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The global rise of populism has fuelled academic interest in how populism impacts international relations. The article argues that the post-Western international order as a context and its perceived opportunities strongly guide the foreign policy conduct of populist leaders regardless of their ideological background or geographical situation. The cases examined are Venezuela under Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) and Hungary under Viktor Orbán since 2010 (excluding his first term between 1998 and 2002). The research questions are as follows: (1) how does post-Westernism manifest itself in Chávista and Orbánist foreign policy and (2) what limitations do or did they face in terms of their post-Western foreign policies? The analysis is structured along three interrelated thematic lines of foreign policy making: populists' conflicts with traditional (Western) powers¸ populists' search for new partnerships in the non-Western world, and empowerment of regional institutions. Finally, the limitations of post-Westernism are explained on a comparative basis to highlight the contradictory features of populist foreign policy making in terms of loud short-term successes and silent long-term challenges.

The subject of the article is the functioning and role of investigative journalism in Hungary in the conditions of the tendency to move from liberal democracy towards autocracy, which has been observed for over two decades. This leads to the restriction of civil liberties in various areas of social life, including the sphere of activity of the independent media, which are obviously perceived by the rulers as an obstacle in appropriating the state and achieving goals contrary to the interests of citizens. Under the rule of Viktor Orbán, the leader of the Fidesz party, since 2010 a plan to monopolize the circulation of information and subordinate the media and advertising market to the ruling party has been consistently implemented. Internet sites of investigative journalism are the only enclaves of independent journalism, identified with the concept of the "fourth power." Three such portals were analyzed, pointing to their economic basis, the methods of conducting and the subject of their investigations, and the effectiveness in publicizing irregularities in the conduct of the rulers and businessmen associated with power.

In this article, the author analyzes the situation inside the Visegrad countries and the Visegrad group against the background of the rapid deterioration of the international situation and the unfolding military actions in Ukraine. The international crisis contributed to an increase in inflation in the countries, the growth of discontent among the population, which resulted almost everywhere in full-scale strikes and manifestations. Against this background, predictions about contradictions within the Visegrad Four – the oldest of the modern regional structures on the continent – and about its possible imminent collapse have intensified in the European press. Indeed, the long absence of meetings in the first half of the year and the demarches of the chairmen of the Czech Parliament gave ground to such conclusions, but politicians of another level – prime ministers and presidents – continued their meetings, joint consultations and exchange of views, that eventually helped them to clarify positions and contributed to the preservation of regional unity of the Visegrad countries. Especially important from this point of view was the November meeting of Prime Ministers Viktor Orban, Mateusz Morawiecki, Piotr Fiala and Eduard Heger in Kosice.

Este artigo busca analisar o significado da participação do Brasil na III Cúpula Demográfica de Budapeste. Esse encontro é derivado de uma série de eventos que ocorrem desde 2015, a partir da ascensão do governo de extrema-direita de Viktor Orbán. Com o objetivo de pensar o enfrentamento ao declínio populacional, a partir de estratégias anti-imigração e pró-família, o evento vem se posicionando como um contraponto às conferências da ONU. Enquanto percurso metodológico, partimos de pesquisa on-line e documental no site dos organizadores da cúpula e do governo brasileiro para, posteriormente, utilizarmos a análise crítica do discurso (ACD) para o pronunciamento da ministra Damares Alves durante o evento, com reflexão a partir dos estudos feministas pós-estruturalistas. O que se apura é uma inflexão do Brasil à agenda neoconservadora e antigênero, se associando a países de extrema-direita, fundamentalistas e contrários à defesa de direitos humanos. O discurso proferido instrumentaliza noções demográficas para camuflar suas perspectivas ideológicas em relação ao gênero, emprestando ares de discurso científico aos ataques aos direitos sexuais e reprodutivos e às noções de família não tradicionais.

Hungary Post-2010 has been ruled by Viktor Orbán and his right-wing Fidesz party and is generally regarded as a typical case of populist governance. Reforming the Penal Code was one of the first major policy changes initiated by Fidesz shortly after winning the 2010 elections. It introduced the 'three-strikes' principle into Hungarian penal policy which is considered a prime example of penal populism. It could be inferred that in the past decade Hungarian penal policy has been dominated by penal populism and punitive measures. This paper argues that reality is more nuanced and presents the concepts of penal populism and populist policy making, with a special focus on the Hungarian context. The article provides an overview of the most important penal policy measures in the past two decades and examines whether and how increased strictness of legislative acts influenced the sentencing practice. The paper highlights the related results of an empirical survey on public opinions about criminal law and ends with a case study exploration of the intersections of lowering the age limit of criminal responsibility and penal populism.

Figures like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and former French National Front leader Marion Maréchal are seeking to establish what we call a new globalist illiberal order. The globalist illiberal agenda extends elements of the globalist project while reclaiming a radicalized view of Christian democracy. Europe's far-right views the global order as composed of strong nations who need to defend their sovereignty on 'cultural' issues while protecting their common Christian roots. We trace their project by focusing on two new institutions of higher education, Hungary's National University of Public Service Ludovika (Ludovika-UPS) and the Institut de sciences sociales, économiques et politiques (Institute of Social Sciences, Economics and Politics—ISSEP), based in France and Spain. Through these institutions, globalist illiberals aim to cultivate new leaders outside the liberal 'mainstream' and redefine the meaning of Christian democracy. We conclude that surging nationalism among mid- to small powers is not resulting in deglobalization but is fostering illiberal globalization, which has no place for those who do not fit in their exclusionary vision of Christian Europe.

Figures like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and former French National Front leader Marion Maréchal are seeking to establish what we call a new globalist illiberal order. The globalist illiberal agenda extends elements of the globalist project while reclaiming a radicalized view of Christian democracy. Europe's far-right views the global order as composed of strong nations who need to defend their sovereignty on 'cultural' issues while protecting their common Christian roots. We trace their project by focusing on two new institutions of higher education, Hungary's National University of Public Service Ludovika (Ludovika-UPS) and the Institut de sciences sociales, économiques et politiques (Institute of Social Sciences, Economics and Politics—ISSEP), based in France and Spain. Through these institutions, globalist illiberals aim to cultivate new leaders outside the liberal 'mainstream' and redefine the meaning of Christian democracy. We conclude that surging nationalism among mid- to small powers is not resulting in deglobalization but is fostering illiberal globalization, which has no place for those who do not fit in their exclusionary vision of Christian Europe.

The article analyzes the last stage of the confrontation between Budapest and Brussels, which this year marks at least 10 years. this means that out of Hungary's 16 years of membership in the European Union, 10 years have not been easy – in periodically recurring disputes about its right to independence in political decision-making. The most tragic was the last two-thirds of the way, when the government of permanent FIDESZ leader Viktor Orban came to power in Hungary, having received two-thirds of the votes in parliament, which tried for the first time during the reform period to make comprehensive changes to the country's fundamental documents. at least twice, the country was on the verge of applying article 7 of the Lisbon treaty, for which it was one of the first to vote in 2009. in 2020, immediately after the re-election of the European parliament, the discussion about Hungary's inconsistency with the EU's value area resumed, taking on a tragic framework towards the end of the year, when Hungary, together with Poland, was forced to pay attention to the problem of its certain «otherness» by vetoing the EU's budget plans.

The purpose of this article is to make sense of the resurgence of religion on the political agenda of a secularizing Europe. The focus is placed on the European Union (EU). The religious factor is considered alternatively as an influence on political attitudes and behaviours; as an ideological and party component; and as a controversial policy stake. We analyse the effects of the religious factor in past European elections as an element framing the perception of European integration and voting. We then document the crisis affecting the Christian-Democratic family incarnated by the European People's Party (EPP) and competing narratives about religion to claim leadership in the redefinition of the core ideology and the boundaries of this political family. Two cases studies are developed: The 'Hungarian crisis' and identity politics promoted by Viktor Orbán: the Spitzenkandidaten process to select the EPP candidate running for the presidency of the Commission. We finally study the treatment of religion as a policy issue within the EP and as a potential bone of contention in the incoming term.

Starting in 2010, the Fidesz party achieved in a row six (partly landslide) victories at municipal, national, and European Parliament elections. Not questioning other explanations, my ongoing research traces the remarkable resilience of the ruling party above all to earlier "tectonic" shifts in civil society, which helped the Right accumulate ample social capital well before its political triumph. This process was decisively advanced by the Civic Circles Movement founded by Viktor Orbán after the lost election of 2002. This movement was militant in terms of its hegemonic aspirations and collective practices; massive in terms of its membership and activism; middle-cIass based in terms of social stratification; and dominantly metropolitan and urban on the spatial dimension. Parallel to contentious mobilization, the civic circles re-organized and extended the Right's grass-roots networks, associations, and media; rediscovered and reinvented its holidays and everyday life-styles, symbols, and heroes; and explored innovative ways for cultural, charity, leisure, and political activities. Leading activists, among them patriots, priests, professionals, politicians, and pundits, offered new frames and practices for Hungarians to feel, think, and act as members of "imagined communities": the nation, Christianity, citizenry, and Europe.

More than any other politician in current Hungarian politics, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán refers to "east" and "west" in his public addresses as symbols of antithetical political cultures and cultural value systems. Of course, he is by no means the first Hungarian statesman to do so. From the Middle Ages, references to the Asian origins of the nation were mobilized by chroniclers and statesmen to characterize the national character and Hungary's place in the European Christian political community. During the Enlightenment, the embracing of a perceived cultural hierarchy between west and east entered the Hungarian public discourse, and from the Reform Era the two intellectual streams shaped modern Hungarian identity discourse equally. This paper describes the national identity discourse that emphasizes the Asian origins of the nation through the lens of what I call "self-Orientalism." Whereas Orbán's political addresses can be viewed as a continuation of the self-Orientalizing language, the examination of the ways in which he breaks from the tradition of self-Orientalism teaches even more important lessons about the viability of the reference to the east-west dichotomy in the global political arena.

The article deals with the political and economic situation in Hungary in the
last several years. The author firstly points to the causes of decline of
influence of the previous socialist government and the heavy defeat of the
socialists in the 2010 elections and the success of the right party Fidesz.
After winning the elections, the Viktor Orban government started, at an
accelerated rate, to implement the pre-election programme of Fidesz that had
been prepared for a long time while it was an opposition party. The author is
of the opinion that this programme is atypical, very radical and unique by
many characteristics in the Europe of today. He points out that only a year
after Fidesz victory the government and the parliament adopted quite a number
of laws, a new Constitution and a set of risky measures of recovery that
should lead to a substantial economic reform. The author particularly
underlines the fact that the government decided to break of negotiation with
IMF, reject its recommendations and try to overcome over-indebtedness by
carrying out its own ideas.

Young Central and Eastern Europeans are growing up in newly solidifying democratic political systems with parents raised under an entirely different regime. In order to comprehend future sociopolitical dynamics within these countries it is crucial to question how the youth are developing their political knowledge and how they are engaging in political activism. As such, political socialization provides a lens for analyzing what forms youth activism is taking and tracking the roots of current political trends. Political socialization, as a theory, is relatively straightforward. The influences of agents affecting an individual in their earlier in life have a significant impact on political outlooks and activism in later years. However, 'political socialization' is also a process and a field of research with certain methods and structures. Through primarily qualitative analysis, this report investigates the influences behind post-communist political trends among the youth, targeting the primary agents of socialization: family unit, educational institutions and the media. These agents are analyzed in the context of political parties and grassroots social movements. Although socialization theory targets these agents as key actors affecting political development, there is limited previous research into multi-agent analysis, with the majority of research focusing on one agent. This report also analyzes social movements as an agent of socialization, not traditionally targeted by previous political socialization theory. Thus, this report adds to wider political socialization research while presenting a unique case study into youth political developments in Hungary. Hungary is an important experiencing a growing political shift away from liberal European values, giving preference to nationalist and increasingly exclusionary politics. Larger trends of right wing and radical right voter support are also heightened among the youth population. Tracking how these shifts are developing and mainstreaming serves to better define what is a national anomaly in Hungary and what might be a predictor of larger regional or European trends.