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AbstractBritish political debate since the EU referendum has hinged on what type of Brexit to pursue: hard or soft. Yet, unlike in instances of treaty rejection, the EU made no counter offer to avoid a breakdown in relations that would follow the hardest of exits. This remarkable unity in not discounting the possibility of a hard Brexit demonstrates that UK withdrawal is very distinct from previous wrangles over EU reform. Drawing on the work of Kissinger, this article argues Brexit is a revolutionary act that denies the legitimacy of the EU order. Hence this process does not conform to other episodes of differentiation. When Westminster sought opt‐outs, it did not reject the core principles of integration. By not seeking to oppose a hard Brexit, Brussels has forced the UK government to find a new legitimising principle to govern EU–UK relations, transferring the burden of adjustment to London.

For a long time, integration was viewed as a one-dimensional deepening process consisting of the transfer of Member States' competences to the EU, while the reverse procedure was treated as non-existent. But although re-nationalization might be considered controversial, it does not have to be destructive for the EU. This was openly accepted by the Lisbon Treaty, which specified conditions for exercising competences and introduced the return of EU competences to the Member States as a viable option. This article concentrates on the partial restoration of tasks (contrary to complete repatriation - i.e. withdrawal from the EU), which might be executed either as repatriation through the revision of primary law or as deactivation through repeal of secondary law. Attention is given not only to theoretical legal framework, but also to past empirical practice. As results indicate, very few restorations have taken place. The text explores obstacles to re-nationalization and suggests potential solutions.

When a guerrilla movement opposing Portuguese rule in Guinea-Bissau issued a unilateral declaration of independence in September 1973, it created a dilemma for Portugal's allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although Britain, like other NATO countries, wanted to keep Portugal within the alliance, British officials were exasperated by the Portuguese regime's refusal to let go of its colonies in Africa. When the United Nations (UN) took up the issue of Guinea-Bissau, Britain came under intense pressure from Portugal to proffer its support. Declassified documents from the British National Archives underscore the difficulties that ensued. British officials were mindful of their relationship with Portugal, but they were unsure of the intentions of the other Western permanent members of the UN Security Council and were worried about damaging Britain's broader position in Africa. This dilemma was not resolved until April 1974 when a military coup in Lisbon led to the Portuguese withdrawal from Guinea-Bissau.

Mit Blick auf den Gesamtkontext der Gorbatschowschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik zeichnet der Autor zunächst die Entwicklungsphasen (Perzeptions- und Konzeptwandel) der sowjetischen Deutschlandpolitik in den Jahren 1985-1990 auf, wobei sein Interesse den Faktoren und Motiven gilt, die letztlich zur folgenreichen Entscheidung in der Frage der deutschen Einheit führten. Im zweiten Teil des Aufsatzes setzt er sich mit den aus den Veränderungen der europäischen Landkarte resultierenden Konsequenzen hinsichtlich der politischen und militärischen Machtposition der UdSSR auseinander und beleuchtet die "Bausteine der sowjetischen Sicherheit in den 90ern" (Bündnistransformation, Militärpräsenz in Europa etc.) sowie die Perspektiven der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen. (BIOst-hml)

"A bill to provide for the withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States over the island of Puerto Rico and for the recognition of its independence ." ; Millard E. Tydings, chairman. ; Paged continuously. ; Pt. 1. Hearings, Mar. 5-8, 1945 -- pt. 2. Hearings, April 23, 24, 26, 27, May 1 and 8, 1945. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The 1972 ABM Treaty between the USSR and the USA allowed for the deployment of a limited strategic missile defense system, but established a strict ban on the deployment of anti-missile systems outside their national territory. The agreement was the first turn in the U.S. policy in this area, determining the direction and content of missile defense development programs for many years to come. Once every ten years, the United States revised its policy, for instance, R. Reagan's intention in 1983 to build a large-scale space-based missile defense system was seen as an attempt to move away from the concept of mutual nuclear deterrence, enshrined in the ABM Treaty. However, only after its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002, the United States set a course for the deployment of a missile defense system in Europe, as stated, to protect the region from nuclear missile threats from "rogue states". At the present stage, the growing degradation of relations between Russia and Western countries, especially against the backdrop of hostilities in Ukraine, has led NATO states to put forward new approaches to the integration of missile defense and air defense systems, providing for the functional interface of information management systems and strike components for the successful interception of different classes of targets. The experience of providing Ukraine with integrated defense and its functioning on the basis of modern Western air defense systems will allow the U.S. / NATO to evaluate the effectiveness of the chosen approach and apply the knowledge gained to improve Europe's "anti-missile umbrella". The article proposes the author's periodization of American policy in the field of missile defense, as well as considers each of the identified stages with special emphasis on the last one, which is directly related to the current political situation.

As Iran edges closer to acquiring a nuclear bomb and its missiles extend an ever darker diplomatic shadow over the Middle East and Europe, Iran is likely to pose three threats. First, Iran could dramatically up the price of oil by interfering with the free passage of vessels in and through the Persian Gulf as it did during the l980s or by threatening to use terrorist proxies to target other states' oil facilities. Second, it could diminish American influence in the Gulf and Middle East by increasing the pace and scope of terrorist activities against Iraq, Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states, Israel, and other perceived supporters of the United States. Finally, it could become a nuclear proliferation model for the world and its neighbors (including many states that otherwise would be more dependent on the United States for their security) by continuing to insist that it has a right to make nuclear fuel under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and then withdrawing once it decides to get a bomb. To contain and deter Iran from posing such threats, the United States and its friends could take a number of steps: increasing military cooperation (particularly in the naval sphere) to deter Iranian naval interference; reducing the vulnerability of oil facilities in the Gulf outside of Iran to terrorist attacks, building and completing pipelines in the lower Gulf region that would allow most of the non-Iranian oil and gas in the Gulf to be exported without having to transit the Straits of Hormuz; diplomatically isolating Iran by calling for the demilitarization of the Straits and adjacent islands, creating country-neutral rules against Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty state members who are suspected of violating the treaty from getting nuclear assistance from other state members and making withdrawal from the treaty more difficult; encouraging Israel to set the pace of nuclear restraint in the region by freezing its large reactor at Dimona and calling on all other states that have large nuclear reactors to follow suit; and getting the Europeans to back targeted economic sanctions against Iran if it fails to shut down its most sensitive nuclear activities. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1726/thumbnail.jpg

Taking the majority of its examples from the Salon of 1872, this article explores the extent to which official intervention was effective in eliminating from the exhibition potentially inopportune representations of the Franco-Prussian War. The withdrawal of a certain number of works deemed to risk offending the Prussians coincided with the very moment the French government was trying to negotiate the departure of occupying enemy troops under the terms of the May 1871 Treaty of Frankfurt. It initiated, or reignited, a debate about censorship during the course of which art criticism was itself politicized. Drawing on information in the Salon catalogue and analysing the reviews of the exhibition which appeared in the Parisian press, the article takes issue with much scholarship to date. In particular, it demonstrates how the interpretation of artistic works on display is inflected by polemical and ideological determinants. What emerges from this is precisely the incipient revanchard discourse which the government had hoped to suppress.

This paper is closed access until 16 November 2020. ; Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon gives the European Parliament (EP) the power to consent on the terms of the withdrawal agreement between the exiting state and the EU. As Brexit is the first case where art. 50 has been invoked, the role of the EP in such a procedure is uncharted territory. This article assesses to what extent the EP has contributed to the Brexit negotiations until November 2018. Drawing on official documentation and thirteen original interviews with EU policy-makers, it maps the Parliament's organisational adaptation to prepare itself for the challenge. Through its steering group and coordinator, and by carefully issuing resolutions, the EP has managed to become a 'quasi-negotiator'. More difficult to detect is the EP's actual influence, as its preferences were closely aligned to those of the other EU institutions. Overall, the EP had a selective attention in the process, primarily focusing on citizens' rights.

Published online: 16 May 2019 ; Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon gives the European Parliament (EP) the power to consent on the terms of the withdrawal agreement between the exiting state and the EU. As Brexit is the first case where art. 50 has been invoked, the role of the EP in such a procedure is uncharted territory. This article assesses to what extent the EP has contributed to the Brexit negotiations until November 2018. Drawing on official documentation and thirteen original interviews with EU policy-makers, it maps the Parliament's organisational adaptation to prepare itself for the challenge. Through its steering group and coordinator, and by carefully issuing resolutions, the EP has managed to become a 'quasi-negotiator'. More difficult to detect is the EP's actual influence, as its preferences were closely aligned to those of the other EU institutions. Overall, the EP had a selective attention in the process, primarily focusing on citizens' rights.

Sino-Russian relations have swayed considerably in the second millennium. During the Yeltsin era, China-Russia relations were still strong, but this changed abruptly after Putin's accession to the presidency in 2000 and his initial pro-Western adventures. This was, in no small part, due to Russia's involvement in the war on terror, together with Russia's complicity in a US military presence in Central Asia which did not go down well in Beijing. Putin's domestic constituency found his swing into Washington's fold equally awkward, which created no small amount of criticism in Russia. Convinced that things could not get much worse, Putin's acceptance of NATO's expansion into the Baltics, his approval of US withdrawal from the ABM-treaty, and his quiet consent for an American military presence in Georgia raised additional fears in the Duma, within Russian public opinion, and to some extent among the Chinese. This was perceived as a direct surrender to American superiority and aggression, and it would not last for long. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

Most historians state that the French presence in Indo-China ended as the war ended. But nobody, in 1954, could foresee a quick withdrawal. Was Pierre Mendes France, who was lauded for the Geneva peace treaty, guilty of having passed the buck to the Americans? Did he betray the hopes of those who wanted a new France in Asia to be a bridge between North and South and between East and West? Mendes France tried to shape a policy after Geneva, and he held on to it through his last six months in office. But he had to take account of the harsh realities of the relationship with the United States, and of the beginnings of the Algerian war. Many groups and individuals wanted to have a say in French policy in Indo-China. The realities on the ground were not conducive, neither in South Vietnam nor in North Vietnam, to a "last hurrah" of French colonialism in Indo-China. Adapted from the source document.

The failure of détente has been a popular theme among historians of American foreign policy, with opinions divided as to where the responsibility for this failure lies. A commonality among all points of view, however, is the importance of events in the third world, particularly in the "Arc of Crisis." One such event—the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia— prompted Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security advisor, to comment that détente was "buried" in the Ogaden. His point was that Carter's new approach to the cold war was put to the test during the Ogaden War, and there the policy's untenability was proven. The policy's failure, in turn, encouraged Soviet adventurism, which further alienated the American public from Carter's attempt to fight the cold war. Carter's policy eventually led to the withdrawal of the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) Treaty and, as Brzezinski claimed, the collapse of détente. This article discusses Carter's foreign policy toward the Ogaden War, considers the accuracy of Brzezinski's claim, and reaches conclusions regarding the role of the Carter administration in the demise of détente.

When a guerrilla movement opposing Portuguese rule in Guinea-Bissau issued a unilateral declaration of independence in September 1973, it created a dilemma for Portugal's allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although Britain, like other NATO countries, wanted to keep Portugal within the alliance, British officials were exasperated by the Portuguese regime's refusal to let go of its colonies in Africa. When the United Nations (UN) took up the issue of Guinea-Bissau, Britain came under intense pressure from Portugal to proffer its support. Declassified documents from the British National Archives underscore the difficulties that ensued. British officials were mindful of their relationship with Portugal, but they were unsure of the intentions of the other Western permanent members of the UN Security Council & were worried about damaging Britain's broader position in Africa. This dilemma was not resolved until April 1974 when a military coup in Lisbon led to the Portuguese withdrawal from Guinea-Bissau. Tables. Adapted from the source document.