Suchergebnisse

Research examining ethnic and cultural differences among individuals who commit sex offenses remains limited. Specifically, literature focusing on sex offenses committed by Latinos is scarce. Using archival data from a large sample of individuals who committed sex offenses, this study explored differences between Latino, White, and African American individuals related to their characteristics, the offenses, and the victims. Latinos in the sample were more likely to have a lower educational level, and to be living with the victim, than either their White or African American counterparts. To further understand the influence of cultural background, the study also examined differences within the Latino group based on their country of origin. Within the Latino sample, differences emerged in their educational level, criminal background, and psychiatric history. These findings are discussed as they pertain to future research and current practices related to the management and treatment of Latinos who commit sexual offenses.

As a response to the Russian invasion of Crimea, NATO returned to the core military concepts of deterrence and collective defence. This NATO adaption has recently come to include attempts to integrate offensive cyber effects into NATO force structure and response doctrine. The article argues—counter to what is publicly declared—that such an integration does little to strengthen NATO's deterrence posture and is unlikely to deter non-military, hybrid cyber activity below the threshold of collective defence. The article identifies several practical challenges to the current integration effort, which include the temporal dimension of developing exploits, battle damage assessment and deconfliction. With these challenges in mind, the article suggests that deploying minor and less resourceful cyber effects that cause persistent 'cyber annoyances' holds an unappreciated potential as they can drain opponent resources, disturb vital IT-systems and complicate decision-making. The article ends by arguing that NATO should not adapt its collective defence clause to cyberspace. A more active NATO in cyberspace risks undermining the cyber-intelligence norm that so far has prevented escalation and thereby increasing the likelihood that Russia misinterprets intelligence and active cyber defence activities as military preparation, armament or an attack in the making.

I present a model where a regulator monitors compliance with a policy by a population of individuals, some of whom repeatedly prefer to violate the policy, while others only occasionally want to experiment. I show that the regulator can use sanctions, contingent on past violations of the policy, to differentiate between the agents and to improve welfare. Such punishment plans arise frequently in practice. As a result, a regulator prefers investing in enforcement rather than use maximal sanctions. (JEL K42, K14, L51)