, a competent bishop and administrator, a practical leader who knows how to make the best of a difficult situation, and a man of great personal charm, courage, and compassion. But perhaps his most strik-ing characteristic is his ability to face martyrdom, that of others and then 681 61~9 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 finally his own, not only with equanimity but even with joy and satis-faction. ~ The selections from his writings in the Liturgy of the Hours com-municate a spirit of firm religiosity which is rendered more attractive by human charm and more realistic by a moderate cast of mind. His mar-tyrdom adds to his words the weight of tested sincerity and makes more telling his exhortations to hope, courage, and joy. Thascius Caecilianus Cyprianus (c.205-258) was an African, born per-haps at Carthage, of wealthy pagan parents. He lived at Carthage where he was an orator and prominent citizen, and, like the more famous St. Augustine who for a time, but more than a century later, also lived in that North African city, Cyprian was a teacher of rhetoric. In midlife he took stock of his own character and of the repugnant pagan society in which he lived. This led him in the year 246 to become a Christian. He gave his money to the poor, took a vow of chastity, was ordained a priest, and in 248-49 he was consecrated bishop of Carthage. The ideal of personal integrity seems to have been what first attracted Cyprian to Christianity, an ideal which he found fulfilled for him there as a gift from God. He seems never to have lost it again, and secure in it, he began to devote himself to helping others. This was especially true as he performed his episcopal tasks of encouraging the faithful, teach-ing sound doctrine, and governing well, always seeking to preserve and foster the unity of the Church. But his desire to help others seems to have accompanied his conversion itself, for one of the first things he did as a Christian was write To Donatus, the purpose of which was to convert to Christianity his friend Donatus and others. Cyprian's election as bishop was unusual in that it occurred not very long after his conversion to Christianity. That the choice fell upon him seems to have been due to his obvious sincerity, his high standing in the local community, his eminent personal qualifications, and the fact that he had already published at least one and perhaps as many as three of his Christian writings.2 Although the exact process of his election is not known, it is clear that it involved the agreement of a majority of the clergy, of the neighboring bishops who assembled to ordain him, and of the laity who were his strongest supporters. Confidence in Adversity His episcopal career was stormy right from the time of his election as bishop. There were some who opposed selecting him, and among them were a certain Novatus and some other elderly presbyters at St. Cyprian of Carthage [ 683 Carthage, who, although they may have had other motives as well, prob-ably were jealous of Cyprian. Soon, in 250, the Roman emperor Decius instituted the first truly sys-tematic and universal persecution of Christians. Commissions were set up throughout the empire which were to witness certain acts of worship of the pagan gods which were to be performed by everyone as a relig-ious test. Some of the Ch?istians complied; others were able to secure official certificates of compliance (libelli) even though they had not in fact worshiped; still others refused to comply and were subject to impris-onment, torture, or even death. Cyprian was among yet a fourth class of Christians who avoided the confrontation by going into hiding. He was criticized for this, but, as he explained it, when the edict against Christians was promulgated, the pagan populace at Carthage called for him to be brought forward. He fled not so much for his own safety, he explained, but in order to avoid a public uprising which he feared would endanger his flock. He further explained that despite his physical sepa-ration he kept in close touch with his people by letter.3 Some of these communications are included in the collection of his extant letters. In this, in other episcopal decisions, and in the general conduct of his personal life, St. Cyprian displays remarkable self-confidence. In this episode, he gives his reasons for withdrawing from Carthage, expects them to be accepted, and does not seem at all embarrassed to return, show his face, and even to admonish in certain matters those who had suffered or were still in prison for the faith, the confessors. Cyprian found it necessary to warn the confessors not to try to usurp the role of the bishop in granting ecclesiastical pardon to those who had given in to the authorities, the lapsed. Not altogether unreasonably, the custom was gaining ground according to which some of the lapsed were securing from the confessors requests for full and immediate reinstate-ment in the Church, and these requests, either written or oral, were gen-erally being honored, thus gaining quasi-hierarchical authority. In addi-tion to cautioning the confessors in this matter, Cyprian also admonished them not to give in to softness and vice once their trials had ended. Cyprian'.s is an attractive self-confidence, not haughty, a self-confidence based on truth and courageous love. One wonders if it en-tailed an inner struggle for Cyprian; if so, it is part of his private life and is not reflected in his writings. The Novatian Schism Probably because the severity of the persecution was unpopular with most pagans, and because the courage of the martyrs was probably at- Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 tracting enough converts to make the persecution self-defeating, it was ended early in 251. At that point Cyprian was faced with a controversy over how the bishops and clergy themselves should treat the lapsed, both those who had obeyed the edict and sacrificed to idols, and those who had obtained fraudulent certificates, or libelli. Cyprian, who adopted moderate and individualized attitude toward those who had lapsed in these ways, was able to make his view prevail'. His guiding principle was that those guilty of serious sin should be given an opportunity to achieve genuine repentance, a state of soul which he thought a sinner could ex-perience only through undergoing a suitable period of penance. But at the same time he insisted that sin can in fact be forgiven and that no re-pentant person should be deprived of hope, that each should be readmit-ted to the Church at the appropriate time. Against Cyprian were both those who wanted everyone readmitted to the Church without further com-plication and those who advised that reconciliation with the Church be forever withheld from those who had fallen. Chief among the proponents of this last course of action were the No-vatianists, so called because they were followers of Novatian, a rigorist Roman bishop who claimed the papal throne. Because his claim was re-jected by the Church at large and because of his rigorism, he and his fol-lowers became schismatic, and their rival church, widespread through-out the empire, was not entirely reconciled with Catholics until the end of the seventh century. Baptism by Heretics Under the Emperor Gallus (25 ! -53) a second persecution took place which was itself followed, in the years 255-57, by another major con-troversy, this time over the validity of baptism administered by heretics, chiefly the Novatianists. The difficulty arose over whether those origi-nally baptized by Novatianists and others not in communion with the Church should be rebaptized when they were accepted into the Catholic communion. Cyprian championed the losing cause, maintaining that the baptisms administered by heretics had no value. He appears still to have been of this opinion when, under the Emperor Valerian (253-60), a third persecution cost him his life. Although the Church later determined that baptism administered by non-Catholics is valid provided certain elements are present, on the un-derstanding that it is Christ himself who truly baptizes rather than the in-dividual who happens to be administering the rites, the whole matter was not yet worked out in Cyprian's day. Clearly he too would attribute the effects of the sacraments to Christ, but in his mind heresy and schism, St. Cyprian of Carthage / 685 since they involve separation from the Church, are tantamount to reject-ing Christ. How, he reasoned, could someone who rejects Christ bap-tize in his name? By the same token, such a person "shall not come to the rewards of Christ," even if he suffers martyrdom.4 His position on the matter underscores the importance he placed on unity in the Church. In the year 258 Cyprian ended his life in stirring fashion, boldly em-bracing his martyrdom. The account of his death forms the alternate sec-ond reading of the Office of Readings on his feast day. It is celebrated on September 16, along with that of Pope Cornelius whom Cyprian sup-ported against the rival claimant to the papacy mentioned above, Nova-tian. Writings Cyprian's treatise On the Lord's Prayer furnishes the largest single group of selections from his writings in the Liturgy of the Hours. These are nearly matched in volume by extracts from his Letters, and the ma-terial is rounded out by single samples from several works: On the D?ess of Virgins, On the Value of Patience, On Man's Mortality, and the Ex-hortation to Martyrdom, Addressed to Fortunatus. Finally there is the description of his martyrdom by an unknown author, taken from The Pro-consular Acts. There are eight other works by Cyprian not included in the Liturgy. Of these, To Demetrianus is a work similar to the longer, more famous City of God by St. Augustine. Both works deny that Christians are to be held responsible for wars and natural disasters, and attribute them instead to the vices of the pagans. Another title of Cyprian's often likened to a writing of St. Augustine, in this instance the Confessions, is To Donatus, mentioned earlier, which describes Cyprian's conversion to Christianity from paganism. Here Cyp-rian rejoices in his new life which he attributes to the cleansing of sav-ing water and the effects of "a quickening act of divin~ grace." Through power given by God he has been enabled to abandon lavish banquets, expensive clothing, and public honors in favor of a private life, simple clothes, and thrift. Although he once thought he could never be rid of his sins which he had come to indulge as "proper and belonging to" him, he had left hard drinking behind, together with exaggerated self-importance, anger, covetousness, cruelty, ambition and lust. He empha-sizes that his new way of life is not to be attributed to himself, but to God.5 As has been mentioned, because it recounts Cyprian's conversion from sin through the power of God, and because he wrote it to help oth- 61~6 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 ers experience a similar conversion, To Donatus has been compared to the Confessions of St. Augustine. Nevertheless, there are three sharp dif-ferences between the two works. Most obvious is their difference in length, Cyprian's work being much shorter. Second, Augustine is spe-cific in recounting his sins and the steps by which he became a Chris-tian, whereas Cyprian summarizes his experiences in general terms. Third, Augustine addresses God directly in the Confessions and always emphasizes his personal love for God. Cyprian addresses his friend Do-natus; he attributes to God his newfound mastery over himself, but he does not dwell on his relationship with God. Instead, his attention cen-ters on treasuring his newly purified way of life and on contrasting it with the wickedness of the pagan society which he has left behind. Cyprian pities the world and gives thanks to God for having escaped from it with its robbers, pirates, wars, and gladiatorial contests.6 He be-lieves the themes of the tragedies presented in the theater corrupt private morals: parricide, incest, and adultery which "is learned as it is seen"; and these things are all the worse because they are presented with the approval of public authority. Men make themselves effeminate on stage, and Venus, Mars, and Jupiter are depicted as unchaste, Jupiter even ad-vancing to "the raping of young boys . Ask now whether he who looks upon this can be healthy-minded or chaste. One imitates the gods whom he venerates. For these poor wretches sins become even religious acts. ' ' 7 Further evils in society include homosexuality, prostitution, litigious-ness, bribery and collusion, fraud, forgery, perjury, and the falsification of charges. In court the wicked fare better than the innocent. To secure a place of prominence in society, men become sycophants, spendthrifts on public spectacles, or they build up estates, dispossessing the poor, and must live in fear of thieves and lawsuits.8 Cyprian recounts all of this in order to show the goodness of God who saves us from becoming wicked or vain.9 The Christian way to live in such a world is to raise one's eyes from earth to heaven, to be next to God in mind, to ignore what is seemingly sublime and great in human affairs, and to be greater than the world, for a religiously oriented way of life is a greater prize than anything the world has to offer. Five other works not included in the Liturgy of the Hours have fairly self-explanatory titles: The Lapsed, The Unity of the Church, Works and Almsgiving, Jealousy and Envy, and That the Idols Are Not Gods, a work sometimes considered spurious.~° A final work not used in the Liturgy is To Quirinus: Three Books of Testimonies. This treatise, which seems St. Cyprian of Carthage actually to represent two separate works by Cyprian which were com-bined later, perhaps by someone else, lists scriptural passages designed to show that the Christians h~ve inherited the promises made to the Jews, texts which illustrate the mysteries of Christ, and passages designed to show how to live the Christian life. Interpreting Cyprian Three aspects of the life of St. Cyprian seem particularly significant for interpreting and appreciating his writings: first, he was a rhetorician; second, he became a bishop; and then finally, he died a martyr. As a rheto-rician he knows how to use words to achieve the result he wants; but he uses them in a less literal sense than does a philosopher or a speculative theologian, and he gives more weight to various ideas and attitudes than would a disinterested writer who is unaffected by the press of circum-stances. Thus it is often necessary to consider carefully the context in which he is writing, and to subordinate the literal meaning of what he says to the effect he seems to be trying to achieve,, A bishop's preoccupation with his duty to guide, instruct, protect, and correct his people permeates the writings of Cyprian. In this office, it is obvious that he is motivated first and last by his love of Christ and the Church, and that he views everything else from a Christian perspec-tive. Constantly he shows good common sense and a sane grasp of the limits and potential of human nature. Finally, the atmosphere of hostility to the faith in which Cyprian ex-ercised his episcopacy'and which finally resulted in his death shaped and sharpened his vision of the world and how it is to be approached; this may well be the most important factor influencing his strong emphasis on eternal life. He quotes the Scriptures, both Old Testament and New, with a natu-ral ease which indicates true familiarity; having made a thorough study of them at the time of his conversion to Christianity, he seems to have continued this study throughout his career as a bishop. Quotations are always at hand to reinforce and embellish the points he wants to make. Among his works are the To Quirinus described above, and another col-lection of Scripture texts briefly mentioned as a work quoted in the Lit-urgy of the Hours, the Exhortation to Martyrdom, Addressed to Fortu-natus. Here, under twelve headings, are texts bearing generally on mar-tyrdom which a preacher or writer could use to encourage Christians liv-ing under the threat of persecution. Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 Literary Style Cyprian's style is clear, orderly, and often ornate, marked by a lib-eral but tasteful use of rhetorical figures such as parallel clauses whose grammatical structures are similar, phrases ending in the same sound, and the strategic repetition of words. His love of metaphors, some of which are quite engaging, is not obscured by translation into English. Vir-gins, for instance, are termed blossoms;~ like the emperor or one of his generals, God watches us doing battle with evil;~2 "the commands of the Gospel. are the rudder for keeping us on the right course";~3 and the Christian victorious over "earth's torment and suffering" is com-pared to a soldier returning home in triumph after defeating the enemy. ~4 On the Lord's Prayer This treatise, more than a third of,which has been included in the Lit-urgy ofothe Hours, has been praised throughout history as a fine com-mentary, certainly among the best non-technical ones ever written. Three points from the material in the Liturgy seem especially note-worthy. The first is Cyprian's insistence that prayer should have a social dimension: "We do not say 'My Father, who art in heaven,' nor 'Give me this day my daily bread'. Rather, we pray., not for one in-dividual but for all. For the people of God are all one." ~5 Second, there is Cyprian's sober awareness that we all sin every day and stand in con-stant need of sanctification. 16 A third point is Cyprian's stirring expres-sion of Christian steadfastness. When he speaks of accepting suffering and even death with Christ who suffered for us, we are reminded of the terrible hostility which confronted him and his fellow Christians.~7 Portions of the work not quoted in the Liturgy show that Cyprian's caution about the world is remarkably well balanced. This is especially true if the pagan culture in which he lived is fully taken into account. For instance, despite superficial similarity between pagan Stoicism and his remarks about rising above the world, Cyprian clearly shows that he does not underestimate the value of material creation; on the contrary, he advises us to pray that by the help of God we experience a harmony between the flesh an°d the spirit, the earthly and' the heavenly; and he un-derstands that Christ renews and preserves humanity. ~8 ~;imilarly, in his warning about the entangling effect of riches, Cyprian may have been more emphatic than he would otherwise have been because he realized that the thought of losing property kept many from confessin~ Christ dur-ing the persecution. 19 Off the negative side, the work includes an embar-rassingly strong and wholesale condemnation of the Jews; Cyprian goes so far as to say that they can no longer call God their Father, since they St. Cyprian of Carthage / 689 rejected and killed Christ.2° On the Dress of Virgins The final work to be considered here is On the Dress of Virgins, ex-cerpts from which make up the second reading in the Common of Vir-gins. (There is an alternate second reading taken from the Decree on the Renewal of Religious Life of the Second Vatican Council.) In the excerpts (chs. 3-4, 22, 23) St. Cyprian describes virgins adorned with right conduct as beautiful, as "the image of God that re-flects the holiness of the Lord," and as "the most illustrious members of Christ's flock." He interprets the virginal life as beginning to be "now what we shall all be in the future," in the kingdom of heaven, he means, where there is no marriage. As a matter of fact, Cyprian's thought goes even further. He sees virginity as a part of the image of the heavenly man, Christ, to whom we are encouraged to conform ourselves. Virgins are "equal to God's angels." ~ Humbled by the thought of them, and not, he says, in a spirit of cen-sure or even of authority, but out of concern for them, he exhorts them to "persevere in chastity and virginity." Having renounced the pleas-ures of the flesh, "they should not strive to adorn themselves or give pleasure to anyone but the Lord." In this way, having passed "through this world without the world's infection," they "will receive a glorious prize" for their virtue.2~ The passages from this treatise which are included in the Liturgy of the Hours express sound and encouraging attitudes good for all time; some of the material not included sounds strange to modern ears. This material, because it is historically conditioned on the one hand or rheto-rically condemnatory on the other, is harder to understand. . Although the excerpts seem to concern women rather than men, else-where in the treatise Cyprian states that he intends .his general remarks for "men as well as women, boys as well as girls, every sex and every age."22 This does not mean, however, that he viewed men and women as equal in every respect, or even that he disagreed with the traditional Roman view of women as the weaker sex. For instance, regarding mar-tyrs in The Lapsed, he says, "Joining.~the victory of their men, come the women too, triumphing over the world and over their sex alike."23 So too, he uses as an. argumeht on behalf of virginity that it frees a woman not.only from the pains of childbirth but also from the dominion of a husband.24 On the warrant of Scripture Cyprian insists that physical adornments should be rejected by virgins, who should strive to please God rather than 690 / Review for Religious, September-October, 1987 men.25 Furthermore, women are to avoid being an occasion of sin for men.26 Even if a woman has wealth, it is false to argue that she should make use of it to improve her physical appearance; rather, things "that have been acquired in the world and will remain here with the world, should be despised (contemni) just as the world itself is despised."27 In-deed, virgins should be like martyrs in that they should avoid the "wide and broad roads" in favor of the "hard and steep path which ascends to glory," for the devil uses allurements and pleasures "that he may kill.' ,28 Today many would consider the judicious and modest use of makeup simply a part of formal dress. From this point of view Cyprian's invec-tive against necklaces, earrings, makeup, and red articles of clothing seems overdrawn. But for Cyprian such things are not innocent. Not only for virgins but for all women makeup and earrings are, to his mind, in-ventions of the devil: "the work of God and his creature and image should in no way be falsified;., everything that comes into existence is the work of God. whatever is changed, is the work of the devil."29 The difference between today's view and his seems to stem neither from licentiousness in us nor from prudishness in him, but from Cyprian's an-cient cultur

RIJEČ UREDNIŠTVANegativna medijska kampanja usmjerena protiv šumara, a posebice na predstavnike trgovačkog društva Hrvatske šume d.o.o., traje neprestano već nekoliko godina, a intenzivnije unatrag dvije godine. Sve je eskaliralo nedavno aferom s vjetroelektranom Krš-Pađene. Mediji su se brže-bolje natjecali tko će više oblatiti pojedinačne i kolektivne vinovnike događaja. Temeljem paušalnih analiza zamjeralo se Hrvatskim šumama svašta, od privremenog neplaćanja šumskog doprinosa gradovima i općinama (u vrijeme kompletnog zastoja države uvjetovanog epidemijom koronavirusa ta namjenska sredstva ionako nitko nije mogao trošiti na izgradnju i održavanje šumskih cesta) do pripreme podizanja kredita za likvidnost tvrtke, koja je u sklopu pomoći pristala na produljenje roka plaćanja drvne industrije za isporučenu sirovinu sa 60 na 100 dana od dana izdavanja računa za sve isporuke od početka 2020. godine. Primjedbe na korištenje valjda najpoznatijega parafiskalnog nameta u Hrvata za usluge općekorisnih funkcija šuma ne treba ni spominjati, jer nema bitnijeg poduzetnika ili bilo kojeg političara koji u cilju pomoći gospodarstvu ne spomene smanjenje ili ukidanje toga. Laicima nije ni poznato da su Hrvatske šume svojim kriznim planom u potpunosti izbacile ovaj način financiranja gospodarenja šumama za 2020. godinu. U vrijeme korona krize to su vjerojatno bili najispravniji poslovni potezi u cilju sačuvanja vlastite zaposlenosti, zaposlenosti kupaca i dobavljača, kao i likvidnosti tvrtke. Koga to zanima kad čitatelje zanimaju negativne vijesti i afere. Većini njih također nije poznato da se šumarstvo uvijek u kriznim vremenima pobrinulo samo za sebe, ali i za druge koje je nosilo na svojim plećima. U svim krizama šumarstvo je pomagalo drvnoj industriji, pa i otpisivalo dugove u raznim državama i uređenjima koji su vladali na našem prostoru, ali i snosilo posljedice objektivnih i subjektivnih poslovnih rizika aktera u drvnom sektoru.Moć objavljenih tekstova na mrežnim stranicama i društ­ve­nim mrežama je velika. U kratkom vremenu dopire do velikog broja čitatelja. Većina tekstova objavljuju se kao bom­bastični naslovi i podnaslovi. Čitanjem sadržaja tek upućenijem čitatelju je jasno što ne odgovara istini. Obično se prema kraju članka sadržaj ublažava, ali to pročitaju najuporniji čitatelji, dok im u percepciji ostaju negativne informacije iz naslova i s početka teksta. Na društvenim mrežama javljaju se mnogi od pojedinaca do udruga, a dosta njih i anonimno te pisanjem svojih komentara stvaraju negativno ozračje o šumarskoj struci. Čitajući brojne napise stječe se dojam da su šumari jedan od većih problema Lijepe naše.Bolji poznavatelji prilika priznat će da je šumarstvo uz poljoprivredu nositelj opstanka preostalih ruralnih krajeva. Šumarstvo koje je najzastupljenije u ruralnim i manje razvijenim područjima osigurava egzistenciju zaposlenicima Hrvatskih šuma, zaposlenicima brojnih izvoditelja radova u šumarstvu te tvrtki i obrta u drvnom sektoru, posredno svima koji prodaju svoje proizvode drvnim tvrtkama, a čuvar je najvećeg dijela ekološke mreže Republike Hrvatske. Kroz zaštitu šuma i šumskih zemljišta od požara na krškom području važna je karika sačuvanja bioraznolikosti države, ali i kulise koja pomaže hrvatskoj grani gospodarstva od posebnog interesa – turizmu. U vrijeme Domovinskog rata šumarstvo je umjesto države gradilo i ceste kako bi povezalo dijelove Republike Hrvatske, gdje su nekada stanovnici putovali preko susjednih do matične države.U dragoj nam Hrvatskoj domovini danas postoji osam nacionalnih parkova i 11 parkova prirode u kojima je većina temeljnih fenomena šuma. Zaštita prirode u biti je sačuvana područja preuzela na upravljanje od šumara. Da se na tim područjima nije gospodarilo uz šumarske postulate i s ekološkim obzirom, ne bi se danas dičili s parkovima kao što su Plitvička jezera, Risnjak, Sjeverni Velebit ili Mljet. U krškom dijelu Hrvatske, gdje se nalazi većina zaštićenih parkova, nikad nije nestalo šume upravo zbog dva i pol stoljetnog gospodarenja s njom. Današnje generacije se ne sjećaju izgleda šuma u prijašnjim razdobljima. Većina najvrjednijih šuma hrasta lužnjaka posječena je kompletno između 1820-ih i 1920-ih godina. Danas stasaju nove generacije tih uzgojenih šuma koje su u biti proizvod hrvatskih šumara. Nakon Drugoga svjetskog rata sjeklo se količinski skoro kao i danas, jer nije bilo drugih resursa pa se država obnavljala i dolazila do potrebnih financijskih sredstava. Uz sve to zahvaljujući mudrosti i radu više generacija šumara, današnja je pokrivenost države pod šumama 44 posto, a sa šumskim zemljištima i 49 posto. Nažalost, većina javnosti ne može shvatiti pojam vječnih šuma koje nisu stalno u istoj dobi, jer jednako kao i druga bića imaju svoje razvojne stadije. Njihova vječnost se proteže kroz slijed generacija šume. Sječa starih zrelih šumskih sastojina preduvjet je nove generacija šume kojoj se svi iskreni šumari najviše vesele, jer je uspješno napravljena smjena generacija i sačuvana opstojnost šume na istoj površini. Taj prijelaz je u nizinskim šumama vidljiviji, no postoje i gorske šume na kojima se tako očiti prijelaz ne vidi, pa to i promatračima manje upada u oko.Neupućeni ili zlonamjerni ne znaju ili zaboravljaju na desetljetne pritiske ponajprije na državno šumarstvo radi pogodovanja pojedincima i tvrtkama u cilju podizanja nekad više maslinika i vinograda, a danas više gradnji vjetroelektrana i pašarenja na obraslim i neobraslim šumskim zemljištima. Hrvatski šumari baštine pojam potrajnog gospodarenja, pojma danas poznatijeg kao održivo gospodarenja, kojim su se borili da se površine pod šumom ne smanjuju. Tako, ako se u funkciji razvoja kojemu se nitko pametan neće protiviti ako je održiv i racionalan, negdje i krče šume radi prenamjene odobrene prostornim planom, smanjena površina pod šumama se nadoknađuje podizanjem nove šume na drugom mjestu. Koliko god se državno šumarstvo najčešće smatralo kočničarem razvoja, ono je zapravo bilo branitelj zakonskog djelovanja, dok su često pa i danas neki investitori, ali i državne institucije, vršili pritisak ubrzavajući proceduru u svoju korist bez pravne podloge. Hrvatske šume d.o.o. sa svim svojim prednostima i manama samo su dio slike koju danas imamo u Republici Hrvatskoj. Način kadroviranja i upravljanja jednak je kao i u ostalim javnim poduzećima i trgovačkim društvima u većinskom državnom vlasništvu. Kao u svakoj struci postoje previdi i pogreške, ali postulati hrvatskoga šumarstva su isprobani i dokazani kroz više od 250 godina. Današnje manje kvalitetne izvedbe u pojedinim šumama posljedica su raznih faktora i ne razlikuju se od pogrešaka koje se u svim djelatnostima događaju (zar se djelomično pogrešno ne obavi operacija, sagradi zgrada ili sastavi stroj?). Čak i u recentnom slučaju s vjetroelektranom Krš-Pađene Hrvatske šume d.o.o. pozitivno su odradile svoju zadaću naplatom duga investitoru za služnost ') INSERT INTO slTekst VALUES('202002290',2,'HR','u iznosu prema pravilniku važećem u vremenu pokretanja investicije. Hrvatske šume većinom su u svom djelovanju između čekića i nakovnja, s jedne strane pritisak korisnika drvne sirovine za što većom sječom i proizvedenom i plasiranom količinom ili korisnika prostora preko služnosti ili zakupa, a s druge strane sve veći pritisak za zaštitom staništa i jedinki što usložnjava i poskupljuje proizvodnju.Resorno ministarstvo, koje osim što je krajem 2011. godine prvi put nakon 1919. godine ispustilo u svom imenu naziv šumarstva, uz taj simbolički čin postalo je maćeha vlastitom čedu, budući resorni ministar/ministrica kao jednočlana skupština trgovačkog društva Hrvatske šume d.o.o. svojim nalozima prema upravi toga Društva djeluju u korist svih aspiranata na sve vrste proizvoda i usluga iz šume i šumskoga zemljišta. Tako se najvrjedniji trupci prodaju po dogovornim cijenama, koje već dugi niz godina nisu usklađene s tržišnim, čak ni s manje razvijenim susjednim zemljama, ogrjevno drvo i drvni ostaci se prodaju po dugogodišnjim ugovorima, bez obzira na promjene tržišnih uvjeta, a neobraslo šumsko zemljište, čak i tartufi, moraju se prepustiti svakome tko zaželi, čak i ako se ne pridržava zakonske regulative.Hrvatsko šumarsko društvo učestalo ističe politizaciju cijeloga sustava kao jedan od najvećih problema našega društva. Politike mijenjaju kompletne Uprave društva, garnirane s većom ili manjom kvotom uhljeba, svake četiri godine, a ponekad i u kraćim terminima. Tako postavljena vodstva dužna su provoditi naloge te iste politike, pa bile one i protuzakonite. Na taj se način tvrtke, kao u našem slučaju Hrvatske šume d.o.o., povlače po medijima kao kriminalne organizacije, ili se čak protiv njih organiziraju javni prosvjedi. Kako se pritom osjećaju zaposlenici, naše kolege koji s ljubavlju i odgovorno obavljaju svoj posao, možemo naslutiti?Prateći sva zbivanja postoji bojazan da se ne priprema teren kako bi se državne šume dale u koncesiju nakon što se trgovačko društvo Hrvatske šume proglase nesposobnim za upravljanje. Na brojnim primjerima poznato je kako koncesije uglavnom donose samo eksploataciju bez ulaganja u šume. Većina europskih država bogatih šumama imaju jake svoje državne tvrtke za gospodarenje državnim šumama i čuvari su tih šuma, ali i prostora kao i života na njima.Svrha ovoga teksta nije obrana bilo koga unaprijed, jer o nečijoj nevinosti i krivnji odlučivat će institucije kojima je to posao. U državi gdje se vode mnoge besplodne rasprave, koje se većinom tiču prošlosti, treba početi racionalnije sagledavati sadašnjost i ne povoditi se za huškačkom histerijom. Potrebno je popuštati okove politike i prepuštati struci da radi ono što najbolje zna, a to je u šumarstvu gospodarenje šumama i šumskim zemljištima. Uredništvo ; EDITORIALThe negative media campaign directed against foresters, and particularly against the representatives of the company Croatian Forests Ltd, has been going on for several years and has gained in intensity in the past two years. It all escalated recently with the scandal concerning the wind power plant Krš-Pađene. The media rushed to smear individual and collective entities involved in the event. Based on impromptu analyses the company Croatian Forests was criticised for all kinds of things, including temporary non-payment of forest contributions to cities and municipalities (at the time when the state was at a complete standstill due to the coronavirus epidemics these earmarked funds could not be spent on the construction and maintenance of forest roads anyway), as well as raising a loan to boost the company's liquidity. Namely, the company agreed to extend the payment period of the wood industry for the delivered raw material from 60 to 100 days from the date of issuing the invoice for all deliveries from the beginning of the year 2020. Let us not even mention all those remarks on the use of probably the most well-known parafiscal levy in Croatia related to non-market forest functions. There is not one entrepreneur or politician who has not requested the reduction or abolition of this levy as a way of helping the economy. Lay people are not even aware of the fact that the crisis plan of Croatian Forests envisages complete elimination of this form of financing forest management for 2020. At the time of the coronavirus crisis these are probably the best business moves aimed at preserving employment in the company, employment of the customers and suppliers, as well as the company's liquidity. But who wants to read about this when negative news and scandals are much more interesting? Most people do not know either that at times of crises forestry has always taken care not only of itself but also of others dependent on it. In all crises forestry has helped the wood industry, written off debts of various states and political systems reigning in these areas, but also borne the consequences of objective and subjective business risks of those working in the wood sector.The power of the texts published on websites and social networks is enormous. They reach large numbers of readers in a very short time. The majority of the published texts feature bombastic headlines and sub headlines. Only when the whole text is read does it transpire what is the truth and what is not. Usually the content of an article is softened towards the end, but the whole article is read only by the most persevering reader, while the majority retain only the negative information from the headlines and the beginning of the text. Social networks are full of individuals and associations whose comments, often anonymous, create a negative image of the forestry profession. All these comments give an impression that foresters are one of the biggest problems of Our Beautiful Homeland.Those better acquainted with the situation realize that forestry and agriculture are the pillars of survival in the remaining rural areas. Forestry, which is most represented in rural and less developed areas, provides a livelihood for employees of Croatian Forests, employees of numerous contractors in forestry and companies and crafts in the wood sector, and indirectly of all those who sell their products to wood companies. Forestry also guards and cares about the largest part of the ecological network in the Republic of Croatia. By protecting forests and forestland from fires in karst areas it forms an important link in the conservation of biodiversity in the state, but also creates a setting which helps the Croatian economic branch of particular interest - tourism. During the Homeland War it was forestry professionals who constructed roads needed to connect parts of the Republic of Croatia at the time when residents had to travel through neighbouring countries in order to reach their home country.In our beloved homeland there are eight national parks and eleven nature parks in which forests constitute the basic phenomena. Basically, nature conservation has taken over the preserved areas for management from foresters. If these areas had not been managed according to forestry postulates and ecological considerations, we would not be able to boast of parks such as Plitvice Lakes, Risnjak, North Velebit and Mljet. In the karst part of Croatia, where the majority of protected parks are located, forests have never disappeared thanks to two and a half century long forest management. Present day generations do not know what forests looked like in earlier periods. The majority of the most valuable forests of pedunculate oak were completely cut down between the 1820s and 1920s. Today we witness the growth of new generations of managed forests, which are essentially the product of Croatian foresters. After World War Two the quantities of forests that were cut down almost equalled present day quantities because there were no other resources and the state needed the necessary financial means for rebuilding and renovation. Moreover, thanks to the wisdom and hard work of several generations of foresters, the present forest cover in Croatia amounts to 44 percent and forestland to 49 percent. Regrettably, most people do not comprehend the concept of eternal forests, which are not always of the same age, because just like other beings they have their development stages. Their eternity extends through generations of forests. Cutting down old, mature forest stands opens the door to a new generation of a forest, and all foresters rejoice in it because it testifies to a successful change of generations and the survival of the forest in the same area. This transition is visible in lowland forests, but there are also mountain forests in which such an obvious transition is not striking, so it is less noticeable to observers.Those less well informed or malicious do not know about or close their eyes to decades of pressures on the state forestry. These pressures are aimed at enabling individuals and companies to receive different benefits: in the past it was olive groves and vineyards, today it is the construction of wind power stations and grazing in vegetation-covered or bare forest areas. Croatian foresters staunchly adhere to the concept of sustainable management, under which they fight against reducing forested areas. Thus, if forests are sometimes cut down for conversion purposes as regulated by spatial plans, reduced forested areas are immediately replaced with new forests in another place. Although state forestry has often been thought as a hindrance to development, it has in fact defended lawful activities in circumstances in which some investors, as well as state institutions, have exerted pressure by speeding up the procedure in their favour without any legal basis. ') INSERT INTO slTekst VALUES('202002290',2,'EN','The company Croatian Forests Ltd, with all its strengths and weaknesses, is only a part of the overall picture in the Republic of Croatia. Personnel recruitment and management is the same as in other public companies and state-owned companies. Just like in any other profession, there are omissions and mistakes, but one things is always the same: the postulates of Croatian forestry have been tested and verified for over 250 years. Present-day activities of lesser quality in some forests are the consequence of various factors and they do not differ from mistakes taking place in all other professional spheres (is not it true that sometimes a surgical operation may go wrong, or a building can be poorly constructed or a piece of machinery badly assembled?). Even in the most recent case of the Krš-Pađene wind power station, Croatian Forests Ltd have done their homework well by collecting the debt to the investor for easement in the amount according to the regulations valid at the time of starting the investment. In most of its activities Croatian Forests Ltd are between the hammer and the anvil: on the one hand, there is constant pressure by users of wood resources for more felling and more produced and sold quantities, and on the other, there is growing pressure to protect habitats and species, which all makes production more complex and more expensive. The relevant ministry, in addition to dropping the word forestry from its name at the end of 2011 for the first time after 1919, has also become an evil stepmother to its own child, since the line minister, as a one-member assembly of the company Croatian Forests Ltd, by his/her orders to the Company management acts to benefit all aspirants to receive all kinds of products and services from forests and forestland. Thus, the most valuable logs are sold at negotiated prices which have for years been out of touch with market conditions, fuel wood and wood residues are sold under long-term contracts regardless of changed market conditions, and bare forest land, and even truffles, must be given over to anyone who wants them, even if legal regulations are not complied with. The Croatian Forestry Association frequently points out that politicization of the entire system is one of the biggest problems of our society. Entire company managements are changed by politics every four or fewer years and nepotism is an inherent part of the system. Managements installed by politics in this way are forced to carry out the orders of the same policies, even if they are illegal. This is how companies, in our case Croatian Forests Ltd, are dragged through the media as criminal organisations; even public protests are organized against them. Can we even guess how the employees, our colleagues who do their jobs responsibly and lovingly, feel?All these events raise fears of the terrain being prepared for giving state forests for concession after the company Croatian Forests is declared incapable of forest management. There are many examples of concessions generating exploitation of forests without any investments in them. The majority of European countries with abundant forest areas have strong state companies which manage and guard state forests, their areas and the life in them.This text does not aim to defend anybody in advance: someone's innocence or guilt will be decided on by relevant institutions. In the state in which fruitless debates about the past are held, it is time to turn to the present in a more rational manner and not succumb to harangues and hysteria. Politics should loosen its grip and leave it to the profession to do what it knows best: in the case of forestry, it is the management of forests and forestland.Editorial Board

There is broad recognition, across the political spectrum and in both 'northern' and 'southern' countries, that justice reform, and more generally the promotion of the 'rule of law', are central to development policy, particularly in conflict-affected, fragile and violent contexts. More recently an increased focus on global security and the interaction between security and development as put a renewed emphasis on such efforts. However, while legal, regulatory and 'justice' institutions are now seen as key part of the 'solution' to problems of conflict, fragility and development, this recognition is not matched by a correspondingly clear sense of what should be done, how it should be done, by whom, in what order, or how 'success' may be determined. There often tends to be a clear misunderstanding of both the nature of the problem and (thus) of the solution. In this paper, the author seek to provide some insight into these questions and sketch out a practical conception of effective justice reform in situations of conflict and fragility that may provide the basis for effective programming.

This paper looks at the role and design of regulatory reform institutions in developing countries. These institutions are classified into four broad types: 1) regulatory reform units, commonly known in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries as oversight bodies for regulatory reform; 2) high-level committees for regulatory reform, established in some countries to leverage support and take decisions at a high political level; 3) advisory and/or advocacy bodies in charge of proposing improvements to the regulatory system by strengthening coordination and consultation mechanisms and by promoting the regulatory reform agenda; and 4) Ad hoc institutions for regulatory reform, established to launch regulatory reform efforts and to work on a single defined task or activity. This paper is divided into the following sections: section one briefly reviews the theoretical debate and literature about the role of institutions in facilitating higher economic growth, focusing in particular on regulatory institutions and their relevance in developing countries; section two discusses the main features of regulatory reform institutions at the center of government, namely regulatory oversight bodies, high level committees, advocacy and/ or advisory bodies and ad-hoc institutions for regulatory reform; and section three identifies the features of these institutions that are considered to be best practice. Section three also identifies and discusses lessons learned and the implications for establishing and operating such institutions in developing country contexts.

The phenomenon of artificial intelligence and robotics, which has been under investigation for several years, has given rise to new taxation models, which have opened a lively ethical and legal debate in the scientific and cultural community which has not yet subsided. 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El viernes 29 de noviembre, durante la Tercera Cumbre de la Alianza Oriental (AO) en Vilna, Lituania, se confirmó lo que ya se sabía desde hace una semana, que Ucrania no firmará un Acuerdo de Asociación con la Unión Europea, acuerdo sobre el que trabajaban Kiev y Bruselas desde hacía 5 años. Este acto representa una victoria clara para la política de Vladimir Putin y un traspié, por no decir una derrota, para la política de acercamiento a Europa Oriental de la UE. De los seis países miembros originales de la AO, tan sólo dos, Moldavia y Georgia, siguen en carrera para un futuro acuerdo. La Alianza Oriental (Eastern Partnership) fue lanzada en 2009 entre la Unión Europea y seis ex Repúblicas Soviéticas, tres en Europa Oriental - Ucrania, Bielorrusia y Moldavia- y tres en el Cáucaso – Armenia, Azerbaiyán y Georgia. El cometido principal de la Alianza, estipulado en la declaración de Praga de mayo de 2009, es el de crear las condiciones necesarias para acelerar el proceso de asociación política e integración económica entre la UE y los países miembro de la Alianza. Se delinearon tres pilares específicos de cooperación: 1) creación de nuevas y más profundas relaciones formales entre los participantes a través de la firma de Acuerdos de Asociación, incluyendo áreas de libre comercio que promuevan la convergencia hacia leyes y estándares de la UE (acquis communautaire); 2) apoyo a la movilidad de los ciudadanos y eliminación de requisitos de visado; y 3) profundización de la cooperación sectorial. Si la posibilidad de firmar Acuerdos de Asociación (AA) y de libre comercio bilaterales entre la Unión y cualquiera de estos Estados fue ciertamente el mayor atractivo de este proceso, tanto por la flexibilidad que otorgaba en las negociaciones bilaterales como por sus beneficios y alcance posibles, no dejaba de presentar dificultades importantes. La primera es que un posible AA demanda la adopción por parte del estado interesado de casi el 80% del acquis communautaire a fin de eliminar la mayor parte de las barreras no arancelarias y armonizar la legislación entre los socios. Un segundo aspecto que terminó siendo un obstáculo en las negociaciones fue el relacionado con la liberalización de las obligaciones de visado y la implementación de la cooperación económica, donde claramente los miembros de la Unión no han tenido una política consensuada. Se ha criticado igualmente la falta de financiación por parte de la UE para hacer progresar la AO. Otro freno importante a la negociación ha sido que la UE no les habría ofrecido la misma perspectiva de integración definitiva a los estados de la AO que si otorgó en el pasado a los antiguos satélites soviéticos (Hungría, Bulgaria, Rumania) y a los estados Bálticos. El fracaso de la firma del Acuerdo de Asociación y de libre comercio con Ucrania amenaza seriamente el futuro de la Alianza Oriental. Efectivamente, de los seis países en cuestión Armenia y Ucrania ya le han dicho que no a la UE. Bielorrusia y Azerbaiyán se han inclinado del lado ruso si bien oficialmente no han rechazado aún un AA con la UE. Tan sólo Georgia y Moldavia han claramente anunciado su voluntad de continuar con vistas a alcanzar un AA con la UE. Asimismo, los países de la AO han tenido la impresión de ser los rehenes de un juego de poder entre Rusia y la UE. Resulta claro también que la UE ha tratado a los miembros de la Alianza de manera diferente y los pequeños estados han percibido claramente que el principal interés estratégico ha sido siempre Ucrania. No obstante, los propios estados de la Alianza tienen una gran parte de responsabilidad en el fracaso de las negociaciones. En efecto, poco deseosos de embarcarse en las reformas económicas y políticas demandadas como requisito por la UE, han utilizado esta iniciativa como un instrumento de negociación y de presión en el juego UE-Rusia. Bielorrusia aún no ha expresado formalmente su rechazo a la Alianza pero claramente se ha volcado del lado ruso. Mas aún si sabemos que conforma, desde 2011, una unión aduanera con Rusia y Kazajistán, tornando incompatible un AA con la UE; unión de la cual Ucrania es miembro observador y posible socio futuro tras su negativa a la UE. En el caso de Bielorrusia, es posible que su negativa termine siendo beneficiosa para la UE, que se ahorraría sendos dolores de cabeza al intentar aplicar reformas políticas y económicas al estado menos democrático de Europa. El rechazo Armenio a la UE se fundamentó, según sus defensores, en un deseo de preservar la cooperación económica con Rusia (ha decidido unirse a la unión aduanera rusa), asegurar su principal fuente de aprovisionamiento energética y garantizar su seguridad frente a sus vecinos, Turquía y Azerbaiyán. En este sentido, para el gobierno de Ereván, la UE no es considerada como una garantía de seguridad, contrariamente a Rusia que no ha dudado en amenazar o utilizar la fuerza en el pasado. El caso ucraniano es aún más complejo que el armenio. La firma de un acuerdo con Ucrania hubiese representado el triunfo de la Ostpolitik europea (deseosa de introducir reformas democráticas y económicas perenes en las ex Repúblicas Soviéticas) y una derrota de la influencia rusa a las puertas de Europa Occidental. Sin embargo, múltiples aspectos jugaron para inclinar la balanza del lado ruso. En primer lugar, las amenazas (y promesas) rusas, su Hard Power, dirán algunos analistas, pudieron más que las potenciales ganancias de un posible AA con la UE. Ucrania atraviesa una grave crisis económica, acentuada aún más por los elevados precios del gas ruso. Nadie duda que Putin ha sabido prometer ya sea el infierno o el paraíso al gobierno de Yanukovich, aunque es más que factible que inclusive con las buenas gracias rusas, éste no salga nunca del purgatorio. Un segundo punto que terminó inclinando la balanza a favor de Rusia es que las reformas exigidas por la UE eran consideradas por el gobierno Ucraniano con un importante grado de desconfianza, tanto por el costo social, económico y sobre todo político que tendrían. Ligado a esto, el tercer punto está relacionado con la liberación demandada, como corolario ineludible de la firma de un AA, de la ex primer ministro Yulia Timoshenko. Sobre este punto el gobierno de Yanukovich se ha negado a cualquier compromiso, considerando que no es a la UE de decidir e intervenir en tales cuestiones, sino que ese asunto es resorte de, eventualmente, la justicia europea. En días previos a la cumbre de Vilna, Timoshenko habría demandado a la UE no tomar a Ucrania como rehén y firmar el AA sin condiciones, inclusive la de su propia liberación. Si el gesto puede parecer loable, es impracticable e inviable para cualquier diplomacia, mas aún la europea. La firma de un acuerdo sin condiciones pondría a la UE en una situación de debilidad y descrédito absolutos, representaría ceder a las demandas de Yanukovich y retroceder frente a la política agresiva de Putin. Mas grave aún, ¿qué clase de mensaje enviaría a los futuros socios y sobre todo a los recientes miembros que han debido implementar costosas reformas para obtener el visto bueno europeo? Si las amenazas rusas han sido mucho menos veladas que las europeas, la UE ha mantenido por momentos una posición bastante intransigente respecto a ciertos temas, dando a entender que el momento para un acuerdo no puede dilatarse y que de lo contrario los estados de la Alianza dejarán pasar una oportunidad única. En este sentido, tanto Washington como Bruselas advirtieron a Ucrania del riesgo de no ver prosperar las negociaciones con el FMI por una línea de crédito cercana a los 10-15 mil millones de dólares tras el anuncio Ucraniano de no seguir adelante con el AA (el FMI ya había suspendido en 2011 una línea de crédito de 15 mil millones en retaliación a los subsidios al consumo doméstico de gas en Ucrania). La vocera del Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos, Jen Paski fue relativamente clara al respecto al referirse a un posible acuerdo: "An historic opportunity to…demonstrate to international financial institutions and investors its [Ukraine´s] unwavering commitment to democratic reform". Estas advertencias no parecen haber tenido el efecto esperado, en particular frente a las amenazas/promesas rusas. Las presiones rusas han sido menos sutiles y si bien nadie tiene realmente claro en detalle cuáles han sido, la lógica de acción de Putin ha alternado entre el premio y el castigo a fin de convencer al presidente Yanukovich de la necesidad de rechazar la oferta europea. Rusia ha, según han expresado varios altos dirigentes europeos, amenazado con retaliaciones comerciales que van desde un bloqueo comercial al aumento de los precios del gas en caso de un acercamiento entre Ucrania y la UE. En el caso contrario, Rusia ha prometido su asistencia en materia energética. Hoy en día tan sólo Georgia y Moldavia siguen adelante con el proyecto de asociación a la UE. En 1999 Georgia y la UE firmaron un acuerdo de cooperación y asociación y durante los años 2000 el país llevó adelante importantes reformas estructurales requeridas por los socios europeos. En 2012, sin embargo, la victoria en las elecciones legislativas del millonario Bidzina Ivanichvilli ha provocado un cambio en las relaciones con Rusia, con la implementación de una política de "buena vecindad", catalogada por la oposición como de servilismo hacia Putin. Este cambio, ligado a la represión de la oposición, preocupa actualmente a la UE. El único buen alumno parece ser Moldavia, uno de los países más pobres de Europa. En 2009 los Moldavos eligieron a una coalición de partidos pro europeos para conducir al país hacia un posible proceso de adhesión. El país ha saneado su déficit como requerido por la UE, pero la situación económica dista de ser la mejor, agravada por el bloqueo comercial Ruso al vino moldavo por "cuestiones sanitarias". Frente a la "humillación" que representó la negativa ucraniana y tratando de salvaguardar lo que queda de la Alianza, la UE se ha comprometido a que los ciudadanos moldavos que posean un pasaporte biométrico puedan circular sin visado en el territorio europeo. Tras el fracaso de la Cumbre, el mensaje oficial de la UE sigue siendo políticamente correcto, como expresó la vice –Presidenta y Alta Representante de Relaciones Exteriores de la UE, Catherine Ashton: "Las puertas de Europa permanecen abiertas para los miembros de la AO. Permanecen abiertas porque es importante tanto para ellos como para nosotros". Tras bastidores, sin embargo, el ánimo no es el mejor, luego de lo que muchos consideran como una traición ucraniana y un acto más de "abuso de poder" por parte del Presidente Putin. Esta apreciación europea no habrá de quitarle el sueño a Vladimir Putin. Luego de 15 años de letargo post comunista, o de hibernación forzada del oso ruso (si se me permite una burda metáfora), Rusia se encuentra hoy en día lanzada a la reconquista de su influencia perdida. La Unión Aduanera iniciada en 2011 junto a Bielorrusia y Kazajistán, conjuntamente con su gran proyecto de Unión Euroasiática (con un intento de atraer a Turquía, Siria e India) prevista para 2015 son sólo mojones en el camino en el gran proyecto de resurgimiento ruso. Sus tácticas son ciertamente poco cristalinas y reminiscentes de un pasado totalitario aún bien presente en el recuerdo. Sin embargo, las tácticas rusas no son en nada diferentes de las del resto de los estados poderosos y autoritarios (y no tanto) a lo largo de la historia, avanzar por la fuerza (y no me refiero forzosamente al poderío militar) hasta encontrar una fuerza similar en su camino. Solo ahí la negociación y el compromiso serán una opción razonable para el coloso ruso. Asimilar sin embargo a la UE a un pobre cordero en la boca del lobo ruso, como parecen avanzar algunos, resulta un tanto ridículo. La UE cuenta con un vasto arsenal de recursos para cortejar o presionar a sus posibles socios. Si el FMI y la UE pueden decidir sancionar a Yanukovich negándole el maná financiero, castigando en última instancia a la población que dicen querer ayudar, ¿por qué Putin no habría de hacer lo mismo con sus reservas de gas? Se ha hablado mucho en estos días del triunfo del Hard Power ruso sobre el Soft Power europeo. De hecho se ha exagerado el Hard Power ruso (o su capacidad de usarlo) y presentado a la UE como desprovista de un real poder. Considero esta lectura inocente, equívoca y hasta burdamente partidaria. Aquellos que diferencian entre Soft y Hard Power confunden crudamente procesos y resultados. En el ámbito de las RRII: "It´s not about Soft or Hard Power, It´s JUST about power and the will to use it".Sobre el autorLicenciado en Estudios Internacionales,Universidad ORT –Uruguay; Master en Ciencia Política,Université de Genève – Suiza;Master en Estudios de Desarrollo,Instituto de Altos Estudios Internacionales y de Desarrollo(IHEID- The Graduate Institute) Ginebra, Suiza.

Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Sources is a review of literature dealing with political, economic and social reconstruction from a gender perspective. One of its objectives is to go beyond conventional images of women as victims of war, and to document the many different ways in which women make a contribution to the rebuilding of countries emerging from armed conflicts. Special attention is given to women's priority concerns, to their resources and capacities, and to structural and situational factors that may reduce their participation in reconstruction processes. A second aim is to shed light on how post-war reconstruction processes influence the reconfiguration of gender roles and positions in the wake of war, and how women's actions shape the construction of post-war social structures. Following the brief Introduction is a chapter on political reconstruction. It raises questions concerning women's participation in peace-building and democratization. In order to illuminate women's expectations regarding their roles and status in post-war society, the chapter opens with a brief discussion of how and to what extent various liberation movements have addressed women's issues. While some movements considered women's issues to detract attention from the main goal of their struggle, many movements regarded women's liberation as an integral dimension of their overall struggle for social justice. The fact that women's issues were included on the political agendas and that women themselves were mobilized to participate actively in the fighting is demonstrated to have been instrumental in raising women's political awareness and their expectations of state and society today. The ensuing discussion of women's participation in formal and informal peace-building activities shows that in most cases women are excluded from formal peace negotiations. Such high-level negotiations are identified as male domains, which means that they also employ discourses and practices that are closer to men's reality than to women's. As a result, women also lack direct influence in the identification of reconstruction priorities that are usually part of a peace agreement. Nevertheless, women are demonstrated to play an influential role through their work in grassroots organizations working for peace and reconciliation. From within these organizations, women constantly challenge the authorities and other members of society with demands for peace, non-discrimination, accountability, recognition of human rights, etc. While always positioned on the margins, these organizations show their ability to mobilize large numbers of women, and to translate individual grievances into legitimate social concerns. Moreover, many of them play a significant role in building a new culture of peace at the local level by organizing peace education and community-based reconciliation and social reconstruction activities. Democratization processes are generally applauded, because they are assumed to guarantee accountability and to grant all citizens the possibility to participate in political life. However, studies on elections and decentralization demonstrate several flaws when it comes to women's position. Many countries emerging from armed conflict have adopted new constitutions that grant women equal political, social and economic rights, and many governments have developed new quota systems to ensure women equal representation in decision-making institutions at all levels. However, the implementation of these laws and good intentions often runs into major obstacles. At the government level the problems include a lack of financial resources and a lack of gender awareness or political will among staff. Other major problems are to be found at the social level, where the new discourse of gender equality may run counter to existing social norms regarding gender roles. The examples discussed show that, in some cases, local authorities and male members of society may discourage or prohibit women from participating in political activities. Moreover, the fact that the division of labour has not changed in favour of women, but rather added to their burden, also poses practical limitations on the possibilities for active involvement of women. Despite these constraints, women have made remarkable contributions in many countries. In the context of elections women have organized civic education targeting women, and they have convinced women of the importance of their vote. Educated women have organized legal counselling to inform women about their rights and to help them exercise these rights. Chapter three deals with economic reconstruction and the strategies that women develop to cope with war-induced changes in the economic environment and to meet the growing responsibilities for the survival and well-being of family and relatives. The focus is on the relationship between women's economic activities and their socio-economic position. The first section of the chapter concentrates on women's involvement in agricultural production, which often constitutes a major source of income. In addition to problems of landmines, a lack of agricultural inputs and farm implements, a shattered infrastructure and the inaccessibility of markets, etc., which equally trouble male farmers, women face a number of particular challenges. First, women often lack legal rights to land and other resources which, in the context of social disintegration where a large number of women become single providers, may reduce their ability to survive on farming alone. In some countries, women are organizing themselves to lobby state and local authorities for increased access to such resources, but in many cases women are forced off the land and are compelled to seek other sources of income. Another problem facing women in agriculture is the dismantling of traditional work groups due to displacement, divorce, death, etc. This has often resulted in the creation of new co-operative associations and voluntary self-help groups which combine old institutions and current social conditions. When cultivating the family land is no longer an option, some women join the casual agricultural labour force. While this opportunity enables women to employ their skills and to earn an income, recent analyses suggest that this may in fact mean that women come to occupy a marginal position in the new structure of rural social stratification. Another area which proved to be of great importance to women's livelihoods was the burgeoning informal sector, with petty trade and small-scale businesses as major sources of income. The documentation of women's involvement in this sector showed a great variety in experiences. Some women took up activities in which they had also been involved prior to the war, but many engaged in innovative projects, even when it meant a break with existing social norms, as they took up jobs perceived to be male jobs. Some women established businesses on the basis of local resources and demand, while others established elaborate trading networks which cut across ethnic boundaries and national borders. Again, women's capacity to build and mobilize extensive social networks had a positive impact. But while women generally proved to be eager and capable entrepreneurs, the sustainability of their enterprises was often constrained by a lack of capital and marketing skills, not to mention the fact that the sector itself is highly insecure and fluctuating. Moreover, women's economic success would in some cases result in social stigmatization and exclusion, due to clashes with prevailing norms or jealousy. Finally, the formal sector is discussed. For various reasons, societies emerging from war usually experience a high unemployment rate, and women are often particularly marginalized with regard to access to formal employment. In some cases this is a result of the fact that women generally have poorer educational qualifications, but research also suggests that discriminatory practices are still frequent. One of the few areas where women seem privileged is the social sector, but because this sector is often exposed to budgetary cuts, women's access to income and status from this field is reduced. Nevertheless, women continue to perform related tasks, but as semi-professionals or even as volunteers. The fourth chapter focuses on social reconstruction, specifically on the rehabilitation of social services (health care and education) and wider issues of social integration. With regard to the first aspect, the main questions are whether the social sector recognizes women's particular needs, and whether it seeks to build on women's skills and capacities. The discussion on social integration shifts the focus to how women are positioned in processes of inclusion and exclusion, and to how women's strategies and activities influence social integration. Studies on the rehabilitation of social services suggest that even though women's needs and rights are increasingly recognized officially, women continue to be discriminated against with regard to access to education for social and cultural reasons. Health care and other social facilities also remain inadequate, with consequences not only for women's health, but also for their ability to participate in political and economic life. The material clearly demonstrates that social issues were generally given high priority by women themselves, and many women in post-conflict societies make a major contribution to their rehabilitation. In rural as well as urban areas, women have re-established primary education for children as a means to build local capacities and influence their socialization, and women are often involved in providing primary health care and socio-economic assistance on a self-help basis to people in crisis. However, as noted above, while such activities are generally welcomed, they are often considered but a natural extension of women's domestic obligations and hence are not remunerated or responded to with offers of training. In addition to ordinary health care problems, intrastate wars produce a number of specific health problems known as psycho-social traumas. These traumas may stem from experiences of forced displacement, torture, rape, violence, witnessing killings, etc. In some cases, women have been particularly vulnerable to this kind of assault on mind and body. But women have also been very active in addressing the scars that such experiences leave, organizing voluntary organizations which offer medical and psychological treatment. Moreover, they have helped former victims to overcome their distress and reintegrate, by offering skills training and income-generating activities. Another issue which has been addressed by women's organizations is the growth of violence within post-war societies. Through classroom education and workshops, women have sought to raise awareness about violence against women and to change the attitudes that consider such violence acceptable. As the discussion on social integration points out, there has long been a tendency to focus exclusively on the reintegration of returnees, internally displaced persons and demobilized soldiers, or of persons who have become marked and marginalized due to torture, disability, widowhood, etc. However, to the extent that any post-war society is inevitably undergoing profound changes in its socio-economic and political composition, the issue of integration is relevant to all members of society. This chapter focuses on this aspect from a gender and family perspective, and shows how integration often also has disintegrative aspects. Newly gained economic freedom and independence, long years of separation and exposure to new social environments and attitudes, new perceptions of the role of the family and its members, and forced migration in search of employment, all contribute to continued dismantling of existing social institutions and the establishment of new ones. Social integration, in other words, is not simply about "coming home", but about defining new guiding social values and establishing corresponding relationships and institutions based on a combination of factors including kinship, socio-economic interests, and shared experiences and circumstances. In the final chapter, conventional conceptualizations of women in conflict and post-conflict situations are examined. The chapter also contains some suggestions for alternative concepts and approaches which appear to be better tools for our understanding of women's situation and thus for the development of programmes that will assist women in their multiple efforts to rebuild their lives. It is pointed out that our understanding of women's roles in post-war societies and of their contributions to post-war reconstruction must go beyond the universalistic narrative of "women's experience of war". The specificity and diversity of women's experiences must be acknowledged. Only on this basis can we conduct comparative analyses and begin to develop a deeper general understanding of post-war reconstruction from a gender perspective. Second, the concluding chapter stresses the need to supplement the image of women as vulnerable victims with an image of women as a highly differentiated group of social actors, who possess valuable resources and capacities and who have their own agendas. Women influence the course of things, and their actions are constitutive of post-war societies. The reduction of women to targets and beneficiaries both fails to recognize their contributions and contributes to their marginalization. A third point stressed in the conclusion is the need for gender-specific data and gender-focused analysis. While special attention is given to women throughout the publication, so as to make visible the previously invisible, the aim has been to see women's situation within a gender framework which pays attention to how gender roles and relationships are continuously constructed and contested by different actors, and which recognizes the gender dimension inherent in all aspects of post-war reconstruction. The gender perspective is also relevant for the achievement of sustainable peace. As the analysis strongly suggests, the failure to recognize gender issues may produce new social tensions and contribute to the differentiating struggles over identity, status and power that are so distinctive for societies which have recently achieved peace.