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Anhand der institutionellen Arrangements innerhalb des politischen Systems in der Republik China (Taiwan) überprüft der Autor den aktuellen Stand im Demokratisierungsprozeß des Landes und sucht nach Hinweisen auf den Grad der demokratischen Konsolidierung. Seine Betrachtungen zum Wandel von sechs zentralen Kriterien/Spielregeln in der politischen Kultur (demokratische Verfassung, Anerkennung ziviler Kontrolle über das Militär, faires und kompetitives Wahlsystem, Parteiensystem, repräsentative Legislative, Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft) führen ihn zu dem Schluß, daß die institutionelle Transformation hin zur Demokratie abgeschlossen ist, der Beweis für die erfolgte Konsolidierung allerdings bis zu einem Machtwechsel (Abwahl der GMD) noch aussteht. (FUB/APCh-Emn)

"Political Polarization in American Politics provides short, accessible chapters about the nature and extent of political polarization within the American public and in American political institutions. These chapters capture the central ideas and debates in political science research on polarization, and are written by leading scholars in this subfield. Each chapter is accompanied by discussion questions and a guide to further reading, making this a great addition to any course looking at issues of polarization."--

Recent care ethics scholarship has reflected on how to render socio-political institutions more inclusive/democratic. This project resonates with that of Miranda Fricker, who proposes means to diminish exclusions and epistemic injustices in institutions. This article considers two of these remedies, which sit in tension: one entails the unveiling of particulars, whereas the other involves the veiling of particulars (for example, the concealing of names and bodily features). The article insists on the significance of time and contact in care delivery, and on the need to consider epistemic wrongs within an economy of attention and credibility.

Summary
This paper analyses the interdependency between political corruption, institutions and growth. The central thesis is that a high level of income will promote corruption in the short run, due to the incentive effect of income on potentially corrupt politicians. Only in the long run income is reducing corruption, because income bolsters institutions which hinder corruption. The retroactive effect of corruption on institutions, paired with high income and untypically badly developed institutions, might in turn cause a problem of henceforth self enforcing corruption. The result can be long lasting obstacles to development. This can − under extreme circumstances − cause growth problems, which are so severe, that initially poorer countries, with initially equally insufficient institutions take over leadership in terms of income. Some empirical evidence on the general existence of the outlined interdependencies is shown in the present paper. The practical relevance of the consequences is illustrated with some examples, especially by comparing several transition processes.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- One. Introduction -- PART ONE: THE THEORY -- Two Actors' Interests, Policy Preferences, and the Demand for International Cooperation -- Three A Model of the Two-Level Game (Coauthored with B. Peter Rosendorff) -- Four Political Institutions and International Cooperation -- PART TWO: THE CASE STUDIES -- Introduction -- Five The Bretton Woods Monetary Agreement and the International Trade Organization, 1943-1950 -- Six The Anglo-American Oil Agreement and the International Civil Aviation Agreement, 1943-1947 -- Seven The European Coal and Steel Community and the European Defense Community, 1950-1954 -- Eight The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Maastricht Treaty on European Monetary Union, 1989-1993 -- PART THREE: CONCLUSIONS -- Nine Conclusions -- Appendix (Coauthored with B. Peter Rosendorff) -- Bibliography -- Index

We examine the incentives of regions in a country to unite or toseparate. We find that smaller regions have greater incentives tounite, relative to larger regions. We show, however, that on thewhole, majority voting on separation and union generates excessiveincentives to separate. This leads us to examine the scope ofalternative political institutions and rules in overcoming thepotential inefficiency. Our paper also provides a wide range ofexamples to illustrate the different institutions used in actualpractice to resolve such problems.

"Addressing major political developments in Iraq over the past century, this book provides an up-to-date and accessible study of the country, advancing a sympathetic yet balanced understanding of its critical role in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and in global affairs. The Author introduces three concepts to understand Iraq's historical trajectory: the pursuit of power, the impact of state institutions, and the transformation of social identities. Using this analytical paradigm, the book illuminates the unique political, economic, and social dimensions of Iraqi national life. As well as providing comparison points with MENA countries, the book evaluates Iraqi relations with external actors, including the Arab states, Iran and Israel, Europe, and the United States. Though conscious of Iraq's long and complex history, special attention is paid to contemporary events, ranging from Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 to the American-led invasion in 2003, and more recent struggles with elections, the Islamic State, and democracy. It is nevertheless argued that, despite its challenges, Iraq's story remains hopeful moving forward in time. Both wide-ranging and closely focused, the book is vital reading for students, scholars and general audiences interested in political economy, international relations, and the history of Iraq"--