Suchergebnisse

Following the 44-day war in September-November 2020, Azerbaijan liberated its seven occupied territories and established control over part of Karabakh. However, another part of Karabakh fell under the control of Russian peacekeepers, who will stay in the region until 2025. The main question that concerns the political establishment and the public in both Armenia and Azerbaijan is the fate of these territories. Which of the plethora of existing cases (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Donbass, Transnistria) will serve as a model for Russia's involvement? So far, Russian action in Karabakh suggests that Moscow is following the approach taken in South Ossetia. However, the involvement of Turkey, the absence of direct borders, and the strength of Azerbaijan may lead to a different outcome. The absence of a comprehensive peace agreement and dependence on the statement from November 10, 2020, complicate the situation, making future uncertainties and even conflict realistic. The article tries to analyze and predict Russian actions in Karabakh and the implications thereof for the broader region.

In September, Russia made another effort to negotiate the nonmilitary use of cyberspace with the United States. Predictably, Washington rejected the proposal, despite admitting the urgency of the issue and the need to find a consensus solution with Moscow. The problem is not new: Russia has insisted on establishing common cyber norms in the United Nations for a long time, while the US has reserved the right to develop its own military cyber capabilities and blocked all Russian initiatives. With the stakes raised dramatically, Russia and the US have to find a way to agree on cybersecurity.

Sammelrezension: 1) Laura J. Shepherd: Gender, UN Peacebuilding, and the Politics of Space. Locating Legitimacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017. ISBN 9780190086862. 2) Sabrina Karim, Kyle Beardsley, 2019: Equal Opportunity Peacekeeping: Women, Peace and
Security in Post-Conflict States. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2019. ISBN
9780190093532.

Following the end of the INF treaty on August 2, 2019, nuclear arms control is in a state of deep crisis. The erosion of the nuclear arms control regime, however, had already begun before this treaty's termination. In the event that New START, the final remaining U.S.-Russian treaty limiting "strategic" nuclear weapons, also expires in February 2021, (perceived) U.S.-Russian strategic equality will have to be redefined and codified. Aware of the risks and imponderables involved in this process, the Kremlin has called for an extension of New START. Thus, gaining time is deemed a preferable policy to witnessing the demise of yet another arms control treaty, despite Moscow's concerns about new developments affecting "strategic stability" that would ideally require treaty modifications.

How the Kremlin deals with accusations that it is responsible for the Novichok attack on Alexei Navalny is a test case for Russia's role within the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). If Moscow changes its policy of deception and takes steps to come clean on its Novichok program, the West should proactively create the diplomatic elbow room necessary for Russia to realign itself with the CWC. In the end, the international community must receive verifiable assurances that the Russian Novichok program has been completely dismantled.

In the context of NATO and its member states seeking to enhance deterrence and defence postures and looking ahead to 2030, the article argues for a shift from seeing Moscow's activities as "measures short of war," blurring the lines between war and peace, toward greater clarity on Russian military strategy and the blurring of lines between the offensive and the defensive.

This article refutes the assumptions that underlie the U.S. perception of the current Russian approach to aerospace operations and offers alternative interpretations of Moscow's current art of strategy and its geopolitical implications.

This article questions whether current scenarios for a Russian fait accompli in the Baltics are representative of this stratagem and challenges prevailing arguments that a Russian "fait accompli strategy" is possible, along with commonly held interpretations of Russian strategy in defense planning circles.