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Recommended readings (Machine generated): 1. James E. Meade (1958), 'Is the National Debt a Burden?', Oxford Economic Papers, 10 (2), June, 163-83 -- 2. Franco Modigliani (1961), 'Long-Run Implications of Alternative Fiscal Policies and the Burden of the National Debt', Economic Journal, 71 (284), December, 730-55 -- 3. Peter A. Diamond (1965), 'National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model', American Economic Review, 55 (5), December, 1126-50 -- 4. Olivier J. Blanchard (1985), 'Debt, Deficits and Finite Horizons,' Journal of Political Economy, 93 (2), April, 223-47 -- 5. Gilles Saint-Paul (1992), 'Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model', Quartely Journal of Economics, 107 (4), November, 1243-59 -- 6. Cristina Checherita-Westphal, Andrew Hughes Hallet and Philipp Rother (2014), 'Fiscal Sustainability using Growth-Maximising Debt Targets', Applied Economics, 46 (6), February, 638-47 -- 7. Carmen M. Reinhart, Vincent R. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2012), 'Public Debt Overhangs: Advanced-Economy Episodes Since 1800', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26 (3), August, 69-86 -- 8. Cristina Checherita-Westphal and Philipp Rother (2012), 'The Impact of High Government Debt on Economic Growth and its Channels: An Empirical Investigation for the Euro Area', European Economic Review, 56 (7), October, 1392-405 -- 9. Anja Baum, Cristina Checherita-Westphal and Philipp Rother (2013), 'Debt and Growth: New Evidence for the Euro Area ', Journal of International Money and Finance, 32, February, 809-21 -- 10. Jaejoon Woo and Manmohan S. Kumar (2015), 'Public Debt and Growth', Economica, 82 (328), October, 705-39 -- 11. Ugo Panizza and Andrea F. Presbitero (2013), 'Public Debt and Economic Growth in Advanced Economies: A Survey', Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 149 (2), January, 175-204 -- 12. Alberto F. Alesina, Mark De Broeck, Alessandro Prati and Guido Tabellini (1992), 'Default Risk on Government Debt in OECD Countries', Economic Policy, 7 (15), October, 428-63 -- 13. Lorenzo Codogno, Carlo Favero and Alessandro Missale (2003), 'Yield Spreads on EMU Government Bonds', Economic Policy, 18 (37), October, 503-32 -- 14. Thomas Laubach (2009), 'New Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget Deficits and Debt', Journal of the European Economic Association, 7 (4), June, 858-85 -- 15. Maria-Grazia Attinasi, Cristina Checherita-Westphal and Christiane Nickel (2010), 'What Explains the Surge in Euro Area Sovereign Spreads During the Financial Crisis of 2007-09?', Public Finance and Management, 10 (4), 595-645 -- 16. Nigel Chalk and Vito Tanzi (2002), 'Impact of Large Public Debt on Growth in the EU: A Discussion of Potential Channels', in Marco Buti, Jürgen Von Hagen and Carlos Martinez-Mongay (eds), The Behaviour of Fiscal Authorities: Stabilisation, Growth and Institutions, Part II, Chapter 11, London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 186-211 -- 17. Riccardo De Bonis and Massimiliano Stacchini (2013), 'Does Government Debt Affect Bank Credit?', International Finance, 16, December, 289-310 -- 18. Óscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick and Alan M. Taylor (2016), 'Sovereigns versus Banks: Credit, Crises, and Consequences', Journal of the European Economic Association, 14 (1), February, 45-79 -- 19. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2009), 'A Digression on the Theoretical Underpinnings of Debt Crisis', in This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly', Part II, Chapter 4, Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, 51-67

The U.S. budget deficit, the U.S. trade deficit, and Third World debt; some emphasis on implications of the high value of the dollar.

This paper examines the causes, processes, and outcomes of the two Belize sovereign debt restructurings in 2006–07 and in 2012–13 that occurred outside of an IMF-supported program. It finds that the motivation for the two debt restructurings differed, as the former was driven by external liquidity concerns while the latter was motivated by a substantial increase in the coupon rates and future fiscal solvency concerns. Despite differential treatment between residents and non-residents, both 2006–07 and 2012–13 debt exchanges were executed through collaborative engagement, due in part to the exi

Partial contents: The background; Repayment costs to debtors; Debt service capacity; Temptation to default.

We examine debt-sensitive majority rules. According to such a rule, the higher a planned public debt, the higher the necessary parliamentary majority to approve it. In a two-period model, we compare debt-sensitive majority rules with the simple majority rule when individuals differ regarding their benefits from public good provision. We establish the existence of Condorcet winners under debt-sensitive majority rules and derive their properties. We find that equilibrium debt-levels are lower under the debt-sensitive majority rule if preferences regarding public goods are sufficiently heterogeneous and if the impact of debt on future public good provision is sufficiently strong. We illustrate how debt-sensitive majority rules act as political stabilizers of negative macroeconomic shocks.

We examine the implications for optimal inflation of changes in the level and maturity of government debt under the assumption where fiscal and monetary policies co-ordinate, and in the case of an independent central bank following a Taylor rule. Under co-ordination, inflation persistence and volatility depend on the sign, size and maturity of debt. Higher debt leads to higher inflation and longer maturity leads to more persistent inflation although inflation plays a minor role in achieving fiscal sustainability. Under an independent monetary authority, inflation is higher, more volatile and more persistent and plays a significant role in achieving fiscal solvency. The Economic Journal © 2013 Royal Economic Society. ; Marcet is grateful for support from DGES, Monfispol and Excellence Program if Banco de Espana. Faraglia and Scott gratefully acknowledge funding from the ESRC's World Economy and Finance Program. Oikonomou is grateful to HEC Montreal for funding ; Peer Reviewed

We examine debt-sensitive majority rules. According to such a rule, the higher a planned public debt, the higher the parliamentary majority required to approve it. In a two-period model we compare debt-sensitive majority rules with the simple majority rule when individuals differ regarding their benefits from public-good provision. We establish the existence of Condorcet winners under debt-sensitive majority rules and derive their properties. We find that equilibrium debt-levels are lower under the debt-sensitive majority rule if preferences regarding public goods are sufficiently heterogeneous and if the impact of debt on future public-good provision is sufficiently strong. We illustrate how debt-sensitive majority rules act as political stabilizers in the event of negative macroeconomic shocks.

I analyze how lack of commitment affects the maturity structure of sovereign debt. Governments balance benefits of default induced redistribution and costs due to income losses in the wake of a default. Their choice of short- versus long-term debt affects default and rollover decisions by subsequent policy makers. The equilibrium maturity structure is shaped by revenue losses on inframarginal units of debt that reflect the price impact of these decisions. The model predicts an interior maturity structure with positive gross positions and a shortening of the maturity structure when debt issuance is high, output low, or a cross default more likely. These predictions are consistent with empirical evidence.

Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Executive Summary -- Ch 1. A Decade of Debt -- I. Introduction -- II. Surges in Public Debt -- III. The Financial Crash-Sovereign Debt Crisis Sequence -- IV. Debt and Growth -- V. The Aftermath of High Debt: The 1930s and World War II -- VI. Conclusion -- Ch 2. Chartbook of Country Histories of Debt, Default, and Financial Crises -- I. Preamble -- II. Key to Figures and Methodology Notes -- III. Debt and Crises: Main Themes -- References -- About the Authors -- Index.

This study provides empirical evidence that the costs of austerity crucially depend on the level of private indebtedness. In particular, fiscal consolidations lead to severe contractions when implemented in high private debt states. Contrary, fiscal consolidations have no significant effect on economic activity when private debt is low. These results are robust to alternative definitions of private debt overhang, the composition of fiscal consolidations and controlling for the state of the business cycle and government debt overhang. I show that deterioration in household balance sheets is important to understand private debt-dependent effects of austerity.

1. Introduction : debts shared and imposed, political and gendered / Bernard Hours and Pepita Ould Ahmed -- 2. Paying what one owes. or carrying out one's obligations / Pepita Ould Ahmed -- 3. Debt : the price of what, exactly? / Bernard Hours -- 4. Incompatibility and complementarity of the Chicago plan and alternative monetary and financial mechanisms / Jean-Michel Servet and Tom Moerenhout -- 5. Why are poor people reluctant to borrow? : microcredit in rural Morocco / Jean-Yves Moisseron and Pepita Ould Ahmed -- 6. Debtors and creditors : constructions and deligitimization of powers in Mali / Francoise Bourdarias -- 7. The indebted state in Algeria : state demand, social conflict, and imaginary sources of power / Laurent Bazin -- 8. The imaginary debt of communism : political conflicts and historical legitimization in Romania / Antoine Heemeryck -- 9. Indebtedness and women's material, monetary, and imaginary debts in the era of globalized gender / Isabelle Guerin, Magalie Saussey, and Monique Selim -- 10. Debt, or, How to get one's neck out of the noose / Tassadit Yacine -- 11. Perceptions of debt and microcredit in Senegal / Eveline Baumann and Mouhamedoune Abdoulaye Fall -- 12. Conclusion : debt without end / Bernard Hours and Pepita Ould Ahmed.