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The European Union-China relationship, based on an optimistic joint strategic agenda agreed in 2013, has shifted direction, with the EU in March 2019 describing China as a "systemic rival" in some areas. The EU has struggled to find a common approach to China, but this change was agreed at record speed and occurred against the background of growing United States pressure on its European allies to support the Donald Trump administration's hard-line approach to China. As the new EU leadership team takes over, it will have to navigate a difficult path in relations with China and the US.
The main reason for the shift in the EU's approach was business frustration at China's failure over many years to implement promises to open up its economy and accept a level playing field. Chinese foot-dragging in the negotiations for a bilateral investment agreement, now running for over six years, was another factor in the changed EU approach.
A number of key players, including commissioners dealing with China, members of the European Parliament, and EU ambassadors who had served in Beijing, played a key role in securing this changed approach, which was agreed very quickly despite some long-standing divisions between member states on how to deal with China.
Pressure from the Trump administration - which, unlike the EU, views China as a "strategic rival" - also played a part. It is likely that the new EU leadership under Ursula von der Leyen will maintain the tougher line, and place greater emphasis on reciprocity and strategic autonomy as guidelines for dealing with China.
Meanwhile there is continuing useful cooperation between the EU and China on the foreign policy front, notably on Iran, and on global issues such as climate change and support for the multilateral trading system.
The EU has to invest more in understanding China, which is a growing and formidable rival. EU leaders need to spend more time discussing China and agreeing a comprehensive approach covering all sectors. It should work with like-minded partners where there are shared interests concerning China.

In some countries of the European Union (EU) complementary pension schemes represent a major part of pension provision, whereas in others they play a relatively marginal role. An important factor is whether the social security scheme provides earnings‐related benefits and whether the ceiling on eligible earnings for social security purposes leaves room for there to be a demand for supplementary pensions arrangements, in particular for the higher paid. Pressures on the financing of social security, especially with the expected ageing of the population in the first 30 years of the next century, are encouraging many countries to develop complementary provision, and a number of new pension laws have been passed in recent years. However, important though the growth of complementary provision is, it should not be forgotten that investment markets are also likely to be affected by the ageing of the population. There are increasing pressures for greater investment freedom for complementary pension schemes, but little progress has been made by the EU in harmonisation of the regulatory regimes for complementary pensions. If mobility of labour between the countries of the EU is to become a reality, progress needs to be made soon on these pensions issues.

The paper explores controversial representation of the European Union in the Georgian political public sphere through the deconstruction of public political narratives of the pro-Western and anti-Western/pro-Russian political and societal forces in Georgia. The dis-information incursion and propaganda of the Russian Federation in the societal landscape of Georgia – soft power capabilities of Moscow – have become the primary tools of the Kremlin to undermine the soft-power policy of the EU and the pro-Western/pro-EU driven agenda in Georgia. The study reflects on the rotating political discourses on the EU through narrative analysis and deconstructs those metanarratives, which legitimize or undermine the pro-Western foreign policy discourses in Georgia. The mutually exclusive metanarratives build on shared cultural values (the pro-Western) and religious commonality (the pro-Russian): the pro-Western – on the myth of Georgians as an ancient European nation and on the 200 years-long Russian colonization, embedded in symbolisms of "mental revolution" and "re-joining the European nations;" the anti-EU – on the Orthodox unity and on a belief that balanced politics between Russia and the West will restore country's territorial integrity. This fact contributes to the fragmentation of the political public sphere in Georgia and makes it vulnerable to the external encroachments. The pro-Western narrative evolves around liberal conceptions, which try to transform the post-Soviet Georgian society through 'mental revolution.' The political discourse analysis – understanding and interpreting meanings – refers to public speeches of elites and policy documents for deconstruction of narrative structures provided by the pro-Western political elites, as their causal explanations provide insights into the ambiguous and contradictory representations of the West/EU in the Georgian political public sphere.

Considers the way in which the European Union has affected autonomy in macroeconomic policy-making of the member states. It begins with an introduction to economic ideas, and explores current themes surrounding monetary and fiscal policy and European integration, including economic policy co-ordination, objectives in national policy-making and motivations for participating in the European Monetary System. Particular focus is given to the larger member states:* the United Kingdom* Germany* France* Italy

"In May 2004, Malta, Cyprus and eight Central and Eastern European countries joined the European Union (EU). This raises the question whether the increasing heterogeneity of the new EU member states, their different memories, interests, ideas and identities will have a negative effect on the policy-making process of the EU or if the integration dynamic of the EU can be maintained. Analytically, three different aspects of such a capacity to act can be distinguished: The capability to enforce compliance with the European legislation and rules, the decision-making capability of the EU organisations and the capability to advance further political projects. 1. The implementation of the Community acquis was a crucial membership criterion in order to preserve the central 'club goods' of the EU, especially the Common Market and the competition rules. 2. The decisionmaking capability of the EU is challenged by the accession of ten mostly smaller and poorer countries. Until the date of accession, the former member states could not agree upon the required fundamental reforms of the institutional architecture, the budget and the redistributive policies. 3. A prerequisite for further political projects is the readiness of the 25 member states to cooperate. This requires a new balance between the equality of sovereign nations and a stronger influence of bigger states. The development of such a balance is considerably impeded by the process and the results of the extremely asymmetric accession negotiations. It can be concluded that compliance with European rules was largely assured, but it is still open to question as to whether the organisational and political prerequisites for the European capability for action can be restored after the successful enlargement process." (author's abstract)

The question of interest group influence is central for both scholars interested in studying policy-making in the EU and those concerned with the legitimacy of decision-making in that entity. Many hypotheses exist that stress a series of factors possibly shaping interest group influence. Nevertheless, only few studies have tried empirically to examine these hypotheses for the case of the EU. What is more, existing empirical studies report contradictory findings. To help researchers advance upon this state of the art, three obstacles that impede research dealing with interest group influence in the EU are discussed: defining the terms 'power' and 'influence'; accounting for different pathways to influence; and measuring influence. In addition to this, several ways to address these obstacles are advanced: by taking a pragmatic approach with respect to defining influence and power; by being conscious that actors may use different pathways to influence when drawing conclusions about interest group influence; and by combining different methods when measuring influence. Adapted from the source document.

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